ZA200210149B - End-to-end security of transactions between a mobile terminal and an internet server at the application level. - Google Patents

End-to-end security of transactions between a mobile terminal and an internet server at the application level. Download PDF

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Publication number
ZA200210149B
ZA200210149B ZA200210149A ZA200210149A ZA200210149B ZA 200210149 B ZA200210149 B ZA 200210149B ZA 200210149 A ZA200210149 A ZA 200210149A ZA 200210149 A ZA200210149 A ZA 200210149A ZA 200210149 B ZA200210149 B ZA 200210149B
Authority
ZA
South Africa
Prior art keywords
record
proxy
transaction
identification
mobile terminal
Prior art date
Application number
ZA200210149A
Inventor
Pierre-Alain Etique
Adriano Huber
Original Assignee
Swisscom Mobile Ag
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Swisscom Mobile Ag filed Critical Swisscom Mobile Ag
Priority to ZA200210149A priority Critical patent/ZA200210149B/en
Publication of ZA200210149B publication Critical patent/ZA200210149B/en

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Description

i
End-to-End Securing of Transactions between a Mobile Terminal and an
Internet Server on the Application Level
The present invention relates to a method and a server suitable therefor for end-to-end securing of transactions between a mobile terminal and an
Internet server on the application level. In particular the present invention relates to a method and a proxy server suitable therefor for end-to-end securing of transactions on the application level between a mobile terminai and an Internet server comprising at least one Internet server application which, for oo _unambiguous identification of an application transaction, transmits transaction identification records to the transaction partner application. and receives oo
Co “transaction identification records which are transmitted-back to the Internet ee
BEE .+ <sefver application fromthe transaction partner-application for unambiguous SE oe “identification of the application transaction. * SEL SEL on 0 mmPRTT The dse of transaction identificatiori records for identification of © uot ‘fransactions and sessions between Internet servers: (or web servers) and Le “terminals of users (personal computers, for example), or-respectively the «=i 0, oo
SEES : - applications on these terminals (for example browsers, for example) is known. © cu : Means of exchange of transaction identification records, which are known . ~~ ] oo above all by the name of "cookies", were introduced by the company Netscape © 20 in order to be better able to handle interactions on the application level between web servers and browsers, since the hypertext transport protocol (HTTP) lying beneath is a connection-less request/response protocol (and therefore does not have any state management). The cookies by means of which transaction identification records are able to be transmitted, are transmitted from the web server to the browser when the user contacts the web server with the browser, for example for the first time. Received cookies are typically stored by the browser on the hard memory disk of the terminal. The instruction to the browser to store a cookie reads, for instance, as follows: set cookie: name= "value"; expires="date"; path = "path"; domain="domain name", secure. After successful storing of a cookie, the browser transmits the value of the cookie in the HTTP request data prefix to the respective web server when the browser is instructed by the user to obtain an URL address whose domain name and path correspond to the values set for the cookie. If the option "secure" is set, this takes place only if the transmission is carried out via a secure connection, for instance via a set-up session of the secure socket layer
(SSL). Thus, by means of the cookies, interactions between the user of the browser and the web server can be handled through applications of the web server for longer periods, e.g. minutes or years, and for a plurality of request/response cycles, it being possible to differentiate between sessions of different users and transactions.
By means of the mechanisms of the secure socket layer used in the
Internet, an encrypted pipe can be set up between the client terminal, on which the browser runs, and the respective web server which secures the confidentiality of the data exchanged, i.e. <prevents> the unauthorized access = to the exchanged data, and makes possible the checking of the authenticity. of the participating transaction partners (client and server), for instance through = “.. . : + Jog iniof the usér by means of user name, user password, ‘one-time-user ...... <.. ~- "= - password (e.g. from. cancel list or secure ID) or other known mechanisms. Gel
ECE Particularly security-critical applications, such as e:g.-home banking and =~. "15. e-commerce, which.are implemented in-the Internet, present high security RO “+... requirements with respect to the confidentiality of the data, the.authenticity of, =". ~ = " - the participating transaction partners, the integrity of the data:and often also... ~~ = +. with respect to the indisputability of the origin of the data or respectively of the . transactions for which the data are exchanged. The necessary security is achieved preferably through an end-to-end securing of the transactions between the transaction partners on the application level, i.e. through mechanisms of the applications and not through mechanisms of the underlying protocol layers. In this connection, a solution based on SSL presents the problem that an unauthorized hacker who can penetrate into the system between the SSL layer and the application level can insert false requests into the application transactions, which has problematic consequences in particular for security-critical applications. Above and beyond this, an error in the handling of the sessions on the SSL layer can lead to a request or a response being incorrectly assigned to a wrong application transaction, which likewise has problematic consequences.
In order to be able to avoid these problems, the previously described mechanism of the cookies can be used such that requests are each transmitted to the server with a cookie (and a transaction identification record contained therein), so that the transactions are each able to be unambiguously identified on the application level. To prevent an attack by the above-mentioned unauthorized hacker who inserts false requests into the application transactions between the SSL layer and the application level, the transaction identification records (in the cookies) are each provided with cryptographic 5s elements. If such cryptographic transaction identification records are supposed to meet high security requirements, they typically become rather long; for instance, required for a digital signature with 1024 bits is a cookie (with the transaction identification record contained therein) with a length of 160 bytes. : “Although with the method derived from the state of the art for end-to-end ~ securing of transactions between terminals and Internet servers on the : application level based on cryptographic transaction identification records. Co
REAR transmitted in cookies, it is possible to:overcome the above-mentioned . EERE SE
TR ore problems of false requests, this method cannot be used for mobile terminals, Ce 4 for example mobile radio telephones or mobile:communication-capable: ee is computers such as laptop computers, palmtop computers or PDAs (Personal ~. =~ : : _ Digital Assistants), on the one hand because the available mobile terminals are ERIE 0 not provided with communications protocols which support cookies (e.g. the. ~~ ITI § wireless application protocol WAP used in mobile devices for access tothe Lo 1+" Internet does not support any cookies), and, on the other-hand, because the Co required lengths of the cryptographic transaction identification records are not _ very efficient for mobile communication.
It is an object of this invention to propose a new and better method as well as means suitable therefor which make possible end-to-end securing of transactions between a mobile terminal and an Internet server on the application level.
This object is achieved according to the present invention in particular through the elements of the independent claims. Further preferred embodiments follow moreover from the dependent claims and the description.
This object is achieved through the present invention in particular in that cryptographic transaction identification records (contained in cookies, for instance) which are directed to transaction partner applications in the mobile terminal are stored, assigned to the mobile terminal, in a transaction identification proxy record server, that a record identification for a respective stored transaction identification record as well as a proxy record calculated by the proxy server from the respective stored transaction identification record are transmitted in each case by the proxy server to the mobile terminal, that a record identification and a proxy record are taken in each case by the proxy server from the messages which are sent by the mobile terminal to the Internet s server application, and checked is the correspondence between the taken proxy record and the proxy record which is calculable from the stored transaction identification record determined through the taken record identification, and in that, in the case of a correspondence, the stored ~. transaction identification record determined through the taken record Sa identification is transmitted to the Internet server application. The advantage of =
Co y the proxy server, which <replaces> in each case a transaction identification. ~ . 0
Lo record directed to a mobile terminal with a tuple, consisting of a record . re aL identification for the respective stored transaction identification record and a- pa ) | 4. proxy.record, which is calculated from the respective transaction identification SRURIESELR ) 15. record, is in particular that the mechanism of the transaction identifications: Ea oo \.
Es records (cookies) used by the Iriternet server can be mapped on:mabile JLo
B Lt oo terminals which do not support this mechanism, the end-to-end secifrity:: ge ae - © % between the. mobile terminal and the Internet server on the application level . -~ remains intact through the cryptographic proxy record which is calculated from 20; the respective transaction identification record and which can have a much . - shorter length than the transaction identification record from which it is calculated. The record identification alone could be faked by a hacker; the proxy record calculated in each case from the respective transaction identification record is not able to be faked by a hacker, however, since the transaction identification records can change with each transaction and the correspondence of the tuple is checked by the proxy server.
The record identification and proxy record to be transmitted to the mobile terminal are preferably transmitted in a data element which is automatically inserted into messages in each case by the transaction partner application in the mobile terminal, which messages are directed to the Internet server application. This procedure has the advantage in particular that the mobile terminal, or respectively software programs of the mobile terminal, do not need to be adapted as well.
The proxy record is preferably calculated from the stored transaction identification record by means of a one-way hash function. The advantage of using a one-way hash function for calculation of the proxy record from the transaction identification record is in particular that, on the one hand, the calculation of the proxy record from the transaction identification record can be carried out easily, but, in the reverse direction, the calculation of the 5s transaction identification record from the proxy record is extremely difficult, if not impossible, and that, on the other hand, a proxy record with a predefined length can be calculated from the transaction identification record even when the length of the transaction identification record varies, whereby in particular * the predefined length of the proxy record is shorter than the length of the 2 - 10 transaction identification record from which it is. calculated. Ce
So # " % In an embodiment variant, thé ‘assignmento the mobile terminal during. =~
T+ the storing of the cryptographic transaction identification:in:the proxy server x «oo
Sg takes place Via'the IP-address of the mobile terminal: This is especially. «= 0 wow” “ry advantageous when ric other data elément'that-¢ould serve for identification of = =~ © i= “15 the mébile“términal is exchanged between the mabileterminal and the:Internet ~~~ “3° serverby means of the communication Protocols Used or. droit vn ns ls “47 ih én embodiment variant, a protocol data fle s ksptin the proxy server "in which are stored indications about the replacement of transaction® ~~ + + identification records with proxy records, or respectively proxy records with transaction identification records, indications about the point in time of this replacement as well as indications about the transaction partners participating in the transaction for which the replacement is carried out. The advantage of such a protocol data file is in particular that it can be used at a later point in time to prove the transaction course carried out on the application level between the mobile terminal and the Internet server.
In alternative embodiment variants the proxy server is insertable into the communication path between the Internet server application and the transport security layer of the Internet server and is implemented with the Internet server on a common computer, or the proxy server is implemented on a common computer with a gateway that links together a mobile radio network and the
Internet and is insertable in the communication path between the transport security layer of the mobile network and the transport security layer of the
Internet.
An embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to an example. The example of the embodiment is illustrated by the following appended figures:
Figure 1 shows a block diagram which illustrates schematically a mobile terminal and an Internet server which communicate via a gateway that connects a mobile radio network and the Internet.
Figure 2 shows a block diagram which illustrates schematically a mobile terminal and an Internet server which communicate via a gateway that connects . together a mobile radio network security pipe and an Internet security pipe. RE — 90.1% .. .~Figure-3-shaws a layer diagram, which illustrates schematically the - ~:~ i.
CL “Sommuynication protocol stack of a mobile terminal; of an Internet serveras well = ~~...
CLE as of the-gateway. via which the mobile terminal and the Internet server. © lle i -piC.communicate with one another... LE = poe [URE - a © ens Se Figure’d’shows a combified time and flow chart in which the exchange is «+ “us illustrated schematically of transaction identification records; or respectively. i. Lo "7. proxy record calculated from thése transaction identification records, for the =... « © 3. end-to-end securing of transactions on the application level between a mobile ~~ terminal and an Internet server, as transaction partners, via a proxy server. oo :
Figure 5 shows a block diagram which illustrates schematically a proxy server.
In Figure 1 the reference numeral 1 refers to a mobile terminal, for example a WAP-capable mobile terminal, which can communicate over a mobile radio network 2, for instance a GSM or UMTS or another, e.g. satellite- based, mobile radio network. As is shown schematically in Figure 1, the mobile radio network 2 is connected via a gateway 3, for example a WAP gateway, to the Internet 4, to which an Internet server 5 is linked. lllustrated in Figure 2 is the configuration iliustrated in Figure 1 with respect to the transport security layer between the mobile terminal 1 and the
Internet server 5, whereby shown in an abstract way as the mobile network security pipe 7 is the mobile radio network 2 as well as the communication protocols of the mobile terminal 1 and of the gateway 3 for access to, and communication processing via, the mobile radio network 2, up to and including the transport security layer, for instance according to the WTLS protocol
(Wireless Transport Layer Security) and whereby shown in an abstract way as the Internet security pipe 8 is the Internet 4 as well as the communication protocols of the gateway 3 and of the Internet server 5 for access to, and communication processing via, the Internet 4, up to and including the transport security layer, for instance according to the SSL protocol (Secure Socket
Layer). The reference numeral 6 in Figure 2 refers to a transaction identification proxy record server which will be explained more closely in the following and is designated in an abbreviated way as the proxy server 6. The proxy server 6 is implemented preferably as a programmed software module on-- 0 a computer. As shown in Figure 2, the proxy server 6 can be implementedona ~~ -ycommon computer with the gateway 3 (block 6 with solid line), where itis... :. BCI o Yinserted in the communication path between the Internet server5,or.- =. =~ ~~ “respectively. an‘internet server application; and the mobile network:security: . ~~ 0 ~& pipe 7, or the proxy server 6 can be implemented on‘a common computer. with Co the Internet server 5 (block 6 with broken line), where it is.inserted inthe. ~~ _%_ communication path between the Internet server 5, or.respectively an Internet . +. . server application, and the Internet security pipe 8. gr .. 3 SETI Gel ay = ©» _Shownin Figure 3 are the communication protocol:stack Pas well as the ~~ “ above-lying application level A in a schematic layer model for the mobile = 20° terminal 1, the gateway 3 and the Internet server 5. Only the transport security layer S is emphasized thereby as a layer in Figure 3, the WTLS protocol being used, for example, as the transport security layer for the communication over the mobile radio network 2 between the mobile terminal 1 and the gateway 3, and the SSL protocol being used, for example, for the communication over the
Internet 4 between the gateway 3 and the Internet server 5. The communication protocol stack P in the mobile terminal 1 and in the gateway 3 for communication over mobile radio network 2 are executed according to WAP (Wireless Application Protocol), for example. As shown furthermore in Figure 3, the proxy server 6 can be carried out on the application level A, as aiready indicated above, together with the gateway 3 or with the Internet server 5 on one computer.
In Figure 4, the reference numeral 91 refers to the transmission of a cryptographic transaction identification record directed to the mobile terminal 1, or respectively to an application of the mobile terminal 1, through the Internet server 5, or respectively an Internet server application of the Internet server 5.
The proxy server 6, which is inserted in the communication path between the
Internet server 5 and the mobile terminal 1, receives the cryptographic transaction identification record by means of the record storing module 61 shown in Figure 5, and stores it in step 92 in the record mapping memory 66.
The transaction identification record comprises, for instance, a digital signature as the cryptographic element. The storing of the cryptographic transaction identification record takes place with assignment to the mobile terminal 1, a mobile terminal identification 662 being assigned to the stored cryptographic -transaction identification record 661. Used as the mobile terminal identification . 662 can be, for example, the IP address (Internet Protocol) of the mobile SE ‘terminal 1 to which the respective message with-the cryptographic transaction -. - FE identification record is directed. Loire oe oo y
Cw = i step 93, in the proxy server 6, an unambiguous (Unique) proxy record i ‘is calculated from the stored transaction identification record 661 by means of = ~~ “4% “thi proxy record module 62. The calciilatior:of the proxy record takes place. = + #= ~& “through a cryptographic function 621, for instance through a one-way hash: =~ .-
GE function'621° e.g. a hash function according to'MD5 or SHA1: As indicated by “+ ~ the arrow 94in the figure, the calculated proxy:record.is transmitted fromthe... =
J proxy record module 62 to the mobile terminal 1 together witha record 20: identification for the stored transaction identification record 661 with the aid of the communication functions of the Internet server 1 <sic. 5> or of the gateway 3, depending upon where the proxy server 6 is implemented. Used as the record identification can be, for example, the mobile terminal identification 662 or another record identification 663 generated by the proxy server 6. The calculated proxy record 660 can also be stored in addition in the record mapping memory 66. The cryptographic function 621 can furthermore secure the uniqueness of newly calculated proxy records on the basis of the previously stored proxy record 660. If the cryptographic function 621 determines that a calculated proxy record corresponds to a previously stored proxy record 660, the uniqueness can be brought about through the cryptographic function 621, for instance by means of data values from a random generator. The uniqueness of proxy records can also be achieved by the cryptographic function 621, however, by addition of data elements, for instance time- dependent values or serial numbers, to the cryptographically calculated proxy record. The tuple is preferably transmitted with the proxy record 660 and the record identification 662 or 663 in a data element which is inserted in each case automatically into messages by the application in the mobile terminal 1, which messages are directed to the Internet server 5, or respectively the
Internet server application. The tuple can be added to the URL address (Uniform Resource Locator), for instance, which is put on each object, for example HTML (Hypertext Markup Language) or WML pages (Wireless Markup
Language) that is transmitted by the Internet server 5, or respectively the
Internet server application, to the mobile terminal 1, or respectively a transaction partner application on the. mobile terminal 1, for instance a WAP ~~ browser, ‘and which is transmitted in each case by these applications of the - -
EAN mobilé terminal 1 with each request to the Internet server. 5, orrespectively to ..: =x». the particular Internet server application. ~~~ coli Los 0 © de 77 Allstrated by the arrow 95 in Figure 4 is the transmission by the.mobile © = © “Tis terminal 1, or respectively by an application of the mobile terminal 1; ofa~ vi. 0
Bia message directed to the internet servers, orrespectively the: Internet server 0 0 . application, comprising the tuple with the calculated proxy record,and the =. «=~
Re record:identification. ‘In step 96, this message is.taken‘in the proxy.server from = «©.
Ra the.tuple with the proxy record and the record identification by means:ofthe =... . . 5 ‘proxy record checking module 63, and in step 97. checked isthe ~. ~~ . ~~ 20- correspondence of the taken proxy record to the proxy record which is - calculable from the stored transaction identification record 661 determined through the taken record identification. For the check, either a proxy record is thereby calculated from the stored transaction identification record 661 determined through the taken record identification, or the corresponding previously calculated and stored proxy record 660 is used, whereby calculating time can be saved. In the case of a positive correspondence, the stored transaction identification record 661 determined through the taken record identification is transmitted to the respective Internet server application in step 98, as indicated by the arrow 99, by means of the record transmission module 64 with the aid of software interfaces of the Internet server 1 <sic. 5> or communication functions of the gateway 3, depending upon where the proxy server 6 is implemented. If there is no correspondence, an error message can be transmitted to the mobile terminal 1, for example, as illustrated by the arrow
In an embodiment variant, the protocol data file 67 is kept in the proxy server 6 by the protocol data file capturing module 65, in which protocol data file information is stored concerning the steps 92, 93, 96, 97 and 98 carried out by the proxy server together with time and/or date indications for the point in time of execution of these steps.
This information comprises, for example, indications about which transaction identification records have been received from the Internet server 5 and have been stored, with which proxy records . these transaction identification records have been replaced, to which mobile - terminal 1 the proxy records have been transmitted in each case, from which mobile terminal 1 the proxy records have been transmitted back, which proxy +. records have'been incorrectly kept back in'the proxy server 6,;and which. == ~~~ = _ _: transaction identification records have been.successfully:transmitted back {o em #14... the Internet server 5; or respectively the particular Internet server application. =. © ©. =.= = © The protocol data file capturing module 65 isa programmed software module, © ER , 15 for example.
The protocol data file 67 is stored on a hard memory disk ©" oo organized in a data file or a database. wo = ae PE n

Claims (14)

Claims
1. A method for end-to-end securing of transactions between a mobile terminal and an Internet server on the application level, in which method, for } unambiguous identification of an application transaction, the Internet server application transmits transaction identification records to the transaction partner application and receives transaction identification records which are transmitted back to the Internet server application by the transaction partner application, for unambiguous identification of the application transaction, wherein stored, assigned to the mobile terminal, in a transaction identification proxy record server, are cryptographic transaction identification records, which are directed to transaction partner applications in the mobile terminal, transmitted to the mobile terminal by the proxy server in each case are a record identification for a respective stored transaction identification record as well as a proxy record, which is calculated by the proxy server from the respective stored transaction identification record, taken in each case by the proxy server from the messages directed by the mobile terminal to the Internet server application are a record identification and a proxy record, and checked is the correspondence of the taken proxy record with the proxy record which is calculable from the stored transaction identification record determined through the taken record identification, and, in the case of correspondence, transmitted to the Internet server application is the stored transaction identification record, determined through the taken record identification.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the record identification and proxy record to be transmitted to the mobile terminal are transmitted in a data element which is automatically inserted by the transaction partner application in the mobile terminal in each case into messages that are directed to the Internet server application. Amended 31 October 2003
3. The method according to one of the claims 1 or 2, wherein the proxy record is calculated from the stored transaction identification record by means of a one-way hash function.
4. The method according to one of the claims 1 to 3, wherein during the storing of the cryptographic transaction identification records in the proxy server, the assignment to the mobile terminal takes place through the IP address of the mobile terminal.
5. The method according to one of the claims 1 to 4, wherein a protocol data file is kept in the proxy server in which data file are stored data about the replacement of transaction identification records with proxy records, respectively of proxy records with transaction identification records, data about the point in time of this replacement as well as data about the transaction partners, who are participating in the transaction, for which the replacement is made.
6. A proxy server, which is insertable in the communication path between a mobile terminal and an Internet server, which Internet server comprises at least one Internet server application, which, for unambiguous identification of the application transaction, transmits transaction identification records to the transaction partner application and receives transaction identification records which are transmitted back to the Internet server application by the transaction partner application, for unambiguous identification of the application transaction, wherein the proxy server comprises first means for storing cryptographic transaction identification records which are directed to the transaction partner applications in the mobile terminal, whereby the storing takes place assigned to the mobile terminal, the proxy server comprises second means for calculating the proxy record from a respective stored transaction identification record and for Amended 31 October 2003 transmitting to the mobile terminal this proxy record as well as a record identification for the respective stored transaction identification record, the proxy server comprises third means for taking a record identification and a proxy record from the messages which are directed from the mobile terminal to the Internet server application and for checking the correspondence of the taken proxy record to the proxy record which is calculable from the stored transaction identification record determined through the taken record identification, and the proxy server comprises fourth means for transmitting, in the case of correspondence, to the Internet server application the stored transaction identification record determined through the taken record identification.
7. The proxy server according to claim 6, wherein the second means are set up in such a way that they transmit in a data element the record identification and proxy record to be transmitted to the mobile terminal which data element is automatically inserted by the transaction partner application in the mobile terminal into messages which are directed to the Internet server application.
8. The proxy server according to one of the claims 6 or 7, wherein the second means comprise a one-way hash function by means of which the proxy record is calculated from the stored transaction identification record.
9. The proxy server according to one of the claims 6 to 8, wherein the first means are set up in such a way that during storing of the cryptographic transaction identification records they carry out the assignment to the mobile terminal through the IP address of the mobile terminal.
10. The proxy server according to one of the claims 6 to 9, wherein the proxy server comprises further means for keeping a protocol data file in which are stored data about the replacement of transaction identification records with proxy records, respectively of proxy records with transaction identification records, data about the point in time of this replacement as well as data about Amended 31 October 2003 the transaction partners taking part in the transaction for which the replacement is made.
11. The proxy server according to one of the claims 6 to 10, wherein the proxy server is implemented with the Internet server on a common computer and is insertable in the communication path between the Internet server application and the transport security layer of the Internet server.
12. The proxy server according to one of the claims 6 to 10, wherein the proxy server is implemented with a gateway, connecting together a mobile radio network and the Internet, on a common computer, and is insertable in the communication path between the transport security layer of the mobile radio network and the transport security layer of the Internet.
13. A method for end-to-end securing of transactions between a mobile terminal and an Internet server, substantially as herein described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
14. A proxy server which is insertable in the communication path between a mobile terminal and an Internet server, substantially as herein described with reference to the accompanying drawings. Amended 31 October 2003
ZA200210149A 2002-12-13 2002-12-13 End-to-end security of transactions between a mobile terminal and an internet server at the application level. ZA200210149B (en)

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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
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Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
ZA200210149A ZA200210149B (en) 2002-12-13 2002-12-13 End-to-end security of transactions between a mobile terminal and an internet server at the application level.

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