CN103701797A - Light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method - Google Patents

Light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method Download PDF

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CN103701797A
CN103701797A CN201310718763.5A CN201310718763A CN103701797A CN 103701797 A CN103701797 A CN 103701797A CN 201310718763 A CN201310718763 A CN 201310718763A CN 103701797 A CN103701797 A CN 103701797A
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node
gateway
authentication
request bag
registration request
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CN103701797B (en
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刘庆昊
吕世超
芦翔
潘磊
周新运
孙利民
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Jiangsu Cas Internet Of Things Technology Venture Capital Co ltd
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Jiangsu IoT Research and Development Center
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Abstract

The invention discloses a light-weight node and gateway two-way identity authentication method which specifically comprises the following steps: A, registering a node; B, authenticating the node; C, authenticating a gateway broadcasting source. According to the method disclosed by the invention, two-way identity authentication between the node and a gateway is adopted, so that 'impersonation attack' is effectively prevented; a light-weight authentication algorithm can be used for reducing the energy consumption of the node; Merkle hash tree broadcasting source authentication is less in expenses on the aspects of calculation, storage and communication, and node capture, solicited information playback and Dos attack can be resisted.

Description

A kind of node of lightweight, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method
Technical field
The present invention relates to Smart Home technical field of security and protection, relate in particular to a kind of node, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method of lightweight.
Background technology
At present, technology of Internet of things has more and more received people's concern.The essence of Internet of Things is that the sensor node (abbreviation node) by obtaining object information carries out information gathering, by ubiquitous network, carries out communication and exchange, by information processing system, carries out information processing and decision-making.
Smart Home be take house as platform, utilizes the efficient house facility of technique construction and the safety and protection systems such as comprehensive wiring, network service, safety precaution, automatic control, promotes house security, convenience, comfortableness, and realizes the living environment of environmental protection and energy saving.Smart Home is applied in Internet of Things industry and has huge consumption potentiality as the typical case in Internet of Things evolution, has a bright future.
Domestic safety prevention system provides important safety guarantee as the subsystem of intelligent domestic system for living environment, and sensing technology is widely used in completing in the subsystems of Smart Home the collection of information and controls in real time, the security risk of sensor-based system existence itself is also brought in intelligent domestic system immediately.The front end awareness apparatus of sensor-based system is that sensor node energy constraint and the mode that adopts radio communication make front end sensing node be easy to become the object of being attacked, and comprises the attacks such as personation identity to sensing node, interference, shielding, signal interception.
Summary of the invention
The object of the invention is to node, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method by a kind of lightweight, solve the problem that above background technology is partly mentioned.
The node of lightweight, a gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, it comprises the steps:
A, node registration; B, entity authentication; C, the authentication of gateway broadcasts source.
Especially, described steps A specifically comprises:
A1, node send registration request bag to gateway;
A2, gateway are resolved the registration request bag of receiving, the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandons this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node.
Especially, described step B specifically comprises:
B1, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and store this random number and corresponding node number;
B2, node are received with after own corresponding described random number, generate authentication request bag, send to gateway;
B3, gateway receive authentication request bag, according to node number, take out the random number corresponding with it, by data XOR in itself and authentication request bag, and use corresponding MAC proof of algorithm MAC, if be verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, node is overtime can initiate authentication again.
Especially, described step C specifically comprises:
The prefabricated work of C1, node and gateway: the complete y-bend Merkle tree that it is 3 that gateway generates a series of Si and the degree of depth; For each node i numbering, meet: when i is father's node, its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes is 2i+1, and the root node of tree is numbered 1; Between node, hash value relation meets: when i is leaf node, and Ki=hash (Si); When i is not leaf node, must there is left and right child K2i, K2i+1 in it, meets
Figure BDA0000444537550000021
the preset K1 of each sensor node and hash hashing algorithm; Gateway is preserved Si and Merkle tree;
C2, gateway send broadcast source authentication bag;
C3, node calculate after receiving broadcast source authentication bag as follows:
Figure BDA0000444537550000022
Figure BDA0000444537550000023
whether the K1 that verifies its result and node self storage equate, if equal, authentication success.
Especially, described steps A 1 specifically comprises: node sends registration request bag to gateway, and its process is as follows:
One, node UART driver is according to the data format consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1B), NodeID (2B), retain position (1B), 8B and random number carry out being input in LKT4200 after XOR altogether to retain position (4B), wherein, the uplink packet random number N of registration phase is constantly equal to 0;
Two, LKT4200 receives described 8B data, carries out following calculating and generates MAC (4B):
Figure BDA0000444537550000031
(4B, registration phase N=0)]
Three, node UART driver is encapsulated as registration request bag by the packing of 13B data, is sent to gateway.
Especially, described steps A 2 specifically comprises: gateway is resolved the registration request bag of receiving, packet explanation according to registration request bag, judges that this packet is registration request bag, according to the algorithm flag bit of registration request bag, judgement generates MAC lightweight algorithm used, thereby the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandons this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node.
Especially, described step B3 specifically comprises: gateway receives authentication request bag, according to node number, take out the random number corresponding with it, by front 8 byte data XORs in itself and authentication request bag, and use corresponding MAC proof of algorithm MAC according to algorithm flag bit, if be verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, node is overtime can initiate authentication again.
The node of lightweight provided by the invention, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method adopt the bidirectional identity authentication between node and gateway effectively to prevent " impersonation attack ", the identifying algorithm of lightweight has reduced the energy consumption of node, Merkle Hash tree broadcast source authentication is less in calculating, storage, communication aspects expense, can resist that node is caught, solicited message is reset and Dos attacks.
Accompanying drawing explanation
The node that Fig. 1 provides for the embodiment of the present invention, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method flow chart;
The node that Fig. 2 provides for the embodiment of the present invention, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method data flow figure;
The Merkle Hash tree schematic diagram that the broadcast source that Fig. 3 provides for the embodiment of the present invention authenticates.
Embodiment
Below in conjunction with drawings and Examples, the invention will be further described.Be understandable that, specific embodiment described herein is only for explaining the present invention, but not limitation of the invention.It also should be noted that, for convenience of description, in accompanying drawing, only show part related to the present invention but not full content.
Please refer to shown in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, in the present embodiment, node, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method specifically comprise the steps:
Step S101, node registration.The detailed process of node registration is as follows:
Step S1011, node send registration request bag to gateway, and its form is as follows:
Figure BDA0000444537550000041
One, node UART driver is according to the data format consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1B), NodeID (2B), retain position (1B), 8B and random number carry out being input in LKT4200 after XOR altogether to retain position (4B), wherein, the uplink packet random number N of registration phase is constantly equal to 0.
Two, LKT4200 receives described 8B data, carries out following calculating and generates MAC (4B).
(4B, registration phase N=0)]
Three, node UART driver is encapsulated as registration request bag by the packing of 13B data, is sent to gateway.
Wherein, UART is universal asynchronous receiving-transmitting transmitter.LKT4200 is up to now, the encryption chip of most significant end in embedded encryption chip, and it has adopted 32 intelligent card chips is hardware platform, and safest encipherment scheme is provided, i.e. algorithm download scenarios.
Step S1012, gateway are resolved the registration request bag of receiving, the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandons this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node.
Gateway is resolved the registration request bag of receiving, according to the SubType of registration request bag (packet explanation), judge that this packet is registration request bag, according to the AlgFlag of registration request bag (algorithm flag bit), judgement generates MAC lightweight algorithm (adopting ZUC, Present in the present embodiment) used, thereby the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandon this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node, its form is as follows:
MAC[K, (identifying algorithm flag bit (1B)+NodeID (2B)+SUCCESS (1B takies original reservation position 1B)+reservation position (4B))]
Node carries out message integrity authentication according to MAC after receiving this packet.
Step S102, entity authentication.The detailed process of entity authentication is as follows:
Step S1021, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and this random number of permanent storage and corresponding node number.
MAC[K, identifying algorithm flag bit (1B)+NodeID (2B)+reservation position (1B)+random number N i(4B takies original 4B and retains position)]
Step S1022, node are received with after own corresponding described random number, call LKT4200 and generate authentication request bag, send to gateway.
Authentication request bag data format:
Figure BDA0000444537550000053
(4B, the N in the authentication first step i)]
Step S1023, gateway receive authentication request bag, according to node number, take out the random number corresponding with it, by front 8 byte data XORs in itself and authentication request bag, and use corresponding MAC proof of algorithm MAC according to AlgFlag (algorithm flag bit), if be verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, node is overtime can initiate authentication again.
Figure BDA0000444537550000062
in order to prevent Replay Attack, freshness protection is provided, the random number in above formula is that in this verification process, gateway is handed down to the random number corresponding with node ID number (4B).
Step S103, the authentication of gateway broadcasts source.
Message authentication is very important for many application of wireless sensor network, and in wireless environment, assailant is easy to injecting data bag, if there is no message authentication, recipient cannot determine the true and false of these message, cannot Secure execution associative operation.In broadcast source authentication, uTESLA authentication techniques adopt one-way hash chain, and delayed backward broadcast hash value Ki+1, makes node calculate checking Ki=H (Ki+1), and Ki is the upper one hash value of constantly receiving.The issue mechanism of the hash parameter of uTESLA authentication can attract Dos and attack.
Calculating, storage and communication overhead that access control scheme based on Merkle Hash tree and user's access ability are cancelled mode are less, can resist that node is caught, solicited message Replay Attack, there is good autgmentability, support the source authentication of multi-user, gateway, adopt merkle tree to carry out the parametric distribution of uTESLA, can reduce or eliminate the impact that Dos attacks.When gateway needs Broadcasting Control order, adopt the broadcast channel of i uTESLA example.In broadcast, comprise parameter certificate ParaCert i.Recipient can utilize preallocated Merkle tree root, immediately broadcast is carried out to source authentication.For example, node is received and is contained ParaCert 3={ S 3, K 4, K 12, K 52broadcast, carry out following calculating relatively, authentication broadcast source:
Figure BDA0000444537550000063
as equated, authentication is passed through.
Based on above-mentioned analysis, the present invention is based on Merkle tree and in conjunction with mechanism such as existing network framework routes, design and realized the gateway broadcasts source authentication method with feasibility, its detailed process is as follows:
The prefabricated work of step S1031, node and gateway: gateway generates a series of Si(1,2 ..., 8) and the degree of depth complete y-bend Merkle tree that is 3, this tree has 15 nodes; As shown in Figure 3, for each node i numbering, meet: when i is father's node, its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes is 2i+1, and the root node of tree is numbered 1; Between node, hash value relation meets: when i is leaf node, and Ki=hash (Si); When i is not leaf node, must there is left and right child K2i, K2i+1 in it, meets the preset K1 of each sensor node and hash hashing algorithm; Gateway is preserved Si(1, and 2 ..., 8) and Merkle tree.
Step S1032, gateway send broadcast source authentication bag.
Gateway is selected i-th uTESLA passage Si, and invoked procedure ParaCertCompute obtains certificate parameter, puts into the Merkle territory of following packet:
Figure BDA0000444537550000071
In above-mentioned data packet format, the payload CMD length of broadcasting command is 3B, control node and complete the action command of taking after broadcast source certification work, sequence of data packet SeqNum (1B) is used for preventing from returning to attack, certificate parameter Merkle is the authentication of 4B assurance source, and MD5 is MAC and guarantees integrated authentication.
Step S1033, node calculate after receiving broadcast source authentication bag as follows:
Figure BDA0000444537550000073
Figure BDA0000444537550000074
whether the K1 that verifies its result and node self storage equate, if equal, authentication success.
Technical scheme of the present invention adopts the bidirectional identity authentication between node and gateway effectively to resist " impersonation attack " to Smart Home front end awareness apparatus, the identifying algorithm of lightweight has reduced the energy consumption of node, Merkle Hash tree broadcast source authentication is less in calculating, storage, communication aspects expense, can resist that node is caught, solicited message is reset and Dos attacks.
Note, above are only preferred embodiment of the present invention and institute's application technology principle.Skilled person in the art will appreciate that and the invention is not restricted to specific embodiment described here, can carry out for a person skilled in the art various obvious variations, readjust and substitute and can not depart from protection scope of the present invention.Therefore, although the present invention is described in further detail by above embodiment, the present invention is not limited only to above embodiment, in the situation that not departing from the present invention's design, can also comprise more other equivalent embodiment, and scope of the present invention is determined by appended claim scope.

Claims (7)

1. the node of lightweight, a gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, is characterized in that, specifically comprises the steps:
A, node registration; B, entity authentication; C, the authentication of gateway broadcasts source.
2. the node of lightweight according to claim 1, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, is characterized in that, described steps A specifically comprises:
A1, node send registration request bag to gateway;
A2, gateway are resolved the registration request bag of receiving, the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandons this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node.
3. the node of lightweight according to claim 2, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, is characterized in that, described step B specifically comprises:
B1, gateway send random number to the node by registration, and store this random number and corresponding node number;
B2, node are received with after own corresponding described random number, generate authentication request bag, send to gateway;
B3, gateway receive authentication request bag, according to node number, take out the random number corresponding with it, by data XOR in itself and authentication request bag, and use corresponding MAC proof of algorithm MAC, if be verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, node is overtime can initiate authentication again.
4. the node of lightweight according to claim 3, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, is characterized in that, described step C specifically comprises:
The prefabricated work of C1, node and gateway: the complete y-bend Merkle tree that it is 3 that gateway generates a series of Si and the degree of depth; For each node i numbering, meet: when i is father's node, its left child nodes is 2i, and right child nodes is 2i+1, and the root node of tree is numbered 1; Between node, hash value relation meets: when i is leaf node, and Ki=hash (Si); When i is not leaf node, must there is left and right child K2i, K2i+1 in it, meets
Figure FDA0000444537540000011
the preset K1 of each sensor node and hash hashing algorithm; Gateway is preserved Si and Merkle tree;
C2, gateway send broadcast source authentication bag;
C3, node calculate after receiving broadcast source authentication bag as follows:
Figure FDA0000444537540000021
Figure FDA0000444537540000022
whether the K1 that verifies its result and node self storage equate, if equal, authentication success.
5. the node of lightweight according to claim 4, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, is characterized in that, described steps A 1 specifically comprises: node sends registration request bag to gateway, and its process is as follows:
One, node UART driver is according to the data format consulting with gateway, by identifying algorithm flag bit (1B), NodeID (2B), retain position (1B), 8B and random number carry out being input in LKT4200 after XOR altogether to retain position (4B), wherein, the uplink packet random number N of registration phase is constantly equal to 0;
Two, LKT4200 receives described 8B data, carries out following calculating and generates MAC (4B):
Figure FDA0000444537540000023
(4B, registration phase N=0)]
Three, node UART driver is encapsulated as registration request bag by the packing of 13B data, is sent to gateway.
6. the node of lightweight according to claim 5, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, it is characterized in that, described steps A 2 specifically comprises: gateway is resolved the registration request bag of receiving, according to the packet explanation of registration request bag, judge that this packet is registration request bag, according to the algorithm flag bit of registration request bag, judgement generates MAC lightweight algorithm used, thereby the MAC of checking registration request bag, if checking is not passed through, abandon this registration request bag, if be verified, send registration respond packet to node.
7. according to the node of the lightweight one of claim 2 to 6 Suo Shu, gateway Bidirectional identity authentication method, it is characterized in that, described step B3 specifically comprises: gateway receives authentication request bag, according to node number, take out the random number corresponding with it, by front 8 byte data XORs in itself and authentication request bag, and use corresponding MAC proof of algorithm MAC according to algorithm flag bit, if be verified, gateway sends authentication response bag to node, otherwise authentification failure, node is overtime can initiate authentication again.
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