WO2023213209A1 - 密钥管理方法及通信装置 - Google Patents

密钥管理方法及通信装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023213209A1
WO2023213209A1 PCT/CN2023/090413 CN2023090413W WO2023213209A1 WO 2023213209 A1 WO2023213209 A1 WO 2023213209A1 CN 2023090413 W CN2023090413 W CN 2023090413W WO 2023213209 A1 WO2023213209 A1 WO 2023213209A1
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Prior art keywords
network
network element
terminal device
decryption
access
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PCT/CN2023/090413
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
雷骜
吴义壮
崔洋
胡力
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华为技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2023213209A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023213209A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communications, and in particular, to a key management method and a communications device.
  • Access network equipment with IOPS functionality can access the IOPS network and continue to provide communication services to terminal devices.
  • the terminal device when a terminal device sends a registration request to the core network element of the 5G network, it needs to carry encrypted user identity information. That is to say, the terminal device uses the public key to encrypt the user identity information, and the core network element of the 5G network (such as the unified data management (UDM) network element) uses the private key to decrypt the encrypted user identity information. .
  • the above public key and private key are mutually asymmetric keys. However, there is a risk of leakage of asymmetric keys.
  • This application provides a key management method and communication device, which can securely protect user identity information.
  • this application adopts the following technical solutions:
  • the first aspect is to provide a key management method.
  • the execution subject of this method may be a terminal device or a chip applied in the terminal device.
  • the following description takes the execution subject being a terminal device as an example.
  • the method includes: a terminal device obtains identification information of a first decrypted network element in a local network.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device, where the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the mapping relationship indicates the encryption keys corresponding to different decryption network elements.
  • the terminal device determines which local network to register to, the terminal device can obtain the encryption key corresponding to the decryption network element in the local network according to the mapping relationship, that is, the first encryption key, using the encryption key corresponding to the local network.
  • the first encryption key is used to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the encryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are different.
  • the decryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are also different.
  • the decryption key of the decryption network element in the local network that has not been attacked will not be leaked.
  • the registration request carries the hidden user identity encrypted by the first encryption key, so that the user identity information is protected.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network, including: the terminal device receives a broadcast message, where the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network, including: the terminal device receives the identification of the local network and the first identification from the access network equipment, where the first identification is Used to identify a decryption network element in the local network.
  • the terminal device determines the identification information of the first decrypted network element based on the identification of the local network and the first identification. That is to say, for decryption network elements in different local networks, the first identifiers of different decryption network elements may be the same.
  • the terminal device first determines which specific network is based on the identifier of the local network, and then determines which decryption network element in the network the first decryption network element is based on the first identifier.
  • the terminal device executes the technical solution of the present application. For example, the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship; using the first An encryption key encrypts user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity; and sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device and other operations.
  • the identity of the local network is the public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • mapping relationship is preconfigured in the terminal device.
  • the terminal device includes a mobile device ME and a universal user identity module USIM, and the USIM has a preconfigured mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the ME obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: the ME sending the identification information to the USIM.
  • the USIM determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information and obtains the hidden user identity, including: USIM uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the USIM can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM, and the USIM has a preconfigured mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the ME obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: the ME sending the first request to the USIM.
  • the USIM sends the mapping relationship and user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives the mapping relationship and user identity information from USIM.
  • the ME determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity, including: the ME uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the ME can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the method also includes: the terminal device receives a second signal from the macro network through the access network device. Decrypt the mapping relationship between network elements. That is to say, before the terminal device registers with the local network, the terminal device can register with the macro network and obtain the mapping relationship from the macro network.
  • the mapping relationship is carried in the registration acceptance message.
  • the terminal device can obtain the mapping relationship during the registration process of the macro network.
  • the mapping relationship is carried in the user equipment configuration update command message.
  • the terminal device can obtain the mapping relationship during the user device configuration update process of the macro network.
  • the terminal equipment includes ME and USIM.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the ME obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the terminal device receives the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device, including: the ME receives the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: the ME determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity, including: ME sending a second request to the USIM. In response to the second request, the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME. ME receives user identity information from USIM. The ME encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the ME can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the terminal equipment includes ME and USIM.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the ME obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the terminal device receives the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device, including: the ME receives the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: the ME determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the terminal device encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, which includes: ME sending the first encryption key to the USIM.
  • the USIM receives the first encryption key from the ME.
  • the USIM uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the USIM can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the method also includes: the terminal device sends capability information to the access and mobility management network element in the macro network, where the capability information indicates that the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, so that the macro network
  • a key management method is provided.
  • the execution subject of this method may be an access network device or a chip applied in the access network device.
  • the following description takes the execution subject being the access network device as an example.
  • the method includes: in the process of establishing a backhaul link between the access network device and the core network element in the local network, the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network. The access network device sends the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the access network device provides the terminal device with the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network to which it is attached. information, so that the terminal device determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element, thereby encrypting the user identity information and obtaining the hidden user identity.
  • the registration request carries the hidden user identity to protect the user's identity information.
  • the access network device sending the identification information of the first decrypted network element includes: the access network device sending a broadcast message.
  • the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the access network device sends the identification information of the first decrypted network element, including: the access network device sends the identification information of the local network and the first identification, where the identification information of the local network and the first identification are used for Determine the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the identity of the local network is the public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • the method further includes: when the connection between the access network device and the core network element in the macro network is disconnected, the access network device and the core network element in the local network Establish a backhaul link between them to continue to provide communication services to terminal devices through the local network.
  • the method further includes: establishing an Internet Protocol secure IPsec link between the access network device and the core network element in the local network, where the backhaul link includes an IPsec link.
  • the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the access network device receives the message from the local network through the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Security Association initial negotiation IKE_SA_INIT message or the Internet Key Exchange Protocol authentication IKE_AUTH message.
  • the identification information of the first decrypted network element of the core network element so that the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element during the IPsec link establishment process.
  • the method further includes: establishing a datagram transport layer secure DTLS link between the access network device and the core network element in the local network, where the return link includes a DTLS link.
  • the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: the access network device receives the identification information of the first decryption network element from the core network element in the local network through a handshake message, so that The access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element during the DTLS link establishment process.
  • a key management method is provided.
  • the execution subject of this method may be a terminal device or a chip applied in the terminal device.
  • the following description takes the execution subject being a terminal device as an example.
  • the method includes: a terminal device receiving a first encryption key from a second decryption network element in a macro network. Wherein, there is a corresponding relationship between the first encryption key and the first local network.
  • the terminal device receives the identity of the first local network, the terminal device encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network, where the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device is connected to the macro network, the terminal device can obtain the first encryption key from the macro network and use the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information.
  • the encryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are different.
  • the decryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are also different. Even if the decryption network element in a certain local network is attacked, the decryption key of the decryption network element in the local network that has not been attacked will not be leaked.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to a local network that has not been attacked, the registration request carries the hidden user identity encrypted by the first encryption key, so that the user identity information is protected.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device sends capability information to an access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the capability information indicates that the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, so that the core network elements in the macro network can learn the capabilities of the terminal device.
  • the identity of the first local network is a public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the first local network.
  • the terminal device includes a mobile device ME and a universal user identity module USIM.
  • the terminal device receiving the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network includes: the ME receiving the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the terminal device encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, which includes: ME sending the first encryption key to the USIM.
  • the USIM uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network, including: the ME sends a registration request to the first local network. That is to say, in the case where the terminal device includes the ME and the USIM, and the ME receives the first encryption key, the USIM can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the terminal equipment includes ME and USIM.
  • the terminal device receiving the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network includes: the ME receiving the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity, including: ME sending a first request to the USIM.
  • the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives user identity information from USIM.
  • the ME encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network, including: the ME sends a registration request to the first local network. That is to say, in the case where the terminal device includes the ME and the USIM, and the ME receives the first encryption key, the ME can generate the hidden user identity based on the first encryption key.
  • the fourth aspect provides a key management method.
  • the execution subject of the method may be an access and mobility management network element in the macro network, or may be a chip applied in the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the following description takes the execution subject being the access and mobility management network element in the macro network as an example.
  • the method includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network receives the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first encryption key is associated with the first decryption network element.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network can obtain the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network, thereby providing the first encryption key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses The first encryption key is used to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the encryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are different.
  • the decryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are also different. Even if the decryption network element in a certain local network is attacked, the decryption key of the decryption network element in the local network that has not been attacked will not be leaked.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to a local network that has not been attacked, the registration request carries the hidden user identity encrypted by the first encryption key, so that the user identity information is protected.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network to which the access network device is attached.
  • the access network equipment is used to transmit the registration request of the terminal equipment to the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network determines the access network device to which the terminal device is connected based on the registration request, and then obtains the first decrypted network element in the local network to which the access network device is attached. Identification information.
  • the method also includes: when the access and mobility management network element in the macro network determines that the access network device has the ability to access the local network, the access and mobility management network element in the macro network The management network element determines the first local network First decrypt the identification information of the network element.
  • the access network equipment is used to provide communication services for terminal equipment to trigger the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in time.
  • the method further includes: an access and mobility management network element in the macro network receiving capability information from the terminal device.
  • the capability information indicates the terminal device's ability to access the local network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network determines the identification information of the first decryption network element in the first local network , to trigger the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network to promptly obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network
  • the sex management network element sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network through the subscription information request. That is to say, the subscription information request carries the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends indication information to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the second decryption network element in the macro network to provide the encryption key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device obtains the encryption key from the macro network.
  • the subscription information request includes the indication information.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network receives a request message from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the request message is used to request the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: according to the request message, the access and mobility management network element in the macro network, Send the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network actively triggers the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network, so that the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network report to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the decryption network element sends the identification information of the first decryption network element.
  • the identification information of the first decrypted network element includes the identification of the first local network and the first identification.
  • the first identifier is used to identify a decryption network element in the first local network.
  • the fifth aspect provides a key management method.
  • the execution subject of this method may be the second decryption network element in the macro network, or may be a chip applied in the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the following description takes the example that the execution subject is the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the method includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network determines the first encryption key based on the identification information and mapping relationship of the first decryption network element.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the first encryption key corresponds to the first decryption network element.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, combined with the mapping relationship, it can determine the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element. , thereby providing the first encryption key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information and obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the encryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are different.
  • the decryption keys corresponding to the decryption network elements in different local networks are also different.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to a local network that is not under attack, the registration request carries the hidden user identity encrypted by the first encryption key, thereby making the user identity Information is protected.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives access and mobility management information from the macro network The network element first decrypts the identification information of the network element.
  • the method further includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives indication information from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the second decryption network element in the macro network to provide the encryption key for the terminal device.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device, including: the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device according to the instruction information.
  • the method before the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, the method further includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element according to the identification information of the local network of the terminal device.
  • the subscription information determines to send the request message to the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the request message is used to request the identification information of the first decryption network element, so as to trigger the access and mobility management network element in the macro network to promptly provide the identification information of the first decryption network element.
  • the method further includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives the first information from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the first information includes identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, and the at least one local network includes the first local network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: the contract information of the second decryption network element in the macro network based on the local network of the terminal device, and the information of the first access network device, Obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element from the first information.
  • the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network when it receives the first information, it can also autonomously determine the identification information of the first decryption network element based on the information of the first access network device.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: the second decryption network element in the macro network based on the subscription information of the local network of the terminal device, and the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the information of the access network device is obtained from the preconfiguration information and the identification information of the first decrypted network element is obtained.
  • the preconfiguration information includes identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, the at least one local network includes a first local network, and the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network when it stores preconfiguration information, it can also autonomously determine the identification information of the first decryption network element based on the information of the first access network device.
  • the sixth aspect provides a key management method.
  • the execution subject of this method may be a terminal device or a chip applied in the terminal device.
  • the following description takes the execution subject being a terminal device as an example.
  • the method includes: when the terminal device needs to access the first local network, the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity identifier.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device. Among them, the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the registration request carries the hidden user identity that has been encrypted by the null algorithm, so that the user identity information is protected.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity, including: the terminal device uses a null algorithm and a default encryption key to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the hidden user identity also includes the identifier of the default encryption key, and the value of the identifier is 0.
  • the default encryption key is an empty key.
  • the default encryption key can be represented by all bits being all zeros.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device receiving a message from the first local network of the access network device. logo.
  • the terminal device determines that it needs to access the first local network to trigger the following operations: encrypt the user identity information using a null algorithm to obtain the hidden user identity, and transmit the information to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the network sends a registration request.
  • the terminal device determines that it needs to access the first local network, including: when the preset conditions are met, in response to the identification of the first local network, the terminal equipment It is determined that access to the first local network is required.
  • the preset conditions include at least one of the following:
  • the first item is the first information preconfigured by the terminal device.
  • the first information instructs the terminal device to access the local network after receiving the identifier of the local network, thereby triggering the terminal device to access the local network in a timely manner.
  • the second item is that the terminal device does not search for the second network.
  • the second network is a network other than the first local network to ensure the continuity of communication services of the terminal device.
  • the terminal device includes a mobile device ME and a universal user identity module USIM.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity, including: ME sending instruction information to USIM.
  • USIM responds to the instruction information, uses a null algorithm to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the USIM can generate a hidden user identity based on a null algorithm.
  • the terminal equipment includes ME and USIM.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity, including: ME sending the first request to USIM.
  • the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives user identity information from USIM.
  • ME uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device, including: the ME sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the ME can generate the hidden user identity based on the null algorithm.
  • the identity of the first local network is a public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the first local network.
  • a seventh aspect provides a communication device.
  • the communication device may be a terminal device in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect, or a chip that implements the functions of the above-mentioned terminal device; the communication device includes a device that implements the above-mentioned function.
  • the module, unit, or means (means) corresponding to the method can be implemented by hardware, software, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the processing module is used to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network.
  • the processing module is also configured to obtain the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the processing module is also used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the transceiver module is used to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device, where the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the processing module is used to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network, including Including: receiving a broadcast message through the transceiver module, where the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network, including: receiving the identification information of the local network and the first identification from the access network device through the transceiver module, where, The first identifier is used to identify a decryption network element in the local network, and the identification information of the first decryption network element is determined based on the identifier of the local network and the first identifier.
  • the identity of the local network is the public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • mapping relationship is preconfigured in the communication device.
  • the communication device includes a mobile device ME and a universal subscriber identity module USIM, and the USIM is pre-configured with a mapping relationship.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: controlling the ME to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: controlling the ME to send the identification information to the USIM.
  • the USIM determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the USIM to use the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtaining the hidden user identity, and sending the hidden user identity.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the transceiver module is used to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the communication device includes the ME and the USIM, and the USIM is preconfigured with a mapping relationship.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: controlling the ME to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: controlling the ME to send the first request to the USIM.
  • the USIM sends the mapping relationship and user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives the mapping relationship and user identity information from USIM.
  • the ME determines the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element based on the identification information and the mapping relationship.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to use the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the transceiver module is used to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the transceiver module is also configured to receive the mapping relationship from the second decryption network element in the macro network through the access network device.
  • mapping relationship is carried in the registration acceptance message.
  • mapping relationship is carried in the user equipment configuration update command message.
  • the communication device includes ME and USIM.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: controlling the ME to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the transceiver module is configured to receive the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to receive the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: controlling the ME to determine the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship. key.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send a second request to the USIM. In response to the second request, the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives user identity information from USIM.
  • ME uses the An encryption key encrypts user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the transceiver module is used to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the communication device includes ME and USIM.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network, including: controlling the ME to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network.
  • the sending module is configured to receive the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to receive the mapping relationship of the second decryption network element from the macro network through the access network device.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship, including: controlling the ME to determine the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and the mapping relationship. key.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send the first encryption key to the USIM.
  • the USIM receives the first encryption key from the ME.
  • the USIM uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the transceiver module is used to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send capability information to access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the capability information indicates that the communication device has the ability to access the local network.
  • An eighth aspect provides a communication device, which may be an access network device in the above-mentioned second aspect or any possible design of the second aspect, or a chip that implements the functions of the above-mentioned access network device; the communication device
  • the device includes corresponding modules, units, or means (means) for implementing the above method.
  • the modules, units, or means can be implemented by hardware, software, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the processing module is used to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network.
  • the transceiver module is used to send the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the identification information of the first decrypted network element, including: sending a broadcast message, where the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the identification information of the first decrypted network element, including: sending the identification information of the local network and the first identification, wherein the identification information and the first identification of the local network are used to determine the first identification information of the first decrypted network element. Decrypt the identification information of the network element.
  • the identity of the local network is the public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • the processing module when the connection between the communication device and the core network element in the macro network is disconnected, the processing module is configured to establish a backhaul link with the core network element in the local network road.
  • the processing module is also used to establish an Internet Protocol secure IPsec link with a core network element in the local network.
  • the backhaul link includes the IPsec link.
  • the processing module is used to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network, including: using the transceiver module to receive messages from the local network through the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Security Association initial negotiation IKE_SA_INIT message or the Internet Key Exchange Protocol authentication IKE_AUTH message.
  • the core network element first decrypts the identification information of the network element.
  • the processing module is also used to establish a datagram transport layer secure DTLS link with the core network element in the local network.
  • the backhaul link includes the DTLS link.
  • the identification information of the first decrypted network element includes: using the transceiver module to receive the identification information of the first decrypted network element from the core network element in the local network through a handshake message.
  • a ninth aspect provides a communication device, which may be a terminal device in the above third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect, or a chip that implements the functions of the above terminal device; the communication device includes a device that implements the above
  • the module, unit, or means (means) corresponding to the method can be implemented by hardware, software, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the transceiver module is used to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network. Wherein, there is a corresponding relationship between the first encryption key and the first local network.
  • the processing module is configured to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • a transceiver module configured to send a registration request to the first local network. Among them, the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send capability information to access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the capability information indicates that the communication device has the ability to access the local network.
  • the identity of the first local network is a public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the first local network.
  • the communication device includes a mobile device ME and a universal subscriber identity module USIM.
  • the transceiver module is configured to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: controlling the ME to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send the first encryption key to the USIM.
  • the USIM uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a registration request to the first local network, including: controlling the ME to send the registration request to the first local network.
  • the communication device includes ME and USIM.
  • the transceiver module is configured to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: controlling the ME to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send the first request to the USIM.
  • the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives user identity information from USIM.
  • the ME encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a registration request to the first local network, including: controlling the ME to send the registration request to the first local network.
  • a communication device in a tenth aspect, can be an access and mobility management network element in the macro network in the above-mentioned fourth aspect or any possible design of the fourth aspect, or implement the above-mentioned macro network.
  • a chip with access and mobility management network element functions; the communication device includes a module, unit, or means (means) corresponding to the above method.
  • the module, unit, or means can be implemented by hardware, software, or through The hardware executes the corresponding software implementation.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the transceiver module is also configured to receive the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first encryption key is associated with the first decryption network element.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the processing module controls the transceiver module Perform the above processing steps.
  • the processing module is also configured to obtain identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network to which the access network device is attached.
  • the access network equipment is used to transmit the registration request of the terminal equipment to the communication device.
  • the processing module when the communication device determines that the access network device has the ability to access the local network, the processing module is configured to determine identification information of the first decrypted network element in the first local network.
  • the access network equipment is used to provide communication services for terminal equipment.
  • the transceiver module is used to receive capability information from the terminal device.
  • the capability information indicates the terminal device's ability to access the local network.
  • the processing module is also used to determine that the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, and when the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, determine the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the first local network.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: sending the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network through a subscription information request. First, decrypt the identification information of the network element.
  • the transceiver module is also used to send indication information to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the second decryption network element in the macro network to provide the encryption key for the terminal device.
  • the subscription information request includes the indication information.
  • the transceiver module is configured to receive a request message from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the request message is used to request the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network, including: sending the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network according to the request message. .
  • the identification information of the first decrypted network element includes the identification of the first local network and the first identification.
  • the first identifier is used to identify a decryption network element in the first local network.
  • An eleventh aspect provides a communication device, which may be the second decryption network element in the macro network in the above fifth aspect or any possible design of the fifth aspect, or implement the third decryption network element in the above macro network.
  • a chip for decrypting network element functions; the communication device includes modules, units, or means (means) corresponding to the above method.
  • the modules, units, or means can be implemented by hardware, software, or the corresponding software can be executed by hardware. accomplish.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the processing module is used to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the processing module is also configured to determine the first encryption key according to the identification information and mapping relationship of the first decryption network element.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the transceiver module is used to send the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the first encryption key corresponds to the first decryption network element.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element, including: receiving the identification of the first decrypted network element from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network through the transceiver module. information.
  • the transceiver module is also used to receive indication information from access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the communication device to provide the encryption key for the terminal device.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send the first encryption key to the terminal device, including: sending the first encryption key to the terminal device according to the instruction information.
  • the processing module is also configured to determine the access and mobility management network element to the macro network based on the subscription information of the local network of the terminal device before obtaining the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • Send request message The request message is used to request the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the transceiver module is also used to receive the first information from the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the first information includes identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, and the at least one local network includes the first local network.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: obtaining the identification information of the first decryption network element from the first information according to the subscription information of the local network of the terminal device and the information of the first access network device. information.
  • the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device.
  • the processing module is configured to obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element, including: according to the subscription information of the local network of the terminal device and the information of the first access network device, from the preconfiguration information Obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the preconfiguration information includes identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, the at least one local network includes a first local network, and the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device.
  • a communication device may be a terminal device in any of the possible designs of the sixth aspect or the sixth aspect, or a chip that implements the functions of the terminal device; the communication device includes:
  • the corresponding module, unit, or means (means) of the above method can be implemented by hardware, software, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules or units corresponding to the above functions.
  • the communication device includes a processing module and a transceiver module.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt user identity information using a null algorithm to obtain a hidden user identity when access to the first local network is required.
  • a transceiver module configured to send a registration request to the first local network through the access network device. Among them, the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt user identity information using a null algorithm to obtain a hidden user identity, including: encrypting user identity information using a null algorithm and a default encryption key to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the hidden user identity also includes the identifier of the default encryption key, and the value of the identifier is 0.
  • the default encryption key is an empty key.
  • the default encryption key can be represented by all bits being all zeros.
  • the transceiver module is also configured to receive the identity of the first local network from the access network device.
  • the processing module is configured to respond to the identification of the first local network and determine the need to access the first local network to trigger the following operations: encrypt the user identity information using a null algorithm to obtain the hidden user identity, and provide the access network device to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the first local network sends a registration request.
  • the processing module is configured to determine the need to access the first local network in response to the identification of the first local network, including: when the preset conditions are met, in response to the identification of the first local network , determine the need to access the first local network.
  • the preset conditions include at least one of the following:
  • the first item is that the communication device pre-configures first information.
  • the first information instructs the communication device to access the local network after receiving the identification of the local network.
  • the second item is that the transceiver module did not search for the second network, which is a network other than the first local network.
  • the communication device includes a mobile device ME and a universal subscriber identity module USIM.
  • the processing module is used to encrypt user identity information using a null algorithm to obtain a hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send instruction information to the USIM.
  • USIM responds to the instruction information, uses a null algorithm to encrypt the user identity information, obtains the hidden user identity, and sends the hidden user identity to the ME.
  • the ME receives the hidden user identity from the USIM.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a registration request to the first local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send the registration request to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the communication device includes ME and USIM.
  • Processing module used for encryption using the null algorithm
  • the user identity information is obtained to obtain the hidden user identity, including: controlling the ME to send the first request to the USIM.
  • the USIM sends the user identity information to the ME.
  • ME receives user identity information from USIM.
  • ME uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the transceiver module is configured to send a registration request to the first local network through the access network device, including: controlling the ME to send the registration request to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the identity of the first local network is a public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the first local network.
  • a communication device in a thirteenth aspect, includes: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer instructions.
  • the processor executes the instructions, the communication device causes the communication device to perform any of the above aspects or any aspect required by the terminal equipment in any possible design. method of execution.
  • the communication device may be a terminal device in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect, or may be a terminal device in any of the above-mentioned third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect, or may be It is a terminal device in the above-mentioned sixth aspect or any possible design of the sixth aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the above-mentioned terminal device.
  • a communication device in a fourteenth aspect, includes: a processor; the processor is coupled to a memory, and is used to read instructions in the memory and execute them, so that the communication device performs any of the above aspects or any possible design of any aspect.
  • the method executed by the terminal device may be a terminal device in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect, or may be a terminal device in any of the above-mentioned third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect, or may be It is a terminal device in the above-mentioned sixth aspect or any possible design of the sixth aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the above-mentioned terminal device.
  • a chip in a fifteenth aspect, includes processing circuits and input and output interfaces.
  • the input and output interface is used to communicate with a module outside the chip.
  • the chip may be a chip that implements the function of the terminal device in the above-mentioned first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the method in the above first aspect or any possible design of the first aspect.
  • the chip may be a chip that implements the functions of the terminal device in the above third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the method in the above third aspect or any possible design of the third aspect.
  • the chip may be a chip that implements the function of the terminal device in the above-mentioned sixth aspect or any possible design of the sixth aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the above sixth aspect or any method in the possible design of the sixth aspect.
  • a communication device in a sixteenth aspect, includes: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer instructions. When the processor executes the instructions, the communication device causes the communication device to perform any of the above aspects or any possible access network design in any aspect. The method performed by the device.
  • the communication device may be an access network device in the above-mentioned second aspect or any possible design of the second aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the above-mentioned access network device.
  • a communication device in a seventeenth aspect, includes: a processor; the processor is coupled to a memory, and is used to read instructions in the memory and execute them, so that the communication device performs any of the above aspects or any possible design of any aspect.
  • the method performed by the access network device may be an access network device in the above-mentioned second aspect or any possible design of the second aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the above-mentioned access network device.
  • An eighteenth aspect provides a chip.
  • the chip includes processing circuits and input and output interfaces.
  • the input and output interface is used to communicate with a module outside the chip.
  • the chip may be a chip that implements the function of the access network device in the above second aspect or any possible design of the second aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the above second aspect or any method in the possible design of the second aspect.
  • a communication device in a nineteenth aspect, includes: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to Computer instructions are stored, and when the processor executes the instructions, the communication device causes the communication device to perform the method performed by the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network in any of the above aspects or any possible design of any aspect.
  • the communication device may be an access and mobility management network element in the macro network in the fourth aspect or any possible design of the fourth aspect, or implement the access and mobility management network element functions in the macro network. of chips.
  • a communication device in a twentieth aspect, includes: a processor; the processor is coupled to a memory, and is used to read instructions in the memory and execute them, so that the communication device performs any of the above aspects or any possible design of any aspect.
  • Method performed by access and mobility management network elements in macro networks The communication device may be an access and mobility management network element in the macro network in the fourth aspect or any possible design of the fourth aspect, or implement the access and mobility management network element functions in the macro network. of chips.
  • a chip in a twenty-first aspect, includes processing circuits and input and output interfaces.
  • the input and output interfaces are used to communicate with modules outside the chip.
  • the chip can be an access and mobility management network element in a macro network that implements the fourth aspect or any of the possible designs of the fourth aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the above fourth aspect or any method in the possible design of the fourth aspect.
  • a communication device in a twenty-second aspect, includes: a processor and a memory; the memory is used to store computer instructions.
  • the processor executes the instructions, the communication device causes the communication device to execute any of the above aspects or any possible macro network in the design.
  • the method performed by the second decryption network element may be the second decryption network element in the macro network in the fifth aspect or any possible design of the fifth aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • a communication device in a twenty-third aspect, includes: a processor; the processor is coupled to a memory, and is used to read instructions in the memory and execute them, so that the communication device performs any of the above aspects or any possible design of any aspect.
  • the method executed by the second decryption network element in the macro network may be the second decryption network element in the macro network in the fifth aspect or any possible design of the fifth aspect, or a chip that implements the function of the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • a chip in a twenty-fourth aspect, includes processing circuits and input and output interfaces.
  • the input and output interfaces are used to communicate with modules outside the chip.
  • the chip may be a chip that implements the function of the second decryption network element in the macro network in any of the possible designs of the fifth aspect or the fifth aspect.
  • the processing circuit is used to run computer programs or instructions to implement the above fifth aspect or any method in the possible design of the fifth aspect.
  • a computer-readable storage medium stores instructions, which when run on a computer, enable the computer to perform any of the methods in any of the above aspects.
  • a twenty-sixth aspect provides a computer program product containing instructions that, when run on a computer, enable the computer to perform any of the methods of any of the above aspects.
  • a circuit system in a twenty-seventh aspect, includes processing circuitry configured to perform a method as in any one of the above aspects.
  • Figure 1a is a schematic diagram of an architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 1b is a schematic diagram of another architecture provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an IOPS scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another IOPS scenario provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic flow chart of key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a key separation scenario provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 6 is a schematic flow chart of yet another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7a is a schematic flowchart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 7b is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 7c is a schematic flowchart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 7d is a schematic flowchart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 8 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 9 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 11 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 12 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 13 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 14 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 15 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 16 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 17 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 18 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 19 is a schematic flow chart of another key separation provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 20 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 21 is a schematic structural diagram of yet another communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application can be applied to various communication systems, such as fifth generation (5th generation, 5G) systems or new radio (new radio, NR) or long term evolution (long term evolution, LTE) systems.
  • the technical solution provided by this application can also be applied to future communication systems, such as the sixth generation mobile communication system.
  • the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application can also be applied to device-to-device (D2D) communication, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, machine-to-machine (M2M) communication, and machine-to-machine (M2M) communication.
  • D2D device-to-device
  • V2X vehicle-to-everything
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • FIG 1a is a schematic diagram of the architecture of the LTE system.
  • the LTE system includes: terminal equipment, evolved universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS) terrestrial radio access network (evolved UMTS territorial radio access network, E-UTRAN) equipment, mobility management entity (MME), serving gateway (SGW), packet data network (PDN) gateway (PDN gateway, PGW), service capability opening function (service capability exposure function, SCEF) network elements and home subscriber server (home subscriber server, HSS) and other network elements or equipment.
  • UMTS evolved universal mobile telecommunications system
  • E-UTRAN evolved universal mobile telecommunications system
  • MME mobility management entity
  • SGW serving gateway
  • PDN gateway packet data network gateway
  • SCEF service capability opening function
  • HSS home subscriber server
  • the terminal device may be a terminal device with a transceiver function, or a chip or a chip system that can be installed on the terminal device.
  • the terminal equipment can also be called user equipment (UE), access terminal, subscriber unit (subscriber unit), user station, mobile station (MS), mobile station, remote station, remote terminal, mobile device , user terminal, terminal, wireless communication device, user agent or user device.
  • the terminal device in the embodiment of the present application may be a mobile phone, a cellular phone, a smart phone, a tablet, a wireless data card, or a personal digital assistant.
  • the terminal device of this application may also be a vehicle-mounted module, vehicle-mounted module, vehicle-mounted component, vehicle-mounted chip, or vehicle-mounted unit built into the vehicle as one or more components or units.
  • E-UTRAN equipment accesses the E-UTRAN equipment through LTE-Uu.
  • E-UTRAN equipment can be an evolved NodeB (evolved NodeB, eNB) or a next generation eNB (next generation-eNB, ng-eNB).
  • E-UTRAN equipment is mainly used to provide network access functions for terminal equipment in specific areas, such as the network signal coverage area of E-UTRAN equipment, so that the above-mentioned terminal equipment can access and attach to the 4G network through E-UTRAN equipment.
  • E-UTRAN equipment communicates with the MME through S1-MME and with the SGW through S1-U.
  • MME is mainly responsible for mobility management, bearer management, user authentication, SGW selection and other functions.
  • Different MMEs communicate with each other through S10 (only one MME is shown as an example in Figure 1a).
  • the MME communicates with the HSS through S6a.
  • the MME communicates with the SGW through S11.
  • the MME communicates with the SCEF network element through T8.
  • the SCEF network element communicates with For server communication, SGSN communicates with MME through S3, SGSN communicates with SGW through S4, SGW communicates with PGW through S5, and PGW accesses the server through SGi.
  • the E-UTRAN equipment belongs to the access network equipment.
  • SGW, PGW, MME, SCEF network elements, HSS network elements and servers are all core network equipment.
  • the core network equipment of the 4G network can also be described as an evolved packet core network (EPC).
  • EPC evolved packet core network
  • Figure 1b is a schematic diagram of the architecture of the 5G system.
  • the 5G system includes: access network (AN) and core network (core network, CN), and can also include: terminal equipment.
  • AN access network
  • core network core network
  • the specific functions of the terminal equipment in the 5G system can be referred to the relevant introduction in the above-mentioned 4G system, and will not be described again.
  • AN is used to implement access-related functions. It can provide network access functions for authorized users in specific areas, and can determine transmission links of different qualities to transmit user data according to user levels, business needs, etc.
  • AN in terminal equipment Forward control signals and user data with the CN.
  • AN may include: access network equipment, which may also be called radio access network equipment (radio access network, RAN) equipment.
  • radio access network radio access network
  • RAN equipment can be a device that provides access to terminal equipment and is mainly responsible for wireless resource management, quality of service (QoS) management, data compression and encryption on the air interface side.
  • RAN equipment may include 5G, such as gNB in the new radio (NR) system, or one or a group (including multiple antenna panels) of base station antenna panels in 5G, or may also constitute gNB, transmission Network nodes of transmission and reception point (TRP or transmission point, TP) or transmission measurement function (TMF), such as baseband unit (building base band unit, BBU), or centralized unit (CU) ) or distributed unit (DU), RSU with base station function, or wired access gateway, or 5G core network element.
  • NR new radio
  • TP transmission point
  • TMF transmission measurement function
  • BBU baseband unit
  • CU centralized unit
  • DU distributed unit
  • RSU with base station function
  • wired access gateway or 5G core network element.
  • RAN equipment can also include access points (APs) in wireless fidelity (WiFi) systems, wireless relay nodes, wireless backhaul nodes, various forms of macro base stations, micro base stations (also (called small stations), relay stations, access points, wearable devices, vehicle-mounted devices, etc.
  • APs access points
  • WiFi wireless fidelity
  • the RAN equipment may also include next-generation mobile communication systems, such as 6G access network equipment, such as 6G base stations, or in the next-generation mobile communication system, the network equipment may also have other naming methods, which are all covered by this application Within the protection scope of the embodiments, this application does not impose any limitations on this.
  • CN is mainly responsible for maintaining the subscription data of the mobile network and providing functions such as session management, mobility management, policy management, and security authentication for terminal devices.
  • CN mainly includes the following network elements: user plane function (UPF) network element, authentication server function (AUSF) network element, access and mobility management function (AMF) network element Element, session management function (SMF) network element, network slice selection function (NSSF) network element, network exposure function (NEF) network element, network function repository function (NF repository function (NRF) network element, policy control function (PCF) network element, unified data management (UDM) network element, unified data repository (UDR) network element, application function (application function, AF) network element, and charging function (charging function, CHF) network element.
  • UPF user plane function
  • AUSF authentication server function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMF session management function
  • NSSF network slice selection function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • CN can be classified according to the deployment location into the core network of macro network (such as macro network EPC or macro network 5GC) and the local core network (also called local network, such as private network or IOPS network).
  • Macro network core network The deployment location of the network is mostly located in the core computer room of the operator, far away from the access network equipment (such as eNB, RAN or gNB), while the local core network (such as IOPS EPC, IOPS 5GC or private network) can be deployed far away from the access network equipment.
  • Network equipment is located close to each other, so the IOPS network (including EPC and 5GC) and private network can also be understood as local networks, or local core networks.
  • the macro network core network and the local core network can also be distinguished according to the size of the network.
  • the macro network core network serves more users than the local core network, or the macro network core network can provide more network functions than the local core network.
  • network, or the macro network core network contains more core network elements than the local core network; the macro network core network and the local core network can also be distinguished according to network functions.
  • those that serve non-public safety (public safety) users are macro networks.
  • the core network that serves public safety users is the local core network, or the macro network core network that does not serve specific enterprise users is the local core network that serves specific enterprise users.
  • the UPF network element is mainly responsible for user data processing (forwarding, receiving, accounting, etc.).
  • the UPF network element can receive user data from a data network (DN) and forward the user data to the terminal device through the access network device.
  • the UPF network element can also receive user data from the terminal device through the access network device and forward the user data to the DN.
  • DN network element refers to the operator network that provides data transmission services to users.
  • IP Internet protocol
  • multimedia service IP multi-media service, IMS
  • Internet etc.
  • DN can be The operator's external network can also be a network controlled by the operator and is used to provide business services to terminal equipment.
  • AUSF network elements are mainly used to perform security authentication of terminal equipment.
  • AMF network elements are mainly used for mobility management in mobile networks. For example, user location update, user registration network, user switching, etc.
  • SMF network elements are mainly used for session management in mobile networks. For example, session establishment, modification, and release. Specific functions include assigning Internet Protocol (IP) addresses to users, selecting UPF that provides message forwarding functions, etc.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • the PCF network element mainly supports providing a unified policy framework to control network behavior, provides policy rules to the control layer network functions, and is also responsible for obtaining user subscription information related to policy decisions.
  • PCF network elements can provide policies to AMF network elements and SMF network elements, such as quality of service (QoS) policies, slice selection policies, etc.
  • QoS quality of service
  • NSSF network elements are mainly used to select network slices for terminal devices.
  • NEF network elements are mainly used to support the opening of capabilities and events.
  • NRF network elements are mainly used to support service discovery functions and maintain the NF text of available network function (NF) instances and the services they support.
  • UDM network elements are mainly used to store user data, such as contract data, authentication/authorization data, etc.
  • UDR network elements are mainly used to store structured data.
  • the stored content includes contract data and policy data, externally exposed structured data and application-related data.
  • the AF network element mainly supports interaction with the CN to provide services, such as affecting data routing decisions, policy control functions, or providing some third-party services to the network side.
  • network elements can communicate with each other through the interfaces shown in the figure, and some interfaces can be implemented using non-service interfaces.
  • the terminal device and the AMF network element can interact through the N1 interface, and the interaction message can be called an N1 message (N1Message), for example.
  • N1Message N1 message
  • Access network equipment and AMF network elements can interact through the N2 interface, and the N2 interface can be used for sending non-access stratum (NAS) messages.
  • Access network equipment and UPF network elements can interact through the N3 interface, and the N3 interface can be used to transmit user plane data, etc.
  • SMF network elements and UPF network elements can interact through the N4 interface.
  • the N4 interface can be used to transmit information such as tunnel identification information of the N3 connection, data cache indication information, and downlink data notification messages.
  • UPF network elements and DN can interact through the N6 interface, which can transmit user plane data, etc.
  • each network element of the control plane function in Figure 1b can also communicate through the service-oriented interface.
  • the AMF network element accesses the service-oriented architecture through the Namf interface to provide corresponding services;
  • the SMF network element accesses the service-oriented architecture through the Nsmf interface. architecture to provide corresponding services; similarly, AUSF network element, CHF network element, NSSF network element, NEF network element, NRF network element, PCF network element, UDM network element, UDR network element and AF network element pass through their corresponding interfaces Access the service-oriented architecture and provide corresponding services, which will not be described here.
  • the relationship between other interfaces and each network element is shown in Figure 1b. For the sake of simplicity, they will not be described in detail here.
  • the network elements in the CN can be described as core network elements or core network equipment.
  • core network elements and core network equipment can be replaced with each other.
  • the scenario shown in Figure 2 is suitable for the deployment of an unfixed evolved packet system (EPS).
  • EPS evolved packet system
  • the non-fixed EPS deployment includes nomadic EPC (nomadic EPC) equipment and access network equipment, which can be recorded as Nomadic EPC+eNB, as shown in a in Figure 2.
  • nomadic EPC nomadic EPC
  • access network equipment with IOPS function can be deployed, and access network equipment with IOPS function can be used to implement an access network without backhaul to provide local connections and services for public safety users, such as Shown as b and c in Figure 2.
  • the core network elements of the macro network are mostly deployed in the operator's core computer room, far away from the access network equipment (such as eNB), while the IOPS network (i.e. IOPS EPC) is deployed
  • the location is often close to the access network equipment, so the IOPS network can also be understood as a local network, or a local core network.
  • the IOPS network in the embodiment of this application can also be used to refer to other local core networks, such as IOPS 5GC or private network. net.
  • the access network equipment when the S1 link between the access network equipment and the core network element of the macro network (such as the macro network EPC) communicates normally, the access network equipment can access the macro network EPC and is a terminal device. Provide communication services, as shown in a in Figure 3.
  • the link between the access network equipment and the core network equipment of the macro network (such as macro network EPC) is interrupted, for the access network equipment with specific IOPS functions, the access network equipment can access the IOPS network to provide terminal equipment with Mission critical service (MCX), as shown in b and c in Figure 3.
  • MCX includes one or more of the following: mission critical push to talk (MCCPTT), mission critical video service (MCVideo), or mission critical data service (MCData).
  • MCPTT refers to voice communication services that have low connection establishment and transmission delays, high availability, reliability, and security, and can realize priority and preemption processing, including individual voice calls and voice group calls.
  • MCVideo refers to video communication services that have low connection establishment and transmission delays, high availability, reliability, and security, and can achieve priority and preemptive processing, such as video calls.
  • MCData refers to data communication services that have low connection establishment and transmission delays, high availability, reliability, and security, and can realize priority and preemptive processing, such as instant messaging, file transfer, etc.
  • the steps between each device include:
  • Step 1 An attachment process is performed between the terminal device, the eNB and the macro network EPC, so that the terminal device is attached to the macro network EPC.
  • MCPTT services are performed between terminal equipment, eNB and macro network EPC.
  • Step 2 eNB determines that the backhaul link between itself and the macro network EPC is interrupted (eNB detects loss of backhaul).
  • the backhaul link between the eNB and the macro network EPC includes the S1 link in Figure 3.
  • Step 3 The eNB starts the local EPC, that is, the local EPC is activated (local EPC activated).
  • the local EPC may include one or more MME, SGW, PGW, etc.
  • Step 4 Establish a communication link between eNB and local EPC (establish S1 link to local EPC).
  • Step 5 eNB announces IOPS mode operation (announce IOPS mode operation).
  • the eNB After the eNB enters the IOPS mode operation, it broadcasts the public land mobile network (public land mobile network, PLMN) identification (identity, ID) corresponding to the IOPS network.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • Step 6 The terminal device detects the PLMN of the IOPS network and switches its own USIM application (detects IOPS PLMN and USIM application is switched).
  • Step 7 The terminal device determines the PLMN of the IOPS network (selects IOPS PLMN).
  • Step 8 An attachment process is performed between the terminal device, the eNB and the local EPC, so that the terminal device is attached to the local EPC and establishes a local PDN connection (attached to local EPC and request local PDN connection).
  • Step 9 Local public safety service transmission (access local public safety services) is performed between the terminal equipment, eNB and local EPC.
  • the attachment process includes an access authentication process between the terminal device and the local EPC.
  • the access authentication process can also be called the authentication and key agreement (AKA) process.
  • AKA process is executed between the terminal device and the local home subscriber server (local home subscriber server, L-HSS).
  • L-HSS local home subscriber server
  • the operator of the IOPS network deploys multiple IOPS networks.
  • the PLMN IDs of these IOPS networks are the same as the stored user keys.
  • each IOPS network is deployed with an L-HSS, and each L-HSS stores user data and root key information (AKA root key) used in the AKA process.
  • AKA root key user data and root key information
  • L-HSS Compared with the physical deployment location of macro network EPC, the physical deployment location of L-HSS is lower. That is, L-HSS is not located in the operator's core network computer room, but is located near the base station computer room. The security measures are not as complete as the core network computer room. Therefore, L-HSS has a higher risk of being attacked. If one L-HSS among multiple L-HSSs is attacked, the information stored in the L-HSS will be leaked. Since the same AKA root key is stored on each L-HSS in multiple L-HSS, even if a single L-HSS is attacked and the AKA root key is leaked, other L-HSS will also be affected. The attacker is based on the AKA root.
  • the key can be connected to the IOPS network at will.
  • the terminal device and the L-HSS store the same root key K, and the AKA process between the terminal device and the L-HSS is performed based on the root key K.
  • the terminal device and the L-HSS use the same key, so the root key K is a symmetric key.
  • terminal equipment includes universal integrated circuit card (UICC) and mobile equipment (mobile equipment, ME).
  • UICC is the hardware carrier of universal subscriber identity module (USIM) application
  • UICC and USIM applications are provided by UICC card suppliers.
  • the information stored in the USIM application is provided by the operator.
  • ME is the hardware of the terminal device, such as a mobile phone.
  • L-HSSs Assume that there are n L-HSSs, numbered 1-n. Each L-HSS is configured with a different key, numbered K_1 to K_n. Keys K_1 to K_n are derived based on the root key K.
  • the root key K used to deduce K_1 to K_n is the same as the K stored in the USIM application of the terminal device, that is, they are mutually symmetric keys.
  • the terminal device receives authentication information from L-HSS (such as L-HSS_2).
  • the authentication information includes an authentication management field (AMF).
  • the authentication management field is used to indicate which L-HSS the USIM application of the terminal device is performing the AKA process with, and how to perform the derivation calculation based on the root key K.
  • the USIM application of the terminal device uses the deduction operation indicated by the authentication management field to calculate the root key K stored in itself to obtain K_2.
  • the USIM application of the terminal device performs the AKA process with L-HSS_2 based on the key K_2.
  • User permanent identifier subscription permanent identifier, SUPI
  • user hidden identifier subscription concealed identifier, SUCI
  • SUPI is the user identity of the terminal device in the 5G network.
  • SUPI can include international mobile subscriber identity (IMSI).
  • IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
  • SUPI protection processing is introduced in the 5G network, that is, the terminal device encrypts part or all of the contents of SUPI to obtain SUCI, so that SUPI is not in the air interface. Exposure ensures the privacy of SUPI.
  • the processing of SUPI requires the use of asymmetric encryption, that is, the terminal device uses the public key to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of SUPI to obtain SUCI; the UDM network element uses the private key to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of SUCI Decrypt to get SUPI.
  • the terminal device needs to store the public key, and the UDM network element needs to store the private key.
  • the terminal device uses the public key to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of SUPI to obtain To SUCI
  • the terminal device uses the public key to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of the SUPI, obtains the encrypted ciphertext information
  • the terminal device uses the ciphertext information to determine the SUCI.
  • part (or all) of the information in SUCI is the ciphertext.
  • the UDM network element uses the private key to decrypt part (or all) of the contents of the SUCI to obtain SUPI, including: the UDM network element uses the private key to decrypt part (or all) of the contents of the SUCI to obtain the decrypted plaintext, and the UDM uses the Clear text information identifies SUPI.
  • part (or all) of the information in SUPI is plain text.
  • the encrypted part of the information in SUPI at least includes user identity information.
  • the terminal device uses the public key to at least protect the user identity information in SUPI.
  • the user identity information is a mobile subscriber identification number (MSIN) in SUPI in IMSI format
  • the user identity information is a user name in SUPI in network access identifier (NAI) format. (username).
  • each IOPS network is deployed with UDM network elements.
  • the same asymmetric key is stored in each UDM network element in different IOPS networks, that is, the private key used to decrypt part or all of the contents of the SUCI. If a UDM network element of a certain IOPS network is attacked, the private key will be leaked. Even if the terminal device initiates a registration request to the unattacked UDM network element, the attacker can obtain SUPI based on the private key, resulting in the failure of user identity information to be protected. Therefore, when a terminal device is connected to an IOPS network, how to securely protect user identity information is an issue that needs to be solved urgently.
  • embodiments of this application propose the following technical solutions to securely protect user identity information and reduce the possibility of leakage of user identity information.
  • the "user identity information” involved in various embodiments of this application can be any information used to identify the user's identity.
  • it can be SUPI or a part of SUPI in the 5G scenario, or it can be used to identify the user's identity in subsequent evolution systems. Information, this application does not limit this.
  • the technical solutions in this application will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings.
  • the RAN device is a device with IOPS function, that is, it has the ability to access the IOPS network.
  • L-UDM network element refers to the UDM network element in the IOPS network.
  • IOPS core network or IOPS network can also be used to refer to other local core networks or local networks, such as IOPS 5GC or private network. A unified explanation is provided here and will not be repeated further.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart 1 of the key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • This key management method can be applied to the process of terminal equipment accessing the IOPS network. As shown in Figure 6, the process of this key management method is as follows:
  • the terminal device is configured with at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • Each of at least one set of mapping relationships is used to indicate: a correspondence between identification information of a local unified data management (L-UDM) network element and a piece of public key information.
  • L-UDM local unified data management
  • L-UDM refers to the UDM network element in the IOPS network.
  • correspondence 1 indicates the correspondence between L-UDM_1 ID and PK_1.
  • Correspondence n indicates the correspondence between L-UDM_n ID and PK_n. Among them, L-UDM_1 ID is used to identify L-UDM network element 1, and L-UDM_n ID is used to identify L-UDM network element n.
  • the terminal equipment includes ME and USIM, as shown in Figure 5.
  • the USIM of the terminal device is configured with at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the UICC card supplier writes the mapping relationship in S600a into the USIM
  • the mobile network operator writes the corresponding relationship in S600a into the USIM.
  • the identification information of the L-UDM network element is introduced through two possible situations:
  • the identification information of each network element is still the unique identifier of the entire network without referring to the identification of the IOPS network where the network element is located.
  • the identification information of the L-UDM network element may be the identification information of the L-UDM network element instance.
  • the identification information of the network element instance may be the network element instance ID.
  • the identification information of the L-UDM network element may also be the identification information of the IOPS network where the L-UDM network element is located.
  • the identification information of the IOPS network may be PLMN ID and/or network identifier (network identifier, NID) information.
  • An L-UDM network element can be uniquely identified with the L-UDM ID.
  • the L-UDM ID can include NID information.
  • PLMN ID and NID can uniquely identify the IOPS network where a certain L-UDM network element is located, and further determine the L-UDM network element in the IOPS network.
  • L-UDM_1 ID includes NID_1
  • L-UDM_n ID includes NID_n.
  • L-UDM ID can uniquely identify an IOPS network.
  • different IOPS networks use different PLMN IDs.
  • the L-UDM ID can include the PLMN ID corresponding to the IOPS network where the L-UDM is located.
  • the PLMN ID can uniquely identify the IOPS network where a certain L-UDM network element is located, and further determine the L-UDM in the IOPS network.
  • UDM network element can include the PLMN ID corresponding to the IOPS network where the L-UDM is located.
  • the identification information of an L-UDM network element includes the PLMN ID and the first identification.
  • the first identifier may be a number from 1 to n, where n represents the number of L-UDM network elements in the PLMN identified by the PLMN ID.
  • L-UDM network element a is configured with private key SK_a.
  • the private key SK_a is used to decrypt part or all of the contents of SUCI.
  • L-UDM network element a is one of the above-mentioned L-UDM network elements 1 to L-UDM network element n.
  • the identifier of L-UDM network element a is recorded as L-UDM_a ID.
  • the private key SK_a and the public key PK_a in step S600a are mutually asymmetric keys.
  • the public key PK_a is used to protect the SUPI of the terminal device
  • the public key PK_a is used to obtain SUCI based on SUPI
  • the private key SK_a is used to obtain SUPI based on SUCI.
  • using the public key PK_a to protect the SUPI of the terminal device to obtain SUCI includes: using the public key PK_a to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of the SUPI to obtain the encrypted ciphertext.
  • the encrypted ciphertext may include part (or all) of the contents of SUCI.
  • Use private key SK_a to obtain SUPI based on SUCI including: using private key SK_a to decrypt part (or all) of the contents of SUCI to obtain the decrypted plaintext, and determine SUPI based on the decrypted plaintext.
  • the decrypted plaintext may include part (or all) of the contents of SUPI.
  • L-UDM network element a is L-UDM network element 1 in Table 1, L-UDM_a ID is L-UDM_1 ID, and private key SK_a is SK_1. Private key SK_1 and public key PK_1 are mutually asymmetric keys.
  • L-UDM network element a is L-UDM network element n in Table 1, L-UDM_a ID is L-UDM_n ID, and private key SK_a is SK_n.
  • the private key SK_n and the public key PK_n are mutually asymmetric keys.
  • the IOPS network operator writes the private key in the L-UDM network element, as shown in Table 2:
  • L-UDM network element a is taken as an example to introduce the configuration process of private key information.
  • the RAN device obtains the identification information of L-UDM network element a.
  • the backhaul link in S601 refers to the communication link between the RAN equipment and the core network equipment of the IOPS network.
  • the backhaul link includes an Internet protocol security (IPSec) link.
  • IPSec Internet protocol security
  • the RAN device and the core network device of the IOPS network exchange Internet key exchange protocol security association initial negotiation (IKE_SA_INIT) messages and Internet key exchange protocol authentication (IKE_AUTH) message.
  • IKE_SA_INIT Internet key exchange protocol security association initial negotiation
  • IKE_AUTH Internet key exchange protocol authentication
  • the core network equipment of the IOPS network carries the identification information of L-UDM network element a in the IKE_SA_INIT message or IKE_AUTH message. In this way, RAN equipment Obtain the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the IKE_SA_INIT message or IKE_AUTH message.
  • the backhaul link includes a protocol and datagram transport layer security (DTLS) link.
  • DTLS protocol and datagram transport layer security
  • the RAN device and the core network device of the IOPS network exchange handshake messages, such as ClientHello, ServerHello, ChangeCipherSpec, and Finished.
  • the core network equipment of the IOPS network carries the identification information of L-UDM network element a in ClientHello, ServerHello, ChangeCipherSpec or Finished.
  • the RAN device obtains the identification information of L-UDM network element a from ClientHello, ServerHello, ChangeCipherSpec or Finished.
  • the process of how the RAN device obtains the identification information of L-UDM network element a is not limited.
  • the triggering conditions of S601 may include: when the connection between the RAN device and the core network (Macro CN) device of the macro network is disconnected, a backhaul link is established between the RAN device and the core network device of the IOPS network. , to continue to provide communication services to terminal devices.
  • a backhaul link can also be established between the RAN equipment and the core network equipment of the IOPS network. According to the embodiment of this application There is no limit to this.
  • a backhaul link is established between the RAN equipment and the core network equipment of the IOPS network, and the RAN equipment determines the identification information of the L-UDM network element in the activated IOPS network, recorded as L-UDM_a ID.
  • the RAN device obtains the L-UDM_a ID when establishing a backhaul link between itself and the IOPS network.
  • the RAN device broadcasts the identification information of L-UDM network element a.
  • S602 includes: the RAN device broadcasts the identity of IOPS network a and the identity information of L-UDM network element a.
  • L-UDM network element a is the network element in IOPS network a.
  • the identification of IOPS network a may be the PLMN ID used by IOPS network a. That is to say, the broadcast message carries the identification information of IOPS network a and the identification information of L-UDM network element a.
  • the RAN device in S602 may broadcast the identification information of the L-UDM network element a.
  • the broadcast message carries the identification information of L-UDM network element a.
  • the L-UDM_a ID can uniquely identify an IOPS network, then the L-UDM_a ID can include the PLMN ID. If the L-UDM_a ID is the PLMN ID of the IOPS network, then S602 can broadcast the PLMN ID of the IOPS network, and There is no need to broadcast the PLMN information of the IOPS network and the information of L-UDM network element a at the same time.
  • the terminal device receives the broadcast message from the RAN device.
  • the identification information of the L-UDM network element is a unique identification in the entire network
  • the terminal device receives the identification information of the L-UDM network element a from the RAN device through a broadcast message.
  • the identification information of the L-UDM network element includes the identification and the first identification of the IOPS network a
  • the terminal equipment receives the identification and the first identification of the IOPS network a from the RAN device through a broadcast message, and then According to the identification of IOPS network a and the first identification, the identification information of L-UDM network element a is determined.
  • the terminal device when the terminal device receives the identifier of the IOPS network a from the RAN device, the terminal device responds to the identifier of the IOPS network a and determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a.
  • the terminal device responds to the identification of IOPS network a and determines that it needs to access IOPS network a.
  • the preset conditions include at least one of the following:
  • the terminal device is pre-configured with the first information.
  • the first information instructs the terminal device to access the IOPS network after receiving the identification of the IOPS network.
  • the first information may be information preconfigured by the operator for the terminal device. In this case, for the terminal device, after receiving the identification of the IOPS network a, the terminal device can confirm based on the preconfigured first information. Determine that you need to access the IOPS network a.
  • Preset condition b the terminal device does not search for the second network.
  • the second network is a network other than IOPS network a.
  • the terminal device cannot search for a PLMN ID that can access the network other than IOPS network a, it is determined that it needs to access IOPS network a.
  • the preset condition a and the preset condition b are introduced as examples, and the embodiments of the present application do not limit the specific manner in which the terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a. After the terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a, the terminal device performs the following steps:
  • the terminal device determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the RAN device in S602 and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • L-UDM_a ID is L-UDM_1 ID in Table 1
  • public key PK_a is public key PK_1.
  • L-UDM_a ID is L-UDM_n ID in Table 1
  • public key PK_a is public key PK_n.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM.
  • the ME receives the broadcast message from the RAN device. After that, the ME determines that it needs to access the IOPS network according to the identification of the IOPS network. The ME determines that the SUCI was generated by USIM, or the ME determines that the SUCI was generated by ME. It should be noted that the ME can determine that the SUCI is generated by the USIM or the ME before executing S602. Below, S603 is introduced through Example 1 and Example 2:
  • S603 when SUCI is generated by USIM, as shown in Figure 7a, S603 includes S6031a and S6032a:
  • the ME sends the identification information of L-UDM network element a to the USIM.
  • USIM receives the identification information of L-UDM network element a from ME.
  • the ME sends the identification information of L-UDM network element a to the USIM through the GET IDENTITY command.
  • the Data field in the GET IDENTITY command carries L-UDM_a ID.
  • USIM determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • S603 when SUCI is generated by ME, as shown in Figure 7a, S603 includes S6031b, S6032b and S6033b:
  • ME sends a request message to USIM.
  • USIM receives the request message from ME.
  • the request message requests information used to deduce SUCI.
  • the ME sends a read command to the USIM to request to read the information in the EF SUCI_Cale_Info file.
  • the EF SUCI_Cale_Info file can be found in the relevant protocol specifications of the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP), which will not be described again here.
  • USIM sends a response message to ME.
  • ME receives the response message from USIM.
  • the response message includes information used to deduce SUCI, such as at least one set of mapping relationships, SUPI, SUPI type, and protection schemes 1-n.
  • the SUPI type is used to compose SUCI and indicates which type of SUPI the SUCI is generated based on, such as SUPI in IMSI format or SUPI in NAI format.
  • the protection scheme refers to the algorithm parameters used to generate SUCI, including key length and parameters of the elliptic curve integral encryption scheme (ECIES) algorithm.
  • ECIES elliptic curve integral encryption scheme
  • protection scheme a in protection scheme 1-n corresponds to the information and public key PK_a of L-UDM network element a in S600a.
  • At least one set of mapping relationships in the response message is consistent with the mapping relationship in S600a, and will not be described again here.
  • the ME determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of the L-UDM network element a and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship in S6033b is consistent with the mapping relationship in S6032b, and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI, including: the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to encrypt part (or all) of the contents of the SUPI, obtains the encrypted ciphertext, and obtains the SUPI according to the encrypted secret key.
  • the article determines SUCI.
  • the encrypted ciphertext may include part (or all) of the contents of SUCI.
  • part of the encrypted content in SUPI includes at least user identity information.
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to at least protect the user identity information in SUPI. User identity information can be found in the introduction to SUPI and SUCI in the Glossary section and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM, as shown in Figure 5.
  • SUCI can be generated by USIM or ME.
  • S604 is introduced through Example 1 and Example 2:
  • S604 when SUCI is generated by USIM, as shown in Figure 7a, S604 includes S6041a and S6042a:
  • USIM uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME.
  • the ME receives the SUCI from the USIM.
  • the SUCI in S6042a is consistent with the SUCI in S6041a, and will not be described again here.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME by getting the identity response (GET IDENTITY response).
  • S604 when SUCI is generated by ME, as shown in Figure 7a, S604 includes S6041b:
  • ME uses public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to IOPS network a.
  • IOPS network a receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the AMF network element in IOPS network a.
  • the AMF network element in IOPS network a receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the AMF network element sends the SUCI in the registration request to L-UDM network element a.
  • L-UDM network element a in IOPS network a receives SUCI.
  • L-UDM network element a After receiving SUCI, L-UDM network element a executes S606:
  • L-UDM network element a obtains SUPI based on the private key SK_a and SUCI, and then continues the subsequent registration process according to the registration request.
  • the specific registration process please refer to 3GPP related protocol specifications.
  • L-UDM network element a obtains SUPI based on the private key SK_a and SUCI, including: using the private key SK_a to decrypt part (or all) of the contents of SUCI to obtain the decrypted plaintext, and determine the SUPI based on the decrypted plaintext.
  • the decrypted plaintext may include part (or all) of the contents of SUPI.
  • the private key SK_a in S606 is consistent with the private key SK_a in S600b, and will not be described again here.
  • the preconfigured mapping relationship of the terminal device is taken as an example for introduction.
  • the above mapping relationship can also be obtained during the process of registering the terminal device to the macro network.
  • S600a is not executed and is replaced by S600c, S611 to S614.
  • S600b, S601 to S606 can still be referred to the introduction in Figure 6 and will not be described again here.
  • the introduction of S600c, S611 to S614 is as follows:
  • UDM network elements in the macro network are configured with at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship please refer to the introduction of S600a and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives Registration request from the end device.
  • the registration request also includes capability information.
  • the capability information indicates that the terminal device has the ability to access the IOPS network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines that it needs to perform main authentication based on the S611 registration request and triggers the main authentication process.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network executes S612:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a main authentication request to the UDM network element in the macro network through the AUSF network element in the macro network.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network receives the main authentication request from the AMF network element in the macro network through the AUSF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a main authentication request to the AUSF network element in the macro network, and the AUSF network element in the macro network further sends a main authentication request to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the AUSF network element in the macro network sends primary authentication success instructions to the UDM network element in the macro network and the AMF network element in the macro network respectively.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network executes S613:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network continues the subsequent registration process. After the subsequent registration process is successfully executed, the AMF network element in the macro network confirms the registration acceptance message.
  • the registration process can refer to the relevant technical specifications of the existing 3GPP, which will not be described again here.
  • the registration acceptance message includes at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship please refer to the introduction of S600c and will not be repeated here.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a registration acceptance message to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives the registration acceptance message from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the registration acceptance includes at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship please refer to the introduction of S600c and will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device can obtain the mapping relationship during the registration process with the macro network.
  • the AMF network element may not carry the mapping relationship in the registration acceptance message, but use the UE configuration update command (UE configuration update command) message in the UE configuration update process to carry at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a UE configuration update command message to the terminal device, where the UE configuration update command message includes at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the mapping relationship please refer to the introduction of S600c, which will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device receives the UE configuration update command message and obtains at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM.
  • the refinement steps of S603 and S604 are shown in Figure 7c:
  • the terminal device determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the RAN device in S602 and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • S603 includes S6031c:
  • the ME determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the RAN device in S602 and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • S604 includes S6041c, S6042c and S6043c:
  • ME sends a request message to USIM.
  • USIM receives the request message from ME.
  • the request message requests information used to deduce SUCI.
  • the ME sends a read command to the USIM to request to read the information in the EF SUCI_Cale_Info file.
  • the EF SUCI_Cale_Info file can be found in 3GPP related protocol specifications, which will not be described again here.
  • USIM sends a response message to ME.
  • ME receives the response message from USIM.
  • the response message includes information used to deduce SUCI, such as SUPI, SUPI type, and protection scheme 1-n.
  • SUPI information used to deduce SUCI
  • SUPI type information used to deduce SUCI
  • protection scheme 1-n protection scheme
  • ME uses public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the ME uses the public key PK_a to generate SUCI.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM.
  • the refinement steps of S603 and S604 are shown in Figure 7d:
  • the terminal device determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the RAN device in S602 and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • S603 includes S6031d:
  • the ME determines the public key PK_a based on the identification information of L-UDM network element a from the RAN device in S602 and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • S604 includes S6041d, S6042d and S6043d:
  • ME sends public key PK_a to USIM.
  • USIM receives the public key PK_a from ME.
  • USIM uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME.
  • the ME receives the SUCI from the USIM.
  • the USIM uses the public key PK_a to generate SUCI.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic flowchart 2 of the key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • This key management method can be applied to the process of terminal equipment accessing the IOPS network. As shown in Figure 8, the process of this key management method is as follows:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the UDM network element in the IOPS network attached to the RAN device to which it is connected.
  • the IOPS network attached to the RAN device specifically refers to the IOPS network deployed by the operator near the RAN device.
  • the IOPS network devices deployed in these IOPS networks can connect to the RAN device after the device is powered on.
  • the RAN device determines the information about the IOPS networks nearby that can be connected to it, as well as the information about UDM network elements in these IOPS networks. Therefore, the IOPS network attached to the RAN equipment in the macro network can also be called the IOPS network to which the RAN equipment can be connected.
  • the AMF network element does not have attached IOPS networks. If all the RAN devices connected to the AMF network element do not have attached IOPS networks, the AMF network element cannot obtain the IOPS network associated with the RAN device. The identification information of the UDM network element in the attached IOPS network, that is, the RAN device does not have the IOPS function.
  • n L-UDM network elements the information of the n L-UDM network elements are recorded as L-UDM_1 ID, L-UDM_2 ID, ⁇ , L-UDM_n ID respectively.
  • the above n L-UDM network elements are UDM network elements in the IOPS network attached to the RAN equipment connected to the AMF network element.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the IOPS network to which the RAN device connected to itself is attached and the information of the UDM network element corresponding to the IOPS network.
  • S800a may be information obtained when the connection between the AMF network element and the RAN device is established after the AMF network element and the RAN device are powered on, or the AMF network element may be configured by the network manager, which is not limited in the embodiments of this application.
  • UDM network elements in the macro network are configured with at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship please refer to the introduction of S600a and will not be described again here.
  • the network operator of the macro network registers the mapping relationship in S800b into the UDM network element of the macro network.
  • L-UDM network element a in IOPS network a is configured with private key SK_a.
  • the private key SK_a is used to decrypt part or all of the contents of SUCI.
  • S800c can be found in the introduction of S600b and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device executes S801:
  • the terminal device sends a registration request (registration request) to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the registration request includes the SUCI and IOPS capability information of the terminal device.
  • the IOPS capability information indicates whether the terminal device has the function of accessing the IOPS network. It should be understood that the registration request is a non-access stratum (NAS) message, and the terminal device carries the NAS message in an access stratum (AS) message and sends it to the RAN device, and the RAN device transmits it back The link sends the NAS message to the AMF network element.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • AS access stratum
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines that the terminal device has the IOPS function and/or the RAN device connected to the terminal device has the IOPS function
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines that the UDM network element in the macro network needs to configure IOPS for the terminal device.
  • the public key information of the network allows the terminal device to perform the IOPS network access process based on the public key information.
  • the RAN device accessed by the terminal device refers to the RAN device corresponding to the backhaul link through which the AMF network element in the macro network receives the registration request.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network After the AMF network element in the macro network receives the registration request from the terminal device through the RAN device, the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the IOPS network element attached to the access network device.
  • the identification information of L-UDM network element a is the identification information of L-UDM network element a.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines the IOPS network based on the location information (such as cell ID) of the RAN device accessed by the terminal device, and then determines the IOPS network.
  • the identification information of the UDM network element Or, for the RAN equipment connected to the terminal equipment, the priority of the IOPS network attached to the RAN equipment is different.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network can also select the IOPS network whose priority meets the requirements based on the priority of the IOPS network. Then determine the information of the UDM network elements in the IOPS network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network can obtain the priority relationship from the RAN device in S800a.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines that the UDM network element in the macro network needs to configure the public key information of the IOPS network for the terminal device based on the RAN device having the IOPS function. In this case, the registration request does not need to include IOPS. Capability information.
  • the IOPS capability information can indicate whether the terminal device has the ability to access the IOPS network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines whether the terminal device is capable of accessing the IOPS network based on the IOPS capability information in the registration request. Equipped with IOPS function.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the L-UDM network element a in the IOPS network to which the RAN device is attached.
  • RAN equipment can provide communication services for terminal equipment.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network executes S802:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a request message to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network receives the request message from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the request message is used to request the public key information corresponding to L-UDM_a ID.
  • L-UDM_a ID is used to identify an L-UDM network element, that is, L-UDM network element a.
  • L-UDM network element a is a UDM network element in the IOPS network attached to the RAN equipment connected to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • RAN equipment provides communication services to terminal equipment.
  • the request message at least includes L-UDM_a ID.
  • the request message is introduced through three examples (such as Example 1, Example 2 and Example 3 below):
  • the request message is a message in the main authentication process, such as Nausf_UEAA_Req and Nudm_UEAA_Req.
  • Nausf_UEAA_Req is the main authentication request transmitted by the Nausf interface, that is, Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request.
  • Nudm_UEAA_Req is the main authentication request transmitted by the Nudm interface, that is, Nudm_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request.
  • both Nausf_UEAA_Req and Nudm_UEAA_Req include the SUCI, IOPS public key configuration indication information and L-UDM_a ID of the terminal device.
  • the IOPS public key configuration instruction information instructs the UDM network element of the macro network to configure the public key information of the IOPS network for the terminal device.
  • the AMF network element first sends Nausf_UEAA_Req to the AUSF network element, and then the AUSF network element sends Nudm_UEAA_Req to the UDM network element of the macro network.
  • the request message is a message after the main authentication process, such as Nudm_SDM_Get Request message.
  • the Nudm_SDM_Get Request message is used to request to obtain the subscription information of the terminal device.
  • the Nudm_SDM_Get Request message includes the terminal device's SUPI, IOPS public key configuration indication information and L-UDM_a ID.
  • IOPS public key configuration indication information please refer to the introduction of Example 1 in S802, and will not be described again here.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends the Nudm_SDM_Get Request message to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the Nudm_SDM_Get Request message is a message sent by the AMF network element in the macro network to the UDM network element in the macro network, without passing through the AUSF network element. It should be noted that the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the SUPI of the terminal device after successful primary authentication. For details, please refer to the relevant technical specifications of 3GPP.
  • the request message is a dedicated message after the main authentication process.
  • the dedicated message includes the SUPI and L-UDM_a ID of the terminal device.
  • the dedicated message may not include the SUPI of the terminal device.
  • the dedicated message is specifically used to request the UDM network element of the macro network to configure the public key information of the IOPS network for the terminal device.
  • the dedicated message may not include the IOPS public key configuration indication information.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a dedicated message to the UDM network element in the macro network. It should be noted that AMF obtains the terminal device SUPI after successful primary authentication. For details, please refer to 3GPP related technical specifications.
  • the L-UDM ID determined by the AMF network element in the macro network can be one or multiple.
  • the RAN device connected to the terminal device is attached to multiple IOPS networks, there are multiple L-UDM IDs determined by the AMF network elements in the macro network.
  • the IOPS network deploys multiple L-UDM network elements, there are multiple L-UDM IDs determined by the AMF network elements in the macro network.
  • the request message includes all L-UDM IDs determined by the AMF network elements.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines the public key PK_a based on the L-UDM_a ID and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • the L-UDM_a ID in S803 is consistent with the L-UDM_a ID in S802; the mapping relationship in S803 is consistent with the mapping relationship in S800b, and will not be described again here. It should be understood that in this case, the request message in Example 3 in S802 may not carry the SUPI of the terminal device.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines the public key PK_a based on the L-UDM_a ID and at least one set of mapping relationships. Among them, the UDM network element in the macro network obtains the contract information of the terminal device based on the SUCI or SUPI of the terminal device, and the UDM network element in the macro network determines whether the terminal device has the authority to access the IOPS network based on the contract information of the terminal device.
  • the UDM network element of the macro network needs to execute S803 after the main authentication is successful.
  • the UDM network element of the macro network needs to obtain an indication of successful primary authentication based on the primary authentication result confirmation request (Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request) message transmitted through the Nudm interface.
  • the Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request message can be abbreviated as Nudm_UEAuth_ResConf.
  • the number of public keys determined by the UDM network element of the macro network in S803 is also multiple. Specifically, when the AMF network element in the macro network determines multiple L-UDM IDs, the UDM network element in the macro network determines the multiple L-UDM IDs based on the multiple L-UDM IDs and at least one set of mapping relationships. -UDM ID The public key information corresponding to each L-UDM ID.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network sends response message 1 to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives response message 1 from the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends response message 2 to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives response message 2 from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • response message 1 and response message 2 at least include the public key PK_a.
  • the public key PK_a in S804a and S804b is consistent with the public key PK_a in S803, and will not be described again here.
  • Response message 1 and response message 2 can also have other names. For example, response message 1 and response message 2 are used to respond to the message in example 1 in S802.
  • response message 1 and response message 2 can be IOPS public key configuration messages; such as Response message 1 and response message 2 are used to respond to the example 2 message in S802, then the names of response message 1 and response message 2 can be Nudm_SDM_Get Response messages; if response message 1 and response message 2 are used to respond to the example 3 message in S802, then The names of response message 1 and response message 2 may be reply messages of the dedicated message, and the names of the response messages are not limited in this embodiment of the application.
  • response message 1 and response message 2 are used to respond to the message in Example 1 in S802, then response message 1 and response message 2 can be dedicated messages.
  • response message 1 in addition to the public key PK_a, response message 1 also needs It carries the SUPI of the terminal device, which is determined by the UDM network element in the macro network based on the SUCI of the terminal device in S802.
  • response message 1 and response message 2 both include: multiple public keys, and the number corresponding to each public key in the multiple public keys.
  • the L-UDM ID when the number of public keys determined by the UDM network element in the macro network in S803 is multiple, response message 1 and response message 2 both include: multiple public keys, and the number corresponding to each public key in the multiple public keys.
  • the L-UDM ID when the number of public keys determined by the UDM network element in the macro network in S803 is multiple, response message 1 and response message 2 both include: multiple public keys, and the number corresponding to each public key in the multiple public keys.
  • the RAN device broadcasts the identifier of the IOPS network a.
  • the identifier of IOPS network a can be the PLMN ID used by this IOPS network a.
  • the RAN device broadcasts the PLMN ID of the IOPS network a.
  • response message 1 in S804a (or response message 2 in S804b) includes multiple public keys and the L-UDM ID corresponding to each public key in the multiple public keys
  • the RAN device also broadcasts the L-UDM ID. Specifically, You can refer to the description in S602 and will not go into details here.
  • the terminal device For a terminal device within the coverage of the broadcast message of S805, the terminal device receives the identification of IOPS network a, and then the terminal device can determine that it needs to access IOPS network a. Among them, the terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network. For details, please refer to the introduction in Figure 6, which will not be described again here. The terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network In the case of network a, the terminal device performs the following steps:
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device uses the public key to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device uses the public key to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the public key PK_a in S806 is consistent with the public key PK_a in S804, and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device receives the L-UDM ID in S805 and the information included in the response message 2 in S804b (that is, the response message 2 includes multiple Public key, and the L-UDM ID corresponding to each public key in multiple public keys), determine the corresponding PK_a.
  • the L-UDM ID in S805 is recorded as L-UDM_a ID
  • the response message 2 includes PK_1, the L-UDM_1 ID corresponding to PK_1, PK_2, and the L-UDM_2 ID corresponding to PK_2.
  • L-UDM_a ID is L-UDM_1 ID
  • the public key PK_a is PK_1.
  • public key PK_a is PK_2.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM, as shown in Figure 5.
  • the public key PK_a is the information received by the ME.
  • the ME determines that the SUCI may be generated by the USIM or the ME.
  • S806 is introduced through Example 1 and Example 2:
  • S806 includes S8061a, S8062a and S8063a:
  • ME sends public key PK_a to USIM.
  • USIM receives the public key PK_a from ME.
  • the public key PK_a in S8061a is consistent with the public key PK_a in S804b, and will not be described again here.
  • ME sends the public key PK_a to USIM through the GET IDENTITY command.
  • the Data field in the GET IDENTITY command carries the public key PK_a.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME.
  • the ME receives the SUCI from the USIM.
  • the SUCI in S8063a is consistent with the SUCI in S8062a, and will not be described again here.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME by getting the identity response (GET IDENTITY response).
  • S806 includes S8061b, S8062b and S8063b:
  • ME sends a request message to USIM.
  • USIM receives the request message from ME.
  • the request message requests information used to deduce SUCI.
  • USIM sends a response message to ME.
  • ME receives the response message from USIM.
  • the response message includes information used to deduce SUCI, such as SUPI, SUPI type, and protection scheme 1-n.
  • SUPI information used to deduce SUCI
  • SUPI type information used to deduce SUCI
  • protection scheme 1-n information used to deduce SUCI
  • S8062b please refer to the introduction of S6032b, which will not be described again here.
  • ME uses public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the ME uses the public key PK_a to protect the SUPI to obtain the SUCI.
  • PK_a public key
  • S604b the introduction of S604b and will not be repeated here.
  • the terminal device determines the corresponding public key based on the L-UDM ID of the IOPS network to be accessed, and uses the public key corresponding to the IOPS network a to protect the SUPI to protect the SUPI. Ensure key separation requirements under different L-UDM deployment situations.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to IOPS network a.
  • IOPS network a receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • L-UDM network element a After receiving SUCI, L-UDM network element a executes S808:
  • L-UDM network element a obtains SUPI based on the private key SK_a and SUCI, and then continues the subsequent registration process according to the registration request.
  • the specific registration process please refer to 3GPP related protocol specifications.
  • the private key SK_a in S808 is consistent with the private key SK_a in S800c.
  • S808 please refer to the introduction of S606, which will not be described again here.
  • Figure 10 is a schematic flowchart three of the key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • This key management method can be applied to the process of terminal equipment accessing the IOPS network.
  • the process of this key management method is as follows:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network obtains the information of the UDM network element in the IOPS network attached to the RAN device to which it is connected.
  • the UDM network elements in the macro network are configured with at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • L-UDM network element a in IOPS network a is configured with private key SK_a.
  • the private key SK_a is used to decrypt part or all of the contents of SUCI.
  • the terminal device executes S1001:
  • the terminal device sends a registration request (registration request) to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the registration request includes SUCI.
  • the registration request in S1001 does not include IOPS capability information.
  • the terminal device After the terminal device sends a registration request to the AMF network element in the macro network, the terminal device, the AMF network element in the macro network, the AUSF network element in the macro network, and the UDM network element in the macro network perform the main authentication process.
  • the main authentication process is introduced as follows: the AMF network element in the macro network triggers the main authentication process according to the registration request, and sends the main authentication request to the AUSF network element in the macro network. After that, the AUSF network element in the macro network requests The UDM network element decrypts part (or all) of the SUCI content of the terminal device to obtain the SUPI of the terminal device.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network After the UDM network element in the macro network decrypts part (or all) of the contents of the SUCI, it obtains the SUPI and continues to perform the subsequent main authentication process based on the SUPI. The specific process of main authentication can be found in related technologies and will not be described again here.
  • the AUSF network element in the macro network sends a primary authentication result confirmation request (Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request) to the UDM network element in the macro network to indicate that the primary authentication is successful.
  • the UDM network elements in the macro network execute S1002:
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines whether to provide public key information to the terminal device based on the contract information of the terminal device.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network pre-stores the contract information of the terminal equipment.
  • the contract information indicates whether the terminal device has the permission to access the IOPS network.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines that the terminal device has the authority to access the IOPS network based on the contract information, it needs to provide public key information to the terminal device.
  • the UDM network elements in the macro network use contract information, If it is determined that the terminal device does not have the authority to access the IOPS network, there is no need to provide public key information to the terminal device.
  • S1002 includes:
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines whether to provide public key information to the terminal device based on the contract information of the terminal device.
  • the preset conditions include at least one of the following:
  • Preset condition 1 UDM network elements in the macro network receive indication information.
  • the indication information indicates that the primary authentication of the terminal device is successful.
  • the indication information may include the above-mentioned Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request message.
  • Preset condition 2 UDM network elements in the macro network receive the contract information request.
  • the subscription information request is used to request the terminal's subscription information.
  • the subscription information request may include a Nudm_SDM_Get Request or Nudm_SDM_Subscribe Request message. It should be understood that the subscription information request is a message transmitted after the primary authentication of the terminal device is successful.
  • Preset condition 3 The UDM network element in the macro network receives a message from the AMF network element. This message is different from other messages other than preset condition 1 and preset condition 2, and the AMF network element in the macro network is different from the macro network element. Transmitted between UDM network elements in the network, such as Nudm_UDCM_Resigtration Request, Nudm_UDCM_Update Request or Nudm_SDM_Info Request messages.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines that it meets the preset conditions, it means that the terminal device is a legal user.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network provides public key information to the terminal device to reduce Possibility of public key information leakage.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network executes S1003:
  • the UDM network element in the macro network sends a network identification information request to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives the network identification information request from the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the network identification information request is used to request the information of the L-UDM network element in the IOPS network.
  • the network identification information request includes the SUPI of the terminal device.
  • the SUPI in the network identification information request is determined by the UDM network element of the macro network during the main authentication process.
  • the network identification information request carries the SUPI of the terminal device, so that the AMF network element in the macro network determines the terminal device and the RAN to which the terminal device accesses based on the SUPI.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network determines that the identification information of the UDM network element in the IOPS network to which the RAN device is attached is L-UDM_a ID.
  • the RAN device accessed by the terminal device is the RAN device corresponding to the backhaul link through which the AMF receives the registration request.
  • the AMF determines that the RAN device has the IOPS function based on the introduction of S800a.
  • L-UDM network element a is one of n L-UDM network elements (ie, L-UDM network element 1 to L-UDM network element n).
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends a network identification information reply to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network receives the network identification information reply from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the network identification information reply includes L-UDM_a ID.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends the first message to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the first message indicates the termination of the public key information acquisition process.
  • the first message indicates that the UDM network element in the macro network does not need to provide public key information to the terminal device.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines the public key PK_a based on the L-UDM_a ID and at least one set of mapping relationships.
  • mapping relationship in S1006 is consistent with the mapping relationship in S1000b.
  • the implementation process of S1006 please refer to the introduction of S6033b and will not be repeated here.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network sends response message 1 to the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network receives response message 1 from the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends response message 2 to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives response message 2 from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the RAN device broadcasts the identifier of the IOPS network a.
  • the terminal device For a terminal device within the coverage of the broadcast message of S1008, the terminal device receives the identification of IOPS network a. After that, the terminal device can determine that it needs to access IOPS network a. For details, please refer to the introduction in Figure 6, which is not shown here. Again. When the terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a, the terminal device performs the following steps:
  • the terminal device uses the public key PK_a to protect SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to IOPS network a.
  • IOPS network a receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • L-UDM network element a After receiving SUCI, L-UDM network element a executes S1011:
  • L-UDM network element a obtains SUPI based on the private key SK_a and SUCI, and then continues the subsequent registration process according to the registration request.
  • the specific registration process please refer to 3GPP related protocol specifications.
  • the private key SK_a in S1011 is consistent with the private key SK_a in S1000c.
  • S1011 please refer to the introduction of S606, which will not be described again here.
  • the L-UDM_a ID can also be obtained through S1020 and S1021.
  • S1003, S1004 and S1005 do not need to be executed, but S1020 and S1021 are executed, as shown in bold text in Figure 11.
  • the introduction of S1020 and S1021 is as follows:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network executes S1020:
  • the AMF network element in the macro network sends the first information to the UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network receives the first information from the AMF network element in the macro network.
  • the first information at least includes identification information of the UDM in the IOPS network to which the RAN device is attached.
  • the RAN equipment involved in the first information is connected to the AMF network element. That is to say, the first information includes at least the information in S1000a.
  • the AMF network element in the macro network and the UDM network element in the macro network can establish a connection when the device is powered on.
  • S1020 is executed so that the UDM network element in the macro network learns the information in S1000a. .
  • UDM network elements in the macro network After S1002, when it is determined to provide public key information to the terminal device, UDM network elements in the macro network do not execute S1003 and S1005 (as shown in Figure 10), but execute S1021:
  • the UDM network element in the macro network determines the L-UDM_a ID based on the first information.
  • the L-UDM ID in the first information is the L-UDM_a ID.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network selects one L-UDM ID from the multiple L-UDM IDs as the L-UDM_a ID.
  • the UDM network element in the macro network can, based on the cell ID, obtain the IOPS network attached to the RAN device connected to the AMF network element. , select an IOPS network, and then determine the UDM network element information in the IOPS network based on the selected IOPS network.
  • FIG 12 is a schematic flowchart 4 of the key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • This key management method can be applied to the process of terminal equipment accessing the IOPS network. As shown in Figure 12, the process of this key management method is as follows:
  • the backhaul link in S1201 refers to the communication link between the RAN device with IOPS function and the core network device of the IOPS network. Please refer to the introduction of S601 and will not be repeated here.
  • the RAN device broadcasts the identification information of IOPS network a.
  • the terminal device receives the identification information of the IOPS network a from the RAN device and determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a. For details, please refer to the introduction in Figure 6, which will not be discussed here. Repeat. When the terminal device determines that it needs to access the IOPS network a, the terminal device performs the following steps:
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to process part or all of the contents of SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm and a default encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the default encryption key is an empty key.
  • the default encryption key can be characterized by all bits being all zeros. For example, assuming that the default encryption key length is 8 bits, the default encryption key is 00000000.
  • the hidden user identity also includes the encryption key identifier (Key ID).
  • the identifier of the encryption key is used to identify the encryption key, for example, the value is a number from 0 to 255. In this embodiment of the present application, the value of the identifier of the encryption key is zero to identify the empty key.
  • the null algorithm can be recorded as NULL-scheme.
  • the terminal device includes ME and USIM, as shown in Figure 5.
  • SUCI can be generated by USIM or ME.
  • S1203 is introduced through Example 1 and Example 2:
  • S1203 when SUCI is generated by USIM, as shown in Figure 13, S1203 includes S12031a, S12032a and S12033a:
  • ME sends instruction information to USIM.
  • USIM receives the indication information from the ME.
  • the instruction information indicates that the null algorithm is used to generate SUCI.
  • ME sends instruction information to USIM through the GET IDENTITY command.
  • the data field in the GET IDENTITY command carries indication information.
  • the indication information can be "IOPS" or "NULL-scheme”.
  • USIM uses the null algorithm to process part or all of the contents of SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME.
  • the ME receives the SUCI from the USIM.
  • the SUCI in S12033a is consistent with the SUCI in S12032a, and will not be described again here.
  • USIM sends SUCI to ME by getting the identity response (GET IDENTITY response).
  • S1203 when SUCI is generated by ME, as shown in Figure 13, S1203 includes S12031b, S12032b and S12033b:
  • ME sends a request message to USIM.
  • USIM receives the request message from ME.
  • the request message requests information used to deduce SUCI.
  • USIM sends a response message to ME.
  • ME receives the response message from USIM.
  • the response message includes information used to deduce SUCI, such as SUPI, SUPI type, and protection scheme 1-n.
  • SUPI information used to deduce SUCI
  • SUPI type information used to deduce SUCI
  • protection scheme 1-n information used to deduce SUCI
  • S12032b please refer to the introduction of S6032b, which will not be described again here.
  • ME uses the null algorithm to process part or all of the contents of SUPI to obtain SUCI.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to IOPS network a.
  • IOPS network a receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • L-UDM network element a After receiving SUCI, L-UDM network element a executes S1205:
  • L-UDM network element a determines SUPI based on SUCI.
  • L-UDM network element a uses the received user identity information, that is, SUCI, as SUPI.
  • L-UDM network element a uses a null algorithm to process part or all of the contents of SUCI to obtain SUPI.
  • S1203 when the terminal device uses the null algorithm to process part of the SUPI content, in S1205, L-UDM network element a uses the null algorithm to process part of the SUCI content.
  • S1203 when the terminal device uses the null algorithm to process all the contents of SUPI, in S1205, L-UDM network element a uses the null algorithm to process all the contents of SUCI.
  • L-UDM network element a For L-UDM network element a, after L-UDM network element a obtains SUPI, it continues the registration process.
  • the private key SK_a decrypts part of the contents of SUCI.
  • the public key PK_a is used to encrypt the entire content of SUPI, correspondingly, the private key SK_a decrypts the entire content of SUCI.
  • the key management methods shown in Figures 6 and 12 can be applied to the scenario of Figure 2 or to the scenario of Figure 3.
  • the key management methods shown in Figure 8, Figure 10 and Figure 11 can be applied to the scenario in Figure 3.
  • Figure 14 shows another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the network architecture shown in Figure 1a and Figure 1b to specifically implement the key management method corresponding to Figure 6.
  • the terminal device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network.
  • the local network is the IOPS network a
  • the first decryption network element is the L-UDM network element a in the IOPS network a
  • the first decryption The identification information of the network element is L-UDM_a ID.
  • S1401 includes: the terminal device receives a broadcast message, where the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • S1401 includes: the terminal device receives an identifier of the local network and a first identifier from the access network device, where the first identifier is used to identify a decryption network element in the local network. The terminal device is based on the local network The identification and the first identification determine the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • the terminal device executes S1402, S1403, and S1404.
  • S1402, S1403, and S1404 For details, see the introduction of S602, which will not be described again here.
  • the identity of the local network is the public land mobile network identity PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • PLMN ID used by the local network.
  • the terminal device obtains the first encryption key corresponding to the first decryption network element according to the identification information and mapping relationship.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the first encryption key is PK_a.
  • S1402 please refer to the relevant description of S603, which will not be described again here.
  • mapping relationship is preconfigured. For details, see the introduction in Figure 7a and will not be described again here.
  • the mapping relationship may also be obtained by the terminal device from the macro network.
  • the terminal device receives the mapping relationship from the second decryption network element in the macro network through the access network device. See the introduction in Figure 7b for details, which will not be described again here.
  • mapping relationship is carried in the registration acceptance message.
  • S614 in Figure 7b which will not be described again here.
  • mapping relationship is carried in the user equipment configuration update command message. See the introduction in Figure 7b for details, which will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device uses the first encryption key to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the user identity information is part of the SUPI, and the hidden user identity is SUCI.
  • the specific implementation process of S1403 please refer to the relevant description of S604 and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the local network through the access network device.
  • the local network receives the registration request from the terminal device through the access network device.
  • the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the terminal device also sends capability information to the access and mobility management network element in the macro network, where the capability information indicates that the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, so that the core network element in the macro network
  • the network element learns the capabilities of the terminal device.
  • the registration request also includes capability information. For details, see the introduction of S611, which will not be described again here.
  • Figure 15 shows another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the network architecture shown in Figure 1a and Figure 1b to specifically implement the key management method corresponding to Figure 6.
  • the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element in the local network.
  • the local network is the IOPS network a
  • the first decryption network element is the L-UDM network element a in the IOPS network a
  • the first decryption The identification information of the network element is L-UDM_a ID.
  • the method further includes: when the connection between the access network device and the core network element in the macro network is disconnected, the access network device and the core network element in the local network To establish a backhaul link between them, please refer to the introduction of S601 for details, which will not be described again here.
  • an IPsec link is established between the access network device and the core network element in the local network.
  • the access network device receives the identification information of the first decrypted network element from the core network element in the local network through the IKE_SA_INIT message or the IKE_AUTH message, so that the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element during the IPsec link establishment process. Identification information.
  • a DTLS link is established between the access network device and the core network element in the local network.
  • the access network device receives the identification information of the first decrypted network element from the core network element in the local network through the handshake message, so that the access network device obtains the identification information of the first decrypted network element during the DTLS link establishment process. .
  • the access network device sends the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • S1502 includes: the access network device sends a broadcast message.
  • the broadcast message includes the identification information of the first decrypted network element and the identification of the local network.
  • S1502 includes: the access network device sending the identity of the local network and the first identity.
  • the identity of the local network and the first identity are used to determine the identity information of the first decryption network element.
  • Figure 16 shows yet another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the network architecture shown in Figure 1a and Figure 1b to specifically implement the key management method corresponding to Figure 8 or Figure 10.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network is the UDM network element in the macro network
  • the first encryption key is PK_a .
  • S1501 please refer to the relevant description of S804b or S1007b, and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device When the terminal device receives the identity of the first local network, the terminal device encrypts the user identity information using the first encryption key to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the first local network is the IOPS network a
  • the user identity information is part of SUPI
  • the hidden user identity identifier is SUCI.
  • S1602 please refer to the relevant description of S806 or S1009, and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network.
  • the first local network receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • the method further includes: the terminal device sends capability information to an access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the capability information indicates that the terminal device has the ability to access the local network, so that the core network elements in the macro network can learn the capabilities of the terminal device.
  • the registration request also includes capability information. For details, see the introduction of S807 or S1010, which will not be described again here.
  • FIG 17 shows yet another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to Figure 1a and Figure 1b In the network architecture shown, the key management method corresponding to Figure 8 or Figure 10 is specifically implemented.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network receives the identification information of the first decryption network element from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network can be the AMF network element in the macro network
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network can be
  • the second decryption network element can be a UDM network element in the macro network.
  • the first local network is IOPS network a.
  • the first decryption network element is L-UDM network element a.
  • the identification information of the first decryption network element is L-UDM_a ID. .
  • S1701 please refer to the relevant description of S802 or S1005, and will not be described again here.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element in the local network to which the access network device is attached.
  • the access network device is used to transmit the registration request of the terminal device to the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the method also includes: when the access and mobility management network element in the macro network determines that the access network device has the ability to access the local network, the access and mobility management network element in the macro network
  • the security management network element determines the identification information of the first decryption network element in the first local network.
  • the access network equipment is used to provide communication services for terminal equipment. For details, see the relevant description of S801 and S802 in Figure 8, which will not be described again here.
  • the method further includes: an access and mobility management network element in the macro network receiving capability information from the terminal device.
  • the capability information indicates the terminal device's ability to access the local network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network determines the identification information of the first decryption network element in the first local network , please refer to the relevant description of S801 and S802 in Figure 8 for details, which will not be described again here.
  • S1701 includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network through a subscription information request.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network through a subscription information request.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends indication information to the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the second decryption network element in the macro network to provide the encryption key for the terminal device.
  • the subscription information request includes indication information.
  • the method further includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network receives a request message from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the request message is used to request the identification information of the first decrypted network element.
  • S1701 includes: the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the identification information of the first decryption network element to the second decryption network element in the macro network according to the request message.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network receives the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first encryption key is associated with the first decryption network element.
  • the first encryption key is PK_a.
  • S1702 please refer to the relevant description of S804a or S1007a, and will not be described again here.
  • the access and mobility management network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives the first encryption key from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • Figure 18 shows yet another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to the network architecture shown in Figure 1a and Figure 1b to specifically implement the key management method corresponding to Figure 8 or Figure 10.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element.
  • the first decryption network element is a network element in the first local network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network may be a UDM network element in the macro network, and the first local network is an IOPS network. a, the first decrypted network element is L-UDM network element a, and the identification information of the first decrypted network element is L-UDM_a ID.
  • the specific implementation process of S1801 please refer to the relevant description of S802 or S1005 or S1021, and will not be described again here.
  • S1801 includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives the identification information of the first decryption network element from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network, see S802 or S1005 or S1021 The relevant descriptions will not be repeated here.
  • the method further includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives the first information from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the first information includes identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, and the at least one local network includes the first local network.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: the contract information of the second decryption network element in the macro network based on the local network of the terminal device, and the information of the first access network device, Obtain the identification information of the first decrypted network element from the first information.
  • the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device. See the introduction in Figure 11 for details, which will not be described again here.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network obtains the identification information of the first decryption network element, including: the second decryption network element in the macro network based on the subscription information of the local network of the terminal device, and the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the information of the access network device is obtained from the preconfiguration information and the identification information of the first decrypted network element is obtained.
  • the preconfiguration information includes the identification information of the decryption network element corresponding to each local network in at least one local network, the at least one local network includes a first local network, and the first access network device is used to provide communication services for the terminal device. Details See the introduction in Figure 11 and will not go into details here.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network determines the first encryption key based on the identification information and mapping relationship of the first decryption network element.
  • the mapping relationship records at least one decryption network element and the encryption key corresponding to each decryption network element in the at least one decryption network element, and the at least one decryption network element includes the first decryption network element.
  • the first encryption key is PK_a.
  • S1802 please refer to the relevant description of S803 or S1006, and will not be described again here.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device receives the first encryption key from the second decryption network element in the macro network.
  • the first encryption key corresponds to the first decryption network element.
  • the specific implementation process of S1803 can refer to the relevant descriptions of S804a and S804b, or the specific implementation process of S1803 can refer to S1007a and S1007b. The relevant descriptions will not be repeated here.
  • the method further includes: the second decryption network element in the macro network receives indication information from the access and mobility management network element in the macro network.
  • the instruction information instructs the second decryption network element in the macro network to provide the encryption key for the terminal device.
  • the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device, including: the second decryption network element in the macro network sends the first encryption key to the terminal device according to the instruction information.
  • Figure 19 shows yet another key management method provided by the embodiment of the present application. This method can be applied to Figure 1a and Figure 1b In the network architecture shown, the key management method corresponding to Figure 13 is specifically implemented.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt the user identity information to obtain the hidden user identity.
  • the first local network is the IOPS network a
  • the user identity information is part of SUPI
  • the hidden user identity is SUCI.
  • S1901 please refer to the relevant description of S1203 and will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device uses a null algorithm to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity, including: the terminal device uses a null algorithm and a default encryption key to encrypt user identity information to obtain a hidden user identity.
  • the hidden user identity also includes the identifier of the default encryption key, and the value of the identifier is 0.
  • the default encryption key is an empty key.
  • the default encryption key can be represented by all zero bits. Please refer to the relevant description of S1203, which will not be described again here.
  • the terminal device sends a registration request to the first local network through the access network device.
  • the first local network receives the registration request from the terminal device.
  • the registration request includes hiding the user identity.
  • embodiments of the present application also provide a communication device.
  • the communication device may be the network element in the above method embodiment, or a device including the above network element, or a component that can be used for the network element.
  • the communication device includes corresponding hardware structures and/or software modules for performing each function.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a function is performed by hardware or computer software driving the hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality using different methods for each specific application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • FIG. 20 shows a schematic structural diagram of a communication device 2000.
  • the communication device 2000 includes a processing module 2001 and a transceiver module 2002.
  • the processing module 2001 is used to support the terminal device to perform S1401, S1402 and S1403 in Figure 14, and/or other tasks that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application. processing operations.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the terminal to perform S1404 in Figure 14 and/or other transceiver operations that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processing module 2001 is configured to support the access network device to execute S1501 in Figure 15, and/or the access network device in the embodiment of the present application. Additional processing operations required.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the access network device to perform S1502 in Figure 15 and/or other sending operations that the access network device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processing module 2001 is configured to support the terminal device to perform S1602 in Figure 16 and/or other processing operations that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the terminal to perform S1601 and S1603 in Figure 16, and/or other transceiver operations that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processing model Block 2001 is used to support other processing operations that need to be performed by access and mobility management network elements in the macro network.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network to perform S1701, S1702, and S1703 in Figure 17, and/or the needs of the access and mobility management network elements in the macro network in the embodiment of the present application. Other sending and receiving operations performed.
  • the processing module 2001 is configured to support the second decryption network element in the macro network to perform S1801 and S1802 in Figure 18, and /Or other processing operations that need to be performed by the second decryption network element in the macro network in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the second decryption network element in the macro network to perform S1803 in Figure 18, and/or other transceiver operations that the second decryption network element in the macro network needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processing module 2001 is configured to support the terminal device to perform S1901 in Figure 19 and/or other processing operations that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the transceiver module 2002 is used to support the terminal to perform S1902 in Figure 19 and/or other transceiver operations that the terminal device needs to perform in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication device 2000 may also include a storage module 2003 for storing program codes and data of the communication device.
  • the data may include but is not limited to original data or intermediate data.
  • the processing module 2001 can be a processor or a controller, such as a CPU, a general-purpose processor, an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field programmable gate array (field programmable gate array, FPGA) or other Programmable logic devices, transistor logic devices, hardware components, or any combination thereof. It may implement or execute the various illustrative logical blocks, modules, and circuits described in connection with this disclosure.
  • the processor can also be a combination that implements computing functions, such as a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of DSP and microprocessors, and so on.
  • the transceiver module 2002 may be a communication interface, a transmitter or a sending circuit, a receiver or a receiving circuit, etc., where the communication interface is a general term, and in a specific implementation, the communication interface may include multiple interfaces.
  • the storage module 2003 may be a memory.
  • the processing module 2001 is a processor
  • the transceiver module 2002 is a communication interface
  • the storage module 2003 is a memory
  • the communication device involved in the embodiment of the present application may be as shown in Figure 21 .
  • the communication device 2100 includes: a processor 2101 , a communication interface 2102 , and a memory 2103 .
  • the communication device may also include a bus 2104.
  • the communication interface 2102, the processor 2101 and the memory 2103 can be connected to each other through the bus 2104;
  • the bus 2104 can be a peripheral component interconnect standard (peripheral component interconnect, PCI) bus or an extended industry standard architecture (EISA) bus etc.
  • the bus 2104 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, etc. For ease of presentation, only one thick line is used in Figure 21, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • embodiments of the present application also provide a computer program product carrying computer instructions.
  • the computer instructions When the computer instructions are run on a computer, they cause the computer to execute the method described in the above embodiments.
  • embodiments of the present application also provide a computer-readable storage medium that stores computer instructions.
  • the computer instructions When the computer instructions are run on a computer, they cause the computer to execute the method described in the above embodiments.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a chip, including: a processing circuit and a transceiver circuit.
  • the processing circuit and the transceiver circuit are used to implement the method introduced in the above embodiment.
  • the processing circuit is used to perform the processing actions in the corresponding method, and the transceiver circuit is used to perform the receiving/transmitting actions in the corresponding method.
  • the above embodiments it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof.
  • software it may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
  • said computer program product package Contains one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer program instructions When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are generated in whole or in part.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another, e.g., the computer instructions may be transferred from a website, computer, server, or data center Transmission to another website, computer, server or data center through wired (such as coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (such as infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) means.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center integrated with one or more available media.
  • the available media may be magnetic media (eg, floppy disk, hard disk, tape), optical media (eg, digital video disc (DVD)), or semiconductor media (eg, solid state drive (SSD)) wait.
  • the disclosed systems, devices and methods can be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of modules is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple modules or components may be combined or can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented.
  • the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection between each other shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or modules, and may be in electrical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed to multiple devices. Some or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
  • the present application can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general hardware. Of course, it can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation. . Based on this understanding, the essence or the contribution part of the technical solution of the present application can be embodied in the form of a software product.
  • the computer software product is stored in a readable storage medium, such as a computer floppy disk, a hard disk or an optical disk. etc., including several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in various embodiments of the present application.

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Abstract

本申请提供一种密钥管理方法及通信装置，属于通信技术领域，用以对用户身份信息进行安全保护。该方法中，终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。

Description

密钥管理方法及通信装置
本申请要求于2022年05月06日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为202210487154.2、发明名称为“密钥管理方法及通信装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信领域，尤其涉及一种密钥管理方法及通信装置。
背景技术
在长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)网络的公共安全隔离运营(isolated E-UTRAN operation for public safety，IOPS)场景中，当接入网设备与宏网的核心网网元之间连接中断时，具备IOPS功能的接入网设备能够接入IOPS网络，继续为终端设备提供通信服务。
在第五代(5th generation，5G)网络中，终端设备向5G网络的核心网网元发送注册请求时，需携带加密后的用户身份信息。也就是说，终端设备采用公钥对用户身份信息进行加密，5G网络的核心网网元(如统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)网元)采用私钥对加密后的用户身份信息进行解密。上述公钥和私钥互为非对称密钥。然而，非对称密钥存在泄露风险。
因此，在5G网络以及后续演进网络中，如何对用户身份信息进行安全保护，是亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种密钥管理方法及通信装置，能够对用户身份信息进行安全保护。为达到上述目的，本申请采用如下技术方案：
第一方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是终端设备，也可以是应用于终端设备中的芯片。下面以执行主体是终端设备为例进行描述。
该方法包括：终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
也就是说，映射关系指示了不同的解密网元所对应的加密密钥。在终端设备确定待注册到哪一本地网络的情况下，终端设备根据映射关系即可获知该本地网络中解密网元所对应的加密密钥，即第一加密密钥，采用与该本地网络对应的第一加密密钥来加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。这样一来，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的加密密钥不同，相应的，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的解密密钥也不一样。即使某一本地网络中的解密网元被攻击，也不会泄露未被攻击的本地网络中解密网元的解密密钥。在终端设备向未被攻击的本地网络发送注册请求的情况下，注册请求中携带了经过第一加密密钥加密后的隐藏用户身份标识，从而使得用户身份信息得到保护。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：终端设备接收广播消息，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识。也就是说，对于不同本地网络中的解密网元而言，每个解密网元具备一个全网唯一的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：终端设备接收来自接入网设备的本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，第一标识用于标识本地网络中的一个解密网元。终端设备根据本地网络的标识和第一标识，确定第一解密网元的标识信息。也就是说，对于不同本地网络中的解密网元而言，不同解密网元的第一标识可能相同。终端设备先基于本地网络的标识确定具体哪一网络，再结合第一标识，来确定第一解密网元是该网络中的哪一解密网元。
在一种可能的设计中，响应于广播消息，终端设备执行本申请的技术方案，例如，终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识；以及通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求等操作。
在一种可能的设计中，本地网络的标识为本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系是预配置在终端设备中的。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM，USIM预配置映射关系。终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：ME向USIM发送标识信息。USIM根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，USIM预配置映射关系的情况下，可以由USIM基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括ME和USIM，USIM预配置映射关系。终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将映射关系和用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的映射关系和用户身份信息。ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，USIM预配置映射关系的情况下，可以由ME基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备通过接入网设备接收来自宏网中的第二 解密网元的映射关系。也就是说，在终端设备注册到本地网络之前，终端设备可以注册到宏网中，从宏网中获取映射关系。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于注册接受消息。也就是说，终端设备可以在宏网的注册过程中获取映射关系。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于用户设备配置更新命令消息。也就是说，终端设备可以在宏网的用户设备配置更新过程中获取映射关系。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。终端设备通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系，包括：ME通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系。终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送第二请求。USIM响应于第二请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，ME接收映射关系的情况下，可以由ME基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。终端设备通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系，包括：ME通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系。终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送第一加密密钥。USIM接收来自ME的第一加密密钥。USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，ME接收映射关系的情况下，可以由USIM基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息，其中，能力信息指示终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力，以使宏网中的核心网网元获知终端设备的能力。
第二方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是接入网设备，也可以是应用于接入网设备中的芯片。下面以执行主体是接入网设备为例进行描述。
该方法包括：在接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路的过程中，接入网设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。接入网设备发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
也就是说，接入网设备向终端设备提供自身所附属本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信 息，以使终端设备确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，从而加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。这样一来，在终端设备向该本地网络发送注册请求时，注册请求中携带隐藏用户身份标识，以保护用户身份信息。
在一种可能的设计中，接入网设备发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：接入网设备发送广播消息。其中，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识。
在一种可能的设计中，接入网设备发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：接入网设备发送本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，本地网络的标识和第一标识用于确定第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，本地网络的标识为本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：在接入网设备与宏网中的核心网网元之间的连接断开的情况下，接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路，以通过本地网络继续为终端设备提供通信服务。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立因特网协议安全IPsec链接，其中，回传链路包括IPsec链接。接入网设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：接入网设备通过因特网密钥交换协议安全联盟初始协商IKE_SA_INIT消息或因特网密钥交换协议认证IKE_AUTH消息接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息，以使接入网设备在IPsec链接建立过程中获取到第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立数据报传输层安全DTLS链接，其中，回传链路包括DTLS链接。接入网设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：接入网设备通过握手报文接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息，以使接入网设备在DTLS链接建立过程中获取到第一解密网元的标识信息。
第三方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是终端设备，也可以是应用于终端设备中的芯片。下面以执行主体是终端设备为例进行描述。
该方法包括：终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一本地网络存在对应关系。在终端设备接收第一本地网络的标识的情况下，终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
也就是说，终端设备在接入宏网的情况下，终端设备能够从宏网中获取第一加密密钥，采用第一加密密钥来加密用户身份信息。这样一来，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的加密密钥不同，相应的，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的解密密钥也不一样。即使某一本地网络中的解密网元被攻击，也不会泄露未被攻击的本地网络中解密网元的解密密钥。在终端设备向未被攻击的本地网络发送注册请求的情况下，注册请求中携带了经过第一加密密钥加密后的隐藏用户身份标识，从而使得用户身份信息得到保护。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力，以使宏网中的核心网网元获知终端设备的能力。
在一种可能的设计中，第一本地网络的标识为第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM。终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：ME接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送第一加密密钥。USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME向第一本地网络发送注册请求。也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，ME接收第一加密密钥的情况下，可以由USIM基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：ME接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME向第一本地网络发送注册请求。也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM，ME接收第一加密密钥的情况下，可以由ME基于第一加密密钥来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
第四方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元，也可以是应用于宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元中的芯片。下面以执行主体是宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元为例进行描述。
该方法包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元相关联。宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。
也就是说，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元能够从宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一加密密钥，从而向终端设备提供第一加密密钥，以使终端设备采用第一加密密钥来加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。这样一来，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的加密密钥不同，相应的，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的解密密钥也不一样。即使某一本地网络中的解密网元被攻击，也不会泄露未被攻击的本地网络中解密网元的解密密钥。在终端设备向未被攻击的本地网络发送注册请求的情况下，注册请求中携带了经过第一加密密钥加密后的隐藏用户身份标识，从而使得用户身份信息得到保护。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元获取接入网设备所附属本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元传输终端设备的注册请求。
也就是说，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元基于注册请求，确定终端设备所连接的接入网设备，进而获取该接入网设备所附属本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：在宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定接入网设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定第一本地网络中 的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务，以触发宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元及时获取第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自终端设备的能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备接入本地网络的能力。在接入和移动性管理网元确定终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定第一本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，以触发宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元及时获取第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元通过签约信息请求向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。也就是说，签约信息请求携带第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送指示信息。其中，指示信息指示宏网中的第二解密网元为终端设备提供加密密钥，以使终端设备从宏网中获取加密密钥。
在一种可能的设计中，签约信息请求包括所述指示信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的请求消息。其中，请求消息用于请求第一解密网元的标识信息。
宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元根据请求消息，向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
也就是说，由宏网中的第二解密网元主动触发宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元，以使宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，第一解密网元的标识信息包括第一本地网络的标识和第一标识。其中，第一标识用于标识第一本地网络中的一个解密网元。
第五方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是宏网中的第二解密网元，也可以是应用于宏网中的第二解密网元中的芯片。下面以执行主体是宏网中的第二解密网元为例进行描述。
该方法包括：宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。宏网中的第二解密网元根据第一解密网元的标识信息和映射关系，确定第一加密密钥。其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元对应。
也就是说，宏网中的第二解密网元获取到第一解密网元的标识信息的情况下，再结合映射关系，也就能够确定与第一解密网元对应的取第一加密密钥，从而向终端设备提供第一加密密钥，以使终端设备采用第一加密密钥来加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。这样一来，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的加密密钥不同，相应的，不同本地网络中的解密网元对应的解密密钥也不一样。即使某一本地网络中的解密网元被攻击，也不会泄露未被攻击的本地网络中解密网元的解密密钥。在终端设备向未被攻击的本地网络发送注册请求的情况下，注册请求中携带了经过第一加密密钥加密后的隐藏用户身份标识，从而使得用户身份 信息得到保护。
在一种可能的设计中，宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的指示信息。其中，指示信息指示宏网中的第二解密网元为终端设备提供加密密钥。宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据指示信息，向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。
在一种可能的设计中，在宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息之前，该方法还包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，确定向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送请求消息。其中，请求消息用于请求第一解密网元的标识信息，以触发宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元及时提供第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一信息。其中，第一信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络。宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从第一信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务。
也就是说，宏网中的第二解密网元在接收第一信息的情况下，也能够基于第一接入网设备的信息，来自主确定第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从预配置信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，预配置信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务。
也就是说，宏网中的第二解密网元在存储预配置信息的情况下，也能够基于第一接入网设备的信息，来自主确定第一解密网元的标识信息。
第六方面，提供一种密钥管理方法。该方法的执行主体可以是终端设备，也可以是应用于终端设备中的芯片。下面以执行主体是终端设备为例进行描述。
该方法包括：终端设备在需要接入第一本地网络的情况下，终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
也就是说，终端设备采用空算法来加密用户身份信息，以得到隐藏用户身份标识。这样一来，在终端设备向本地网络发送注册请求的情况下，注册请求中携带了经过空算法加密后的隐藏用户身份标识，从而使得用户身份信息得到保护。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：终端设备使用空算法和默认的加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。其中，隐藏用户身份标识还包括默认的加密密钥的标识符，且标识符的取值为0。默认的加密密钥为空密钥，例如，默认的加密密钥可以使用全为零的比特位全来表征。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备接收来自接入网设备的第一本地网络的 标识。响应于第一本地网络的标识，终端设备确定需要接入第一本地网络，以触发执行如下操作：使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，以及通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，响应于第一本地网络的标识，终端设备确定需要接入第一本地网络，包括：在满足预设条件的情况下，响应于第一本地网络的标识，终端设备确定需要接入第一本地网络。其中，预设条件包括以下至少一项：
第一项，终端设备预配置第一信息。其中，第一信息指示终端设备接收到本地网络的标识后接入本地网络，以及时触发终端设备接入本地网络。
第二项，终端设备未搜索到第二网络，第二网络是除第一本地网络之外的网络，以保障终端设备通信服务的连续性。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM。终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送指示信息。USIM响应于指示信息，采用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM的情况下，可以由USIM基于空算法来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。终端设备通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：ME通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
也就是说，在终端设备包括ME和USIM的情况下，可以由ME基于空算法来生成隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，第一本地网络的标识为第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
第七方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第一方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者实现上述终端设备功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。处理模块，还用于根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。处理模块，还用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包 括：通过收发模块接收广播消息，其中，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：通过收发模块接收来自接入网设备的本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，第一标识用于标识本地网络中的一个解密网元，以及根据本地网络的标识和第一标识，确定第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，本地网络的标识为本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系是预配置在所述通信装置中的。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM，USIM预配置映射关系。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：控制ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。处理模块，用于根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME向USIM发送标识信息。USIM根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括ME和USIM，USIM预配置映射关系。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：控制ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。处理模块，用于根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将映射关系和用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的映射关系和用户身份信息。ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于通过接入网设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的映射关系。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于注册接受消息。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于用户设备配置更新命令消息。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括ME和USIM。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：控制ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系。处理模块，用于根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第二请求。USIM响应于第二请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用第 一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括ME和USIM。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：控制ME获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。发送模块，用于通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的映射关系。处理模块，用于根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME根据标识信息和映射关系，确定与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第一加密密钥。USIM接收来自ME的第一加密密钥。USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息。其中，能力信息指示通信装置具备接入本地网络的能力。
第八方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第二方面或第二方面任一种可能的设计中的接入网设备，或者实现上述接入网设备功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，在通信装置与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路的过程中，处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。收发模块，用于发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，用于发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：发送广播消息，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，用于发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：发送本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，本地网络的标识和第一标识用于确定第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，本地网络的标识为本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，在通信装置与宏网中的核心网网元之间的连接断开的情况下，处理模块，用于与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，还用于与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立因特网协议安全IPsec链接。其中，回传链路包括IPsec链接。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：采用收发模块通过因特网密钥交换协议安全联盟初始协商IKE_SA_INIT消息或因特网密钥交换协议认证IKE_AUTH消息接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，还用于与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立数据报传输层安全DTLS链接。其中，回传链路包括DTLS链接。处理模块，用于获取本地网络中的 第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：采用收发模块通过握手报文接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息。
第九方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第三方面或第三方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者实现上述终端设备功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，收发模块，用于接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一本地网络存在对应关系。在通信装置接收第一本地网络的标识的情况下，处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于向第一本地网络发送注册请求。其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息。其中，能力信息指示通信装置具备接入本地网络的能力。
在一种可能的设计中，第一本地网络的标识为第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM。收发模块，用于接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第一加密密钥。USIM使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括ME和USIM。收发模块，用于接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：控制ME接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。处理模块，用于使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
第十方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第四方面或第四方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元，或者实现上述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，收发模块，用于向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。收发模块，还用于接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元相关联。收发模块，还用于向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。其中，处理模块控制收发模块 执行上述处理步骤。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，还用于获取接入网设备所附属本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于向通信装置传输终端设备的注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，在通信装置确定接入网设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，处理模块，用于确定第一本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，用于接收来自终端设备的能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备接入本地网络的能力。处理模块，还用于确定终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力，以及在终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，确定第一本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，用于向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：通过签约信息请求向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于向宏网中的第二解密网元发送指示信息。其中，指示信息指示宏网中的第二解密网元为终端设备提供加密密钥。
在一种可能的设计中，签约信息请求包括所述指示信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，用于接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的请求消息。其中，请求消息用于请求第一解密网元的标识信息。收发模块，用于向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：根据请求消息，向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，第一解密网元的标识信息包括第一本地网络的标识和第一标识。其中，第一标识用于标识第一本地网络中的一个解密网元。
第十一方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第五方面或第五方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的第二解密网元，或者实现上述宏网中的第二解密网元功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，处理模块，用于获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。处理模块，还用于根据第一解密网元的标识信息和映射关系，确定第一加密密钥。其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。收发模块，用于向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元对应。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：通过收发模块接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的指示信息。其中，指示信息指示通信装置为终端设备提供加密密钥。收发模块，用于向终端设备发送第一加密密钥，包括：根据指示信息，向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，还用于在获取第一解密网元的标识信息之前，根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，确定向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送请求消息。其中，请求消息用于请求第一解密网元的标识信息。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一信息。其中，第一信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络。处理模块，用于获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从第一信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从预配置信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，预配置信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务。
第十二方面，提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述第六方面或第六方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者实现上述终端设备功能的芯片；所述通信装置包括实现上述方法相应的模块、单元、或手段(means)，该模块、单元、或means可以通过硬件实现，软件实现，或者通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块或单元。
该通信装置包括处理模块和收发模块。其中，处理模块，用于在需要接入第一本地网络的情况下，使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：使用空算法和默认的加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。其中，隐藏用户身份标识还包括默认的加密密钥的标识符，且标识符的取值为0。默认的加密密钥为空密钥，例如，默认的加密密钥可以使用全为零的比特位全来表征。
在一种可能的设计中，收发模块，还用于接收来自接入网设备的第一本地网络的标识。处理模块，用于响应于第一本地网络的标识，确定需要接入第一本地网络，以触发执行如下操作：使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，以及通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，处理模块，用于响应于第一本地网络的标识，确定需要接入第一本地网络，包括：在满足预设条件的情况下，响应于第一本地网络的标识，确定需要接入第一本地网络。其中，预设条件包括以下至少一项：
第一项，通信装置预配置第一信息。其中，第一信息指示通信装置接收到本地网络的标识后接入本地网络。
第二项，收发模块未搜索到第二网络，第二网络是除第一本地网络之外的网络。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM。处理模块，用于使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送指示信息。USIM响应于指示信息，采用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，并将隐藏用户身份标识发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，通信装置包括ME和USIM。处理模块，用于使用空算法加密用 户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：控制ME向USIM发送第一请求。USIM响应于第一请求，将用户身份信息发送给ME。ME接收来自USIM的用户身份信息。ME使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。收发模块，用于通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：控制ME通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。
在一种可能的设计中，第一本地网络的标识为第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
第十三方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器和存储器；该存储器用于存储计算机指令，当该处理器执行该指令时，使得该通信装置执行上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中终端设备所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第一方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者，可以为上述第三方面或第三方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者，可以为上述第六方面或第六方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者实现上述终端设备功能的芯片。
第十四方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器；所述处理器与存储器耦合，用于读取存储器中的指令并执行，以使该通信装置执行如上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第一方面或第一方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者，可以为上述第三方面或第三方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者，可以为上述第六方面或第六方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备，或者实现上述终端设备功能的芯片。
第十五方面，提供一种芯片。该芯片包括处理电路和输入输出接口。其中，输入输出接口用于与芯片之外的模块通信，例如，该芯片可以为实现上述第一方面或第一方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第一方面或第一方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。再如，该芯片可以为实现上述第三方面或第三方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第三方面或第三方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。又如，该芯片可以为实现上述第六方面或第六方面任一种可能的设计中的终端设备功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第六方面或第六方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。
第十六方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器和存储器；该存储器用于存储计算机指令，当该处理器执行该指令时，使得该通信装置执行上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中接入网设备所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第二方面或第二方面任一种可能的设计中的接入网设备，或者实现上述接入网设备功能的芯片。
第十七方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器；所述处理器与存储器耦合，用于读取存储器中的指令并执行，以使该通信装置执行如上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中的接入网设备所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第二方面或第二方面任一种可能的设计中的接入网设备，或者实现上述接入网设备功能的芯片。
第十八方面，提供一种芯片。该芯片包括处理电路和输入输出接口。其中，输入输出接口用于与芯片之外的模块通信，例如，该芯片可以为实现上述第二方面或第二方面任一种可能的设计中的接入网设备功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第二方面或第二方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。
第十九方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器和存储器；该存储器用于 存储计算机指令，当该处理器执行该指令时，使得该通信装置执行上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第四方面或第四方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元，或者实现上述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元功能的芯片。
第二十方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器；所述处理器与存储器耦合，用于读取存储器中的指令并执行，以使该通信装置执行如上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第四方面或第四方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元，或者实现上述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元功能的芯片。
第二十一方面，提供一种芯片。该芯片包括处理电路和输入输出接口。其中，输入输出接口用于与芯片之外的模块通信，例如，该芯片可以为实现上述第四方面或第四方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第四方面或第四方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。
第二十二方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器和存储器；该存储器用于存储计算机指令，当该处理器执行该指令时，使得该通信装置执行上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中宏网中的第二解密网元所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第五方面或第五方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的第二解密网元，或者实现上述宏网中的第二解密网元功能的芯片。
第二十三方面，提供了一种通信装置。该通信装置包括：处理器；所述处理器与存储器耦合，用于读取存储器中的指令并执行，以使该通信装置执行如上述任一方面或任一方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的第二解密网元所执行的方法。该通信装置可以为上述第五方面或第五方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的第二解密网元，或者实现上述宏网中的第二解密网元功能的芯片。
第二十四方面，提供一种芯片。该芯片包括处理电路和输入输出接口。其中，输入输出接口用于与芯片之外的模块通信，例如，该芯片可以为实现上述第五方面或第五方面任一种可能的设计中的宏网中的第二解密网元功能的芯片。处理电路用于运行计算机程序或指令，以实现以上第五方面或第五方面任一种可能的设计中的方法。
第二十五方面，提供一种计算机可读存储介质。该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述任一方面中任一项的方法。
第二十六方面，提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述任一方面中任一项的方法。
第二十七方面，提供一种电路系统。电路系统包括处理电路，处理电路被配置为执行如上述任一方面中任一项的方法。
其中，第七方面至第二十七方面中任一种设计所带来的技术效果可参考上文所提供的对应的方法中的有益效果，此处不再赘述。
附图说明
图1a为本申请实施例提供的一种架构示意图；
图1b为本申请实施例提供的再一种架构示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种IOPS场景示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的再一种IOPS场景示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的一种密钥分离的场景示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的再一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图7a为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图7b为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图7c为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图7d为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图8为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图10为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图11为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图12为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图13为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图14为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图15为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图16为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图17为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图18为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图19为本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥分离的流程示意图；
图20为本申请实施例提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图；
图21为本申请实施例提供的再一种通信装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
本申请的说明书以及附图中的术语“第一”和“第二”等是用于区别不同的对象，或者用于区别对同一对象的不同处理，而不是用于描述对象的特定顺序。此外，本申请的描述中所提到的术语“包括”和“具有”以及它们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含。例如包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备没有限定于已列出的步骤或单元，而是可选地还包括其他没有列出的步骤或单元，或可选地还包括对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，“示例性的”或者“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请实施例中被描述为“示例性的”或者“例如”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其它实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用“示例性的”或者“例如”等词旨在以具体方式呈现相关概念。在本申请实施例中，“两个以上”包括两个本身。多个可以包括两个，也可以包括三个，还可以包括更多。
本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，如第五代(5th generation，5G)系统或新无线(new radio，NR)或长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)系统等。本申请提供的技术方案还可以应用于未来的通信系统，如第六代移动通信系统。本申请实施例的技术方案还可以应用于设备到设备(device to device，D2D)通信，车辆外联(vehicle-to-everything，V2X)通信，机器到机器(machine to machine，M2M)通信，机器类型通信(machine type communication，MTC)，以及物联网(internet of things，IoT)通信系统或者其他通信系统。
为了便于理解本申请实施例，先结合图1a和图1b简单介绍本申请实施例适用的通信系统。
图1a为LTE系统的架构示意图，如图1a所示，该LTE系统包括：终端设备、演进的通用移动通信系统(universal mobile telecommunications system，UMTS)陆地无线接入网(evolved UMTS territorial radio access network，E-UTRAN)设备、移动管理实体(mobility management entity，MME)、服务网关(serving gateway，SGW)、分组数据网络(packet data network，PDN)网关(PDN gateway，PGW)、业务能力开放功能(service capability exposure function，SCEF)网元以及归属签约用户服务器(home subscriber server，HSS)等网元或设备。
其中，终端设备可以为具有收发功能的终端设备，或为可设置于该终端设备的芯片或芯片系统。该终端设备也可以称为用户设备(uesr equipment，UE)、接入终端、用户单元(subscriber unit)、用户站、移动站(mobile station，MS)、移动台、远方站、远程终端、移动设备、用户终端、终端、无线通信设备、用户代理或用户装置。本申请的实施例中的终端设备可以是手机(mobile phone)、蜂窝电话(cellular phone)、智能电话(smart phone)、平板电脑(Pad)、无线数据卡、个人数字助理电脑(personal digital assistant，PDA)、无线调制解调器(modem)、手持设备(handset)、膝上型电脑(laptop computer)、机器类型通信(machine type communication，MTC)终端、带无线收发功能的电脑、虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端、车载终端、具有终端功能的路边单元(road side unit，RSU)等。本申请的终端设备还可以是作为一个或多个部件或者单元而内置于车辆的车载模块、车载模组、车载部件、车载芯片或者车载单元。
终端设备通过LTE-Uu接入E-UTRAN设备。E-UTRAN设备可以为演进型节点B(evolved NodeB，eNB)，或者下一代eNB(next generation-eNB，ng-eNB)。E-UTRAN设备主要用于为特定区域，如E-UTRAN设备的网络信号覆盖区域内的终端设备提供入网功能，使得上述终端设备可以通过E-UTRAN设备接入并附着到4G网络上。E-UTRAN设备通过S1-MME与MME通信，以及通过S1-U与SGW通信。MME主要负责移动性管理、承载管理、用户的鉴权认证、SGW选择等功能。不同的MME之间通过S10通信(图1a中仅是示例性的给出一个MME)，MME通过S6a与HSS通信，MME通过S11与SGW通信，MME通过T8与SCEF网元通信，SCEF网元与服务器通信，SGSN通过S3与MME通信，SGSN通过S4与SGW通信，SGW通过S5与PGW通信，PGW通过SGi接入服务器。
应理解，在图1a中，E-UTRAN设备属于接入网设备。SGW、PGW、MME、SCEF网元、HSS网元和服务器，均属于核心网设备。在本申请实施例中，4G网络的核心网设备，也可以描述为演进的分组核心网(evolved packet core network，EPC)。
图1b为5G系统的架构示意图，如图1b所示，5G系统包括：接入网(access network，AN)和核心网(core network，CN)，还可以包括：终端设备。
其中，5G系统中终端设备的具体功能可参考上述4G系统中的相关介绍，不再赘述。
上述AN用于实现接入有关的功能，可以为特定区域的授权用户提供入网功能，并能够根据用户的级别，业务的需求等确定不同质量的传输链路以传输用户数据。AN在终端设备 与CN之间转发控制信号和用户数据。AN可以包括：接入网设备，也可以称为无线接入网设备(radio access network，RAN)设备。
RAN设备(简称RAN，或者AN)可以是为终端设备提供接入的设备，主要负责空口侧的无线资源管理、服务质量(quality of service，QoS)管理、数据压缩和加密等功能。RAN设备可以包括5G，如新空口(new radio，NR)系统中的gNB，或，5G中的基站的一个或一组(包括多个天线面板)天线面板，或者，还可以为构成gNB、传输点(transmission and reception point，TRP或者transmission point，TP)或传输测量功能(transmission measurement function，TMF)的网络节点，如基带单元(building base band unit，BBU)，或，集中单元(centralized unit，CU)或分布单元(distributed unit，DU)、具有基站功能的RSU，或者有线接入网关，或者5G的核心网网元。或者，RAN设备还可以包括无线保真(wireless fidelity，WiFi)系统中的接入点(access point，AP)，无线中继节点、无线回传节点、各种形式的宏基站、微基站(也称为小站)、中继站、接入点、可穿戴设备、车载设备等等。或者，RAN设备也可以包括下一代移动通信系统，例如6G的接入网设备，例如6G基站，或者在下一代移动通信系统中，该网络设备也可以有其他命名方式，其均涵盖在本申请实施例的保护范围以内，本申请对此不做任何限定。
CN主要负责维护移动网络的签约数据，为终端设备提供会话管理、移动性管理、策略管理以及安全认证等功能。CN主要包括如下网元：用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)网元、认证服务功能(authentication server function，AUSF)网元、接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)网元、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)网元、网络切片选择功能(network slice selection function，NSSF)网元、网络开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)网元、网络功能仓储功能(NF repository function，NRF)网元、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)网元、统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)网元、统一数据存储(unified data repository，UDR)网元、应用功能(application function，AF)网元、以及计费功能(charging function，CHF)网元。
需要说明的是，CN可根据部署位置分类为宏网的核心网(如宏网EPC或宏网5GC)和本地核心网(也可称为本地网络，如私网或IOPS网络)，宏网核心网的部署位置多位于运营商的核心机房内，离接入网设备(例如eNB、RAN或gNB)较远，而本地核心网(例如IOPS EPC、IOPS 5GC或私网)可部署在离接入网设备较近的位置，因此IOPS网络(包括EPC和5GC)和私网也可理解为本地网络，或本地核心网。实际应用中，也可按照网络规模的大小来区分宏网核心网与本地核心网，例如宏网核心网服务的用户多与本地核心网，或宏网核心网可提供的网络功能多与本地核心网，或宏网核心网比本地核心网包含更多的核心网网元；还可以按照网络功能区分宏网核心网与本地核心网，例如服务于非公共安全(public safety)用户的为宏网核心网而服务公共安全用户的为本地核心网，或不为特定企业用户服务的为宏网核心网而为特定企业用户服务的为本地核心网。
其中，UPF网元主要负责用户数据处理(转发、接收、计费等)。例如，UPF网元可以接收来自数据网络(data network，DN)的用户数据，通过接入网设备向终端设备转发该用户数据。UPF网元也可以通过接入网设备接收来自终端设备的用户数据，并向DN转发该用户数据。DN网元指的是为用户提供数据传输服务的运营商网络。例如网际互连协议(internet protocol，IP)多媒体业务(IP multi-media srvice，IMS)、互联网(internet)等。DN可以为 运营商外部网络，也可以为运营商控制的网络，用于向终端设备设备提供业务服务。
AUSF网元主要用于执行终端设备的安全认证。
AMF网元主要用于移动网络中的移动性管理。例如用户位置更新、用户注册网络、用户切换等。
SMF网元主要用于移动网络中的会话管理。例如会话建立、修改、释放。具体功能例如为用户分配互联网协议(internet protocol，IP)地址，选择提供报文转发功能的UPF等。
PCF网元主要支持提供统一的策略框架来控制网络行为，提供策略规则给控制层网络功能，同时负责获取与策略决策相关的用户签约信息。PCF网元可以向AMF网元、SMF网元提供策略，例如服务质量(quality of service，QoS)策略、切片选择策略等。
NSSF网元主要用于为终端设备选择网络切片。
NEF网元主要用于支持能力和事件的开放。
NRF网元主要用于支持服务发现功能，维护可用的网络功能(network function，NF)实例的NF文本以及他们支持的服务。
UDM网元主要用于存储用户数据，例如签约数据、鉴权/授权数据等。
UDR网元主要用于存储结构化数据，存储的内容包括签约数据和策略数据、对外暴露的结构化数据和应用相关的数据。
AF网元主要支持与CN交互来提供服务，例如影响数据路由决策、策略控制功能或者向网络侧提供第三方的一些服务。
在图1b所示的网络架构中，各网元之间可以通过图中所示的接口通信，部分接口可以采用非服务化接口的方式实现。如图1b所示，终端设备和AMF网元之间可以通过N1接口进行交互，交互消息例如可以称为N1消息(N1Message)。接入网设备和AMF网元之间可以通过N2接口进行交互，N2接口可以用于非接入层(non-access stratum，NAS)消息的发送等。接入网设备和UPF网元之间可以通过N3接口进行交互，N3接口可以用于传输用户面的数据等。SMF网元和UPF网元之间可以通过N4接口进行交互，N4接口可以用于传输例如N3连接的隧道标识信息，数据缓存指示信息，以及下行数据通知消息等信息。UPF网元和DN之间可以通过N6接口进行交互，N6接口可以于传输用户面的数据等。
另外，图1b中控制面功能的各个网元也可以通过服务化接口进行通信，比如，AMF网元经过Namf接口接入服务化架构，提供相应的服务；SMF网元经过Nsmf接口接入服务化架构，提供相应的服务；同理，AUSF网元、CHF网元、NSSF网元、NEF网元、NRF网元、PCF网元、UDM网元、UDR网元以及AF网元经过各自对应的接口接入服务化架构，提供相应的服务，这里不再赘述。其他接口与各网元之间的关系如图1b中所示，为了简洁，这里不一一详述。
应理解，在图1b中，CN中的网元，可以描述为核心网网元，或核心网设备。在本申请实施例中，核心网网元与核心网设备之间可以相互替换。
还应理解，上述命名仅为便于区分不同的功能而定义，不应对本申请构成任何限定。本申请并不排除在5G网络以及未来其它的网络中采用其他命名的可能。例如，在6G网络中，上述各个网元中的部分或全部可以沿用5G中的术语，也可能采用其他名称等。
还应理解，图1a和图1b中的各个网元之间的接口名称只是一个示例，具体实现中接口的名称可能为其他的名称，本申请对此不作具体限定。此外，上述各个网元之间的所传输的 消息(或信令)的名称也仅仅是一个示例，对消息本身的功能不构成任何限定。
为了便于理解本申请实施例，下面对本申请涉及的相关技术做简单介绍。
1、IOPS
如图2所示的场景，适用于不固定的演进分组系统(evolved packet system，EPS)部署的情况。其中，不固定的EPS部署包括游牧的EPC(nomadic EPC)设备和接入网设备，可以记为Nomadic EPC+eNB，如图2中的a所示。此种情况下，可以部署具有IOPS功能的接入网设备，使用具有IOPS功能的接入网设备实现无回传的接入网，为公共安全用户(public safety user)提供本地连接和服务，如图2中的b和c所示。
需要说明的是，宏网的核心网网元(如宏网EPC)部署位置多位于运营商的核心机房内，离接入网设备(例如eNB)较远，而IOPS网络(即IOPS EPC)部署位置多离接入网设备较近，因此IOPS网络也可理解为本地网络，或本地核心网，在本申请实施例中的IOPS网络，也可用于指代其他本地核心网，例如IOPS 5GC或私网。
如图3所示的场景，当接入网设备与宏网的核心网网元(如宏网EPC)之间S1链路正常通信时，接入网设备能够接入宏网EPC，为终端设备提供通信服务，如图3中的a所示。当接入网设备与宏网的核心网设备(如宏网EPC)之间链接中断时，对于具体IOPS功能的接入网设备而言，接入网设备能够接入IOPS网络，为终端设备提供关键业务(mission critical service，MCX)，如图3中的b和c所示。其中，MCX包括以下一项或多项：关键语音业务(mission critical push to talk，MCPTT)、关键视频业务(mission critical video service，MCVideo)、或关键数据业务(mission critical data service，MCData)。其中，MCPTT指连接建立和传输时延低，可用性、可靠性、安全性高，可实现优先和抢占处理的语音通信业务，包括语音个呼和语音组呼。MCVideo指连接建立和传输时延低，可用性、可靠性、安全性高，可实现优先和抢占处理的视频通信类业务，如视频通话。MCData指连接建立和传输时延低，可用性、可靠性、安全性高，可实现优先和抢占处理的数据通信业务，如即时消息、文件传输等。
如图4所示，终端设备从宏网切换到IOPS网络的过程中，各个设备之间的步骤包括：
步骤1，终端设备、eNB和宏网EPC之间执行附着过程，以使终端设备附着到宏网EPC。终端设备、eNB和宏网EPC之间进行MCPTT业务。
步骤2，eNB确定自身与宏网EPC之间的回传链路中断(eNB detects loss of backhaul)。
其中，eNB与宏网EPC之间的回传链路包括图3中的S1链路。
步骤3，eNB启动本地EPC，即本地EPC被激活(local EPC activated)。其中，本地EPC可以包括一个或多个MME、SGW、PGW等。
步骤4，eNB与本地EPC之间建立通信链路(establish S1 link to local EPC)。
步骤5，eNB宣告IOPS模式操作(announce IOPS mode operation)。
示例性的，eNB进入IOPS模式操作之后，广播IOPS网络对应的公共陆地移动网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)标识(identity，ID)。
步骤6，终端设备检测IOPS网络的PLMN，切换自身的USIM应用(detects IOPS PLMN and USIM application is switched)。
步骤7，终端设备确定IOPS网络的PLMN(selects IOPS PLMN)。
步骤8，终端设备、eNB和本地EPC之间执行附着过程，以使终端设备附着到本地EPC，并建立本地PDN连接(attached to local EPC and request local PDN connection)。
步骤9，终端设备、eNB和本地EPC之间进行本地公共安全业务传输(access local public safety services)。
应理解，附着过程包括终端设备与本地EPC之间的接入认证过程。在4G网络中，接入认证过程，也可以称为认证与密钥协商(authentication and key agreement，AKA)过程。AKA过程在终端设备与本地归属用户服务器(local home subscriber server，L-HSS)之间执行。为了保证IOPS网络的覆盖范围和容灾备份，IOPS网络的运营商部署多个IOPS网络，这些IOPS网络的PLMN ID和存储的用户密钥相同。然而，对于共用同一PLMN ID的多个IOPS网络而言，每个IOPS网络部署有L-HSS，每个L-HSS存储有用户数据和AKA过程所用的根密钥信息(AKA根密钥)，如根密钥K。相比于宏网EPC的物理部署位置，L-HSS的物理部署位置较低，即L-HSS不位于运营商的核心网机房中，而位于与基站机房附近，安保措施不如核心网机房完善，因此，L-HSS被攻击的风险较高。如果多个L-HSS中有一个L-HSS被攻击，则该L-HSS存储的信息泄露。由于多个L-HSS中每个L-HSS上存储了相同的AKA根密钥，即使单个L-HSS被攻击导致AKA根密钥泄露，则其他L-HSS也受到影响，攻击者基于AKA根密钥可以随意接入IOPS网络。其中，终端设备与L-HSS存储相同的根密钥K，终端设备与L-HSS之间的AKA流程是基于该根密钥K进行的。相应的，AKA过程中终端设备与L-HSS使用相同的密钥，因此根密钥K为对称密钥。
2、对称密钥的密钥分离机制
在4G系统中，引入了对称密钥的密钥分离机制。如图5所示，终端设备包括通用集成电路卡(universal integrated circuit card，UICC)和移动设备(mobile equipment，ME)。其中，UICC为通用用户识别模块(universal subscriber identity module，USIM)应用的硬件载体，UICC和USIM应用由UICC卡供应商提供。USIM应用内存储的信息由运营商提供。ME为终端设备的硬件，如手机。假设有n个L-HSS，编号为1-n。每个L-HSS分别配置不同的密钥，编号为K_1到K_n。密钥K_1到K_n是基于根密钥K推演得到的。用于推演K_1到K_n的根密钥K，与终端设备的USIM应用中存储的K相同，即互为对称密钥。
在AKA流程中，终端设备收到来自于L-HSS(如L-HSS_2)的鉴权信息。其中，鉴权信息包括认证管理字段(authentication management field，AMF)。该认证管理字段用于指示终端设备的USIM应用在与哪一个L-HSS进行AKA流程，以及如何基于根密钥K进行推演运算。终端设备的USIM应用采用认证管理字段指示的推演运算对自身存储的根密钥K进行运算，以得到K_2。终端设备的USIM应用基于密钥K_2，与L-HSS_2进行AKA流程。
3、用户永久标识(subscription permanent identifier，SUPI)、用户隐藏标识符(subscription concealed identifier，SUCI)
SUPI是5G网络中终端设备的用户标识。SUPI可以包括国际移动用户识别码(international mobile subscriber identity，IMSI)。考虑到SUPI暴露在空口中，容易导致用户隐私泄露问题，因此，5G网络中引入了SUPI的保护处理，即终端设备对SUPI的部分或全部内容进行加密，以得到SUCI，从而使得SUPI不在空口中暴露，保证了SUPI的隐私性。
其中，对SUPI的处理过程需要使用非对称加密，即终端设备使用公钥对SUPI的部分(或全部)内容进行加密，以得到SUCI；UDM网元使用私钥对SUCI的部分(或全部)内容进行解密，以得到SUPI。其中，终端设备需要存储公钥，而UDM网元需要存储私钥。
需要进一步说明的是，终端设备使用公钥对SUPI的部分(或全部)内容进行加密，以得 到SUCI，包括：终端设备使用公钥对SUPI的部分(或全部)内容进行加密，获取加密后的密文信息，终端设备使用该密文信息确定SUCI。其中，SUCI中的部分(或全部)信息为该密文。UDM网元使用私钥对SUCI的部分(或全部)内容进行解密，以得到SUPI，包括：UDM网元使用私钥对SUCI的部分(或全部)内容进行解密获取解密后的明文，UDM使用该明文信息确定SUPI。其中，SUPI中的部分(或全部)信息为该明文。在本申请实施例中，SUPI中被加密的部分信息至少包括用户身份信息。也就是说，终端设备使用公钥至少对SUPI中的用户身份信息进行保护。其中，用户身份信息是IMSI格式的SUPI中的移动用户识别号码(mobile subscriber identification number，MSIN)，或者，用户身份信息是网络接入指示符(network access identifier，NAI)格式的SUPI中的用户名称(username)。
业界正在讨论将IOPS场景与5G网络结合。其中，一些LTE网络中的IOPS场景的技术也可能复用到5G网络中。
然而，对于共用同一PLMN ID的多个IOPS网络而言，使用同一对非对称秘钥来保护用户身份信息。每个IOPS网络都部署有UDM网元。对于共用同一PLMN ID的IOPS网络而言，不同IOPS网络中每个UDM网元中都存储了相同的非对称密钥，即用于解密SUCI的部分或全部内容的私钥。若某一IOPS网络的UDM网元被攻击，则私钥泄露，即使终端设备向未攻击的UDM网元发起注册请求，攻击者也可以根据私钥获取SUPI，导致用户身份信息无法被保护。所以，当终端设备接入IOPS网络时，如何对用户身份信息进行安全保护，是亟待解决的问题。
综上，针对上述技术问题，本申请实施例提出了如下技术方案，以对用户身份信息进行安全保护，降低用户身份信息泄露的可能性。本申请各个实施例中涉及的“用户身份信息”可以是用于标识用户身份的任何信息，例如可以是5G场景下的SUPI或者SUPI的一部分，也可以是后续演进系统中用于标识用户身份的信息，本申请对此不做限定。下面将结合附图，对本申请中的技术方案进行描述。
本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，如图1a或图1b所示。
本申请将围绕可包括多个设备、组件、模块等的系统来呈现各个方面、实施例或特征。应当理解和明白的是，各个系统可以包括另外的设备、组件、模块等，并且/或者可以并不包括结合附图讨论的所有设备、组件、模块等。此外，还可以使用这些方案的组合。
另外，在本申请实施例中，“示例性的”、“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请中被描述为“示例”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其它实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用示例的一词旨在以具体方式呈现概念。
本申请实施例中，“信息(information)”，“信号(signal)”，“消息(message)”，“信道(channel)”、“信令(singaling)”有时可以混用，应当指出的是，在不强调其区别时，其所要表达的含义是匹配的。“的(of)”，“相应的(corresponding，relevant)”和“对应的(corresponding)”有时可以混用，应当指出的是，在不强调其区别时，其所要表达的含义是匹配的。此外，本申请提到的“/”可以用于表示“或”的关系。
本申请实施例描述的网络架构以及业务场景是为了更加清楚的说明本申请实施例的技术方案，并不构成对于本申请实施例提供的技术方案的限定，本领域普通技术人员可知，随着网络架构的演变和新业务场景的出现，本申请实施例提供的技术方案对于类似的技术问题，同样适用。
为了方便理解，下面将结合图6至图13，通过方法实施例具体介绍各个设备之间的交互流程。在本申请实施例中，RAN设备为具备IOPS功能的设备，即具备接入IOPS网络的能力。为了描述简洁，仍采用RAN设备进行介绍。L-UDM网元是指IOPS网络中的UDM网元。IOPS核心网或IOPS网络也可用于指代其他本地核心网或本地网络，例如IOPS 5GC或私网。在此作统一说明，后续不再赘述。
示例性的，图6为本申请实施例提供的密钥管理方法的流程示意图一。该密钥管理方法可以适用于终端设备接入IOPS网络过程中。如图6所示，该密钥管理方法的流程如下：
S600a、终端设备被配置至少一组映射关系。
其中，至少一组映射关系中每组映射关系用于指示：一项本地统一数据管理(local unified data management，L-UDM)网元的标识信息与一项公钥信息之间的对应关系。在本申请实施例中，L-UDM网元的标识信息与公钥信息之间存在一一对应关系。应理解，在本申请实施例中，L-UDM是指IOPS网络中的UDM网元。
示例性的，以n组映射关系为例，各组对应关系如表1所示：
表1
在表1中，对应关系1指示L-UDM_1 ID与PK_1之间的对应关系。对应关系n指示L-UDM_n ID与PK_n之间的对应关系。其中，L-UDM_1 ID用于标识L-UDM网元1，L-UDM_n ID用于标识L-UDM网元n。
示例性的，终端设备包括ME和USIM，如图5所示。终端设备的USIM被配置至少一组映射关系。例如，由UICC卡供应商将S600a中的映射关系写入USIM中，或由移动网络运营商将S600a中的对应关系写入USIM中。
需要说明的是，在本申请实施例中，通过两种可能的情况，对L-UDM网元的标识信息进行介绍：
作为一种可能的情况，对于每个L-UDM网元来说，在无需参考该网元所在的IOPS网络的标识的情况下，每个网元的标识信息仍是全网唯一的标识。示例性的，L-UDM网元的标识信息可以是L-UDM网元实例(instance)的标识信息。其中，网元实例的标识信息可以是网元instance ID。L-UDM网元的标识信息也可以是L-UDM网元所在的IOPS网络的标识信息。其中，IOPS网络的标识信息可以是PLMN ID和/或网络标识(network identifier，NID)信息。以L-UDM ID可以唯一标识一个L-UDM网元。此种情况下，每个IOPS网络共用同一个PLMN ID时，则L-UDM ID可以包括NID信息。其中，PLMN ID和NID可以唯一识别到某个L-UDM网元所在的IOPS网络，进一步确定该IOPS网络中的L-UDM网元。例如，L-UDM_1 ID包括NID_1，L-UDM_n ID包括NID_n。或者，L-UDM ID可以唯一标识一个IOPS网络。此种情况下，不同IOPS网络使用不同的PLMN ID。L-UDM ID可以包括L-UDM所在IOPS网络对应的PLMN ID，在这种情况下，PLMN ID可以唯一识别到某个L-UDM网元所在的IOPS网络，进一步确定该IOPS网络中的L-UDM网元。
作为另一种可能的情况，对于每个L-UDM网元来说，需参考该网元所在的IOPS网络的 标识，以确定该网元的标识信息。此种情况下，一个L-UDM网元的标识信息，包括PLMN ID和第一标识。其中，第一标识可以是1到n中的某一个数字，n表示该PLMN ID所标识的PLMN中的L-UDM网元的数量。
S600b、L-UDM网元a被配置私钥SK_a。
其中，私钥SK_a用于解密SUCI的部分或全部内容。
其中，L-UDM网元a是上述L-UDM网元1至L-UDM网元n中的一个网元。相应的，L-UDM网元a的标识记为L-UDM_a ID。私钥SK_a与步骤S600a中的公钥PK_a互为非对称密钥。其中，公钥PK_a用于保护终端设备的SUPI，公钥PK_a用于根据SUPI获取SUCI，私钥SK_a用于根据SUCI获取SUPI。
需要说明的是，在本申请实施例中，使用公钥PK_a保护终端设备的SUPI获取SUCI，包括：使用公钥PK_a加密SUPI的部分(或全部)内容，以获取加密后的密文，根据加密后获取的密文确定SUCI。其中，加密后的密文可以包括SUCI的部分(或全部)内容。使用私钥SK_a根据SUCI获取SUPI，包括：使用私钥SK_a解密SUCI的部分(或全部)内容，以获取解密后的明文，根据解密后的明文确定SUPI。其中，解密后的明文可以包括SUPI的部分(或全部)内容。
应理解，当L-UDM网元a是表1中的L-UDM网元1时，L-UDM_a ID是L-UDM_1 ID，私钥SK_a是SK_1。私钥SK_1与公钥PK_1互为非对称密钥。当L-UDM网元a是表1中的L-UDM网元n时，L-UDM_a ID是L-UDM_n ID，私钥SK_a是SK_n。私钥SK_n与公钥PK_n互为非对称密钥。
示例性的，IOPS网络运营商在L-UDM网元中写入私钥，如表2所示：
表2
在表2中，IOPS网络运营商在L-UDM网元1中写入私钥SK_1，IOPS网络运营商在L-UDM网元n中写入私钥SK_n。应理解，S600b中以L-UDM网元a为例，对私钥信息的配置过程进行介绍。
对于(具备IOPS功能的)RAN设备而言，在某一时刻，RAN设备执行S601：
S601、RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立回传链路的过程中，RAN设备获取L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
其中，S601中的回传链路是指，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间的通信链路。
示例性的，S601的实现过程介绍如下：
作为一种可能的实现方式，回传链路包括因特网协议安全(internet protocol security，IPSec)链接。在RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立IPSec链接过程中，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备交互因特网密钥交换协议安全联盟初始协商(internet key exchange protocol security association initial，IKE_SA_INIT)消息和因特网密钥交换协议认证(internet key exchange protocol authentication，IKE_AUTH)消息。其中，IOPS网络的核心网设备在IKE_SA_INIT消息或IKE_AUTH消息中携带L-UDM网元a的标识信息。如此，RAN设备 从IKE_SA_INIT消息或IKE_AUTH消息中获取L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
作为另一种可能的实现方式，回传链路包括议以及数据报传输层安全(datagram transport layer security，DTLS)链接。在RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立DTLS链接过程中，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备交互握手报文，如ClientHello、ServerHello、ChangeCipherSpec和Finished。其中，IOPS网络的核心网设备在ClientHello、ServerHello、ChangeCipherSpec或Finished中携带L-UDM网元a的标识信息。如此，RAN设备从ClientHello、ServerHello、ChangeCipherSpec或Finished中获取L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
本申请实施例中，RAN设备如何获知L-UDM网元a的标识信息的过程不进行限定。
示例性的，S601的触发条件可以包括：RAN设备与宏网的核心网(Macro CN)设备之间的连接断开的情况下，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立回传链路，以继续为终端设备提供通信服务。当然，对于RAN设备而言，在RAN设备与宏网的核心网设备之间的连接正常的情况下，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间也可以建立回传链路，本申请实施例对此不作限定。应理解，对于RAN设备而言，RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立回传链路，RAN设备确定所启动IOPS网络中L-UDM网元的标识信息，记为L-UDM_a ID。示例性的，RAN设备在自身与IOPS网络之间建立回传链路时获取L-UDM_a ID。
S602、RAN设备广播L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
示例性的，作为一种可能的示例，S602包括：RAN设备广播IOPS网络a的标识和L-UDM网元a的标识信息。此种情况下，L-UDM网元a是IOPS网络a中的网元。IOPS网络a的标识可以是IOPS网络a所使用的PLMN ID。也就是说，广播消息中携带IOPS网络a的标识和L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
作为另一种可能的示例，在L-UDM网元的标识信息包括IOPS网络的标识和第一标识的情况下，S602中的RAN设备广播L-UDM网元a的标识信息即可。也就是说，广播消息中携带L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
应理解，如果L-UDM_a ID可以唯一标识一个IOPS网络，则L-UDM_a ID可以包括PLMN ID时，如果L-UDM_a ID为IOPS网络的PLMN ID，则S602广播IOPS网络的PLMN ID即可，而不需要同时广播IOPS网络的PLMN信息和L-UDM网元a的信息。
对于处于S602的广播消息覆盖范围内的终端设备而言，终端设备接收来自RAN设备的广播消息。在L-UDM网元的标识信息是全网唯一的标识的情况下，对于终端设备而言，终端设备通过广播消息接收来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息。在L-UDM网元的标识信息包括IOPS网络a的标识和第一标识的情况下，对于终端设备而言，终端设备通过广播消息接收来自RAN设备的IOPS网络a的标识和第一标识，再根据IOPS网络a的标识和第一标识，确定L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
对于终端设备而言，在终端设备接收来自RAN设备的IOPS网络a的标识的情况下，终端设备响应于IOPS网络a的标识，确定需要接入IOPS网络a。或者，在满足预设条件的情况下，终端设备响应于IOPS网络a的标识，确定需要接入IOPS网络a。其中，预设条件包括以下至少一项：
预设条件a，终端设备预配置第一信息。其中，第一信息指示终端设备接收到IOPS网络的标识后接入IOPS网络。第一信息可以是运营商为终端设备预配置的信息。此种情况下，对于终端设备来说，终端设备接收IOPS网络a的标识之后，根据预配置的第一信息，即可确 定自身需要接入IOPS网络a。
预设条件b，终端设备未搜索到第二网络。其中，第二网络是除IOPS网络a之外的其他网络。此种情况下，终端设备若搜索不到除IOPS网络a以外的其他可接入网络的PLMN ID时，确定需要接入IOPS网络a。
应理解，预设条件a和预设条件b作为示例性的介绍，本申请实施例对终端设备如何确定自身需要接入IOPS网络a的具体方式不作限定。终端设备确定需要接入IOPS网络a之后，终端设备执行如下步骤：
S603、终端设备根据S602中来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
示例性的，以表1为例，当L-UDM_a ID为表1中的L-UDM_1 ID时，公钥PK_a为公钥PK_1。当L-UDM_a ID为表1中的L-UDM_n ID时，公钥PK_a为公钥PK_n。
在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。如图7a所示，在S602中，ME接收来自RAN设备的广播消息，之后，ME根据IOPS网络的标识确定需要接入IOPS网络。ME确定SUCI由USIM生成，或ME确定SUCI由ME生成。需要说明的是，ME可以在执行S602之前，确定SUCI由USIM或ME生成。下面，通过示例1和示例2对S603进行介绍：
示例1，当SUCI由USIM生成时，如图7a所示，S603包括S6031a和S6032a：
S6031a、ME向USIM发送L-UDM网元a的标识信息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
示例性的，ME通过获取身份命令(GET IDENTITY command)向USIM发送L-UDM网元a的标识信息。其中，GET IDENTITY命令中数据(Data)字段携带L-UDM_a ID。
S6032a、USIM根据L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，USIM中预配置至少一组映射关系，详见S600a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
示例2，当SUCI由ME生成时，如图7a所示，S603包括S6031b、S6032b和S6033b：
S6031b、ME向USIM发送请求消息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的请求消息。
其中，请求消息请求用于推演SUCI的信息。
示例性的，ME向USIM发送读取命令，以请求读取EFSUCI_Cale_Info文件中的信息。其中，EFSUCI_Cale_Info文件可以参见第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)相关协议规范，此处不再赘述。
S6032b、USIM向ME发送响应(response)消息。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的响应消息。
其中，响应消息包括用于推演SUCI的信息，如至少一组映射关系、SUPI、SUPI类型、保护方案1-n。其中，SUPI类型用于组成SUCI，并指示SUCI是基于哪种类型的SUPI生成，例如IMSI格式的SUPI，或NAI格式的SUPI，具体可以参见3GPP相关协议规范。保护方案是指，用于生成SUCI所用的算法参数，包括密钥长度和椭圆曲线积分加密方案(elliptic curve integrate encrypt scheme，ECIES)算法的参数等，具体可以参见3GPP相关协议规范。其中，保护方案1-n中的保护方案a与S600a中L-UDM网元a的信息和公钥PK_a对应。
其中，响应消息中的至少一组映射关系，与S600a中的映射关系一致，此处不再赘述。
S6033b、ME根据L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，S6033b中的映射关系，与S6032b中的映射关系一致，此处不再赘述。
对于终端设备而言，终端设备确定公钥PK_a之后，执行S604：
S604、终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
示例性的，终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI，包括：终端设备使用公钥PK_a加密SUPI的部分(或全部)内容，获取加密后的密文，根据加密后获取的密文确定SUCI。其中，加密后的密文可以包括SUCI的部分(或全部)内容。其中，SUPI中被加密的部分内容至少包括用户身份信息。具体的，终端设备使用公钥PK_a至少对SUPI中的用户身份信息进行保护。用户身份信息可以参见名词解释部分关于SUPI和SUCI的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM，如图5所示。此种情况下，SUCI可以由USIM生成，也可以由ME生成。下面，通过示例1和示例2对S604进行介绍：
示例1，当SUCI由USIM生成时，如图7a所示，S604包括S6041a和S6042a：
S6041a、USIM采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，S6041a的实现过程，可以参见S604中的示例性介绍，此处不再赘述。
S6042a、USIM向ME发送SUCI。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的SUCI。
其中，S6042a中的SUCI，与S6041a中的SUCI一致，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，USIM通过获取身份响应(GET IDENTITY response)向ME发送SUCI。
示例2，当SUCI由ME生成时，如图7a所示，S604包括S6041b：
S6041b、ME采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，S6041b的实现过程，可以参见S604中的示例性介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于终端设备而言，终端设备确定SUCI之后，执行S605：
S605、终端设备向IOPS网络a发送注册请求。相应的，IOPS网络a接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
应理解，在S605中，终端设备向IOPS网络a中的AMF网元发送注册请求。相应的，IOPS网络a中的AMF网元接收来自终端设备的注册请求。在IOPS网络a中，AMF网元将注册请求中的SUCI发送给L-UDM网元a。相应的，IOPS网络a中的L-UDM网元a接收SUCI。
对于L-UDM网元a而言，L-UDM网元a接收SUCI之后，执行S606：
S606、L-UDM网元a根据私钥SK_a和SUCI获取SUPI，再根据注册请求继续后续注册流程，具体注册流程可参考3GPP相关协议规范。
其中，L-UDM网元a根据私钥SK_a和SUCI获取SUPI，包括：使用私钥SK_a解密SUCI的部分(或全部)内容，以获取解密后的明文，根据解密后的明文确定SUPI。其中，解密后的明文可以包括SUPI的部分(或全部)内容。
其中，S606中的私钥SK_a，与S600b中的私钥SK_a一致，此处不再赘述。
应理解，图6和图7a中，以终端设备预配置映射关系为例，进行介绍。当然，上述映射关系也可以是终端设备注册到宏网过程中获取的。如图7b所示，S600a不执行，替换为S600c、S611至S614。S600b、S601至S606，仍可以参见图6的介绍，此处不再赘述。其中，S600c、S611至S614的介绍如下：
S600c、宏网中的UDM网元被配置至少一组映射关系。
其中，映射关系可以参见S600a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S611、终端设备向宏网中的AMF网元发送注册请求。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收 来自终端设备的注册请求。
在一些实施例中，注册请求还包括能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备具备接入IOPS网络的能力。
对于宏网中的AMF网元而言，宏网中的AMF网元根据S611的注册请求确定需要执行主认证并触发主认证流程。宏网中的AMF网元执行S612：
S612、宏网中的AMF网元通过宏网中的AUSF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送主认证请求。相应的，宏网中的UDM网元通过宏网中的AUSF网元接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的主认证请求。
也就是说，宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的AUSF网元发送主认证请求，宏网中的AUSF网元进一步向宏网中的UDM网元发送主认证请求。
主认证通过后，宏网中的AUSF网元向宏网中的UDM网元和宏网中的AMF网元分别发送主认证成功指示。
对于宏网中的AMF网元而言，宏网中的AMF网元接收到主认证成功指示之后，执行S613：
S613、宏网中的AMF网元继续后续注册流程，在后续注册流程成功执行后，宏网中的AMF网元确定注册接受消息。
其中，注册流程可参考现有3GPP的相关技术规范，此处不再赘述。
其中，注册接受消息包括至少一组映射关系。映射关系可以参见S600c的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S614、宏网中的AMF网元向终端设备发送注册接受消息。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的注册接受消息。
其中，注册接受包括至少一组映射关系。映射关系可以参见S600c的介绍，此处不再赘述。
如此，对于终端设备而言，即可在与宏网的注册过程中，获取到映射关系。
可选的，AMF网元可以不在注册接受消息中携带映射关系，而使用UE配置更新(UE configuration update)流程中的UE配置更新命令(UE configuration update command)消息携带至少一组映射关系。具体的，宏网中的AMF网元向终端设备发送UE配置更新命令消息，其中，UE配置更新命令消息包括至少一组映射关系。映射关系可以参见S600c的介绍，此处不再赘述，相应的，终端设备接收UE配置更新命令消息，并获取包括至少一组映射关系。
需要说明的是，在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。此种情况下，作为一种可能的实现方式，S603和S604的细化步骤如图7c所示：
S603、终端设备根据S602中来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
示例性的，S603包括S6031c：
S6031c、ME根据S602中来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，S6031c的实现过程，可以参见S6032a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S604、终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
示例性的，S604包括S6041c、S6042c和S6043c：
S6041c、ME向USIM发送请求消息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的请求消息。
其中，请求消息请求用于推演SUCI的信息。
示例性的，ME向USIM发送读取命令，以请求读取EFSUCI_Cale_Info文件中的信息。其中，EFSUCI_Cale_Info文件可以参见3GPP相关协议规范，此处不再赘述。
S6042c、USIM向ME发送响应(response)消息。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的响应消息。
其中，响应消息包括用于推演SUCI的信息，如SUPI、SUPI类型、保护方案1-n，具体可以参见S6032b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S6043c、ME采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，S6043c的实现过程，可以参见S604中的示例性介绍，此处不再赘述。
也就是说，由ME采用公钥PK_a生成SUCI。
在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM。此种情况下，作为另一种可能的实现方式，S603和S604的细化步骤如图7d所示：
S603、终端设备根据S602中来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
示例性的，S603包括S6031d：
S6031d、ME根据S602中来自RAN设备的L-UDM网元a的标识信息，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，S6031d的实现过程，可以参见S6032a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S604、终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
示例性的，S604包括S6041d、S6042d和S6043d：
S6041d、ME向USIM发送公钥PK_a。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的公钥PK_a。
S6042d、USIM采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
S6043d、USIM向ME发送SUCI。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的SUCI。
也就是说，由USIM采用公钥PK_a生成SUCI。
示例性的，图8为本申请实施例提供的密钥管理方法的流程示意图二。该密钥管理方法可以适用于终端设备接入IOPS网络过程中。如图8所示，该密钥管理方法的流程如下：
S800a、宏网中的AMF网元获取自身连接的RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元的标识信息。
其中，RAN设备所附属的IOPS网络，具体是指，运营商部署在RAN设备附近的IOPS网络，这些IOPS网络中所部署的IOPS网络设备可以在设备上电后与RAN设备进行连接。RAN设备根据运营商预配置信息，确定自身附近可连接到IOPS网络的信息，以及这些IOPS网络中UDM网元的信息。因此，宏网中的RAN设备所附属的IOPS网络，也可称作RAN设备可连接的IOPS网络。
需要额外说明的是，宏网中的AMF网元连接的全部或部分RAN设备有附属的IOPS网络，如果AMF网元连接的全部RAN设备没有附属IOPS网络，则AMF网元不能获取该RAN设备所附属的IOPS网络中UDM网元的标识信息，即该RAN设备不具备IOPS功能。
示例性的，以n个L-UDM网元为例，该n个L-UDM网元的信息分别记为L-UDM_1 ID、L-UDM_2 ID、···、L-UDM_n ID。上述n个L-UDM网元是AMF网元连接的RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元。
示例性的，宏网中的AMF网元获取与自身连接的RAN设备所附属IOPS网络，以及该IOPS网络对应的UDM网元的信息。S800a可以是AMF网元和RAN设备上电之后，建立AMF网元和RAN设备之间的连接时获取的信息，也可由网络管理者对AMF网元进行配置，本申请实施例对此不作限定。
S800b、宏网中的UDM网元被配置至少一组映射关系。
其中，映射关系可以参见S600a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，由宏网的网络运营商将S800b中的映射关系注册到宏网的UDM网元中。
S800c、IOPS网络a中的L-UDM网元a被配置私钥SK_a。
其中，私钥SK_a用于解密SUCI的部分或全部内容。
其中，S800c可以参见S600b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于终端设备而言，在某一时刻，终端设备执行S801：
S801、终端设备向宏网中的AMF网元发送注册请求(registration request)。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，注册请求包括终端设备的SUCI和IOPS能力信息，IOPS能力信息指示终端设备是否具备接入IOPS网络的功能。应理解，注册请求为非接入层(non-access stratum，NAS)消息，终端设备将该NAS消息承载在接入层(access stratum，AS)消息中发送给RAN设备，由RAN设备通过回传链路将NAS消息发送给AMF网元。
当宏网中的AMF网元确定终端设备具备IOPS功能和/或终端设备接入的RAN设备具备IOPS功能时，宏网中的AMF网元确定需要宏网中的UDM网元为终端设备配置IOPS网络的公钥信息，以使终端设备基于公钥信息进行IOPS网络的接入流程。其中，终端设备接入的RAN设备是指，宏网中的AMF网元接收注册请求的回传链路对应的RAN设备。
例如，对于宏网中的AMF网元来说，在宏网中的AMF网元通过RAN设备接收来自终端设备的注册请求之后，宏网中的AMF网元获取接入网设备所附属IOPS网络中的L-UDM网元a的标识信息。
示例性的，当不同位置的RAN设备所附属的IOPS网络不同时，宏网中的AMF网元基于终端设备所接入的RAN设备位置信息(例如小区ID)确定IOPS网络，再确定该IOPS网络中UDM网元的标识信息。或者，对于终端设备所接入RAN设备来说，该RAN设备所附属IOPS网络的优先级不同，宏网中的AMF网元也可以基于IOPS网络的优先级，选择优先级满足要求的IOPS网络，再确定该IOPS网络中UDM网元的信息。其中，宏网中的AMF网元可以在S800a中从该RAN设备获取所述优先级关系。
可选的，宏网中的AMF网元根据RAN设备具备IOPS功能，确定需要宏网中的UDM网元为终端设备配置IOPS网络的公钥信息，此种情况下，注册请求中可以不包括IOPS能力信息。
再如，对于宏网中的AMF网元来说，IOPS能力信息能够指示终端设备是否具备接入IOPS网络的能力，宏网中的AMF网元根据注册请求中的IOPS能力信息，确定终端设备是否具备IOPS功能。在终端设备具备IOPS功能的情况下，宏网中的AMF网元获取RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中的L-UDM网元a的标识信息。其中，RAN设备能够为终端设备提供通信服务。
对于宏网中的AMF网元而言，当宏网中的AMF网元确定需要宏网的UDM网元为终端设备配置IOPS网络的公钥信息时，宏网中的AMF网元执行S802：
S802、宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送请求消息。相应的，宏网中的UDM网元接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的请求消息。
其中，请求消息用于请求L-UDM_a ID对应的公钥信息。L-UDM_a ID用于标识一个L-UDM网元，即L-UDM网元a，L-UDM网元a是宏网中的AMF网元连接的RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元，该RAN设备为终端设备提供通信服务。
示例性的，请求消息至少包括L-UDM_a ID。下面，通过三个示例(如下述示例1、示例2和示例3)对请求消息进行介绍：
示例1，请求消息是主认证过程中的消息，如Nausf_UEAA_Req和Nudm_UEAA_Req。其中，Nausf_UEAA_Req是Nausf接口传输的主认证请求，即Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request。Nudm_UEAA_Req是Nudm接口传输的主认证请求，即Nudm_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request。此种情况下，Nausf_UEAA_Req和Nudm_UEAA_Req均包括终端设备的SUCI、IOPS公钥配置指示信息和L-UDM_a ID。其中，IOPS公钥配置指示信息指示宏网的UDM网元为终端设备配置IOPS网络的公钥信息。AMF网元先向AUSF网元发送Nausf_UEAA_Req，再由AUSF网元向宏网的UDM网元发送Nudm_UEAA_Req。
示例2，请求消息是主认证过程之后的消息，如Nudm_SDM_Get Request消息。其中，Nudm_SDM_Get Request消息用于请求获取终端设备的签约信息。此种情况下，Nudm_SDM_Get Request消息包括终端设备的SUPI、IOPS公钥配置指示信息和L-UDM_a ID。其中，IOPS公钥配置指示信息可以参见S802中示例1的介绍，此处不再赘述。宏网中的AMF网元向宏网的UDM网元发送Nudm_SDM_Get Request消息。也就是说，Nudm_SDM_Get Request消息是宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送的消息，不经过AUSF网元。需要说明的是，宏网中的AMF网元在主认证成功后获取到终端设备的SUPI，具体可参考3GPP相关技术规范。
示例3，请求消息是主认证过程之后的一条专用消息。其中，专用消息包括终端设备的SUPI和L-UDM_a ID。可选的，该专用消息可以不包括终端设备的SUPI。容易理解的是，专用消息专用于请求宏网的UDM网元为终端设备配置IOPS网络的公钥信息。此种情况下，专用消息可以不包括IOPS公钥配置指示信息。宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送专用消息。需要说明的是，AMF在主认证成功后获取到终端设备SUPI，具体可参考3GPP相关技术规范。
应理解，宏网中的AMF网元所确定的L-UDM ID可以是一个，也可以是多个。例如，在终端设备所接入RAN设备附属多个IOPS网络的情况下，宏网中的AMF网元所确定的L-UDM ID是多个。再如，在终端设备所接入RAN设备附属一个IOPS网络，且该IOPS网络部署多个L-UDM网元的情况下，宏网中的AMF网元所确定的L-UDM ID是多个。
当宏网中的AMF网元所确定的L-UDM ID是多个时，请求消息包括AMF网元所确定的全部L-UDM ID。
S803、宏网中的UDM网元根据L-UDM_a ID，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，S803中的L-UDM_a ID，与S802中的L-UDM_a ID一致；S803中的映射关系，与S800b中的映射关系一致，此处不再赘述。应理解，在这种情况下，S802中示例3的请求消息可不携带终端设备的SUPI。
可选的，当终端设备具备权限接入IOPS网络时，宏网中的UDM网元根据L-UDM_a ID，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。其中，宏网中的UDM网元根据终端设备的SUCI或SUPI获取终端设备的签约信息，宏网中的UDM网元根据终端设备的签约信息，确定终端设备是否具备权限接入IOPS网络。
需要说明的是，如果S802中的请求消息是AMF网元在主认证过程中发送的消息，则宏网的UDM网元需在主认证成功之后执行S803。例如，宏网的UDM网元需要基于Nudm接口传输的主认证结果确认请求(Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request)消息获取主认证成功的指示。其中，Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request消息可以简记为Nudm_UEAuth_ResConf。
应理解，当请求消息中包括多个L-UDM ID时，S803中宏网的UDM网元所确定的公钥数量也是多个。具体的，当宏网中的AMF网元所确定的L-UDM ID是多个时，宏网中的UDM网元根据多个L-UDM ID，以及至少一组映射关系，确定该多个L-UDM ID每个L-UDM ID对应的公钥信息。
S804a、宏网中的UDM网元向宏网中的AMF网元发送响应消息1。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收来自宏网中的UDM网元的响应消息1。
S804b、宏网中的AMF网元向终端设备发送响应消息2。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的响应消息2。
其中，响应消息1和响应消息2至少包括公钥PK_a。S804a和S804b中的公钥PK_a，与S803中的公钥PK_a一致，此处不再赘述。响应消息1和响应消息2，也可以有其他名称，如响应消息1和响应消息2用于响应S802中示例1消息，则响应消息1和响应消息2的名称可以为IOPS公钥配置消息；如响应消息1和响应消息2用于响应S802中示例2消息，则响应消息1和响应消息2的名称可为Nudm_SDM_Get Response消息；如响应消息1和响应消息2用于响应S802中示例3消息，则响应消息1和响应消息2的名称可为该专用消息的回复消息，本申请实施例对响应消息的名称不作限定。
需要说明的是，如果响应消息1和响应消息2用于响应S802中示例1中消息，则该响应消息1和响应消息2可以为专用消息，此时响应消息1除公钥PK_a外，还需携带终端设备的SUPI，该SUPI是宏网中的UDM网元基于S802中的终端设备的SUCI确定的。
应理解，当S803中宏网中的UDM网元所确定公钥数量是多个时，响应消息1和响应消息2包括均包括：多个公钥，以及多个公钥中每个公钥对应的L-UDM ID。
S805、在RAN设备与宏网中的核心网设备之间的连接中断的情况下，RAN设备广播IOPS网络a的标识。
对于RAN设备而言，由于每个IOPS网络使用一个PLMN ID，相应的，IOPS网络a的标识可以是该IOPS网络a所使用的PLMN ID。RAN设备广播该IOPS网络a的PLMN ID。
应理解，当S804a中响应消息1(或S804b中响应消息2)包括多个公钥以及多个公钥中每个公钥对应的L-UDM ID时，RAN设备还广播L-UDM ID，具体可以参考S602中描述，此处不再赘述。
对于处于S805的广播消息覆盖范围内的终端设备而言，终端设备接收IOPS网络a的标识，之后，终端设备即可确定自身需要接入IOPS网络a。其中，终端设备确定自身需要接入IOPS网络，具体可以参见图6的介绍，此处不再赘述。终端设备确定自身需要接入IOPS网 络a的情况下，终端设备执行如下步骤：
S806、终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，在S806中，终端设备采用公钥对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI，具体可以参考S604的介绍，此处不再赘述。
其中，S806中的公钥PK_a，与S804中的公钥PK_a一致，此处不再赘述。
应理解，当S805中具备IOPS功能的RAN设备还广播L-UDM ID时，终端设备根据S805接收到的L-UDM ID，以及S804b中响应消息2所包括的信息(即响应消息2包括多个公钥，以及多个公钥中每个公钥对应的L-UDM ID)，确定对应的PK_a。示例性的，S805中的L-UDM ID记为L-UDM_a ID，响应消息2包括PK_1、与PK_1对应的L-UDM_1 ID、PK_2、与PK_2对应的L-UDM_2 ID。当L-UDM_a ID为L-UDM_1 ID时，公钥PK_a为PK_1。当L-UDM_a ID为L-UDM_2 ID时，公钥PK_a为PK_2。
在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM，如图5所示。此种情况下，公钥PK_a是ME接收到的信息。ME确定SUCI可以由USIM生成，也可以由ME生成。下面，通过示例1和示例2对S806进行介绍：
示例1，当SUCI由USIM生成时，如图9所示，S806包括S8061a、S8062a和S8063a：
S8061a、ME向USIM发送公钥PK_a。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的公钥PK_a。
其中，S8061a中的公钥PK_a，与S804b中的公钥PK_a一致，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，ME通过获取身份命令(GET IDENTITY command)向USIM发送公钥PK_a。其中，GET IDENTITY命令中数据(Data)字段携带公钥PK_a。
S8062a、USIM采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，在S8062a中，USIM采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI，具体描述可以参考S604a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S8063a、USIM向ME发送SUCI。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的SUCI。
其中，S8063a中的SUCI，与S8062a中的SUCI一致，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，USIM通过获取身份响应(GET IDENTITY response)向ME发送SUCI。
示例2，当SUCI由ME生成时，如图9所示，S806包括S8061b、S8062b和S8063b：
S8061b、ME向USIM发送请求消息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的请求消息。
其中，请求消息请求用于推演SUCI的信息。
示例性的，S8061b的实现过程，可以参见S6031b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S8062b、USIM向ME发送响应(response)消息。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的响应消息。
其中，响应消息包括用于推演SUCI的信息，如SUPI、SUPI类型、保护方案1-n。示例性的，S8062b的实现过程，可以参见S6032b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S8063b、ME采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，ME采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI，具体描述可以参考S604b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
应理解，当响应消息2包括多个公钥时，终端设备根据待接入IOPS网络的L-UDM ID来确定相应的公钥，采用与IOPS网络a对应的公钥来对SUPI进行保护，以保证不同L-UDM部署情况下的密钥分离要求。
对于终端设备而言，终端设备确定SUCI之后，执行S807：
S807、终端设备向IOPS网络a发送注册请求。相应的，IOPS网络a接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，S807的实现过程，可以参见S605的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于L-UDM网元a而言，L-UDM网元a接收SUCI之后，执行S808：
S808、L-UDM网元a根据私钥SK_a和SUCI获取SUPI，再根据注册请求继续后续注册流程，具体注册流程可参考3GPP相关协议规范。
其中，S808中的私钥SK_a，与S800c中的私钥SK_a一致，S808的实现过程，可以参见S606的介绍，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，图10为本申请实施例提供的密钥管理方法的流程示意图三。该密钥管理方法可以适用于终端设备接入IOPS网络过程中。如图10所示，该密钥管理方法的流程如下：
S1000a、宏网中的AMF网元获取自身连接的RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元的信息。
其中，S1000a的实现过程，可以参见S800a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1000b、宏网中的UDM网元被配置至少一组映射关系。
其中，S1000b的实现过程，可以参见S800b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1000c、IOPS网络a中的L-UDM网元a被配置私钥SK_a。
其中，私钥SK_a用于解密SUCI的部分或全部内容。
其中，S1000c的实现过程，可以参见S800c的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于终端设备而言，在某一时刻，终端设备执行S1001：
S1001、终端设备向宏网中的AMF网元发送注册请求(registration request)。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，注册请求包括SUCI。相比于S801中的注册请求而言，S1001中的注册请求不包括IOPS能力信息。
应理解，在终端设备向宏网中的AMF网元发送注册请求之后，终端设备、宏网中的AMF网元、宏网中的AUSF网元和宏网的UDM网元执行主认证过程。其中，主认证过程的介绍如下：宏网中的AMF网元根据注册请求触发主认证过程，向宏网中的AUSF网元发送主认证请求，之后，宏网中的AUSF网元请求宏网中的UDM网元对终端设备的SUCI的部分(或全部)内容进行解密获取终端设备的SUPI。宏网中的UDM网元对SUCI的部分(或全部)内容解密之后，获取SUPI，基于SUPI继续执行后续主认证过程。主认证的具体过程可以参见相关技术，此处不再赘述。在主认证成功的情况下，宏网中的AUSF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送主认证结果确认请求(Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request)以指示主认证成功。在主认证成功之后，对于宏网中的UDM网元来说，宏网中的UDM网元执行S1002：
S1002、宏网中的UDM网元根据终端设备的签约信息，确定是否向终端设备提供公钥信息。
其中，宏网中的UDM网元预先存储终端设备的签约信息。签约信息指示终端设备是否具备权限接入IOPS网络。当宏网中的UDM网元根据签约信息，确定终端设备具备权限接入IOPS网络，则需要向终端设备提供公钥信息。反之，当宏网中的UDM网元根据签约信息， 确定终端设备不具备权限接入IOPS网络，则无需向终端设备提供公钥信息。
在一些实施例中，S1002包括：
当满足预设条件时，宏网中的UDM网元根据终端设备的签约信息，确定是否向终端设备提供公钥信息。
其中，预设条件包括以下至少一项：
预设条件1，宏网中的UDM网元接收指示信息。其中，指示信息指示终端设备的主认证成功。示例性的，指示信息可以包括上述Nudm_UEAuthentication_Result Confirmation Request消息。
预设条件2，宏网中的UDM网元接收签约信息请求。其中，签约信息请求用于请求终端很的签约信息。示例性的，签约信息请求可以包括Nudm_SDM_Get Request或Nudm_SDM_Subscribe Request消息。应理解，签约信息请求是在终端设备的主认证成功之后传输的消息。
预设条件3，宏网中的UDM网元接收来自AMF网元的消息，该消息是不同于预设条件1和预设条件2以外的其他消息，且在宏网中的AMF网元与宏网中的UDM网元之间传输，例如Nudm_UDCM_Resigtration Request、Nudm_UDCM_Update Request或Nudm_SDM_Info Request消息。
应理解，当宏网中的UDM网元确定满足预设条件时，意味着，终端设备是合法的用户，此种情况下，宏网中的UDM网元向终端设备提供公钥信息，以降低公钥信息泄露的可能性。
当宏网中的UDM网元确定向终端设备提供公钥信息时，宏网中的UDM网元执行S1003：
S1003、宏网中的UDM网元向宏网中的AMF网元发送网络标识信息请求。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收来自宏网的UDM网元的网络标识信息请求。
其中，网络标识信息请求用于请求IOPS网络中L-UDM网元的信息。示例性的，网络标识信息请求包括终端设备的SUPI。网络标识信息请求中的SUPI是宏网的UDM网元在主认证过程中确定的。
具体的，网络标识信息请求中携带终端设备的SUPI，以使宏网中的AMF网元根据该SUPI确定终端设备和该终端设备接入的RAN。
S1004、当终端设备所接入的RAN设备具备IOPS功能时，宏网中的AMF网元确定该RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元的标识信息为L-UDM_a ID。
具体的，终端设备接入的RAN设备为AMF接收注册请求的回传链路对应的RAN设备，AMF根据S800a的介绍确定RAN设备具备IOPS功能。
应理解，在本申请实施例中，以RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM网元记为L-UDM网元a为例，进行介绍。L-UDM网元a是n个L-UDM网元(即L-UDM网元1至L-UDM网元n)中的一个网元。
S1005、宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送网络标识信息回复。相应的，宏网中的UDM网元接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的网络标识信息回复。
其中，网络标识信息回复包括L-UDM_a ID。
需要说明的是，当终端设备所接入的RAN设备不具备IOPS功能时，则宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送第一消息。其中，第一消息指示终止公钥信息获取流程。或者，第一消息指示宏网中的UDM网元无需向终端设备提供公钥信息。
对于宏网中的UDM网元而言，在接收到L-UDM_a ID之后，执行S1006：
S1006、宏网中的UDM网元根据L-UDM_a ID，以及至少一组映射关系，确定公钥PK_a。
其中，S1006中的映射关系，与S1000b中的映射关系一致。S1006的实现过程，可以参见S6033b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1007a、宏网中的UDM网元向宏网中的AMF网元发送响应消息1。相应的，宏网中的AMF网元接收来自宏网的UDM网元的响应消息1。
其中，S1007a的实现过程，可以参见S804a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1007b、宏网中的AMF网元向终端设备发送响应消息2。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的响应消息2。
其中，S1007b的实现过程，可以参见S804b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1008、在RAN设备与宏网的核心网网元之间的连接中断的情况下，RAN设备广播IOPS网络a的标识。
其中，S1008的实现过程，可以参见S805的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于处于S1008的广播消息覆盖范围内的终端设备而言，终端设备接收IOPS网络a的标识，之后，终端设备即可确定自身需要接入IOPS网络a，具体可以参见图6的介绍，此处不再赘述。终端设备确定自身需要接入IOPS网络a的情况下，终端设备执行如下步骤：
S1009、终端设备采用公钥PK_a对SUPI进行保护，以得到SUCI。
其中，S1009的实现过程，可以参见S806的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1010、终端设备向IOPS网络a发送注册请求。相应的，IOPS网络a接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，S1010的实现过程，可以参见S605的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于L-UDM网元a而言，L-UDM网元a接收SUCI之后，执行S1011：
S1011、L-UDM网元a根据私钥SK_a和SUCI获取SUPI，再根据注册请求继续后续注册流程，具体注册流程可参考3GPP相关协议规范。
其中，S1011中的私钥SK_a，与S1000c中的私钥SK_a一致，S1011的实现过程，可以参见S606的介绍，此处不再赘述。
需要说明的是，对于宏网中的UDM网元来说，还可以通过S1020和S1021获取L-UDM_a ID。相比于图10所示的密钥管理方法，在图11所示的密钥管理方法中，S1003、S1004和S1005无需执行，而S1020和S1021被执行，如图11中粗体文字所示。其中，S1020和S1021的介绍如下：
对于宏网中的AMF网元来说，宏网中的AMF网元执行S1000a之后，执行S1020：
S1020、宏网中的AMF网元向宏网中的UDM网元发送第一信息。相应的，宏网中的UDM网元接收来自宏网中的AMF网元的第一信息。
其中，第一信息至少包括RAN设备所附属IOPS网络中UDM的标识信息。第一信息所涉及的RAN设备与AMF网元连接。也就是说，第一信息至少包括S1000a中的信息。
示例性的，宏网中的AMF网元和宏网中的UDM网元可以在设备上电时建立连接，在连接建立的过程中，执行S1020，以使宏网的UDM网元获知S1000a中的信息。
对于宏网中的UDM网元来说，在S1002之后，确定向终端设备提供公钥信息的情况下， 宏网中的UDM网元不执行S1003和S1005(如图10所示)，而执行S1021：
S1021、宏网中的UDM网元根据第一信息，确定L-UDM_a ID。
示例性的，当第一信息中包括一个L-UDM ID时，第一信息中的L-UDM ID，即为L-UDM_a ID。当第一信息中包括多个L-UDM ID时，宏网中的UDM网元从多个L-UDM ID中选择一个L-UDM ID，作为L-UDM_a ID。作为一种可能的实现方式，当第一信息包括多个L-UDM ID和小区ID时，宏网中的UDM网元可以根据小区ID，从该AMF网元连接的RAN设备所附属的IOPS网络中，选择一个IOPS网络，再基于被选择的IOPS网络，确定该IOPS网络中UDM网元的信息。
应理解，图11中S1006至S1011的介绍，可以参见图10中S1006至S1011的介绍，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，图12为本申请实施例提供的密钥管理方法的流程示意图四。该密钥管理方法可以适用于终端设备接入IOPS网络过程中。如图12所示，该密钥管理方法的流程如下：
S1201、RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间建立回传链路。
其中，S1201中的回传链路是指，具备IOPS功能的RAN设备与IOPS网络的核心网设备之间的通信链路，可以参见S601的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1202、在RAN设备与宏网的核心网设备之间的连接中断的情况下，RAN设备广播IOPS网络a的标识信息。
对于处于S1202的广播消息覆盖范围内的终端设备而言，终端设备接收来自RAN设备的IOPS网络a的标识信息，并确定需要接入IOPS网络a，具体可以参见图6的介绍，此处不再赘述。终端设备确定自身需要接入IOPS网络a的情况下，终端设备执行如下步骤：
S1203、终端设备采用空算法对SUPI的部分或全部内容进行处理，以得到SUCI。
示例性的，终端设备使用空算法和默认的加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。其中，默认的加密密钥为空密钥，例如，默认的加密密钥可以使用全为零的比特位全来表征。例如，以默认的加密密钥长度是8比特(bits)为例，默认的加密密钥是00000000。隐藏用户身份标识还包括加密密钥的标识符(Key ID)。其中，加密密钥的标识符用于标识加密密钥，如取值是0-255中的一个数字。在本申请实施例中，该加密密钥的标识符的取值为零，以标识空密钥。也就是说，终端设备采用空算法进行处理时，空算法的输入内容与输出内容相同。其中，空算法可以记为NULL-scheme。
在一些实施例中，终端设备包括ME和USIM，如图5所示。此种情况下，SUCI可以由USIM生成，也可以由ME生成。下面，通过示例1和示例2对S1203进行介绍：
示例1，当SUCI由USIM生成时，如图13所示，S1203包括S12031a、S12032a和S12033a：
S12031a、ME向USIM发送指示信息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的指示信息。
其中，指示信息指示采用空算法生成SUCI。
示例性的，ME通过获取身份命令(GET IDENTITY command)向USIM发送指示信息。其中，GET IDENTITY命令中数据(Data)字段携带指示信息。该指示信息可以为“IOPS”或“NULL-scheme”。
S12032a、USIM采用空算法对SUPI的部分或全部内容进行处理，以得到SUCI。
S12033a、USIM向ME发送SUCI。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的SUCI。
其中，S12033a中的SUCI，与S12032a中的SUCI一致，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，USIM通过获取身份响应(GET IDENTITY response)向ME发送SUCI。
示例2，当SUCI由ME生成时，如图13所示，S1203包括S12031b、S12032b和S12033b：
S12031b、ME向USIM发送请求消息。相应的，USIM接收来自ME的请求消息。
其中，请求消息请求用于推演SUCI的信息。
示例性的，S12031b的实现过程，可以参见S6031b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S12032b、USIM向ME发送响应(response)消息。相应的，ME接收来自USIM的响应消息。
其中，响应消息包括用于推演SUCI的信息，如SUPI、SUPI类型、保护方案1-n。示例性的，S12032b的实现过程，可以参见S6032b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S12033b、ME采用空算法对SUPI的部分或全部内容进行处理，以得到SUCI。
对于终端设备而言，终端设备确定SUCI之后，执行S1204：
S1204、终端设备向IOPS网络a发送注册请求。相应的，IOPS网络a接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，S1204的实现过程，可以参见S605的介绍，此处不再赘述。
对于L-UDM网元a而言，L-UDM网元a接收SUCI之后，执行S1205：
S1205、L-UDM网元a根据SUCI确定SUPI。
示例性的，L-UDM网元a将接收到的用户身份信息，即SUCI，作为SUPI。或者，L-UDM网元a采用空算法对SUCI的部分或全部内容进行处理，以得到SUPI。应理解，在S1203中，当终端设备采用空算法对SUPI的部分内容进行处理时，S1205中，L-UDM网元a采用空算法对SUCI的部分内容进行处理。在S1203中，当终端设备采用空算法对SUPI的全部内容进行处理时，S1205中，L-UDM网元a采用空算法对SUCI的全部内容进行处理。
对于L-UDM网元a来说，L-UDM网元a获取到SUPI之后，继续执行注册过程。
需要说明的是，在本申请实施例中，当公钥PK_a用于加密SUPI的部分内容时，相应的，私钥SK_a解密SUCI的部分内容。当公钥PK_a用于加密SUPI的全部内容时，相应的，私钥SK_a解密SUCI的全部内容。
在本申请实施例中，图6和图12所示的密钥管理方法，可以适用于图2的场景，也可以适用于图3的场景。图8、图10和图11所示的密钥管理方法，可以适用于图3的场景。
图14示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b所示的网络架构中，具体实现图6所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1401、终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。
示例性的，当图14所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，本地网络是IOPS网络a，第一解密网元是IOPS网络a中的L-UDM网元a，第一解密网元的标识信息是L-UDM_a ID。S1401的具体实现过程可以参见S602的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1401包括：终端设备接收广播消息，其中，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1401包括：终端设备接收来自接入网设备的本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，第一标识用于标识本地网络中的一个解密网元。终端设备根据本地网络的 标识和第一标识，确定第一解密网元的标识信息，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，响应于广播消息，终端设备执行S1402、S1403和S1404，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，本地网络的标识为本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1402、终端设备根据标识信息以及映射关系，获取与第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥。
其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。
示例性的，当图14所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，第一加密密钥是PK_a。S1402的具体实现过程可以参见S603的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
其中，映射关系是预配置的，详见图7a的介绍，此处不再赘述。
其中，映射关系也可以是终端设备从宏网获取的。例如，终端设备通过接入网设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的映射关系，详见图7b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于注册接受消息，详见图7b中S614的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，映射关系承载于用户设备配置更新命令消息，详见图7b的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1403、终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图14所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，用户身份信息是SUPI中的一部分，隐藏用户身份标识是SUCI。S1403的具体实现过程可以参见S604的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1404、终端设备通过接入网设备向本地网络发送注册请求。相应的，本地网络通过接入网设备接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图14所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，S1404的具体实现过程可以参见S605的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备还向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息，其中，能力信息指示终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力，以使宏网中的核心网网元获知终端设备的能力。例如，注册请求中还包括能力信息，详见S611的介绍，此处不再赘述。
图15示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b所示的网络架构中，具体实现图6所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1501、在接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路的过程中，接入网设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。
示例性的，当图15所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，本地网络是IOPS网络a，第一解密网元是IOPS网络a中的L-UDM网元a，第一解密网元的标识信息是L-UDM_a ID。S1501的具体实现过程可以参见S601的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：在接入网设备与宏网中的核心网网元之间的连接断开的情况下，接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路，详见S601的介绍，此处不再赘述。
示例性的，在回传链路包括IPsec链接的情况下，接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立IPsec链接。接入网设备通过IKE_SA_INIT消息或IKE_AUTH消息接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息，以使接入网设备在IPsec链接建立过程中获取到第一解密网元的标识信息。
示例性的，在回传链路包括DTLS链接的情况下，接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立DTLS链接。接入网设备通过握手报文接收来自本地网络中的核心网网元的第一解密网元的标识信息，以使接入网设备在DTLS链接建立过程中获取到第一解密网元的标识信息。
S1502、接入网设备发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
示例性的，当图15所示的方法具体用于图6所示的方法时，S1502的具体实现过程可以参见S602的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1502包括：接入网设备发送广播消息。其中，广播消息包括第一解密网元的标识信息以及本地网络的标识，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1502包括：接入网设备发送本地网络的标识和第一标识。其中，本地网络的标识和第一标识用于确定第一解密网元的标识信息，详见S602的介绍，此处不再赘述。
图16示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b所示的网络架构中，具体实现图8或图10所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1601、宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。
其中，第一加密密钥与第一本地网络存在对应关系。
示例性的，当图16所示的方法具体用于图8或图10所示的方法时，宏网中的第二解密网元是宏网中的UDM网元，第一加密密钥是PK_a。S1501的具体实现过程可以参见S804b或S1007b的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1602、在终端设备接收第一本地网络的标识的情况下，终端设备使用第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图16所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，第一本地网络是IOPS网络a，用户身份信息是SUPI中的一部分，隐藏用户身份标识是SUCI。S1602的具体实现过程可以参见S806或S1009的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1603、终端设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。相应的，第一本地网络接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图16所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，S1603的具体实现过程可以参见S807或S1010的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：终端设备向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力，以使宏网中的核心网网元获知终端设备的能力。例如，注册请求中还包括能力信息，详见S807或S1010的介绍，此处不再赘述。
图17示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b 所示的网络架构中，具体实现图8或图10所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1701、宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。相应的，宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一解密网元的标识信息。
其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。
示例性的，当图17所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元可以是宏网中的AMF网元，宏网中的第二解密网元可以是宏网中的UDM网元，第一本地网络是IOPS网络a，第一解密网元是L-UDM网元a，第一解密网元的标识信息是L-UDM_a ID。S1701的具体实现过程可以参见S802或S1005的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元获取接入网设备所附属本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元传输终端设备的注册请求，详见S802或S1005的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：在宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定接入网设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定第一本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务，详见图8中S801和S802的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自终端设备的能力信息。其中，能力信息指示终端设备接入本地网络的能力。在接入和移动性管理网元确定终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定第一本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，详见图8中S801和S802的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1701包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元通过签约信息请求向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，详见S802的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向宏网中的第二解密网元发送指示信息。其中，指示信息指示宏网中的第二解密网元为终端设备提供加密密钥，详见S802的介绍，此处不再赘述。例如，签约信息请求包括指示信息。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的请求消息。其中，请求消息用于请求第一解密网元的标识信息。S1701包括：宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元根据请求消息，向宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，详见S1003和S1004的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1702、宏网中的第二解密网元向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送第一加密密钥。相应的，宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。
其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元相关联。
示例性的，当图17所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，第一加密密钥是PK_a。S1702的具体实现过程可以参见S804a或S1007a的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1703、宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一加密密钥。
示例性的，当图17所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，S1703的具体实现过程可以参见S804b或S1007b的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
图18示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b所示的网络架构中，具体实现图8或图10所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1801、宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息。
其中，第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元。
示例性的，当图18所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，宏网中的第二解密网元可以是宏网中的UDM网元，第一本地网络是IOPS网络a，第一解密网元是L-UDM网元a，第一解密网元的标识信息是L-UDM_a ID。S1801的具体实现过程可以参见S802或S1005或S1021的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，S1801包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一解密网元的标识信息，参见S802或S1005或S1021的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一信息。其中，第一信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络。宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从第一信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务，详见图11的介绍，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从预配置信息中获取第一解密网元的标识信息。其中，预配置信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，至少一个本地网络包括第一本地网络，第一接入网设备用于为终端设备提供通信服务，详见图11的介绍，此处不再赘述。
S1802、宏网中的第二解密网元根据第一解密网元的标识信息和映射关系，确定第一加密密钥。
其中，映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且至少一个解密网元包括第一解密网元。
示例性的，当图18所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，第一加密密钥是PK_a。S1802的具体实现过程可以参见S803或S1006的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1803、宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。相应的，终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥。
其中，第一加密密钥与第一解密网元对应。
示例性的，当图18所示的方法具体用于图8或10所示的方法时，S1803的具体实现过程可以参见S804a、S804b的相关描述，或者，S1803的具体实现过程可以参见S1007a、S1007b的相关描述此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，该方法还包括：宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的指示信息。其中，指示信息指示宏网中的第二解密网元为终端设备提供加密密钥，详见S802的介绍，此处不再赘述。宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥，包括：宏网中的第二解密网元根据指示信息，向终端设备发送第一加密密钥。
图19示出了本申请实施例提供的又一种密钥管理方法。该方法可以应用于图1a和图1b 所示的网络架构中，具体实现图13所对应的密钥管理方法。
S1901、终端设备在需要接入第一本地网络的情况下，终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图19所示的方法具体用于图13所示的方法时，第一本地网络是IOPS网络a，用户身份信息是SUPI中的一部分，隐藏用户身份标识是SUCI。S1901的具体实现过程可以参见S1203的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：终端设备使用空算法和默认的加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识。其中，隐藏用户身份标识还包括默认的加密密钥的标识符，且标识符的取值为0。默认的加密密钥为空密钥，例如，默认的加密密钥可以使用全为零的比特位全来表征，参见S1203的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
S1902、终端设备通过接入网设备向第一本地网络发送注册请求。相应的，第一本地网络接收来自终端设备的注册请求。
其中，注册请求包括隐藏用户身份标识。
示例性的，当图19所示的方法具体用于图13所示的方法时，S1902的具体实现过程可以参见S1204的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
上述主要从各个网元之间交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的方案进行了介绍。相应的，本申请实施例还提供了通信装置，该通信装置可以为上述方法实施例中的网元，或者包含上述网元的装置，或者为可用于网元的部件。可以理解的是，该通信装置为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的模块及算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
示例性的，图20示出了一种通信装置2000的结构示意图。该通信装置2000包括处理模块2001和收发模块2002。
一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为终端设备为例，处理模块2001用于支持终端设备执行图14中的S1401、S1402和S1403，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持终端执行图14中的S1404，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他收发操作。
再一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为接入网设备为例，处理模块2001用于支持接入网设备执行图15中的S1501，和/或本申请实施例中接入网设备设备需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持接入网设备执行图15中的S1502，和/或本申请实施例中接入网设备需要执行的其他发送操作。
又一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为终端设备为例，处理模块2001用于支持终端设备执行图16中的S1602，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持终端执行图16中的S1601、S1603，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他收发操作。
又一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元为例，处理模 块2001用于支持宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元执行图17中的S1701、S1702、S1703，和/或本申请实施例中宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元需要执行的其他收发操作。
又一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为宏网中的第二解密网元为例，处理模块2001用于支持宏网中的第二解密网元执行图18中的S1801、S1802，和/或本申请实施例中宏网中的第二解密网元需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持宏网中的第二解密网元执行图18中的S1803，和/或本申请实施例中宏网中的第二解密网元需要执行的其他收发操作。
又一种可能的示例中，以通信装置2000为终端设备为例，处理模块2001用于支持终端设备执行图19中的S1901，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他处理操作。收发模块2002用于支持终端执行图19中的S1902，和/或本申请实施例中终端设备需要执行的其他收发操作。
可选的，该通信装置2000还可以包括存储模块2003，用于存储通信装置的程序代码和数据，数据可以包括不限于原始数据或者中间数据等。
其中，处理模块2001可以是处理器或控制器，例如可以是CPU，通用处理器，专用集成电路(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，现场可编程逻辑门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、晶体管逻辑器件、硬件部件或者其任意组合。其可以实现或执行结合本申请公开内容所描述的各种示例性的逻辑方框，模块和电路。处理器也可以是实现计算功能的组合，例如包含一个或多个微处理器组合，DSP和微处理器的组合等等。
收发模块2002可以是通信接口、发送器或发送电路、接收器或接收电路等，其中，该通信接口是统称，在具体实现中，该通信接口可以包括多个接口。
存储模块2003可以是存储器。
当处理模块2001为处理器，收发模块2002为通信接口，存储模块2003为存储器时，本申请实施例所涉及的通信装置可以为图21所示。
参阅图21所示，该通信装置2100包括：处理器2101、通信接口2102、存储器2103。可选的，通信装置还可以包括总线2104。其中，通信接口2102、处理器2101以及存储器2103可以通过总线2104相互连接；总线2104可以是外设部件互连标准(peripheral component interconnect，PCI)总线或扩展工业标准结构(extended industry standard architecture，EISA)总线等。所述总线2104可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图21中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。
可选的，本申请实施例还提供一种携带计算机指令的计算机程序产品，当该计算机指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述实施例所介绍的方法。
可选的，本申请实施例还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储计算机指令，当该计算机指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述实施例所介绍的方法。
可选的，本申请实施例还提供一种芯片，包括：处理电路和收发电路，处理电路和收发电路用于实现上述实施例所介绍的方法。其中，处理电路用于执行相应方法中的处理动作，收发电路用于执行相应方法中的接收/发送的动作。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包 括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包括一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，数字视频光盘(digital video disc，DVD))、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘(solid state drive，SSD))等。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统，装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述模块的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个模块或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或模块的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个设备上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
通过以上的实施方式的描述，所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到本申请可借助软件加必需的通用硬件的方式来实现，当然也可以通过硬件，但很多情况下前者是更佳的实施方式。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在可读取的存储介质中，如计算机的软盘，硬盘或光盘等，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述的方法。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，在本申请揭露的技术范围内的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (51)

  1. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述终端设备根据所述标识信息以及映射关系，获取与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；其中，所述映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及所述至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且所述至少一个解密网元包括所述第一解密网元；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述本地网络发送注册请求，其中，所述注册请求包括所述隐藏用户身份标识。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述终端设备接收广播消息，其中，所述广播消息包括所述第一解密网元的标识信息以及所述本地网络的标识。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自所述接入网设备的所述本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，所述第一标识用于标识所述本地网络中的一个解密网元；
    所述终端设备根据所述本地网络的标识和所述第一标识，确定所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述本地网络的标识为所述本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
  5. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM，所述USIM预配置所述映射关系；
    所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述ME获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述终端设备根据所述标识信息以及映射关系，获取与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送所述标识信息；
    所述USIM根据所述标识信息和所述映射关系，确定与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述USIM使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识，并将所述隐藏用户身份标识发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  6. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括ME和USIM，所述USIM预配置所述映射关系；
    所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述ME获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述终端设备根据所述标识信息以及映射关系，获取与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送第一请求；
    所述USIM响应于所述第一请求，将所述映射关系和所述用户身份信息发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述映射关系和所述用户身份信息；
    所述ME根据所述标识信息和所述映射关系，确定与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  7. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备通过所述接入网设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的所述映射关系。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述映射关系承载于注册接受消息；或者，
    所述映射关系承载于用户设备配置更新命令消息。
  9. 根据权利要求7或8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括ME和USIM；
    所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述ME获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述终端设备通过所述接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的所述映射关系，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备接收来自所述宏网的第二解密网元的所述映射关系；
    所述终端设备根据所述标识信息以及映射关系，获取与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME根据所述标识信息和所述映射关系，确定与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送第二请求；
    所述USIM响应于所述第二请求，将所述用户身份信息发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述用户身份信息；
    所述ME使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  10. 根据权利要求7或8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括ME和USIM；
    所述终端设备获取本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述ME获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述终端设备通过所述接入网设备接收来自宏网的第二解密网元的所述映射关系，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备接收来自所述宏网的第二解密网元的所述映射关系；
    所述终端设备根据所述标识信息以及映射关系，获取与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME根据所述标识信息和所述映射关系，确定与所述第一解密网元对应的第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送第一加密密钥；
    所述USIM接收来自所述ME的所述第一加密密钥；
    所述USIM使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识，并将所述隐藏用户身份标识发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  11. 根据权利要求7-10任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备向所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息，其中，所述能力信息指示所述终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力。
  12. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    在接入网设备与本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路的过程中，所述接入网设备获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述接入网设备发送所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述接入网设备发送所述第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述接入网设备发送广播消息，其中，所述广播消息包括所述第一解密网元的标识信息以及所述本地网络的标识。
  14. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述接入网设备发送所述第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述接入网设备发送所述本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，所述本地网络的标识和所述第一标识用于确定所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  15. 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法，其特征在于，所述本地网络的标识为所述本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
  16. 根据权利要求12-15任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在所述接入网设备与宏网中的核心网网元之间的连接断开的情况下，所述接入网设备与所述本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立回传链路。
  17. 根据权利要求12-16任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述接入网设备与所述本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立因特网协议安全IPsec链接，其中，所述回传链路包括所述IPsec链接；
    所述接入网设备获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述接入网设备通过因特网密钥交换协议安全联盟初始协商IKE_SA_INIT消息或因特网密钥交换协议认证IKE_AUTH消息接收来自所述本地网络中的核心网网元的所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  18. 根据权利要求12-16任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述接入网设备与所述本地网络中的核心网网元之间建立数据报传输层安全DTLS链接，其中，所述回传链路包括所述DTLS链接；
    所述接入网设备获取所述本地网络中的第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述接入网设备通过握手报文接收来自所述本地网络中的核心网网元的所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  19. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端设备在需要接入第一本地网络的情况下，所述终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，其中，所述注册请求包括所述隐藏用户身份标识。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述终端设备使用空算法和默认的加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识，其中，所述隐藏用户身份标识还包括所述默认的加密密钥的标识符，且所述标识符的取值为0。
  21. 根据权利要求19或20所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自所述接入网设备的所述第一本地网络的标识；
    响应于所述第一本地网络的标识，所述终端设备确定需要接入所述第一本地网络。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的方法，其特征在于，所述响应于所述第一本地网络的标识，所述终端设备确定需要接入所述第一本地网络，包括：
    在满足预设条件的情况下，响应于所述第一本地网络的标识，所述终端设备确定需要接入所述第一本地网络；其中，所述预设条件包括以下至少一项：
    所述终端设备预配置第一信息，其中，所述第一信息指示所述终端设备接收到本地网络的标识后接入本地网络；或
    所述终端设备未搜索到第二网络，所述第二网络是除所述第一本地网络之外的网络。
  23. 根据权利要求19-22任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM；
    所述终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送指示信息；
    所述USIM响应于所述指示信息，采用空算法加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识，并将所述隐藏用户身份标识发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述第一本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  24. 根据权利要求19-22任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括ME和USIM；
    所述终端设备使用空算法加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送第一请求；
    所述USIM响应于所述第一请求，将所述用户身份信息发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述用户身份信息；
    所述ME使用空算法加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备通过接入网设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME通过所述接入网设备向所述第一本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  25. 根据权利要求19-24任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一本地网络的标识为所述第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
  26. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，其中，所述第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元；
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元根据所述第一解密网元的标识信息和映射关系，确定第一加密密钥；其中，所述映射关系记录有至少一个解密网元以及所述至少一个解密网元中每个解密网元对应的加密密钥，且所述至少一个解密网元包括所述第一解密网元；
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥，其中，所述第一加密密钥与所述第一解密网元对应。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的方法，其特征在于，所述宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的指示信息，其中，所述指示信息指示所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元为所述终端设备提供加密密钥；
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元向终端设备发送第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元根据所述指示信息，向所述终端设备发送所述第一加密密钥。
  29. 根据权利要求27所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元根据所述终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，确定向所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送请求消息，其中，所述请求消息用于请求所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  30. 根据权利要求26所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元接收来自所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元的第一信息，其中，所述第一信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，所述至少一个本地网络包括所述第一本地网络；
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元根据所述终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网设备的信息，从所述第一信息中获取所述第一解密网元的标识信息；其中，所述第一接入网设备用于为所述终端设备提供通信服务。
  31. 根据权利要求26所述的方法，其特征在于，所述宏网中的第二解密网元获取第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述宏网中的第二解密网元根据所述终端设备的本地网络的签约信息，以及第一接入网 设备的信息，从预配置信息中获取所述第一解密网元的标识信息；
    其中，所述预配置信息包括至少一个本地网络中每个本地网络所对应解密网元的标识信息，所述至少一个本地网络包括所述第一本地网络，所述第一接入网设备用于为所述终端设备提供通信服务。
  32. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，其中，所述第一加密密钥与第一本地网络存在对应关系；
    在所述终端设备接收所述第一本地网络的标识的情况下，所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，其中，所述注册请求包括所述隐藏用户身份标识。
  33. 根据权利要求32所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备向所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元发送能力信息，其中，所述能力信息指示所述终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力。
  34. 根据权利要求32或33所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一本地网络的标识为所述第一本地网络使用的公共陆地移动网络标识PLMN ID。
  35. 根据权利要求32-34任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括移动设备ME和通用用户识别模块USIM；
    所述终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME接收来自所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元的所述第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送所述第一加密密钥；
    所述USIM使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识，并将所述隐藏用户身份标识发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME向所述第一本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  36. 根据权利要求32-34任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备包括ME和USIM；
    所述终端设备接收来自宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，包括：
    所述ME接收来自所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元的所述第一加密密钥；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一加密密钥加密用户身份信息，得到隐藏用户身份标识，包括：
    所述ME向所述USIM发送第一请求；
    所述USIM响应于所述第一请求，将所述用户身份信息发送给所述ME；
    所述ME接收来自所述USIM的所述用户身份信息；
    所述ME使用所述第一加密密钥加密所述用户身份信息，得到所述隐藏用户身份标识；
    所述终端设备向所述第一本地网络发送注册请求，包括：
    所述ME向所述第一本地网络发送所述注册请求。
  37. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向所述宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识 信息，其中，所述第一解密网元是第一本地网络中的网元；
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自所述宏网中的第二解密网元的第一加密密钥，其中，所述第一加密密钥与所述第一解密网元相关联；
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向终端设备发送所述第一加密密钥。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元获取所述接入网设备所附属本地网络中的所述第一解密网元的标识信息，其中，接入网设备用于向宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元传输终端设备的注册请求。
  39. 根据权利要求37或38所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定接入网设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定所述第一本地网络中的所述第一解密网元的标识信息；
    其中，所述接入网设备用于为所述终端设备提供通信服务。
  40. 根据权利要求37或38所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自所述终端设备的能力信息，其中，所述能力信息指示所述终端设备接入本地网络的能力；
    在所述接入和移动性管理网元确定所述终端设备具备接入本地网络的能力的情况下，所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元确定所述第一本地网络中的所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  41. 根据权利要求39或40所述的方法，其特征在于，所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向所述宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元通过签约信息请求向所述宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向所述宏网中的第二解密网元发送指示信息，其中，所述指示信息指示所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元为所述终端设备提供加密密钥。
  43. 根据权利要求42所述的方法，其特征在于，所述签约信息请求包括所述指示信息。
  44. 根据权利要求37或38所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元接收来自所述宏网的所述第二解密网元的请求消息，其中，所述请求消息用于请求所述第一解密网元的标识信息；
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元向所述宏网中的第二解密网元发送第一解密网元的标识信息，包括：
    所述宏网中的接入和移动性管理网元根据所述请求消息，向所述宏网中的所述第二解密网元发送所述第一解密网元的标识信息。
  45. 根据权利要求37-44任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述第一解密网元的标识信息包括所述第一本地网络的标识和第一标识，其中，所述第一标识用于标识所述第一本地网络中的一个解密网元。
  46. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：用于执行如权利要求1-11中任一项所述的方法的模块、或者用于执行如权利要求12-18中任一项所述的方法的模块、或者用于执行如权利要求19-25中任一项所述的方法的模块、或者用于执行如权利要求26-31中任一项 所述的方法的模块、或者用于执行如权利要求32-36中任一项所述的方法的模块、或者用于执行如权利要求37-45中任一项所述的方法的模块。
  47. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置包括：处理器和存储器；所述存储器用于存储计算机指令，当所述处理器执行该指令时，以使所述通信装置执行如权利要求1-11中任一项所述的方法，或使所述通信装置执行如权利要求12-18任一项所述的方法，或使所述通信装置执行如权利要求19-25任一项所述的方法，或使所述通信装置执行如权利要求26-31任一项所述的方法，或使所述通信装置执行如权利要求32-36任一项所述的方法，或使所述通信装置执行如权利要求37-45任一项所述的方法。
  48. 一种芯片，其特征在于，所述芯片包括处理器，当所述处理器执行计算机程序指令时，使得所述芯片执行权利要求1-11中任一项，或者权利要求12-18任一项，或者权利要求19-25任一项，或者权利要求26-31任一项，或者权利要求32-36任一项，或者权利要求37-45任一项所述的方法。
  49. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质包括计算机程序或指令，当所述计算机程序或指令在计算机上运行时，使得所述计算机执行如权利要求1-45中任一项所述的方法。
  50. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包括指令，当所述计算机程序产品在计算机上运行时，使得所述计算机执行权利要求1-45中任一项所述的方法。
  51. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，所述通信系统包括：如权利要求1-11中任一项所述的终端设备，和如权利要求12-18中任一项所述的接入网设备；
    或，所述通信系统包括：接入网设备，和如权利要求19-25中任一项所述的终端设备；
    或，所述通信系统包括：如权利要求32-36中任一项所述的终端设备，如权利要求37-45中任一项所述的接入和移动性管理网元，和如权利要求26-31中任一项所述的解密网元。
PCT/CN2023/090413 2022-05-06 2023-04-24 密钥管理方法及通信装置 WO2023213209A1 (zh)

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Citations (4)

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CN108848502A (zh) * 2018-05-18 2018-11-20 兴唐通信科技有限公司 一种利用5g-aka对supi进行保护的方法
WO2019158028A1 (zh) * 2018-02-13 2019-08-22 华为技术有限公司 一种通信方法及装置
CN110166230A (zh) * 2017-09-29 2019-08-23 华为国际有限公司 秘钥管理方法和装置
US20220116777A1 (en) * 2019-01-18 2022-04-14 Thales Dis France Sa A Method for Authentication a Secure Element Cooperating with a Mobile Equipment within a Terminal in a Telecommunication Network

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN110166230A (zh) * 2017-09-29 2019-08-23 华为国际有限公司 秘钥管理方法和装置
WO2019158028A1 (zh) * 2018-02-13 2019-08-22 华为技术有限公司 一种通信方法及装置
CN108848502A (zh) * 2018-05-18 2018-11-20 兴唐通信科技有限公司 一种利用5g-aka对supi进行保护的方法
US20220116777A1 (en) * 2019-01-18 2022-04-14 Thales Dis France Sa A Method for Authentication a Secure Element Cooperating with a Mobile Equipment within a Terminal in a Telecommunication Network

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