CN114727259B - 一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法 - Google Patents

一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法 Download PDF

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CN114727259B
CN114727259B CN202210290875.4A CN202210290875A CN114727259B CN 114727259 B CN114727259 B CN 114727259B CN 202210290875 A CN202210290875 A CN 202210290875A CN 114727259 B CN114727259 B CN 114727259B
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杨安家
陈小虎
翁健
李涛
翁嘉思
刘家男
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Jinan University
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Abstract

本发明公开一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，包括：对紧急事件汇报系统进行初始化，得到车端集合的公私钥对和预计算参数；基于所述公私钥对和预计算参数，得到紧急事件的认证信息；整合所述认证信息，得到紧急事件多重签名；基于所述紧急事件多重签名调控交通状态，完成系统构建。实现了计算资源受限的车端高效生成签名功能，减少了路侧单元的通信压力和计算压力，能够有效防止其他方案中常见的流氓密钥攻击。

Description

一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法
技术领域
本发明涉及网络空间安全技术领域，特别涉及一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法。
背景技术
VANET是一种基于道路沿线车辆和基础设施的可用性而动态建立的网络。通过VANET的无线通信，车辆之间可以共享不同种类的信息。当车辆目击紧急事件（如交通事故）时，车辆可以通过VANET网络将消息和自己对该消息的签名发送给路侧单元，路侧单元在收到消息并验证签名的有效性后，向其通信范围内的车辆广播该消息，从而达到避免二次事故的目的。然而，VANET的动态特性同时也带来了许多传统网络未有的问题，如：过多车端给路侧单元发送同一紧急消息引起的广播风暴问题和车端生成签名慢导致的计算资源浪费问题等。
多重签名技术是当今一项备受关注的技术，它允许一组签名者在同一个消息上产生一个共同的签名，这个签名可以被这组签名者的公钥验证，代表这一组签名者都认可该消息。多重签名中的签名长度与签名人数无关，且始终与单个签名的长度一致，这在很大程度上降低了信息传输量和通信压力。自多重签名的概念被提出以来，多重签名的方案设计得到了充分的研究，这些方案的安全性可规约于大整数分解问题、离散对数问题和格上困难问题等。
发明内容
为解决上述现有技术中所存在的传统方法引起广播风暴和车端生成签名慢导致的计算资源浪费的问题，本发明提供一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，利用多重签名算法和次指数算法相结合，减少了路侧单元的通信压力和计算压力，避免了多重签名中常见的流氓密钥攻击。
为了实现上述技术目的，本发明提供了一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，包括：
步骤1，对紧急事件汇报系统进行初始化，得到车端集合的公私钥对和预计算参数；
步骤2，基于所述公私钥对和预计算参数，得到紧急事件的认证信息；
步骤3，整合所述认证信息，得到紧急事件的多重签名；
步骤4，基于所述多重签名调控交通状态，完成系统构建。
可选的，所述公私钥对的获取过程包括：
通过密钥管理机构注册获得所述密钥管理机构颁发的公私钥对，所述公私钥对包括公钥和私钥。
可选的，得到所述预计算参数的过程包括：
所述车端集合更新所述紧急事件汇报系统的公开安全参数，随机选取参数，对所述公开安全参数进行预计算，得到所述预计算参数。
可选的，所述紧急事件的认证过程包括：
将所述紧急事件汇报给路侧单元，所述路侧单元向所述车端集合广播所述紧急事件和哈希值；所述哈希值用于表示所述车端集合对所述紧急事件的认证程度。
可选的，所述多重签名的获取过程包括：
将所述公钥发送给所述路侧单元，设置公钥集合，对所述紧急事件和所述公钥集合进行广播并签名；
对所述签名进行聚合运算，得到多重签名和聚合参数。
可选的，所述签名的公式为：
Figure 165312DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
其中，
Figure 815736DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
为编号为i的车端的签名，
Figure 864464DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
为编号为i的车端随机选取的参数，
Figure 233128DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
为紧急事件的哈希值，
Figure 533659DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
为编号为i的车端的私钥，
Figure 927338DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
为次指数。
可选的，所述聚合运算的公式为：
Figure 22333DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
Figure 2928DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
其中，
Figure 107150DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
为多重签名，n为愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端的个数，
Figure 466587DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
为编号为i的车端的签名，
Figure 122696DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
为聚合参数，
Figure 200374DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
为编号为i的车端随机选取的参数。
可选的，所述预计算参数的计算公式为：
Figure 108287DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
其中，
Figure 712444DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
和
Figure 414820DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
为预计算参数，
Figure 605892DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
为
Figure 51917DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
的一个生成元，是全系统共用的公开安全参数，
Figure 651526DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
为
Figure 383859DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
阶的循环群，其中
Figure 436128DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
为素数，
Figure 420265DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
为紧急事件，
Figure 264593DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
为编号为i的车端的公钥。
可选的，所述哈希值的计算公式为：
Figure 43193DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
其中，
Figure 848338DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
为哈希值，
Figure 495220DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
是任意常用的哈希函数，
Figure 69421DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
为紧急事件。
本发明具有如下技术效果：
利用多重签名算法和次指数算法相结合，改进了传统方法中引起广播风暴和车端生成签名慢导致的计算资源浪费的问题，减少了路侧单元的通信压力和计算压力，避免了多重签名中常见的流氓密钥攻击。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本发明实施例紧急事件汇报系统构建方法的流程框图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图，对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本发明保护的范围。
如图1所示，本发明公开一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，包括：
步骤一，对紧急事件汇报系统进行初始化，得到车端集合的公私钥对和预计算参数，过程为：
紧急事件汇报系统初始化，当每个车端在接入车联网时，车端通过车载单元都会先向密钥管理机构注册来获得密钥管理机构颁发的公私钥对：
Figure 284501DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
，其中，
Figure 674812DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
为编号为i的车端的公钥，
Figure 751DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
为编号为i的车端的私钥，
Figure 554093DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
为
Figure 940075DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
的一个生成元，是全系统共用的公开安全参数，
Figure 454233DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
为
Figure 708496DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
阶的循环群，其中
Figure 726131DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
为素数；
同时，车端更新紧急事件汇报系统的公开安全参数，每个车端会对公开安全参数中的部分参数进行预计算，包括：车端提前从公开安全参数域中随机选取参数
Figure 548593DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
，继而通过以下公式进行预计算参数：
Figure 409102DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
式中，
Figure 342423DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
和
Figure 840663DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
为预计算参数，
Figure 834026DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
为编号为i的车端选取的参数，
Figure 57197DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
为紧急事件。
步骤2，基于所述公私钥对和预计算参数，得到紧急事件的认证信息，过程为：
当某个司机目击事故发生时，他控制车端将紧急消息汇报给路侧单元，进行简单而不可信的汇报。随后，路侧单元接到汇报，由于该汇报消息来源于单个车端，而单个司机可能会因为主观或者客观上的原因向路侧单元发出错误的紧急事件消息，主观上，该司机可能会想通过捏造不存在的事故消息，来让路侧单元对该路段进行交通调控，使自己的出行路线更加通畅；客观上，该司机可能看错或是输入错误的时间地点等因素，导致紧急事件内容出错，造成交通资源和救援资源的浪费，所以路侧单元要收到多个车端对该紧急事件的认证以后才相信这个紧急事件。为了能更快的收到对该紧急事件的其他认证消息，路侧单元向管辖区间内的车端广播紧急事件和对该紧急事件的哈希值，并询问有哪些车载单元愿意进行紧急消息的认证，得到紧急事件的认证信息，所述哈希值的计算公式为：
Figure 653264DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
,其中
Figure 645491DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
是任意常用的哈希函数。
步骤3，整合所述认证信息，得到紧急事件的多重签名，过程为：
在车端收到紧急事件和对该紧急事件的哈希值后，愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端将自己的公钥发送给路侧单元，路侧单元设置公钥集合：
Figure 809756DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
，其中，n表示愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端的个数，不失一般性，路侧单元选定车端集合中的一个车端N作为代表进行多重签名的聚合运算，路侧单元将
Figure 379277DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
信息和路侧单元设置的公钥集合广播出去，愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端收到广播消息后，采用次指数算法计算次指数：
Figure 654401DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
然后进行签名，签名公式为：
Figure 32293DEST_PATH_IMAGE030
式中，
Figure 960934DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
是任意常用的哈希函数，
Figure 424277DEST_PATH_IMAGE031
为公钥集合，
Figure 595102DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
为编号为i的车端的公钥，
Figure 827500DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
为编号为i的车端选取的参数，
Figure 802409DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
为紧急事件的哈希值，
Figure 877681DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
为私钥。
将各个参与紧急事件认证的车端签名
Figure 229028DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
、之前预计算得到的秘密参数
Figure 315933DEST_PATH_IMAGE032
、
Figure 117536DEST_PATH_IMAGE033
以及各个愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端公钥
Figure 24312DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
发送给车端
Figure 179350DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
进行聚合, 当车端
Figure 245395DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
集齐所有愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端的签名后，车端
Figure 827686DEST_PATH_IMAGE036
进行聚合运算，聚合运算公式如下：
Figure 847857DEST_PATH_IMAGE037
式中，
Figure 806585DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
为多重签名，n为愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端的个数，
Figure 602503DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
为聚合参数。
路侧单元在等待车端
Figure 745908DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
发送多重签名和聚合参数的同时，采用次指数算法计算次指数
Figure 627277DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
，然后计算聚合公钥：
Figure 124117DEST_PATH_IMAGE038
路侧单元接收到车端
Figure 899175DEST_PATH_IMAGE034
发送的多重签名和聚合参数后，进行验证多重签名运算，公式如下：
Figure DEST_PATH_IMAGE039
若以上等式两边相等，则多重签名通过验证，表示公钥集合中的车端对紧急事件都表示认可，若以上等式两边不相等，则多重签名验证不通过，路侧单元终止本次紧急事件汇报。
步骤4，基于多重签名调控交通状态，完成系统构建；
紧急事件多重签名验证通过，路侧单元采用该验证通过的紧急事件信息对交通状态进行调控，包括：向驶近的车辆发出紧急讯息并警告潜在的交通堵塞，以及帮助公路管理部门迅速启动救援。
以上显示和描述了本发明的基本原理、主要特征和优点。本行业的技术人员应该了解，本发明不受上述实施例的限制，上述实施例和说明书中描述的只是说明本发明的原理，在不脱离本发明精神和范围的前提下，本发明还会有各种变化和改进，这些变化和改进都落入要求保护的本发明范围内。本发明要求保护范围由所附的权利要求书及其等效物界定。

Claims (4)

1.一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，其特征在于，包括以下步骤：
步骤1，对紧急事件汇报系统进行初始化，得到车端集合的公私钥对和预计算参数；所述预计算参数的获取过程为：所述车端集合更新所述紧急事件汇报系统的公开安全参数，随机选取参数，对所述公开安全参数进行预计算，得到所述预计算参数；
步骤2，基于所述公私钥对和预计算参数，得到紧急事件的认证信息；所述紧急事件的认证信息获取过程为：将所述紧急事件汇报给路侧单元，所述路侧单元向所述车端集合广播所述紧急事件和哈希值；所述哈希值用于表示所述车端集合对所述紧急事件的认证程度；
步骤3，整合所述认证信息，得到紧急事件的多重签名；所述多重签名的获取过程为：将所述公钥发送给所述路侧单元，设置公钥集合，对所述紧急事件和所述公钥集合进行广播并签名；对所述签名进行聚合运算，得到多重签名和聚合参数，所述多重签名的计算公式为：
Figure 219097DEST_PATH_IMAGE001
其中，n为愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端的个数；
Figure 464134DEST_PATH_IMAGE002
为各个参与紧急事件认证的车端签名；
所述聚合参数的计算公式为：
Figure 775029DEST_PATH_IMAGE003
其中，
Figure 202862DEST_PATH_IMAGE004
为预计算得到的秘密参数；
所述路侧单元将车端的信息和所述路侧单元设置的所述公钥集合广播出去，愿意参与紧急事件认证的车端收到广播消息后，采用次指数算法计算次指数：
Figure 751655DEST_PATH_IMAGE005
，然后进行签名，签名公式为：
Figure 105276DEST_PATH_IMAGE006
Figure 169047DEST_PATH_IMAGE007
其中，
Figure 899106DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
是任意常用的哈希函数，
Figure 99143DEST_PATH_IMAGE009
为公钥集合，
Figure 623665DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
为编号为i的车端的公钥，
Figure 112415DEST_PATH_IMAGE011
为编号为i的车端选取的参数，
Figure 380585DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
为紧急事件的哈希值，
Figure 700708DEST_PATH_IMAGE013
为私钥；
所述路侧单元在等待车端发送所述多重签名和所述聚合参数的同时，采用次指数算法计算次指数
Figure 160246DEST_PATH_IMAGE014
，然后计算聚合公钥：
Figure 933030DEST_PATH_IMAGE015
，所述路侧单元接收到所述车端发送的所述多重签名和所述聚合参数后，进行验证多重签名运算，所述验证多重签名运算的公式为：
Figure 739312DEST_PATH_IMAGE016
其中，
Figure 117204DEST_PATH_IMAGE017
为多重签名，
Figure 983529DEST_PATH_IMAGE018
为聚合参数，
Figure 509188DEST_PATH_IMAGE019
为聚合公钥；
步骤4，基于所述多重签名调控交通状态，完成系统构建。
2.根据权利要求1所述的一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，其特征在于，所述公私钥对的获取过程包括：
通过密钥管理机构注册获得所述密钥管理机构颁发的公私钥对，所述公私钥对包括公钥和私钥。
3.根据权利要求1所述的一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，其特征在于，
所述预计算参数的计算公式为：
Figure 119161DEST_PATH_IMAGE020
其中，
Figure 148297DEST_PATH_IMAGE021
和
Figure 654364DEST_PATH_IMAGE022
为预计算参数，
Figure 136161DEST_PATH_IMAGE023
为
Figure 316869DEST_PATH_IMAGE024
的一个生成元，是全系统共用的公开安全参数，
Figure 200512DEST_PATH_IMAGE025
为
Figure 877481DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
阶的循环群，其中
Figure 846574DEST_PATH_IMAGE026
为素数，
Figure 798349DEST_PATH_IMAGE027
为编号为i的车端随机选取的参数，
Figure 67656DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
为紧急事件的哈希值，
Figure 712264DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
为紧急事件，
Figure 371916DEST_PATH_IMAGE010
为编号为i的车端的公钥。
4.根据权利要求1所述的一种基于多重签名的车联网紧急事件汇报系统构建方法，其特征在于，
所述哈希值的计算公式为：
Figure 127382DEST_PATH_IMAGE029
其中，
Figure 720038DEST_PATH_IMAGE012
为哈希值，
Figure 305521DEST_PATH_IMAGE008
是任意常用的哈希函数，
Figure 249206DEST_PATH_IMAGE028
为紧急事件。
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