WO2023116266A1 - 通信加密方法、系统和装置 - Google Patents

通信加密方法、系统和装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023116266A1
WO2023116266A1 PCT/CN2022/132005 CN2022132005W WO2023116266A1 WO 2023116266 A1 WO2023116266 A1 WO 2023116266A1 CN 2022132005 W CN2022132005 W CN 2022132005W WO 2023116266 A1 WO2023116266 A1 WO 2023116266A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
terminal
akma
session
communication encryption
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PCT/CN2022/132005
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张越
王渭清
黄铖斌
薛伟佳
王聪丽
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中国电信股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2023116266A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023116266A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the technical field of communication, and in particular to a communication encryption method, a communication encryption system, a communication encryption device, and a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium.
  • 3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project, 3rd Generation Partnership Project
  • AKMA Authentication and Key Management for Applications, application layer authentication and key management
  • 5G scenarios the AKMA specification can provide fast and efficient authentication, key management and data exchange for terminals and application servers.
  • the AKMA authentication method in order to ensure the security of data transmission between the terminal device and the application server, the AKMA authentication method establishes a session and generates an application layer key, and uses a long-term fixed key to encrypt and decrypt data in communication.
  • a communication encryption method including: receiving the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated by the terminal when the session is established, the ciphertext is encrypted using the Session (session) key, The session key is generated by the terminal according to the random number and the AF (application function) key; the session key is generated according to the random number and the locally stored AF key; the ciphertext is decrypted to obtain the plaintext by using the session key.
  • the communication encryption method further includes: obtaining an AF key generated by the AKMA anchor function network element according to the AKMA key, and the AKMA key is generated during the AKMA authentication process and stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the AKMA key is generated according to an AUSF (Authentication Server Function, authentication server function) key when the main authentication of the terminal network access is successful, and the AUSF key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element.
  • AUSF Authentication Server Function, authentication server function
  • receiving the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated during session establishment includes: after obtaining the AF key, sending a session establishment response to the terminal to establish a communication channel.
  • generating the Session key according to the random number and the locally stored AF key includes: using the random number and the AF key as input parameters of KDF (Key Derivation Function, Key Derivation Function) to generate the Session key , the random number is generated by the terminal using its random number generator after the communication channel is established.
  • KDF Key Derivation Function, Key Derivation Function
  • the input parameters of the KDF also include an octet, an AF identifier, and a length of the AF identifier.
  • a communication encryption device including: a receiving unit, configured to receive the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated by the terminal when the session is established, and the ciphertext is encrypted using the Session key. Encryption, the Session key is generated by the terminal according to the random number and the AF key; the generation unit is used to generate the Session key according to the random number and the locally stored AF key; the decryption unit is used to use the Session key to decrypt the ciphertext Decrypt to get the plaintext.
  • the receiving unit obtains the AF key generated by the AKMA anchor function network element according to the AKMA key.
  • the AKMA key is generated during the AKMA authentication process and stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the AKMA key is generated according to the AUSF key when the main authentication of the terminal network access succeeds, and the AUSF key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element.
  • receiving the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated during session establishment includes: after obtaining the AF key, sending a session establishment response to the terminal to establish a communication channel.
  • the generating unit uses a random number and an AF key as input parameters of the KDF to generate a Session key, and the random number is generated by the terminal using its random number generator after the communication channel is established.
  • the input parameters of the KDF also include an octet, an AF identifier, and a length of the AF identifier.
  • a communication encryption system including: an application function network element, configured to execute the communication encryption method in any one of the foregoing embodiments.
  • the communication encryption system further includes: an AKMA anchor function network element, configured to receive the AKMA key from the AUSF network element, the AKMA key is stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element, and the AF key is generated according to the AKMA key. key.
  • the communication encryption system further includes: an AUSF network element, used to generate an AUSF key when the main authentication of the terminal network access is successful, the AUSF key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element, and the AKMA key is based on the AUSF Key generation.
  • an AUSF network element used to generate an AUSF key when the main authentication of the terminal network access is successful, the AUSF key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element, and the AKMA key is based on the AUSF Key generation.
  • a communication encryption device including: a memory; and a processor coupled to the memory, the processor is configured to execute the method in any one of the above-mentioned embodiments based on instructions stored in the memory device. communication encryption method.
  • a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the communication encryption method in any one of the above-mentioned embodiments is implemented.
  • a computer program including: instructions, which, when executed by a processor, cause the processor to execute the communication encryption method in any one of the above embodiments.
  • FIG. 1 shows a flowchart of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 3 shows a signaling diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 4 shows a block diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption device of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of other embodiments of the communication encryption device of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 6 shows a block diagram of some other embodiments of the communication encryption device of the present disclosure
  • Figure 7 shows a block diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption system of the present disclosure.
  • the inventors of the present disclosure have discovered the following problems in the above-mentioned related technologies: there is a risk of the key being leaked or cracked, resulting in a decrease in communication security.
  • the present disclosure proposes a communication encryption technical solution, which can improve communication security.
  • this disclosure adds a session key level to encrypt and decrypt data; the terminal needs to update the session key before sending data, and the server also needs to update it synchronously after receiving the content The session key.
  • FIG. 1 shows a flowchart of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure.
  • step 110 the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated by the terminal when the session is established this time are received.
  • the ciphertext is encrypted with the Session key, which is generated by the terminal based on the random number and the AF key.
  • two modules are newly added in the terminal: a random number generation module, used for the terminal to generate a random number before each data transmission, as an input variable of the session key update module; a session key update module for Create a new session key for each session.
  • the terminal derives the session key K SESSION and encrypts the session content.
  • a random number RAND is generated by a random number generation module.
  • RAND and the AF key K AF are used as input parameters of the key derivation algorithm to derive the Session key K SESSION and encrypt the data to obtain ciphertext.
  • the terminal sends the ciphertext to the server together with RAND.
  • the terminal sends the ciphertext and random number RAND generated in this session to the server, and the RAND will be used by the server to update the session key.
  • the AF key generated by the AKMA anchor function network element according to the AKMA key is obtained.
  • the AKMA key is generated during the AKMA authentication process and stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the AKMA key is generated according to the AUSF key when the main authentication of the terminal network access is successful, and the AUSF key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element.
  • the terminal network master authentication is successful, and the UDM (Unified Data Management, unified data management) network element generates an AUSF key K AUSF .
  • the AUSF network element generates the AKMA key K AKMA , which is stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element; the AF key K AF is generated by the AKMA anchor function network element, and is stored in the terminal and the AF network element.
  • the terminal initiates an application session establishment request; the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element derive K AF from K AKMA ; the application function network element obtains the K AF key; A session establishment response is initiated, and the channel is established; the random number generator in the terminal generates a random number RAND; RAND and the key K AF are used as input parameters of the key derivation algorithm to derive K SESSION ; K SESSION encrypts data to obtain ciphertext; This time the ciphertext and RAND are sent to the application function network element.
  • a Session key is generated according to the random number and the locally stored AF key.
  • receiving the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated during session establishment includes: after obtaining the AF key, sending a session establishment response to the terminal to establish a communication channel.
  • generating the Session key according to the random number and the locally stored AF key includes: using the random number and the AF key as KDF input parameters to generate the Session key, and the random number is the terminal after the communication channel is established. Generated using its random number generator.
  • the method of KDF can be specifically selected as an HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code, hash operation message authentication code) algorithm.
  • the application function network element receives the RAND of this session, and uses it as an input parameter together with the locally stored K AF to derive K SESSION .
  • step 130 use the Session key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext.
  • the server receives the ciphertext and RAND, updates the session key and obtains the plaintext. For example, the server receives the RAND of this session and uses it as an input parameter together with the locally stored K AF to derive the K SESSION ; use the K SESSION to decrypt the data to obtain the plaintext.
  • K SESSION may be generated using KDF.
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard, Advanced Encryption Standard
  • the plaintext decrypted by K SESSION is hello.
  • an AKMA enhanced communication encryption method is proposed.
  • the random number generation module Before the terminal sends data, the random number generation module generates a random number for this session; the session key update module uses the key derivation algorithm to derive the session key K SESSION between the terminal and the server from the key K AF , using this The key encrypts the contents of the session.
  • the server After the server receives the ciphertext, it can derive the same session key K SESSION , and use this key to decrypt the content to obtain the plaintext.
  • the key is updated by transmitting the random number of the generated key without transmitting the key itself, which can effectively reduce the risk of key interception, solve the problem of untimely update of the session key, and improve the security of the entire system .
  • Fig. 2 shows a schematic diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure.
  • a random number generation module which is used for the terminal to generate a random number before each data transmission, as an input variable of the session key update module
  • a session key update module which is used for Create a new session key for each session.
  • the terminal derives the Session key K SESSION and encrypts the session content. For example, before the terminal sends the session content to the server, a random number generating module is used to generate a random number RAND. RAND and the AF key K AF are used as input parameters of the key derivation algorithm to derive the Session key K SESSION and encrypt the data to obtain ciphertext.
  • the terminal sends the ciphertext to the server together with RAND.
  • the terminal sends the ciphertext and random number RAND generated in this session to the server, and the RAND will be used by the server to update the session key for this session.
  • the server receives the ciphertext and RAND, updates the session key and gets the plaintext. For example, the server receives the RAND of this session and uses it as an input parameter together with the locally stored K AF to derive the K SESSION ; use the K SESSION to decrypt the data to obtain the plaintext.
  • the session key level is added by using the random number generated by the terminal to encrypt and decrypt the data; the terminal generates a random number before sending data to update the session key; the server receives the content After that, the session key needs to be updated synchronously. In this way, a key update mechanism can be established, thereby reducing the risk of key leakage or cracking, and improving communication security.
  • Fig. 3 shows a signaling diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption method of the present disclosure.
  • the main authentication process of terminal network access generates an AUSF key K AUSF , which is stored in the functional network element of the terminal and the authentication server.
  • the AUSF network element In event 2, the AUSF network element generates the AKMA key K AKMA and sends it to the AKMA anchor function network element, and the terminal generates the AKMA key K AKMA .
  • the terminal initiates an application session establishment request.
  • the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element derive K AF from K AKMA .
  • the application function network element After receiving the K AF , the application function network element initiates a session establishment response to the terminal, and the channel is established.
  • the random number generator in the terminal generates a random number RAND.
  • K SESSION encrypts data to obtain ciphertext.
  • the application function network element receives the RAND of this session, and uses it as an input parameter together with the locally stored K AF to derive K SESSION .
  • the session key K SESSION decrypts the data to obtain plaintext.
  • FIG. 4 shows a block diagram of some embodiments of a communication encryption device of the present disclosure.
  • the communication encryption device 4 includes: a receiving unit 41, which is used to receive the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated by the terminal when the session is established, the ciphertext is encrypted using the Session key, and the Session key Generate for the terminal according to the random number and the AF key; the generation unit 42 is used to generate the Session key according to the random number and the locally stored AF key; the decryption unit 43 is used to use the Session key to decrypt to obtain the plaintext .
  • the receiving unit 41 obtains the AF key generated by the AKMA anchor function network element according to the AKMA key.
  • the AKMA key is generated during the AKMA authentication process and stored in the terminal and the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the AKMA key is generated according to the AUSF key when the main authentication of the terminal network access succeeds, and the AKMA key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF network element.
  • receiving the ciphertext sent by the terminal and the random number generated during session establishment includes: after obtaining the AF key, sending a session establishment response to the terminal to establish a communication channel.
  • the generation unit 42 uses the random number and the AF key as input parameters of the KDF to generate the Session key, and the random number is generated by the terminal using its random number generator after the communication channel is established.
  • the input parameters of the KDF also include an octet, an AF identifier, and a length of the AF identifier.
  • Fig. 5 shows a block diagram of other embodiments of the communication encryption device of the present disclosure.
  • the communication encryption device 5 of this embodiment includes: a memory 51 and a processor 52 coupled to the memory 51 , the processor 52 is configured to execute any of the present disclosure based on instructions stored in the memory 51 .
  • a communication encryption method in one embodiment.
  • the memory 51 may include, for example, a system memory, a fixed non-volatile storage medium, and the like.
  • the system memory stores, for example, an operating system, an application program, a Boot Loader, a database, and other programs.
  • Fig. 6 shows a block diagram of some other embodiments of the communication encryption device of the present disclosure.
  • the communication encryption device 6 of this embodiment includes: a memory 610 and a processor 620 coupled to the memory 610.
  • the processor 620 is configured to execute any one of the aforementioned implementations based on instructions stored in the memory 610.
  • the communication encryption method in the example is not limited to: a processor 620 and a processor 620 coupled to the memory 610.
  • the processor 620 is configured to execute any one of the aforementioned implementations based on instructions stored in the memory 610.
  • the communication encryption method in the example.
  • the memory 610 may include, for example, a system memory, a fixed non-volatile storage medium, and the like.
  • the system memory stores, for example, an operating system, an application program, a Boot Loader program, and other programs.
  • the communication encryption device 6 may also include an input and output interface 630, a network interface 640, a storage interface 650, and the like. These interfaces 630 , 640 , and 650 , as well as the memory 610 and the processor 620 may be connected through a bus 660 , for example.
  • the input and output interface 630 provides a connection interface for input and output devices such as a display, a mouse, a keyboard, a touch screen, a microphone, and a speaker.
  • the network interface 640 provides a connection interface for various networked devices.
  • the storage interface 650 provides connection interfaces for external storage devices such as SD cards and U disks.
  • Figure 7 shows a block diagram of some embodiments of the communication encryption system of the present disclosure.
  • the communication encryption system 7 includes: an application function network element 71 configured to execute the communication encryption method in any one of the above embodiments.
  • the communication encryption system 6 further includes: an AKMA anchor function network element 72, configured to receive the AKMA key from the AUSF network element, and generate an AF key according to the AKMA key.
  • an AKMA anchor function network element 72 configured to receive the AKMA key from the AUSF network element, and generate an AF key according to the AKMA key.
  • the communication encryption system 7 also includes: an AUSF network element 73, used to generate an AKMA key when the main authentication of the terminal network access is successful, and the AKMA key is stored in the terminal and the AUSF anchor function network element. The key is generated based on the AUSF key.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Accordingly, the present disclosure can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the present disclosure may take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable non-transitory storage media including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc., having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
  • the methods and systems of the present disclosure may be implemented in many ways.
  • the methods and systems of the present disclosure may be implemented by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination of software, hardware, and firmware.
  • the above sequence of steps for the method is for illustration only, and the steps of the method of the present disclosure are not limited to the sequence described above, unless specifically stated otherwise.
  • the present disclosure can also be implemented as programs recorded in recording media, the programs including machine-readable instructions for realizing the method according to the present disclosure.
  • the present disclosure also covers a recording medium storing a program for executing the method according to the present disclosure.

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Abstract

本公开涉及一种通信加密方法、系统和装置，涉及通信技术领域。该通信加密方法，包括：接收终端发来的密文和终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，密文利用Session密钥进行加密，Session密钥为终端根据随机数和AF密钥生成；根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥；利用Session密钥，对密文进行解密，获取明文。

Description

通信加密方法、系统和装置
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请是以CN申请号为202111589904.9，申请日为2021年12月23日的申请为基础，并主张其优先权，该CN申请的公开内容在此作为整体引入本申请中。
技术领域
本公开涉及通信技术领域，特别涉及一种通信加密方法、通信加密系统、通信加密装置和非易失性计算机可读存储介质。
背景技术
3GPP(3rd Generation Partnership Project，第三代合作伙伴计划)提出AKMA(Authentication and Key Management for Applications，应用层认证和密钥管理)规范，应用于物联网领域。在5G场景中，AKMA规范可以为终端与应用服务器提供快速高效的鉴权、密钥管理与数据交换。
在相关技术中，为了保证终端设备与应用服务器之间数据传输的安全性，AKMA认证方式通过建立会话并产生应用层密钥，采用长期固定的密钥对通信中的数据进行加解密。
发明内容
根据本公开的一些实施例，提供了一种通信加密方法，包括：接收终端发来的密文和终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，密文利用Session(会话)密钥进行加密，Session密钥为终端根据随机数和AF(应用功能)密钥生成；根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥；利用Session密钥，对密文进行解密，获取明文。
在一些实施例中，通信加密方法还包括：获取AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的AF密钥，AKMA密钥在AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中。
在一些实施例中，AKMA密钥为在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，根据AUSF(Authentication Server Function，认证服务器功能)密钥生成，AUSF密钥保存在终端和AUSF网元中。
在一些实施例中，接收终端发来的密文和在此次会话建立时生成的随机数包括：在获取了AF密钥后，向终端发起会话建立响应，以建立通信通道。
在一些实施例中，根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥包括：将随机数和AF密钥作为KDF(Key Derivation Function，密钥派生函数)的入参，生成Session密钥，随机数为终端在通信通道建立后利用其随机数生成器生成。
在一些实施例中，KDF的入参还包括一个八位位组、AF标识和AF标识的长度。
根据本公开的另一些实施例，提供一种通信加密装置，包括：接收单元，用于接收终端发来的密文和终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，密文利用Session密钥进行加密，Session密钥为终端根据随机数和AF密钥生成；生成单元，用于根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥；解密单元，用于利用Session密钥，对密文进行解密，获取明文。
在一些实施例中，接收单元获取AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的AF密钥，AKMA密钥为AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中。
在一些实施例中，AKMA密钥为在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，根据AUSF密钥生成，AUSF密钥保存在终端和AUSF网元中。
在一些实施例中，接收终端发来的密文和在此次会话建立时生成的随机数包括：在获取了AF密钥后，向终端发起会话建立响应，以建立通信通道。
在一些实施例中，生成单元将随机数和AF密钥作为KDF的入参，生成Session密钥，随机数为终端在通信通道建立后利用其随机数生成器生成。
在一些实施例中，KDF的入参还包括一个八位位组、AF标识和AF标识的长度。
根据本公开的又一些实施例，提供一种通信加密系统，包括：应用功能网元，用于执行上述任一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
在一些实施例中，通信加密系统还包括：AKMA锚功能网元，用于接收来自AUSF网元的AKMA密钥，AKMA密钥保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中，根据AKMA密钥生成AF密钥。
在一些实施例中，通信加密系统还包括：AUSF网元，用于在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，产生AUSF密钥，AUSF密钥保存在终端和AUSF网元中，AKMA密钥根据AUSF密钥生成。
根据本公开的再一些实施例，提供一种通信加密装置，包括：存储器；和耦接至存储器的处理器，处理器被配置为基于存储在存储器装置中的指令，执行上述任一个 实施例中的通信加密方法。
根据本公开的再一些实施例，提供一种非易失性计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现上述任一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
根据本公开的再一些实施例，提供一种计算机程序，包括：指令，指令当由处理器执行时使处理器执行上述任一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
附图说明
构成说明书的一部分的附图描述了本公开的实施例，并且连同说明书一起用于解释本公开的原理。
参照附图，根据下面的详细描述，可以更加清楚地理解本公开：
图1示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的流程图；
图2示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的示意图；
图3示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的信令图；
图4示出本公开的通信加密装置的一些实施例的框图；
图5示出本公开的通信加密装置的另一些实施例的框图；
图6示出本公开的通信加密装置的又一些实施例的框图；
图7示出本公开的通信加密系统的一些实施例的框图。
具体实施方式
现在将参照附图来详细描述本公开的各种示例性实施例。应注意到：除非另外具体说明，否则在这些实施例中阐述的部件和步骤的相对布置、数字表达式和数值不限制本公开的范围。
同时，应当明白，为了便于描述，附图中所示出的各个部分的尺寸并不是按照实际的比例关系绘制的。
以下对至少一个示例性实施例的描述实际上仅仅是说明性的，决不作为对本公开及其应用或使用的任何限制。
对于相关领域普通技术人员已知的技术、方法和设备可能不作详细讨论，但在适当情况下，技术、方法和设备应当被视为说明书的一部分。
在这里示出和讨论的所有示例中，任何具体值应被解释为仅仅是示例性的，而不是作为限制。因此，示例性实施例的其它示例可以具有不同的值。
应注意到：相似的标号和字母在下面的附图中表示类似项，因此，一旦某一项在一个附图中被定义，则在随后的附图中不需要对其进行进一步讨论。
本公开的发明人发现上述相关技术中存在如下问题：具有密钥泄露或被破解的风险，导致通信安全性下降。
鉴于此，本公开提出了一种通信加密技术方案，能够提高通信安全性。
如前所述，为了解决AKMA认证方式无密钥更新机制导致的终端设备与应用服务器交互时会话密钥不能及时更新的技术问题，从而降低因加密内容累积而导致会话密钥被破解的概率，本公开在AKMA密钥派生机制的基础上，新增会话密钥这一密钥层级，对数据进行加解密；终端在数据发送之前需更新会话密钥，服务器在收到内容后也需要同步更新本次会话密钥。
例如，可以通过如下的实施例实现本公开的技术方案。
图1示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的流程图。
如图1所示，在步骤110中，接收终端发来的密文和终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数。密文利用Session密钥进行加密，Session密钥为终端根据随机数和AF密钥生成。
在一些实施例中，在终端新增两个模块：随机数生成模块，用于终端在每次数据发送之前生成随机数，作为会话密钥更新模块的输入变量；会话密钥更新模块，用于为每次会话创建新的会话密钥。
例如，终端派生Session密钥K SESSION并加密会话内容。在终端向服务器发送会话内容前，利用随机数生成模块生成随机数RAND。RAND与AF密钥K AF作为密钥派生算法的入参，派生出Session密钥K SESSION，并对数据加密得到密文。
例如，终端将密文与RAND一起发送给服务器。终端将本次会话生成的密文与随机数RAND发送给服务器，该RAND将用于服务器更新本次会话密钥。
在一些实施例中，获取AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的AF密钥。AKMA密钥在AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中。
例如，AKMA密钥为在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，根据AUSF密钥生成，AUSF密钥保存在终端和AUSF网元中。
在一些实施例中，终端入网主认证成功，UDM(Unified Data Management，统一数据管理)网元产生AUSF密钥K AUSF。AUSF网元产生AKMA密钥K AKMA，保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中；AKMA锚功能网元产生AF密钥K AF，保存在终端和 AF网元中。
在一些实施例中，终端发起应用会话建立请求；终端和AKMA锚功能网元由K AKMA派生出K AF；应用功能网元获得K AF密钥；应用功能网元收到K AF后，向终端发起会话建立响应，通道建立；终端中的随机数生成器生成随机数RAND；RAND与密钥K AF作为密钥派生算法的入参，派生出K SESSION；K SESSION对数据加密得到密文；将本次密文与RAND发送给应用功能网元。
在步骤120中，根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥。
在一些实施例中，接收终端发来的密文和在此次会话建立时生成的随机数包括：在获取了AF密钥后，向终端发起会话建立响应，以建立通信通道。
在一些实施例中，根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥包括：将随机数和AF密钥作为KDF的入参，生成Session密钥，随机数为终端在通信通道建立后利用其随机数生成器生成。例如，可以将KDF的方法具体选择为HMAC(Hash-based Message Authentication Code，哈希运算消息认证码)算法。
例如，应用功能网元收到本次会话的RAND，与存储在本地的K AF一起作为入参，派生出K SESSION。
在步骤130中，利用Session密钥，对密文进行解密，获取明文。
在一些实施例中，服务器接收密文与RAND，更新会话密钥并得到明文。例如，服务器收到本次会话的RAND，与存储在本地的K AF一起作为入参，派生出K SESSION；利用K SESSION对数据解密得到明文。
在一些实施例中，可以利用KDF生成K SESSION。
例如，KDF的输入参数由上一级密钥K AF和字符串S构成：K SESSION＝KDF(K AF，S)＝HMAC-SHA-256(K AF，S)，S＝FC||P0||L0||P1。
其中，FC＝0x82，P0＝AF_ID，P1＝RAND，L0＝length of AF_ID，RAND由终端中的随机数生成器生成。
在一些实施例中，KDF的输入为K AF＝123；AF_ID＝112234；L0＝6；RAND＝2345；待加密的文本内容为hello；生成的K SESSION为：aa221476b8e5ae8bf0eb28644b092165f9738771dff4b81baebc54a12b961756。
在一些实施例中，可以使用AES(Advanced Encryption Standard，高级加密标准)对上述文本内容加解密，得到利用K SESSION加密后的密文为U2FsdGVkX19/ikVmu11GX/avP66pIuc6hBLbUfAwFVg＝，利用K SESSION解密后的明 文为hello。
上述实施例中，提出了AKMA增强通信加密方法。终端在发送数据之前，由随机数生成模块生成本次会话随机数；会话密钥更新模块内利用密钥派生算法由密钥K AF派生出终端与服务器之间的会话密钥K SESSION，用此密钥对会话内容进行加密。服务器收到密文后，可派生出相同的会话密钥K SESSION，用此密钥对内容进行解密得到明文。
这样，通过传输生成密钥的随机数来而对密钥进行更新，而不传输密钥本身，可以有效降低密钥截获风险，并解决会话密钥更新不及时的问题，提高整个系统的安全性。
图2示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的示意图。
如图2所示，在终端新增两个模块：随机数生成模块，用于终端在每次数据发送之前生成随机数，作为会话密钥更新模块的输入变量；会话密钥更新模块，用于为每次会话创建新的会话密钥。可以通过如下步骤实现本公开的技术方案。
终端派生Session密钥K SESSION并加密会话内容。例如，在终端向服务器发送会话内容前，利用随机数生成模块生成随机数RAND。RAND与AF密钥K AF作为密钥派生算法的入参，派生出Session密钥K SESSION，并对数据加密得到密文。
终端将密文与RAND一起发送给服务器。例如，终端将本次会话生成的密文与随机数RAND发送给服务器，该RAND将用于服务器更新本次会话密钥。
服务器接收密文与RAND，更新会话密钥并得到明文。例如，服务器收到本次会话的RAND，与存储在本地的K AF一起作为入参，派生出K SESSION；利用K SESSION对数据解密得到明文。
在上述实施例中，利用终端生成的随机数，新增了Session密钥这一密钥层级，对数据进行加解密；终端在数据发送之前生成随机数以更新会话密钥；服务器在收到内容后也需要同步更新本次会话密钥。这样，能够建立密钥更新机制，从而降低密钥泄露或被破解的风险，提高通信安全性。
图3示出本公开的通信加密方法的一些实施例的信令图。
如图3所示，在事件1中，终端入网主认证过程产生AUSF密钥K AUSF，保存在终端和认证服务器功能网元中。
在事件2中，AUSF网元产生AKMA密钥K AKMA，发送给AKMA锚功能网元中，终端产生AKMA密钥K AKMA。
在事件3中，终端发起应用会话建立请求.
在事件4中，终端和AKMA锚功能网元由K AKMA派生出K AF。
在事件5中，应用功能网元获得K AF密钥。
在事件6中，应用功能网元收到K AF后，向终端发起会话建立响应，通道建立。
在事件7中，终端中的随机数生成器生成随机数RAND。
在事件8中，RAND与密钥K AF作为密钥派生算法的入参，派生出K SESSION。
在事件9中，K SESSION对数据加密得到密文。
在事件10中，将本次密文与RAND发送给应用功能网元。
在事件11中，应用功能网元收到本次会话的RAND，与存储在本地的K AF一起作为入参，派生出K SESSION。
在事件12中，会话密钥K SESSION对数据解密得到明文。
图4示出本公开的通信加密装置的一些实施例的框图。
如图4所示，通信加密装置4包括：接收单元41，用于接收终端发来的密文和终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，密文利用Session密钥进行加密，Session密钥为终端根据随机数和AF密钥生成；生成单元42，用于根据随机数和本地存储的AF密钥，生成Session密钥；解密单元43，用于利用Session密钥，对进行解密，获取明文。
在一些实施例中，接收单元41获取AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的AF密钥，AKMA密钥在进行AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在终端和AKMA锚功能网元中。
在一些实施例中，AKMA密钥为在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，根据AUSF密钥生成，AKMA密钥保存在终端和AUSF网元中。
在一些实施例中，接收终端发来的密文和在此次会话建立时生成的随机数包括：在获取了AF密钥后，向终端发起会话建立响应，以建立通信通道。
在一些实施例中，生成单元42将随机数和AF密钥作为KDF的入参，生成Session密钥，随机数为终端在通信通道建立后利用其随机数生成器生成。
在一些实施例中，KDF的入参还包括一个八位位组、AF标识和AF标识的长度。
图5示出本公开的通信加密装置的另一些实施例的框图。
如图5所示，该实施例的通信加密装置5包括：存储器51以及耦接至该存储器51的处理器52，处理器52被配置为基于存储在存储器51中的指令，执行本公开中 任意一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
其中，存储器51例如可以包括系统存储器、固定非易失性存储介质等。系统存储器例如存储有操作系统、应用程序、引导装载程序Boot Loader、数据库以及其他程序等。
图6示出本公开的通信加密装置的又一些实施例的框图。
如图6所示，该实施例的通信加密装置6包括：存储器610以及耦接至该存储器610的处理器620，处理器620被配置为基于存储在存储器610中的指令，执行前述任意一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
存储器610例如可以包括系统存储器、固定非易失性存储介质等。系统存储器例如存储有操作系统、应用程序、引导装载程序Boot Loader以及其他程序等。
通信加密装置6还可以包括输入输出接口630、网络接口640、存储接口650等。这些接口630、640、650以及存储器610和处理器620之间例如可以通过总线660连接。其中，输入输出接口630为显示器、鼠标、键盘、触摸屏、麦克、音箱等输入输出设备提供连接接口。网络接口640为各种联网设备提供连接接口。存储接口650为SD卡、U盘等外置存储设备提供连接接口。
图7示出本公开的通信加密系统的一些实施例的框图。
如图7所示，通信加密系统7包括：应用功能网元71，用于执行上述任一个实施例中的通信加密方法。
在一些实施例中，通信加密系统6还包括：AKMA锚功能网元72，用于接收来自AUSF网元的AKMA密钥，根据AKMA密钥生成AF密钥。
在一些实施例中，通信加密系统7还包括：AUSF网元73，用于在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，产生AKMA密钥，AKMA密钥保存在终端和AUSF锚功能网元中，AKMA密钥根据AUSF密钥生成。
本领域内的技术人员应当明白，本公开的实施例可提供为方法、系统、或计算机程序产品。因此，本公开可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且，本公开可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用非瞬时性存储介质包括但不限于磁盘存储器、CD-ROM、光学存储器等上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
至此，已经详细描述了根据本公开的通信加密方法、通信加密系统、通信加密装置和非易失性计算机可读存储介质。为了避免遮蔽本公开的构思，没有描述本领域所 公知的一些细节。本领域技术人员根据上面的描述，完全可以明白如何实施这里公开的技术方案。
可能以许多方式来实现本公开的方法和系统。例如，可通过软件、硬件、固件或者软件、硬件、固件的任何组合来实现本公开的方法和系统。用于方法的步骤的上述顺序仅是为了进行说明，本公开的方法的步骤不限于以上具体描述的顺序，除非以其它方式特别说明。此外，在一些实施例中，还可将本公开实施为记录在记录介质中的程序，这些程序包括用于实现根据本公开的方法的机器可读指令。因而，本公开还覆盖存储用于执行根据本公开的方法的程序的记录介质。
虽然已经通过示例对本公开的一些特定实施例进行了详细说明，但是本领域的技术人员应该理解，以上示例仅是为了进行说明，而不是为了限制本公开的范围。本领域的技术人员应该理解，可在不脱离本公开的范围和精神的情况下，对以上实施例进行修改。本公开的范围由所附权利要求来限定。

Claims (16)

  1. 一种通信加密方法，包括：
    接收终端发来的密文和所述终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，所述密文利用会话Session密钥进行加密，所述Session密钥为所述终端根据所述随机数和应用功能AF密钥生成；
    根据所述随机数和本地存储的所述AF密钥，生成所述Session密钥；
    利用所述Session密钥，对所述密文进行解密，获取明文。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的通信加密方法，还包括：
    获取应用层认证和密钥管理AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的所述AF密钥，所述AKMA密钥在AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在所述终端和所述AKMA锚功能网元中。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述AKMA密钥为在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，根据认证服务器功能AUSF密钥生成，所述AUSF密钥保存在所述终端和所述AUSF网元中。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述接收终端发来的密文和在此次会话建立时生成的随机数包括：
    在获取了所述AF密钥后，向所述终端发起会话建立响应，以建立通信通道。
  5. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述根据所述随机数和本地存储的所述AF密钥，生成所述Session密钥包括：
    将所述随机数和所述AF密钥作为密钥派生函数KDF的入参，生成所述Session密钥，所述随机数为所述终端在通信通道建立后利用其随机数生成器生成。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述KDF的入参还包括一个八位位组、AF标识和所述AF标识的长度。
  7. 根据权利要求5所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述KDF包括哈希运算消息认证码HMAC算法。
  8. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的通信加密方法，其中，所述密文利用高级加密标准AES进行加密，
    所述利用所述Session密钥，对所述密文进行解密，获取明文包括：
    利用AES，对所述密文进行解密。
  9. 一种通信加密装置，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收终端发来的密文和所述终端在此次会话建立时生成的随机数，所述密文利用会话Session密钥进行加密，所述Session密钥为所述终端根据所述随机数和应用功能AF密钥生成；
    生成单元，用于根据所述随机数和本地存储的所述AF密钥，生成所述Session密钥；
    解密单元，用于利用所述Session密钥，对所述进行密文解密，获取明文。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的通信加密装置，其中，
    所述接收单元获取应用认证和密钥管理AKMA锚功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成的所述AF密钥，所述AKMA密钥在AKMA认证过程中产生，保存在所述终端和所述AKMA锚功能网元中。
  11. 一种通信加密系统，包括：
    应用功能网元，用于执行权利要求1-8任一项所述的通信加密方法。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的通信加密系统，还包括：
    应用层认证和密钥管理AKMA锚功能网元，用于接收来自认证服务器功能AUSF网元的AKMA密钥，所述AKMA密钥保存在所述终端和所述AKMA锚功能网元中，根据所述AKMA密钥生成AF密钥。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的通信加密系统，还包括：
    AUSF网元，用于在终端入网主认证成功的情况下，产生AKMA密钥，所述AKMA密钥保存在所述终端和所述AKMA锚功能网元中，所述AKMA密钥根据AUSF密钥生成。
  14. 一种通信加密装置，包括：
    存储器；和
    耦接至所述存储器的处理器，所述处理器被配置为基于存储在所述存储器中的指令，执行权利要求1-8任一项所述的通信加密方法。
  15. 一种非易失性计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时实现权利要求1-8任一项所述的通信加密方法。
  16. 一种计算机程序，包括：
    指令，所述指令当由处理器执行时使所述处理器执行根据权利要求1-8中任一项所述的通信加密方法。
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