JP2011122377A - Electronic key system - Google Patents

Abstract

<P>PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED: To provide an electronic key system capable of hardly causing the illegal operation of a communication object by an illegal act using a relay. <P>SOLUTION: The electronic key system is adapted to permit locking/unlocking of a door lock installed at a vehicle 2 when an electronic key 1 returns an ID code signal Sid to the vehicle 2 to perform ID collation and a vehicle outside door handle 25 provided at the vehicle is operated under the establishment of the ID collation. The electronic key system includes a vibrator 17, a buzzer 18 and an indicator 19 for presenting the specific content of a specific operation imposed on a user as one authentication other than ID collation, as specific operation presenting action by the electronic key 1 in a collation process, and a specific operation determining part 21c performing specific operation collation for collating specific operation and execution operation performed to the vehicle 2 based on the specific operation presenting action, and permitting locking/unlocking of the door lock by the vehicle outside door handle 25 on condition that the ID collation is established while the specific operation collation is established. <P>COPYRIGHT: (C)2011,JPO&INPIT

Description

  The present invention relates to an electronic key system.

  2. Description of the Related Art In recent years, in vehicle key systems, an electronic key system that uses an electronic key that can wirelessly transmit an ID code as a unique key code of the key is used as a vehicle key in various vehicle types. In this electronic key system, there is a key operation free system that does not require button operation on the electronic key when the ID code is transmitted from the electronic key, that is, the ID code is automatically transmitted from the electronic key. In this system, a request communication area is formed by a LF band signal as an ID code return request around the vehicle, and when the electronic key enters the communication area and receives the request, the electronic key sends the ID code to the RF band signal. Reply to the vehicle with When the vehicle receives the ID code, the vehicle performs ID verification. If the ID verification is established, the vehicle permits or executes door lock locking / unlocking and engine start (for example, see Patent Document 1).

JP 2002-29385 A JP 2006-161545 A

  By the way, as a technique for performing ID verification illegally, for example, a malicious third party uses a relay that can relay a request from a vehicle and an ID code from an electronic key. There are those that can transmit and receive between the electronic key and the vehicle even if they are not present in the area. For this reason, if the user is far away from the vehicle and is not interested in the vehicle, the ID code of the electronic key possessed by the user is illegally made to reach the vehicle by the repeater, and ID verification is established unintentionally. There is no denying the possibility of this (for example, see Patent Document 2).

  Since the distance between the vehicle and the repeater and the distance between the electronic key and the repeater must be less than the communication distance between the vehicle and the electronic key, that is, a few meters, no actual damage has been reported. However, if an illegal act using this repeater is realized, the door lock may be unlocked by a third party and the engine may be started. Therefore, it has been desired to suppress unauthorized operation of equipment mounted on a vehicle due to unauthorized acts using a repeater.

  Similarly, in an electronic key system in which an electronic key is used as a key for a door of a building (house), the door lock may be unlocked by an illegal act using a repeater. Therefore, even in such an electronic key system for buildings, it has been desired to suppress unauthorized operation of equipment provided in the building due to unauthorized acts using a repeater.

  The present invention has been made in view of such circumstances, and an object of the present invention is to provide an electronic key system that can prevent an unauthorized operation of a communication target due to an unauthorized action using a repeater.

Hereinafter, means for achieving the above-described object and its operation and effects will be described.
According to the first aspect of the present invention, when the electronic key receives a reply request for the ID code transmitted from the communication target, the electronic key returns the ID code to the communication target, ID verification is performed, and the communication target In the electronic key system in which the device corresponding to the operation means operates when the operation means provided in the ID check is established, the user is provided as one authentication other than the ID check in the electronic key system. Specific operation presenting means for presenting the specific content of the specific operation imposed on the electronic key as the specific operation presenting operation with the electronic key in the collation process; provided in the communication target; and performed on the communication target based on the specific operation presenting operation The specific operation matching is performed by comparing the execution operation and the specific operation, and the specific operation verification is established and the ID verification is established. Te, and its gist, further comprising an authentication means to permit operation of the device by the operation means.

  According to this configuration, even if the ID verification between the electronic key and the communication target is established, the operation of the communication target device cannot be executed unless the specific operation verification is further established. For this reason, even if a third party who attempts to steal equipment establishes ID verification by an illegal act using a repeater, the third party cannot know the specific operation. I can't. Therefore, it is possible to fail user authentication due to fraud using the repeater, and thus it is possible to prevent unauthorized operation by a third party. In addition, even if a third party imagines a specific operation and an operation performed appropriately matches the specific operation presented, the electronic key presents the specific operation. It is possible to recognize that the communication target and the communication target are communicating, and it is possible to perform crime prevention actions such as confirming the status of the communication target.

The invention according to claim 2 is the gist of the electronic key system according to claim 1, wherein the operation target of the specific operation is the operation means.
According to this configuration, since the operating means operated when operating the device is the operation target of the specific operation, it is not necessary for the user to operate the separate member for the specific operation when operating the device. Therefore, even if a specific operation is imposed on the user, the convenience is not greatly impaired.

  According to a third aspect of the present invention, in the electronic key system according to the first or second aspect, the specific operation verification is executed after the ID verification is established.

  According to this configuration, the ID collation and the specific operation collation are not processed at the same time, but the specific operation collation is executed after the ID collation is established. For this reason, when the ID collation is not established, the specific operation collation is not executed, so that unnecessary collation operation is not performed.

  According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic key system according to any one of the first to third aspects, the electronic key selects one operation from a plurality of the specific operations prepared in advance. Electronic key side selection means is provided, the electronic key side selection means sends the selected specific operation to the communication object and notifies the communication target, and the authentication means grasps the specific operation by notification from the electronic key. Then, the gist is to execute the specific operation collation.

  According to this configuration, since the specific operation selection is performed on the electronic key side, for example, the specific operation presentation operation of the electronic key is selected according to the design requirements before, at the same time, or after the transmission of the ID code. It becomes possible. Further, for example, when an ID code is returned to the communication target, it is possible to realize the transmission without newly increasing the number by transmitting a specific operation together.

  According to a fifth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic key system according to any one of the first to third aspects, the communication target selects one operation from a plurality of the specific operations prepared in advance. A communication target side selection unit is provided, the communication target side selection unit sends the selected specific operation to the electronic key and notifies the electronic key, and the specific operation presenting unit is notified by the notification from the communication target. The gist of this is to grasp the above and execute the specific operation presentation operation.

  According to the configuration, since the specific operation selection is performed on the communication target side, the communication target performs all of the specific operation selection and the specific operation determination together with the ID verification in the operation for preventing the illegal operation due to the fraud using the repeater. It becomes possible. Therefore, when this configuration is added to an existing electronic key system, the addition becomes easy.

  According to a sixth aspect of the present invention, in the electronic key system according to any one of the first to fifth aspects, the authentication unit controls the operation of the device by the operation unit when the specific operation verification is not established. The gist is to prohibit it.

According to this configuration, if the execution operation for the communication target is not correct, the operation of the communication target device is prohibited, so that unauthorized use of the device can be prevented more reliably.
A seventh aspect of the present invention is the electronic key system according to any one of the first to sixth aspects, wherein the electronic key includes a stop capable of stopping communication of the ID collation with the communication target. The gist is that a switch is provided.

  According to this configuration, if the stop switch is operated, it is possible to stop the communication for ID verification between the electronic key and the communication target at the time of the switch operation. For this reason, even if a third party luckily performs a correct specific operation, if the communication can be forcibly stopped at that time by operating the stop switch, the subsequent ID verification is not continued by the third party.

  ADVANTAGE OF THE INVENTION According to this invention, the electronic key system which can make it difficult to generate | occur | produce the unauthorized operation of the communication object by the unauthorized act using a repeater can be provided.

The block diagram which shows schematic structure of an electronic key system. The external view of an electronic key. The top view which shows the structure of a door handle outside a vehicle. The time chart which shows the timing of specific operation presentation operation | movement and specific operation determination. The time chart which shows the timing of specific operation presentation operation | movement and specific operation determination. The time chart which shows the timing of specific operation presentation operation | movement and specific operation determination. The figure which shows the outline of the fraudulent act using a repeater. The time chart which shows the communication operation | movement of an electronic key system. The flowchart which shows control of the vehicle at the time of ID collation of an electronic key system. The time chart which shows the communication operation | movement of an electronic key system. The flowchart which shows control of the vehicle at the time of ID collation of an electronic key system.

(First embodiment)
A first embodiment in which an electronic key system according to the present invention is applied to a vehicle will be described below with reference to FIGS.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the vehicle 2 includes an electronic key that can perform vehicle operations such as locking / unlocking a door lock and starting / stopping an engine without the driver actually operating the vehicle key. The system, so-called key operation free system is installed. Here, the vehicle 2 is a communication target of the electronic key 1. In the key operation free system, an electronic key 1 capable of transmitting a key-specific ID code by wireless communication is used as a vehicle key, and ID verification is executed with the vehicle 2 by narrow area wireless communication.

  In the key operation free system, there is an entry system in which ID verification is automatically performed when the vehicle 2 approaches or leaves the vehicle 2 and door lock / unlock is permitted. This will be described below. The vehicle 2 includes a verification ECU (Electronic Control Unit) 21 that performs ID verification when performing narrow-area wireless communication with the electronic key 1, and a main that manages the power supply system of the vehicle 2. A body ECU 31 is provided. The verification ECU 21 includes an outside LF transmitter 22 embedded in each door of the vehicle 2 and capable of transmitting an LF (Low Frequency) band signal to the outside of the vehicle, and an LF band radio signal embedded in the vehicle under the floor of the vehicle. An in-vehicle LF transmitter 23 capable of transmitting and an RF receiver 24 embedded in a vehicle body or the like behind the vehicle and capable of receiving radio signals in an RF (Radio Frequency) band are connected. For example, a main body ECU 31 that manages door lock locking / unlocking and the like is connected to the verification ECU 21 via an in-vehicle LAN (Local Area Network) 30.

  On the other hand, the electronic key 1 is provided with a communication control unit 11 as a control unit for performing wireless communication with the vehicle 2 according to the electronic key system. The communication control unit 11 includes a memory 11a in which an ID code is stored as a unique key code. Connected to the communication control unit 11 are an LF reception unit 12 capable of receiving an LF band signal transmitted externally and an RF transmission unit 13 capable of transmitting an RF band signal in accordance with a command from the communication control unit 11. Yes.

  The verification ECU 21 intermittently transmits a request signal Srq in the LF band from the outside LF transmitter 22 to form an outside communication area around the vehicle 2. When the electronic key 1 enters the outside communication area and receives the request signal Srq by the LF receiver 12, the electronic key 1 includes an ID code registered in its own memory 11a in response to the request signal Srq. An RF band ID code signal Sid is returned from the RF transmitter 13. When the verification ECU 21 receives the ID code signal Sid by the RF receiver 24, the verification ECU 21 compares the ID code registered in its own memory 21a with the ID code of the electronic key 1 and performs smart verification (external vehicle verification) as ID verification. The establishment of the vehicle outside verification is made one condition for permitting the door lock.

  Further, the electronic key system includes a one-push engine start system as a function capable of performing an engine start / stop operation only by a simple switch operation without requiring an actual vehicle key operation at the time of engine start / stop operation. The one-push engine start system will be described below. The vehicle 2 is provided with an engine ECU 32 that performs engine ignition control and fuel injection control on the basis of the result of ID verification establishment by the verification ECU 21. The engine ECU 32 is connected to various ECUs such as the verification ECU 21 through the in-vehicle LAN 30. The driver's seat of the vehicle 2 is provided with an engine switch 33 that is operated when switching the power supply state (power supply position) of the vehicle 2. Each time the engine switch 33 is pushed, the power state is repeatedly changed in the order of ACC on → IG on → power off. When the engine is operated with the brake pedal depressed when the engine is stopped, the engine is switched to start. .

  The verification ECU 21 transmits a request signal Srq from the in-vehicle LF transmitter 23 when, for example, the courtesy switch 37 recognizes that the door is opened and the driver has boarded after the vehicle exterior verification is established and the door lock is unlocked. Thus, an in-vehicle communication area is formed throughout the vehicle. When the ID code signal Sid returned by the electronic key 1 entering the in-vehicle communication area is received by the RF receiver 24, the verification ECU 21 compares the ID code registered in the electronic key 1 with the ID code of the electronic key 1. Then, smart verification (in-vehicle verification) is performed as ID verification, and the establishment of in-vehicle verification is set as one condition for permission of power supply state switching.

  In addition, the electronic key system includes a wireless key system as a function capable of wirelessly transmitting a locking signal S1 or an unlocking signal Sul to the vehicle 2 by operating the switch of the electronic key 1 to lock and unlock the door lock. . The aforementioned verification ECU 21 also manages the operation of the wireless key system. The electronic key 1 is provided with a locking switch 14 for transmitting the locking signal S1 and an unlocking switch 15 for transmitting the unlocking signal Sul exposed on the surface of the casing (see FIG. 2). The locking switch 14 and the unlocking switch 15 are connected to the communication control unit 11. The lock switch 14 and the unlock switch 15 function as operation switches. The RF transmitter 13 modulates the communication data obtained from the communication controller 11 and transmits an RF band locking signal S1 or an unlocking signal Sul including the unique ID code of the electronic key 1.

  When the lock switch 14 is operated, a lock signal S1 is transmitted from the RF transmitter 13 of the electronic key 1. When the verification ECU 21 receives the locking signal Sl by the RF receiver 24, the verification ECU 21 compares the ID code registered in its own memory 21a with the ID code of the electronic key 1, and confirms that ID verification is established. A door lock locking command is output to the main body ECU 31, and the door lock device 38 is locked. On the other hand, when the unlock switch 15 is operated, the unlock signal Sul is transmitted from the RF transmitter 13 of the electronic key 1. When the ID verification of the ID code in the unlock signal Sul is established, an unlock command is output from the verification ECU 21 to the main body ECU 31, and the door lock device 38 unlocks the door lock.

  Further, as shown in FIG. 1, the ID verification is encrypted communication encrypted by challenge response authentication. Challenge response authentication means that the vehicle 2 sends a challenge signal Scc to the electronic key 1 during ID verification, causes the electronic key 1 to calculate the response of the challenge signal Scc, and determines whether the response signal Sre takes a correct calculation result. 2 is a type of authentication to be confirmed. When the verification ECU 21 receives the response signal Sre from the electronic key 1 as the calculation result for the challenge signal Scc, the verification ECU 21 compares the response of the electronic key 1 with the response calculated by itself, and verifies the establishment of the verification as an ID. One condition for the establishment of verification.

  In addition, the electronic key system of this example presents information related to vehicle operation, that is, a specific operation in the electronic key 1 at the time of ID verification after ID verification is established, on the condition that the operation is executed on the vehicle 2. An authentication form is used to lock and unlock the door lock or start and stop the engine. That is, the electronic key system performs ID verification establishment and specific operation verification as user authentication, and executes door lock locking / unlocking and engine start / stop on the condition that both verifications are established. In this example, the electronic key 1 notifies a specific operation (hereinafter referred to as a specific operation presenting operation), notifies the vehicle 2 of the specific operation, and the execution operation performed on the vehicle 2 matches the specific operation. The specific operation is verified by checking whether or not to do so. The door is locked and unlocked outside the vehicle, and the engine is started and stopped inside the vehicle.

  The electronic key 1 is provided with a vibrator 17, a buzzer 18, and an indicator 19 as specific operation presenting means for performing a specific operation presenting operation. The vibrator 17 performs the specific operation presentation operation by changing the vibration time and the vibration interval. The buzzer 18 performs the specific operation presentation operation by changing the blowing time and the blowing interval. The indicator 19 includes two lighting portions 19a and 19b (see FIG. 2), and changes the lighting time and lighting interval, and further performs a specific operation presentation operation by combining lighting of the two lighting portions 19a and 19b. Operations of the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are managed by the communication control unit 11.

  As shown in FIG. 3, an exterior door handle 25 as an operation means of the vehicle 2 includes two first touch sensors 26 and a second touch sensor 27 that are touch-operated when unlocking the vehicle door, and a vehicle door. There is provided a lock button 28 that is operated to push the button. The specific operation in this example is set by an operation sequence of the operation order and the number of operations of the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27. That is, the specific operation is confirmed by checking whether or not the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are operated in a predetermined order and number of times. In addition, a plurality of specific operations are prepared in advance, and one of these operations is selected for each ID collation, and notification corresponding to the selected specific operation is executed on the electronic key 1.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the communication control unit 11 notifies the vehicle 2 which specific operation has been selected from among a plurality of characteristic operations, that is, a specific operation code is transmitted to the vehicle 2 during ID verification communication. There is provided a specific operation selection unit 11b as electronic key side selection means for transmitting to the terminal. The specific operation code is stored in the memory 11a together with a notification format corresponding to each specific operation. The specific operation selection unit 11b reads the specific operation code stored in the memory 11a, and causes the RF transmission unit 13 to transmit the specific operation code by including it in the response signal Sre at the time of challenge response authentication.

  The communication control unit 11 is provided with a notification execution unit 11c that causes the electronic key 1 to execute notification corresponding to the specific operation selected by the specific operation selection unit 11b, that is, the specific operation presenting operation. The notification execution unit 11c performs notification corresponding to the specific operation via the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 with reference to, for example, after the response signal Sre is transmitted. That is, after the response signal Sre is transmitted from the electronic key 1, a specific operation is presented by the electronic key 1 to the user who is the key holder, and the user is caused to execute the specific operation.

  The verification ECU 21 is provided with a specific operation confirmation unit 21b for confirming what the specific operation selected by the electronic key 1 is by reading the specific operation code included in the response signal Sre transmitted from the electronic key 1. ing.

  Further, the verification ECU 21 is provided with a specific operation determination unit 21c as an authentication unit that determines whether or not a correct specific operation is performed on the vehicle 2. The specific operation determination unit 21c compares the specific operation confirmed by the specific operation confirmation unit 21b, that is, the specific operation selected by the electronic key 1 and the execution operation actually performed on itself (that is, the vehicle 2). The correctness of the specific operation is determined. At this time, the specific operation determination unit 21c starts determination based on reception of the response signal Sre. When the specific operation determination unit 21c determines that the correct specific operation is being performed on the vehicle 2, the specific operation determination unit 21c causes the door lock to be locked / unlocked or the engine to be started and stopped based on the establishment of both ID verification.

  On the other hand, if the specific operation determination unit 21c determines that the correct specific operation is not performed on the vehicle 2, there is a high possibility that the operation is an illegal operation by an illegal act using a repeater even if ID verification is established. And smart communication is prohibited on the vehicle 2 side. The specific operation determination unit 21c prohibits the smart communication of the vehicle 2 when the lock switch 14 or the unlock switch 15 is operated with the electronic key 1 and the wireless key communication is established when the vehicle 2 is in the smart communication prohibited state. Release the state. That is, the specific operation determination unit 21c resumes the transmission of the wake signal Swk.

  As shown in FIGS. 4 to 6, there are, for example, three types of specific operations outside the vehicle. First, as shown in FIG. 4, the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are continuously operated for a certain period of time as a specific operation presentation operation, and during the period in which these are operating, the first touch sensor 26 and This is an operation of touching at least one of the second touch sensors 27. It should be noted that the specific operation determination unit 21c specifies the specific operation when the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are touched while the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are not operated while the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are active. Determines that no operation has been performed and stops smart communication.

  Second, as shown in FIG. 5, the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are actuated several times at the same timing as the specific operation presenting action, and the first touch sensor 26 and the This is an operation of touching at least one of the two touch sensors 27 by the same number. It should be noted that the specific operation determination unit 21c determines the specific operation when the number of touches is different from the number of activations of the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 while the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are active. It is determined that has not been performed, and smart communication is stopped.

  As shown in FIG. 6, the third type is a specific operation presentation operation, for example, the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are operated twice, for example, the first type is activated twice and the second type is activated once. Are operated in combination, the first touch sensor 26 is touched twice and the second touch sensor 27 is touched once according to the operation pattern. It should be noted that the specific operation determination unit 21c determines the specific operation when the operation pattern of the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 is different from the operation pattern of the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 while the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are active. It is determined that has not been performed, and smart communication is stopped.

  As shown in FIGS. 4 to 6, there are, for example, three types of specific operations in the vehicle. Note that the specific operation inside the vehicle is only the first switch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 that are operated outside the vehicle, but this is only changed to the engine switch 33. Therefore, a description of a specific example of the specific operation inside the vehicle will be omitted with the description of the specific operation outside the vehicle.

  As shown in FIG. 1, the electronic key 1 is provided with a lock switch 16 exposed on the surface of the casing as a stop switch that is operated when the smart communication operation is forcibly stopped (see FIG. 1). 2). Therefore, when the lock switch 16 is operated, the electronic key 1 shifts to a state in which smart communication cannot be performed, that is, a smart communication prohibited state in which a response to the vehicle 2 cannot be returned. It cannot be established, and subsequent vehicle operations are prohibited. The electronic key 1 cancels the smart communication prohibited state when the lock switch 16 is operated again.

Next, communication operation by the electronic key system of this example will be described with reference to FIG.
When executing the smart communication with the electronic key 1 outside the vehicle, the verification ECU 21 first transmits a wake signal Swk from the external LF transmitter 22 to activate the electronic key 1 that is in a stopped state (sleep state). The wake signal Swk is repeatedly transmitted from the outside LF transmitter 22 at regular intervals, and the presence or absence of the electronic key 1 around the vehicle 2 is monitored.

  Here, for example, it is assumed that a user who has the electronic key 1 registered in the vehicle 2 approaches the vehicle 2. At this time, when the electronic key 1 enters the outside communication area of the wake signal Swk, the LF reception unit 12 receives the wake signal Swk. When the electronic key 1 receives the wake signal Swk, the electronic key 1 switches from the sleep state to the activated state and starts smart communication. Then, the electronic key 1 transmits an ACK signal Sac from the RF transmitter 13.

  When the vehicle 2 receives the ACK signal Sac within a predetermined time after receiving the wake signal Swk, the vehicle 2 recognizes that the electronic key 1 is present in the communication area outside the vehicle, and transmits the vehicle ID signal Svi from the LF transmitter 22 outside the vehicle. The vehicle ID signal Svi includes a vehicle ID as a vehicle-specific ID for identifying the vehicle 2. The electronic key 1 that has received the vehicle ID signal Svi performs vehicle ID collation against the code registered in the memory 11a, and when the collation matches, transmits an ACK signal Sac from the RF transmission unit 13.

  When the vehicle 2 receives the ACK signal Sac within a predetermined time after receiving the vehicle ID signal Svi, the vehicle 2 recognizes that the electronic key 1 corresponding to itself is present in the outside communication area. The vehicle 2 transmits a challenge signal Scc from the external LF transmitter 22. The challenge signal Scc includes a challenge code whose value changes each time a call is made and the key number of the electronic key 1. Note that the key number notifies the master key of which number or the sub key of the key number.

  When the communication control unit 11 of the electronic key 1 receives the challenge signal Scc by the LF receiving unit 12, the communication control unit 11 performs number verification for checking whether the key number of the challenge signal Scc is correct, and whether or not the communication control unit 11 itself is a communication partner at this time. Determine whether. This number verification is verification for determining the master or sub key type for the electronic key 1 of the communication partner. When this number verification is established, the communication control unit 11 generates a response code by calculating a challenge code included in the challenge signal Scc with its own encryption key.

  At this time, the specific operation selection unit 11b of the communication control unit 11 selects one of the three types of specific operation codes registered in the memory 11a. When the generation of the response code is completed, the communication control unit 11 generates a response signal Sre including the ID code registered in its own memory 11a, the specific operation code selected by the specific operation selection unit 11b, and the response code. The transmission is performed from the RF transmitter 13. Note that the arrangement order of the ID code, the response code, and the specific operation code in the response signal Sre can be changed as appropriate.

  When transmitting the challenge signal Scc, the verification ECU 21 calculates a challenge code using its own encryption key and also generates a response code. When the verification ECU 21 receives the response signal Sre from the electronic key 1 by the RF receiver 24, the verification ECU 21 compares the response code of the electronic key 1 with the response code calculated by itself, and executes response verification. When the verification ECU 21 confirms that this response verification is established, the verification ECU 21 verifies whether the ID code included in the response signal Sre is correct.

  After the electronic key 1 transmits the response signal Sre, the notification execution unit 11c of the communication control unit 11 transmits the response signal Sre including the specific operation code, and then specifies the specific operation code selected by the specific operation selection unit 11b. Notification corresponding to is performed. For example, in the example shown in FIG. 4, the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are continuously operated for a predetermined time. Further, in the example shown in FIG. 5, the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 are operated several times at the same timing. Furthermore, in the example shown in FIG. 6, among the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19, for example, the first type is operated twice and the second type is operated once.

  When receiving the response signal Sre, the specific operation determination unit 21c of the verification ECU 21 grasps the selected specific operation from the specific operation code included in the response signal Sre. When the specific operation determination unit 21c of the verification ECU 21 detects an actual operation with respect to the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27, the specific operation is captured as an execution operation and the specific operation included in the response signal Sre. Then, the specific operation collation is performed in comparison with the execution operation, and when these operations match, it is recognized that the specific operation collation is established. And if collation ECU21 confirms that specific operation collation will be materialized in addition to response collation and ID code collation establishment, it will process as smart collation establishment by this.

Next, the determination operation of the specific operation outside the vehicle by the electronic key system of this example will be described with reference to FIG.
When receiving the response signal Sre, the verification ECU 21 determines whether or not ID verification (response verification, ID code verification) is established (step S11). When the ID verification is not established (step S11: NO), the verification ECU 21 ends the process. On the other hand, when the ID collation is established (step S11: YES), the collation ECU 21 proceeds to step S12. In step S12, it is determined whether the specific operation determination part 21c of collation ECU21 is specific operation. That is, the specific operation determination unit 21 c confirms the presence or absence of a touch by input from the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27.

  Here, when the user holding the electronic key 1 approaches the vehicle 2 and tries to unlock the door lock of the vehicle 2, the user confirms a specific operation presentation operation (for example, vibration, sound, light) of the electronic key 1. Thus, which specific operation is requested from the vehicle 2 is recognized, and the specific operation is executed on the vehicle 2. At this time, the specific operation determining unit 21c determines that the specific operation is performed when the user operates based on the specific operation presenting operation of the electronic key 1 (step S12: YES). Since the operation on the vehicle 2 is not the same operation every time and is not recognized from the specific operation presentation operation of the electronic key 1, the specific operation cannot be performed unless the electronic key 1 is possessed. When the verification ECU 21 confirms that the specific operation has been performed correctly, the verification ECU 21 unlocks the door lock (step S13).

  On the other hand, as shown in FIG. 9, the relays 3 and 4 relay communication between the vehicle 2 and the electronic key 1, so that the vehicle 2 is illegal even if the electronic key 1 does not exist in the vehicle outside communication area. Assume a case where an illegal act using an operated repeater is attempted. When an illegal act using a repeater is attempted, a third party approaches the vehicle 2 and tries to unlock the door lock with the electronic key 1 held by the user of the vehicle 2. A third person approaching the vehicle 2 thinks that the ID verification has been completed by an illegal act using this repeater, and grips and operates the outside door handle 25 to open the door.

  At this time, since an operation that is not a specific operation is performed, as illustrated in FIG. 8, the specific operation determination unit 21c of the verification ECU 21 determines that the execution operation is not a specific operation (step S12: NO). When the verification ECU 21 confirms that the specific operation is not performed, the verification ECU 21 locks the operation by smart communication (step S14). That is, the verification ECU 21 forcibly terminates smart communication on the vehicle 2 side and puts the vehicle 2 into a smart communication prohibited state. Thereby, since the state where smart verification is established is not reached, the vehicle 2 can be prevented from being stolen by a third party who attempts to establish ID verification by an unauthorized act using a repeater.

  On the other hand, when the smart communication is locked, it is troubled when the user wants to use the vehicle 2. Therefore, the verification ECU 21 checks whether or not a wireless key signal has been received (step S15), and waits if no wireless key signal has been received (step S15: NO). That is, the smart communication lock release condition is wireless key signal reception. When receiving the wireless key signal (step S15: YES), the verification ECU 21 cancels the smart communication lock, that is, the smart communication prohibition state of the vehicle 2 (step S16).

  Here, it is also assumed that a third party's touch operation is luckily matched with a correct specific operation during an illegal act using a repeater. However, at this time, the user of the vehicle 2 who possesses the electronic key 1 is improperly acted using the repeater by being suddenly notified of vibration, sound, or light even though the user is not approaching the vehicle 2. The lock switch 16 is pushed and operated. At this time, the communication control unit 11 forcibly terminates smart communication on the electronic key 1 side and puts the electronic key 1 into a smart communication prohibited state. Therefore, although the door is unlocked by a third party by an unauthorized act using the repeater, subsequent communication is prohibited on the electronic key 1 side, and the engine start can be prohibited. When the lock switch 16 is pressed again with the electronic key 1, the smart communication prohibition state of the electronic key 1 is released. In the series of explanations so far, the operation of the vehicle 2 and the electronic key 1 at the time of external verification has been described. However, since the same operation is performed at the time of internal verification, the description of the internal verification will be omitted.

  In this example, the specific operation presenting operation is executed with the electronic key 1 at the time of ID collation, and if the execution operation performed on the vehicle 2 by the user along the specific operation presenting operation is correct, the ID collation is established. In addition to the conditions, it is considered that smart verification is established. For this reason, even if a third party who is a theft agent tries to establish smart communication by an illegal act using a repeater, a third party who does not have the electronic key 1 at hand cannot know the specific operation. The correct specific operation cannot be performed on the vehicle 2, and the smart communication cannot be established. Therefore, it is possible to suppress an unauthorized operation of the vehicle 2 due to an unauthorized act using the repeater.

As described above, according to the embodiment described above, the following effects can be obtained.
(1) Even if ID collation between the electronic key 1 and the vehicle 2 is established, if the specific operation collation is not established, an operation of unlocking a door lock or starting and stopping the engine installed in the vehicle 2 is not possible. For this reason, even if the third party establishes ID verification by an unauthorized act using a repeater in a state where the electronic key 1 does not exist in the communication area with the vehicle 2, the third party cannot know the specific operation. The door lock installed in the vehicle 2 and the engine start / stop operation cannot be operated. In addition, even if a third party imagines a specific operation and an operation performed appropriately matches the specific operation notified, the electronic key 1 notifies the specific operation. 1 can recognize that the vehicle 2 is communicating, and can perform crime prevention actions such as confirming the situation of the vehicle 2.

  (2) Since the operation target of the specific operation is the outside door handle 25, the specific operation can be executed in a series of door unlocking operations. Therefore, since the user does not bother to operate the separate member for the specific operation, it is difficult for the user to feel troublesome of the operation.

  (3) Since the specific operation verification is executed after the ID verification is established, the specific operation verification is executed only when the ID verification is established. Therefore, since the specific operation verification is not executed when the ID verification is not established, the specific operation verification is executed only when it is really necessary, and as a result, the verification can be performed efficiently.

  (4) Since the selection of the specific operation is performed on the electronic key 1 side, it can be dealt with by adding the specific operation code to the response signal Sre. Therefore, the technique of this example can be applied without making a significant design change to the electronic key system.

  (5) If the execution operation for the vehicle 2 is not correct, the smart communication is stopped in the vehicle 2 in order to stop the operation of the door lock and the engine switch installed in the vehicle 2. It becomes possible to refuse more reliably.

  (6) When smart communication is prohibited due to an erroneous operation, if the lock switch 14 or unlock switch 15 of the electronic key 1 is operated and wireless key verification is established, the smart communication prohibited state on the vehicle 2 side Is released. For this reason, when the vehicle 2 is in the smart communication prohibited state, the smart communication prohibited state can be canceled by a natural flow of operation of the lock switch 14 or the unlock switch 15 of the electronic key 1.

  (7) The electronic key 1 is provided with a lock switch 16 capable of shifting the smart communication to the prohibited state on the electronic key 1 side. For this reason, the communication between the electronic key 1 and the vehicle 2 can be stopped by operating the lock switch 16. Therefore, even if a third party luckily performs a specific operation, the operation of the lock switch 16 can forcibly stop the communication between the electronic key 1 and the repeater 4 and prevent subsequent ID verification by a third party. be able to.

  (8) Since the technique of this example is used for the electronic key 1 system in which door lock / unlock and engine start / stop are permitted or executed, when the user is away from the vehicle 2, the repeater is used. It is possible to prevent the inside of the vehicle 2 from being colored or the vehicle 2 itself being stolen by the fraudulent act used.

  (9) Since the specific operation presentation operation is executed by the vibrator 17 or the buzzer 18, the user can recognize the specific operation without taking out the electronic key 1 from the pocket or the bag.

(Second Embodiment)
Hereinafter, a second embodiment in which the electronic key system according to the present invention is embodied in a vehicle will be described with reference to FIGS. 10 and 11. The electronic key system of this embodiment is different from the first embodiment in that the vehicle 2 selects a specific operation. Hereinafter, a description will be given focusing on differences from the first embodiment. Note that the electronic key system of this embodiment has substantially the same configuration as the electronic key system of the first embodiment shown in FIG.

  In the electronic key system of this example, when a series of ID verifications is established in the electronic key 1 and the vehicle 2, the vehicle 2 selects a specific operation, and receives an operation signal Ssa given a specific operation code indicating the specific operation from the vehicle 2. send. When the electronic key 1 receives the operation signal Ssa, the electronic key 1 grasps the specific operation from the specific operation code included in the operation signal Ssa and performs a specific operation presentation operation based on the specific operation code. And only when specific operation is performed with respect to the vehicle 2, locking and unlocking of a door lock, or starting and a stop of an engine are performed.

  As shown in FIGS. 1 and 10, upon receiving the response signal Sre, the verification ECU 21 selects one of a plurality of specific operations, and receives an operation signal Ssa including a specific operation code indicating the selected specific operation. A specific operation selection unit 21d is provided as communication target side selection means to be transmitted. The specific operation code is stored in the memory 21a. The specific operation selection unit 21d reads the specific operation code stored in the memory 21a and includes the specific operation code in the operation signal Ssa to be transmitted from the LF transmitters 22 and 23. Note that the operation signal Ssa is preferably encrypted. Further, the communication control unit 11 is provided with a specific operation confirmation unit 11d that confirms what the specific operation selected in the vehicle 2 is by reading the specific operation code included in the operation signal Ssa transmitted from the vehicle. It has been. The notification execution unit 11c of the communication control unit 11 displays the specific operation confirmed from the specific operation code by the specific operation confirmation unit 11d, that is, the specific operation presenting operation corresponding to the specific operation selected by the vehicle 2, with the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator. 19 through. Since the specific operation presentation operation is the same as that in the first embodiment, the description thereof is omitted. The specific operation determination unit 21c of the verification ECU 21 determines whether or not the specific operation is actually performed on the basis of the specific operation code selected by the specific operation selection unit 21d.

Next, the determination operation of the specific operation outside the vehicle by the electronic key system of this example will be described with reference to FIG.
When receiving the response signal Sre, the verification ECU 21 determines whether or not ID verification (response verification, ID code verification) is established (step S11). The collation ECU 21 ends the process when the ID collation is not established (step S11: NO). On the other hand, collation ECU21 selects specific operation, when ID collation is materialized (step S11: YES) (step S21). That is, the specific operation selection unit 21d of the verification ECU 21 selects one from a plurality of specific operations registered in the memory 21a. And collation ECU21 transmits operation signal Ssa containing the selected specific operation code from vehicle LF transmitter 22 in order to transmit specific operation selected to specific operation selection part 21d to vehicle 2 (Step S22). Then, the process proceeds to step S12. Since step S12 and subsequent steps are the same as those in the first embodiment, a description thereof will be omitted.

  In the electronic key system of this example, since the vehicle 2 is configured to select a specific operation, the electronic key 1 only needs to operate passively with respect to the vehicle 2, and the vehicle 2 side performs the processing of this configuration. The burden on the electronic key 1 side can be suppressed.

As mentioned above, according to embodiment described, in addition to the effect of (1)-(3) and (5)-(9) of 1st Embodiment, there can exist the following effects.
(10) Since the selection of the specific operation is performed on the vehicle 2 side, the vehicle 2 can perform all of the notification of the specific operation and the determination of the specific operation together with the ID verification in the operation for preventing the unauthorized operation by the repeater. Therefore, when this configuration is added to an existing electronic key system, the addition becomes easy.

In addition, the said embodiment can be implemented with the following forms which changed this suitably.
In the above embodiment, the operation switching timing of the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19 and the operation switching timing of the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 are the same timing. However, the operation switching timing of the first touch sensor 26 and the second touch sensor 27 may be appropriately shifted in consideration of a time lag from when the user recognizes the presentation operation to when the user operates.

In the above embodiment, three types of specific operations are set, but not limited to three types, four or more types may be set.
In the above embodiment, the specific operation is presented by the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19, but the specific operation may be presented by at least one of them.

  -In above-mentioned embodiment, specific operation presentation operation | movement is not limited to being performed by the vibrator 17, the buzzer 18, and the indicator 19. FIG. For example, if the electronic key 1 is provided with a display capable of displaying characters and pictures, the specific operation may be visually displayed on the display.

  In the above-described embodiment, the specific operation is performed on the vehicle door handle 25 in the vehicle outside verification. However, the specific operation is not limited to the vehicle door handle 25 but other things such as a window glass and a side mirror. You may set it to do.

  In the above embodiment, the specific operation is set to the engine switch 33 in the in-vehicle collation, but the specific operation is set not only to the engine switch 33 but also to the other parts near the instrument panel. May be.

In the above configuration, a configuration in which the lock switch 16 as a stop switch is omitted may be adopted.
-In above-mentioned embodiment, specific operation collation is not limited to performing after confirming ID collation establishment, and may be performed in the middle of ID collation, or simultaneously with ID collation.

In the above embodiment, the smart communication is stopped when the specific operation is not performed, but the smart communication may not be stopped.
In the above embodiment, the challenge signal Scc is not limited to a signal including a key number and a challenge code, and may include, for example, the vehicle ID described above.

In the above embodiment, authentication is performed from number verification, response verification, and ID code verification, but various authentication formats can be adopted.
In the above embodiment, the frequency of the radio wave used in the electronic key system is not necessarily limited to LF or RF, and other frequencies can be used. Further, the frequency when the radio wave is transmitted from the vehicle 2 to the electronic key 1 and the frequency when the radio wave is returned from the electronic key 1 to the vehicle 2 are not necessarily different from each other, and may be the same frequency.

  -In the said embodiment, the electronic key system of this example is not necessarily applied only to the vehicle 2, If the communication object which uses an electronic key is communication object, the employ | adopting destination will not be specifically limited.

Next, the technical idea that can be grasped from the embodiment will be described together with the effects.
(A) In the electronic key system according to claim 2 or 3, when the ID collation is established, the operation unit is in an active state, and an operation applied to the operation unit in the active state is performed. Electronic key system characterized by handling as an operation.

  According to the configuration, since the operation means is in an active state on the condition that the ID collation is established, the operation means is handled as an execution operation so that the operation means is not always in the active state. , It can be activated only when needed, saving energy.

  (B) In the electronic key system according to (a), the specific operation is to operate the operation means switched to an active state at an execution timing of the specific operation presentation operation. system.

  According to this configuration, since the specific operation is performed in accordance with the execution timing of the specific operation presenting operation, it is difficult to match even if a third party appropriately operates, but it can be easily performed if the presenting operation can be grasped. it can.

  (C) The electronic key system according to (a), wherein the specific operation is to operate the operation means for the number of times presented in the specific operation presentation operation.

  According to this configuration, since the specific operation is performed in accordance with the number of times of the specific operation presenting operation, it is difficult to match even if a third party appropriately operates, but it can be easily performed if the presenting operation can be grasped. it can.

  (D) The electronic key system according to (a), wherein the specific operation is to operate the operation means in the order presented in the specific operation presentation operation.

  According to this configuration, since the specific operation is performed in accordance with the order of presentation of the specific operation presentation operation, it is difficult to match even if a third party appropriately operates, but it can be easily performed if the presentation operation can be grasped. it can.

  (E) In the electronic key system according to claim 6, when the authentication unit establishes wireless key verification for performing authentication by an ID code transmitted when an operation switch provided in the electronic key is operated, An electronic key system which cancels the stop of the operation of the device installed in the communication target.

  According to this configuration, when the operation of the device is stopped, the operation switch of the electronic key for performing the wireless key verification is operated, and if the wireless key verification is established, the stop of the operation of the device is released. For this reason, when the user cannot operate the communication target device by the key-free operation, it can be canceled by a natural operation of operating the operation switch instead.

  (F) In the electronic key system according to any one of claims 1 to 7 and (a) to (e), when the communication target is a vehicle and the ID verification is established, the door lock is unlocked and the engine The electronic key system is characterized in that starting or stopping is permitted or executed.

  According to this configuration, the communication target is a vehicle, and is used in an electronic key system in which door lock / unlock and engine start / stop are permitted or executed. Therefore, when the user is away from the vehicle, the repeater It is possible to prevent the inside of the vehicle from being cheated or being stolen by a fraudulent act using.

  DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 1 ... Electronic key, 2 ... Vehicle as communication object, 3, 4 ... Repeater, 11 ... Communication control part, 11a ... Memory, 11b ... Specific operation selection part as electronic key side selection means, 11c ... Notification execution part, DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 12 ... LF receiving part, 13 ... RF transmission part, 14 ... Lock switch, 15 ... Unlock switch, 16 ... Lock switch, 17 ... Vibrator as specific operation presentation means, 18 ... Buzzer as specific operation presentation means, 19 ... Indicator as specific operation presenting means, 21 ... verification ECU, 21a ... memory, 21b ... specific operation confirmation unit, 21c ... specific operation determination unit as authentication means, 22 ... LF transmitter outside vehicle, 23 ... LF transmitter inside vehicle, 24 ... RF receiver, 25 ... Outdoor door handle, 26 ... First touch sensor, 27 ... Second touch sensor, 28 ... Lock button, 30 ... In-vehicle LAN, 31 ... Main De-ECU, 32 ... Engine ECU, 33 ... Engine switch, 37 ... Courtesy switch, 38 ... Door lock device, Sac ... Acknowledgment signal, Scc ... Challenge signal, Sid ... ID code signal, Sre ... Response signal, Srq ... Request signal, Svi: Vehicle ID signal, Swk: Wake signal.

Claims (7)

When the electronic key receives a reply request for the ID code transmitted from the communication target, the electronic key returns the ID code to the communication target, ID verification is performed, and the operation means provided in the communication target is the ID In the electronic key system in which the device corresponding to the operation means operates when operated under the verification,
A specific operation presenting means that is provided in the electronic key and presents the specific content of the specific operation imposed on the user as one authentication other than the ID verification as a specific operation presentation operation with the electronic key in the verification process;
A specific operation verification is performed by comparing the execution operation performed on the communication target based on the specific operation presenting operation and the specific operation, and the specific operation verification is established. An electronic key system comprising: an authentication unit that permits operation of the device by the operation unit on condition that the ID verification is established. The electronic key system according to claim 1.
The electronic key system characterized in that the operation target of the specific operation is the operation means. The electronic key system according to claim 1 or 2,
The specific operation verification is executed after the ID verification is completed. The electronic key system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
The electronic key is provided with electronic key side selection means for selecting one operation from the plurality of specific operations prepared in advance.
The electronic key side selection means sends the selected specific operation to the communication target and notifies it,
The electronic key system, wherein the authentication unit grasps the specific operation based on a notification from the electronic key and executes the specific operation collation. The electronic key system according to any one of claims 1 to 3,
The communication target is provided with communication target side selection means for selecting one operation from the plurality of specific operations prepared in advance.
The communication target side selection means sends the selected specific operation to the electronic key and notifies it,
The electronic key system according to claim 1, wherein the specific operation presenting unit grasps the specific operation based on a notification from the communication target and executes the specific operation presenting operation. In the electronic key system according to any one of claims 1 to 5,
The electronic key system, wherein the authentication unit prohibits operation of the device by the operation unit when the specific operation verification is not established. In the electronic key system according to any one of claims 1 to 6,
The electronic key system, wherein the electronic key is provided with a stop switch capable of stopping the communication of the ID collation with the communication target.

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