WO2023147785A1 - 基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备 - Google Patents

基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023147785A1
WO2023147785A1 PCT/CN2023/074761 CN2023074761W WO2023147785A1 WO 2023147785 A1 WO2023147785 A1 WO 2023147785A1 CN 2023074761 W CN2023074761 W CN 2023074761W WO 2023147785 A1 WO2023147785 A1 WO 2023147785A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
vehicle
roadside facility
algorithm
roadside
hash value
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2023/074761
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
戚湧
刘洺君
Original Assignee
南京理工大学
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Application filed by 南京理工大学 filed Critical 南京理工大学
Priority to GB2400234.7A priority Critical patent/GB2623015A/en
Publication of WO2023147785A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023147785A1/zh

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/45—Structures or tools for the administration of authentication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F7/58—Random or pseudo-random number generators
    • G06F7/588—Random number generators, i.e. based on natural stochastic processes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of Internet of Vehicles security, in particular to a communication security authentication method, system and equipment for Internet of Vehicles based on a national secret algorithm.
  • the current Internet of Vehicles identity authentication technology has the following limitations:
  • Computing and storage resources are limited: most of the resources in the vehicle are used for driving technology, and less resources are used for computing and communication technology;
  • the purpose of the present invention is to provide a security authentication method, system and equipment for the Internet of Vehicles communication based on the National Secret Algorithm, which is used to solve the problem of how to realize the verification of Internet of Vehicles information with relatively low computing resources and communication bandwidth.
  • the identity legitimacy of the node is authenticated.
  • the present invention is realized by adopting the following technical solutions.
  • the present invention provides a method for security authentication of a vehicle-mounted terminal for Internet of Vehicles communication based on a national secret algorithm, the method comprising:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal constructs an identity authentication request message and sends it to the roadside facility;
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal receives the identity authentication response message constructed by the roadside facility, and verifies the signature; if the verification fails, the vehicle-mounted terminal’s request to connect to the roadside facility is interrupted; if the verification is successful, the vehicle-mounted terminal calculates the session key and its hash value and constructs A confirmation message is sent to the roadside facility;
  • the identity authentication response message is constructed by the roadside facility after receiving the identity authentication request message and verifying the signature successfully;
  • the confirmation message is used for comparing and verifying the session key calculated by the roadside facility and its hash value; if the hash value of the session key calculated by the roadside facility is equal to the hash value of the session key calculated by the vehicle terminal, then The security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility is successful and a session key is generated. If they are not equal, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility fails;
  • the method for the vehicle-mounted terminal to construct an identity authentication request message includes:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal generates a temporary serial number SN and a random number r A , and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the random number r A with the public key of the roadside facility.
  • the temporary serial number SN, identity identifier ID A , encrypted random number signature hash Combining the identity authentication request message M Req ; the identity authentication request message is calculated according to the following formula:
  • the method for the on-vehicle terminal to receive the identity authentication response message constructed by the roadside facility and verify the signature includes:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal receives the identity authentication response message M Rep of the roadside facility, obtains the identity identifier ID B of the roadside facility, and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt random numbers with the private key of the vehicle-mounted terminal Decrypt the random number r A , use the SM2 digital signature algorithm to use the public key of the roadside facility Verify signature hash
  • the method for calculating the session key and its hash value by the vehicle terminal and constructing a confirmation message includes:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal calculates the session key S ka as the XOR value of the random number r A and the random number r B , and calculates the hash value H(S ka ) of the session key S ka , and converts the serial number SN+2, the identity identifier ID A , session key hash value H(S ka ) combined confirmation message M Ack ; the session key and confirmation message are calculated according to the following formula:
  • vehicle-mounted terminal constructs an identity authentication request message and sends it to the roadside facility, it also includes:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal sends a certificate request file to the CA, and receives the digital certificate generated by the CA signing the certificate request file of the vehicle-mounted terminal, and the digital certificate includes the public key of the vehicle-mounted terminal and the public key of the roadside facility;
  • the digital certificate issued by the CA to the vehicle terminal is a CA root certificate in X.509 format, and the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject public key algorithm and signature value.
  • the present invention also provides a vehicle-mounted terminal for the Internet of Vehicles based on the national secret algorithm.
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal includes a random number generation module, a certificate issuance module, an identity authentication message construction module, and an authentication module;
  • the random number generation module generates a private key through the random number generator in the security chip preset in the vehicle terminal, and stores it in the storage unit of the security chip and cannot export it;
  • the certificate issuing module is used for the vehicle-mounted terminal to send a certificate request file to the CA, and receive the digital certificate generated by the CA signing the certificate request file of the vehicle-mounted terminal;
  • the identity authentication message construction module is used to construct an identity authentication request and send it to the roadside facility;
  • the authentication module is configured to, after receiving the identity authentication response message of the roadside facility, use The public key of the digital certificate of the roadside facility verifies the signature, and calculates the session key and its hash value at the same time.
  • the present invention also provides a security authentication method for roadside facilities of the Internet of Vehicles communication based on a national secret algorithm, the method comprising:
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message constructed by the vehicle terminal and verifies the signature; if the verification fails, the vehicle terminal’s request to connect to the roadside facility is interrupted; if the verification is successful, the roadside facility constructs an identity authentication response message and sends it to the vehicle terminal;
  • the roadside facility receives the confirmation message constructed by the vehicle terminal and calculates the session key and its hash value, and compares and verifies it with the session key and its hash value calculated by the vehicle terminal; if the hash value of the session key calculated by the roadside facility If the value is equal to the hash value of the session key calculated by the vehicle terminal, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility succeeds and a session key is generated; if they are not equal, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility fails;
  • the confirmation message is constructed by the vehicle-mounted terminal after receiving the identity authentication response message and verifying that the signature verification is successful, calculating the session key and its hash value, and sending it to the roadside facility;
  • the method that the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message constructed by the vehicle terminal and verifies the signature includes:
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message M Req of the vehicle terminal, obtains the identity identifier ID A of the vehicle terminal, and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt random numbers with the private key pair of the roadside facility Decrypt the random number r A , use the SM2 digital signature algorithm to verify the signature hash value with the public key of the vehicle terminal
  • the method for constructing an identity authentication response message of the roadside facility includes:
  • the roadside facility generates a random number r B , and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the random number r B with the public key of the vehicle terminal.
  • the roadside facility receives the confirmation message and calculates the session key and its hash Methods for comparative verification of values include:
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message constructed by the vehicle terminal, it also includes:
  • the roadside facility sends the certificate request file to the CA, and receives the digital certificate generated by the CA signing the certificate request file of the roadside facility, and the digital certificate includes the public key of the vehicle terminal and the public key of the roadside facility;
  • the digital certificate issued by the CA to roadside facilities is a CA root certificate in X.509 format, and the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject public key algorithm and Signature value.
  • the present invention also provides a roadside facility for the Internet of Vehicles based on a national secret algorithm.
  • the roadside facility includes a random number generation module, a certificate issuance module, an identity authentication message construction module, and an authentication module; Algorithmic vehicle network communication roadside facility safety authentication method, wherein,
  • the random number generation module generates a private key through the random number generator in the safety chip preset in the roadside facility, and stores it in the storage unit of the safety chip and cannot export it;
  • the certificate issuing module is used for the roadside facility to send a certificate request file to the CA, and receives the digital certificate generated by the CA to sign and issue the certificate request file of the roadside facility;
  • the identity authentication message construction module is used to construct an identity authentication response message and send the message to the vehicle terminal;
  • the authentication module is used to verify the signature using the public key of the digital certificate of the vehicle terminal after receiving the confirmation message constructed by the vehicle terminal, and verify the hash value of the session key at the same time. If the hash value of the signature or session key is verified If it fails, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility fails.
  • the present invention also provides a vehicle network communication security authentication system based on a national secret algorithm, and the system includes;
  • the CA includes a certificate issuing module, which is used to sign and generate a digital certificate for the certificate request file received from the vehicle-mounted terminal or the roadside facility, and the digital certificate includes the public key of the vehicle-mounted terminal and the public key of the roadside facility;
  • the digital certificate is a CA root certificate in X.509 format.
  • the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject public key algorithm and signature value.
  • the present invention also provides a vehicle network communication security authentication device based on the national secret algorithm, the device includes a memory and processing; the memory stores a computer program for implementing the vehicle network communication security certification method based on the national secret algorithm , the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the above method.
  • the invention discloses the following technical effects:
  • the present invention combines the SM2 public key encryption algorithm, the SM2 digital signature algorithm and the SM3 hash algorithm to perform two-way identity authentication for the communication node equipment of the Internet of Vehicles, and can reduce the number of complex operations and time on the premise of ensuring that the information of the Internet of Vehicles can be effectively and safely transmitted. complexity and save vehicle terminal memory.
  • a session key can be generated through a random number generator, and the session key can be used as a symmetric key to encrypt subsequent vehicle network communication message transmissions. Ensure the confidentiality of the communication data of the Internet of Vehicles in the future.
  • the present invention performs identity authentication on each node connection. After the identity authentication is completed, a new session key will be generated. Due to the continuous update of the session key, the attacker cannot obtain the new session key in time, effectively ensuring that the message cannot be eavesdropped for a long time possible.
  • the present invention uses temporary serial numbers, random numbers and session key hash values for comparison and verification. If the hash values are different, the user message will be changed during the authentication process and cannot pass the authentication, effectively preventing message replay attacks, counterfeit attacks, The occurrence of various security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
  • Fig. 1 is the composition and flow chart of the vehicle network communication security authentication system of the present invention.
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of the digital certificate information structure issued by the CA of the present invention.
  • Fig. 3 is a detailed flow chart of the vehicle network communication security authentication of the present invention.
  • Fig. 4 is a schematic diagram of calculation overhead of two-way identity authentication in the method of the present invention.
  • Fig. 5 is a schematic diagram of two-way identity authentication communication overhead in the method of the present invention.
  • Fig. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of the car terminal of the Internet of Vehicles in Embodiment 2 and the roadside facilities of the Internet of Vehicles in Embodiment 3.
  • Fig. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of embodiment 6.
  • An embodiment of the present invention is a security authentication method for the Internet of Vehicles communication based on the national secret algorithm, based on the SM2 digital signature algorithm, the SM2 public key encryption algorithm and the SM3 hash algorithm, and the vehicle-mounted terminal and roadside facilities in the Internet of Vehicles realize the vehicle-mounted Two-way identity authentication between terminals and roadside facilities, as shown in Figure 1.
  • the on-board terminal and roadside facilities are preset with a random number generator in the security chip to generate private keys Pri A and Pri B respectively, which are stored in the storage unit of the security chip and cannot be exported.
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal and the roadside facility Before the vehicle-mounted terminal and the roadside facility perform two-way security identity authentication, the vehicle-mounted terminal and the roadside facility send certificate request files to the CA respectively, and the CA signs and generates digital certificates for the certificate request files of the vehicle-mounted terminal and the roadside facility respectively.
  • the digital certificate includes The public key of the vehicle terminal and the public key of the roadside facilities.
  • the digital certificate is a CA root certificate in X.509 format.
  • the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject public key algorithm, and signature value, as shown in Figure 2 . in,
  • Serial number the entity that issues the certificate specifies a serial number for the certificate, which is used to distinguish other certificates issued by the entity;
  • Signature algorithm used to identify the algorithm used by the CA to issue the certificate
  • Issuer used to identify the entity that signed the certificate and issued the certificate
  • the validity period is used to identify that the certificate is valid within a limited period of time, and the validity period is represented by the time of the certificate start date and the end date;
  • the subject is used to identify the entity name that the certificate can identify the subject's public key.
  • the subject name is unique in the network using the X.500 standard;
  • Subject public key used to identify the subject's public key information
  • Subject public key algorithm which is used to identify the corresponding public key algorithm of the subject
  • the signature value is used to identify the CA digital signature information and effectively verify the authenticity of the digital certificate.
  • the national secret algorithm-based vehicle network communication security authentication method includes the vehicle network communication vehicle terminal security authentication method based on the national secret algorithm implemented by the vehicle terminal, and the vehicle network communication roadside facility security based on the national secret algorithm realized by the roadside facility
  • the authentication method, the specific process is shown in Figure 3. Include the following steps:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal constructs an identity authentication request message and sends it to the roadside facility.
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal generates a temporary serial number SN and a random number r A , and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the random number r A with the public key of the roadside facility.
  • the temporary serial number SN, identity identifier ID A , encrypted random number signature hash Combining the identity authentication request message M Req ; the identity authentication request message is calculated according to the following formula:
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message and verifies the signature; if the verification fails, the vehicle terminal’s request to connect to the roadside facility is interrupted; if the verification is successful, the roadside facility constructs an identity authentication response message and sends it to the vehicle terminal.
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message and verifies the signature specifically includes:
  • the roadside facility receives the identity authentication request message M Req of the vehicle terminal, obtains the identity identifier ID A of the vehicle terminal, and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt random numbers with the private key pair of the roadside facility Decrypt the random number r A , use the SM2 digital signature algorithm to use the public key of the vehicle terminal Verify signature hash
  • an identity authentication response message which specifically includes:
  • the roadside facility generates a random number r B , and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt the random number r B with the public key of the vehicle terminal.
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal receives the identity authentication response message and verifies the signature; if the verification fails, the vehicle-mounted terminal’s request to connect to the roadside facility is interrupted; if the verification is successful, the vehicle-mounted terminal calculates the session key and its hash value and constructs a confirmation message to send to roadside facilities.
  • the on-vehicle terminal receives the identity authentication response message and verifies the signature specifically includes:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal receives the identity authentication response message M Rep of the roadside facility, obtains the identity identifier ID B of the roadside facility, and uses the SM2 public key encryption algorithm to encrypt random numbers with the private key of the vehicle-mounted terminal Decrypt the random number r A , use the SM2 digital signature algorithm to verify the signature hash value with the public key of the roadside facility
  • the vehicle terminal calculates the session key and its hash value and constructs a confirmation message, including:
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal calculates the session key S ka as the XOR value of the random number r A and the random number r B , and calculates the hash value H(S ka ) of the session key S ka , and converts the serial number SN+2, the identity identifier ID A , session key hash value H(S ka ) combined confirmation message M Ack ; the session key and confirmation message are calculated according to the following formula:
  • the roadside facility receives the confirmation message and calculates the session key and its hash value for comparison and verification; if the hash values of the session key are equal, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility is successful and Generate session keys, if they are not equal, the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility will fail. Specifically include:
  • the roadside facility receives the confirmation message M Ack , obtains the session key hash value H(S ka ), and at the same time, calculates the session key S kb as the XOR value of the random number r A and the random number r B , and calculates the session key
  • the length of the SM2 key used in the present invention is 256 bits
  • the identity identifier is an 8-byte hardware code
  • the length of the random number is 16 bytes.
  • the present invention can reduce complex calculations under the premise of ensuring effective and safe transmission of Internet of Vehicles messages The number of times, reducing time complexity and saving vehicle terminal memory, can achieve efficient identity authentication with lower computing resources and communication bandwidth.
  • the session key that can be generated by the random number generator after the two-way identity authentication of the vehicle-mounted terminal and the roadside server based on the national secret algorithm can be used as a symmetric key to encrypt the subsequent communication message transmission of the Internet of Vehicles to ensure that the communication data of the Internet of Vehicles in the future confidentiality.
  • Identity authentication is performed on each node connection, and a new session key is generated after the identity authentication is completed. Due to the continuous update of the session key, the attacker cannot obtain the new session key in time, effectively ensuring that the message cannot be eavesdropped for a long time.
  • the temporary serial number, random number and session key hash value are used for comparative verification. If the hash value is different, the user message changes during the authentication process and cannot pass the authentication, effectively preventing message replay attacks , impersonation attacks, man-in-the-middle attacks and other security threats.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention is a vehicle-connected vehicle terminal based on a national secret algorithm, including a random number generation module, a certificate issuance module, an identity authentication message construction module, and an authentication module, as shown in FIG. 6 .
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal of this embodiment implements the security authentication method for the vehicle-mounted terminal of the Internet of Vehicles communication based on the national secret algorithm as described in Embodiment 1, wherein,
  • the random number generation module generates a private key through the random number generator in the safety chip preset in the vehicle terminal, and stores it in the storage unit of the safety chip and cannot export it;
  • the certificate issuing module is used for the vehicle-mounted terminal to send a certificate request file to the CA, and receive the digital certificate generated by the CA signing the certificate request file of the vehicle-mounted terminal;
  • An identity authentication message construction module used to construct an identity authentication request and send it to the roadside facility
  • the authentication module is configured to use the public key of the digital certificate of the roadside facility to verify the signature after receiving the identity authentication response message from the roadside facility, and calculate the session key and its hash value at the same time.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention is a vehicle network roadside facility based on a national secret algorithm, including a random number generation module, a certificate issuance module, an identity authentication message construction module, and an authentication module, as shown in FIG. 6 .
  • the roadside facility in this embodiment implements the security authentication method for the vehicle network communication roadside facility based on the national secret algorithm as described in Embodiment 1, wherein,
  • the random number generation module generates a private key through the random number generator in the safety chip preset in the roadside facility, and stores it in the storage unit of the safety chip and cannot export it;
  • the certificate issuing module is used for the roadside facility to send the certificate request file to the CA, and receive the digital certificate generated by the CA to sign the certificate request file of the roadside facility;
  • the identity authentication message construction module is used to construct the identity authentication response message and send the message to the vehicle terminal;
  • the authentication module is used to verify the signature using the public key of the digital certificate of the vehicle-mounted terminal after receiving the confirmation message constructed by the vehicle-mounted terminal, and simultaneously verify the hash value of the session key. If the verification of the hash value of the signature or the session key fails, Then the security authentication between the vehicle terminal and the roadside facility fails.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention is a CA of the Internet of Vehicles based on a national secret algorithm, including a certificate issuing module, which is used to sign and generate a digital certificate for a certificate request file received from a vehicle terminal or a roadside facility, and the digital certificate includes The public key of the vehicle terminal and the public key of the roadside facility; the digital certificate is a CA root certificate in X.509 format, and the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject Public key algorithm, signature value.
  • the digital certificate is a CA root certificate in X.509 format.
  • the digital certificate information includes version number, serial number, signature algorithm, issuer, validity period, subject, subject public key, subject public key algorithm, and signature value, as shown in Figure 2 . in,
  • Serial number the entity that issues the certificate specifies a serial number for the certificate, which is used to distinguish the certificate issued by the entity other certificates;
  • Signature algorithm used to identify the algorithm used by the CA to issue the certificate
  • Issuer used to identify the entity that signed the certificate and issued the certificate
  • the validity period is used to identify that the certificate is valid within a limited period of time, and the validity period is represented by the time of the certificate start date and the end date;
  • the subject is used to identify the entity name that the certificate can identify the subject's public key.
  • the subject name is unique in the network using the X.500 standard;
  • Subject public key used to identify the subject's public key information
  • Subject public key algorithm which is used to identify the corresponding public key algorithm of the subject
  • the signature value is used to identify the CA digital signature information and effectively verify the authenticity of the digital certificate.
  • Another embodiment of the present invention is a security authentication system for Internet of Vehicles communication based on a national secret algorithm, including;
  • At least one IoV vehicle terminal based on the national secret algorithm as described in Embodiment 2 the IoV roadside facility based on the national secret algorithm described in Embodiment 3, and the IoV CA based on the national secret algorithm described in Embodiment 4 .
  • the random number generator in the safety chip preset by the vehicle terminal and roadside facilities generates a private key, which is stored in the storage unit of the safety chip and cannot be exported;
  • the vehicle-mounted terminal and roadside facilities send certificate request files to CA, and CA signs and generates digital certificates for the certificate request files of vehicle-mounted terminals and roadside facilities;
  • the vehicle terminal constructs an identity authentication request message and sends it to the roadside facility, and the roadside facility receives the request message and verifies the signature;
  • the roadside facility constructs an identity authentication response message and sends it to the vehicle terminal, and the vehicle terminal receives the response message and verifies the signature;
  • the vehicle terminal calculates the session key and its hash value, constructs a confirmation message and sends it to the roadside facility, and the roadside facility receives the confirmation message and calculates the session key and its hash value for comparison and verification.
  • Embodiment 6 is a diagrammatic representation of Embodiment 6
  • Another embodiment of the present invention is a vehicle network communication security authentication device based on a national secret algorithm
  • the device includes memory and processing, as shown in FIG. 7 .
  • the memory stores a computer program for realizing the security authentication method of the Internet of Vehicles communication based on the national secret algorithm
  • the processor executes the computer program The procedure is to realize the steps of the security authentication method of the vehicle network communication vehicle terminal based on the national secret algorithm or the security certification method of the vehicle network communication roadside facility based on the national secret algorithm.
  • the vehicle network communication security authentication method, device and system based on the national secret algorithm of the present invention have the following technical effects:
  • the present invention combines the SM2 public key encryption algorithm, the SM2 digital signature algorithm and the SM3 hash algorithm to perform two-way identity authentication for the communication node equipment of the Internet of Vehicles, and can reduce the number of complex operations and time on the premise of ensuring that the information of the Internet of Vehicles can be effectively and safely transmitted. complexity and save vehicle terminal memory.
  • a session key can be generated through a random number generator, and the session key can be used as a symmetric key to encrypt subsequent vehicle network communication message transmissions. Ensure the confidentiality of the communication data of the Internet of Vehicles in the future.
  • the present invention performs identity authentication on each node connection. After the identity authentication is completed, a new session key will be generated. Due to the continuous update of the session key, the attacker cannot obtain the new session key in time, effectively ensuring that the message cannot be eavesdropped for a long time possible.
  • the present invention uses temporary serial numbers, random numbers and session key hash values for comparison and verification. If the hash values are different, the user message will be changed during the authentication process and cannot pass the authentication, effectively preventing message replay attacks, counterfeit attacks, The occurrence of various security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks.
  • certain aspects of the techniques described above may be implemented by one or more processors of a processing system executing software.
  • the software includes one or more sets of executable instructions stored or otherwise tangibly embodied on a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium.
  • the software may include instructions and certain data that, when executed by the one or more processors, direct the one or more processors to perform one or more aspects of the techniques described above.
  • Non-transitory computer readable storage media may include, for example, magnetic or optical disk storage devices, solid state storage devices such as flash memory, cache memory, random access memory (RAM), or other nonvolatile memory devices.
  • the executable instructions stored on the non-transitory computer readable storage medium may be in source code, assembly language code, object code, or other instruction formats to be interpreted or otherwise executed by one or more processors.
  • a computer-readable storage medium may include any storage medium, or combination of storage media, that can be accessed by a computer system to provide instructions and/or data to the computer system during use.
  • Such storage media may include, but are not limited to, optical media (e.g., compact discs (CDs), digital versatile disk (DVD, Blu-ray Disc), magnetic media (for example, floppy disk, magnetic tape, or magnetic hard drive), volatile memory (for example, random access memory (RAM) or cache memory), nonvolatile memory (for example, Read Only Memory (ROM) or Flash) or Micro Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) based storage media.
  • optical media e.g., compact discs (CDs), digital versatile disk (DVD, Blu-ray Disc
  • magnetic media for example, floppy disk, magnetic tape, or magnetic hard drive
  • volatile memory for example, random access memory (RAM) or cache memory
  • nonvolatile memory for example, Read Only Memory (ROM) or Flash
  • MEMS Micro Electro Mechanical Systems
  • a computer-readable storage medium may be embedded in a computing system (e.g., system RAM or ROM), fixedly attached to a computing system (e.g., a magnetic hard drive), removably attached to a computing system (e.g., an optical disk or a general-purpose serial bus (USB) or coupled to a computer system via a wired or wireless network such as network accessible storage (NAS).
  • a computing system e.g., system RAM or ROM
  • a computing system e.g., a magnetic hard drive
  • removably attached to a computing system e.g., an optical disk or a general-purpose serial bus (USB) or coupled to a computer system via a wired or wireless network such as network accessible storage (NAS).
  • NAS network accessible storage

Abstract

本发明属于车联网安全技术领域，公开了一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备。本发明的方法包括，车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施；车载终端接收身份认证应答消息并验证签名；若验证成功，车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息发送至路侧设施；用于路侧设施计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若哈希值相等，则安全认证成功并生成会话密钥，若不相等，则安全认证失败。本发明结合SM2数字签名算法、SM2公钥加密算法和SM3杂凑算法，确保该方法可应用于车载终端与路侧设施的通信过程中，能够以较低的总计算资源和较低的通信带宽抵御多种攻击。

Description

基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备
本申请要求于2022年02月07日提交中国专利局、申请号为202210116012.5、发明名称为“基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及车联网安全技术领域，特别是涉及一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备。
背景技术
传统汽车行业在现有计算机和通信技术的驱动下，通过搭载传感器设备和通信设备实现车辆之间、车与路侧设施之间的通信。但由于车联网通信环境的开放性和高速移动性的特点，车辆的用户身份、地理位置等隐私信息可能会暴露在网络中。如果用户身份没有进行合法认证，使得用户信息无法得到有效的保护，车联网通信将带给用户隐私泄露、身份欺诈、虚假信息传播等一系列安全问题，同时车辆和路侧设施等信息节点将面临重放攻击、假冒攻击、消息拦截、窃听或篡改等安全威胁。
与传统的物联网不同，现阶段的车联网身份认证技术存在以下局限性：
(1)计算和存储资源有限：车辆中大部分资源用于汽车驾驶技术，较少的资源用于计算和通信技术；
(2)服务平台专业化：车辆用户需要在多个服务端认证信息以获得多样化的体验，服务端需要不同的身份验证操作；
(3)路侧设施不完善：能够接入车联网数据的路侧设施节点通用性不强，造成网络延迟或资源浪费。
基于上述分析，如何实现以较低的计算资源和通信带宽对车联网信息节点的身份合法性进行认证，是目前需要解决的技术问题。
发明内容
本发明目的是提供一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、系统及设备，用来解决如何实现以较低的计算资源和通信带宽对车联网信息 节点的身份合法性进行认证问题。
具体地说，本发明是采用以下技术方案实现的。
一方面，本发明提供一种基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，所述方法包括：
车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施；
车载终端接收路侧设施所构造的身份认证应答消息，并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息发送至路侧设施；
所述身份认证应答消息由路侧设施根据接收的所述身份认证请求消息并验证签名成功后所构造；
所述确认消息用于路侧设施计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若路侧设施计算的会话密钥的哈希值与车载终端计算的会话密钥的哈希值相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功并生成会话密钥，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败；
所述车载终端构造身份认证请求消息的方法包括：
车载终端生成临时序列号SN和随机数rA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的公钥对随机数rA进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的私钥对随机数rA的哈希值H(rA)进行签名得将临时序列号SN、身份标识符IDA、加密随机数签名哈希值组合所述身份认证请求消息MReq；所述身份认证请求消息按照下式计算：
其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rA)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法；
所述车载终端接收路侧设施所构造的身份认证应答消息并验证签名的方法包括：
车载终端接收路侧设施的身份认证应答消息MRep，获取路侧设施的身份标识符IDB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的公钥 验证签名哈希值
进一步地，所述车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息的方法包括：
车载终端计算会话密钥Ska为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Ska的哈希值H(Ska)，将序列号SN+2、身份标识符IDA、会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)组合确认消息MAck；所述会话密钥、确认消息按照下式计算：
MAck＝SN+2||IDA||H(Ska)
其中，表示异或运算，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(Ska)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
进一步地，在所述车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施之前还包括：
车载终端向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对车载终端的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥和路侧设施的公钥；
所述CA对车载终端签发的数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
另一方面，本发明还提供一种基于国密算法的车联网车载终端，所述车载终端包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块和认证模块；实现根据权利要求上述基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，其中，
所述随机数生成模块，通过所述车载终端中预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
所述证书签发模块，用于车载终端向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对车载终端的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
所述身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证请求并发送至路侧设施；
所述认证模块，用于在接收到路侧设施的身份认证应答消息后，使用 路侧设施数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时计算会话密钥及其哈希值。
再一方面，本发明还提供一种基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，所述方法包括：
路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息发送至车载终端；
路侧设施接收车载终端构造的确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希值，与车载终端计算的会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若路侧设施计算的会话密钥的哈希值与车载终端计算的会话密钥的哈希值相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功并生成会话密钥，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败；
所述确认消息由车载终端接收所述身份认证应答消息并验证签名验证成功，计算会话密钥及其哈希值后构造，并发送至路侧设施；
所述路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息并验证签名的方法包括：
路侧设施接收车载终端的身份认证请求消息MReq，获取车载终端的身份标识符IDA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的公钥验证签名哈希值
所述路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息的方法包括：
路侧设施生成随机数rB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的公钥对随机数rB进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的私钥对随机数rB的哈希值H(rB)进行签名得将序列号SN+1、身份标识符IDB、加密随机数签名哈希值组合成所述身份认证应答消息MRep；所述身份认证应答消息按照下式计算：
其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rB)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
进一步地，所述路侧设施接收所述确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希 值进行对比验证的方法包括：
路侧设施接收所述确认消息MAck，获取会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)，同时，计算会话密钥Skb为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Skb的哈希值H(Skb)；将H(Skb)与H(Ska)进行对比，若相等则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功，并生成会话密钥Sk＝Ska＝Skb，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
进一步地，在所述路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息之前还包括：
路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥和路侧设施的公钥；
所述CA对路侧设施签发的数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
又一方面，本发明还提供一种基于国密算法的车联网路侧设施，所述路侧设施包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块和认证模块；实现上述基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，其中，
所述随机数生成模块，通过所述路侧设施中预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
所述证书签发模块，用于路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
所述身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证应答消息并将消息发送至车载终端；
所述认证模块，用于在接收到车载终端构造的确认消息后，使用车载终端数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时验证会话密钥的哈希值，如果签名或会话密钥的哈希值验证失败，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
又一方面，本发明还提供一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证系统，所述系统包括；
上述车载终端、路侧设施和CA；
所述CA包括证书签发模块，用于分别对从车载终端或路侧设施接收的证书请求文件进行签发生成数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥、路侧设施的公钥；所述数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
又一方面，本发明还提供一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证设备，所述设备包括存储器和处理；所述存储器存储有实现基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述计算机程序，以实现上述方法的步骤。
根据本发明提供的具体实施例，本发明公开了以下技术效果：
本发明结合SM2公钥加密算法、SM2数字签名算法和SM3杂凑算法为车联网通信节点设备进行双向身份认证，在保证车联网消息能够有效安全传输的前提下，能够减少复杂运算的次数，降低时间复杂度并节省车载终端内存。
本发明完成对车载终端和路侧服务端基于国密算法的双向身份认证后，能够通过随机数生成器生成会话密钥，会话密钥可以作为对称密钥对后续车联网通信消息传输进行加密，确保之后车联网通信数据的保密性。
本发明对每个节点连接进行身份认证，身份认证完成后，会生成新会话密钥，由于会话密钥的不断更新，攻击者无法及时获取新会话密钥，有效地确保消息无法被长期窃听的可能。
本发明采用临时序列号、随机数及会话密钥散列值进行对比验证，若散列值不同，则用户消息在认证过程中产生变动无法通过认证，有效地防止消息重放攻击、假冒攻击、中间人攻击等多种安全威胁的发生。
说明书附图
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1是本发明的车联网通信安全认证系统组成及流程图。
图2是本发明CA签发的数字证书信息结构示意图。
图3是本发明的车联网通信安全认证详细流程图。
图4是本发明的方法中双向身份认证计算开销示意图；
图5是本发明的方法中双向身份认证通信开销示意图；
图6是实施例2的车联网车载终端和实施例3的车联网路侧设施的结构示意图。
图7是实施例6的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图，对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本发明保护的范围。
实施例1：
本发明的一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法，基于SM2数字签名算法、SM2公钥加密算法和SM3杂凑算法，由车联网中车载终端、路侧设施实现车载终端、路侧设施间双向身份认证，如图1所示。
车载终端与路侧设施出厂预置有安全芯片内的随机数生成器分别生成私钥PriA、PriB，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出。
在车载终端与路侧设施进行双向安全身份认证之前，车载终端和路侧设施分别向CA发送证书请求文件，CA分别对车载终端和路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成数字证书，数字证书包括车载终端的公钥、路侧设施的公钥。
该数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法、签名值，如图2所示。其中，
版本号，用于标识该证书的X.509标准的版本；
序列号，颁发证书的实体为证书指定序列号，用于区别该实体颁发的其他证书；
签名算法，用于标识CA签发证书时所使用的算法；
颁发者，用于标识证书签名和证书颁发的实体；
有效期，用于标识证书在一个有限的时间段内有效，有效期以证书起始日期的时间和终止日期的时间表示；
主体，用于标识证书可以识别主体公钥的实体名，主体名称使用X.500标准在网络中是唯一的；
主体公钥，用于标识主体的公钥信息；
主体公钥算法，用于标识主体相应的公钥算法；
签名值，用于标识CA数字签名信息，有效验证数字证书的真伪。
基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法包括由车载终端实现的基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，和由路侧设施实现的基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，具体流程如图3所示。包括以下步骤：
一、车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施。
车载终端生成临时序列号SN和随机数rA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的公钥对随机数rA进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的私钥对随机数rA的哈希值H(rA)进行签名得将临时序列号SN、身份标识符IDA、加密随机数签名哈希值组合所述身份认证请求消息MReq；身份认证请求消息按照下式计算：
其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rA)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
二、路侧设施接收身份认证请求消息并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息发送至车载终端。
路侧设施接收身份认证请求消息并验证签名具体包括：
路侧设施接收车载终端的身份认证请求消息MReq，获取车载终端的身份标识符IDA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的公钥 验证签名哈希值
若验证成功，路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息，具体包括：
路侧设施生成随机数rB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的公钥对随机数rB进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的私钥对随机数rB的哈希值H(rB)进行签名得将序列号SN+1、身份标识符IDB、加密随机数签名哈希值组合成所述身份认证应答消息MRep；所述身份认证应答消息按照下式计算：
其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rB)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
三、车载终端接收所述身份认证应答消息并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息发送至路侧设施。
车载终端接收所述身份认证应答消息并验证签名具体包括：
车载终端接收路侧设施的身份认证应答消息MRep，获取路侧设施的身份标识符IDB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的公钥验证签名哈希值
若验证成功，车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息，具体包括：
车载终端计算会话密钥Ska为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Ska的哈希值H(Ska)，将序列号SN+2、身份标识符IDA、会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)组合确认消息MAck；所述会话密钥、确认消息按照下式计算：
MAck＝SN+2||IDA||H(Ska)
其中，表示异或运算，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(Ska)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
四、路侧设施接收确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若会话密钥的哈希值相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功并 生成会话密钥，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。具体包括：
路侧设施接收确认消息MAck，获取会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)，同时，计算会话密钥Skb为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Skb的哈希值H(Skb)；将H(Skb)与H(Ska)进行对比，若相等则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功，并生成会话密钥Sk＝Ska＝Skb，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
本发明采用的SM2密钥长度为256bits，身份识别符为8字节的硬件编码，随机数长度为16字节。如图4-图5所示，本发明与传统单一的基于ECC椭圆曲线、SM2密钥协商、RSA算法的认证方法相比，在保证车联网消息能够有效安全传输的前提下，能够减少复杂运算的次数，降低时间复杂度并节省车载终端内存，能够以较低的计算资源和通信带宽实现高效率的身份认证。
对车载终端和路侧服务端基于国密算法的双向身份认证后能够通过随机数生成器生成的会话密钥，可以作为对称密钥对后续车联网通信消息传输进行加密，确保之后车联网通信数据的保密性。对每个节点连接进行身份认证，身份认证完成后生成新会话密钥，由于会话密钥的不断更新，攻击者无法及时获取新会话密钥，有效地确保消息无法被长期窃听的可能。
双向身份认证过程中，采用临时序列号、随机数及会话密钥散列值进行对比验证，若散列值不同，则用户消息在认证过程中产生变动无法通过认证，有效地防止消息重放攻击、假冒攻击、中间人攻击等多种安全威胁的发生。
实施例2：
本发明的另一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网车载终端，包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块、认证模块，如图6所示。本实施例的车载终端实现如实施例1所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，其中，
随机数生成模块，通过所述车载终端中出厂预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
证书签发模块，用于车载终端向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对车载终端的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证请求并发送至路侧设施；
认证模块，用于在接收到路侧设施的身份认证应答消息后，使用路侧设施数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时计算会话密钥及其哈希值。
实施例3：
本发明的另一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网路侧设施，包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块、认证模块，如图6所示。本实施例的路侧设施实现如实施例1所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，其中，
随机数生成模块，通过所述路侧设施中出厂预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
证书签发模块，用于路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证应答消息并将消息发送至车载终端；
认证模块，用于在接收到车载终端构造的确认消息后，使用车载终端数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时验证会话密钥的哈希值，如果签名或会话密钥的哈希值验证失败，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
实施例4：
本发明的另一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网CA，包括证书签发模块，用于分别对从车载终端或路侧设施接收的证书请求文件进行签发生成数字证书，数字证书包括车载终端的公钥、路侧设施的公钥；数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法、签名值。
该数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法、签名值，如图2所示。其中，
版本号，用于标识该证书的X.509标准的版本；
序列号，颁发证书的实体为证书指定序列号，用于区别该实体颁发的 其他证书；
签名算法，用于标识CA签发证书时所使用的算法；
颁发者，用于标识证书签名和证书颁发的实体；
有效期，用于标识证书在一个有限的时间段内有效，有效期以证书起始日期的时间和终止日期的时间表示；
主体，用于标识证书可以识别主体公钥的实体名，主体名称使用X.500标准在网络中是唯一的；
主体公钥，用于标识主体的公钥信息；
主体公钥算法，用于标识主体相应的公钥算法；
签名值，用于标识CA数字签名信息，有效验证数字证书的真伪。
实施例5：
本发明的另一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证系统，包括；
至少一个如实施例2所述的基于国密算法的车联网车载终端、实施例3所述的基于国密算法的车联网路侧设施和实施例4所述的基于国密算法的车联网CA。
车载终端与路侧设施出厂预置的安全芯片内的随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
车载终端和路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，CA对车载终端和路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成数字证书；
车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施，路侧设施接收请求消息并验证签名；
路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息发送至车载终端，车载终端接收应答消息并验证签名；
车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息发送至路侧设施，路侧设施接收确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证。
实施例6：
本发明的另一个实施例，为一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证设备，所述设备包括存储器和处理，如图7所示。存储器存储有实现基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法的计算机程序，处理器执行该计算机 程序，以实现基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法或基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法的步骤。
本发明的基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法、装置及系统，具有以下技术效果：
本发明结合SM2公钥加密算法、SM2数字签名算法和SM3杂凑算法为车联网通信节点设备进行双向身份认证，在保证车联网消息能够有效安全传输的前提下，能够减少复杂运算的次数，降低时间复杂度并节省车载终端内存。
本发明完成对车载终端和路侧服务端基于国密算法的双向身份认证后，能够通过随机数生成器生成会话密钥，会话密钥可以作为对称密钥对后续车联网通信消息传输进行加密，确保之后车联网通信数据的保密性。
本发明对每个节点连接进行身份认证，身份认证完成后，会生成新会话密钥，由于会话密钥的不断更新，攻击者无法及时获取新会话密钥，有效地确保消息无法被长期窃听的可能。
本发明采用临时序列号、随机数及会话密钥散列值进行对比验证，若散列值不同，则用户消息在认证过程中产生变动无法通过认证，有效地防止消息重放攻击、假冒攻击、中间人攻击等多种安全威胁的发生。
在一些实施例中，上述技术的某些方面可以由执行软件的处理系统的一个或多个处理器来实现。该软件包括存储或以其他方式有形实施在非暂时性计算机可读存储介质上的一个或多个可执行指令集合。软件可以包括指令和某些数据，这些指令和某些数据在由一个或多个处理器执行时操纵一个或多个处理器以执行上述技术的一个或多个方面。非暂时性计算机可读存储介质可以包括例如磁或光盘存储设备，诸如闪存、高速缓存、随机存取存储器(RAM)等的固态存储设备或其他非易失性存储器设备。存储在非临时性计算机可读存储介质上的可执行指令可以是源代码、汇编语言代码、目标代码或被一个或多个处理器解释或以其他方式执行的其他指令格式。
计算机可读存储介质可以包括在使用期间可由计算机系统访问以向计算机系统提供指令和/或数据的任何存储介质或存储介质的组合。这样的存储介质可以包括但不限于光学介质(例如，光盘(CD)、数字多功能光 盘(DVD)、蓝光光盘)、磁介质(例如，软盘、磁带或磁性硬盘驱动器)、易失性存储器(例如，随机存取存储器(RAM)或高速缓存)、非易失性存储器(例如，只读存储器(ROM)或闪存)或基于微机电系统(MEMS)的存储介质。计算机可读存储介质可以嵌入计算系统(例如，系统RAM或ROM)中，固定地附接到计算系统(例如，磁性硬盘驱动器)，可移除地附接到计算系统(例如，光盘或通用基于串行总线(USB)的闪存)，或者经由有线或无线网络(例如，网络可访问存储(NAS))耦合到计算机系统。
请注意，并非上述一般性描述中的所有活动或要素都是必需的，特定活动或设备的一部分可能不是必需的，并且除了描述的那些之外可以执行一个或多个进一步的活动或包括的要素。更进一步，活动列出的顺序不必是执行它们的顺序。而且，已经参考具体实施例描述了这些概念。然而，本领域的普通技术人员认识到，在不脱离如下权利要求书中阐述的本公开的范围的情况下，可以进行各种修改和改变。因此，说明书和附图被认为是说明性的而不是限制性的，并且所有这样的修改被包括在本公开的范围内。
上面已经关于具体实施例描述了益处、其他优点和问题的解决方案。然而，可能导致任何益处、优点或解决方案发生或变得更明显的益处、优点、问题的解决方案以及任何特征都不应被解释为任何或其他方面的关键、必需或任何或所有权利要求的基本特征。此外，上面公开的特定实施例仅仅是说明性的，因为所公开的主题可以以受益于这里的教导的本领域技术人员显而易见的不同但等同的方式进行修改和实施。除了在权利要求书中描述的以外，没有意图限制在此示出的构造或设计的细节。因此明显的是，上面公开的特定实施例可以被改变或修改，并且所有这样的变化被认为在所公开的主题的范围内。

Claims (10)

  1. 一种基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施；
    车载终端接收路侧设施所构造的身份认证应答消息，并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息发送至路侧设施；
    所述身份认证应答消息由路侧设施根据接收的所述身份认证请求消息并验证签名成功后所构造；
    所述确认消息用于路侧设施计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若路侧设施计算的会话密钥的哈希值与车载终端计算的会话密钥的哈希值相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功并生成会话密钥，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败；
    所述车载终端构造身份认证请求消息的方法包括：
    车载终端生成临时序列号SN和随机数rA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的公钥对随机数rA进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的私钥对随机数rA的哈希值H(rA)进行签名得将临时序列号SN、身份标识符IDA、加密随机数签名哈希值组合所述身份认证请求消息MReq；所述身份认证请求消息按照下式计算：
    其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rA)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法；
    所述车载终端接收路侧设施所构造的身份认证应答消息并验证签名的方法包括：
    车载终端接收路侧设施的身份认证应答消息MRep，获取路侧设施的身份标识符IDB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的公钥验证签名哈希值
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全 认证方法，其特征在于，所述车载终端计算会话密钥及其哈希值并构造确认消息的方法包括：
    车载终端计算会话密钥Ska为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Ska的哈希值H(Ska)，将序列号SN+2、身份标识符IDA、会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)组合确认消息MAck；所述会话密钥、确认消息按照下式计算：
    MAck＝SN+2||IDA||H(Ska)
    其中，表示异或运算，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(Ska)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，其特征在于，在所述车载终端构造身份认证请求消息发送至路侧设施之前还包括：
    车载终端向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对车载终端的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥和路侧设施的公钥；
    所述CA对车载终端签发的数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
  4. 一种基于国密算法的车联网车载终端，其特征在于，所述车载终端包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块和认证模块；实现根据权利要求1-3任一所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信车载终端安全认证方法，其中，
    所述随机数生成模块，通过所述车载终端中预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
    所述证书签发模块，用于车载终端向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对车载终端的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
    所述身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证请求并发送至路侧设施；
    所述认证模块，用于在接收到路侧设施的身份认证应答消息后，使用 路侧设施数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时计算会话密钥及其哈希值。
  5. 一种基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息并验证签名；若验证失败，车载终端连接路侧设施的请求中断；若验证成功，则路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息发送至车载终端；
    路侧设施接收车载终端构造的确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希值，与车载终端计算的会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证；若路侧设施计算的会话密钥的哈希值与车载终端计算的会话密钥的哈希值相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功并生成会话密钥，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败；
    所述确认消息由车载终端接收所述身份认证应答消息并验证签名验证成功，计算会话密钥及其哈希值后构造，并发送至路侧设施；
    所述路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息并验证签名的方法包括：
    路侧设施接收车载终端的身份认证请求消息MReq，获取车载终端的身份标识符IDA，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用路侧设施的私钥对加密随机数解密得随机数rA，利用SM2数字签名算法使用车载终端的公钥验证签名哈希值
    所述路侧设施构造身份认证应答消息的方法包括：
    路侧设施生成随机数rB，利用SM2公钥加密算法使用车载终端的公钥对随机数rB进行加密得利用SM2数字签名算法使用路侧设施的私钥对随机数rB的哈希值H(rB)进行签名得将序列号SN+1、身份标识符IDB、加密随机数签名哈希值组合成所述身份认证应答消息MRep；所述身份认证应答消息按照下式计算：
    其中，||表示数据连接符，计算哈希值H(rB)使用的散列算法为SM3国密杂凑算法。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全 认证方法，其特征在于，所述路侧设施接收所述确认消息并计算会话密钥及其哈希值进行对比验证的方法包括：
    路侧设施接收所述确认消息MAck，获取会话密钥哈希值H(Ska)，同时，计算会话密钥Skb为随机数rA与随机数rB的异或值，并计算会话密钥Skb的哈希值H(Skb)；将H(Skb)与H(Ska)进行对比，若相等则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证成功，并生成会话密钥Sk＝Ska＝Skb，若不相等，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，其特征在于，在所述路侧设施接收车载终端构造的身份认证请求消息之前还包括：
    路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥和路侧设施的公钥；
    所述CA对路侧设施签发的数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
  8. 一种基于国密算法的车联网路侧设施，其特征在于，所述路侧设施包括随机数生成模块、证书签发模块、身份认证消息构造模块和认证模块；实现根据权利要求5-7任一所述的基于国密算法的车联网通信路侧设施安全认证方法，其中，
    所述随机数生成模块，通过所述路侧设施中预置的安全芯片内随机数生成器生成私钥，并存储在安全芯片的存储单元中不能导出；
    所述证书签发模块，用于路侧设施向CA发送证书请求文件，接收CA对路侧设施的证书请求文件进行签发生成的数字证书；
    所述身份认证消息构造模块，用于构造身份认证应答消息并将消息发送至车载终端；
    所述认证模块，用于在接收到车载终端构造的确认消息后，使用车载终端数字证书的公钥验证签名，同时验证会话密钥的哈希值，如果签名或会话密钥的哈希值验证失败，则车载终端与路侧设施间安全认证失败。
  9. 一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证系统，其特征在于，所 述系统包括；
    权利要求4所述的车载终端、权利要求8所述的路侧设施和CA；
    所述CA包括证书签发模块，用于分别对从车载终端或路侧设施接收的证书请求文件进行签发生成数字证书，所述数字证书包括车载终端的公钥、路侧设施的公钥；所述数字证书为X.509格式的CA根证书，数字证书信息包括版本号、序列号、签名算法、颁发者、有效期、主体、主体公钥、主体公钥算法和签名值。
  10. 一种基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证设备，其特征在于，所述设备包括存储器和处理；所述存储器存储有实现基于国密算法的车联网通信安全认证方法的计算机程序，所述处理器执行所述计算机程序，以实现根据权利要求1-3、5-7任一所述方法的步骤。
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