WO2026007356A1 - 应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法 - Google Patents

应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法

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Publication number
WO2026007356A1
WO2026007356A1 PCT/CN2024/141691 CN2024141691W WO2026007356A1 WO 2026007356 A1 WO2026007356 A1 WO 2026007356A1 CN 2024141691 W CN2024141691 W CN 2024141691W WO 2026007356 A1 WO2026007356 A1 WO 2026007356A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
control chip
cabinet
core
protection
control system
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Pending
Application number
PCT/CN2024/141691
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
江辉
周叶翔
王旭峰
李恒
彭华清
孙亮
张睿
李公杰
任立永
王婷
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
Original Assignee
China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd
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Publication date
Application filed by China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd, Shenzhen China Guangdong Nuclear Engineering Design Co Ltd filed Critical China Nuclear Power Engineering Co Ltd
Publication of WO2026007356A1 publication Critical patent/WO2026007356A1/zh
Pending legal-status Critical Current
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
    • G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
    • G21D3/001—Computer implemented control
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21C—NUCLEAR REACTORS
    • G21C17/00—Monitoring; Testing ; Maintaining
    • G21C17/06—Devices or arrangements for monitoring or testing fuel or fuel elements outside the reactor core, e.g. for burn-up, for contamination
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G21—NUCLEAR PHYSICS; NUCLEAR ENGINEERING
    • G21D—NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
    • G21D3/00—Control of nuclear power plant
    • G21D3/04—Safety arrangements
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02E—REDUCTION OF GREENHOUSE GAS [GHG] EMISSIONS, RELATED TO ENERGY GENERATION, TRANSMISSION OR DISTRIBUTION
    • Y02E30/00—Energy generation of nuclear origin
    • Y02E30/30—Nuclear fission reactors

Definitions

  • This invention relates to the field of instrumentation and control technology in nuclear power plants, specifically to an instrumentation and control system and its implementation method used in reactor protection in nuclear power plants.
  • Core protection is an automatic shutdown system designed to prevent reactors from developing into serious accidents.
  • Core protection also known as Advanced Core Protection System, ARPS
  • SPND self-powered neutron detector
  • SPND self-powered neutron detector
  • the reactor core contains 177 fuel assemblies.
  • Locations A, B, C, and D collectively contain 42 SPND (Special Purpose Detector and Discharge) assemblies. These 42 SPND assemblies are monitored via four instrumentation and control (IP) channels: the IP channel corresponds to 11 SPND assemblies at location A, the IIP channel to 11 at location B, the IIIP channel to 10 at location C, and the IVP channel to 10 at location D.
  • IP instrumentation and control
  • Each SPND assembly contains 7 detectors along its axis.
  • the existing core protection system can be functionally divided into three parts: the Neutron Flux Signal Processing Cabinet (ASPC), the Core Protection Upper Cabinet (AUPC), and the Core Protection Lower Cabinet (ALPC). The functions of each part are shown in Figure 2.
  • the Neutron Flux Signal Processing Cabinet is used to acquire and condition the SPND signals (including current and status signals), remove invalid signals, and then perform delay compensation on the SPND current and status signals using a delay compensation algorithm.
  • the Core Protection Upper Cabinet is used to reconstruct the core flux diagram power and provide the ALPC with the core status parameters (hereinafter referred to as correction parameters) required by the protection algorithm at regular intervals.
  • the Core Protection Lower Cabinet is used to reconstruct the core power distribution based on the latest core status parameters and the delayed SPND current and status signals using a power mapping algorithm.
  • the reconstructed core power is used to calculate values such as High Linear Power Density (HLPD) and Low Deviation Nucleus Boiling Ratio (LDNBR) in real time, realizing online HLPD and LDNBR protection functions.
  • the weak SPND signals are conditioned in the ASPC and the delay compensation algorithm is used to compensate for the delay of the SPND signals.
  • the compensated signals are converted into 4-20mA standard signals and transmitted to the ALPC through hard wiring, corresponding to signal links A/B/C/D in Figure 3.
  • each ALPC After receiving the 4-20mA standard signal from the corresponding ASPC of the four instrumentation and control channels, each ALPC transmits the SPND signal received in its channel via hardwiring to the ALPCs of the other three channels through point-to-point communication.
  • each ALPC has 294 (42*7) SPND signals and performs complex calculations such as power reconfiguration, linear power density (LPD), and deviation from nucleus boiling ratio (DNBR) within its own channel ALPC. Based on the calculation results, a shutdown command is generated, with each instrumentation and control channel ALPC generating one shutdown command.
  • the SPND signal, probe final status, intermediate calculation process (LPD, DNBR, etc.) and shutdown command in ALPC will be transmitted unidirectionally to KIC and core monitoring cabinet via the Safety System Bus (ARPS) gateway GW.
  • ARPS Safety System Bus
  • AUPC periodically transmits calibration parameters to ALPC via a network cable. Since AUPC is a low-security device and ALPC is a high-security device, the network cable between AUPC and ALPC is only connected when transmitting calibration parameters, and the network cable connection must be disconnected after the transmission is completed.
  • the total time from signal acquisition from the reactor (time T1), processing by the ASPC (time T2), transmission to the ALPC (time T3), ALPC calculation, and generation of the final shutdown command (time T4) should be as short as possible to ensure the rapidity of reactor shutdown protection.
  • the total shutdown time T T1 + T2 + T3 + T4, where T1 + T2 + T3 ⁇ 300 ms.
  • the algorithms used to calculate LPD and DNBR are very complex and computationally intensive, because the calculation cycle of the MPU needs to be as long as possible while ensuring that the load of the computing unit MPU in ALPC does not exceed the limit; therefore, the calculation cycle of the MPU in ALPC is usually no less than 200ms.
  • the total downtime T T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 ⁇ 1320ms, which exceeds the expected total downtime.
  • the AUPC When performing parameter calibration, the AUPC needs to connect to the sub-lower cabinets of the ALPC one by one. Since the AUPC is a low-security-level device, the corresponding ALPC needs to be bypassed when connecting the AUPC and ALPC.
  • the SPND signal collected by the bypassed ALPC sub-cabinet may not be able to be transmitted to the other three ALPC channels via point-to-point communication. This results in a 25% reduction in the number of SPNDs used for core power reconfiguration in the other three channels. For example, if the IP channel sub-cabinet is bypassed, the number of SPNDs used for core power reconfiguration in the other three channels decreases from 294 to 217. This, in turn, leads to a decrease in the accuracy of subsequent LPD and DNBR calculations, i.e., an increase in the uncertainty of shutdown protection, which is detrimental to reactor protection.
  • the purpose of this invention is to overcome the problems of excessive total shutdown time and parameter correction leading to increased uncertainty in the protection function of the core protection instrumentation and control system in the prior art, and to provide an instrumentation and control system and its implementation method for use in nuclear power plant reactor protection.
  • the present invention provides an instrumentation and control system for use in reactor protection in nuclear power plants, which includes a neutron flux signal processing cabinet, a core protection upper cabinet, and a core protection lower cabinet.
  • the neutron flux signal processing cabinet includes four sub-signal processing cabinets. These sub-signal processing cabinets and the core protection upper-level cabinet are connected to the core protection lower-level cabinet via hardwiring and communication.
  • Each core protection lower-level cabinet includes four sub-lower-level cabinets, each containing a first control chip, a second control chip, and a third control chip. The input terminals of the four first control chips are connected one-to-one with the four sub-signal processing cabinets.
  • the output terminals of the first control chips are communicatively connected to the input terminals of all the second control chips, and vice versa.
  • the second control chips are communicatively connected to the core protection upper-level cabinet.
  • the first control chip receives the self-powered neutron detector detection signal from the sub-signal processing cabinet.
  • the second control chip calculates the line power density, deviation from the nucleus boiling ratio, and threshold comparison results.
  • the third control chip issues a shutdown command.
  • the first control chip is specifically used to receive the self-powered neutron detector detection signal sent by the sub-signal processing cabinet and perform format conversion or data rejection processing to obtain the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the second control chip is specifically used to obtain the core state parameters obtained by the core protection host cabinet and the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal obtained by the first control chip, and calculate the line power density and the deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio accordingly. The line power density and the deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio are compared with a preset threshold to obtain a threshold comparison result.
  • the third control chip is specifically used to obtain the threshold comparison result and perform logical voting accordingly. When the specified logical combination requirements are met, a shutdown command is issued.
  • the logical voting is a two-out-of-four logical voting or a two-out-of-three logical voting.
  • the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal, the threshold comparison result, and the reactor shutdown command are all sent to the nuclear power plant computer information and control system.
  • the first control chip, the second control chip and the third control chip are communicatively connected to a safety system bus, and the safety system bus is connected to the nuclear power plant computer information and control system through the gateway of the core protection lower cabinet.
  • the communication connection between the first control chip and the second control chip is a point-to-point unidirectional communication connection.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinet is used to acquire the detection signal of the self-powered neutron detector and perform conditioning, removal of invalid signals, delay compensation and data conversion processing to obtain the delay-compensated self-powered neutron detector detection signal, and send the delay-compensated self-powered neutron detector detection signal to the first control chip.
  • the core protection host cabinet includes a core monitoring cabinet and a calibration station.
  • the core monitoring cabinet is used to calculate core state parameters and send them to the calibration station.
  • the calibration station is used to verify the validity of the calculated core state parameters in the calibration state.
  • the core protection host cabinet is used to send the core state parameters in the calibration state to each of the second control chips.
  • the calibration station is specifically used to acquire the core state parameters obtained by the core monitoring cabinet in the calibrated state and to acquire the detection signal of the self-powered neutron detector from the lower core protection cabinet, and to calculate the line power density and deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio based on these parameters, for verifying the validity of the core state parameters generated by the core monitoring cabinet.
  • the algorithm of the calibration station for calculating the line power density and deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio is the same as the algorithm of the second control chip for calculating the line power density and deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio.
  • the present invention provides a method for implementing an instrumentation and control system applied in reactor protection of a nuclear power plant, wherein the instrumentation and control system adopts the instrumentation and control system applied in reactor protection of a nuclear power plant as described in the first aspect of the present invention, and the method includes:
  • the first control chip receives the self-powered neutron detector detection signal sent by the sub-signal processing cabinet and performs format conversion or data removal processing to obtain the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the second control chip obtains the core status parameters from the core protection host cabinet and the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal from the first control chip, and calculates the line power density and deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio accordingly.
  • the line power density and the deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio are compared with a preset threshold to obtain a threshold comparison result.
  • the method further includes: the sub-signal processing cabinet acquiring the self-powered neutron detector detection signal and performing conditioning, invalid signal removal, delay compensation and data conversion processing to obtain a delay-compensated self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the core state parameters are core state parameters in the corrected state.
  • the calculation accuracy of the second control chip is not reduced, meaning the determinism of the shutdown protection remains stable, improving the accuracy of line power density and deviation from the nucleus boiling ratio protection, and enhancing the accuracy and stability of the shutdown protection.
  • the core monitoring cabinet is based on a server architecture, which has a lower security level and reliability. Adding an independent calibration station allows for validity verification of the core status parameters calculated by the core monitoring cabinet, improving the high reliability of advanced core protection.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the fuel assembly and SPND arrangement.
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the core protection function.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of the implementation scheme of the existing core protection instrumentation and control system.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of the calculation of time T4.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the instrumentation and control system of the present invention applied to reactor protection in nuclear power plants.
  • Figure 6 is a flowchart of the implementation method of the instrumentation and control system of the present invention in the reactor protection of nuclear power plants.
  • the total reactor shutdown time occupied by signal acquisition, core power reconfiguration, threshold comparison, and logical voting reaches approximately 1300 milliseconds, and the total shutdown duration needs to be reduced.
  • Parameter calibration leads to significant uncertainty in protection functions: the SPND signal (detection signal of the self-powered neutron detector) acquired by the bypassed ALPC may not be able to be transmitted to the other three ALPC channels via point-to-point communication. This will reduce the accuracy of subsequent LPD and DNBR calculations, thereby increasing the uncertainty of shutdown protection and hindering reactor protection.
  • this invention provides an instrumentation and control system and its implementation method for reactor protection in nuclear power plants.
  • the lower-level cabinet for core protection By designing the lower-level cabinet for core protection, the total shutdown time is significantly reduced, parameter calibration is avoided from affecting the shutdown protection function, and the determinism of the shutdown protection function is improved.
  • the instrumentation and control system includes a neutron flux signal processing cabinet, a core protection upper-level cabinet, and a core protection lower-level cabinet.
  • the neutron flux signal processing cabinet includes four sub-signal processing cabinets.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinets and the core protection upper-level cabinet are respectively connected to the core protection lower-level cabinet through hardwiring and communication.
  • the core protection lower-level cabinet includes four sub-lower-level cabinets. Each sub-lower-level cabinet includes a first control chip, a second control chip, and a third control chip.
  • the input terminals of the four first control chips are connected to the four sub-signal processing cabinets one-to-one.
  • the output terminals of the first control chips are communicatively connected to the input terminals of all second control chips.
  • the output terminals of the second control chips are connected to the input terminals of all third control chips.
  • the second control chips are communicatively connected to the core protection upper-level cabinet.
  • the first control chip is used to receive the self-powered neutron detector detection signal sent by the sub-signal processing cabinet; the second control chip is used to calculate the line power density, deviation from the nucleus boiling ratio, and threshold comparison results; and the third control chip is used to issue a shutdown command.
  • the output terminal of the core protection upper cabinet can communicate with the input terminal of the core protection lower cabinet, specifically through periodic offline communication.
  • the four sub-signal processing cabinets of the neutron flux signal processing cabinet correspond one-to-one with four channels, namely instrument control IP channel, instrument control IIP channel, instrument control IIIP channel and instrument control IVP channel, and the four sub-lower cabinets correspond one-to-one with four channels.
  • each sub-signal processing cabinet is connected to a self-powered neutron detector.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinet is used to acquire the detection signal from the self-powered neutron detector and perform a first processing to obtain the self-powered neutron detector detection signal after delay compensation.
  • the first processing includes conditioning, removal of invalid signals, delay compensation, and data conversion.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinet is used to acquire the detection signal (SPND signal) from the self-powered neutron detector. This sub-signal processing cabinet is used to acquire the SPND signal and condition the weak signals within it, removing invalid signals.
  • a delay compensation algorithm is used to perform delay compensation on the SPND signal after invalid signal removal.
  • the compensated signal is then converted into a standard delay-compensated SPND signal; the specific standard is set according to the specific circumstances.
  • the final result i.e., the delay-compensated SPND signal after standard conversion, is then sent.
  • the detection signal includes a current signal, which is the current obtained by measuring the current formed by the release of electrons using a galvanometer.
  • the functions of the sub-signal processing cabinet include modeling the current signal data, filtering the modeled current signal, and using a delay compensation algorithm to determine whether a single point of failure exists.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinet is also used to send the SPND signal after delay compensation of standard conversion.
  • the sub-signal processing cabinet and the first control unit are connected by hardwiring, and the standard SPND signal is transmitted to the corresponding first control chip in the core protection lower cabinet through hardwiring.
  • first, second, and third control chips in each sub-cabinet are independent of each other, and they do not share a single independent MPU for execution. It is also understandable that the sub-cabinet adopts a three-layer architecture, with the first, second, and third control chips corresponding one-to-one with the first-layer control unit L1, the second-layer control unit L2, and the third-layer control unit L3, respectively.
  • the communication connection between the first control chip and the second control chip is a point-to-point unidirectional communication connection.
  • the first, second, and third control chips are all connected to the safety-level system bus, which specifically uses the ARPS Safety System Bus and employs a multi-point communication connection method.
  • the core protection lower-level cabinet also includes a gateway.
  • the ARPS Safety System Bus connects to the KIC system and the core protection upper-level cabinet (core monitoring cabinet) through the gateway GW.
  • the first control chip receives the self-powered neutron detector detection signal (i.e., the delayed-compensated SPND signal) from the sub-signal processing cabinet and performs a second processing step to obtain the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the second processing includes format conversion.
  • the second processing includes data removal, i.e., data filtering, specifically analyzing fault data in the standard SPND signal and removing the faulty data.
  • the first control chip is used to send the processed SPND signal unidirectionally to all the second control chips via point-to-point communication; the first control chip is also used to transmit the processed SPND signal unidirectionally to the KIC system (nuclear power plant computer information and control system) and the core monitoring cabinet via the ARPS Safety System Bus.
  • KIC system nuclear power plant computer information and control system
  • the first control chip Since the first control chip performs fewer calculations, its calculation cycle is kept as short as possible, using 25ms.
  • the second control chip is used to obtain the core status parameters from the core protection host cabinet and the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal from the first control chip, and calculates the line power density and deviation from the nucleus boiling ratio based on these parameters. It then compares the line power density and the deviation from the nucleus boiling ratio with preset thresholds to obtain a threshold comparison result.
  • the core protection host cabinet is used to generate the core status parameters.
  • the host cabinet can be unidirectionally connected to the second control chip.
  • the second control chip receives the processed SPND signals from all the first control chips, calculates the LPD and DNBR based on the processed SPND signals and core status parameters, compares the LPD with a preset first threshold, and compares the DNBR with a preset second threshold.
  • the comparison results are collectively referred to as threshold comparison results, and are unidirectionally transmitted to all third control units via communication.
  • the core state parameters obtained by the second control chip are the core state parameters in the corrected state (see below for details), which are the core state parameters that have been confirmed to be correct.
  • the second control chip Based on the core state parameters in the corrected state and the processed detection signal from the self-powered neutron detector, the second control chip reconstructs the power distribution of the core through a power mapping algorithm. The reconstructed core power is used to calculate HLPD and LDNBR in real time, realizing online HLPD and LDNBR protection functions.
  • the second control chip is also used to transmit the threshold comparison result unidirectionally to the KIC system via the ARPS Safety System Bus.
  • the calculation cycle of the second control unit is no less than 200ms.
  • the third control unit performs fewer calculations, its calculation cycle is kept as short as possible, using 25ms.
  • the ALPC includes a communication module connected to the AUPC, used to receive core status parameters and send them to the second control chip. Specifically, the AUPC transmits the parameters offline to the communication module, and when the ALPC is operational, the communication module sends the core status parameters to the corresponding second control chip.
  • the existing technology still has the problem of not being able to guarantee the effectiveness of the calibration parameters, that is, since the core monitoring cabinet adopts a server architecture with a low security level, the calibration parameters it generates are used for protection calculations in the high-security ALPC. If there is a problem with the generation of calibration parameters, the protection calculations in ALPC will also be incorrect.
  • the core protection supervisory cabinet includes a core monitoring cabinet and a calibration station.
  • the core monitoring cabinet is connected to the calibration station.
  • the core monitoring cabinet generates core status parameters and sends them to the calibration station.
  • the core monitoring cabinet sends the core status parameters to the calibration station via the first link E.
  • the calibration station uses the latest core status parameters to calculate LPD and DNBR to verify the validity of the core status parameters.
  • the calibration station or the core monitoring cabinet sends the calibrated core status parameters to the second control chip.
  • the core monitoring cabinet is used to implement core flux map power reconfiguration and periodically transmits the calibrated core status parameters to the second control chip via a network cable at regular intervals.
  • the network cable from the AUPC to the ALPC is only connected when transmitting calibration parameters, and the network cable connection needs to be disconnected after the transmission is completed.
  • the algorithms for calculating LPD and DNBR carried in the calibration station are the same as those carried in ALPC.
  • this embodiment adds an independent calibration station to the AUPC.
  • the calibration station obtains the SPND signal from the ALPC via the second link F. Specifically, the calibration station obtains the SPND signal processed by the first control chip and the threshold comparison result of the second control chip.
  • the core monitoring cabinet After the core monitoring cabinet generates calibration parameters, it first sends the calibration parameters to the calibration station via the first link E.
  • the calibration station uses the latest calibration parameters to calculate LPD and DNBR and calculates to confirm whether the calibration parameters are correct. Only after confirming that they are correct is the calibration parameter transmitted to the ALPC for formal protection calculation.
  • an independent calibration station is added to the AUPC.
  • the calibration station acquires the SPND signal via link F and adopts the same protection algorithm as in the ALPC.
  • the calibration station uses the new calibration parameters to calculate LPD and DNBR. Only after confirmation are the calibration parameters transmitted to the ALPC for formal protection calculation, thereby improving the effectiveness of the calibration parameters and avoiding problems with the core status parameters generated by the upper core protection cabinet that could affect the calculation of the lower core protection cabinet.
  • Figure 6 illustrates the implementation method of the instrumentation and control system of the present invention applied to reactor protection in a nuclear power plant, comprising:
  • the first control chip receives the self-powered neutron detector detection signal from the sub-signal processing cabinet and performs the second processing to obtain the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the second control chip obtains the core status parameters from the core protection host cabinet and the processed self-powered neutron detector detection signal from the first control chip, and calculates the line power density and deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio accordingly.
  • the line power density and the deviation from the bubble-nucleus boiling ratio are compared with a preset threshold to obtain the threshold comparison result.
  • the third control chip obtains the threshold comparison result and performs logical voting accordingly. When the specified logical combination requirements are met, it issues a stop command.
  • the process also includes the following steps: the sub-signal processing cabinet acquires the detection signal from the self-powered neutron detector and performs a first processing to obtain a delay-compensated self-powered neutron detector detection signal.
  • the core state parameters are the core state parameters in the corrected state.
  • implementation methods of the instrumentation and control system in nuclear power plant reactor protection also include:
  • the core monitoring cabinet calculates and obtains core status parameters and sends them to the calibration station;
  • the calibration station acquires core status parameters
  • the calibration station obtains the detection signal from the self-powered neutron detector from the lower-level cabinet of the core protection system.
  • the calibration station verifies the validity of the core condition parameters
  • the core protection host cabinet sends the verified and corrected core status parameters to the second control chip.
  • T T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 ⁇ 725 ms.
  • the total shutdown time is much shorter than that of existing technologies, and the total shutdown time is reduced from about 1.3 s to about 725 ms, which can effectively improve the speed of shutdown protection action.
  • the AUPC only needs to be connected to the second control chip of the ALPC to perform parameter calibration. Therefore, the first control chip does not need to be bypassed.
  • the first control chip can send signals to other channels of the ALPC through point-to-point communication. This ensures that each channel of the ALPC can still acquire the complete 294 SPND signals, so the accuracy of subsequent LPD and DNBR calculations will not be reduced. That is, the determinism of the shutdown protection is stable, and the accuracy of LPD and DNBR protection is improved.
  • the voting logic of the third control chip in other channels may degenerate from 2/4 to 2/3.
  • the calibrated core state parameters are transferred to ALPC for formal protection calculations after the confirmed core state parameters are calculated.
  • the instrumentation and control system and its implementation method applied to reactor protection in nuclear power plants in this invention not only effectively improve the speed of reactor shutdown protection actions and the determinism of reactor shutdown protection functions, but also improve the effectiveness of core state parameters, thereby improving the accuracy of reactor protection in nuclear power plants.

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Abstract

本发明公开了一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法，仪控系统的堆芯保护下位机柜包括四个子下位机柜，每个子下位机柜包括一个第一控制芯片、一个第二控制芯片和一个第三控制芯片，第一控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有第二控制芯片，第二控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有第三控制芯片，第二控制芯片通信连接堆芯保护上位机柜；第一控制芯片用于接收子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号；第二控制芯片用于计算线功率密度、偏离泡核沸腾比和阈值比较结果，第三控制芯片用于发出停堆指令。相对于现有技术，本发明仪控系统大幅降低了总的停堆时间，有效提高了停堆保护动作的快速性，提高了停堆保护的准确和稳定。

Description

应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法 技术领域
本发明涉及核电厂仪控技术领域，具体涉及一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法。
背景技术
堆芯保护是为了防止发展成反应堆严重事故的自动停堆系统，堆芯保护(又称先进堆芯保护系统ARPS)采用自给能中子探测器(SPND)，实时获取堆芯不同位置的功率(或中子通量)信号，并通过一系列的保护算法直接计算出堆芯实时的最小DNBR和局部最高LPD，直接用于堆芯保护。
请参照图1所示，堆芯共有177个燃料组件，其中A、B、C、D所在位置共包含42组SPND组件。42组SPND组件通过4个仪控通道采集，仪控IP通道对应A位置的11组SPND组件，仪控IIP通道对应B位置的11组SPND组件，仪控IIIP通道对应C位置的10组SPND组件，仪控IVP通道对应D位置的10组SPND组件。其中每个SPND组件轴向包含7个探测器。
现有堆芯保护系统从功能上可以分为中子通量信号处理机柜(ASPC)、堆芯保护上位机柜(AUPC)和堆芯保护下位机柜(ALPC)，各部分的功能请参见图2所示。中子通量信号处理机柜，用于对SPND信号(包括电流信号和状态信号)采集和调理，去除无效信号，然后通过延迟补偿算法对SPND电流信号和状态信号进行延迟补偿。堆芯保护上位机柜，用于实现堆芯通量图功率重构，并每隔一段时间为ALPC提供保护算法所需要的堆芯状态参数(下称校正参数)。堆芯保护下位机柜，用于根据最新的堆芯状态参数以及延迟处理后的SPND电流信号和状态信号，通过功率映射算法重构堆芯的功率分布，重构后的堆芯功率用于实时计算高线功率密度(HLPD)、低偏离泡核沸腾比(LDNBR)等数值，实现在线的HLPD与LDNBR保护功能。
现有堆芯保护系统的仪控系统的技术方案如图3所示，包括如下内容：
首先通过四个ASPC机柜(即四个仪控通道)采集42组SPND信号，在ASPC中对SPND信号的微弱信号进行调理，并通过延迟补偿算法对SPND信号进行延迟补偿，补偿后的信号转换为4-20mA标准信号并通过硬接线传递至ALPC，对应图3中信号链路A/B/C/D。
四个仪控通道的ALPC分别接受对应通道ASPC发来的4-20mA标准信号后，ALPC将本通道通过硬接线接受的SPND信号通过点对点通讯分别传递至另外三个通道的ALPC中。这样每个ALPC中均有294个(42*7)SPND信号，并在本通道ALPC中开展功率重构、线功率密度(LPD)及偏离泡核沸腾比(DNBR)等复杂运算，根据计算结果产生停堆指令，每个仪控通道的的ALPC产生一个停堆指令。
ALPC中的SPND信号、探头最终状态、中间计算过程(LPD、DNBR等)以及停堆指令将通过Safety System Bus(ARPS安全系统总线)经网关GW单方向传递至KIC和堆芯监测机柜。
AUPC通过网线定期向ALPC传递校正参数，由于AUPC为低安全等级设备、ALPC为高安全等级设备，所以只有在传递校正参数时AUPC至ALPC的网线才连接，传递完成后需断开网线连接。
但是，现有技术至少存在以下缺陷：
1)停堆总时间长度超标
从反应堆中采集信号(反应堆中采集信号的时间为T1)、经ASPC处理(ASPC处理的时间为T2)、传递至ALPC(传递的时间T3)、ALPC运算及产生最终停堆指令(ALPC运算及产生最终停堆指令的时间为T4)的总时间长度应尽可能短，以便确保反应堆停堆保护的快速性。现有技术中总的停堆时间T＝T1+T2+T3+T4，其中T1+T2+T3≈300ms。
用于计算LPD和DNBR的算法非常复杂，且运算量很大，因为在确保ALPC中计算单元MPU负荷不超标的前提下，MPU的运算周期需尽可能长；鉴于此，ALPC的MPU计算周期通常不低于200ms。
请参照图4所示，由于信号采集、堆芯功率重构、阈值比较和2/4逻辑表决均在同一个MPU中执行，则T4＝T41+T42+T43＝1.7*200ms*3＝1020ms，总的停堆时间T＝T1+T2+T3+T4≈1320ms，停堆总时长超预期。
2)参数校刻导致停堆保护功能不确定度较大
当执行参数校刻时，AUPC需要逐一和ALPC的子下位机柜进行连接，由于AUPC为低安全等级设备，所以在AUPC和ALPC连接时需要将对应的ALPC旁通。
被旁通的ALPC的子下位机柜所采集的SPND信号将可能无法通过点对点通讯送至其它3个ALPC通道。导致其它3个通道用于堆芯功率重构的SPND数量减少四分之一。比如IP通道的子下位机柜被旁通，其它3个通道用于堆芯功率重构的SPND数量由294个减少为217个。进而导致后续的LPD、DNBR计算精度降低，即停堆保护的不确定度增大，不利于反应堆保护。
3)校刻参数的有效性得不到保证
由于AUPC的安全等级较低，其生成的校正参数用于高安全等级ALPC中的保护运算，如果校正参数生成出现问题，ALPC中的保护运算也将对应出现错误，从而无法有效触发停堆保护。
有鉴于此，确有必要提供一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法。
发明内容
本发明的发明目的在于：克服现有技术停堆总时间长度超标和参数校正导致堆芯保护仪控系统的保护功能不确定度增大的问题，提供一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法。
为了实现上述发明目的，第一方面，本发明提供了一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其包括中子通量信号处理机柜、堆芯保护上位机柜和堆芯保护下位机柜。中子通量信号处理机柜包括四个子信号处理机柜，所述子信号处理机柜和堆芯保护上位机柜分别通过硬接线和通信连接所述堆芯保护下位机柜，所述堆芯保护下位机柜包括4个子下位机柜，其中，所述子下位机柜包括一个第一控制芯片、一个第二控制芯片和一个第三控制芯片，四个所述第一控制芯片的输入端和四个所述子信号处理机柜一一对应连接，所述第一控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有所述第二控制芯片的输入端，所述第二控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有所述第三控制芯片的输入端，所述第二控制芯片通信连接所述堆芯保护上位机柜，所述第一控制芯片用于接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号，所述第二控制芯片用于计算线功率密度、偏离泡核沸腾比和阈值比较结果，所述第三控制芯片用于发出停堆指令。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述第一控制芯片具体用于接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，所述第二控制芯片具体用于获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，将所述线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果，所述第三控制芯片具体用于获得所述阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述逻辑表决为四取二的逻辑表决或三取二的逻辑表决。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号、所述阈值比较结果和所述停堆指令均发送至核电站计算机信息和控制系统。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述第一控制芯片、所述第二控制芯片和所述第三控制芯片通信连接安全系统总线，所述安全系统总线通过所述堆芯保护下位机柜的网关连接所述核电站计算机信息和控制系统。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述第一控制芯片和所述第二控制芯片的通信连接为点对点单向通讯连接。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述子信号处理机柜用于获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行调理、去除无效信号、延迟补偿和数据转换处理得到延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号，发出延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号至所述第一控制芯片。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述堆芯保护上位机柜包括堆芯监测机柜和校正站，所述堆芯监测机柜用于计算堆芯状态参数并发送至校正站，所述校正站用于复核计算校正态的堆芯状态参数的有效性，所述堆芯保护上位机柜用于将所述校正态的堆芯状态参数发送至每个所述第二控制芯片。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的一个实施方式，所述校正站具体用于获取堆芯监测机柜得到校正态的堆芯状态参数和从堆芯保护下位机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，用于复核堆芯监测机柜生成的堆芯状态参数的有效性，所述校正站计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比的算法和所述第二控制芯片计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比的算法相同。
第二方面，本发明提供了一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法，所述仪控系统采用如本发明第一方面所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，所述方法包括：
所述第一控制芯片接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号；
所述第二控制芯片获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，将所述线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果；
所述第三控制芯片获得所述阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法的一个实施方式，在所述第一控制芯片接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号步骤之前，进一步包括：子信号处理机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行调理、去除无效信号、延迟补偿和数据转换处理得到延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号。
根据本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法的一个实施方式，所述堆芯状态参数为校正态的堆芯状态参数。
相对于现有技术，本发明通过设计所述子下位机柜包括一个第一控制芯片、一个第二控制芯片和一个第三控制芯片，第一控制芯片用于接收子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号，第二控制芯片用于计算线功率密度、偏离泡核沸腾比和阈值比较结果，第三控制芯片用于发出停堆指令，使得停堆总时长远低于现有技术方案，总的停堆时间由约1.3s降低至约725ms，有效提高了停堆保护动作的快速性。通过第二控制芯片连接堆芯保护上位机柜，避免了第一控制芯片的旁通，使得第二控制芯片能确定性的获得完整数量的SPND信号，从而第二控制芯片计算精度并不会降低，即停堆保护的确定度稳定，提高了线功率密度和偏离泡核沸腾比保护准确性，提高了停堆保护的准确和稳定。同时，堆芯监测机柜基于服务器架构，其安全等级和可靠性较低，增加独立校正站可对堆芯监测机柜计算得到的堆芯状态参数进行有效性复核，提高先进堆芯保护高可靠性。
附图说明
下面结合附图和具体实施方式，对本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法进行详细说明，其中：
图1为燃料组件及SPND布置示意图。
图2为堆芯保护功能示意图。
图3为现有堆芯保护仪控系统的实现方案示意图。
图4为时间T4的计算示意图。
图5为本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的方案示意图。
图6为本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法流程图。
具体实施方式
为了使本发明的发明目的、技术方案及其技术效果更加清晰，以下结合附图和具体实施方式，对本发明进行进一步详细说明。应当理解的是，本说明书中描述的具体实施方式仅仅是为了解释本发明，并非为了限定本发明。
在先进堆芯保护，信号采集、堆芯功率重构、阈值比较和逻辑表决所占用的总堆停时间达到约1300毫秒，停堆总时长需要降低。参数校刻导致保护功能不确定度较大：被旁通的ALPC所采集的SPND信号(自给能中子探测器的探测信号)可能无法通过点对点通讯送至其它3个ALPC通道，这将导致后续的LPD、DNBR计算精度降低，进而使得停堆保护的不确定度增大，不利于反应堆保护。
为此，本发明提供了一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法，通过设计堆芯保护下位机柜，大幅降低了停堆总时间长度，避免参数校刻影响停堆保护功能，提高了停堆保护功能的确定性。
下面，对本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法及其技术效果进行描述。
请参见图5所示，图5为本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方案示意图，仪控系统包括中子通量信号处理机柜、堆芯保护上位机柜和堆芯保护下位机柜，中子通量信号处理机柜包括4个子信号处理机柜，子信号处理机柜和堆芯保护上位机柜分别通过硬接线和通信连接堆芯保护下位机柜，堆芯保护下位机柜包括4个子下位机柜，每个子下位机柜包括一个第一控制芯片、一个第二控制芯片和一个第三控制芯片，4个第一控制芯片的输入端和4个子信号处理机柜一一对应连接，第一控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有第二控制芯片的输入端，第二控制芯片的输出端连接所有第三控制芯片的输入端，第二控制芯片通信连接堆芯保护上位机柜。第一控制芯片用于接收子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号，第二控制芯片用于计算线功率密度、偏离泡核沸腾比和阈值比较结果，第三控制芯片用于发出停堆指令。
本实施例中，堆芯保护上位机柜的输出端能够通信连接堆芯保护下位机柜的输入端，具体为定期离线通信。
本实施例中，中子通量信号处理机柜的4个子信号处理机柜一一对应4个通道，即仪控IP通道、仪控IIP通道、仪控IIIP通道和仪控IVP通道，4个子下位机柜一一对应4个通道。
本实施例中，每个子信号处理机柜均连接自给能中子探测器，子信号处理机柜用于获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行第一处理得到延迟补偿后的自给能中子探测器探测信号。
具体的，第一处理包括调理、去除无效信号、延迟补偿和数据转换。子信号处理机柜用于获得自给能中子探测器的探测信号(简称SPND信号)。子信号处理机柜用于采集SPND信号和对采集SPND信号中的微弱信号进行调理，用于去除SPND信号中的无效信号，通过延迟补偿算法对去除无效信号后的SPND信号进行延迟补偿，用于将补偿后的信号转换为标准的延迟补偿后的SPND信号，具体标准根据具体情况设定，发送最终结果，即进行标准转换的延迟补偿后的SPND信号。
在本实施例中，探测信号包括电流信号，也就是用电流计测量释放出电子形成的电流得到的电流。对应的，子信号处理机柜的功能包括用于将电流信号数据模化、对模化后的电流信号进行滤波、利用延迟补偿算法判定是否存在单点失效。
子信号处理机柜还用于发出标准转换的延迟补偿后的SPND信号，本实施例中，子信号处理机柜和第一控制单元通过硬接线连接，通过硬接线将标准的SPND信号传递至堆芯保护下位机柜中对应的第一控制芯片。
可以理解的是，4个子下位机柜的计算处理互相独立，存在信息的传输，但是对数据的处理过程和计算过程相互独立。
可以理解的是，每个子下位机柜的第一控制芯片、第二控制芯片和第三控制芯片相互独立，第一控制芯片、第二控制芯片和第三控制芯片不共用在一个独立MPU中执行。可以理解的，子下位机柜采用3层架构，第一控制芯片、第二控制芯片和第三控制芯片分别一一对应第一层控制单元L1、第二层控制单元L2和第三层控制单元L3。
可以理解的是，第一控制芯片和第二控制芯片的通信连接为点对点单向通讯连接。
第一控制芯片、第二控制芯片和第三控制芯片均信号连接安全级系统总线，安全级系统总线具体采用ARPS Safety System Bus，具体为多点通讯连接方式。堆芯保护下位机柜还包括网关，ARPS Safety System Bus通过网关GW连接KIC系统和堆芯保护上位机柜(堆芯监测机柜)。
第一控制芯片用于接收子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号(即延迟补偿后的SPND信号)，并进行第二处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号。作为一种例举而非限定，第二处理包括格式转换。作为另一种例举而非限定，第二处理包括数据剔除，即过滤数据，具体为分析标准的SPND信号中的故障数据，并对故障数据进行剔除。
进一步的，第一控制芯片用于将处理后的SPND信号通过点对点通讯单向发送到所有第二控制芯片；第一控制芯片还用于将处理后的SPND信号通过ARPS Safety System Bus单方向传递至KIC系统(核电站计算机信息和控制系统)和堆芯监测机柜。
由于第一控制芯片执行的计算量少，第一控制芯片计算周期尽可能短，采用25ms。
第二控制芯片用于获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，用于将线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果。堆芯保护上位机柜用于生成堆芯状态参数，堆芯保护上位机柜可以单向通信连接第二控制芯片，具体的，第二控制芯片用于接收所有第一控制芯片的处理后的SPND信号，用于根据处理后的SPND信号和堆芯状态参数计算LPD、计算DNBR，用于将LPD和预设的第一阈值进行比较，将DNBR和预设的第二阈值进行比较，得到的比较结果统称为阈值比较结果，用于将阈值比较结果通过通讯单向发送到所有第三控制单元。
进一步的，第二控制芯片所获得的堆芯状态参数为校正态的堆芯状态参数(详见下文)，校正态的堆芯状态参数为已确认正确的堆芯状态参数。第二控制芯片根据校正态的堆芯状态参数以及处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，通过功率映射算法重构堆芯的功率分布，重构后的堆芯功率用于实时计算HLPD和LDNBR，实现在线的HLPD与LDNBR保护功能。
第二控制芯片还用于将阈值比较结果通过ARPS Safety System Bus单方向传递至KIC系统。
由于LPD、DNBR计算量大，第二控制单元计算周期不低于200ms。
第三控制芯片用于获得所述阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，用于在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。具体的，第三控制单元通过通讯接收所有第二控制单元的阈值比较结果，据此进行例如运算和定值比较等处理，产生用于逻辑表决的信号，然后进行逻辑表决，进行四取二的或三取二的复合逻辑运算，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。第三控制芯片还用于通过ARPS Safety System Bus将停堆指令单方向传递至KIC系统。
由于第三控制单元执行的计算量少，第三控制单元计算周期尽可能短，采用25ms。
在另一个实施例中，ALPC中设有与AUPC连接的通信模块，用于接收堆芯状态参数并发送至第二控制芯片。具体的，AUPC将参数离线传输至通信模块，待ALPC工作时，通信模块将堆芯状态参数发送至对应的第二控制芯片。
因为现有技术中还存在校正参数的有效性得不到保证的问题，即由于堆芯监测机柜采用服务器架构其安全等级较低，其生成的校正参数用于高安全等级ALPC中的保护运算，如果校正参数生成出现问题，ALPC中的保护运算也将对应出现错误。
在本实施例中，堆芯保护上位机柜包括堆芯监测机柜和校正站。堆芯监测机柜连接校正站。堆芯监测机柜用于生成堆芯状态参数并发送至校正站，堆芯监测机柜通过第一链路E将堆芯状态参数送至校正站，校正站利用最新的堆芯状态参数计算LPD和DNBR，用于复核堆芯状态参数的有效性，校正站或堆芯监测机柜将校正态的堆芯状态参数发送至第二控制芯片。本实施例中，堆芯监测机柜用于实现堆芯通量图功率重构，用于每隔一段时间通过网线定期向第二控制芯片传递校正态的堆芯状态参数，由于堆芯监测机柜为低安全等级设备、ALPC为高安全等级设备，所以只有在传递校正参数时AUPC至ALPC的网线才连接，传递完成后需断开网线连接。
本实施例中，校正站中载有的计算LPD和DNBR的算法和ALPC中载有计算LPD和DNBR的算法相同。
相比于现有技术，通过本实施例在AUPC中增加独立的校正站，校正站通过第二链路F从ALPC获取SPND信号，具体的，校正站获取第一控制芯片处理后的SPND信号以及获取第二控制芯片的阈值比较结果；当堆芯监测机柜生成校正参数后，首先通过第一链路E将校正参数送至校正站，校正站利用最新的校正参数计算LPD和DNBR，并计算以确认校正参数是否正确，经确认正确后才将校正参数传递至ALPC正式用于保护计算。
鉴于此，在AUPC中增加独立的校正站。校正站通过链路F获取SPND信号，并采用和ALPC中完全一致的保护算法；当堆芯监测机柜通过计算生成校正参数后，首先通过链路E将校正参数送至校正站，校正站利用新的校正参数计算LPD和DNBR，经确认后才将校正参数传递至ALPC正式用于保护计算，进而提高校正参数的有效性，避免堆芯保护上位机柜生成的堆芯状态参数出现问题而影响堆芯保护下位机柜的计算。
请参见图6所示，为本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法，其包括：
第一控制芯片接收子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行第二处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号；
第二控制芯片获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，将线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果；
第三控制芯片获得阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。
进一步的，进行上述步骤前，还包括步骤：子信号处理机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行第一处理得到延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号。
进一步的，堆芯状态参数为校正态的堆芯状态参数。
更进一步的，核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法还包括：
堆芯监测机柜通过计算获得堆芯状态参数并发送至校正站；
校正站获取堆芯状态参数；
校正站从堆芯保护下位机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号；
校正站对堆芯状态参数有效性进行复核；
堆芯保护上位机柜将经过复核后校正态的堆芯状态参数发送至第二控制芯片。
综上，相比于现有技术，本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法具有如下效果：
(1)降低了停堆总时间长度；
本发明中T4＝T41+T42+T43＝1.7*25ms+1.7*200ms+1.7*25ms＝425ms，总的停堆时长T＝T1+T2+T3+T4≈725ms，停堆总时长远低于现有技术方案，总的停堆时间，由约1.3s降低至约725ms，可有效提高停堆保护动作的快速性。
(2)避免参数校刻影响停堆保护功能，提高了停堆保护功能的确定性；
由于仪控实现采用3层架构，AUPC仅连接至ALPC的第二控制芯片即可实现参数校刻，所以第一控制芯片可不用被旁通，第一控制芯片可通过点对点通信送至ALPC的其他通道，因此可以确保ALPC的每个通道仍然能够采集完整的294个SPND信号，从而后续的LPD、DNBR计算精度并不会降低，即停堆保护的确定度稳定，提高了LPD和DNBR保护准确性；但其它通道中第三控制芯片的表决逻辑有可能由2/4退化为2/3。
(3)设置独立校正站，提高堆芯状态参数的有效性；
通过校正站校正确认堆芯监测机柜的结果，避免了堆芯状态参数出现错误，而导致ALPC中的保护运算也将对应出现错误，从而无法有效触发停堆保护。
通过在AUPC中增加独立的校正站，通过计算经确认堆芯状态参数后，将校正态的堆芯状态参数传递至ALPC正式用于保护计算。
本发明应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统及其实现方法，不仅有效提高停堆保护动作的快速性，有效提高了停堆保护功能的确定性，而且提高堆芯状态参数的有效性，进而提高了核电厂反应堆保护的准确性。
根据上述原理，本发明还可以对上述实施方式进行适当的变更和修改。因此，本发明并不局限于上面揭示和描述的具体实施方式，对本发明的一些修改和变更也应当落入本发明的权利要求的保护范围内。此外，尽管本说明书中使用了一些特定的术语，但这些术语只是为了方便说明，并不对本发明构成任何限制。

Claims (12)

  1. 一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其包括中子通量信号处理机柜、堆芯保护上位机柜和堆芯保护下位机柜，中子通量信号处理机柜包括四个子信号处理机柜，所述子信号处理机柜和堆芯保护上位机柜分别通过硬接线和通信连接所述堆芯保护下位机柜，所述堆芯保护下位机柜包括四个子下位机柜，其特征在于，每个所述子下位机柜包括一个第一控制芯片、一个第二控制芯片和一个第三控制芯片，四个所述第一控制芯片的输入端和四个所述子信号处理机柜一一对应连接，所述第一控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有所述第二控制芯片的输入端，所述第二控制芯片的输出端通信连接所有所述第三控制芯片的输入端，所述第二控制芯片通信连接所述堆芯保护上位机柜，所述第一控制芯片用于接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号，所述第二控制芯片用于计算线功率密度、偏离泡核沸腾比和阈值比较结果，所述第三控制芯片用于发出停堆指令。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述第一控制芯片具体用于接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，所述第二控制芯片具体用于获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，将所述线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果，所述第三控制芯片具体用于获得所述阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述逻辑表决为四取二的逻辑表决或三取二的逻辑表决。
  4. 根据权利要求2所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号、所述阈值比较结果和所述停堆指令均发送至核电站计算机信息和控制系统。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述第一控制芯片、所述第二控制芯片和所述第三控制芯片通信连接安全系统总线，所述安全系统总线通过所述堆芯保护下位机柜的网关连接所述核电站计算机信息和控制系统。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述第一控制芯片和所述第二控制芯片的通信连接为点对点单向通讯连接。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述子信号处理机柜用于获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行调理、去除无效信号、延迟补偿和数据转换处理得到延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号，发出延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号至所述第一控制芯片。
  8. 根据权利要求1所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述堆芯保护上位机柜包括堆芯监测机柜和校正站，所述堆芯监测机柜用于计算堆芯状态参数并发送至校正站，所述校正站用于复核计算校正态堆芯状态参数的有效性，所述堆芯保护上位机柜用于将所述校正态的堆芯状态参数发送至每个所述第二控制芯片。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，其特征在于，所述校正站具体用于获取堆芯监测机柜得到校正态的堆芯状态参数和从堆芯保护下位机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，用于复核堆芯监测机柜生成的堆芯状态参数的有效性，所述校正站计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比的算法和所述第二控制芯片计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比的算法相同。
  10. 一种应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法，其特征在于，所述仪控系统采用权利要求1至9中任意一项所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统，所述方法包括：
    所述第一控制芯片接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号；
    所述第二控制芯片获得堆芯保护上位机柜得到的堆芯状态参数和第一控制芯片得到的处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号，并据此计算线功率密度及偏离泡核沸腾比，将所述线功率密度及所述偏离泡核沸腾比和预设阈值比较得到阈值比较结果；
    所述第三控制芯片获得所述阈值比较结果并据此进行逻辑表决，在满足规定的逻辑组合要求时发出停堆指令。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法，其特征在于，在所述第一控制芯片接收所述子信号处理机柜发出的自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行格式转换或数据剔除处理得到处理后的自给能中子探测器探测信号步骤之前，进一步包括：子信号处理机柜获取自给能中子探测器探测信号并进行调理、去除无效信号、延迟补偿和数据转换处理得到延时补偿的自给能中子探测器探测信号。
  12. 根据权利要求10所述的应用在核电厂反应堆保护中的仪控系统的实现方法，其特征在于，所述堆芯状态参数为校正态的堆芯状态参数。
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