CN101159543A - 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 - Google Patents

一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 Download PDF

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CN101159543A
CN101159543A CNA2007100190928A CN200710019092A CN101159543A CN 101159543 A CN101159543 A CN 101159543A CN A2007100190928 A CNA2007100190928 A CN A2007100190928A CN 200710019092 A CN200710019092 A CN 200710019092A CN 101159543 A CN101159543 A CN 101159543A
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unicast key
unicast
key agreement
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CN100566240C (zh
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铁满霞
曹军
庞辽军
赖晓龙
黄振海
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China Iwncomm Co Ltd
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Priority to PCT/CN2008/073053 priority patent/WO2009067934A1/zh
Priority to KR1020107013120A priority patent/KR20100072105A/ko
Priority to EP08855081A priority patent/EP2214368A1/en
Priority to RU2010123944/08A priority patent/RU2448427C2/ru
Priority to JP2010533419A priority patent/JP2011504332A/ja
Priority to US12/743,032 priority patent/US20100250941A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1458—Denial of Service
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H04L9/0841—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols
    • H04L9/0844—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these involving Diffie-Hellman or related key agreement protocols with user authentication or key authentication, e.g. ElGamal, MTI, MQV-Menezes-Qu-Vanstone protocol or Diffie-Hellman protocols using implicitly-certified keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/126—Anti-theft arrangements, e.g. protection against subscriber identity module [SIM] cloning

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

本发明涉及一种WAPI单播密钥协商方法。该方法步骤如下：1.鉴别器实体在单播密钥协商请求分组上添加消息完整性码，发送给鉴别请求者实体；2.鉴别请求者实体收到单播密钥协商请求分组后进行验证，不正确则直接丢弃该分组；正确则进行其他验证，验证成功，向鉴别器实体回应单播密钥协商响应分组；3.鉴别器实体收到单播密钥协商响应分组后进行验证，验证成功则向鉴别请求者实体回应单播密钥协商确认分组；4.鉴别请求者实体收到单播密钥协商确认分组后进行验证，验证成功协商出一致的单播会话密钥。本发明解决了目前WAPI安全机制中单播密钥管理协议存在的DoS攻击问题。

Description

一种WAPI单播密钥协商方法
技术领域
本发明涉及一种无线局域网密钥管理方法，尤其是一种WAPI单播密钥协商方法。
背景技术
为了解决无线局域网WLAN(Wireless Local Area Network)国际标准ISO/IEC 8802-11中定义的WEP(Wired Equivalent Privacy)安全机制存在的安全漏洞，我国颁布了无线局域网国家标准及其第1号修改单，采用无线局域网认证与保密基础结构WAPI(WLAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure)替代WEP，解决无线局域网的安全问题。
WAPI利用证书或预共享密钥认证及密钥管理协议实现认证与密钥分发功能。该安全机制较好地解决了WLAN的安全问题，但由于这种机制在设计时更多考虑了安全性，而没有过多考虑协议的可用性，因此其单播密钥协商协议存在可能遭受DoS攻击的问题。这是由于WAPI单播密钥协商协议的单播密钥协商请求分组未采取保护措施，裸露的单播密钥协商请求分组可被攻击者利用。
对于鉴别器实体AE(Authenticator Entity)，最多与每个鉴别请求者实体ASUE(Authentication Supplicant Entity)存在一个握手，并具有超时重发功能，但鉴别请求者实体ASUE去却不能采用同样的策略。若鉴别请求者实体ASUE配置成完全状态的，即仅期望某个特定消息的应答，现考虑鉴别请求者实体ASUE接收到单播密钥协商请求分组并发出单播密钥协商响应分组这种情况，若单播密钥协商响应分组由于各种原因丢失了，鉴别器实体AE将得不到期望的单播密钥协商响应分组，因此鉴别器实体AE超时之后会重传单播密钥协商请求分组，但由于鉴别请求者实体ASUE仅期望收到单播密钥协商确认分组，则会丢弃该重传的单播密钥协商请求分组，引起协议失败，则攻击者利用这一点可以抢先在合法单播密钥协商请求分组之前发送伪造的单播密钥协商请求分组，造成鉴别请求者实体ASUE阻塞协议。因此在握手过程中，鉴别请求者实体ASUE必须允许接受多个单播密钥协商请求分组以保证协议能够继续，即鉴别请求者实体ASUE必须允许多个握手实例同时运行。
协议阻塞攻击是由于单播密钥协商请求分组的薄弱性造成的，为回避此问题，在协议实施时，鉴别请求者实体ASUE可存储多个单播会话密钥USK(Unicast Session Key)，一个为合法的单播会话密钥，其余为临时的单播会话密钥。收到单播密钥协商请求分组时仅更新临时的单播会话密钥，只有收到带有有效消息完整性码MIC(Message Integrity Code)的单播密钥协商确认分组时才更新合法的单播会话密钥。若攻击者发送多个携带不同Nonce的单播密钥协商请求分组，为了确保不阻塞合法鉴别器实体AE的协议执行，鉴别请求者实体ASUE必须采用相当大的存储空间来存储所有收到的单播密钥协商请求分组中的Nonce、本地新产生的Nonce及对应的临时的单播会话密钥，直到它完成握手并得到一个合法的单播会话密钥。单播会话密钥的计算虽然花费不大，不会造成CPU耗尽攻击，但攻击者若有意提高伪造单播密钥协商请求分组的发送频率，则存在存储耗尽的危险。这种伪造攻击易于实施，造成的危害也比较严重，一次成功的攻击将使得先期的对认证过程的种种努力化为泡影。
发明内容
本发明为解决背景技术中存在的上述技术问题，而提供一种可防止DoS攻击的WAPI单播密钥协商方法。
本发明的技术解决方案是：本发明为一种WAPI单播密钥协商方法，其特殊之处在于：该方法包括以下步骤：
1)鉴别器实体AE在单播密钥协商请求分组原有定义的内容上，添加消息完整性码MIC，构成新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，发送给鉴别请求者实体ASUE；
2)当鉴别请求者实体ASUE收到新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，进行验证，验证其中的MIC是否正确，若不正确，则直接丢弃该分组；正确则进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别器实体AE回应单播密钥协商响应分组；
3)当鉴别器实体AE收到单播密钥协商响应分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别请求者实体ASUE回应单播密钥协商确认分组；
4)当鉴别请求者实体ASUE收到单播密钥协商确认分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则鉴别器实体AE和鉴别请求者实体ASUE之间成功完成单播密钥协商过程，协商出一致的单播会话密钥USK。
上述步骤1)中消息完整性码MIC为鉴别器实体AE利用已协商的基密钥BK对MIC字段之前的所有字段计算的杂凑值。
上述单播密钥协商请求分组原有定义的内容、单播密钥协商响应分组和单播密钥协商确认分组的内容分别与GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006标准文本中的定义相同。
上述原有验证均为GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006标准文本中的验证过程。
本发明通过在原有的WAPI单播密钥协商协议的单播密钥协商请求分组的基础上添加消息完整性码MIC，防止攻击者对单播密钥协商请求分组的伪造，以增强协议的安全性和健壮性，解决了目前WAPI安全机制中单播密钥协商协议存在的DoS攻击问题。
具体实施方式
本发明适用于WAPI框架方法(基于三元对等鉴别的访问控制方法TePA-AC(Access Control method based on Tri-element Peer Authentication))在无线局域网、无线城域网等具体网络中应用时的安全协议。
本发明的具体方法如下：
1)鉴别器实体AE在单播密钥协商请求分组原有定义的内容上，添加消息完整性码MIC，构成新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，发送给鉴别请求者实体ASUE；其中消息完整性码MIC为鉴别器实体AE利用认证阶段已协商的基密钥BK(Base Key)对MIC字段之前的所有字段计算的杂凑值；
2)当鉴别请求者实体ASUE收到新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，进行验证，验证其中的MIC是否正确，若不正确，则直接丢弃该分组；正确则进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别器实体AE回应单播密钥协商响应分组；单播密钥协商响应分组的内容与原有定义相同；
3)当鉴别器实体AE收到单播密钥协商响应分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别请求者实体ASUE回应单播密钥协商确认分组；单播密钥协商确认分组的内容与原有定义相同；
4)当鉴别请求者实体AE收到单播密钥协商确认分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则鉴别器实体AE和鉴别请求者实体ASUE之间成功完成单播密钥协商过程，协商出一致的单播会话密钥。
名词解释：
Nonce：实体产生的一次性随机数；
原有定义和原有验证分别指的是GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006标准文本中的定义和验证。

Claims (4)

1.一种WAPI单播密钥协商方法，其特征在于：该方法包括以下步骤：
1)鉴别器实体AE在单播密钥协商请求分组原有定义的内容上，添加消息完整性码MIC，构成新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，发送给鉴别请求者实体ASUE；
2)当鉴别请求者实体ASUE收到新的单播密钥协商请求分组后，进行验证，验证其中的MIC是否正确，若不正确，则直接丢弃该分组；正确则进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别器实体AE回应单播密钥协商响应分组；
3)当鉴别器实体AE收到单播密钥协商响应分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则向鉴别请求者实体ASUE回应单播密钥协商确认分组；
4)当鉴别请求者实体ASUE收到单播密钥协商确认分组后，进行原有验证，若验证成功，则鉴别器实体AE和鉴别请求者实体ASUE之间成功完成单播密钥协商过程，协商出一致的单播会话密钥。
2.根据权利要求1所述的WAPI单播密钥协商方法，其特征在于：所述步骤1)中消息完整性码MIC为鉴别器实体AE利用已协商的基密钥BK对MIC字段之前的所有字段计算的杂凑值。
3.根据权利要求1或2所述的WAPI单播密钥协商方法，其特征在于：所述单播密钥协商请求分组原有定义的内容、单播密钥协商响应分组和单播密钥协商确认分组的内容分别与GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006标准文本中的定义相同。
4.根据权利要求1或2所述的WAPI单播密钥协商方法，其特征在于：所述原有验证均为GB 15629.11-2003/XG1-2006标准文本中的验证过程。
CNB2007100190928A 2007-11-16 2007-11-16 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法 Active CN100566240C (zh)

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CNB2007100190928A CN100566240C (zh) 2007-11-16 2007-11-16 一种wapi单播密钥协商方法
PCT/CN2008/073053 WO2009067934A1 (en) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method
KR1020107013120A KR20100072105A (ko) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 Ｗａｐｉ 유니캐스트 비밀 키 협상 방법
EP08855081A EP2214368A1 (en) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method
RU2010123944/08A RU2448427C2 (ru) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 Способ согласования секретного ключа одноадресной рассылки wapi
JP2010533419A JP2011504332A (ja) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 Ｗａｐｉユニキャストシークレットキー交渉方法
US12/743,032 US20100250941A1 (en) 2007-11-16 2008-11-14 Wapi unicast secret key negotiation method

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Cited By (7)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2009067934A1 (en) * 2007-11-16 2009-06-04 China Iwncomm Co., Ltd. A wapi unicast secret key negotiation method
CN101527905A (zh) * 2009-04-08 2009-09-09 刘建 无线局域网鉴别与保密基础结构单播密钥协商方法及系统
CN101557591B (zh) * 2009-05-14 2011-01-26 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 会聚式wlan中由wtp完成wpi时的sta切换方法及其系统
WO2011023015A1 (zh) * 2009-08-31 2011-03-03 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种实现来电转接的系统和方法及终端
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