CA1060996A - System for verifying the user of a card - Google Patents
System for verifying the user of a cardInfo
- Publication number
- CA1060996A CA1060996A CA230,931A CA230931A CA1060996A CA 1060996 A CA1060996 A CA 1060996A CA 230931 A CA230931 A CA 230931A CA 1060996 A CA1060996 A CA 1060996A
- Authority
- CA
- Canada
- Prior art keywords
- card
- data
- secret number
- balance
- user
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
- G07F19/202—Depositing operations within ATMs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F19/00—Complete banking systems; Coded card-freed arrangements adapted for dispensing or receiving monies or the like and posting such transactions to existing accounts, e.g. automatic teller machines
- G07F19/20—Automatic teller machines [ATMs]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1025—Identification of user by a PIN code
- G07F7/1058—PIN is checked locally
- G07F7/1066—PIN data being compared to data on card
Landscapes
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
- Control Of Vending Devices And Auxiliary Devices For Vending Devices (AREA)
- Input From Keyboards Or The Like (AREA)
Abstract
ABSTRACT OF THE DISCLOSURE
A system for verifying the user of a card in an automatic banking system and the like, wherein when a card is used for the first time after issuance, the user of the card himself manipulates the machine to input a secret number he intends to use with the card so that strict secrecy of the secret number can be maintained. The balance of the user's account is utilized for checking operation of the secret number when the card is used after the first use thereof.
A system for verifying the user of a card in an automatic banking system and the like, wherein when a card is used for the first time after issuance, the user of the card himself manipulates the machine to input a secret number he intends to use with the card so that strict secrecy of the secret number can be maintained. The balance of the user's account is utilized for checking operation of the secret number when the card is used after the first use thereof.
Description
This invention relates to a system for verifying the user of a card.
Verification of the user of a card is essential in a POS ~point of sales) system, a security gate system or a banking system. In known systems, generally the user of a card is previously given a predetermined secret number. When he uses the card in the system, he is requested to manually enter his secret number into the system, and at the same time the secret number is read from the card or a suitable memory device to which access iâ made by the card. For identification of the user of the card the manually entered secret number and the secret number read from the card or the memory device are compared to see if there exists a predetermined relation ~typically, coincidence) between the two numbers.
In the prior art, to be given a secret number the customer tells the clerk in charge a number he desires to have, and the clerk enters the number into the card issuing machine so as to be recorded t~ the card to be issued to the customer. As a result, the secret number that should not be known to any other person than the owner of the card is ~nown to the clerk in charge of the card issuing operation so the complete secrecy of the secret number cannot be maintained.
The primary object of the invention is therefore to provide a sys-tem for verifying the user of a card used in a banking system and the like, which is capable of maintaining strict secrecy of the secret number given to each card owner.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when a card is issued to a customer, he need not tell his selected secret number to the clerk in charge of the card issuing machine, but the secret number is recorded on the card by the operation of the customer himself.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when a card is issued, it has no secret lQ60996 number recorded thereon, and when the card is used for the first time, the user of the card manually enters a secret number ~o be recorded on the card, thereby maintaining strict secrecy of the secret number.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein even when the numbers recorded on the card are known to a third person, the card cannot be used improperly by the third person, thereby maintaining the secrecy of the secret number.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when the card is used, the numbers recorded on the card are changed to different numbers which have a predetermined relation to the secret number memorized by the user of the card, thereby maintaining the secrecy of the secret number.
To accomplish the above objects, in accordance with the invention, when a card is issued to a customer, tha customer need not tell any secret number to the clerk in chargeJ so that no secret number is recorded on the card issued. Instead the card has certain numbers recorded thereon.
When operations are conducted on those numbers by predetermined equations, the number obtained indicates that the card has not been previously used.
When the card is used for the first time, the user of the card manually inputs the secret number for the first time. If the card is recognized as being used for the first time, the secret number is not checked, or even when it is checked, the result of the checking is neglected. In other words, when the card is used for the first time, the user is considered as the proper owner of the card.
The manually entered secret number is not recorded as it is but a code is obtained by predetermined functional equations from that number and a different number recorded on the card, such as for example, the bank number, the account number or the balance and the code thus obtained is recorded on the card.
If the code is determined by at least the balance of a savings 106~99~
account, the balance is changed every time the card is used, so that the code is also changed every time the card is used.
Once the card has been used, the above-mentioned code is recorded on the card. When the card is used next time, a secret number is calculated by the predetermined functional equations from the above-mentioned code and at least one of the bank number, the account number, the bank cipher and the balance, and the secret number thus obtained is compared with the memorized secret number manually entered by the user of the card to check correspondence therebetween for identification of the user.
Since the above code is changed every time the card is used, it is impossible for a third person who happens to know all the numbers recorded on the card to know the secret number that the owner of the card memorizes.
If the records on the card are unjustly changed to increase the balance, the manually entered secret number will not coincide with the secret number calculated in the above manner unless the above-mentioned code is changed so as to satisfy the above-mentioned equations. This helps prevent fraudulent use of the card by alternation of the balance.
Thus, in accordance with one broad aspect of the invention, there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means for taking out data by said card;
means operable by the user of said card to input a secret number; first checking means for checking correspondence between said data and said secret number; second checking means for checking whether said data include predetermined specific data;
and means for recognizing said user as the proper user of said card if said second checking means detects that said data include ~ ~ -4-said specific data, reyardless of said first checking means.
In accordance with another broad aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means manually operable by said user to enter a secret number; means for taking out data by means of said card; means for checking whether said data are the data that mean the first use of said card; control means operable in response to said checking means detecting said data that mean the first use of said card to cause said user to operate said manually operable means to enter a secret number as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
According to another aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising:
a card issuing device comprising a first operation means for calculating a subsidiary code from at least useful data and a specific code and a first recording means for recording said useful data and said subsidiary code on said card; and an encoding device comprising means for checking whether said useful data and said subsidiary code read from said card coincides with said specific code, means operable by the user of said card to enter a secret number, means for obtaining new useful data to renew said useful data, a second operation means operable in response to said checking means having detected said coincidence to calculate a new subsidiary code from said secret number and said new useful data, and a second recording means for recording said new data and said new subsidiary code on said card.
According to still another aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means for taking out at least the balance of an ~ ~ -4a-iO60996 account and a subsidiary code by means of said card; means manually operable by said user to enter a secret number; means for checking correspondence between said balance, said sub-sidiary code and said secret number; means for setting an amount of money for a transaction; means for calculating a new balance from said balance and said amount of money and calculating a new subsidiary code from said new balance and said secret number; and means for storing said new balance and said new subsidiary code as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
The invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings showing preferred embodiments of the invention, wherein:
Figure 1 is a block diagram of a card issuing apparatus for issuing cards for use in an off-line cash dispenser;
Figure 2 is a block diagram of the off-line cash dispenser;
Figure 3 is a detailed block diagram of the scrambling board shown in Figure l;
. Figure 4 is a flow chart for the operation of the - card issuing apparatus of Figure l;
Figure 5 is a flow chart of the operation of the cash dispenser of Figure 2;
-4b-~060996 Figure 6 is a block diagram of a card issuing apparatus for issuing cards for use in an on-line cash dispenser;
Figure 7 is a block diagram of the on-line cash dispenser of Figure 6;
Figure 8 is a flow chart for the operation of the card issuing apparatus of Figure 6; and Figure 9 is a flow chart for the operation of the on-line cash dispenser of Figure 7.
Referring to the drawings, first, to Figures 1 to 5 which show one embodiment of the invention as applied to an off-line cash dispenser (to be referred to simply as the off-line CD), the card which is to be issued to a customer has a bank number already magnetically recorded thereon. Other data also are to be recorded on the card, but the area in which such other data than the bank number are to be recorded has "O" recorded thereon. This is because the bank number is the information to be commonly recorded on all the cards to be issued, so that it is more eficient to record it on the cards collectively at the head ofice o the bank, and a more important thing is to enable the head office of the bank to strictly supervise issuance of new cards to customers at its branches, thereby to prevent improper issuance of new cards.
In the card issuing device shown in Figure 1, when a card is to be issued, a clerk in charge puts a card 1 into a slot 3 formed in the front panel 4 of the card issuing machine. ~In the following description reference should also be made to the flow chart shown in Figure 4.) When a photodetect-or 4 detects the forward edge of the card, the detector 4 produces a detection signal to be applied to a motor control circuit 5, whereupon a motor 6 is rotated to cause a pair of belts 7 and 8 to pull in the card 1 rightward in Figure 1.
As the card is pulled in, a magnetic~eading head 9 reads the bank number previously recorded on the card to produce a corresponding signal.
The signal is converted to a digital signal by a reading and writing circuit 10 ~to be referred to as the R/W circuit hereinafter) so as to be stored in a register 11.
When the forward edge of the card reaches a photodetector 12, it produces a signal to cause the control circuit 5 to stop the rotation of the motor 6.
The bank number read from the card and stored in the register 11 is checked to see if it is a predetermined bank number. For this purpose, a setting device 13 is provided to have a predetermined bank number set therein.
The device 13 may comprise a rotary switch or an integrated read-only memory ~to be referred to as ROM). The bank number set in the setting device 13 and the bank number stored in the register 11 are compared by an operation or arithmetic circuit 14 to see if they coincide.
If the two numbers do not coincide, the ope~ation circuit 14 pro- -duces a corresponding output signal to cause the control circuit 5 to rotate the motor 6 in the reverse direction so that the card is carried by the belts 7 and 8 back to the slot 3. At this time a red lamp not shown but provided on the front panel is lit. Since the card is not one issued by an authorized person, the lighting of the red lamp means that the card is not to be issued to a customer.
If the two numbers set in the setting device 13 and stored in the register 11, respectively, coincide, a green lamp not shown but provided on the front panel is lit to indicate that the card is a proper one which can be issued to the customer, whereupon the clerk enters through a keyboard 15 an account number allotted to the customer to which the card is to be issued .-and the amount of money to be initially entered to the credit of the account (that is, the balance of the account since that time).
The account number and the balance ~tha* is the amount initially de-; posited) entered through the keyboard 15 are stored in registers 16 and 17, respectively. It is assumed that the bank number, the account number and the balance comprise a four-digit decimal number, an eight-digit decimal number, and a four-digit decimal number, respective~y. In a setting device 18 a bank cipher is set by an authorized person,e.g. the chief of the branch of the bank at which the card issuing machine is installed. ~nce the bank cipher has been 10~099~i set, it will not be changed except in special circumstances. Different banks have different bank ciphers.
The bank cipher is scrambled by a scrambling board 19 and then applied to the operation circuit 14. The scrambling board may comprise a relatively simple wiring connection or a diode matrix circuit. The more complicated it is, the better.
Figure 3 shows one example of the scrambling circuit in detail.
The setting device 18 comprises three subsidiary setting sections 180, 181 and 182, by which a three-digit decimal number is set. The outputs from the three subsidiary setting sections 180, 181 and 182 are applied to an extremely complicated logic circuit 190, which scrambles the three-digit number to produce at its output a four-digit number. In Figure 3 the output is shown as 0 ... 9 for convenience of illustration, but actually it comprises, for example, a BCD code.
Returning to Figure 1, a third setting device 20 has set therein a four-digit decimal secret number. It is assumed that when a new card is to be issued, the secret number is set as 1l0000l!.
If each digit of each of above-mentioned five numbers is expressed by an alphabetic letter suffixed with a decimal number, the following will result, with a smaller suffixed number expressing a higher place in each number.
The bank number: Bl - B4 The account number: Al - A8 The balance: Rl - R4 The secret number: Ql - Q4 The bank cipher: Hl - H4 wherein the bank cipher is the output of the scrambled board 19.
The following relations exist between the digits which cons~itute the above numbers.
Ql = Bl + Al + A5 + Rl + Hl + Cl ~2 = B2 + A2 + A6 + R2 + H2 + C2 Q3 = B3 + A3 + A7 + R3 + H3 + C3 .
` 10~i099~;
Q4 = B4 + A4 ~ A8 ~ R4 + H4 + C4 wherein Cl - C4 express the four digits of a four-digit decimal subsidiary code number.
Each digit of the numbers in the above equations is a positive integral number, and both carries and borrows are ignored when operations are conducted.
After the account number and the bala~ce have been entered through the keyboard 15, the operation circuit 14 calculates a subsidiary code Cl -C4 on the basis of the above equations. Since Ql - Q4 are all "0", Cl - C4 is the only unknown number in each of the e~uations so that it is easy to calculate the subsidiary code Cl - C4. The code that has been calculated is stored in a register 21.
After the subsidiary code has been stored in the register 21, the belts 7 and 8 are rotated in thc reverse direction. As the card is carried backward, the R/W clrcuit 10 records the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code stored in the registers 11, 16, 17 and 21, respectively, on the card through a writing head 22. The card is returned through ~he slot 3.
Thus the operation of the apparatus for issuing a new card has been finished. The operation is controlled by means of a control circuit 24 which addresses, decodes and carries out an instruction program stored in a memory device 23. The technics for such control are well known as the fundamental technics for controlling electronic computers, so that no detailed explanation thereof will be given.
It should be particularly noted in the above card issuing operation that the customer need not tell the clerk his secret number and, therefore, immediately after the card has been issued, the secret number selected by the customer or any other corresponding number is not yet recorded on the card.
As will be described later, the secret number is recorded by the owner of the card himself, so that there is no chance for the clerk in charge to know the secret number, thereby reducing the possibility of improper use of the card. The secret number selected by the customer is manually entered by him-self when he uses the card in a cash dispenser for the first time. Figure 2 is a block diagram of a cash dispenser.
The data on the card that has been inserted into the machine by the customer are read by a card reader 30. The read data, that is, the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code are stored in the registers Rl, R2, R3 and R4, respectively, of a storing device 31.
The cash dispenser is provided with a setting device 32 and a scrambling board 33 which are o the same construction as in Figure 1, The bank cipher for the same bank is set in the setting device 32, so that the scrambling board 33 produces the same output Hl - H4 as in the previously mentioned card issueng device in Figure 1.
After the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code have been stored in the registers Rl, R2, R3 and R4, an oper-ation or arithmetic circuit 34 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 from these data in the registers on the basis of the previously described equations.
The secret number is stored in a register 35. If the card has been used for the first time, the digits of the secret number must be all "zeros".
Then in order to check if the digits Ql - Q4 of the secret number are all zeros, the operation circuit 34 compares the output of the register 35 and that of the setting device 36 which is all "zeros". Coincidence of the two outputs means that the card is now being used for the first time because as previously mentioned when the card was issued the relation between the above-mentioned numbers was so predetermined that the secret number is "0000". If the two outputs do not coincide, it means that the card has already being used at least one time, as will be described again later.
If the two outputs coincide, that is, the secret number as stored in the register 35 is "0000", an indicator 37 indicates "Please enter a four-digit secret number you intend to use with your card from now on", whereupon the customer enters through a keyboard 38 the four-digit secret number which he desires to use. This secret number is stored in a register Pl included in ~; a storing device 39. Then the indicator 37 indicates "Please enter th~ amount _ g _ ., ~, :
106099~
of money you request", whereupon the customer enters through the keyboard 38 the amount of money he desires to be paid. The entered amount of money is stored in a register P2 in the storing device 39. The indicator 37 can be the well-known type that has an endless curtain on which the above-mention-ed and other necessary indications are printed.
When the requested amount has been entered, the operation circuit 34 substTacts the requested amount stored in the register P2 from the balance stored in the register R3 to obtain a new balance to be stored in a register R5 included in the storing device 31. At the time of subtraction, the oper-ation circuit 34 checks whether the value of the new balance is positive or negative. If it is negative, the balance is short of the requested amount ; of cash and the card is returned to the customer.
If the value of the new balance is positive so that payment is allowed, the operation circuit 34 calculates a new subsidiary code Cl - C4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations.
In this calculation, Ql - Q4 in the equations are the four digits of the secret number entered by the customer and Rl - M are the numbers determined by the new balance stored in the register R5, so that the new subsidiary code Cl - C4 calculated by the operation circuit 34 is different from the subsidiary code when the card was issued. This new subsidiary code Cl - C4 is stored in a register R6 included in the storing device 31.
Then the bank number, the account number, the new balance and the new subsidiary code stored in the registers Rl, R2, R5 and R6, respectively, are recorded on the card. It should be noted here that the subsidiary code is changed by the secret number entered for the first time and the new balance. When the card is used next time, the subsidiary code will be chang-ed by the change of the balance alone, as will be described later.
A slip issuing device 40 then issues a slip on which the account number stored in the register R2, the new balance stored in the register R5 and the requested amount ~that is, the amount of money that has been paid) stored in the register P2 are printed. A recorder 41, which can be a tape puncher, records the same data as those printed on the slip so that the - . .. :. : :
~060996 recorded data will later be processed by a batch process.
The card the data of which have been renewed is returned to the customer together with the slip on which the data have been printed. A cash dispensing device 42 dispenses the number of bills which correspond to the requested amount of money as stored in the register P2. This completes the operation of the cash dispenser when the card has been used for the first time.
When the card is used for the second timP or after that, the operation circuit 34 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 from the output of the scrambling device 33 and the card data stored in the storing device 31 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The secret number obtained is stored in the register 35. Since the values Ql - Q4 are not all "zeros", the contents of the registers 35 and 36 disagree. The disagreement means that the use of the card is not the first use thereof. Then, unlike in the first use of the card, it is necessary to check the secret number entered by the customer. In order to perform this checking of the entered secret number) the operation circuit 34 compares the secret number entered by the customer through the keyboard 38 and stored in the register Pl with the secret number stored in the register 35 to see if the two secret numbers coincide.
If they do not coincide, the card is recognized as being improperly used so as to be returned to the user and the requested payment of cash is refused.
If the two secret numbers coincide, however, the card is recognized as being properly used by an authorized person, so that the indicator 37 indicates "Please input the amount you request." The operation of the system following that indication is quite the same as in the previously mentioned case in which the card was used for the first time. ~See the flow chart shown in Figure 5). That is, when the card is used for the second or more time, the subsidiary code is changed in accordance with the rewritten balance, so that when the card is used next time, the secret number Ql - Q4 calculated by the operation circuit must necessarily coinicide with the secret number :
: . ...
~06099~
entered initially by the customer.
If the customer has entered all 0's as the secret number when the card is used for the first time, the same operation as in the first use of the card takes place for the second use thereof. This would not cause so much inconvenience, but if the card is stolen and illegilly used by an unauthorized person, entry of any secret number would cause the apparatus to operate. To avoid this, preferably the customer should be advised not to enter all zeros as`the secret number when he uses the card for the first time, and the program is so arranged that if nevertheless he has entered all zeros as the secret number! he is requested to do the operation over again.
The above-mentioned operation is controlled by a control circuit 44 on the basis of a predetermined program stored in a memory device 43. The techinics for such control are well known in the art as previously mentioned in connection with the card issuing apparatus shown in Figure 1.
In the above the invention has been described as applied to an off-line cash dispenser. Another embodiment of the invention as applied to an on-line cash dispenser cto be referred to as the on-line CD) will next be described. The card for use in the on-line CD has recorded thereon the account number alone as the data by which access can be made to the balance, etc. stored in a center file. -In the card issuing apparatus shown in Figure 6, the clerk in charge puts into a card reader 50 a new card to be issued to a customer. The card is pulled in and stopped in the card reader. Then the clerk inputs through a keyboard 51 the account number allotted to the customer and the amount of money deposited to open the account, that is, the balance of the account, whereupon the account number and the balance are once stored in a register 52 and thence sent to a central station through a transmission con-trol circuit 53 and a terminal MODEM 54. Reference should also be made to Figure 8.
The account number and the balance sent from the terminal machine to the central station are applied through a MODEM 55 and a communication control circuit 56 to a central processing unit 57 ~to be referred to as the ~ ' ' CPU hereinafter) and stored in registers 58 and 59, respectively.
In the CPU the bank number and all "zeros" are set in setting devices 60 and 61, respectively, and the bank cipher is set in a setting device 62. A scrambling board 63 scrambles the bank cipher to produce a corresponding output. These setting devices 60, 61 and 62 and the scrambling board 63 correspond to the setting device 13, 20 and 18 and the scrambling board 19 of Figure 1, respectively.
After the account number and thc balance have been stored in the registers 58 and 59, an operation control circuit 64 (which will be referred to as the AR circuit hereinafter) calculates a subsidiary code Cl - C4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The calculated code is stored in a register 65.
Then the balance stored in the register 59 is stored in a memory register 67 included in a memory device 66. A reading and writing circuit 68 operates so that access is made by the account number stored in the register 58 to the corresponding area in a file 69 so as to record the balance in that area. In a similar manner, the subsidiary code is also recorded in the area of the account. Typically, the file comprises a magnetic disk or a magnetic drum.
When the above recording of the balance and the subsidiary code in the corresponding area of the file has been completed, the AR circuit 64 produces a completion message, which is sent back to the terminal machine through the communication control circuit 56, the MODEM 55, and MODEM 54 and the transmission control circuit 53.
` The card reader 50 receives the signal and operates to record the account number on the card and the card is returned to the customer. In this case, the balance is not recorded on the card. The operation of issuing a card has thus been completed.
How the on-line CD is operated by the card that has been issued in the above manner will now be described.
In the on-line CD shown in Figure 7 the card is put into the machine by the customer. The account number read from the card is stored in ' ' , .
.
~060996 a register 71. Reference should be made also to the flow chart shown in Figure 9. The customer then manipulates a keyboard 72 to enter the secret number and the amount of money which he requests to be paid. The secret number and the requested amount are once stored in registers 73 and 74, respectively, and then these data together with the account number stored in the register 71, are sent to a central station through a transmission control circuit 75 and a MODEM 54. At the central station, these data, that is, the account number, the secret number and the requested amount are applied through a MODEM 55 and a communication control circuit 56 to be stored in registers 76, 77 and 78, respectively.
As previously mentioned in connection with the card issuing apparatus, the bank cipher Hl - H4 is produced by scrambling board 63 con-nected to the setting device 62 and the bank number Bl - B4 is set in the setting device 60 and the balance Rl - R4 and the subsidiary code Cl - C4 are stored in the file 69. By the account number stored in the register 76 access is made to the file 69 so that the balance of the account and the subsidiary code are successively called through the reading and writing cir-cuit 68 and the memory register 67 so as to be stored in the registers 79 and 65, respectively, in the CPU 57.
The AR circuit 64 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations, and the calculated secret number is stored in a regis~er 80. Then the AR circuit 64 checks if the secret number stored in the register 80 and the contents ~all zeros) of the setting device 61 coincide.
If the contents of the register 80 and those of the setting device 61 coincide, that is, if all the digits of the calculated secret number are "O", it means that the card is now being used for the first time, so that the new balance is calculated without checking the secret number sent from the terminal machine and stored in the register 77.
If the contents of the register 80 and the setting device 61 do not coincide, that is, if the calculated secret number is not all "zeros", the card is recogni~ed as having already been used before, that is, the 106099~;
present use of the card is not its first use, whereupon the AR circuit 64 compares the secret number sent from the terminal machine and stored in the register 77 and the calculated secret number stored in the register 80. If the two numbers do not coincideJ it means improper use of the card, so that a payment rejection message is sent to the terminal machine. I they coin-cide, howeverJ it means proper use o the card, so that the new balance is calculated as in the above case in which the card has been used for the first time.
The new balance is calculated by the AR circuit 64 which subtracts the requested amount stored in the register 78 from the existing balance stored in the register 79. If the result of the subtraction is negative, the balance is short of the requested amount so that a payment rejection message is sent to the terminal machine.
When the new balance has been calculated, the AR circuit 64 cal-culates a new subsidiary code Cl C4 from the bank number set in the register 60, the account number stored in the register 76, the new balance stored in the register 19, the bank cipher provided by the scrambling board 63 and the secret n~mber stored in the register 77 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The calculated anew subsidiary code is stored again in the register 65.
Then the new balance stored in the register 79 and the new subsidiary code stored in the register 65 are successively recorded in the corresponding one of the recording areas in the file 69 which access is made by the account number stored in the register 76 in place of the previ-ous data recorded therein.
Then the AR circuit 64 sends a payment permission message and the new balance to the cash dispenser through the communication control circuit 56.
The message sent from the central station through the MODEM 55, the MODEM 54 and the transmission control circuit 75 is checked by a message discriminating circuit 81. If the message is recognized as the payment rejection message, the card reader 70 returns the card it has until then .
3 06~9'~6 boen keeping and the indicator 82 indicates payment rejection.
If the message is recognized as the payment permission message~
slip issuing device 83 issues a slip on which the account number stored in the register 71, the requested amount ~that is, the amount paid) stored in the register 74 and the new balance in the discriminating circuit 81 are printed. At the same time the card reader 70 returns to the customer the card on which the accoun~ number has been recorded. ~The account number remains the same and is`not changed.).
After the card has been returned, a cash dispensing device 84 dispenses the number of bills which correspond to the requested amount stored in the register 74.
Thus the explanation of the on-line CD and the card issuing appar-atus used therewith has been completed.
The invention is not limited to the above embodiments, but there are various other modifications thereof such as follows:
~1) As the parameters for calculating the secret number, the date of use of the card, the number of times of use of the card, etc. may be used individually or in combination instead of the balance. These para-meters may be recorded on the card or a recording medium to which access is made by the card. In a POS ~point of sales) system, the balance may mean - the total of the prices of the articles the customer has purchased.
(2~ Besides the cash dispenser, the invention can be applied to a deposit machine, a POS system, or a security gate system, etc.
~3) In the above embodiments in order to check whether the card is used for the first time a predetermined operation is conducted. Alter-natively, when a card is issued, the code which directly means the first use of the card may be recorded on the card or a recording medium to which access is made by the card. When the card is used for the first time, the code expressing the first use of the card is erased or changed before returning the card to the customer.
(4) The functions of theequations for calculating the secret number from the subsidiary code, etc. may be trigonometrical, square, cubic, or any other forms.
(5) Even when the card is used for the irst time, lt is possible to check the secret number. In this case, the user of the card is recogniz-ed as the owner of the card, regardless of the result of the checking. This can be effected by merely changing the program.
~ 6) For checking of the manually entered secret number, all the digits of the balance need not be used, but some of them, e.g. the lowest four digits alone may be used, or the complement of the number expressing the balance may also be used.
~7) In the illustrated embodiments the secret number is entered when the card is used in the cash dispenser for the first time. This need not always be so, but an encoder for exclusive use by the customer himself may be provided so as to enable the customer to enter the secret number.
Such an encoder may be incorporated into the card issuing device. In this case, it is necessary to prevent the clerk in charge from seeing the secret number as the customer operates to enter the number into the machine.
~8) In the illustrated embodiments, the secret number entered by the customer is not recorded as it is, but it is combined with other numbers as parameters. This arrangement helps to reduce the possibility of the secret number being known to other persons. It is of course possible to record the secret number as it is entered by the customer.
,' ' ' `
Verification of the user of a card is essential in a POS ~point of sales) system, a security gate system or a banking system. In known systems, generally the user of a card is previously given a predetermined secret number. When he uses the card in the system, he is requested to manually enter his secret number into the system, and at the same time the secret number is read from the card or a suitable memory device to which access iâ made by the card. For identification of the user of the card the manually entered secret number and the secret number read from the card or the memory device are compared to see if there exists a predetermined relation ~typically, coincidence) between the two numbers.
In the prior art, to be given a secret number the customer tells the clerk in charge a number he desires to have, and the clerk enters the number into the card issuing machine so as to be recorded t~ the card to be issued to the customer. As a result, the secret number that should not be known to any other person than the owner of the card is ~nown to the clerk in charge of the card issuing operation so the complete secrecy of the secret number cannot be maintained.
The primary object of the invention is therefore to provide a sys-tem for verifying the user of a card used in a banking system and the like, which is capable of maintaining strict secrecy of the secret number given to each card owner.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when a card is issued to a customer, he need not tell his selected secret number to the clerk in charge of the card issuing machine, but the secret number is recorded on the card by the operation of the customer himself.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when a card is issued, it has no secret lQ60996 number recorded thereon, and when the card is used for the first time, the user of the card manually enters a secret number ~o be recorded on the card, thereby maintaining strict secrecy of the secret number.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein even when the numbers recorded on the card are known to a third person, the card cannot be used improperly by the third person, thereby maintaining the secrecy of the secret number.
Another object of the invention is to provide such a verification system as aforesaid, wherein when the card is used, the numbers recorded on the card are changed to different numbers which have a predetermined relation to the secret number memorized by the user of the card, thereby maintaining the secrecy of the secret number.
To accomplish the above objects, in accordance with the invention, when a card is issued to a customer, tha customer need not tell any secret number to the clerk in chargeJ so that no secret number is recorded on the card issued. Instead the card has certain numbers recorded thereon.
When operations are conducted on those numbers by predetermined equations, the number obtained indicates that the card has not been previously used.
When the card is used for the first time, the user of the card manually inputs the secret number for the first time. If the card is recognized as being used for the first time, the secret number is not checked, or even when it is checked, the result of the checking is neglected. In other words, when the card is used for the first time, the user is considered as the proper owner of the card.
The manually entered secret number is not recorded as it is but a code is obtained by predetermined functional equations from that number and a different number recorded on the card, such as for example, the bank number, the account number or the balance and the code thus obtained is recorded on the card.
If the code is determined by at least the balance of a savings 106~99~
account, the balance is changed every time the card is used, so that the code is also changed every time the card is used.
Once the card has been used, the above-mentioned code is recorded on the card. When the card is used next time, a secret number is calculated by the predetermined functional equations from the above-mentioned code and at least one of the bank number, the account number, the bank cipher and the balance, and the secret number thus obtained is compared with the memorized secret number manually entered by the user of the card to check correspondence therebetween for identification of the user.
Since the above code is changed every time the card is used, it is impossible for a third person who happens to know all the numbers recorded on the card to know the secret number that the owner of the card memorizes.
If the records on the card are unjustly changed to increase the balance, the manually entered secret number will not coincide with the secret number calculated in the above manner unless the above-mentioned code is changed so as to satisfy the above-mentioned equations. This helps prevent fraudulent use of the card by alternation of the balance.
Thus, in accordance with one broad aspect of the invention, there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means for taking out data by said card;
means operable by the user of said card to input a secret number; first checking means for checking correspondence between said data and said secret number; second checking means for checking whether said data include predetermined specific data;
and means for recognizing said user as the proper user of said card if said second checking means detects that said data include ~ ~ -4-said specific data, reyardless of said first checking means.
In accordance with another broad aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means manually operable by said user to enter a secret number; means for taking out data by means of said card; means for checking whether said data are the data that mean the first use of said card; control means operable in response to said checking means detecting said data that mean the first use of said card to cause said user to operate said manually operable means to enter a secret number as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
According to another aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising:
a card issuing device comprising a first operation means for calculating a subsidiary code from at least useful data and a specific code and a first recording means for recording said useful data and said subsidiary code on said card; and an encoding device comprising means for checking whether said useful data and said subsidiary code read from said card coincides with said specific code, means operable by the user of said card to enter a secret number, means for obtaining new useful data to renew said useful data, a second operation means operable in response to said checking means having detected said coincidence to calculate a new subsidiary code from said secret number and said new useful data, and a second recording means for recording said new data and said new subsidiary code on said card.
According to still another aspect of the invention there is provided a system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means for taking out at least the balance of an ~ ~ -4a-iO60996 account and a subsidiary code by means of said card; means manually operable by said user to enter a secret number; means for checking correspondence between said balance, said sub-sidiary code and said secret number; means for setting an amount of money for a transaction; means for calculating a new balance from said balance and said amount of money and calculating a new subsidiary code from said new balance and said secret number; and means for storing said new balance and said new subsidiary code as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
The invention will be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings showing preferred embodiments of the invention, wherein:
Figure 1 is a block diagram of a card issuing apparatus for issuing cards for use in an off-line cash dispenser;
Figure 2 is a block diagram of the off-line cash dispenser;
Figure 3 is a detailed block diagram of the scrambling board shown in Figure l;
. Figure 4 is a flow chart for the operation of the - card issuing apparatus of Figure l;
Figure 5 is a flow chart of the operation of the cash dispenser of Figure 2;
-4b-~060996 Figure 6 is a block diagram of a card issuing apparatus for issuing cards for use in an on-line cash dispenser;
Figure 7 is a block diagram of the on-line cash dispenser of Figure 6;
Figure 8 is a flow chart for the operation of the card issuing apparatus of Figure 6; and Figure 9 is a flow chart for the operation of the on-line cash dispenser of Figure 7.
Referring to the drawings, first, to Figures 1 to 5 which show one embodiment of the invention as applied to an off-line cash dispenser (to be referred to simply as the off-line CD), the card which is to be issued to a customer has a bank number already magnetically recorded thereon. Other data also are to be recorded on the card, but the area in which such other data than the bank number are to be recorded has "O" recorded thereon. This is because the bank number is the information to be commonly recorded on all the cards to be issued, so that it is more eficient to record it on the cards collectively at the head ofice o the bank, and a more important thing is to enable the head office of the bank to strictly supervise issuance of new cards to customers at its branches, thereby to prevent improper issuance of new cards.
In the card issuing device shown in Figure 1, when a card is to be issued, a clerk in charge puts a card 1 into a slot 3 formed in the front panel 4 of the card issuing machine. ~In the following description reference should also be made to the flow chart shown in Figure 4.) When a photodetect-or 4 detects the forward edge of the card, the detector 4 produces a detection signal to be applied to a motor control circuit 5, whereupon a motor 6 is rotated to cause a pair of belts 7 and 8 to pull in the card 1 rightward in Figure 1.
As the card is pulled in, a magnetic~eading head 9 reads the bank number previously recorded on the card to produce a corresponding signal.
The signal is converted to a digital signal by a reading and writing circuit 10 ~to be referred to as the R/W circuit hereinafter) so as to be stored in a register 11.
When the forward edge of the card reaches a photodetector 12, it produces a signal to cause the control circuit 5 to stop the rotation of the motor 6.
The bank number read from the card and stored in the register 11 is checked to see if it is a predetermined bank number. For this purpose, a setting device 13 is provided to have a predetermined bank number set therein.
The device 13 may comprise a rotary switch or an integrated read-only memory ~to be referred to as ROM). The bank number set in the setting device 13 and the bank number stored in the register 11 are compared by an operation or arithmetic circuit 14 to see if they coincide.
If the two numbers do not coincide, the ope~ation circuit 14 pro- -duces a corresponding output signal to cause the control circuit 5 to rotate the motor 6 in the reverse direction so that the card is carried by the belts 7 and 8 back to the slot 3. At this time a red lamp not shown but provided on the front panel is lit. Since the card is not one issued by an authorized person, the lighting of the red lamp means that the card is not to be issued to a customer.
If the two numbers set in the setting device 13 and stored in the register 11, respectively, coincide, a green lamp not shown but provided on the front panel is lit to indicate that the card is a proper one which can be issued to the customer, whereupon the clerk enters through a keyboard 15 an account number allotted to the customer to which the card is to be issued .-and the amount of money to be initially entered to the credit of the account (that is, the balance of the account since that time).
The account number and the balance ~tha* is the amount initially de-; posited) entered through the keyboard 15 are stored in registers 16 and 17, respectively. It is assumed that the bank number, the account number and the balance comprise a four-digit decimal number, an eight-digit decimal number, and a four-digit decimal number, respective~y. In a setting device 18 a bank cipher is set by an authorized person,e.g. the chief of the branch of the bank at which the card issuing machine is installed. ~nce the bank cipher has been 10~099~i set, it will not be changed except in special circumstances. Different banks have different bank ciphers.
The bank cipher is scrambled by a scrambling board 19 and then applied to the operation circuit 14. The scrambling board may comprise a relatively simple wiring connection or a diode matrix circuit. The more complicated it is, the better.
Figure 3 shows one example of the scrambling circuit in detail.
The setting device 18 comprises three subsidiary setting sections 180, 181 and 182, by which a three-digit decimal number is set. The outputs from the three subsidiary setting sections 180, 181 and 182 are applied to an extremely complicated logic circuit 190, which scrambles the three-digit number to produce at its output a four-digit number. In Figure 3 the output is shown as 0 ... 9 for convenience of illustration, but actually it comprises, for example, a BCD code.
Returning to Figure 1, a third setting device 20 has set therein a four-digit decimal secret number. It is assumed that when a new card is to be issued, the secret number is set as 1l0000l!.
If each digit of each of above-mentioned five numbers is expressed by an alphabetic letter suffixed with a decimal number, the following will result, with a smaller suffixed number expressing a higher place in each number.
The bank number: Bl - B4 The account number: Al - A8 The balance: Rl - R4 The secret number: Ql - Q4 The bank cipher: Hl - H4 wherein the bank cipher is the output of the scrambled board 19.
The following relations exist between the digits which cons~itute the above numbers.
Ql = Bl + Al + A5 + Rl + Hl + Cl ~2 = B2 + A2 + A6 + R2 + H2 + C2 Q3 = B3 + A3 + A7 + R3 + H3 + C3 .
` 10~i099~;
Q4 = B4 + A4 ~ A8 ~ R4 + H4 + C4 wherein Cl - C4 express the four digits of a four-digit decimal subsidiary code number.
Each digit of the numbers in the above equations is a positive integral number, and both carries and borrows are ignored when operations are conducted.
After the account number and the bala~ce have been entered through the keyboard 15, the operation circuit 14 calculates a subsidiary code Cl -C4 on the basis of the above equations. Since Ql - Q4 are all "0", Cl - C4 is the only unknown number in each of the e~uations so that it is easy to calculate the subsidiary code Cl - C4. The code that has been calculated is stored in a register 21.
After the subsidiary code has been stored in the register 21, the belts 7 and 8 are rotated in thc reverse direction. As the card is carried backward, the R/W clrcuit 10 records the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code stored in the registers 11, 16, 17 and 21, respectively, on the card through a writing head 22. The card is returned through ~he slot 3.
Thus the operation of the apparatus for issuing a new card has been finished. The operation is controlled by means of a control circuit 24 which addresses, decodes and carries out an instruction program stored in a memory device 23. The technics for such control are well known as the fundamental technics for controlling electronic computers, so that no detailed explanation thereof will be given.
It should be particularly noted in the above card issuing operation that the customer need not tell the clerk his secret number and, therefore, immediately after the card has been issued, the secret number selected by the customer or any other corresponding number is not yet recorded on the card.
As will be described later, the secret number is recorded by the owner of the card himself, so that there is no chance for the clerk in charge to know the secret number, thereby reducing the possibility of improper use of the card. The secret number selected by the customer is manually entered by him-self when he uses the card in a cash dispenser for the first time. Figure 2 is a block diagram of a cash dispenser.
The data on the card that has been inserted into the machine by the customer are read by a card reader 30. The read data, that is, the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code are stored in the registers Rl, R2, R3 and R4, respectively, of a storing device 31.
The cash dispenser is provided with a setting device 32 and a scrambling board 33 which are o the same construction as in Figure 1, The bank cipher for the same bank is set in the setting device 32, so that the scrambling board 33 produces the same output Hl - H4 as in the previously mentioned card issueng device in Figure 1.
After the bank number, the account number, the balance and the subsidiary code have been stored in the registers Rl, R2, R3 and R4, an oper-ation or arithmetic circuit 34 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 from these data in the registers on the basis of the previously described equations.
The secret number is stored in a register 35. If the card has been used for the first time, the digits of the secret number must be all "zeros".
Then in order to check if the digits Ql - Q4 of the secret number are all zeros, the operation circuit 34 compares the output of the register 35 and that of the setting device 36 which is all "zeros". Coincidence of the two outputs means that the card is now being used for the first time because as previously mentioned when the card was issued the relation between the above-mentioned numbers was so predetermined that the secret number is "0000". If the two outputs do not coincide, it means that the card has already being used at least one time, as will be described again later.
If the two outputs coincide, that is, the secret number as stored in the register 35 is "0000", an indicator 37 indicates "Please enter a four-digit secret number you intend to use with your card from now on", whereupon the customer enters through a keyboard 38 the four-digit secret number which he desires to use. This secret number is stored in a register Pl included in ~; a storing device 39. Then the indicator 37 indicates "Please enter th~ amount _ g _ ., ~, :
106099~
of money you request", whereupon the customer enters through the keyboard 38 the amount of money he desires to be paid. The entered amount of money is stored in a register P2 in the storing device 39. The indicator 37 can be the well-known type that has an endless curtain on which the above-mention-ed and other necessary indications are printed.
When the requested amount has been entered, the operation circuit 34 substTacts the requested amount stored in the register P2 from the balance stored in the register R3 to obtain a new balance to be stored in a register R5 included in the storing device 31. At the time of subtraction, the oper-ation circuit 34 checks whether the value of the new balance is positive or negative. If it is negative, the balance is short of the requested amount ; of cash and the card is returned to the customer.
If the value of the new balance is positive so that payment is allowed, the operation circuit 34 calculates a new subsidiary code Cl - C4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations.
In this calculation, Ql - Q4 in the equations are the four digits of the secret number entered by the customer and Rl - M are the numbers determined by the new balance stored in the register R5, so that the new subsidiary code Cl - C4 calculated by the operation circuit 34 is different from the subsidiary code when the card was issued. This new subsidiary code Cl - C4 is stored in a register R6 included in the storing device 31.
Then the bank number, the account number, the new balance and the new subsidiary code stored in the registers Rl, R2, R5 and R6, respectively, are recorded on the card. It should be noted here that the subsidiary code is changed by the secret number entered for the first time and the new balance. When the card is used next time, the subsidiary code will be chang-ed by the change of the balance alone, as will be described later.
A slip issuing device 40 then issues a slip on which the account number stored in the register R2, the new balance stored in the register R5 and the requested amount ~that is, the amount of money that has been paid) stored in the register P2 are printed. A recorder 41, which can be a tape puncher, records the same data as those printed on the slip so that the - . .. :. : :
~060996 recorded data will later be processed by a batch process.
The card the data of which have been renewed is returned to the customer together with the slip on which the data have been printed. A cash dispensing device 42 dispenses the number of bills which correspond to the requested amount of money as stored in the register P2. This completes the operation of the cash dispenser when the card has been used for the first time.
When the card is used for the second timP or after that, the operation circuit 34 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 from the output of the scrambling device 33 and the card data stored in the storing device 31 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The secret number obtained is stored in the register 35. Since the values Ql - Q4 are not all "zeros", the contents of the registers 35 and 36 disagree. The disagreement means that the use of the card is not the first use thereof. Then, unlike in the first use of the card, it is necessary to check the secret number entered by the customer. In order to perform this checking of the entered secret number) the operation circuit 34 compares the secret number entered by the customer through the keyboard 38 and stored in the register Pl with the secret number stored in the register 35 to see if the two secret numbers coincide.
If they do not coincide, the card is recognized as being improperly used so as to be returned to the user and the requested payment of cash is refused.
If the two secret numbers coincide, however, the card is recognized as being properly used by an authorized person, so that the indicator 37 indicates "Please input the amount you request." The operation of the system following that indication is quite the same as in the previously mentioned case in which the card was used for the first time. ~See the flow chart shown in Figure 5). That is, when the card is used for the second or more time, the subsidiary code is changed in accordance with the rewritten balance, so that when the card is used next time, the secret number Ql - Q4 calculated by the operation circuit must necessarily coinicide with the secret number :
: . ...
~06099~
entered initially by the customer.
If the customer has entered all 0's as the secret number when the card is used for the first time, the same operation as in the first use of the card takes place for the second use thereof. This would not cause so much inconvenience, but if the card is stolen and illegilly used by an unauthorized person, entry of any secret number would cause the apparatus to operate. To avoid this, preferably the customer should be advised not to enter all zeros as`the secret number when he uses the card for the first time, and the program is so arranged that if nevertheless he has entered all zeros as the secret number! he is requested to do the operation over again.
The above-mentioned operation is controlled by a control circuit 44 on the basis of a predetermined program stored in a memory device 43. The techinics for such control are well known in the art as previously mentioned in connection with the card issuing apparatus shown in Figure 1.
In the above the invention has been described as applied to an off-line cash dispenser. Another embodiment of the invention as applied to an on-line cash dispenser cto be referred to as the on-line CD) will next be described. The card for use in the on-line CD has recorded thereon the account number alone as the data by which access can be made to the balance, etc. stored in a center file. -In the card issuing apparatus shown in Figure 6, the clerk in charge puts into a card reader 50 a new card to be issued to a customer. The card is pulled in and stopped in the card reader. Then the clerk inputs through a keyboard 51 the account number allotted to the customer and the amount of money deposited to open the account, that is, the balance of the account, whereupon the account number and the balance are once stored in a register 52 and thence sent to a central station through a transmission con-trol circuit 53 and a terminal MODEM 54. Reference should also be made to Figure 8.
The account number and the balance sent from the terminal machine to the central station are applied through a MODEM 55 and a communication control circuit 56 to a central processing unit 57 ~to be referred to as the ~ ' ' CPU hereinafter) and stored in registers 58 and 59, respectively.
In the CPU the bank number and all "zeros" are set in setting devices 60 and 61, respectively, and the bank cipher is set in a setting device 62. A scrambling board 63 scrambles the bank cipher to produce a corresponding output. These setting devices 60, 61 and 62 and the scrambling board 63 correspond to the setting device 13, 20 and 18 and the scrambling board 19 of Figure 1, respectively.
After the account number and thc balance have been stored in the registers 58 and 59, an operation control circuit 64 (which will be referred to as the AR circuit hereinafter) calculates a subsidiary code Cl - C4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The calculated code is stored in a register 65.
Then the balance stored in the register 59 is stored in a memory register 67 included in a memory device 66. A reading and writing circuit 68 operates so that access is made by the account number stored in the register 58 to the corresponding area in a file 69 so as to record the balance in that area. In a similar manner, the subsidiary code is also recorded in the area of the account. Typically, the file comprises a magnetic disk or a magnetic drum.
When the above recording of the balance and the subsidiary code in the corresponding area of the file has been completed, the AR circuit 64 produces a completion message, which is sent back to the terminal machine through the communication control circuit 56, the MODEM 55, and MODEM 54 and the transmission control circuit 53.
` The card reader 50 receives the signal and operates to record the account number on the card and the card is returned to the customer. In this case, the balance is not recorded on the card. The operation of issuing a card has thus been completed.
How the on-line CD is operated by the card that has been issued in the above manner will now be described.
In the on-line CD shown in Figure 7 the card is put into the machine by the customer. The account number read from the card is stored in ' ' , .
.
~060996 a register 71. Reference should be made also to the flow chart shown in Figure 9. The customer then manipulates a keyboard 72 to enter the secret number and the amount of money which he requests to be paid. The secret number and the requested amount are once stored in registers 73 and 74, respectively, and then these data together with the account number stored in the register 71, are sent to a central station through a transmission control circuit 75 and a MODEM 54. At the central station, these data, that is, the account number, the secret number and the requested amount are applied through a MODEM 55 and a communication control circuit 56 to be stored in registers 76, 77 and 78, respectively.
As previously mentioned in connection with the card issuing apparatus, the bank cipher Hl - H4 is produced by scrambling board 63 con-nected to the setting device 62 and the bank number Bl - B4 is set in the setting device 60 and the balance Rl - R4 and the subsidiary code Cl - C4 are stored in the file 69. By the account number stored in the register 76 access is made to the file 69 so that the balance of the account and the subsidiary code are successively called through the reading and writing cir-cuit 68 and the memory register 67 so as to be stored in the registers 79 and 65, respectively, in the CPU 57.
The AR circuit 64 calculates a secret number Ql - Q4 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations, and the calculated secret number is stored in a regis~er 80. Then the AR circuit 64 checks if the secret number stored in the register 80 and the contents ~all zeros) of the setting device 61 coincide.
If the contents of the register 80 and those of the setting device 61 coincide, that is, if all the digits of the calculated secret number are "O", it means that the card is now being used for the first time, so that the new balance is calculated without checking the secret number sent from the terminal machine and stored in the register 77.
If the contents of the register 80 and the setting device 61 do not coincide, that is, if the calculated secret number is not all "zeros", the card is recogni~ed as having already been used before, that is, the 106099~;
present use of the card is not its first use, whereupon the AR circuit 64 compares the secret number sent from the terminal machine and stored in the register 77 and the calculated secret number stored in the register 80. If the two numbers do not coincideJ it means improper use of the card, so that a payment rejection message is sent to the terminal machine. I they coin-cide, howeverJ it means proper use o the card, so that the new balance is calculated as in the above case in which the card has been used for the first time.
The new balance is calculated by the AR circuit 64 which subtracts the requested amount stored in the register 78 from the existing balance stored in the register 79. If the result of the subtraction is negative, the balance is short of the requested amount so that a payment rejection message is sent to the terminal machine.
When the new balance has been calculated, the AR circuit 64 cal-culates a new subsidiary code Cl C4 from the bank number set in the register 60, the account number stored in the register 76, the new balance stored in the register 19, the bank cipher provided by the scrambling board 63 and the secret n~mber stored in the register 77 on the basis of the previously mentioned equations. The calculated anew subsidiary code is stored again in the register 65.
Then the new balance stored in the register 79 and the new subsidiary code stored in the register 65 are successively recorded in the corresponding one of the recording areas in the file 69 which access is made by the account number stored in the register 76 in place of the previ-ous data recorded therein.
Then the AR circuit 64 sends a payment permission message and the new balance to the cash dispenser through the communication control circuit 56.
The message sent from the central station through the MODEM 55, the MODEM 54 and the transmission control circuit 75 is checked by a message discriminating circuit 81. If the message is recognized as the payment rejection message, the card reader 70 returns the card it has until then .
3 06~9'~6 boen keeping and the indicator 82 indicates payment rejection.
If the message is recognized as the payment permission message~
slip issuing device 83 issues a slip on which the account number stored in the register 71, the requested amount ~that is, the amount paid) stored in the register 74 and the new balance in the discriminating circuit 81 are printed. At the same time the card reader 70 returns to the customer the card on which the accoun~ number has been recorded. ~The account number remains the same and is`not changed.).
After the card has been returned, a cash dispensing device 84 dispenses the number of bills which correspond to the requested amount stored in the register 74.
Thus the explanation of the on-line CD and the card issuing appar-atus used therewith has been completed.
The invention is not limited to the above embodiments, but there are various other modifications thereof such as follows:
~1) As the parameters for calculating the secret number, the date of use of the card, the number of times of use of the card, etc. may be used individually or in combination instead of the balance. These para-meters may be recorded on the card or a recording medium to which access is made by the card. In a POS ~point of sales) system, the balance may mean - the total of the prices of the articles the customer has purchased.
(2~ Besides the cash dispenser, the invention can be applied to a deposit machine, a POS system, or a security gate system, etc.
~3) In the above embodiments in order to check whether the card is used for the first time a predetermined operation is conducted. Alter-natively, when a card is issued, the code which directly means the first use of the card may be recorded on the card or a recording medium to which access is made by the card. When the card is used for the first time, the code expressing the first use of the card is erased or changed before returning the card to the customer.
(4) The functions of theequations for calculating the secret number from the subsidiary code, etc. may be trigonometrical, square, cubic, or any other forms.
(5) Even when the card is used for the irst time, lt is possible to check the secret number. In this case, the user of the card is recogniz-ed as the owner of the card, regardless of the result of the checking. This can be effected by merely changing the program.
~ 6) For checking of the manually entered secret number, all the digits of the balance need not be used, but some of them, e.g. the lowest four digits alone may be used, or the complement of the number expressing the balance may also be used.
~7) In the illustrated embodiments the secret number is entered when the card is used in the cash dispenser for the first time. This need not always be so, but an encoder for exclusive use by the customer himself may be provided so as to enable the customer to enter the secret number.
Such an encoder may be incorporated into the card issuing device. In this case, it is necessary to prevent the clerk in charge from seeing the secret number as the customer operates to enter the number into the machine.
~8) In the illustrated embodiments, the secret number entered by the customer is not recorded as it is, but it is combined with other numbers as parameters. This arrangement helps to reduce the possibility of the secret number being known to other persons. It is of course possible to record the secret number as it is entered by the customer.
,' ' ' `
Claims (14)
PROPERTY OR PRIVILEGE IS CLAIMED ARE DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
1. A system for verifying the user of a card comprising; means for taking out data by said card; means operable by the user of said card to input a secret number; first checking means for checking correspondence between said data and said secret number; second checking means for checking whether said data include predetermined specific data; and means for recognizing said user as the proper user of said card if said second checking means detects that said data include said specific data, regardless of said first checking means.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein said specific data means the first use of said card.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein said data are recorded on said card, and said means for taking out said data is a card reader for reading said data from said card.
4. The system of claim 1, wherein said card has an account number recorded thereon, and said data are stored in a memory device; and said means for taking out said data comprises a card reader for reading said account number from said card, and means for withdrawing from said memory device the data which are stored therein in correspondence to said account number and to which access is made by said account number.
5. The system of claim 1, wherein said second checking means com-prises means for performing an operation on said taken out data to obtain different data, means for setting specific data which mean the first use of said card, and means for comparing said different data and specific data.
6. The system of claim 1, wherein said data taken out by said card comprise at least two kinds of data; and said first checking means performs a predetermined operation on said two kinds of data and said secret number in accordance with predetermined functional equations.
7. The system of claim 6, wherein one of said at least two kinds of data is the balance of the account the owner of said card has.
8. A system for verifying the user of a card comprising: means man-ually operable by said user to enter a secret number; means for taking out data by means of said card; means for checking whether said data are the data that means the first use of said card; control means operable in respon-se to said checking means detecting said data that means the first use of said card to cause said user to operate said manually operable means to enter a secret number as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
9. A system for verifying the user of a card comprising: a card issuing device comprising a first operation means for calculating a subsidi-ary code from at least useful data and a specific code and a first recording means for recording said useful data and said subsidiary code on said card;
and an encoding device comprising means for checking whether said useful data and said subsidiary code read from said card coincides with said specif-ic code, means operable by the user of said card to enter a secret number, means for obtaining new useful data to renew said useful data, a second operation means operable in response to said checking means having detected said coincidence to calculate a new subsidiary code from said secret number and said new useful data, and a second recording means for recording said new data and said new subsidiary code on said card.
and an encoding device comprising means for checking whether said useful data and said subsidiary code read from said card coincides with said specif-ic code, means operable by the user of said card to enter a secret number, means for obtaining new useful data to renew said useful data, a second operation means operable in response to said checking means having detected said coincidence to calculate a new subsidiary code from said secret number and said new useful data, and a second recording means for recording said new data and said new subsidiary code on said card.
10. The system of claim 9, wherein said specific code means the first use of said card and said useful data include the balance of the account of said user.
11. A system for verifying the user of a card comprising; means for taking out at least the balance of an account and a subsidiary code by means of said card; means manually operable by said user to enter a secret number;
means for checking correspondence between said balance, said subsidiary code and said secret number; means for setting an amount of money for a trans-action; means for calculating a new balance from said balance and said amount of money and calculating a new subsidiary code from said new balance and said secret number; and means for storing said new balance and said new subsidiary code as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
means for checking correspondence between said balance, said subsidiary code and said secret number; means for setting an amount of money for a trans-action; means for calculating a new balance from said balance and said amount of money and calculating a new subsidiary code from said new balance and said secret number; and means for storing said new balance and said new subsidiary code as data to be taken out when said card is used next time.
12. The system of claim 1, further including means operable by the supervisor of said system to set a cipher; and wherein said second checking means comprises operation means for performing predetermined operations on said data and said cipher to produce different data, means for setting specific data meaning the first use of said card, and means for comparing said different data and said specific data.
13. The system of claim 8, further including means operable by the supervisor of said system to set a cipher, and wherein said checking means checks whether said card is used for the first time on the basis of said taken out data and said cipher.
14. The system of claim 11, further including means operable by the supervisor of said system to set a cipher, and wherein said checking means checks correspondence between at least said balance, said subsidiary code, said secret number and said cipher, and said operation means calculates a new subsidiary code from said new balance, said secret number and said cipher.
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| JP7848174A JPS5329542B2 (en) | 1974-07-08 | 1974-07-08 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| CA1060996A true CA1060996A (en) | 1979-08-21 |
Family
ID=13663179
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| CA230,931A Expired CA1060996A (en) | 1974-07-08 | 1975-07-07 | System for verifying the user of a card |
Country Status (10)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| JP (1) | JPS5329542B2 (en) |
| CA (1) | CA1060996A (en) |
| CH (1) | CH615034A5 (en) |
| DE (1) | DE2528668C3 (en) |
| FR (1) | FR2278115A1 (en) |
| GB (1) | GB1458646A (en) |
| HK (1) | HK53879A (en) |
| IT (1) | IT1040848B (en) |
| MY (1) | MY8000085A (en) |
| SE (1) | SE429069B (en) |
Families Citing this family (22)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE2738113C2 (en) * | 1976-09-06 | 1998-07-16 | Gao Ges Automation Org | Device for performing machining operations with an identifier |
| JPS5350351U (en) * | 1976-09-30 | 1978-04-27 | ||
| CA1100593A (en) * | 1976-10-28 | 1981-05-05 | Atalla Technovations Corporation | Programmable security system and method |
| DE2708316C2 (en) * | 1977-02-25 | 1984-03-15 | Diebold, Inc., 44702 Canton, Ohio | Process for determining whether the owner of a card is authorized to use a terminal of a network system, and a device for carrying out the process |
| JPS55115157A (en) * | 1979-02-26 | 1980-09-04 | Ricoh Co Ltd | Picture processing unit |
| JPS59154572A (en) * | 1983-02-23 | 1984-09-03 | Omron Tateisi Electronics Co | Transaction settling device |
| DE3320680A1 (en) * | 1983-06-06 | 1984-12-13 | AV - Hähnel Gesellschaft für elektronische Bild- und Tonanlagen mbH, 5000 Köln | Hospital information, communication and accounting arrangement |
| SE440287B (en) * | 1983-11-28 | 1985-07-22 | Kurt Paulsson | DEVICE FOR A TERMINAL SYSTEM |
| US4650977A (en) | 1983-12-21 | 1987-03-17 | International Business Machines Corporation | Automatic self service machine system and method |
| JPS60205688A (en) * | 1984-03-29 | 1985-10-17 | Toshiba Corp | Portable medium |
| JPH0721812B2 (en) * | 1984-05-18 | 1995-03-08 | オムロン株式会社 | Transaction processor |
| JPS613279A (en) * | 1984-06-18 | 1986-01-09 | Toshiba Corp | Portable electronic device |
| JPS6116361A (en) * | 1984-07-02 | 1986-01-24 | Omron Tateisi Electronics Co | Transaction processing system |
| GB2199681A (en) * | 1986-10-17 | 1988-07-13 | Henry James Davey | Anti fraud system |
| JPH0268739U (en) * | 1988-11-15 | 1990-05-24 | ||
| US4965568A (en) * | 1989-03-01 | 1990-10-23 | Atalla Martin M | Multilevel security apparatus and method with personal key |
| DE4026221A1 (en) * | 1990-08-18 | 1992-02-20 | Harting Elektronik Gmbh | DEVICE FOR ELECTRONICALLY RELEASING THE DOOR LOCKING OF A GOODS MACHINE |
| JPH0691619B2 (en) * | 1991-06-24 | 1994-11-14 | 株式会社リコー | Image processing device |
| GB2261538B (en) * | 1991-11-13 | 1995-05-24 | Bank Of England | Transaction authentication system |
| DE4205615A1 (en) * | 1992-02-24 | 1993-08-26 | Provera Ges Fuer Projektierung | Secret PIN number input into electronic system - has card inserted into input carrier that provides storage of number for un-observed reading |
| DE19541081C2 (en) * | 1995-11-03 | 1998-04-09 | Frank Culjak | Protected data transmission device |
| DE102008056708B3 (en) * | 2008-11-11 | 2010-04-22 | Giesecke & Devrient Gmbh | Method for assigning a portable data carrier, in particular a chip card, to a terminal |
Family Cites Families (2)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US3221304A (en) * | 1961-02-23 | 1965-11-30 | Marquardt Corp | Electronic identification system employing a data bearing identification card |
| US3512298A (en) * | 1968-07-17 | 1970-05-19 | Donald B Poynter | Coin return amusement device |
-
1974
- 1974-07-08 JP JP7848174A patent/JPS5329542B2/ja not_active Expired
-
1975
- 1975-06-20 GB GB2638075A patent/GB1458646A/en not_active Expired
- 1975-06-27 SE SE7507404A patent/SE429069B/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1975-06-27 DE DE2528668A patent/DE2528668C3/en not_active Expired
- 1975-07-01 CH CH853275A patent/CH615034A5/en not_active IP Right Cessation
- 1975-07-07 IT IT50392/75A patent/IT1040848B/en active
- 1975-07-07 CA CA230,931A patent/CA1060996A/en not_active Expired
- 1975-07-07 FR FR7521265A patent/FR2278115A1/en active Granted
-
1979
- 1979-08-02 HK HK538/79A patent/HK53879A/en unknown
-
1980
- 1980-12-30 MY MY85/80A patent/MY8000085A/en unknown
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| HK53879A (en) | 1979-08-10 |
| SE7507404L (en) | 1976-01-09 |
| DE2528668B2 (en) | 1981-05-14 |
| SE429069B (en) | 1983-08-08 |
| DE2528668C3 (en) | 1986-10-23 |
| CH615034A5 (en) | 1979-12-28 |
| FR2278115B1 (en) | 1977-12-16 |
| FR2278115A1 (en) | 1976-02-06 |
| MY8000085A (en) | 1980-12-31 |
| JPS517841A (en) | 1976-01-22 |
| JPS5329542B2 (en) | 1978-08-22 |
| GB1458646A (en) | 1976-12-15 |
| DE2528668A1 (en) | 1976-08-12 |
| IT1040848B (en) | 1979-12-20 |
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