WO2012171284A1 - 一种三方认证方法、装置及支持双向认证的智能卡 - Google Patents

一种三方认证方法、装置及支持双向认证的智能卡 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012171284A1
WO2012171284A1 PCT/CN2011/080785 CN2011080785W WO2012171284A1 WO 2012171284 A1 WO2012171284 A1 WO 2012171284A1 CN 2011080785 W CN2011080785 W CN 2011080785W WO 2012171284 A1 WO2012171284 A1 WO 2012171284A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
authentication
terminal
smart card
information
binding relationship
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PCT/CN2011/080785
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
吴传喜
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2012171284A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012171284A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0869Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0853Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using an additional device, e.g. smartcard, SIM or a different communication terminal
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/321Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a three-party authentication method, apparatus, and smart card supporting two-way authentication.
  • the Internet of Things has been regarded as one of the key technologies for coping with the economic crisis and revitalizing the economy.
  • the IoT business can be widely applied to many industries, such as vehicles, electricity, finance, environmental protection, petroleum, personal and corporate security, hydrology, military, fire, weather, coal, agriculture, forestry, elevators, etc.
  • industries such as vehicles, electricity, finance, environmental protection, petroleum, personal and corporate security, hydrology, military, fire, weather, coal, agriculture, forestry, elevators, etc.
  • the Internet of Things business will quickly enter many industries, and its number of users will also grow rapidly. It is estimated that by the end of 2012, the number of Internet of Things users based on mobile cellular communication technology in China will reach 30-40 million.
  • IoT applications will become one of the core applications of Long Term Evolution (LTE) technology in a few years, and have broad development prospects.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • the IoT service many services require high security of the device devices of the terminal and the smart card, for example: environmental monitoring, by deploying various environmental monitoring devices in the cell, for monitoring the environmental quality of the community, including Community pollutants, noise, garbage, sewage, etc., to create a quiet, healthy and harmonious living environment for the residents of the community; and community security, because personal safety and property safety are the top priority of the community residents, the community needs to install video surveillance equipment , anti-theft alarm equipment, home security equipment, home video intercom, building access control, etc., and realize the information of the owners, property, security, neighborhood committee, public security bureau to jointly build a harmonious and safe living environment; In addition, it also includes intelligence In applications such as home, coal mine safety production and monitoring, and medical health, the requirements for application safety management are also very high.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a three-party authentication method, a device and a smart card supporting two-way authentication, which can ensure the security problem of the terminal device in various application environments.
  • the present invention provides a three-party authentication method, the method includes: performing authentication between a terminal and a smart card; after the authentication between the terminal and the smart card is passed, the terminal reports to the management platform The binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, and requesting the management platform to authenticate the binding relationship; the management platform authenticating the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, if If the binding relationship authentication is passed, the three-party authentication is determined to pass. If the binding relationship authentication fails, it is determined that the three-party authentication fails.
  • the authentication between the terminal and the smart card uses a two-way authentication protocol, where the two-way authentication protocol includes: the smart card uses the algorithm 1 to obtain the smart card side authentication result, and uses the algorithm 2 to use the smart card. After the side authentication result is encrypted, the authentication information and the encrypted smart card side authentication result are sent to the terminal;
  • the terminal obtains the terminal side authentication result according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, and decrypts the encrypted smart card side authentication result by using the third algorithm, and decrypts the obtained smart card side authentication result with the The terminal side authentication results are compared. If they are the same, the terminal side authentication result is sent to the smart card. If they are inconsistent, the authentication fails, and the current authentication process ends.
  • the smart card compares the received terminal side authentication result with the obtained smart card side authentication result, and if they are consistent, the authentication succeeds;
  • the algorithm 3 is an inverse operation of the algorithm 2.
  • the step of authenticating, by the terminal, the smart card includes:
  • the terminal sends a terminal configuration (TERMINAL PROFILE) command to the smart card;
  • the smart card initiates a two-way authentication process with the terminal when the terminal supports the two-way authentication function according to the two-way authentication indication bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE command; the smart card obtains the smart card side authentication according to the authentication information using the algorithm
  • the authentication information and the encrypted smart card side authentication result are sent to the terminal;
  • the terminal obtains the terminal side authentication result according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, and decrypts the encrypted smart card side authentication result by using the third algorithm, and decrypts the obtained smart card side authentication result with the The terminal side authentication results are compared. If they are the same, the terminal side authentication result is sent to the smart card. If they are inconsistent, the authentication fails, and the current authentication process ends.
  • the smart card compares the received terminal-side authentication result with the obtained smart card-side authentication result. If they match, the authentication passes, and if they do not match, the authentication fails.
  • the method further includes:
  • the terminal and the smart card are set to a machine card authentication pass state or a two-way authentication pass state;
  • the terminal and the smart card are set to a card lock state or a two-way authentication fail state, and the authentication information of the smart card is set as invalid information.
  • the binding relationship refers to a combination of terminal information and smart card information
  • the terminal information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: an International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI), an Electronic Serial Numbers (ESN), and parameter information stored in the terminal. ;
  • IMEI International Mobile Equipment Identity
  • ESN Electronic Serial Numbers
  • the smart card information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number (IMSI), Integrated Circuit Card Identity (ICCID), stored in a smart card Parameter information in .
  • IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number
  • ICCID Integrated Circuit Card Identity
  • the step of the management platform for authenticating the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card includes: The management platform searches for a binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card in a local binding relation database, and if yes, determines that the binding relationship is authenticated, and if not, determines the binding relationship. The certification failed.
  • the method further includes:
  • the terminal and the smart card are set to a three-party authentication pass state or a security state; when it is determined that the three-party authentication fails, the terminal and the smart card are set to three-party authentication. Failed state or non-secure state.
  • the method further includes: when the smart card determines that the terminal supports the two-way authentication function, using the command status word to send an allow authentication command to the terminal, and initiate a two-way authentication process with the terminal.
  • the step of performing authentication by the terminal and the smart card further includes:
  • an instruction to obtain an input (Get input) is sent to the terminal to notify the terminal to obtain the authentication information.
  • the step of performing authentication by the terminal and the smart card further includes:
  • the terminal After receiving the Get input command, the terminal sends a Fetch instruction to the smart card, and requests the smart card to send a smart card side authentication result.
  • the step of performing authentication by the terminal and the smart card further includes:
  • the card When the terminal compares the smart card side authentication result with the terminal side authentication result, the card is activated.
  • the invention also provides a smart card supporting two-way authentication, the smart card comprising: an authentication processing module, an information transceiver module and an authentication result implementation module,
  • the authentication processing module is configured to: initiate and execute a two-way authentication process between the smart card and the terminal;
  • the information transceiver module is configured to: receive the terminal side authentication result sent by the terminal; and send the authentication information and the smart card side authentication result to the terminal;
  • the authentication result implementation module is configured to: when the two-way authentication fails, the terminal is And the smart card is set to a card lock state or a two-way authentication fail state, and the authentication information of the smart card is set to invalid information.
  • the authentication processing module is configured to: determine, according to the received bidirectional authentication indication information sent by the terminal, or according to the bidirectional authentication indication bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE command sent by the terminal, that the terminal supports bidirectional When the authentication function is performed, a two-way authentication process with the terminal is initiated.
  • the present invention also provides a three-party authentication device, the device includes a terminal device composed of a terminal and a smart card, and further includes a management platform; the terminal device includes a binding relationship authentication request module, and the management platform includes a binding relationship authentication. Module, where:
  • the binding relationship authentication request module is configured to: after the authentication between the terminal and the smart card passes, report the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card to the management platform, and request the binding relationship to the management platform Authenticate;
  • the binding relationship authentication module is configured to: authenticate the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, and if the binding relationship authentication passes, determine that the three-party authentication passes, and if the binding relationship authentication fails, Then it is determined that the three-party authentication has not passed.
  • the terminal device further includes a two-way authentication module on the terminal side, and a two-way authentication module on the smart card side,
  • the two-way authentication module on the smart card side is configured to: obtain the smart card side authentication result according to the authentication information using the algorithm 1 and encrypt the smart card side authentication result by using the algorithm 2, and then use the authentication information and the encrypted smart card side.
  • the authentication result is sent to the terminal; and after receiving the terminal side authentication result, comparing with the obtained smart card side authentication result, if the agreement is successful, the authentication is successful, and if not, the authentication fails;
  • the two-way authentication module on the terminal side is configured to: according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, use the algorithm 1 to obtain the terminal side authentication result, and simultaneously use the algorithm 3 to decrypt the encrypted smart card side authentication result, and decrypt the obtained
  • the smart card side authentication result is compared with the terminal side authentication result, and if the agreement is the same, the terminal side authentication result is sent to the smart card. If not, the authentication fails, and the current authentication process is ended;
  • the algorithm 3 is an inverse operation of the algorithm 2.
  • the terminal device further includes an instruction sending module in the terminal, and a two-way authentication initiating module in the smart card,
  • the instruction sending module is configured to: send a two-way authentication indication bit to the smart card by using a reserved field or a reserved bit in the extended TERMINAL PROFILE instruction, where the two-way authentication indication bit is used to indicate whether the terminal supports two-way Authentication function;
  • the two-way authentication initiation module is configured to: determine, according to the two-way authentication indication bit in the received TERMINAL PROFILE instruction, whether the terminal supports the two-way authentication function, and if so, initiate a two-way authentication process with the terminal.
  • the binding relationship authentication module is configured to: determine whether a binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card exists in a binding relation database local to the management platform, and if yes, determine the binding If the relationship is not valid, the binding relationship is determined to be unsuccessful; the binding relationship is a combination of the terminal information and the smart card information;
  • the terminal information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: IMEI, ESN, parameter information stored in the terminal;
  • the smart card information includes one or any combination of the following information: IMSI, ICCID, parameter information stored in the smart card.
  • the device further includes an authentication result implementation module in the smart card,
  • the authentication result implementation module is configured to: when the two-way authentication process passes, set the terminal and the smart card to a machine card authentication pass state or a two-way authentication pass state; when the two-way authentication fails, The terminal and the smart card are set to a card lock state or a two-way authentication fail state, and the authentication information of the smart card is set to invalid information.
  • the above authentication method is used to ensure the security of the terminal and the smart card.
  • the terminal uses the forged smart card, the terminal locks the terminal and ensures the security of the terminal.
  • the terminal cannot be logged into the network, and the terminal is in use.
  • an illegal smart card is used, the terminal can be locked in time.
  • the binding relationship can be dynamically authenticated.
  • the management platform has control over the terminal and the card device, which facilitates the operator to carry out his own business and ensures the development. The specificity and security of terminals and smart cards for networked services. BRIEF abstract
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of interaction between a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a three-party authentication method according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of bidirectional authentication of a terminal and a smart card according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of bidirectional authentication according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of successful three-party authentication of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram showing a failure of a three-party authentication of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram showing a failure of a three-party authentication of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of the third party in the fourth embodiment of the present invention, in which the terminal does not support the profile download process, and the other authentication mode is used for mutual authentication and the three-party authentication is successfully performed.
  • Preferred embodiment of the invention
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a method for three-party authentication of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform, including:
  • Step 1 After the smart card is reset, the terminal device is in the unauthenticated state of the machine card. First, the two-way authentication between the mobile terminal and the smart card is performed. If the two-way authentication of the terminal and the smart card does not pass, go to step 2. If the two-party authentication between the mobile terminal and the smart card is passed, go to step 3.
  • the terminal device refers to a device composed of a terminal and a smart card.
  • Step 2. Set the status to the card lock status (can lock the terminal, set the terminal invalid, etc.), and modify the smart card authentication information (such as IMSI) to invalid information, such as changing the IMSI to blank, random number, error information, etc. Make sure the smart card is not available and the authentication is over.
  • the smart card authentication information such as IMSI
  • Step 3 If the terminal and the smart card pass the two-way authentication, the status is set to the card authentication pass status, and the mobile terminal informs the management platform of the binding relationship with the smart card, and requests the management platform to authenticate the binding relationship. If the management platform passes the binding relationship authentication between the terminal and the smart card, the three-party authentication is passed, and the management platform returns the binding relationship authentication pass sign to the terminal, and the status is the security state (three-party authentication pass status), and the terminal device can run the related Internet of Things. If the management platform does not pass the authentication of the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, the binding relationship authentication failure flag is returned to the terminal, and the status is in an unsecured state (the three-party authentication is not passed), and the related IoT application is prohibited from running.
  • the related IoT application Before the terminal device runs the related IoT application, if the status is determined to be the security status (three-party authentication pass status), the related IoT application can be run, and the status is determined to be unsafe (the three-party authentication is not passed), then the related IoT application is prohibited. .
  • the binding relationship described in the step 3 refers to the combination of the terminal information and the smart card information;
  • the terminal information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: IMEI, ESN, parameter information stored in the terminal, and the like;
  • the smart card information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: IMSI, ICCID, parameter information stored in the smart card, and the like.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a two-way authentication method based on the extended TERMINAL PROFILE instruction, including:
  • the 8 bytes of the first byte (Download) of the first byte of TERMINAL PROFILE are bl, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8. Indicates whether the terminal supports the Profile download function, whether the terminal supports the SMS-PP data download function, whether the terminal supports the Cell Broadcast data download function, and whether the terminal supports menu selection (Menu).
  • the two-way authentication provided by the present invention uses the following scheme:
  • the unused bytes in the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction are used to implement the two-way authentication function of the terminal and smart card. That is, using the ith bit of a byte (i is greater than or equal to 1 and less than 8) indicates whether bidirectional authentication is supported. For example, the first bit of a byte indicates whether the two-way authentication function is supported, as shown in Figure 1.
  • the terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE command to the smart card; the smart card processes the TERMINAL PROFILE command sent by the terminal, and if the corresponding supported two-way authentication bit is 1, the two-way authentication of the smart card and the terminal is started.
  • the mobile terminal and the smart card pass the two-way authentication, continue the subsequent process (such as the network authentication process, etc.), otherwise the terminal smart card authentication fails, and the set terminal is in an abnormal use state (such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.), and modifying the smart card.
  • the authentication information is invalid information (such as blanks, random numbers, error messages, etc.).
  • the two-way authentication process of the terminal and the smart card is performed by using the terminal and the smart card authentication protocol.
  • the smart card and the terminal respectively store the algorithm 1 and the algorithm 2, and the inverse algorithm 1 of the algorithm 2 is additionally stored in the terminal.
  • An algorithm three wherein the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information, the algorithm 2 is used to encrypt the authentication result, and the algorithm 3 is used to decrypt the result of the algorithm 2.
  • the management platform includes a machine card binding relation database, which is used to save the corresponding relationship of the machine card binding relationship. Information.
  • the management platform may be a network authentication platform, an application management platform, a security management platform, or the like.
  • the method for three-party authentication of a mobile terminal, a smart card, and a management platform includes the following processes:
  • Step 301 After the terminal device is powered on, after the smart card is reset, the terminal device is changed from the initial state to the uncertified state of the card;
  • Step 302 First, perform two-party authentication between the mobile terminal and the smart card. If the two-party authentication between the mobile terminal and the smart card is passed, go to step 303. If the authentication of both the terminal and the smart card fails, go to step 304.
  • Step 303 If the terminal and the smart card pass the two-way mutual authentication, the state is set to the machine card authentication pass state, and the mobile terminal reports the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card to the management platform, and requests the management platform to authenticate the binding relationship.
  • Step 304 Set the state to the card lock state (can lock the terminal, set the terminal invalid, etc.), and modify the authentication information (especially IMSI) of the smart card to be invalid information, such as changing the IMSI to blank, random number, error information, etc. Make sure the smart card is not available and the authentication is over.
  • the authentication information especially IMSI
  • Step 305 The management platform performs a three-party authentication process of the mobile terminal, the smart card, and the management platform.
  • Step 306 If the management platform passes the binding relationship authentication between the terminal and the smart card, the three-party authentication is passed, and the management platform returns the binding relationship authentication pass flag to the terminal, and step 307 is performed. Otherwise, step 308 is performed.
  • Step 307 After receiving the authentication pass sign of the management platform, the terminal sets the state of the terminal device to a security state (three-party authentication pass state), and allows the terminal device to run the related IoT application.
  • a security state three-party authentication pass state
  • Step 308 The terminal receives the authentication failure sign of the management platform, and sets the state of the terminal device to an unsecured state (the three-party authentication does not pass the state), and prohibits the terminal device from running the related Internet of Things application.
  • the two-way authentication process of the mobile terminal and the smart card according to the embodiment of the present invention is specifically described as follows:
  • Step 401 the smart card is reset.
  • Step 402 The terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE command to the smart card.
  • Step 403 The smart card processing terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE command. If the corresponding supported two-way authentication bit is 1, step 404 is performed. If the corresponding supported two-way authentication bit is not 1, step 405 is performed.
  • Step 404 Perform two-way authentication of the smart card and the terminal.
  • Step 405 using other authentication methods.
  • Step 406 The mobile terminal and the smart card are authenticated in both directions. If yes, step 407 is performed. If not, step 408 is performed.
  • Step 407 the mobile terminal and the smart card can be used normally, and the subsequent process is continued.
  • Step 408 The set terminal is in an abnormal use state (such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.), and modifying the authentication information of the smart card to be invalid information (such as blank, random number, error information, etc.).
  • an abnormal use state such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.
  • modifying the authentication information of the smart card to be invalid information such as blank, random number, error information, etc.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a two-way authentication protocol for a terminal and a smart card, and the authentication protocol is as follows:
  • the algorithm 1 and the algorithm 2 are respectively stored in the smart card and the terminal, and the inverse algorithm 3 of the algorithm 2 is additionally stored in the terminal.
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information
  • the algorithm 2 is used to encrypt the authentication result
  • the algorithm is used in three ways.
  • the result of Algorithm 2 is decrypted.
  • the smart card sends an allowable authentication command to the terminal, and the carrying parameters include one or more of a random number, an IMSL user authentication key, and other information stored in the smart card.
  • the smart card obtains the smart card side operation result according to the agreed algorithm. It is encrypted by Algorithm 2 and transmitted to the terminal.
  • the terminal performs the decryption process of the algorithm 2 on the encrypted operation result transmitted by the smart card, and obtains the operation result of the smart card, and the terminal performs the operation according to the information sent by the smart card using the same algorithm to obtain the terminal side operation result. If the terminal side operation result and the decrypted smart card operation The result is the same, the terminal side transmits its own operation result to the smart card, and transfers E. If it is inconsistent, the authentication fails and goes to 0.
  • the smart card After the smart card obtains the operation result of the terminal, it compares with the result obtained by the self operation, and if it is the same, it passes the two-way authentication. If they are not the same, turn to G.
  • the authentication fails, the authentication ends, the set terminal is in an abnormal state of use (such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.), and the authentication information of the smart card is modified to be invalid information (such as blank, random number, error information, etc.).
  • the foregoing algorithm 1 and algorithm 2 are currently known algorithms, including but not limited to the following symmetric and asymmetric algorithms and any combination thereof: Data encryption algorithm DES, 3 data encryption algorithm 3DES, Ha Hash algorithm HASH, IMSI authentication algorithm A3, RSA algorithm and error checking and correction algorithm ECC, encryption key generation algorithm A5, user key generation algorithm A8.
  • the combination between the algorithms refers to, for example, using one of the algorithms and then performing the operation, and then using the other algorithm to perform the operation, and the like.
  • the state of the terminal device can be classified into the following types:
  • the state of the terminal device is the uncertified state of the machine card; specifically, the default state of the terminal device is the initial state, and when the terminal is powered on and the smart card is just reset, the terminal device is switched from the initial state.
  • the status of the machine card is not authenticated; the terminal device is converted to the two-way authentication pass state of the machine card;
  • the terminal device changes to the card lock state. In addition, if other authentication methods fail, the terminal device also switches to the card lock state.
  • the terminal device changes to the three-party authentication pass state or security state.
  • the terminal device changes to the three-party authentication fail state or non-secure state.
  • the process of authenticating using the two-way authentication protocol of the above terminal and smart card is as follows:
  • Step 601 The smart card obtains the smart card side operation result (hereinafter also referred to as the authentication result) according to the authentication information (including the authentication parameter and the like), and sends the permission authentication instruction to the terminal by using the algorithm 2 for encryption. And carrying authentication information, and an encrypted authentication result calculated according to the authentication information;
  • the authentication information includes one or more of a random number, an IMSL user authentication key, and other information stored in the smart card.
  • Step 602 The terminal performs an algorithm three operation (the inverse operation of the algorithm 2) on the encrypted operation result transmitted by the smart card, that is, performs the decryption process of the algorithm 2, and obtains the smart card side authentication result; meanwhile, the terminal uses the same information according to the information sent by the smart card.
  • the algorithm performs an operation to obtain a terminal side authentication result.
  • Step 603 Determine whether the authentication result of the smart card is the same as the authentication result of the terminal. If the same, perform step 604. If not, perform step 605.
  • Step 604 If the terminal side operation result is consistent with the decrypted smart card operation result, the terminal side transmits the operation result of the operation to the smart card, and the process proceeds to step 606.
  • Step 605 If the terminal side operation result is inconsistent with the decrypted smart card operation result, the authentication fails, and the process goes to step 608.
  • Step 606 After obtaining the operation result of the terminal, the smart card compares with the result obtained by the self operation. If the same, the process proceeds to step 607. If not, the process proceeds to step 608.
  • Step 607 the two-way authentication is passed, the authentication is ended, and the subsequent process is continued.
  • Step 608 The authentication fails, the authentication ends, and the set terminal is in an abnormal use state (such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.), and the authentication information of the smart card is modified to be invalid information (such as blank, random number, error information, etc.).
  • an abnormal use state such as locking the terminal, the terminal is invalid, etc.
  • the authentication information of the smart card is modified to be invalid information (such as blank, random number, error information, etc.).
  • the management platform authenticates the binding relationship between the smart card and the terminal. Only through the authentication of the binding relationship, the management platform allows the device based on the terminal and the smart card to run the Internet of Things application. Otherwise, the device of the terminal and the smart card is prohibited from running. Internet of Things applications.
  • the terminal device is in the unauthenticated state of the machine card, it means that the terminal does not support the ProfileDownload command, and still supports other authentication methods. If the terminal does not support the profile download command, you can use other authentication methods to change the state of the terminal device to the card binding state. Then, the management platform authenticates the binding relationship, and the three-party authentication is passed. The terminal device is secure. Status (three-party authentication pass status), which will not be described in detail here.
  • the mobile terminal After the two-party authentication between the mobile terminal and the smart card is passed, the mobile terminal reports its binding relationship with the smart card to the management platform, and requests management to authenticate the binding relationship.
  • the management platform maintains a binding relationship correspondence table between the smart card and the terminal.
  • the management platform verifies whether the binding relationship between the smart card and the terminal exists. If the binding relationship passes the full certificate, the terminal returns a three-party authentication pass indication. Otherwise, return the three-party authentication to the terminal without passing the label.
  • the terminal receives the three-party authentication pass-through indication returned by the management platform, the status of the terminal device is set to the security state (three-party authentication pass status). Otherwise, if the three-party authentication returned by the management platform does not pass the indication, the terminal device is set. The status is unsafe (the three-party authentication does not pass the status).
  • the terminal device Before the IoT application is run, the terminal device first determines whether the status is a security status (three-party authentication pass status), and if it is a security status (three-party authentication pass status), the application is run, otherwise the application is not run.
  • a method and a tool for unlocking are provided so that the smart card and the terminal can be unlocked as needed to enable normal use when needed.
  • the terminal, the smart card, and the management platform of the embodiment successfully perform the three-party authentication process, which mainly includes:
  • Step 701 The Internet of Things terminal is powered on, and after the smart card is reset, the terminal executes the profile.
  • the terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE instruction to the smart card, where the 1st bit in the 40th byte of the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1 to indicate that the terminal and the smart card are required to be authenticated in both directions.
  • Step 702 After receiving the instruction, the smart card determines that the corresponding bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1, and performs a two-way authentication process of the mobile terminal and the smart card.
  • the random number and the IMSI are used as the authentication information
  • the smart card and the terminal respectively store the algorithm 1 and the algorithm 2
  • the terminal additionally stores the inverse algorithm 3 of the algorithm 2.
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication according to the authentication information.
  • Algorithm 2 is used to encrypt the authentication result
  • Algorithm 3 is used to decrypt the result of Algorithm 2.
  • Step 704 The smart card simultaneously sends a Get input command to the terminal to notify the terminal to obtain the authentication parameter.
  • Step 705 The terminal receives the command status word, identifies the allowed authentication, and sends a Fetch command to the smart card according to the Get input command, and requests the smart card to send the encrypted authentication result.
  • Step 706 The smart card performs an operation using a pair of authentication parameters according to the terminal request, and performs encryption using algorithm 2, and transmits the authentication parameter and the encrypted authentication result to the terminal by using the command status word.
  • Step 707 The terminal performs an operation on the encrypted authentication result transmitted by the smart card by using algorithm 3 (the decryption process of algorithm 2), and obtains the authentication result of the smart card, and the terminal simultaneously performs the operation according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, using the same algorithm.
  • the terminal side authentication result is obtained. Terminal comparison Whether the two authentication results are consistent.
  • Step 708 If the terminal finds that the two authentication results are consistent, the terminal sends the unencrypted terminal-side authentication result to the smart card by using the Terminal Response command.
  • Step 709 After obtaining the terminal side authentication result, the smart card compares with the authentication result obtained by the smart card.
  • Step 710 The smart card comparison finds that the two authentication results are the same, and the terminal status certificate is used to notify the terminal that the two-way authentication is successful.
  • Step 711 After receiving the notification, the terminal sets the state to the card authentication pass status, and sends the terminal device identification number and the information such as the IMSI to identify the mobile terminal and the smart card to the management platform, and report the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card to the management platform.
  • Communication means can use existing technologies, such as short messages, BIP, etc.), and send request information to the management platform to request authentication of the binding relationship.
  • Step 712 When the management platform receives the terminal device identification number and the IMSI pair of the binding relationship, If the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card is found, the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card is found. If the corresponding relationship exists, the management platform returns the binding relationship authentication pass sign to the terminal.
  • the terminal device After receiving the authentication pass sign, the terminal device sets the terminal device status to a safe state (three-party authentication pass status). Before the terminal device runs the related IoT application, it determines that the device status is a safe state (three-party authentication pass status), and starts to run related. Internet of Things applications.
  • FIG. 8 is a flowchart of a process for a three-party authentication failure of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 8, the process mainly includes:
  • Step 801 The terminal is powered on, and after the smart card is reset, the terminal performs a Profile Download process, and the terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE instruction to the smart card, wherein the 7th bit in the 50th byte of the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1 when the terminal and the smart card are required. Two-way authentication.
  • Step 802 After receiving the instruction, the smart card determines that the corresponding bit bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1, and therefore performs a two-way authentication process of the mobile terminal and the smart card.
  • the IMSI is used as the authentication information
  • the smart card and the terminal respectively store the algorithm 1 and the algorithm 2
  • the terminal additionally stores the inverse algorithm 3 of the algorithm 2.
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication result according to the authentication information
  • the second is used to encrypt the authentication result
  • the third algorithm is used to decrypt the result of the second algorithm.
  • Step 804 The smart card simultaneously sends a Get input instruction to the terminal to notify the terminal to obtain the authentication parameter.
  • Step 805 The terminal receives the command status word, identifies the allowed authentication, and sends a Fetch command to the smart card according to the Get input command, and requests the smart card to send the encrypted authentication result.
  • Step 806 The smart card performs an operation using a pair of authentication parameters according to the terminal request, and performs encryption using the algorithm 2, and transmits the authentication parameter and the encrypted authentication result to the terminal by using the command status word.
  • Step 807 The terminal performs an operation on the encrypted authentication result transmitted by the smart card by using the algorithm three (the decryption process of the algorithm 2), obtaining the authentication result of the smart card, and the terminal simultaneously sends the smart card according to the smart card.
  • the authentication information is calculated using the same algorithm, and the terminal side operation result is obtained.
  • the terminal compares the two authentication results.
  • Step 808 If the terminal compares and finds that the two authentications are not consistent, the terminal response command is used to notify the smart card that the authentication fails.
  • the terminal and the smart card end the authentication, the terminal is locked, and the terminal cannot be used.
  • the IMSI information of the smart card is changed to a random number. Even if it is stolen, it cannot be used for the network, and the terminal device is locked in the machine card state.
  • FIG. 9 is a flowchart of a process for a three-party authentication failure of a terminal, a smart card, and a management platform according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 9, the process mainly includes:
  • Step 901 The terminal is powered on, and after the smart card is reset, the terminal performs a Profile Download process, and the terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE instruction to the smart card, where the first bit in the 62nd byte of the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1 to represent the terminal and the smart card. Two-way authentication.
  • Step 902 After receiving the instruction, the smart card determines that the corresponding bit bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1, so the two-way authentication process of the mobile terminal and the smart card is performed.
  • the random number and the IMSI are used as the authentication information
  • the smart card and the terminal respectively store the algorithm 1 and the algorithm 2
  • the terminal additionally stores the inverse algorithm 3 of the algorithm 2.
  • the algorithm 1 is used to obtain the authentication according to the authentication information.
  • Algorithm 2 is used to encrypt the authentication result
  • Algorithm 3 is used to decrypt the result of Algorithm 2.
  • Step 904 The smart card simultaneously sends a Get input instruction to the terminal to notify the terminal to obtain the authentication parameter.
  • Step 905 The terminal receives the command status word, identifies the allowed authentication, and sends a Fetch command to the smart card according to the Get input command, and requests the smart card to send the encrypted authentication result.
  • Step 906 The smart card performs an operation using a pair of authentication parameters according to the terminal request, and performs encryption using algorithm 2, and transmits the authentication parameter and the encrypted authentication result to the terminal by using the command status word.
  • Step 907 The terminal performs an operation on the encrypted authentication result transmitted by the smart card by using algorithm 3 (the decryption process of algorithm 2), and obtains the authentication result of the smart card, and the terminal simultaneously performs the operation according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, using the same algorithm.
  • the terminal side operation result is obtained.
  • the terminal compares the two authentication results.
  • Step 908 If the terminal compares and finds that the two authentication results are consistent, the terminal response command is used to send the smart card with its own unencrypted authentication result.
  • Step 909 After obtaining the operation result of the terminal, the smart card compares with the result obtained by the self operation.
  • Step 910 If two authentication results are found to be the same, the terminal status message is used to notify the terminal that the two-way authentication is successful.
  • Step 911 After receiving the notification, the terminal sets the status to the card authentication pass status, and the terminal sends the terminal device identification number and the information such as the IMSI to identify the mobile terminal and the smart card to the management platform, and report the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card to the management platform.
  • Communication means can use existing technologies, such as short messages, BIP, etc.), and send request information to the management platform to request authentication of the binding relationship.
  • Step 912 When the management platform receives the terminal device identification number and the IMSI pair of the binding relationship, the corresponding binding relationship database searches for the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, and finds that the corresponding relationship does not exist, and fails to pass the three parties. Authentication, the management platform returns the binding relationship authentication failure flag to the terminal.
  • the terminal device status is in an unsafe state (the three-party authentication is not passed).
  • the device status is determined to be in an insecure state (the three-party authentication fails the state). ), it is forbidden to run related IoT applications.
  • the process in which the terminal does not support the profile download process and passes the three-party authentication process mainly includes:
  • Step 1001 The IoT device (terminal) is powered on, and after the smart card is reset, the terminal performs a Profile Download process, and the terminal sends a TERMINAL PROFILE instruction to the smart card, where the third bit in the 53th byte of the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 1 Need to Terminal and smart card two-way authentication.
  • Step 1002 After receiving the instruction, the smart card determines that the corresponding bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE instruction is 0, and determines that the terminal does not support the Profile Download process.
  • Step 1003 The smart card does not perform the two-way authentication process of the mobile terminal and the smart card, but uses other authentication methods and passes the machine card authentication, and the state of the card is also converted to the card authentication pass status.
  • Step 1004 The terminal sends the terminal device identification number and the information such as the IMSI to identify the mobile terminal and the smart card to the management platform, and reports the binding relationship between the mobile terminal and the smart card to the management platform (the communication means may use existing technologies, such as short information, BIP, etc.) Method), and send the request information to the management platform, requesting to authenticate the binding relationship.
  • the communication means may use existing technologies, such as short information, BIP, etc.
  • Step 1005 When the management platform receives the terminal device identification number and the IMSI pair of the binding relationship, the corresponding binding relationship database searches for the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card, and finds that the corresponding relationship exists, so the three-party authentication, the management platform Returns the binding relationship authentication pass flag to the terminal.
  • the terminal device state When the terminal device receives the authentication pass flag, the terminal device state is in a safe state (three-party authentication pass state), and before the terminal device runs the related IoT application, the device state is determined to be in a safe state (three-party authentication pass state), and the operation starts.
  • a safe state three-party authentication pass state
  • the device state is determined to be in a safe state (three-party authentication pass state)
  • the operation starts. Internet of Things applications.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a smart card supporting two-way authentication, and the smart card includes: an authentication processing module, an information transceiver module, and an authentication result implementation module.
  • the authentication processing module is configured to initiate and execute a two-way authentication process between the smart card and the terminal;
  • the information transceiver module is configured to: receive the terminal side authentication result sent by the terminal; and send the authentication information and the smart card side authentication result to the terminal;
  • the authentication result implementation module is configured to set the terminal and the smart card to a card lock state or a two-way authentication fail state when the two-way authentication fails, and set the authentication information of the smart card to invalid information.
  • the authentication processing module is configured to initiate and the terminal according to the bidirectional authentication indication information sent by the received terminal or the mutual authentication indication bit in the TERMINAL PROFILE command sent by the terminal to determine that the terminal supports the two-way authentication function.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a three-party authentication device, where the device includes a terminal device composed of a terminal and a smart card, and further includes a management platform.
  • the terminal device includes a binding relationship authentication request module, and the management platform includes a binding platform.
  • a relationship authentication module where:
  • the binding relationship authentication request module is configured to report the binding relationship between the terminal and the energy card to the management platform after the authentication between the terminal and the smart card is passed, and request the management platform to authenticate the binding relationship;
  • the binding relationship authentication module is configured to authenticate the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card. If the binding relationship authentication is passed, the three-party authentication is determined to pass. If the binding relationship fails to pass the authentication, the three-party authentication fails.
  • the terminal device further includes a two-way authentication module on the terminal side, and a two-way authentication module on the smart card side,
  • the two-way authentication module on the smart card side is configured to obtain the smart card side authentication result according to the authentication information using the algorithm 1 and encrypt the smart card side authentication result by using the algorithm 2, and then send the authentication information and the encrypted smart card side authentication result to the encrypted smart card side authentication result.
  • the terminal After receiving the authentication result on the terminal side, the terminal compares with the obtained smart card side authentication result. If the authentication result is the same, the authentication succeeds. If the authentication is inconsistent, the authentication fails.
  • the two-way authentication module on the terminal side is configured to obtain the terminal side authentication result according to the authentication information sent by the smart card, and decrypt the encrypted smart card side authentication result by using the algorithm three, and decrypt the obtained smart card side authentication result with The terminal side authentication results are compared. If they are the same, the terminal side authentication result is sent to the smart card. If they are inconsistent, the authentication fails, and the current authentication process is ended.
  • the algorithm 3 is an inverse operation of the algorithm 2.
  • the terminal device further includes an instruction sending module in the terminal, and a two-way authentication initiating module in the smart card,
  • the instruction sending module is configured to send a two-way authentication indication bit to the smart card by using a reserved field or a reserved bit in the extended TERMINAL PROFILE instruction, where the two-way authentication indication bit is used to indicate whether the terminal supports the two-way authentication function;
  • the two-way authentication initiation module is set to, according to the received TERMINAL PROFILE instruction
  • the two-way authentication indicator determines whether the terminal supports the two-way authentication function. If supported, initiates a two-way authentication process with the terminal.
  • the binding relationship authentication module is configured to: determine whether the binding relationship between the terminal and the smart card exists in the binding relational database local to the management platform, and if yes, determine that the binding relationship is authenticated, and if not, determine the binding. The relationship certification failed.
  • the binding relationship refers to a combination of terminal information and smart card information
  • the terminal information includes one of the following information or any combination thereof: IMEI, ESN, parameter information stored in the terminal;
  • the smart card information includes one or any combination of the following information: IMSI, ICCID, parameter information stored in the smart card.
  • the above-mentioned three-party authentication device further includes an authentication result implementation module in the smart card, and the authentication result implementation module is configured to set the terminal and the smart card to a machine card authentication pass state or a two-way authentication pass state when the two-way authentication process passes;
  • the terminal and the smart card are set to the card lock state or the two-way authentication fails, and the authentication information of the smart card is set to invalid information.
  • modules or steps can be implemented by a general computing device, which can be concentrated on a single computing device or distributed over a network composed of multiple computing devices. They may be implemented by program code executable by the computing device, such that they may be stored in the storage device for execution by the computing device, and in some cases may be performed in a different order than that illustrated herein. Or the steps described, either by making them into individual integrated circuit modules, or by making multiple of the modules or steps into a single integrated circuit module. Thus, the invention is not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.
  • the above authentication method is used to ensure the security of the terminal and the smart card.
  • the terminal uses the forged smart card, the terminal locks the terminal and ensures the security of the terminal.
  • the terminal cannot be logged into the network, and the terminal is in use.
  • an illegal smart card is used, the terminal can be locked in time.
  • the binding relationship can be dynamically authenticated.
  • the management platform has control over the terminal and the card device, which facilitates the operator to carry out his own business and ensures the development. The specificity and security of terminals and smart cards for networked services.

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Abstract

本发明公开了一种三方认证方法、装置及支持双向认证的智能卡,三方认证方法包括:终端与智能卡之间进行认证;终端与智能卡之间的认证通过后,终端向管理平台报告终端与智能卡的绑定关系,并向管理平台请求对该绑定关系进行认证;管理平台对终端与智能卡的绑定关系进行认证,若绑定关系认证通过,则判定三方认证通过,若绑定关系认证通过,则判定三方认证未通过。采用本发明,使得终端和智能卡的安全都得到了保证,同时终端和智能能卡的绑定关系能够被动态的认证,在管理平台侧具有对终端和卡设备的控制管理权,便于运营商开展自己的业务,也保证了开展物联网业务的终端和智能卡的专用性和安全性。

Description

一种三方认证方法、 装置及支持双向认证的智能卡
技术领域
本发明涉及通信技术领域, 尤其涉及一种三方认证方法、 装置及支持双 向认证的智能卡。
背景技术
物联网作为新兴高技术产业的重要组成部分, 已被世界各国当作应对经 济危机、 振兴经济的重点技术之一。 物联网业务可以广泛地应用到众多的行 业中, 例如车辆、 电力、 金融、 环保、 石油、 个人与企业安防、 水文、 军事、 消防、 气象、 煤炭、 农林业、 电梯等。 根据专家预计, 未来几年间, 物联网 业务将快速地进入很多行业, 其用户数也将快速成长, 预计至 2012年底, 中 国国内基于移动蜂窝通信技术的物联网用户数将可能达到 3000 ~ 4000万,物 联网应用也会在若干年后成为长期演进(Long Term Evolution, LTE )技术的 核心应用之一, 具有广阔的发展前景。
目前物联网业务的应用类型中, 很多业务都要求终端和智能卡的设备装 置具备较高的安全性, 例如: 环境监控, 通过在小区内部署各种环境监测设 备, 用于监控小区环境质量, 包括小区污染物、 噪音、 垃圾、 污水等, 为小 区居民营造安静、 健康、 和谐的居住环境; 以及社区安保, 由于人身安全、 财物安全是小区居民关注的重中之重, 小区需安装视频监控设备、 防盗报警 设备、 家庭安防设备、 家庭可视对讲、 楼宇门禁等, 并实现业主、 物业、 保 安、 居委会、 公安局的信息联互, 共同构建和谐安全的居住环境; 此外, 还 包括在智能家居、 煤矿安全生产及监测、 医疗健康等应用中, 对于应用安全 管理要求也非常高。
为避免智能卡被挪作他用或物理被盗, 需考虑智能卡的应用安全管理, 如釆取机卡绑定、 第三方合法性认证等手段等管理方式, 实现专卡专用。 但 是, 目前已有的机卡绑定方案、 第三方合法性认证等手段或者绑定效果不佳, 容易破解, 或者安全性不高, 或者无法解决在新应用环境下的问题。 发明内容
本发明解决的技术问题是提供一种三方认证方法、 装置及支持双向认证 的智能卡, 能够保证终端设备在多种应用环境下的安全性问题。
为解决上述技术问题, 本发明提供了一种三方认证方法, 所述方法包括: 终端与智能卡之间进行认证; 所述终端与所述智能卡之间的认证通过后 , 所述终端向管理平台报告所 述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 并向所述管理平台请求对所述绑定关系进 行认证; 所述管理平台对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进行认证, 若所述绑 定关系认证通过, 则判定三方认证通过, 若所述绑定关系认证不通过, 则判 定三方认证未通过。
可选的, 所述终端与所述智能卡之间的认证釆用双向认证协议, 所述双 向认证协议包括: 智能卡根据认证信息使用算法一得出智能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算法二 对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所述认证信息以及加密后的智能卡 侧认证结果发送给所述终端;
所述终端根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使用算法一得出终端侧认证结 果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认证结果进行解密, 并将解密 得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则将所 述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认 证过程;
所述智能卡将收到的所述终端侧认证结果与得出的智能卡侧认证结果进 行比较, 若一致, 则认证成功;
其中, 所述算法三为所述算法二的逆运算。
可选的, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的步骤包括:
智能卡复位后,终端向所述智能卡发送终端配置 ( TERMINAL PROFILE ) 指令; 所述智能卡根据所述 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的双向认证指示位判 断出所述终端支持双向认证功能时, 发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程; 智能卡根据认证信息使用算法一得出智能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算法二 对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所述认证信息以及加密后的智能卡 侧认证结果发送给所述终端;
所述终端根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使用算法一得出终端侧认证结 果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认证结果进行解密, 并将解密 得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则将所 述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认 证过程;
所述智能卡将收到的所述终端侧认证结果与得出的智能卡侧认证结果进 行比较, 若一致, 则认证通过, 若不一致, 则认证未通过。
可选的, 所述方法还包括:
所述终端和所述智能卡之间的双向认证通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能 卡置为机卡认证通过状态或双向认证通过状态;
所述终端和所述智能卡之间的双向认证未通过时, 将所述终端及所述智 能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态, 并将所述智能卡的认证信息 置为无效信息。
可选的, 所述绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合;
其中, 所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动设 备身份标识( International Mobile Equipment Identity , IMEI ) 、 电子序列号 ( Electronic Serial Numbers , ESN ) 、 存储在终端中的参数信息;
所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动用户识 另 ll号 ( International Mobile Subscriber Identification Number , IMSI ) 、 集成电 路卡识别号( Integrate Circuit Card Identity , ICCID ) 、 存储在智能卡中的参 数信息。
可选的, 所述管理平台对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进行认证的 步骤包括: 所述管理平台查找本地的绑定关系数据库中是否存在所述终端与所述智 能卡的绑定关系, 若存在, 则判定所述绑定关系认证通过, 若不存在, 则判 定所述绑定关系认证未通过。
可选的, 所述方法还包括:
所述管理平台在判定所述三方认证通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能卡置 为三方认证通过状态或安全状态; 判定三方认证未通过时, 将所述终端及所 述智能卡置为三方认证未通过状态或非安全状态。
可选的, 所述方法还包括: 所述智能卡判断出终端支持双向认证功能时, 使用命令状态字向所述终端发送允许认证指令, 发起与所述终端之间的双向 认证过程。
可选的, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的步骤还包括:
所述智能卡发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程后, 向所述终端发送获 取输入(Get input )指令, 通知终端获取认证信息。
可选的, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的步骤还包括:
所述终端收到所述 Get input指令后, 向所述智能卡发送提取 ( Fetch )指 令, 要求所述智能卡发送智能卡侧认证结果。
可选的, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的步骤还包括:
所述终端比较所述智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果一致时, 使 卡。
本发明还提供了一种支持双向认证的智能卡, 所述智能卡包括: 认证处 理模块、 信息收发模块和认证结果实施模块,
所述认证处理模块设置为: 发起并执行智能卡与终端之间的双向认证过 程;
所述信息收发模块设置为: 接收终端发送的终端侧认证结果; 以及, 向 终端发送认证信息及智能卡侧认证结果;
所述认证结果实施模块设置为: 当所述双向认证未通过时, 将所述终端 及所述智能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态, 并将所述智能卡的 认证信息置为无效信息。
可选的, 所述认证处理模块是设置为: 根据接收到的所述终端发送的双 向认证指示信息、 或者根据所述终端发送的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的 双向认证指示位判断出所述终端支持双向认证功能时, 发起与所述终端之间 的双向认证过程。
本发明还提供了一种三方认证装置, 所述装置包括由终端和智能卡组成 的终端设备, 还包括管理平台; 所述终端设备包括绑定关系认证请求模块, 所述管理平台包括绑定关系认证模块, 其中:
所述绑定关系认证请求模块设置为: 终端与智能卡之间的认证通过后, 向管理平台报告所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 并向所述管理平台请求 对所述绑定关系进行认证;
所述绑定关系认证模块设置为: 对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进 行认证, 若所述绑定关系认证通过, 则判定三方认证通过, 若所述绑定关系 认证不通过, 则判定三方认证未通过。
此外, 所述终端设备还包括终端侧的双向认证模块, 和智能卡侧的双向 认证模块,
所述智能卡侧的双向认证模块设置为: 根据认证信息使用算法一得出智 能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算法二对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所 述认证信息以及加密后的智能卡侧认证结果发送给所述终端; 并在收到终端 侧认证结果后, 与得出的所述智能卡侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则认证 成功, 若不一致, 则认证失败;
所述终端侧的双向认证模块设置为: 根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使 用算法一得出终端侧认证结果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认 证结果进行解密, 并将解密得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果 进行比较, 若一致, 则将所述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认证过程;
其中, 所述算法三为所述算法二的逆运算。 可选的, 所述终端设备还包括终端中的指令发送模块, 和智能卡中的双 向认证发起模块,
所述指令发送模块设置为: 使用扩展的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的 预留字段或预留位, 向所述智能卡发送双向认证指示位, 其中所述双向认证 指示位用于指示所述终端是否支持双向认证功能;
所述双向认证发起模块设置为: 根据收到的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令 中的所述双向认证指示位判断所述终端是否支持双向认证功能, 若支持, 则 发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程。
可选的, 所述绑定关系认证模块是设置为: 查找所述管理平台本地的绑 定关系数据库中是否存在所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 若存在, 则判 定所述绑定关系认证通过, 若不存在, 则判定所述绑定关系认证未通过; 所述绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合;
其中, 所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMEI、 ESN、 存储在终端中的参数信息;
所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMSI、 ICCID、 存储在智能卡中的参数信息。
可选的, 所述装置还包括所述智能卡中的认证结果实施模块,
所述认证结果实施模块设置为: 当所述双向认证过程通过时, 将所述终 端及所述智能卡置为机卡认证通过状态或双向认证通过状态; 当所述双向认 证未通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过 状态, 并将所述智能卡的认证信息置为无效信息。
釆用上述认证方法, 使得终端和智能卡的安全都得到了保证, 终端使用 伪造的智能卡时, 锁定终端, 保证了终端的安全, 智能卡在被盗或者非法使 用时将无法登录网络使用, 终端在使用非法智能卡时, 也能及时锁定终端, 同时这种绑定关系能够被动态的认证, 在管理平台侧具有对终端和卡设备的 控制管理权, 便于运营商开展自己的业务, 也保证了开展物联网业务的终端 和智能卡的专用性和安全性。 附图概述
此处所说明的附图用来提供对本发明的进一步理解, 构成本申请的一部 分, 本发明的示意性实施例及其说明用于解释本发明, 并不构成对本发明的 不当限定。 在附图中:
图 2为本发明实施方式的终端、 智能卡和管理平台的交互示意图; 图 3为本发明实施例的三方认证方法的总体流程示意图;
图 4为本发明实施例的终端和智能卡双向认证的流程示意图;
图 6为本发明实施例的双向认证的流程示意图;
图 7为本发明实施例一中终端、 智能卡、 管理平台成功进行三方认证示 意图;
图 8为本发明实施例二中终端、 智能卡、 管理平台进行三方认证失败示 意图;
图 9为本发明实施例三中终端、 智能卡、 管理平台进行三方认证失败示 意图;
图 10为本发明实施例四中终端不支持 Profile download流程, 釆用其他 认证方式进行双方认证, 成功进行三方认证的示意图。 本发明的较佳实施方式
下文中将结合附图对本发明的实施方式进行详细说明。 需要说明的是, 在不冲突的情况下,本申请中的实施例及实施例中的特征可以相互任意组合。
本发明的实施方式提供了一种终端和智能卡、管理平台三方认证的方法, 包括:
步骤 1. 智能卡复位后, 终端设备为机卡未认证状态, 首先进行移动终 端和智能卡之间的双向认证, 如果终端、 智能卡双向认证不通过, 转步骤 2, 如果通过了移动终端和智能卡之间的两方认证, 转步骤 3。
其中, 终端设备是指由终端和智能卡组成的设备。
步骤 2. 将状态置为机卡锁定状态(可以锁定终端、 设置终端无效等) , 同时修改智能卡的认证信息 (如 IMSI )为无效信息, 如将 IMSI改为空白、 随机数、 错误信息等, 确保智能卡无法使用, 认证结束。
步骤 3.如果终端和智能卡通过了双向认证, 则将状态置为机卡认证通过 状态, 移动终端向管理平台 告其和智能卡的绑定关系, 并请求管理平台对 绑定关系进行认证。 如果管理平台通过了终端和智能卡的绑定关系认证, 则 三方认证通过, 管理平台向终端返回绑定关系认证通过标志, 置状态为安全 状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 终端设备可以运行相关物联网应用, 如果管理 平台没有通过终端和智能卡的绑定关系认证, 则向终端返回绑定关系认证不 通过标志, 置状态为不安全状态 (三方认证不通过状态) , 禁止运行相关物 联网应用。 终端设备运行相关物联网应用前, 判断状态为安全状态 (三方认 证通过状态) , 则可以运行相关物联网应用, 判断状态为不安全状态 (三方 认证不通过状态) , 则禁止运行相关物联网应用。
该步骤 3中所述的绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合; 所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMEI、 ESN、 存储 在终端中的参数信息等;
所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMSI、 ICCID、 存储在智能卡中的参数信息等。
针对终端和智能卡之间的双向认证, 本发明实施方式提出一种基于扩展 TERMINAL PROFILE指令的双向认证方法, 包括:
根据 3GPP TS 31.111 V10.2.0 (2011-04)、3GPP TS 11.14 V8.18.0 (2007-06) 以及 ETSI TS 131 111 V9.4.0 (2011-01)、 ETSI TS 102 223 V10.3.0 (2011-05)^- 版本规定的方法, 终端开机后将执行配置下载(Profile download )过程, 使 得终端能够告知智能卡其支持的功能。 该 Profile download过程是通过终端向 智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE指令实现的, TERMINAL PROFILE的各个 字节、 位代表了终端支持的功能。 如果该字节的 bit位为 1 , 表示终端支持该 功能, bit位为 0, 表示终端不支持该功能。
以 3GPP TS 11.14 V8.18.0 (2007-06)协议版本为例说明, 如 TERMINAL PROFILE的首字节 First byte (Download)的 8个 bit位 bl、 b2、 b3、 b4、 b5、 b6、 b7、 b8分别表示: 终端是否支持 Profile download功能; 终端是否支持点 对点短消息业务数据下载( SMS-PP data download )功能; 终端是否支持小 区广播数据下载( Cell Broadcast data download )功能; 终端是否支持菜单选 择(Menu selection ) 功能; 终端是否支持 '9EXX' SIM数据下载错误响应码 ( response code for SIM data download error )功能; 终端是否支持计时器超时 ( Timer expiration )功能; 终端是否支持非结构化补充数据业务字符串数据对 象支持 USIM呼叫控制 (USSD string data object support in Call Control by USIM ) 功能; 终端是否支持自动重拨模式下封装呼叫控制总是发送到 SIM ( Envelope Call Control always sent to the SIM during automatic redial mode )功
•6匕
匕。
结合以上内容, 本发明提供的双向认证釆用如下方案: 通过扩展
TERMINAL PROFILE指令中未使用的字节,用于实现终端和智能卡的双向验 证功能。 即, 使用某个字节的第 i位(i大于等于 1且小于 8 )表示是否支持 双向认证。 例如, 通过某个字节的第 1个比特位表示是否支持双向认证功能, 如图 1中所示。 终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE指令; 智能卡处理 终端发送的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令,如果对应的支持双向认证位为 1 , 则 启动智能卡和终端的双向认证。 如果移动终端和智能卡双向认证通过, 则继 续执行后续流程(如网络鉴权过程等) , 否则终端智能卡认证不通过, 置位 终端为非正常使用状态 (如锁定终端、 终端无效等) , 修改智能卡的认证信 息为无效信息 (如空白、 随机数、 错误信息等) 。
较佳地, 终端和智能卡的双向认证过程是釆用终端、 智能卡认证协议进 行认证, 如图 2所示, 智能卡和终端内分别存储算法一和算法二, 终端中另 外存储算法二的逆算法一一算法三, 其中, 算法一用于根据认证信息获得认 证结果, 算法二用于对认证结果进行加密, 算法三用于对算法二的结果进行 解密。 管理平台中包括机卡绑定关系数据库, 用于保存机卡绑定关系的相应 信息。 其中, 所述的管理平台可以是网络认证平台, 应用管理平台, 安全管 理平台等。
如图 3所示, 移动终端和智能卡、 管理平台三方认证的方法, 包括如下 流程:
步骤 301. 终端设备开机, 智能卡复位后, 终端设备从初始状态转为机 卡未认证状态;
步骤 302, 首先进行移动终端和智能卡之间的两方认证, 如果通过了移 动终端和智能卡之间的两方认证, 转步骤 303 , 如果终端、 智能卡双方认证 不通过, 转步骤 304。
步骤 303 , 如果终端和智能卡通过了两方双向认证, 则将状态置为机卡 认证通过状态, 移动终端向管理平台上报其和智能卡的绑定关系, 并请求管 理平台对绑定关系进行认证。
步骤 304,将状态置为机卡锁定状态 (可以锁定终端、设置终端无效等), 同时修改智能卡的认证信息(尤其 IMSI )为无效信息, 如将 IMSI改为空白、 随机数、 错误信息等, 确保智能卡无法使用, 认证结束。
步骤 305, 管理平台执行移动终端和智能卡、 管理平台三方认证过程。 步骤 306, 如果管理平台通过了终端和智能卡的绑定关系认证, 则三方 认证通过, 管理平台向终端返回绑定关系认证通过标志, 并执行步骤 307, 否则, 执行步骤 308。
步骤 307 , 终端收到管理平台的认证通过标志, 则置终端设备的状态为 安全状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 允许终端设备运行相关物联网应用。
步骤 308, 终端收到管理平台的认证不通过标志, 置终端设备的状态为 不安全状态 (三方认证不通过状态) , 禁止终端设备运行相关物联网应用。
其中, 终端设备运行相关物联网应用前, 判断状态为安全状态 (三方认 证通过状态) , 则可以运行相关物联网应用, 否则, 禁止运行相关物联网应 用。 如图 4所示, 本发明实施方式所述的移动终端和智能卡双向认证过程具 体 4 述 ^口下:
步骤 401 , 智能卡复位。
步骤 402 , 终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE指令。
步骤 403 ,智能卡处理终端发送的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令,如果对应 的支持双向认证位为 1 ,则执行步骤 404,如果对应的支持双向认证位不为 1 , 则执行步骤 405。
步骤 404 , 执行智能卡和终端的双向认证。
步骤 405, 使用其他认证方式。
步骤 406, 移动终端和智能卡双向认证是否通过, 如果通过, 则执行步 骤 407, 如果不通过, 则执行步骤 408。
步骤 407, 可以正常使用移动终端和智能卡, 继续后续流程。
步骤 408, 置位终端为非正常使用状态 (如锁定终端、 终端无效等) , 修改智能卡的认证信息为无效信息 (如空白、 随机数、 错误信息等) 。
此外, 本发明的实施方式还提供了一种终端和智能卡的双向认证协议, 认证协议如下:
A, 智能卡和终端内分别存储算法一和算法二, 终端中另外存储算法二 的 逆算法算法三, 算法一用于根据认证信息获得认证结果, 算法二用于对认 证结果进行加密, 算法三用于对算法二的结果进行解密。
B, 智能卡向终端发送允许认证指令, 并携带参数包括: 随机数、 IMSL 用户鉴权密钥、 存于智能卡内的其他信息等其中一个或多个。
C,智能卡根据约定的算法一得出智能卡侧运算结果。并使用算法二进行 加密后传送给终端。
D, 终端对智能卡传送的加密过的运算结果进行算法二的解密过程, 获 得智能卡的运算结果, 终端根据智能卡发送的信息, 使用同样的算法一进行 运算, 得到终端侧运算结果。 如果终端侧运算结果与解密得到的智能卡运算 结果一致, 则终端侧将自己的运算结果传送给智能卡, 转 E, 如果不一致, 则认证失败, 转0。
E, 智能卡得到终端的运算结果后, 和自己运算得到的结果进行比较, 如 果相同, 则给双向认证通过。 如果不相同, 则转 G。
F, 认证成功, 结束认证, 继续后续流程。
G, 认证失败, 结束认证, 置位终端为非正常使用状态 (如锁定终端、 终端无效等) , 修改智能卡的认证信息为无效信息 (如空白、 随机数、 错误 信息等) 。
其中, 上述所述算法一和算法二为目前已知的各类算法, 包括但不限于 如下对称和非对称算法以及它们之间的任意组合: 数据加密算法 DES, 3重 数据加密算法 3DES, 哈希算法 HASH, IMSI认证算法 A3 , RSA算法和错误 检查和纠正算法 ECC, 加密密匙生成算法 A5, 用户密匙生成算法 A8。 其中, 算法之间的组合是指, 如先用其中一个算法后运算后, 将得到的结果再用另 外一个算法进行运算, 等。
如图 5示出了终端设备在具体应用中的各种状态, 如图 5所示, 终端设 备的状态可分为如下几种:
在终端与智能卡尚未进行双向认证时, 终端设备的状态为机卡未认证状 态; 具体地, 终端设备的默认状态为起始状态, 当终端开机、 智能卡刚复位 后, 终端设备由起始状态转为机卡未认证状态; 终端设备转为机卡双向认证通过状态;
双向认证未通过时, 终端设备转为机卡锁定状态; 另外, 若使用其他认 证方式未通过时, 终端设备也转为机卡锁定状态;
管理平台对终端与智能卡的绑定关系认证通过时, 终端设备转为三方认 证通过状态或安全状态; 绑定关系认证未通过时, 终端设备转为三方认证未 通过状态或非安全状态。 如图 6所示, 釆用上述终端和智能卡的双向认证协议进行认证的过程如 下:
步骤 601 , 智能卡根据认证信息 (包括认证参数等信息)使用约定的算 法一得出智能卡侧运算结果(下文中也称作认证结果) , 并使用算法二进行 加密后, 向终端发送允许认证指令, 并携带认证信息, 以及根据认证信息运 算的加密的认证结果;
其中, 认证信息包括: 随机数、 IMSL 用户鉴权密钥、 存于智能卡内的 其他信息等其中一个或多个。
步骤 602 , 终端对智能卡传送的加密过的运算结果进行算法三运算(算 法二的逆运算), 即进行算法二的解密过程, 获得智能卡侧认证结果; 同时, 终端根据智能卡发送的信息, 使用同样的算法一进行运算, 得到终端侧认证 结果。
步骤 603 , 判断智能卡的认证结果是否与终端的认证结果相同, 如果相 同, 则执行步骤 604, 如果不相同, 则执行步骤 605。
步骤 604 , 如果终端侧运算结果与解密得到的智能卡运算结果一致, 则 终端侧将自己的运算结果传送给智能卡, 转步骤 606。
步骤 605 , 如果终端侧运算结果与解密得到的智能卡运算结果不一致, 则认证失败, 转步骤 608。
步骤 606 , 智能卡得到终端的运算结果后, 和自己运算得到的结果进行 比较, 如果相同, 则转步骤 607 , 如果不相同, 则转步骤 608。
步骤 607 , 双向认证通过, 结束认证, 继续后续流程。
步骤 608 , 认证失败, 结束认证, 置位终端为非正常使用状态 (如锁定 终端、 终端无效等), 修改智能卡的认证信息为无效信息(如空白、 随机数、 错误信息等 ) 。
管理平台认证的是智能卡和终端之间的绑定关系, 只有通过了这个绑定 关系的认证, 管理平台才允许基于该终端和智能卡的设备运行物联网应用, 否则禁止该终端和智能卡的设备运行物联网应用。 在终端设备处于机卡未认证状态时, 是指在终端不支持 ProfileDownload 命令的情况, 依然支持釆用其他的认证方式处理。 在终端不支持 ProfileDownload命令的情况下, 可以釆用其他认证方式使得终端设备的状态 转为机卡绑定状态, 然后再由管理平台对绑定关系进行认证, 达到三方认证 通过, 终端设备处于安全状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 这里不予详细描述。
管理平台对绑定关系的认证的具体实现如下:
1. 移动终端和智能卡之间的两方认证通过后, 移动终端向管理平台报告 其和智能卡的绑定关系, 并请求管理对绑定关系进行认证。
2. 管理平台保存有智能卡和终端的绑定关系对应表。
3. 管理平台验证该智能卡和终端的绑定关系是否存在, 如果绑定关系通 过马全证, 则给终端返回三方认证通过标示。 否则, 给终端返回三方认证不通 过标示。
4. 如果终端收到管理平台返回的三方认证通过标示, 则置终端设备的状 态为安全状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 否则如果收到管理平台返回的三方认 证不通过标示, 则置终端设备的状态为不安全状态(三方认证不通过状态)。
5. 物联网应用被运行前, 终端设备首先判断状态是否为安全状态(三方 认证通过状态) , 如果为安全状态 (三方认证通过状态)则运行该应用, 否 则不运行该应用。
另外, 提供了一种解除锁定的方法和工具, 使得在需要时, 可以按需对 智能卡和终端进行解除锁定, 使之能正常使用。
实施例一
如图 7所示, 本实施例的终端、 智能卡、 管理平台成功进行三方认证过 程, 主要包括:
步骤 701 , 物联网终端开机, 智能卡进行复位后, 终端执行 Profile
Download 流程, 终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE 指令, 其中 TERMINAL PROFILE指令的第 40个字节中的第 1 bit位为 1时代表需要进行 终端和智能卡双向认证。 步骤 702 ,智能卡收到该指令后,判断 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中对应 bit位为 1 , 则执行移动终端和智能卡双向认证过程。
具体地,本实施例中是使用随机数和 IMSI作为认证信息, 智能卡和终端 内分别存储算法一和算法二, 终端中另外存储算法二的逆算法算法三, 算法 一用于根据认证信息获得认证结果, 算法二用于对认证结果进行加密, 算法 三用于对算法二的结果进行解密。
步骤 704,智能卡同时向终端发送 Get input指令通知终端获取认证参数。 步骤 705, 终端接收到命令状态字, 识别允许认证, 根据 Get input命令 向智能卡发送 Fetch指令, 要求智能卡发送其加过密的认证结果。
步骤 706, 智能卡根据终端请求, 使用算法一对认证参数进行运算, 并 使用算法二进行加密, 将认证参数及加密的认证结果使用命令状态字传给终 端。
步骤 707 , 终端对智能卡传送的加密过的认证结果使用算法三进行运算 (进行算法二的解密过程),获得智能卡的认证结果,终端同时根据智能卡发送 的认证信息, 使用同样的算法一进行运算, 得到终端侧认证结果。 终端比较 两个认证结果是否一致。
步骤 708,终端若比较发现两个认证结果一致,则使用 Terminal Response 命令给智能卡发送未加密的终端侧认证结果。
步骤 709, 智能卡得到终端侧认证结果后, 和自己运算得到的认证结果 进行比较。
步骤 710, 智能卡比较发现两个认证结果相同, 则通过命令状态字通知 终端双向认证成功。
步骤 711 , 终端收到通知后则将状态置为机卡认证通过状态, 并向管理 平台发送终端设备识别号和 IMSI等标识移动终端和智能卡的信息,向管理平 台报告其和智能卡的绑定关系(通讯手段可以釆用现有技术, 如短信息, BIP 等方式) , 并发送请求信息给管理平台, 请求对绑定关系进行认证。
步骤 712, 管理平台收到绑定关系的终端设备识别号和 IMSI对时, 去对 应的绑定关系数据库查找终端和智能卡的绑定关系是否存在, 发现对应关系 存在, 则通过三方认证, 管理平台向终端返回绑定关系认证通过标志。
终端设备接收到认证通过标志后, 则置终端设备状态为安全状态 (三方 认证通过状态) , 终端设备运行相关物联网应用前, 判断设备的状态为安全 状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 开始运行相关物联网应用。
实施例二
图 8为本发明实施例中终端、 智能卡、 管理平台进行三方认证失败的过 程, 如图 8所示, 该过程主要包括:
步骤 801 , 终端开机, 智能卡进行复位后, 终端执行 Profile Download流 程,终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE指令,其中 TERMINAL PROFILE 指令的第 50个字节中的第 7 bit位为 1时代表需要进行终端和智能卡双向认 证。
步骤 802 ,智能卡收到该指令后,判断 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中对应 bit位为 1 , 因此, 执行移动终端和智能卡双向认证过程。
具体地,本实施例中是使用 IMSI作为认证信息, 智能卡和终端内分别存 储算法一和算法二, 终端中另外存储算法二的逆算法算法三, 算法一用于根 据认证信息获得认证结果, 算法二用于对认证结果进行加密, 算法三用于对 算法二的结果进行解密。
步骤 804,智能卡同时向终端发送 Get input指令通知终端获取认证参数。 步骤 805, 终端接收到命令状态字, 识别允许认证, 根据 Get input命令 向智能卡发送 Fetch指令, 要求智能卡发送其加过密的认证结果。
步骤 806, 智能卡根据终端请求, 使用算法一对认证参数进行运算, 并 使用算法二进行加密, 将认证参数以及加密的认证结果使用命令状态字传给 终端。
步骤 807 , 终端对智能卡传送的加密过的认证结果使用算法三进行运算 (进行算法二的解密过程),获得智能卡的认证结果,终端同时根据智能卡发送 的认证信息, 使用同样的算法一进行运算, 得到终端侧运算结果。 终端比较 两个认证结果是否一致。
步骤 808,终端比较发现两个认证不结果一致,则使用 Terminal Response 命令通知智能卡未通过认证。
此时, 终端和智能卡结束认证, 终端被锁定, 无法使用, 智能卡的 IMSI 信息被改为随机数, 即使被盗, 也无法登网使用, 终端设备处于机卡锁定状 态。
实施例三
图 9为本发明实施例中终端、 智能卡、 管理平台进行三方认证失败的过 程, 如图 9所示, 该过程主要包括:
步骤 901 , 终端开机, 智能卡进行复位后, 终端执行 Profile Download流 程,终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE指令,其中 TERMINAL PROFILE 指令的第 62个字节中的第 1 bit位为 1时代表需要进行终端和智能卡双向认 证。
步骤 902 ,智能卡收到该指令后,判断 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中对应 bit位为 1 , 所以执行移动终端和智能卡双向认证过程。
具体地,本实施例中是使用随机数和 IMSI作为认证信息, 智能卡和终端 内分别存储算法一和算法二, 终端中另外存储算法二的逆算法算法三, 算法 一用于根据认证信息获得认证结果, 算法二用于对认证结果进行加密, 算法 三用于对算法二的结果进行解密。
步骤 904,智能卡同时向终端发送 Get input指令通知终端获取认证参数。 步骤 905, 终端接收到命令状态字, 识别允许认证, 根据 Get input命令 向智能卡发送 Fetch指令, 要求智能卡发送其加过密的认证结果。
步骤 906, 智能卡根据终端请求, 使用算法一对认证参数进行运算, 并 使用算法二进行加密, 将认证参数以及加密的认证结果使用命令状态字传给 终端。 步骤 907 , 终端对智能卡传送的加密过的认证结果使用算法三进行运算 (进行算法二的解密过程),获得智能卡的认证结果,终端同时根据智能卡发送 的认证信息, 使用同样的算法一进行运算, 得到终端侧运算结果。 终端比较 两个认证结果是否一致。
步骤 908, 终端比较发现两个认证结果一致, 则使用 Terminal Response 命令给智能卡发送自己的未加密的认证结果。
步骤 909, 智能卡得到终端的运算结果后, 和自己运算得到的结果进行 比较。
步骤 910, 发现两个认证结果相同, 则通过命令状态字通知终端双向认 证成功。
步骤 911 , 终端收到通知后则将状态置为机卡认证通过状态, 终端向管 理平台发送终端设备识别号和 IMSI等标识移动终端和智能卡的信息,向管理 平台报告其和智能卡的绑定关系 (通讯手段可以釆用现有技术, 如短信息, BIP等方式) , 并发送请求信息给管理平台, 请求对绑定关系进行认证。
步骤 912, 管理平台收到绑定关系的终端设备识别号和 IMSI对时, 去对 应的绑定关系数据库查找终端和智能卡的绑定关系是否存在, 发现对应关系 不存存在, 则未能通过三方认证, 管理平台向终端返回绑定关系认证不通过 标志。
终端设备接收到认证不通过标志时,则置终端设备状态为不安全状态(三 方认证不通过状态) , 终端设备运行相关物联网应用前, 判断设备的状态为 不安全状态 (三方认证不通过状态) , 则禁止运行相关物联网应用。
实施例四
参见图 10, 本发明实施例中终端不支持 Profile download 流程的且通过 三方认证的过程, 主要包括:
步骤 1001 ,物联网设备(终端)开机,智能卡进行复位后,终端执行 Profile Download 流程, 终端向智能卡发送 TERMINAL PROFILE 指令, 其中 TERMINAL PROFILE指令的第 53个字节中的第 3 bit位为 1时代表需要进行 终端和智能卡双向认证。
步骤 1002 , 智能卡收到该指令后, 判断 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中对 应 bit位为 0 , 判断终端不支持 Profile Download流程。
步骤 1003 , 智能卡不执行移动终端和智能卡双向认证过程, 而是使用其 他的认证方式并且通过了机卡认证, 此时机卡状态也将转为机卡认证通过状 态。
步骤 1004, 终端向管理平台发送终端设备识别号和 IMSI等标识移动终 端和智能卡的信息, 向管理平台报告其和智能卡的绑定关系 (通讯手段可以 釆用现有技术, 如短信息, BIP等方式) , 并发送请求信息给管理平台, 请 求对绑定关系进行认证。
步骤 1005, 管理平台收到绑定关系的终端设备识别号和 IMSI对时, 去 对应的绑定关系数据库查找终端和智能卡的绑定关系是否存在, 发现对应关 系存在, 所以通过三方认证, 管理平台向终端返回绑定关系认证通过标志。
终端设备接收到认证通过标志时, 则置终端设备状态为安全状态 (三方 认证通过状态) , 终端设备运行相关物联网应用前, 判断设备的状态为安全 状态 (三方认证通过状态) , 开始运行相关物联网应用。
此外, 本发明实施例中还提供了一种支持双向认证的智能卡, 该智能卡 包括: 认证处理模块、 信息收发模块、 认证结果实施模块,
认证处理模块设置为, 发起并执行智能卡与终端之间的双向认证过程; 信息收发模块设置为, 接收终端发送的终端侧认证结果; 以及, 向终端 发送认证信息及智能卡侧认证结果;
认证结果实施模块设置为, 当双向认证未通过时, 将终端及智能卡置为 机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态,并将智能卡的认证信息置为无效信息。
较佳的, 认证处理模块是设置为, 根据接收到的终端发送的双向认证指 示信息、 或者根据终端发送的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的双向认证指示 位判断出终端支持双向认证功能时, 发起与该终端之间的双向认证过程。 此外, 本发明实施例中还提供了一种三方认证装置, 该装置包括由终端 和智能卡组成的终端设备, 还包括管理平台; 所述的终端设备包括绑定关系 认证请求模块, 管理平台包括绑定关系认证模块, 其中:
绑定关系认证请求模块设置为, 终端与智能卡之间的认证通过后, 向管 理平台报告终端与能卡的绑定关系, 并向管理平台请求对该绑定关系进行认 证;
绑定关系认证模块设置为, 对终端与智能卡的绑定关系进行认证, 若绑 定关系认证通过, 则判定三方认证通过, 若绑定关系认证不通过, 则判定三 方认证未通过。
此外, 终端设备还包括终端侧的双向认证模块, 和智能卡侧的双向认证 模块,
智能卡侧的双向认证模块设置为 , 根据认证信息使用算法一得出智能卡 侧认证结果, 并使用算法二对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将认证信 息以及加密后的智能卡侧认证结果发送给终端;并在收到终端侧认证结果后 , 与得出的智能卡侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则认证成功, 若不一致, 则 认证失败;
终端侧的双向认证模块设置为, 根据智能卡发送的认证信息使用算法一 得出终端侧认证结果, 同时使用算法三对加密后的智能卡侧认证结果进行解 密, 并将解密得到的智能卡侧认证结果与终端侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则将终端侧认证结果发送给智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认证 过程;
其中, 所述算法三为所述算法二的逆运算。
较佳的, 终端设备还包括终端中的指令发送模块, 和智能卡中的双向认 证发起模块,
指令发送模块设置为, 使用扩展的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的预留 字段或预留位, 向智能卡发送双向认证指示位, 其中双向认证指示位用于指 示终端是否支持双向认证功能;
双向认证发起模块设置为, 根据收到的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的 双向认证指示位判断终端是否支持双向认证功能, 若支持, 则发起与终端之 间的双向认证过程。
较佳的, 绑定关系认证模块设置为, 查找管理平台本地的绑定关系数据 库中是否存在终端与智能卡的绑定关系, 若存在, 则判定绑定关系认证通过, 若不存在, 则判定绑定关系认证未通过。
其中, 所述的绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合;
所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMEI、 ESN、 存储 在终端中的参数信息;
所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: IMSI、 ICCID、 存储在智能卡中的参数信息。
较佳的, 上述的三方认证装置还包括智能卡中的认证结果实施模块, 认证结果实施模块设置为, 当双向认证过程通过时, 将终端及智能卡置 为机卡认证通过状态或双向认证通过状态; 当双向认证未通过时, 将终端及 智能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态, 并将智能卡的认证信息置 为无效信息。
以上仅为本发明的优选实施案例而已, 并不用于限制本发明, 本发明还 可有其他多种实施例, 在不背离本发明精神及其实质的情况下, 熟悉本领域 的技术人员可根据本发明做出各种相应的改变和变形, 但这些相应的改变和 变形都应属于本发明所附的权利要求的保护范围。
显然, 本领域的技术人员应该明白, 上述各模块或各步骤可以用通用的 计算装置来实现, 它们可以集中在单个的计算装置上, 或者分布在多个计算 装置所组成的网络上, 可选地, 它们可以用计算装置可执行的程序代码来实 现, 从而, 可以将它们存储在存储装置中由计算装置来执行, 并且在某些情 况下, 可以以不同于此处的顺序执行所示出或描述的步骤, 或者将它们分别 制作成各个集成电路模块, 或者将它们中的多个模块或步骤制作成单个集成 电路模块来实现。 这样, 本发明不限制于任何特定的硬件和软件结合。 工业实用性
釆用上述认证方法, 使得终端和智能卡的安全都得到了保证, 终端使用 伪造的智能卡时, 锁定终端, 保证了终端的安全, 智能卡在被盗或者非法使 用时将无法登录网络使用, 终端在使用非法智能卡时, 也能及时锁定终端, 同时这种绑定关系能够被动态的认证, 在管理平台侧具有对终端和卡设备的 控制管理权, 便于运营商开展自己的业务, 也保证了开展物联网业务的终端 和智能卡的专用性和安全性。

Claims

权 利 要 求 书
1、 一种三方认证方法, 所述方法包括:
终端与智能卡之间进行认证; 所述终端与所述智能卡之间的认证通过后 , 所述终端向管理平台报告所 述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 并向所述管理平台请求对所述绑定关系进 行认证; 所述管理平台对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进行认证, 若所述绑 定关系认证通过, 则判定三方认证通过, 若所述绑定关系认证不通过, 则判 定三方认证未通过。
2、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其中, 所述终端与所述智能卡之间的认证 釆用双向认证协议, 所述双向认证协议包括:
所述智能卡根据认证信息使用算法一得出智能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算 法二对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所述认证信息以及加密后的智 能卡侧认证结果发送给所述终端;
所述终端根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使用算法一得出终端侧认证结 果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认证结果进行解密, 并将解密 得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则将所 述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认 证过程;
所述智能卡将收到的所述终端侧认证结果与得出的智能卡侧认证结果进 行比较, 若一致, 则认证成功;
其中, 所述算法三为所述算法二的逆运算。
3、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其中, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的 步骤包括:
智能卡复位后,终端向所述智能卡发送终端配置( TERMINAL PROFILE ) 指令;
所述智能卡根据所述 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的双向认证指示位判 断出所述终端支持双向认证功能时, 发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程; 智能卡根据认证信息使用算法一得出智能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算法二 对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所述认证信息以及加密后的智能卡 侧认证结果发送给所述终端;
所述终端根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使用算法一得出终端侧认证结 果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认证结果进行解密, 并将解密 得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则将所 述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认 证过程;
所述智能卡将收到的所述终端侧认证结果与得出的智能卡侧认证结果进 行比较, 若一致, 则认证通过, 若不一致, 则认证未通过。
4、 如权利要求 3所述的方法, 所述方法还包括:
所述终端和所述智能卡之间的双向认证通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能 卡置为机卡认证通过状态或双向认证通过状态;
所述终端和所述智能卡之间的双向认证未通过时, 将所述终端及所述智 能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态, 并将所述智能卡的认证信息 置为无效信息。
5、 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其中,
所述绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合;
其中, 所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动设 备身份标识(IMEI ) 、 电子序列号 (ESN ) 、 存储在终端中的参数信息; 所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动用户识 别号(IMSI ) 、 集成电路卡识别号(ICCID ) 、 存储在智能卡中的参数信息。
6、 如权利要求 5所述的方法, 其中,
所述管理平台对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进行认证的步骤包 括:
所述管理平台查找本地的绑定关系数据库中是否存在所述终端与所述智 能卡的绑定关系, 若存在, 则判定所述绑定关系认证通过, 若不存在, 则判 定所述绑定关系认证未通过。
7、 如权利要求 1、 5或 6所述的方法, 所述方法还包括:
所述管理平台在判定所述三方认证通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能卡置 为三方认证通过状态或安全状态; 判定三方认证未通过时, 将所述终端及所 述智能卡置为三方认证未通过状态或非安全状态。
8、 如权利要求 3所述的方法, 所述方法还包括:
所述智能卡判断出终端支持双向认证功能时, 使用命令状态字向所述终 端发送允许认证指令, 发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程。
9、 如权利要求 3所述的方法, 其中, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证的 步骤还包括:
所述智能卡发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程后, 向所述终端发送获 取输入(Get input )指令, 通知终端获取认证信息。
10、 如权利要求 9所述的方法, 其中, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证 的步骤还包括:
所述终端收到所述 Get input指令后, 向所述智能卡发送提取 ( Fetch )指 令, 要求所述智能卡发送智能卡侧认证结果。
11、 如权利要求 3所述的方法, 其中, 所述终端与所述智能卡进行认证 的步骤还包括:
所述终端比较所述智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果一致时, 使 卡。 。 、 '、 .
12、 一种支持双向认证协议的智能卡, 所述智能卡包括: 认证处理模块、 信息收发模块和认证结果实施模块,
所述认证处理模块设置为: 发起并执行智能卡与终端之间的双向认证过 程;
所述信息收发模块设置为: 接收终端发送的终端侧认证结果; 以及, 向 终端发送认证信息及智能卡侧认证结果;
所述认证结果实施模块设置为: 当所述双向认证未通过时, 将所述终端 及所述智能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过状态, 并将所述智能卡的 认证信息置为无效信息。
13、 如权利要求 12所述的智能卡, 其中,
所述认证处理模块是设置为: 根据接收到的所述终端发送的双向认证指 示信息、 或者根据所述终端发送的终端配置( TERMINAL PROFILE )指令中 的双向认证指示位判断出所述终端支持双向认证功能时, 发起与所述终端之 间的双向认证过程。
14、一种三方认证装置, 所述装置包括由终端和智能卡组成的终端设备, 还包括管理平台; 所述终端设备包括绑定关系认证请求模块, 所述管理平台 包括绑定关系认证模块, 其中:
所述绑定关系认证请求模块设置为: 所述终端与所述智能卡之间的认证 通过后, 向所述管理平台^艮告所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 并向所述 管理平台请求对所述绑定关系进行认证;
所述绑定关系认证模块设置为: 对所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系进 行认证, 若所述绑定关系认证通过, 则判定三方认证通过, 若所述绑定关系 认证不通过, 则判定三方认证未通过。
15、 如权利要求 14所述的装置, 其中, 所述终端设备还包括终端侧的双 向认证模块, 和智能卡侧的双向认证模块,
所述智能卡侧的双向认证模块设置为: 根据认证信息使用算法一得出智 能卡侧认证结果, 并使用算法二对所述智能卡侧认证结果进行加密后, 将所 述认证信息以及加密后的智能卡侧认证结果发送给所述终端; 并在收到终端 侧认证结果后, 与得出的所述智能卡侧认证结果进行比较, 若一致, 则认证 成功, 若不一致, 则认证失败;
所述终端侧的双向认证模块设置为: 根据所述智能卡发送的认证信息使 用算法一得出终端侧认证结果, 同时使用算法三对所述加密后的智能卡侧认 证结果进行解密, 并将解密得到的智能卡侧认证结果与所述终端侧认证结果 进行比较, 若一致, 则将所述终端侧认证结果发送给所述智能卡, 若不一致, 则认证失败, 结束本次认证过程;
其中, 所述算法三为所述算法二的逆运算。
16、 如权利要求 15所述的装置, 其中, 所述终端设备还包括终端中的指 令发送模块, 和智能卡中的双向认证发起模块,
所述指令发送模块设置为: 使用扩展的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令中的 预留字段或预留位, 向所述智能卡发送双向认证指示位, 其中所述双向认证 指示位用于指示所述终端是否支持双向认证功能;
所述双向认证发起模块设置为: 根据收到的 TERMINAL PROFILE指令 中的所述双向认证指示位判断所述终端是否支持双向认证功能, 若支持, 则 发起与所述终端之间的双向认证过程。
17、 如权利要求 15或 16所述的装置, 其中,
所述绑定关系认证模块是设置为: 查找所述管理平台本地的绑定关系数 据库中是否存在所述终端与所述智能卡的绑定关系, 若存在, 则判定所述绑 定关系认证通过, 若不存在, 则判定所述绑定关系认证未通过;
所述绑定关系, 是指终端信息与智能卡信息的组合;
其中, 所述终端信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动设 备身份标识(IMEI ) 、 电子序列号 (ESN ) 、 存储在终端中的参数信息; 所述智能卡信息包括以下信息中的一种或其任意组合: 国际移动用户识 别号(IMSI ) 、 集成电路卡识别号(ICCID ) 、 存储在智能卡中的参数信息。
18、 如权利要求 15或 16所述的装置, 其中, 所述装置还包括所述智能 卡中的认证结果实施模块,
所述认证结果实施模块设置为: 当所述双向认证过程通过时, 将所述终 端及所述智能卡置为机卡认证通过状态或双向认证通过状态; 当所述双向认 证未通过时, 将所述终端及所述智能卡置为机卡锁定状态或双向认证未通过 状态, 并将所述智能卡的认证信息置为无效信息。
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