WO2021218978A1 - 密钥管理方法、设备及系统 - Google Patents

密钥管理方法、设备及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021218978A1
WO2021218978A1 PCT/CN2021/090348 CN2021090348W WO2021218978A1 WO 2021218978 A1 WO2021218978 A1 WO 2021218978A1 CN 2021090348 W CN2021090348 W CN 2021090348W WO 2021218978 A1 WO2021218978 A1 WO 2021218978A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
request message
network element
terminal device
authentication
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2021/090348
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
郭龙华
李�赫
吴�荣
吴义壮
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to EP21796895.7A priority Critical patent/EP4135377A4/en
Publication of WO2021218978A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021218978A1/zh
Priority to US18/050,977 priority patent/US20230086032A1/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0431—Key distribution or pre-distribution; Key agreement
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/14—Session management
    • H04L67/141—Setup of application sessions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/065—Continuous authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communication technology, in particular to key management methods, equipment and systems.
  • terminal devices can support application authentication and key management (authentication and key management for applications, AKMA) services.
  • AKMA authentication and key management for applications
  • the terminal device and the application function network element perform data transmission, and the terminal device needs to negotiate the communication key between the two with the application function network element.
  • the communication key can be used for identity authentication and communication protection .
  • the application function network element obtains the communication key between the application function network element and the terminal device from the anchor function network element of AKMA.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element generates the communication key between the application function network element and the terminal device according to the AKMA key. Communication key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element can obtain the AKMA key from the authentication server function network element corresponding to the terminal device.
  • This application provides a key management method, communication device, and communication system to ensure that after re-authentication occurs in the AKMA process, the terminal device and the application function network element can still successfully negotiate the relationship between the application function network element and the terminal device. Communication key.
  • the present application provides a key management method.
  • the method includes: a terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to a first application function network element, where the first application session establishment request message carries the information of the first key Identification information, the first key is the application authentication and key management AKMA key; the terminal device receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; the terminal device sends the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process A response message of an authentication request message; the terminal device receives a response message of the first application session establishment request message from the first application function network element; the terminal device uses the first key to derive the terminal device and the second A communication key between application function network elements.
  • the terminal device after sending the re-authentication, the terminal device still uses the first key generated before the re-authentication to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element obtain the same
  • the communication keys between the application function network elements are consistent, so as to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and realize the communication between the terminal device and the application function network element.
  • Secure communication This method can also avoid application session service interruption, reduce service delay, and improve user experience.
  • the terminal device After the terminal device sends a response message to the first authentication request message, the first key and the identification information of the first key are not deleted.
  • the terminal device does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device if the first application session establishment request is sent before the re-authentication process, and the response message of the first application session establishment request message is not received, the terminal device does not delete the first key And the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device if the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and has received the response message of the first application session establishment request message, but the terminal device and the terminal device are not deduced For the communication key between the first application function network elements, the terminal device does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device after receiving the response message from the first application session establishment request message, determines to use the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element .
  • the terminal device generates a second key after sending a response message to the first authentication request message, and the second key is an AKMA key.
  • the terminal device determines that the first application session establishment request message was sent before the re-authentication process, the terminal device determines to use the first key to derive the terminal device and the first application Communication key between functional network elements.
  • the terminal device determines that the first application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the first key
  • the terminal device determines to use the first key to derive the terminal device and the first key.
  • the terminal device determines, according to the identification information of the first key in the context of the first application session, that the first application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device After the terminal device sends a response message to the first authentication request message, it saves the sequence of sending the first application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process.
  • the terminal device when the application session request messages carrying the identification information of the first key are all responded, the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device when the application session request messages for which the terminal device does not receive a response message are all sent after the re-authentication process, the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device after the terminal device sends a response message to the first authentication request message, the terminal device sends a second application session establishment request message to the second application function network element, and the second application session establishment request message Carries the identification information of the second key, and the second key is an AKMA key.
  • the terminal device also uses the identification information of the first key or the identification information of the first application function network element to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the present application provides a key management method, the method includes: an authentication service function network element receives a second authentication request in a re-authentication process; the authentication service function network element sends the re-authentication request The response message of the second authentication request in the process; the authentication service function network element receives the first key request message from the application authentication and key management AKMA anchor function network element, the first key request message Carrying identification information of the first key, the first key being an AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process; the authentication service function network element sends the first key to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the authentication service function network element still sends the first key generated before the re-authentication to the AKMA anchor function network element, so that the AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate
  • the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element ensures the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element generated by the terminal device and the communication between the terminal device and the application function network element obtained by the application function network element
  • the keys are consistent to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and secure communication between the terminal device and the application function network element is realized.
  • This method can also avoid application session service interruption, reduce service delay, and improve user experience.
  • the authentication service function network element sends a response message to the second authentication request, the first key and the identification information of the first key are not deleted.
  • the authentication service function network element receives a first instruction from the terminal device, where the first instruction is used to instruct not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the first indication is carried in the second authentication request.
  • the authentication service function network element when the re-authentication process is successful, the authentication service function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the authentication service function network element After the authentication service function network element sends a response message to the second authentication request, it generates a second key, and the second key is an AKMA key.
  • the authentication service function network element determines the first key according to the identification information of the first key.
  • this application provides a key management method, which includes: after the re-authentication process, the authentication and key management of the application, the AKMA anchor function network element receives the first request from the first application function network element Message, the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, the first request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is the re-authentication
  • the AKMA key generated before the right process; the AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element; the AKMA anchor function network element sends the The application function network element sends the communication key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element still uses the first key generated before the re-authentication to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure that the terminal device generated by the terminal device.
  • the communication key between the application function network element and the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element obtained by the application function network element are consistent, so as to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the terminal device and application
  • the communication key between the functional network elements realizes the secure communication between the terminal device and the application functional network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element receives a second indication from the terminal device or the authentication service function network element, and the second indication is used to indicate not to delete the first key and the first secret.
  • the identification information of the key is used to indicate not to delete the first key and the first secret.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element when the re-authentication process is successful, the AKMA anchor function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element obtains a second key, and the second key is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element determines the first key according to the identification information of the first key.
  • the present application provides a key management method, the method includes: a terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to a first application function network element, the first application session establishment request message carrying a first key
  • the first key is the authentication and key management AKMA key of the application
  • the terminal device receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process
  • the terminal device sends the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process
  • the response message of the first authentication request message
  • the terminal device receives the response message of the first application session establishment request message from the first application function network element
  • the terminal device sends the second application to the first application function network element
  • a session establishment request message, the second application session establishment request message carries identification information of a second key, and the second key is an AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the terminal device uses the identification information of the first key generated before the re-authentication and the application function network element to initiate an application session establishment process, and after the re-authentication is sent, the terminal device uses the post-re-authentication
  • the identification information of the generated second key re-initiates the application session establishment process with the application function network element, thereby ensuring that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and realize Secure communication between terminal equipment and application function network elements.
  • the terminal device determines that the first application session establishment failed according to the response message of the first application session establishment request message; the terminal device sends a second application session establishment request to the first application function network element information.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message includes any one or more of the following: a third indication, a first failure reason value, or a second failure reason value, where the third indication is used for Indicates that the establishment of the first application session fails, the first failure reason value is used to indicate that the authentication service function network element cannot be found, and the second failure reason value is used to indicate that the first key identification information corresponding to the first key cannot be determined.
  • a key which is used by the authentication service function network element to generate the first key.
  • the terminal device sends the second application session establishment request message to the first application server according to a first identifier, where the first identifier is used to identify that the re-authentication process is executed on the terminal device.
  • the first identifier is used to identify that the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request message before the main authentication process is executed.
  • the terminal device sets the first identifier on the terminal device.
  • the terminal device sends the second application session establishment request message to the first application server, and the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device is derived from the first key.
  • the terminal device if it receives the response message of the first application session establishment request message, it uses the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device to communicate with the first application function network. If the element fails to perform secure communication, the terminal device sends the second application session establishment request message to the first application server, and the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device is derived from the first key Come.
  • the terminal device deletes the context of the first application session; or the terminal device instructs the first application function network element to delete the context of the first application session.
  • the present application provides a key management method, which includes: after the re-authentication process, the authentication and key management of the application, the AKMA anchor function network element receives the first request from the first application function network element Message, the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, the first request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is the re-authentication
  • the AKMA key generated before the authorization process; the AKMA anchor function network element cannot determine the authentication service function network element corresponding to the identification information of the first key; the AKMA anchor function network element reports to the first application function network element Sending a response message of the first request message, where the response message of the first request message indicates that the communication key request between the terminal device and the first application function network element has failed.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element indicates that the first application function network element cannot determine the authentication service function Network element so that the first application function network element indicates that the terminal device fails to establish the first application session, so that the terminal device can re-initiate the application session establishment process, thereby ensuring that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the terminal device and the application function network
  • the communication key between the elements realizes the secure communication between the terminal device and the application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element sends an authentication service function network element path information request message to the data management network element, and the authentication service function network element path information request message carries the identification of the first key Information; the AKMA anchor function network element receives a response message from the data management network element of the authentication service function network element path information request message, and the response message of the authentication service function network element path information request message indicates the authentication service The path information request of the functional network element failed.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element sends a first failure reason value to the first application function network element, and the first failure reason value indicates that the authentication service function network element cannot be found.
  • the present application provides a key management method, the method includes: an authentication service function network element receives a second authentication request in a re-authentication process; the authentication service function network element sends the re-authentication request The response message of the second authentication request in the process;
  • the authentication service function network element receives a first key request message from the application authentication and key management AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first key request message carries the identification information of the first key, and the first key
  • the key is the AKMA key generated by the authentication service function network element before the re-authentication process;
  • the authentication service function network element cannot determine the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key
  • the authentication service function network element sends a response message of the first key request message to the AKMA anchor function network element, where the response message of the first key request message is used to indicate that the first key request fails.
  • the authentication service function network element indicates that the AKMA anchor function network element cannot determine the first key, So that the AKMA anchor function network element indicates that the communication key request between the application function network element terminal device and the application function network element has failed, so that the application function network element indicates that the terminal device has failed to establish the first application session, so that the terminal device can re-initiate
  • the application session establishment process ensures that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and secure communication between the terminal device and the application function network element is realized.
  • the authentication service function network element sends a second failure reason value to the AKMA anchor function network element, and the second failure reason value indicates that the first key identification information corresponding to the first key cannot be determined.
  • the second failure reason value indicates that the first key identification information corresponding to the first key cannot be determined.
  • the present application provides a terminal device that has the function of implementing the method in the first aspect or the fourth aspect.
  • This function can be realized by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware and software include one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
  • the structure of the terminal device includes a processor and a transceiver, and the processor is configured to support the terminal device to execute the method in the first or fourth aspect above, and the transceiver is used to support the terminal device and Communication between other devices.
  • the terminal device may also include a memory, which is used for coupling with the processor, and stores the necessary program instructions and data of the terminal device.
  • this application provides an authentication service function network element, which has the function of implementing the method in the second aspect or the sixth aspect.
  • This function can be realized by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware and software include one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
  • the structure of the authentication service function network element includes a processor and a transceiver, and the processor is configured to support the authentication service function network element to perform the second aspect or the sixth aspect.
  • the transceiver is used to support the communication between the authentication service function network element and other devices.
  • the authentication service function network element may further include a memory, which is used for coupling with the processor and stores necessary program instructions and data for the authentication service function network element.
  • the present application provides an AKMA anchor function network element for authentication and key management of an application.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element has the function of implementing the method in the third aspect or the fifth aspect. This function can be realized by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware and software include one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
  • the structure of the AKMA anchor function network element includes a processor and a transceiver, and the processor is configured to support the AKMA anchor function network element to perform the third aspect or the fifth aspect.
  • the transceiver is used to support the communication between the AKMA anchor function network element and other devices.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element may further include a memory, which is used for coupling with the processor, and stores the necessary program instructions and data of the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the present application provides a device (for example, the device may be a chip system).
  • the device includes a processor and can execute any one or more of the methods in the first to sixth aspects.
  • the device further includes a memory for storing necessary program instructions and data.
  • this application provides a computer program product, which when running on a computer, enables the computer to execute any one or more of the methods in the first to sixth aspects.
  • the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium that stores instructions in the computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer-readable storage medium runs on a computer, the computer can execute the above-mentioned first to sixth aspects. Any one or more of the methods.
  • this application provides a communication system, which includes the authentication service function network element involved in the second aspect and the authentication and key management AKMA anchor function network of the application involved in the second aspect. Yuan.
  • the system also includes other equipment such as the application function network elements involved in the second aspect.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture of a 5G system
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of an AKMA architecture
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a process for generating an AKMA key
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a triggering and execution flow of master authentication
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of an AKMA process
  • Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of re-authentication occurring in the AKMA process in scenario 1;
  • Figure 7 is a schematic diagram of re-authentication occurring in the AKMA process in scenario 2;
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a key management system provided by this application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of the architecture of another key management system provided by this application.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of a key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 11 is a schematic flowchart of a key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic flowchart of another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 13 is a schematic flowchart of another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic flowchart of another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic flowchart of yet another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 16 is a schematic flowchart of yet another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 17 is a schematic flowchart of yet another key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 18 is a schematic flowchart of a key management method provided by this application.
  • FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by this application.
  • FIG. 20 is a schematic structural diagram of another communication device provided by this application.
  • LTE long term evolution
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunication System
  • WiMAX Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access
  • 5G Fifth Generation
  • New Radio New Radio
  • the 5G system may include terminal equipment, access network and core network.
  • the terminal device is a device with wireless transceiver function, which can be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld, wearable or vehicle-mounted; it can also be deployed on the water (such as ships, etc.); it can also be deployed in the air (such as Airplanes, balloons and satellites etc.).
  • Terminal devices can be mobile phones, tablets, computers with wireless transceiver functions, virtual reality (VR) terminal devices, augmented reality (AR) terminal devices, industrial control (industrial control) )
  • in-vehicle terminal equipment unmanned (self-driving) wireless terminal, remote medical (remote medical) wireless terminal, smart grid (smart grid) wireless terminal, transportation safety (transportation safety) Wireless terminals in smart cities, wireless terminals in smart cities, wireless terminals in smart homes, wearable terminal devices, and so on.
  • Terminal equipment can sometimes be called terminal, user equipment (UE), access terminal equipment, vehicle-mounted terminal, industrial control terminal, UE unit, UE station, mobile station, mobile station, remote station, remote terminal equipment, mobile Equipment, UE agent or UE device, etc.
  • the terminal device can also be fixed or mobile.
  • Fig. 1 and the terminal device in this application are introduced by taking UE as an example.
  • the access network is used to implement access-related functions, and can provide network access functions for authorized users in a specific area.
  • the access network forwards control signals and user data between the terminal equipment and the core network.
  • the access network may include access network equipment, which may be equipment that provides access for terminal equipment, and may include radio access network (RAN) equipment and AN equipment.
  • the RAN device is mainly a wireless network device in the 3GPP network, and the AN device may be an access network device that is not defined by the 3GPP.
  • the names of devices with base station functions may be different. For example, in 5G systems, they are called RAN or next-generation Node basestation (gNB); In the LTE system, it is called an evolved NodeB (eNB or eNodeB).
  • gNB next-generation Node basestation
  • eNB evolved NodeB
  • the core network is responsible for maintaining the subscription data of the mobile network, and provides functions such as session management, mobility management, policy management, and security authentication for the UE.
  • the core network can include the following network elements: user plane function (UPF), authentication server function (authentication server function, AUSF), access and mobility management function (AMF), session management function (session management function, SMF), network exposure function (NEF), network function repository function (NRF), policy control function (PCF), unified data management (unified data management) , UDM) and application function (AF).
  • UPF user plane function
  • authentication server function authentication server function
  • AMF access and mobility management function
  • SMF session management function
  • NEF network exposure function
  • NRF network function repository function
  • PCF policy control function
  • UDM application function
  • AF application function
  • AMF is mainly responsible for the mobility management in the mobile network, such as user location update, user registration network, user handover, etc.
  • SMF is mainly responsible for session management in the mobile network, such as session establishment, modification, and release.
  • UPF is responsible for the forwarding and receiving of user data in terminal equipment. It can receive user data from the data network and transmit it to the terminal device through the access network device; it can also receive user data from the terminal device through the access network device and forward it to the data network.
  • PCF mainly supports the provision of a unified policy framework to control network behavior, provides policy rules to the control layer network functions, and is responsible for obtaining user subscription information related to policy decisions.
  • AUSF used to perform UE safety authentication.
  • NEF is mainly used to support the opening of capabilities and events.
  • NRF is used to provide storage function and selection function of network function entity information for other network elements.
  • UDM is used to store user data, such as subscription data, authentication/authorization data, etc.
  • AF interacts with the 3GPP core network to provide application layer services, such as providing data routing on the application layer, providing access network capability opening functions, interacting with the policy framework to provide policy control, and interacting with the IP multimedia subsystem of the 5G network (IP multimedia). subsystem, IMS) interaction, etc.
  • IP multimedia IP multimedia subsystem
  • IMS IP multimedia subsystem
  • the data network is used to provide users with business services. It can be a private network, such as a local area network; it can also be an external network that is not under the control of an operator, such as the Internet (Internet); it can also be a common operator
  • the deployed private network such as the IMS network.
  • the terminal device can access the DN through the established protocol data unit (PDU) session.
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • AKAM authentication and key management for applications
  • the AKMA architecture defines the network elements involved in the AKMA process. As shown in Figure 2, it is a schematic diagram of the AKAM architecture.
  • the AKAM architecture includes UE, (R)AN, AUSF, AMF, AF, NEF, AKMA anchor function (AKMA anchor function, AAnF) and UDM.
  • the UE there are three ways for the UE to communicate with the AF.
  • One is for the UE to communicate with the AF through (R)AN and AMF, the other is for the UE to communicate with the AF through AMF, and the other is for the UE to communicate directly through the Ua* interface.
  • Communicate with AF is for the UE to communicate with the AF through (R)AN and AMF.
  • the Ua* interface is the communication interface between the UE and the AF.
  • the UE may generate an AKMA key and AKMA key identification information, and initiate an application session establishment request message to the AF.
  • the application session request message carries the AKMA key identification information.
  • the AF can use the AKMA key identification information to request the AAnF for the communication key between the AF and the UE.
  • AAnF can request an AKMA key from AUSF, and generate a communication key between the AF and the UE and the effective time of the communication key according to the AKMA key.
  • AUSF can generate AKMA keys.
  • the AKMA key can be, for example, Kakma, which can also be called the root key of AKMA;
  • the AKMA key identification information can be any information used to identify the AKMA key, for example, it can be A-KID (AKMA-Key identifier) or Kakma ID (Kakma identifier);
  • the communication key between AF and UE for example, may be Kaf.
  • the AF uses Kaf to perform data transmission with the UE can improve the security of data transmission between the AF and the UE.
  • the process of generating the AKMA key (take Kakma as an example) by the AUSF and the UE can be seen in FIG. 3.
  • the process specifically includes:
  • Step 101 UE and AUSF execute the primary authentication process (Primary Authentication)
  • Primary authentication refers to the process in which the UE authenticates the AMF and/or AUSF during the registration process of the UE to the 5G core network.
  • the process in which the AUSF authenticates the UE can also be described as two-way authentication. For details, see Figure 4 The process shown.
  • the core network device and the terminal interact through messages.
  • the terminal and the core network device respectively compare the parameter to be verified provided by the other party with another parameter generated by the other party. If the parameter to be verified provided by the other party is If the generated parameters are the same, the authentication verification between the terminal and the core network device passes.
  • Step 102 UE generates Kakma and AKMA key identification information (taking A-KID as an example) using the intermediate key generated in the main authentication process (taking Kausf as an example)
  • the UE After the UE authenticates the AMF and/or AUSF and before initiating an application session establishment request, it uses the intermediate key generated in the main authentication process such as Kausf to generate Kakma and generate AKMA key identification information such as A-KID.
  • the intermediate key generated in the main authentication process such as Kausf to generate Kakma and generate AKMA key identification information such as A-KID.
  • Step 103 AUSF uses Kausf to generate Kakma and A-KID
  • AUSF After AUSF authenticates the UE, AUSF can use Kausf to generate Kakma and generate A-KID.
  • AUSF can generate Kakma and A-KID directly after the main authentication process, or generate Kakma and A-KID when AAnF requests Kakma from AUSF in Figure 5 below, or generate Kakma at different times.
  • A-KID this application does not limit this.
  • the UE and AUSF respectively generate the same Kausf, Kakma, and A-KID locally.
  • step 102 can be executed first, and then step 103 can be executed, or step 103 can be executed first, and step 102 can be executed later. Alternatively, step 102 and step 103 can be executed simultaneously. This application does not restrict this.
  • triggering and executing the master authentication can be seen in Fig. 4, and the process specifically includes:
  • Step 201 The UE sends a registration request (Registration Request) to the AMF through the RAN.
  • the registration request carries the identity information of the UE, and the AMF selects AUSF according to the identity information of the UE (for example, a subscriber concealed identifier (SUCI)).
  • the identity information of the UE for example, a subscriber concealed identifier (SUCI)
  • the AMF can be referred to as a security anchor function (SEAF) network element, that is, the AMF in the embodiments of the present application can be replaced with a SEAF.
  • SEAF security anchor function
  • Step 202 AMF sends a UE authentication request message (UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message) to AUSF.
  • UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message
  • the UE authentication request message carries the identity information of the UE.
  • Step 203 AUSF sends a UE Authentication Get Request (UEAuthentication_Get Request) message to UDM to trigger the main authentication process.
  • UEAuthentication_Get Request UE Authentication Get Request
  • the UE authentication acquisition request message carries the identity information of the UE.
  • the identity information is SUCI
  • UDM parses SUCI and obtains the permanent identity of the UE, and searches for the root key of the UE.
  • Step 204 UDM sends a response message (Authentication_Get response) of the UE authentication acquisition request message to AUSF
  • Step 205 AUSF sends a response message (UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response) of the UE authentication request message to the AMF.
  • the response message of the UE authentication and authentication request message carries the authentication parameters of the AMF.
  • Step 206 The AMF sends a first authentication request (Authentication-Request) message to the UE.
  • the first authentication request message carries the authentication parameters of the AMF.
  • Step 207 The UE uses the locally stored root key to calculate the authentication parameters, and verifies the AMF authentication parameters, and the verification passed represents the credibility of the core network. After the verification is passed, the UE sends a response message (Authentication Response) of the first authentication request message to the AMF, and the response message of the first authentication request message carries the authentication parameters of the UE. According to the authentication parameters of the UE, the AMF determines that the AMF does not deceive the AUSF in the authentication.
  • Authentication Response Authentication Response
  • Step 208 AMF sends a second authentication request (UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message) message to AUSF.
  • the second authentication request message carries the authentication parameters of the UE.
  • the AUSF verifies the authentication parameters of the UE. If the verification is successful, it means that the authentication is successful.
  • Step 209 AUSF authenticates the UE according to the authentication parameters of the UE, and sends a response message (UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response) of the second authentication request message to the AMF to inform the AMF AUSF of the result of the authentication of the UE.
  • UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response
  • AUSF and UE generate Kausf, which can be used for AUSF and UE to generate Kakma.
  • Kausf which can be used for AUSF and UE to generate Kakma.
  • the above-mentioned main authentication process (that is, steps 204-209) is a brief introduction to the main authentication process of the 5G network in the prior art.
  • the main authentication process of the 5G network please refer to the 5G AKA (authentication and key agreement) process or the EAP-AKA' (Extensible Authentication Protocol-Authentication and Key Agreement) process.
  • the main authentication process of the LTE network please refer to the EPS (evolved packet system) AKA process, which will not be repeated in this application.
  • AKMA process can be seen in Figure 5, which specifically includes:
  • Step 301 UE and AUSF perform master authentication and generate A-KID corresponding to Kakma and Kakma.
  • AAnF may save Kakma and A-KID.
  • Step 302 The UE sends an application session establishment request (for example, application session establishment request) to the AF.
  • an application session establishment request for example, application session establishment request
  • the application session establishment request carries A-KID.
  • Step 303 After receiving the application session establishment request, the AF sends a Kaf request message (for example, key request) to AAnF.
  • a Kaf request message for example, key request
  • the Kaf request message carries the A-KID and the identification information of the application service function network element
  • the identification information of the application service function network element may be, for example, the AF ID.
  • Step 304 If the AAnF stores the Kakma corresponding to the A-KID, then the AAnF directly generates the Kaf and the effective time of the Kaf according to the Kakma and the AF ID, and executes steps 307-311.
  • steps 305-311 are executed.
  • Step 305 AAnF sends a Kakma key request (for example, AKMA key request) to AUSF.
  • a Kakma key request for example, AKMA key request
  • the Kakma key request carries A-KID.
  • Step 306 AUSF searches for the corresponding Kakma according to the A-KID, and sends a response message for the Kakma key request (for example, AKMA key response) to AAnF.
  • a response message for the Kakma key request for example, AKMA key response
  • the response message of the Kakma key request carries Kakma.
  • Step 307 AAnF uses Kakma to derive Kaf, and further AAnF will generate the effective time of Kaf.
  • Step 308 AAnF sends a response message (for example, key response) of the Kaf request message to the AF.
  • the response message of the Kaf request message carries the effective time of Kaf and Kaf.
  • Step 309 After receiving the response message of the Kaf request message, the AF sends a response message of the application session establishment request (for example, application session establishment response) to the UE.
  • the application session establishment request for example, application session establishment response
  • Step 310 After the UE receives the response message of the application session establishment request, it can use Kakma to derive Kaf.
  • the UE deduced Kaf may be after receiving the response message of the application session establishment request, or after sending the application session establishment request, or before sending the application session establishment request, which is not limited in this application.
  • the Kaf between different AFs and the same UE may be different, for example, the Kaf between AF1 and UE1 is Kaf1, and the Kaf between AF2 and UE1 is Kaf2.
  • Step 311 Kaf is used between the UE and the AF for data transmission or identity authentication, thereby improving the security of data transmission between the AF and the UE.
  • the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present application also involve re-authentication, that is, the UE re-authenticates the core network equipment (for example, AMF and/or AUSF in 5G), and the core network equipment (for example, AUSF in 5G)
  • the UE performs authentication again.
  • the core network device for example, AMF in 5G
  • the trigger condition for the core network device (for example, AMF in 5G) to authenticate the UE again is reached according to the configuration requirements of the operator.
  • the core network device and the terminal will exchange messages.
  • the terminal and the core network device will compare the parameter to be verified provided by the other party with another parameter generated by itself. If the other party provides If the parameter to be verified is the same as the parameter generated by itself, the authentication verification between the terminal and the core network device passes.
  • steps 202-209 shown in FIG. 4. It is understandable that re-authentication is the process in which the core network device initiates the primary authentication for the UE again after the primary authentication has occurred.
  • the re-authentication in this application is initiated by the core network device, and the UE registration process
  • the primary authentication in the UE sends a registration request to the core network device, which is then initiated by the core network device.
  • the UE and AUSF will generate a new Kausf, and the old Kausf will be deleted.
  • the old Kakma and A-KID will be deleted, and when the UE needs to initiate a new application session establishment request message, a new Kakma and A-KID will be generated.
  • the life cycle of Kakma can be the same as the interval period for the UE to perform primary authentication again.
  • the UE has a master authentication for the first time and produces Kakma. Then Kakma will be saved until the re-authentication occurs. Because the occurrence of re-authentication cannot be determined clearly, the storage time of Kakma cannot be determined either.
  • Kaf has a clear effective time, which causes the expiration time of Kakma and Kaf to be decoupled, and there is no way to influence each other.
  • the current AKMA process does not consider the occurrence of re-authentication, and further does not consider the problems caused by the generation of new Kakma and A-KID due to re-authentication.
  • the UE can access the 5G core network through the 3GPP access technology.
  • the UE and the 5G core network exchange control plane messages and user plane messages.
  • the AKMA business belongs to the user plane business, and the main authentication and re-authentication belong to the control plane process.
  • the core network initiates a re-authentication process for the UE.
  • the Kakma stored on the UE side and the Kakma stored on the AUSF side, or the Kaf generated on the UE side and the Kaf generated by AAnF may be out of synchronization.
  • Out-of-synchronization means that the Kakma stored on the UE side is different from the Kakma stored on the AUSF side, or the Kaf generated by the UE is different from the Kaf obtained by the AF.
  • the UE can simultaneously access the 5G core network through the 3GPP access technology and the non-3GPP access technology.
  • the following scenarios will occur: 1: The UE uses one access technology to interact with the 5G core network to control plane NAS messages, and the UE uses another access technology to deliver the user plane. Data; 2: UE uses two technologies at the same time to transmit user plane data corresponding to different DNs; 3: UE uses two access technologies at the same time to exchange control plane NAS messages with the 5G core network.
  • the AKMA service belongs to the user plane service and the main authentication and re-authentication belong to the control plane process, for scenario 1, it may happen that the UE initiates the AKMA service while the core network initiates the re-authentication process for the UE.
  • the Kakma stored on the UE side and the Kakma stored on the AUSF side, or the Kaf generated on the UE side and the Kaf generated by AAnF may be out of synchronization.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides the following specific scenarios:
  • Scenario 1 The UE side generates a new Kakma (denoted as Kakma-2) and uses the new Kakma to generate Kaf-2, but AAnF is using the old Kakma (denoted as Kakma-1) to generate Kaf-1.
  • the UE sends an application session establishment request message, and AAnF requests the completion of Kakma-1 from AUSF, that is, reauthentication occurs after AAnF obtains Kakma-1 Right, AAnF uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, and the UE uses the new Kakma to generate Kaf-2 after receiving the application session establishment request message;
  • the UE sends an application session establishment request message, AAnF directly generates Kaf-1 and re-authentication occurs, and the UE receives the application session establishment request message and uses it The new Kakma generates Kaf-2;
  • Scenario 2 The UE side uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, but AAnF cannot use A-KID-1 to find Kakma-1.
  • AAnF For example, corresponding to the situation in which AAnF does not hold Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1, after the UE sends an application session establishment request message, AAnF re-authentication occurs before requesting Kakma-1 from AUSF, and Kakma-1 on AUSF is Delete, AAnF cannot use A-KID-1 to find Kakma-1, but the UE can generate Kaf-1 before re-authentication after sending the application session establishment request message;
  • AAnF retains Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1
  • AAnF re-authentication occurs before Kaf-1 is generated, and Kakma-1 on AAnF is deleted, and The UE may generate Kaf-1 before re-authentication after sending the application session establishment request message.
  • Scenario 3 The UE side uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1-1, but AAnF uses Kakma-2 to generate Kaf-2.
  • AAnF For example, corresponding to the situation where AAnF does not hold the Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1, after the UE sends the application session establishment request message, AAnF asks AUSF for re-authentication before Kakma-1, AUSF still saves A-KID-1 However, Kakma-2 was generated. AUSF mistakenly believed that A-KID-1 corresponds to Kakma-2, and the corresponding Kakma-2 returned to AAnF.
  • This extreme situation may occur when the UE requests an AF AKMA service for the first time, but unfortunately it is accompanied by re-authentication.
  • Step 401 UE and AUSF execute the main authentication process.
  • the UE and AUSF perform the main authentication process please refer to the detailed description of the main authentication process in FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 402 The UE generates Kakma-1 and A-KID-1.
  • A-KID-1 is used to mark the key identification information generated for Kakma-1 before re-authentication.
  • the UE uses the Kausf generated in the main authentication process to generate Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 for Kakma-1.
  • the A-KID generated by the UE is unique, that is, the A-KID is globally unique.
  • One A-KID is used to uniquely identify a Kakma, and different Kakmas correspond to different A-KIDs.
  • Step 403 The UE initiates an application session request to AF1, and A-KID-1 is carried in the application session request.
  • AF1 is used to mark the application function network element that the UE requests to establish an application session before re-authentication.
  • the application session request is, for example, an application session establishment request.
  • Step 404 AF1 requests Kaf-1 from AAnF after receiving the application session request.
  • the request message that AF1 requests from AAnF for Kaf is a servicing message
  • the name of the request message is the name of the servicing message, which can be key request specifically.
  • the request message carries A-KID-1 and the identification of the AF, and the identification of the AF may be, for example, an AF ID (identifier).
  • Step 405 If Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1 is stored in AAnF, AAnF directly generates the effective time of Kaf-1 and Kaf-1, and executes steps 409 to 414. If there is no Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1 at AAnF, AAnF requests Kakma-1 from AUSF, and executes steps 406 to 414.
  • the request message of AAnF requesting Kakma-1 from AUSF is a servicing message, and the name of the request message is the servicing message name, which can be AKMA key request.
  • the request message carries A-KID-1.
  • Step 406 AUSF finds the corresponding Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1.
  • Step 407 AUSF sends Kakma-1 to AAnF.
  • Kakma-1 can be carried in the AKMA Key Response message and sent to AAnF.
  • Step 408 AAnF uses Kakma to generate the effective time of Kaf-1 and Kaf-1.
  • Step 409 AAnF sends the generated effective time of Kaf-1 and Kaf-1 to AF1.
  • the effective time of Kaf-1 and Kaf-1 can be carried in the Key response message and sent to AF1.
  • Step 410 Re-authentication occurs between the UE and AUSF.
  • Step 411 After re-authentication, Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 on the UE side will be deleted. If the re-authentication is successful, the UE side will generate Kakma-2.
  • Step 412 AF1 sends an application session establishment response to the UE after receiving the effective time of Kaf and Kaf.
  • the application session establishment response is, for example, Application session establishment Response.
  • Step 413 The UE receives the application session establishment response. If the UE side key is Kakma-2, the UE deduces that the coming AF key is Kaf-2, causing the Kaf on the UE side and the AF side to lose synchronization. If the UE side Kakma is deleted, the UE side cannot deduce the coming Kaf.
  • Step 414 Optionally, the UE and AF2 initiate an application session establishment negotiation process, and A-KID-2 will be carried by the UE in the application session request message sent to AF2.
  • Step 501 UE and AUSF execute the main authentication process.
  • the UE and AUSF perform the main authentication process please refer to the detailed description of the main authentication process in FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 502 The UE generates Kakma-1 and A-KID-1.
  • the A-KID generated by the UE is unique, that is, the A-KID is globally unique.
  • One A-KID is used to uniquely identify a Kakma, and different Kakmas correspond to different A-KIDs.
  • Step 503 The UE initiates an application session request to AF1, and A-KID-1 is carried in the application session request.
  • the application session request is, for example, application session establishment request.
  • Step 504 Re-authentication occurs between the UE and AUSF;
  • Step 505 After re-authentication, the Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 on the UE side and the AUSF side will be deleted. If the re-authentication is successful, the UE side and the AUSF side will generate Kakma-2.
  • AAnF retains Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 before re-authentication, after re-authentication, Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 in AAnF will be deleted. If re-authentication is successful, AAnF will obtain Kakma -2 and A-KID-2.
  • Step 506 AF1 requests Kaf-1 from AAnF after receiving the application session request.
  • the request message that AF1 requests from AAnF for Kaf-1 is a servicing message, and the name of the request message is the name of the servicing message, which can specifically be key request.
  • the request message carries the identifiers of A-KID-1 and AF.
  • Step 507 If AAnF retains Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 before re-authentication, because Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 in AAnF are deleted after re-authentication, AAnF cannot be found according to A-KID-1 Kakma-1, the Kaf on the AF side cannot be generated.
  • AAnF requests Kakma-1 from AUSF.
  • the request message of AAnF requesting Kakma-1 from AUSF is a servicing message, and the name of the request message is the servicing message name, which can be AKMA key request.
  • the request message carries A-KID-1. Because Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 in AUSF are deleted after re-authentication, AUSF cannot find Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1, which causes Kaf on the AF side to fail to be generated.
  • AAnF searches for AUSF routing information by accessing UDM, and the required identification information is A-KID-1. After the re-authentication, the related information about A-KID-1 in UDM is deleted, UDM cannot find the AUSF routing information according to A-KID-1, and the Kaf on the AF side cannot be generated.
  • the UE when the UE needs to establish application communication with the AF, the UE initiates an application connection establishment process to the AF.
  • the UE and the core network re-authentication will cause the Kakma generated before the re-authentication to be deleted, which will cause the Kaf generated by the UE and the Kaf obtained by the AF to lose synchronization or cause the AF Failed to request AF key from AAnF.
  • how to ensure that the UE and the AF side successfully negotiate the AF key so as to realize the secure communication between the UE and the AF is a technical problem to be solved urgently.
  • this application provides a key management method, device, and system to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to realize the terminal device and the application function network element Secure communication between.
  • FIG. 8 it is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a key management system provided by this application.
  • the system includes at least one terminal device and at least one application function network element.
  • the application function network element can be an AF in a 5G system, or a network element for realizing all or part of the AF function in a future communication system.
  • the terminal device is used to send a first application session establishment request message to the application function network element, the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is the application's Authentication and key management AKMA key; receive the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; send the response message of the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; receive the first application from the application function network element The response message of the session establishment request message; and the use of the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element.
  • the application function network element receives the first application session establishment request message from the terminal device; and sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the first key and the identification information of the first key may not be deleted.
  • the terminal device still uses the first key generated before the re-authentication to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure that the terminal obtained by the application function network element
  • the communication key between the device and the application function network element is consistent, so as to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and realize the connection between the terminal device and the application function network element. Secure communication between.
  • the terminal device is used to send a first application session establishment request message to the application function network element, the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is the application Authentication and key management of the AKMA key; the terminal device receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; sends the response message of the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; receives the message from the application function network element The response message of the first application session establishment request message; the second application session establishment request message is sent to the application function network element, the second application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the second key, and the second key is the re-authentication process AKMA key generated afterwards.
  • the application function network element receives the first application session establishment request message from the terminal device; sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device; and receives the second application session establishment request message from the terminal device.
  • the terminal device uses the identification information of the first key generated before the re-authentication and the application function network element to initiate the application session establishment process, and after the re-authentication is sent, the terminal device uses the re-authentication
  • the identification information of the second key generated after the authorization re-initiates the application session establishment process with the application function network element, thereby ensuring that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element , To achieve secure communication between terminal equipment and application function network elements.
  • the system includes at least one authentication service function network element and at least one AKMA anchor point function network element.
  • the authentication service function network element can be the AUSF in the 5G system, or the network element used to implement all or part of the functions of the AUSF in the future communication system.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element can be the AAnF in the 5G system, or the network element used to implement all or part of the AAnF function in the future communication system.
  • the authentication service function network element is used to receive the second authentication request in the re-authentication process; send a response message to the second authentication request in the re-authentication process; receive the first authentication request from the AKMA anchor function network element A key request message, the first key request message carries the identification information of the first key, the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process; and the first key is sent to the AKMA anchor function network element .
  • the AKMA anchor function network element is used to receive the first request message from the application service function network element, and the first request message is used to request the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element; send to the authentication service function network element The first key request message; receiving the first key from the authentication service function network element; using the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element; and send the terminal to the application service function network element The communication key between the device and the application function network element.
  • the authentication service function network element After the authentication service function network element is used to send a response message to the second authentication request, it does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the system further includes at least one application service function network element.
  • the application function network element can be the AF in the 5G system, or the network element used to implement all or part of the AF function in the future communication system.
  • the application service function network element is configured to receive a first application session establishment request message from the terminal device, the first application session establishment request message carrying identification information of the first key; send the first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element; receive The communication key between the terminal device from the AKMA anchor function network element and the first application function network element; and a response message for sending the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the authentication service function network element still sends the first key generated before the re-authentication to the AKMA anchor function network element, so that the AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate
  • the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element generated by the terminal device and the communication between the terminal device and the application function network element obtained by the application function network element
  • the keys are consistent to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and secure communication between the terminal device and the application function network element is realized.
  • FIG. 10 it is a schematic flow chart of a key management method provided by this application.
  • the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 601 The terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element.
  • the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is an AKMA key.
  • the terminal device stores the identification information of the first key in the context of the first application session. It can also be said that the terminal device associates the identification information of the first key with the first application session, that is, The terminal device saves the corresponding relationship between the identification information of the first key and the first application session.
  • Step 602 After receiving the first application session establishment request message, the first application function network element sends the first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the first request message carries identification information of the first key and identification information of the first application function network element.
  • Step 603 After receiving the first request message, if the corresponding relationship between the identification information of the first key and the first key is stored in the AKMA anchor function network element, the AKMA anchor function network element will The information determines the first key, directly use the determined first key to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, and continue to perform steps 607-612, optionally, the AKMA anchor function network element The office also generates the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element;
  • the AKMA anchor function network element If the AKMA anchor function network element does not save the corresponding relationship between the identification information of the first key and the first key, the AKMA anchor function network element sends the first key request message to the authentication service function network element and continues execution Steps 604-612, the first key request message carries identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element may also use part of the identification information of the first key. Or all, or part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function uses part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, which can realize the communication between different application function network elements and the same terminal device.
  • the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device is the first communication key
  • the communication key between the second application function network element and the terminal device is different from the first communication key.
  • the second communication key of the communication key is the communication key between the second application function network element and the terminal device.
  • Step 604 After receiving the first key request message, the authentication service function network element determines the first key according to the identification information of the first key.
  • the authentication service function network element may generate the first key after receiving the first key request message; or after the main authentication process, directly generate the first key according to the intermediate key generated in the main authentication process The first key. This application does not limit the time for the authentication service function network element to generate the first key.
  • Step 605 The authentication service function network element sends the first key to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • Step 606 The AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element is also generated.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element may also use part of the identification information of the first key. Or all, or part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element. For details, please refer to the description in step 603, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 607 The AKMA anchor function network element sends the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element also sends the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the first application function network element.
  • Step 608 Re-authentication occurs, where the terminal device receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the first authentication request message may be, for example, the first authentication request message in step 206 in FIG. 2.
  • the terminal device receives the first authentication request message from the security anchor function network element in the re-authentication process.
  • Step 609 The terminal device sends a response message of the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the response message of the first authentication request message may be, for example, the response message of the first authentication request message in step 207 in FIG. 2.
  • the terminal device after the terminal device sends the response message of the first authentication request message, it saves the sequence of sending the first application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process, which can be stored in the context of the terminal device, namely The sequence of the first application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process is associated with the terminal device.
  • the terminal device after the terminal device sends the response message of the first authentication request message, the first key and the identification information of the first key are not deleted.
  • the trigger condition for the terminal device to determine not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key may be any one or more of the following: (1) Re-authentication is successful; (2) Terminal before re-authentication process The device sends the first application session establishment request, and does not receive the response message of the first application session establishment request message; (3) When the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and receives the first application session The response message of the request message is established but there is no communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element; (4) There is no available communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or when the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and does not receive the first application session establishment request
  • the terminal device determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or when the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and receives the first
  • the response message of the session establishment request message is applied but the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element is not deduced, and the terminal device determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or there is no terminal device
  • the terminal device determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device determines that the re-authentication is successful, thereby determining not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or the terminal device determines that the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and The response message of the first application session establishment request message is not received, so it is determined not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the terminal device determines the re-authentication process, And the response message of the first application session establishment request message is received but there is no communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, so it is determined not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key; or The terminal device determines that there is no communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, thereby determining not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the second key and the identification information of the second key are generated, and the second key is an AKMA key.
  • the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process
  • the second key is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the generation of the second key and the identification information of the second key in this application means that the second key and the identification information of the second key can be generated at the same time, or can mean that they are generated at different times.
  • generating the first key and the identification information of the first key means that the first key and the identification information of the first key may be generated at the same time, or may mean that they are generated at different times.
  • deleting the first key and the identification information of the first key means that the identification information of the first key and the first key can be deleted at the same time or at different times, which is not limited in this application. In this manner, the terminal device simultaneously saves the identification information of the second key and the second key, and the identification information of the first key and the first key.
  • the terminal device after the terminal device sends the response message of the first authentication request message, it determines that the first application session establishment request is initiated before the re-authentication, and the request to the network element other than the first application function is temporarily suspended.
  • the other application function network elements of the NAS initiate an application session establishment request until the terminal device and the first application function network element complete the negotiation of the communication key.
  • the terminal device in the first application session establishment request process, the terminal device only needs to save the first key and the first key identifier.
  • the terminal device and the first application function network element complete the communication key negotiation and initiate an application session establishment request to other application function network elements, the terminal device generates the second key again. In this way, there will be no situation where there are multiple AKMA keys on the terminal device, which saves the storage space of the terminal device and avoids the judgment action of which AKMA key is selected by the terminal device.
  • step 603 the AKMA anchor function network element stores the identification information of the first key and the corresponding relationship between the first key
  • steps 608-609 are executed after step 603; if in step 603 In the AKMA anchor point function network element, the identification information of the first key and the corresponding relationship between the first key are not stored, and steps 608-609 are executed after step 605.
  • steps 608-609 can be executed first, and steps 606-607 can be executed later, or steps 606-607 can be executed after steps 608-609 are executed first.
  • steps 606-607 and steps 608-609 can be executed at the same time, which is not limited in this application.
  • Step 610 The first application function network element sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device After receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the terminal device determines to use the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device determines to use the first key to derive the terminal device and the first application function network element
  • the communication key between the communication keys can be in any one or more of the following ways: (1) When the first application session establishment request message is sent before the re-authentication process, the terminal device determines to use the first key to derive the terminal device (2) When the first application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the first key, the terminal device determines to use the first key to derive the terminal device and the first key. Communication key between application function network elements. It should be noted that, for the application session request sent after the re-authentication process, the terminal device determines to use the second key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device determines that the first application session establishment request message was sent before the re-authentication process, thereby determining to use the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element; or the terminal device It is determined that the first application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the first key, so that it is determined that the first key is used to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • Step 611 After receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the terminal device uses the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, and uses the communication key and the first application
  • the functional network elements perform secure communication.
  • the terminal device may also use part or all of the identification information of the first key, or Part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device may also use part or all of the identification information of the first key, or Part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key, wherein the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key by one of the following methods: Any one or more: (1) When the application session request message carrying the identification information of the first key is responded, the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key; (2) When the terminal The application session request messages for which the device does not receive a response message are all sent after the re-authentication process, and the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device determines that the application session request message carrying the identification information of the first key has been responded (or the application session establishment process issued before re-authentication has been completed), thereby deleting the first key and the first key.
  • the identification information of a key; or the terminal device determines that the application session request messages that have not received the response message are all sent after the re-authentication process (or the incomplete application session establishment process is initiated after the re-authentication), thus Delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element and carries the identification information of the first key, and sends a third application session establishment request message to the third application function network element and carries the first key. ⁇ identification information.
  • the terminal device After re-authentication, the terminal device has received the response message of the first application session establishment request message from the first application function network element and the response message of the third application session establishment request message from the third application function network element. If other application session establishment requests that carry the identification information of the first key are not responded, the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element and carries the identification information of the first key, and after re-authentication, sends a third application session establishment request message to the third application function network element And carry the identification information of the second key.
  • the terminal device has received the response message of the first application session establishment request message from the first application function network element, but has not received the response message of the third application session establishment request message from the third application function network element, and has not received a response.
  • the application session request message of the message is sent after the re-authentication process, and the terminal device deletes the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • Step 612 the terminal device sends a second application session establishment request message to the second application function network element, where the second application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the second key.
  • the terminal device after sending the re-authentication, the terminal device still uses the first key generated before the re-authentication to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element obtain the same
  • the communication keys between the application function network elements are consistent, so as to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and realize the communication between the terminal device and the application function network element. Secure communication.
  • FIG. 10 a schematic diagram of the flow of a key management method provided by this application, the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 701 UE and AUSF execute the main authentication process, and the UE generates Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 corresponding to Kakma.
  • the A-KID generated by the UE is unique, that is, an A-KID is used to identify a Kakma, the A-KID and the Kakma have a one-to-one relationship, and different Kakmas correspond to different A-KIDs.
  • Step 702 The UE sends a first application session request message to AF1, and A-KID-1 is carried in the first application session request message.
  • the first application session request message is, for example, application session establishment request.
  • the UE may save A-KID-1 in the context of the first application session. It can also be said that the UE associates A-KID-1 with the first application session.
  • Step 703 After receiving the first application session request message, AF1 sends the first request message to AAnF.
  • the first request message is used to request the communication key Kaf1 between the UE and AF1, and it carries A-KID-1 and AF1ID.
  • the first request message is a servicing message
  • the name of the request message is a servicing message name, which may be a key request.
  • Step 704 If the correspondence between A-KID-1 and Kakma-1 is saved at AAnF, AAnF determines Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1, directly uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, and continues to perform steps 709 to 716 , Optionally, AAnF also generates the effective time of Kaf-1.
  • AAnF If the correspondence between A-KID-1 and Kakma-1 is not saved in AAnF, AAnF sends a Kakma-1 request message to AUSF, and continues to perform steps 705 to 716, and the Kakma-1 request message carries A-KID-1.
  • the request message of AAnF requesting Kakma-1 from AUSF is a servicing message
  • the name of the request message is the servicing message name, which can be AKMA key request.
  • AAnF in addition to using Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, AAnF can also use part or all of A-KID-1, or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1.
  • AAnF uses A-KID-1 or A-TID (AKMA-temporary identifier)-1 to derive Kaf-1.
  • A-KID-1 includes A-TID-1, that is, A-TID-1 is A-KID-1 part.
  • the AKMA anchor function uses part or all of the AF1ID to generate Kaf-1, which can realize the difference of Kaf between different AFs and the same UE.
  • the Kaf between AF1 and UE is Kaf-1
  • the Kaf between AF2 and UE It is Kaf-2.
  • Step 705 After receiving the Kakma-1 request message, AUSF determines Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1.
  • AUSF can generate Kakma-1 after receiving the Kakma-1 request message; or after the main authentication process, directly generate Kakma-1 according to the Kausf generated in the main authentication process.
  • Step 706 AUSF sends Kakma-1 to AAnF.
  • Kakma-1 can be carried in the AKMA Key Response message and sent to AAnF.
  • Step 707 AAnF uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1.
  • AAnF also generates the effective time of Kaf-1.
  • AAAnF can also use part or all of A-KID-1, or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1. For details, please refer to the description in step 704, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 708 AAnF sends Kaf-1 to AF1
  • AAnF also sends the effective time of Kaf-1 to AF1.
  • Kaf-1 (optionally including the effective time of Kaf-1) can be carried in a Key response message and sent to AF1.
  • Step 709 A re-authentication process occurs, where the UE receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the first authentication request message may be, for example, the first authentication request message in step 206 in FIG. 2.
  • the UE receives the first authentication request message from the AMF in the re-authentication procedure.
  • Step 710 The UE sends a response message to the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the response message of the first authentication request message may be, for example, the response message of the first authentication request message in step 207 in FIG. 2.
  • the UE after the UE sends the response message of the first authentication request message, it saves the sequence of sending the first application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process. Specifically, it can be saved in the context of the UE, that is, the first The sequence of the application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process is associated with the UE.
  • Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 are not deleted.
  • the trigger condition for the UE not to delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 can be any one or more of the following:
  • the UE Before the re-authentication, the UE sends the first application session request message, and does not receive the response message of the first application session establishment request message;
  • the trigger conditions include the above (1) and (3), the UE determines that the re-authentication is successful and there is no available Kaf-1 on the UE, then the Kakma is deleted -1 and A-KID-1; or when the UE does not delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 and the trigger conditions include (2) and (3) above, the UE determines to send the first application session request before re-authentication Message, the response message of the first application session establishment request message is not received, and there is no available Kaf-1 on the UE, then Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 are deleted.
  • the UE when the UE does not delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1, the trigger condition includes the above (2), the UE can determine the sequence according to the stored sequence of sending the first application session establishment request message and the re-authentication process Whether the conditions are met.
  • the trigger condition can be pre-configured on the UE when the UE leaves the factory, or configured on the UE by the network through configuration information, or before the UE sends the first application session establishment request or sends the first application session establishment If it is obtained from another device after request, this application does not restrict it.
  • Kakma-2 and A-KID-2 are generated after the UE sends the response message of the first authentication request message. It is understandable that Kakma-1 is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process, and Kakma-2 is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the UE after the UE sends the response message of the first authentication request message, it determines to initiate the first application session request message to AF1 before re-authentication. ) If an application session establishment request is initiated, the application session establishment request initiated to AF3 is suspended until the UE side and AF1 complete the Kaf-1 negotiation before initiating a session establishment request to AF3. In this way, during the Kaf negotiation between the UE side and AF1, the UE saves Kakma-1 and the corresponding A-KID-1 and Kausf generated in the re-authentication process.
  • the UE side and AF1 After the UE side and AF1 complete the Kaf negotiation, and Before initiating a session establishment request to AF3, delete Kakma-1 and the corresponding A-KID-1, and generate Kakma-2 and the corresponding A-KID-2 according to the Kausf generated in the re-authentication process. In this way, the UE saves one Kakma and the corresponding A-KID at the same time, and there is no need to save multiple Kakmas and corresponding multiple A-KIDs, which reduces the burden of storing multiple Kakmas and corresponding multiple A-KIDs for the UE.
  • step 609 Regarding the relationship between steps 709-710 and steps 707-708, please refer to the description in step 609, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 711 AF1 sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the UE.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message is, for example, Application session establishment Response.
  • the UE After receiving the response message from the first application session establishment request message, the UE determines to use Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1.
  • the UE determines to use Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1 through any one or more of the following methods: (1) When the first application session establishment request message is sent before the re-authentication process, the UE determines to use Kakma-1 deduction Kaf-1; (2) When the first application session establishment request message carries A-KID-1, the UE determines to use Kakma-1 to derive Kaf-1.
  • Step 712 After receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the UE uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, and uses Kaf-1 and AF1 for secure communication.
  • the UE may also use part or all of A-KID-1, or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1.
  • A-KID-1 or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1.
  • the UE deletes Kakma-1 and A-KID-1, where the UE deletes Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 through any one or more of the following methods: (1 ) When the application session request messages carrying A-KID- are all responded, the UE deletes Kakma-1 and A-KID-1; (2) When the UE does not receive a response message, the application session request messages are all after the re-authentication process If it is sent, the UE deletes Kakma-1 and A-KID-1.
  • Step 713 Optionally, the UE sends a second application session establishment request message to AF2, and the second application session establishment request message carries A-KID-2.
  • FIG. 12 a schematic flow diagram of another key management method provided by this application.
  • the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 801 The terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element.
  • the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is an AKMA key.
  • step 801 the terminal device saves the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • Step 802 the terminal device uses the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device If the terminal device generates the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element without the parameters carried in the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the terminal device generates the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element
  • the time of the communication key may be after the terminal device generates the first key, or after the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element. In this way, the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element generated by the terminal device will not be affected by the re-authentication.
  • the terminal device may also use part or all of the identification information of the first key, or Part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device uses part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, which can realize the communication between different application function network elements and the same terminal device
  • the keys are different.
  • the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device is the first communication key
  • the communication key between the second application function network element and the terminal device is different from the first communication key.
  • the second communication key of the key is different.
  • Step 803 Re-authentication occurs, where the authentication service function network element receives the second authentication request in the re-authentication process.
  • the second authentication request message may be, for example, the second authentication request message in step 208 in FIG. 2.
  • the authentication service function network element receives the second authentication request message from the security anchor function network element in the re-authentication process.
  • the second authentication request carries a first indication
  • the first indication is used to indicate not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the first instruction may be sent by the terminal device to the security anchor function network element, and then sent by the security anchor function network element to the authentication service function network element.
  • the trigger condition for the terminal device to send the first indication to the authentication service function network element can be any one or more of the following: (1) Re-authentication is successful; (2) The terminal device sends the first application session establishment before the re-authentication process Request, and did not receive the response message of the first application session establishment request message; (3) When the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process, and receives the response message of the first application session establishment request message, but There is no communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element; (4) There is no available communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device determines that the re-authentication is successful and sends the first instruction to the authentication service function network element; or the terminal device determines that the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the re-authentication process and does not receive the first application session establishment request.
  • a response message of an application session establishment request message thereby sending the first instruction to the authentication service function network element; or the terminal device sends the first application session establishment request before the terminal device determines the re-authentication process, and receives the first application session establishment
  • the response message of the request message but there is no communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, thereby determining to send the first instruction to the authentication service function network element; or the terminal device determines that the terminal device and the first application do not exist
  • the communication key between the functional network elements is thereby determined to send the first instruction to the authentication service functional network element.
  • Step 804 The authentication service function network element sends a response message of the second authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the response message of the second authentication request message may be, for example, the response message of the second authentication request message in step 209 in FIG. 2.
  • the authentication service function network element sends a response message to the second authentication request, the first key and the identification information of the first key are not deleted.
  • the authentication service function network element determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key through any one of the following methods: (1) The authentication service function network element receives the first instruction from the terminal device , According to the first instruction, it is determined not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key. The first indication can be carried in the second authentication request message in step 803; (2) When the re-authentication process is successful, the authentication service function network element determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key, That is, the authentication service function network element determines that the re-authentication process is successful, and thus determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the authentication service function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key for a period of time, and the length of the time may be determined by the operator, which is not limited in this application.
  • the data management network element if the data management network element retains the identification information of the first key or the information related to the first key, such as the routing information of the authentication service function network element, the data management network element also continues to retain the information for a period of time .
  • the second key is generated, and the second key is an AKMA key.
  • the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process
  • the second key is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the authentication service function network element simultaneously saves the identification information of the second key and the second key, and the identification information of the first key and the first key.
  • Step 805 After receiving the first application session establishment request message, the first application service function network element sends the first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the first request message carries identification information of the first key and identification information of the first application function network element.
  • Step 806 After receiving the first request message, if the corresponding relationship between the identification information of the first key and the first key is not stored in the AKMA anchor function network element, the AKMA anchor function network element sends the authentication service function network element to the authentication service function network element. Send the first key request message.
  • the first key request message carries identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element can search for the routing information of the authentication service function network element by accessing the data management network element, and the identification information required to find the routing information of the authentication service function network element is the first secret.
  • the identification information of the key is the first secret.
  • Step 807 After receiving the first key request message, the authentication service function network element determines the first key according to the identification information of the first key.
  • the authentication service function network element simultaneously saves the identification information of the second key and the second key, and the identification information of the first key and the first key, and the authentication service function network element according to the first
  • the identification information of the first key in a key request message determines the first key.
  • the authentication service function network element may generate the first key after receiving the first key request message; or after the main authentication process, directly generate the first key according to the intermediate key generated in the main authentication process. key. This application does not limit the time for the authentication service function network element to generate the first key.
  • steps 804-805 are executed before step 807. That is to say, there is no timing relationship between steps 804-805 and 806. Steps 804-805 can be executed first, and then step 806 can be executed, or they can be executed after steps 804-805, and step 806 can be executed first, or steps 804-805 can be executed. It is executed simultaneously with step 806, which is not limited in this application.
  • Step 808 The authentication service function network element sends the first key to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • Step 809 The AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element also generates the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element may also use part of the identification information of the first key. Or all, or part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element. For details, please refer to the description in step 802, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 810 The AKMA anchor function network element sends the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element also sends the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the first application function network element.
  • Step 811 The first application function network element sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the authentication service function network element still sends the first key generated before the re-authentication to the AKMA anchor function network element, so that the AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate
  • the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element ensures the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element generated by the terminal device and the communication between the terminal device and the application function network element obtained by the application function network element
  • the keys are consistent to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element, and secure communication between the terminal device and the application function network element is realized.
  • FIG. 12 is a schematic flow diagram of another key management method provided by this application. The flow includes but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 901 The UE and AUSF execute the main authentication process and the UE generates Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 corresponding to Kakma.
  • the A-KID generated by the UE is unique, that is, one A-KID is used to identify a Kakma, and the A-KID and the Kakma have a one-to-one relationship, and different Kakmas correspond to different A-KIDs.
  • Step 902 The UE sends a first application session request message to AF1, and the first application session request message carries A-KID-1.
  • the first application session request message is, for example, application session establishment request.
  • Step 903 Optionally, the UE uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1.
  • the time when the UE generates Kaf-1 can be after the UE generates Kakma-1, or it can be after the UE sends the first application to AF1 After the session establishment request message. In this way, the Kaf-1 generated by the UE will not be affected by the re-authentication.
  • the UE may also use part or all of A-KID-1, or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1.
  • the UE uses A-KID-1 or A-TID-1 to derive Kaf-1, and A-KID-1 includes A-TID-1, that is, A-TID-1 is a part of A-KID-1.
  • the UE uses part or all of the AF1ID to generate Kaf-1, which can realize the difference of Kaf between different AFs and the same UE.
  • the Kaf between AF1 and UE is Kaf-1
  • the Kaf between AF2 and UE is Kaf- 2.
  • Step 904 Re-authentication occurs, where AUSF receives the second authentication request in the re-authentication procedure.
  • the second authentication request message may be, for example, the second authentication request message in step 208 in FIG. 2.
  • the AUSF element receives the second authentication request message from the AMF in the re-authentication process.
  • the second authentication request carries a first indication
  • the first indication is used to indicate not to delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1.
  • the first indication may be sent by the UE to the AMF, and then the AMF is sent to the AUSF.
  • the trigger condition for the UE to send the first indication to the AUSF reference may be made to the description in step 803 in FIG. 12, which is not repeated here.
  • Step 905 AUSF sends a response message to the second authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the response message of the second authentication request message may be, for example, the response message of the second authentication request message in step 209 in FIG. 2.
  • Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 are not deleted.
  • the specific manner for the AUSF to determine not to delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 can refer to the description in step 804 in FIG. 12, which will not be repeated here.
  • AUSF does not delete Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 for a period of time, and the length of the period can be determined by the operator, which is not limited in this application.
  • UDM will continue to retain this information for a period of time.
  • Kakma-2 is generated after AUSF sends a response message to the second authentication request. It is understandable that Kakma-1 is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process, and Kakma-2 is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process. In this way, AUSF simultaneously saves Kakma-2 and A-KID-2, as well as Kakma-1 and A-KID-1.
  • Step 906 After receiving the first application session request, AF1 sends the first request message to AAnF.
  • the first request message is used to request Kaf-1.
  • the first request message carries the identifiers of A-KID-1 and AF1.
  • the first request message is a servicing message
  • the name of the first request message is a servicing message name, which may specifically be a key request.
  • Step 907 After receiving the first request message, if the corresponding relationship between A-KID-1 and Kakma-1 is not saved in AAnF, AAnF sends a Kakma-1 request message to AUSF.
  • the Kakma-1 request message is a servicing message
  • the name of the Kakma-1 request message is the servicing message name, which can be AKMA key request.
  • the Kakma-1 request message carries A-KID-1.
  • AAnF can search for the routing information of AUSF by accessing UDM, and the identification information required for searching the routing information of AUSF is A-KID-1.
  • Step 908 After receiving the first key request message, AUSF determines Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1.
  • AUSF saves Kakma-2 and A-KID-2, as well as Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 at the same time, and AUSF determines Kakma- according to A-KID-1 in the first key request message. 1.
  • steps 905-906 are executed before step 908.
  • steps 905-906 and step 907 reference may be made to the description of step 807 in FIG. 12.
  • Step 909 AUSF sends Kakma-1 to AAnF.
  • Kakma-1 can be carried in the AKMA Key Response message and sent to AAnF.
  • Step 910 AAnF uses Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1.
  • AAnF also generates the effective time of Kaf-1.
  • AAnF in addition to using Kakma-1 to generate Kaf-1, AAnF can also use part or all of A-KID-1, or part or all of AF1ID to generate Kaf-1. For details, please refer to the description in step 903, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 911 AAnF sends Kaf-1 to AF1.
  • AAnF also sends the effective time of Kaf-1 to AF1.
  • Kaf-1 (optionally including the effective time of Kaf-1) can be carried in a Key response message and sent to AF1.
  • Step 912 The AF sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the UE.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message is, for example, Application session establishment Response.
  • FIG. 14 there is a schematic flow diagram of another key management method provided for this application.
  • the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 1001 After the re-authentication process, the first application service function network element sends a first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the first request message carries identification information of the first key and identification information of the first application function network element.
  • the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key through any of the following methods: (1) The AKMA anchor function network element receives from the terminal device or the authentication service function The second instruction of the network element, the second instruction is used to indicate not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key. (2) When the re-authentication process is successful, the AKMA anchor function network element determines not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key, that is, the AKMA anchor function network element determines that the re-authentication process is successful, and It is determined not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element obtains the second key, and the second key is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process. In this manner, the AKMA anchor function network element simultaneously saves the identification information of the second key and the second key, and the identification information of the first key and the first key.
  • Step 1002 The AKMA anchor function network element determines the first key according to the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element simultaneously saves the identification information of the second key and the second key, and the identification information of the first key and the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element stores the identification information of the second key and the The identification information of the first key in a request message is used to determine the first key.
  • Step 1003 The AKMA anchor function network element uses the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element also generates the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element may also use part of the identification information of the first key. Or all, or part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element generates a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element uses part or all of the identification information of the first application function network element to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, which can realize the difference between different application function network elements and the same terminal device
  • the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device is the first communication key
  • the communication key between the second application function network element and the terminal device is different from The second communication key of the first communication key.
  • Step 1004 The AKMA anchor function network element sends the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the application function network element.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element also sends the valid time of the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element to the first application function network element.
  • Step 1005 The first application function network element sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element still uses the first key generated before the re-authentication to generate the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element to ensure that the terminal device generated by the terminal device.
  • the communication key between the application function network element and the communication key between the terminal device and the application function network element obtained by the application function network element are consistent, so as to ensure that the terminal device and the application function network element successfully negotiate the terminal device and application
  • the communication key between the functional network elements realizes the secure communication between the terminal device and the application functional network element.
  • a schematic flow diagram of another key management method provided by this application the flow may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 1101 The terminal device sends a first application session establishment request message to the first application function network element.
  • the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is an AKMA key.
  • Step 1102 Re-authentication occurs, where the terminal device receives the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the first authentication request message may be, for example, the first authentication request message in step 206 in FIG. 2.
  • the terminal device receives the first authentication request message from the security anchor function network element in the re-authentication process.
  • Step 1103 The terminal device sends a response message of the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • the response message of the first authentication request message may be, for example, the response message of the first authentication request message in step 207 in FIG. 2.
  • the terminal device sets a first identifier on the terminal device, and the first identifier is used to identify that the re-authentication process is performed on the terminal device; or the first identifier is used to identify that the terminal device sends before the main authentication process is executed.
  • the first application session establishment request message is received.
  • Step 1104 The first application function network element sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device after receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, deletes the context of the first application session.
  • Step 1105 After receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the terminal device sends a second application session establishment request message to the first application function network element.
  • the second application session establishment request message carries the identification information of the second key, and the second key is the AKMA key generated after the re-authentication process.
  • the second application session establishment request message itself indicates to delete the context of the first application session, or the second application session establishment request message carries indication information, and the first application function network element deletes the first application session according to the indication information.
  • the context of the application session
  • the trigger condition for the terminal device to send the second application session establishment request message to the first application function network element may include any one of the following:
  • the terminal device sends a second application session establishment request message to the first application server according to the first identifier
  • the terminal device fails to perform secure communication with the first application function network element after receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, using the communication key between the first application function network element and the terminal device, the terminal The device sends a second application session establishment request message to the first application server.
  • the terminal device cannot determine the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key, and thus cannot use the first key to generate a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the terminal device determines that the establishment of the first application session fails according to the response message of the first application session establishment request message. Specifically, the response message of the first application session establishment request message itself indicates that the first application session establishment failed, or the response message of the first application session establishment request message carries indication information, so that the terminal device determines that the first application session is established according to the indication information. fail.
  • the indication information may include any one or more of the following: a third indication, a first failure reason value, and a second failure reason value.
  • the third indication is used to indicate that the establishment of the first application session fails, the first failure reason value is used to indicate that the authentication service function network element cannot be found, and the second failure reason value is used to indicate that the identification information corresponding to the first key cannot be determined.
  • the first key of the authentication service function network element is used to generate the first key.
  • step 1102 For the failure to establish the first application session because the authentication service function network element cannot be found, the following steps may be included between step 1102 and step 1103:
  • Step 11021 After receiving the first application session establishment request message, the first application function network element sends the first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, and the first request message carries identification information of the first key and identification information of the first application function network element.
  • Step 11022 The AKMA anchor point function network element cannot determine the authentication service function network element corresponding to the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element sends an authentication service function network element path information request message to the data management network element, and the authentication service function network element path information request message carries the identification information of the first key.
  • the AKMA anchor function network element receives the response message of the authentication service function network element path information request message from the data management network element, and the response message of the authentication service function network element path information request message indicates the authentication service function network element path information request fail.
  • Step 11023 The AKMA anchor function network element sends a response message of the first request message to the first application function network element, and the response message of the first request message indicates that the communication key request between the terminal device and the first application function network element failed .
  • the AKMA anchor function network element sends the first failure reason value to the first application function network element.
  • step 1102 For the failure to establish the first application session because the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key cannot be determined, the following steps may be further included between step 1102 and step 1103:
  • Step 11024 The authentication service function network element receives the second authentication request in the re-authentication process.
  • Step 11025 The authentication service function network element sends a response message to the second authentication request in the re-authentication process.
  • Step 11026 After receiving the first request message, the AKMA anchor function network element sends a first key request message to the authentication service function network element.
  • the first key request message carries identification information of the first key.
  • Step 11027 After receiving the first key request message, the authentication service function network element cannot determine the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key;
  • Step 11028 The authentication service function network element sends a response message of the first key request message to the AKMA anchor function network element, where the response message of the first key request message is used to indicate that the first key request fails.
  • the authentication service function network element sends a second failure reason value to the AKMA anchor function network element, and the second failure reason value indicates that the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key cannot be determined.
  • step 1102 for the failure to establish the first application session because the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key cannot be determined, the following steps may be further included between step 1102 and step 1103:
  • Step 11029 After receiving the first application session establishment request message, the first application function network element sends the first request message to the AKMA anchor function network element.
  • the first request message is used to request a communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element, and the first request message carries identification information of the first key and identification information of the first application function network element.
  • Step 110210 The AKMA anchor point function network element cannot determine the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key.
  • Step 110211 The AKMA anchor function network element sends a response message of the first request message to the first application function network element, and the response message of the first request message indicates that the communication key request between the terminal device and the first application function network element failed .
  • the AKMA anchor function network element sends a second failure reason value to the application function network element, and the second failure reason value indicates that the first key corresponding to the identification information of the first key cannot be determined.
  • FIG. 15 is a schematic flowchart of another key management method provided by this application.
  • the terminal device triggers condition (1)(2)(3) to send a second application session establishment to the first application server. Request message.
  • the process includes but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Steps 1201-1209 are the same as steps 701-709 in FIG. 11, and will not be described in detail.
  • Step 1210 The UE sends a response message to the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process.
  • a flag is set on the UE on the UE.
  • the flag may indicate that the UE has performed re-authentication, and may also indicate that the UE has sent the first application session establishment request before re-authentication.
  • Step 1211 After receiving Kaf (optionally, the validity time of Kaf is also received), AF1 sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the UE.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message is, for example, Application session establishment Response.
  • Step 1212 After receiving the response message of the first application session establishment request message, the UE releases the first application session and sends a second application session establishment request message to AF1.
  • the second application session establishment request message carries the A-KID-2 generated after re-authentication.
  • the trigger condition for the UE to send the second application session establishment request message to AF1 may include any one or more of the following:
  • the UE After the UE receives the response message of the first application session establishment request message, it uses Kakma-2 to derive Kaf-2, and the UE uses Kaf-2 to perform authentication with AF-1, or the secure communication fails.
  • the second application session establishment request message carries indication information indicating that the establishment of the first application session fails or instructs the UE to initiate application session re-establishment, or the second application session establishment request message is used for re-establishment between the UE and AF1. Establish an application session.
  • the UE deletes the first application session context that failed to establish with AF-1.
  • Step 1213 After receiving the second application session establishment request message, AF-1 deletes the first application session context that failed to establish with the UE, such as deleting information such as Kaf-1.
  • AF-1 and the UE After receiving the second application session establishment request message, AF-1 and the UE perform Kaf-2 negotiation based on Kakma-2 and/or A-KID-2, which is the same as the prior art and will not be repeated.
  • FIG. 15 a schematic flow diagram of another key management method provided by this application.
  • the terminal device triggers condition (4) to send a second application session establishment request message to the first application server.
  • the process includes but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Steps 1301-1306 are the same as steps 901-906 in FIG. 13 and will not be described in detail.
  • Step 1307 If AAnF retains Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 before re-authentication, because Kakma-1 and A-KID-1 in AAnF are deleted after re-authentication, AAnF cannot be found according to A-KID-1 Kakma-1, Kaf-1 on the AF side cannot be generated. AAnF generates failure indication 1 and executes steps 1309a-1311a and 1312. Failure indication 1 indicates that the Kaf request failed. Optionally, AAnF also generates a failure reason value 2. The failure reason means that Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1 cannot be found, and the reason value is recorded as Cause 2.
  • the first request message is a servicing message
  • the name of the first request message is a servicing message name, which may specifically be AKMA key request.
  • the first request message carries A-KID-1.
  • AAnF searches for the routing information of AUSF by accessing UDM, and the identification information required to find the routing information of AUSF is A-KID-1. Because the relevant information about A-KID-1 in UDM is deleted after re-authentication, UDM cannot find AUSF routing information according to A-KID-1, and returns failure indication 2 to AAnF. Failure indication 2 indicates that the AUSF routing information search failed. Optionally, the failure reason value 1 is also returned. The failure reason means that the routing information of AUSF cannot be found, and the reason value is recorded as cause 1. After the AAnF receives one or more of the failure indication 2 or the failure reason value 1, steps 1309b-1311b and 1312 are executed.
  • Step 1308 AUSF cannot find the corresponding Kakma-1 according to A-KID-1, AUSF returns failure indication 3 to AAnF, failure indication 3 indicates that the Kakma request failed, optionally, it also returns the failure reason value 2, and the failure reason cannot be found Kakma-1 corresponding to A-KID-1, the cause value is recorded as cause 2.
  • Step 1309a AAnF sends one or more of failure indication 1 or cause 2 to AF1, and failure indication 1 indicates that the Kaf request failed.
  • failure indication 1 or cause 2 may be carried in a Key response message and sent to AF1.
  • Step 1310a After receiving one or more of failure indication 1 or cause 2, AF1 sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the UE.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message includes failure One or more of indication 4 or cause 2, and failure indication 4 indicates that the establishment of the first application session fails.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message is, for example, Application session establishment Response.
  • Step 1311a After receiving one or more of the failure indication 4 or cause 2, the UE releases the first application session connection, and re-initiates the application session establishment process.
  • Step 1309b AAnF sends one or more of the failure indication 1 or cause1 to the AF, and the failure indication 1 indicates that the Kaf request failed.
  • failure indication 1 or cause 1 may be carried in a Key response message and sent to AAnF.
  • Step 1310b After receiving one or more of failure indication 1 or cause 1, the AF sends a response message of the first application session establishment request message to the UE.
  • the response message of the first application session establishment request message includes failure indication 4 or cause One or more of 1, and the failure indication 4 indicates that the establishment of the first application session fails.
  • Step 1311b After receiving one or more of the failure indication 4 or cause 1, the UE releases the first application session connection, and re-initiates the application session establishment process.
  • Step 1312 The UE uses the re-authenticated A-KID-2 to request the establishment of an application session, which is the same as the prior art, and will not be repeated.
  • FIG. 18 is a flow chart of the method. The flow includes but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Steps 1401-1410 are the same as steps 401-410 in FIG. 6, and will not be described in detail.
  • Step 1412 After the re-authentication is successful, the UE does not delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the UE uses the second K AUSF after re-authentication to derive the second K AKMA . It is understandable that the UE saves two sets of K AKMA and corresponding key identification information;
  • Step 1413 The AF sends an application session establishment response message to the UE.
  • the message may carry deduction parameters for generating K AF , MAC (message authentication code) 1 for integrity protection, etc., where the deduction parameters can be random numbers, Counter value, etc., the input key of MAC1 may be K AF , and the input parameter may be the entire application session establishment response message or some cells in the application session establishment response message.
  • Step 1414 The UE receives the application session establishment response message sent by the AF, and derives K AF .
  • the UE derives K AF according to the deduction parameters and K AKMA. It is understandable that the UE obtains the first K AF according to the deduction parameter and the first K AKMA , and the UE obtains the second K AF according to the deduction parameter and the second K AKMA .
  • the deduction parameter carried in the application session establishment response message may be part or all of the deduction parameter of the deduction K AF.
  • Step 1415 The UE judges the key K AF used by the AF.
  • the UE uses the first K AF and the second K AF to calculate MAC2 and MAC3 respectively, and the input parameters and security algorithm used in the calculation of MAC1 and the input parameters and security The algorithm is the same.
  • the UE compares MAC1 with MAC2 and MAC3 respectively.
  • MAC1 and MAC2 are the same, it means that the key used by AF is the first K AF , and the application session establishment response message has not been tampered with, then the UE and AF conduct subsequent sessions
  • the first K AF is selected, the second K AF and the corresponding key identification information can be optionally deleted;
  • MAC1 is the same as MAC3
  • it means that the key used by AF is the second K AF
  • the application session establishment response message has not been tampered with when selecting the second AF K, the UE and the AF subsequent sessions, the first optional delete key K corresponding to the identification information and AF.
  • the UE When MAC1 is different from MAC2 and MAC3, it indicates that the application session establishment response message may be tampered with, and the UE discards the application session establishment response message. According to the local configuration, the UE re-initiates the application session establishment process, that is, the UE re-sends the application session establishment request message.
  • the message carries the key identification information of the second K AKMA selected when the second and AF conduct subsequent sessions, and the first is optionally deleted. And the second K AF and corresponding key identification information.
  • the local configuration may be that the UE receives an incorrect application session establishment response message one or more times.
  • the UE When the application session establishment response message does not carry MAC1 for integrity protection, the UE tries to use the first K AF and the second K AF and AF to perform subsequent application session services, and judges the UE selection based on the success or failure of the subsequent application session services Which K AF to use .
  • the K AF may be a credential for authentication between the UE and the AF, or a symmetric key for communication.
  • the success of the subsequent application session service may be the successful authentication of the UE using the K AF and the AF, or the successful security protection when the UE and the AF use the K AF or its derived key to communicate.
  • the subsequent failure of the application session service may be the failure of the UE to use the K AF and the AF for authentication, or the failure of the security protection when the UE and the AF use the K AF or its derived key to communicate.
  • the UE uses the first K AF and the subsequent application session with the AF is successful, it means that the key used by the AF is the first K AF , then the UE and the AF select the first K AF during the subsequent session, and optionally delete the second K AF And the corresponding key identification information; when the UE uses the first K AF and the subsequent application session with the AF fails, the UE uses the second K AF to conduct the subsequent application session with the AF.
  • the key used by the AF is second selecting a second K K AF AF, the UE and the AF subsequent sessions, deleting the second alternative K AF and the corresponding key identification information; when the UE using a first and a second K AF, AF and subsequent
  • the UE re-initiates the application session establishment process according to the local configuration, that is, the UE re-sends the application session establishment request message, which carries the key identification information of the second K AKMA when the second and AF are in the subsequent session.
  • the local configuration may be that one or more application session failures occur in the UE and AF due to the inconsistency of K AF on both sides.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a key management device, including a corresponding module for executing the foregoing embodiment.
  • the module can be software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.
  • FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by this application.
  • the communication device 1500 shown in FIG. 19 includes a transceiver module 1501 and a processing module 1502, and optionally, a storage module 1503.
  • the device 1500 is a terminal device:
  • the transceiver module 1501 is configured to send a first application session establishment request message to a first application function network element, where the first application session establishment request message carries identification information of a first key, and the first key is the application's Authentication and key management AKMA key; receiving the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; sending the response message of the first authentication request message in the re-authentication process; and receiving from the first application function A response message of the first application session establishment request message of the network element; the processing module 1502 is configured to use the first key to derive the communication key between the terminal device and the first application function network element.
  • the processing module 1502 is configured not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key
  • the apparatus 1500 is used to implement the functions of the terminal device or UE in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18
  • the processing module 1502 is configured to support the terminal device to execute the method in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18
  • the transceiver module 1501 It is used to support the communication between the terminal device and other devices.
  • the terminal device or UE in Figure 10-18.
  • the device 1500 is an authentication service function network element:
  • the transceiver module 1501 is configured to receive the second authentication request in the re-authentication process; send a response message to the second authentication request in the re-authentication process; receive the authentication and key management AKMA from the application A first key request message of the anchor function network element, where the first key request message carries identification information of the first key, and the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process; and The AKMA anchor function network element sends the first key.
  • the processing module 1502 is configured not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the apparatus 1500 is used to implement the functions of the authentication service function network element or AUSF in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18, and the processing module 1502 is configured to support the authentication service function network element to perform the method in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18
  • the transceiver module 1501 is used to support communication between the authentication service function network element and other devices. For details, refer to the corresponding description of the authentication service function network element or AUSF in Figure 10-18.
  • the device 1500 is an AKMA anchor function network element for authentication and key management of the application:
  • the transceiver module 1501 is used to receive a first request message from the first application function network element after the re-authentication process, and the first request message is used to request communication between the terminal device and the first application function network element Communication key, the first request message carries the identification information of the first key, and the first key is the AKMA key generated before the re-authentication process; the processing module 1502 is configured to use the first key to derive the terminal The communication key between the device and the first application function network element; the transceiver module 1501 is also used to send the communication key to the application function network element.
  • the processing module 1502 is configured not to delete the first key and the identification information of the first key.
  • the apparatus 1500 is used to implement the functions of the AKMA anchor function network element or AAnF in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18, and the processing module 1502 is configured to support the AKMA anchor function network element to perform the method in the embodiment shown in FIGS. 10-18
  • the transceiver module 1501 is used to support communication between the AKMA anchor function network element and other devices. For details, please refer to the corresponding description of the AKMA anchor function network element or AAnF in Figure 10-18.
  • FIG. 20 is a schematic structural diagram of another communication device provided by this application.
  • the communication device 1600 shown in FIG. 20 includes at least one processor 1601, a transceiver 1602, and optionally, a memory 1603 or a bus 1604.
  • the processor 1601, the transceiver 1602, and the memory 1603 are connected by a bus 1604.
  • the processor 1601 may be, for example, a central processing unit (CPU), a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (digital signal processor, DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), which can be used on site.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • the processor may also be a combination for realizing computing functions, for example, including a combination of one or more microprocessors, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, and so on.
  • the bus 1604 may be a peripheral component interconnect (PCI) bus or an extended industry standard architecture (EISA) bus, etc.
  • PCI peripheral component interconnect
  • EISA extended industry standard architecture
  • the bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus and so on. For ease of presentation, only one thick line is used to represent in FIG. 20, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • An embodiment of the present application also provides a chip system 1700, which includes at least one processor 1701, an interface circuit 1702, and the processor 1701 is connected to the interface circuit 1702.
  • the processor 1701 may be an integrated circuit chip with signal processing capabilities. In the implementation process, the steps of the foregoing method can be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor 1701 or instructions in the form of software.
  • the aforementioned processor 1701 may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), an off-the-shelf programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, discrete gate or transistor logic device, discrete hardware Components.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • FPGA off-the-shelf programmable gate array
  • the methods and steps disclosed in the embodiments of the present application can be implemented or executed.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may also be any conventional processor or the like.
  • the interface circuit 1702 can complete the sending or receiving of data, instructions or information.
  • the processor 1701 can use the data, instructions or other information received by the interface circuit 1702 to perform processing, and can send processing completion information through the interface circuit 1702.
  • the chip system further includes a memory 1703.
  • the memory 1703 may include a read-only memory and a random access memory, and provides operation instructions and data to the processor.
  • a part of the memory 1703 may further include non-volatile random access memory (NVRAM).
  • NVRAM non-volatile random access memory
  • the memory 1703 stores executable software modules or data structures, and the processor 1703 can execute corresponding operations by calling operation instructions stored in the memory (the operation instructions may be stored in the operating system).
  • the chip system may be used in the terminal device, the authentication service function network element, or the AKMA anchor function network element involved in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the interface circuit 1702 is configured to perform the receiving and sending steps of the terminal device, the authentication service function network element, or the AKMA anchor function network element in the embodiments shown in FIG. 10 to FIG. 18.
  • the processor 1701 is used to perform the processing steps of the terminal device, the authentication service function network element, or the AKMA anchor function network element in the embodiments shown in FIG. 10 to FIG. 18.
  • the memory 1703 is used to store data and instructions of the terminal device, the authentication service function network element, or the AKMA anchor function network element in the embodiments shown in FIG. 10 to FIG. 18.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the methods described in the foregoing method embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. If implemented in software, the functions can be stored on a computer-readable medium or transmitted on a computer-readable medium as one or more instructions or codes.
  • Computer-readable media may include computer storage media and communication media, and may also include any media that can transfer a computer program from one place to another.
  • the storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer.
  • the computer-readable medium may include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used for carrying or with instructions or data structures
  • the required program code is stored in the form of and can be accessed by the computer.
  • any connection is properly termed a computer-readable medium.
  • coaxial cable, fiber optic cable, twisted pair, digital subscriber line (DSL) or wireless technology such as infrared, radio and microwave
  • coaxial cable, fiber optic cable , Twisted pair, DSL or wireless technologies such as infrared, radio and microwave are included in the definition of the medium.
  • Magnetic disks and optical disks as used herein include compact disks (CDs), laser disks, optical disks, digital versatile disks (DVDs), floppy disks and blu-ray disks, in which disks usually reproduce data magnetically, and optical disks use lasers to optically reproduce data. Combinations of the above should also be included in the scope of computer-readable media.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a computer program product.
  • the methods described in the foregoing method embodiments may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof. If it is implemented in software, it can be fully or partially implemented in the form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the above computer program instructions are loaded and executed on the computer, the procedures or functions described in the above method embodiments are generated in whole or in part.
  • the above-mentioned computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, network equipment, user equipment, or other programmable devices.
  • system and “network” in this article are often used interchangeably in this article.
  • the term “and/or” in this article is only an association relationship describing the associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and/or B, which can mean: A alone exists, A and B exist at the same time, exist alone In the three cases of B, A can be singular or plural, and B can be singular or plural.
  • B corresponding to A means that B is associated with A, and B can be determined according to A.
  • determining B based on A does not mean that B is determined only based on A, and B can also be determined based on A and/or other information.
  • the corresponding relationships shown in the tables in this application can be configured or pre-defined.
  • the value of the information in each table is only an example, and can be configured to other values, which is not limited in this application.
  • the corresponding relationship shown in some rows may not be configured.
  • appropriate deformation adjustments can be made based on the above table, such as splitting, merging, and so on.
  • the names of the parameters shown in the titles in the above tables may also be other names that can be understood by the communication device, and the values or expressions of the parameters may also be other values or expressions that can be understood by the communication device.
  • other data structures can also be used, such as arrays, queues, containers, stacks, linear tables, pointers, linked lists, trees, graphs, structures, classes, heaps, hash tables, or hash tables. Wait.
  • the pre-definition in this application can be understood as definition, pre-definition, storage, pre-storage, pre-negotiation, pre-configuration, curing, or pre-fired.
  • the systems, devices, and methods described in this application can also be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.

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Abstract

本申请提供一种密钥管理方法、设备及系统，用以保证AKMA流程中发生重鉴权后终端设备与应用功能网元之间仍能成功协商该应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥。该方法包括：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话的建立请求消息，该建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；该终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；该终端设备发送该重鉴权流程中的该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备接收来自该建立请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。

Description

密钥管理方法、设备及系统 技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及密钥管理方法、设备及系统。
背景技术
目前，终端设备可支持应用程序的身份验证和密钥管理(authentication and key management for applications，AKMA)服务。在AKMA服务中，终端设备与应用功能网元进行数据传输，终端设备需要与应用功能网元之间协商两者之间的通信密钥，该通信密钥可以用来进行身份鉴权和通信保护。应用功能网元从AKMA的锚点功能网元获取该应用功能网元与终端设备之间的通信密钥，AKMA的锚点功能网元根据AKMA密钥生成该应用功能网元与终端设备之间的通信密钥。AKMA的锚点功能网元可以从终端设备对应的鉴权服务器功能网元获取AKMA密钥。
而当前的AKMA流程中未考虑重鉴权的发生，重鉴权会导致AKMA密钥的更新和删除，该种情况下，如何保证终端设备与应用功能网元之间成功协商该应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥是亟待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种密钥管理方法、通信装置及通信系统，保证AKMA流程中发生重鉴权后终端设备与应用功能网元之间仍能成功协商该应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥。
第一方面，本申请提供一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息，该第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；该终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；该终端设备发送该重鉴权流程中的该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备接收来自该第一应用功能网元的该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，终端设备仍使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥推演终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。该方法还可以避免应用会话业务中断，减少业务时延，提高用户体验。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备发送该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，若该重鉴权流程成功，该终端设备不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，若该重鉴权流程之前发送了该第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，该终端设备不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，若该重鉴权流程之前该终端设备发送了该第一应用会话建立请求，且已收到该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但未推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，该终端设备不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，若未推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，该终端设备不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备接收来自该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，确定使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备发送该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，生成第二密钥，该第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，当该终端设备确定该第一应用会话建立请求消息为该重鉴权流程前发送的，则该终端设备确定使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，当该终端设备确定该第一应用会话建立请求消息携带的是该第一密钥的标识信息，则该终端设备确定使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备根据第一应用会话上下文中的第一密钥的标识信息确定该第一应用会话建立请求消息携带的是该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备发送该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，保存发送该第一应用会话建立请求消息和该重鉴权流程的先后关系。
在一个可能的设计中，当携带该第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应，该终端设备删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，当该终端设备未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为该重鉴权流程之后发送的，该终端设备删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备发送该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，该终端设备向第二应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，该第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，该第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备还使用第一密钥的标识信息或第一应用功能网元的标识信息推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
第二方面，本申请提供了一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：鉴权服务功能网元接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求；该鉴权服务功能网元发送该重鉴权流程中的该第二鉴权请求的响应消息；该鉴权服务功能网元接收来自应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元的第一密钥请求消息，该第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；该鉴权服务功能网元向该AKMA锚点功能网元发送该第一密钥。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，鉴权服务功能网元仍向AKMA锚点功能网元发送重鉴权前生成的第一密钥，以使AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证终端设备生成的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。该方法还可以避免应用会话业务中断，减少业务时延，提高用户体验。
在一个可能的设计中，该鉴权服务功能网元发送该第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该鉴权服务功能网元接收来自终端设备的第一指示，该第一指示用于指示不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该第一指示携带在该第二鉴权请求中。
在一个可能的设计中，当该重鉴权流程成功，该鉴权服务功能网元不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该鉴权服务功能网元发送该第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，生成第二密钥，该第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该鉴权服务功能网元根据该第一密钥的标识信息，确定该第一密钥。
第三方面，本申请提供了一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：重鉴权流程后，应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自第一应用功能网元的第一请求消息，该第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，该第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；该AKMA锚点功能网元使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；该AKMA锚点功能网元向该应用功能网元发送该通信密钥。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，AKMA锚点功能网元仍使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥生成终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证终端设备生成的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
在一个可能的设计中，该重鉴权流程后，该AKMA锚点功能网元不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自该终端设备或鉴权服务功能网元的第二指示，该第二指示用于指示不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，当该重鉴权流程成功，该AKMA锚点功能网元不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
在一个可能的设计中，该重鉴权流程后，该AKMA锚点功能网元获取第二密钥，该第二密钥为该重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该AKMA锚点功能网元根据该第一密钥的标识信息，确定该第一密钥。
第四方面，本申请提供了一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息，该第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；该终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；该终端设备发送该重鉴权流程中的该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备接收来自该第一应用功能网元的该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；该终端设备向该第一应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，该第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，该第二密钥为该重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。
该方法中，发生重鉴权前，终端设备使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥的标识信息和应用功能网元发起应用会话建立流程，发送重鉴权后，终端设备使用重鉴权后生成的第二密钥的标识信息重新和该应用功能网元发起应用会话建立流程，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的 安全通信。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备根据该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，确定该第一应用会话建立失败；该终端设备向该第一应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。
在一个可能的设计中，该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息包括以下任意一项或多项：第三指示、第一失败原因值或第二失败原因值，其中，第三指示用于指示该第一应用会话建立失败，该第一失败原因值用于指示无法找到鉴权服务功能网元，该第二失败原因值用于指示无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的该第一密钥，该鉴权服务功能网元用于生成该第一密钥。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备根据第一标识向该第一应用服务器发送该第二应用会话建立请求消息，该第一标识用于标识该终端设备上执行了该重鉴权流程。
在一个可能的设计中，该第一标识用于标识执行该主鉴权流程之前该终端设备发送了该第一应用会话建立请求消息。
在一个可能的设计中，该重主鉴权流程后，该终端设备在该终端设备上设置该第一标识。
在一个可能的设计中，若该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息受到该第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥的安全保护，该终端设备解安全保护失败，则该终端设备向该第一应用服务器发送该第二应用会话建立请求消息，该第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥由该第一密钥推演而来。
在一个可能的设计中，若该终端设备收到该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，使用该第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥与该第一应用功能网元进行安全通信失败，则该终端设备向该第一应用服务器发送该第二应用会话建立请求消息，该第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥为由该第一密钥推演而来。
在一个可能的设计中，该终端设备删除该第一应用会话的上下文；或者该终端设备指示该第一应用功能网元删除该第一应用会话的上下文。
第五方面，本申请提供了一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：重鉴权流程后，应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自第一应用功能网元的第一请求消息，该第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，该第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；该AKMA锚点功能网元无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的鉴权服务功能网元；该AKMA锚点功能网元向该第一应用功能网元发送第一请求消息的响应消息，该第一请求消息的响应消息指示该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥请求失败。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，若无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的鉴权服务功能网元，AKMA锚点功能网元指示该第一应用功能网元无法确定鉴权服务功能网元，以便第一应用功能网元指示终端设备第一应用会话建立失败，使得终端设备可以重新发起应用会话建立流程，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
在一个可能的设计中，该AKMA锚点功能网元向数据管理网元发送鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息，该鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息携带该第一密钥的标识信息；该AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自该数据管理网元的该鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息的响应消息，该鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息的响应消息指示鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求失败。
在一个可能的设计中，该AKMA锚点功能网元向该第一应用功能网元发送第一失败原因值，该第一失败原因值指示无法找到该鉴权服务功能网元。
第六方面，本申请提供了一种密钥管理方法，该方法包括：鉴权服务功能网元接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求；该鉴权服务功能网元发送该重鉴权流程中的该第二鉴权请求的响应消息；
该鉴权服务功能网元接收来自应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元的第一密钥请求消息，该第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前该鉴权服务功能网元生成的AKMA密钥；
该鉴权服务功能网元无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的该第一密钥；
该鉴权服务功能网元向该AKMA锚点功能网元发送该第一密钥请求消息的响应消息，该第一密钥请求消息的响应消息用于指示该第一密钥请求失败。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，若无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的该第一密钥，鉴权服务功能网元指示AKMA锚点功能网元无法确定该第一密钥，以便AKMA锚点功能网元指示应用功能网元终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥请求失败，进而使得应用功能网元指示终端设备第一应用会话建立失败，这样终端设备可以重新发起应用会话建立流程，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
在一个可能的设计中，该鉴权服务功能网元向该AKMA锚点功能网元发送第二失败原因值，该第二失败原因值指示无法确定该第一密钥的标识信息对应的该第一密钥。
第七方面，本申请提供了一种终端设备，该终端设备具有实现上述第一方面或第四方面中该方法的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件和软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
在一种可能的设计中，终端设备的结构中包括处理器和收发器，该处理器被配置为支持终端设备执行上述第一方面或第四方面中的方法，该收发器用于支持终端设备与其他设备之间的通信。该终端设备还可以包括存储器，该存储器用于与处理器耦合，其保存该终端设备必要的程序指令和数据。
第八方面，本申请提供了一种鉴权服务功能网元，该鉴权服务功能网元具有实现上述第二方面或第六方面中该方法的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件和软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
结合第八方面，在一种可能的设计中，鉴权服务功能网元的结构中包括处理器和收发器，该处理器被配置为支持鉴权服务功能网元执行上述第二方面或第六方面中该的方法，该收发器用于支持鉴权服务功能网元与其他设备之间的通信。该鉴权服务功能网元还可以包括存储器，该存储器用于与处理器耦合，其保存该鉴权服务功能网元必要的程序指令和数据。
第九方面，本申请提供了一种应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元，该AKMA锚点功能网元具有实现上述第三方面或第五方面中该方法的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件和软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
结合第九方面，在一种可能的设计中，AKMA锚点功能网元的结构中包括处理器和收发器，该处理器被配置为支持AKMA锚点功能网元执行上述第三方面或第五方面中该的方法，该收发器用于支持AKMA锚点功能网元与其他设备之间的通信。该AKMA锚点功能网元还可以包括存储器，该存储器用于与处理器耦合，其保存该AKMA锚点功能网元必要的程序指 令和数据。
第十方面，本申请提供了一种装置(例如，该装置可以是芯片系统)，该装置包括处理器，可以执行上述第一方面至第六方面中该的任意一种或多种方法。
结合第十方面，在一种可能的设计中，该装置还包括存储器，用于保存必要的程序指令和数据。
第十一方面，本申请提供了一种计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述第一方面至第六方面中该的任意一种或多种方法。
第十二方面，本申请提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机可以执行上述第一方面至第六方面中中该的任意一种或多种方法。
第十三方面，本申请提供了一种通信系统，该系统包括上述第二方面所涉及的鉴权服务功能网元和上述第二方面所涉及的应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元。
结合第十三方面，在一种可能的设计中，该系统还包括与第二方面所涉及的应用功能网元等其他设备。
附图说明
图1为一种5G系统的网络架构示意图；
图2为一种AKMA架构示意图；
图3为一种生成AKMA密钥的流程示意图；
图4为一种主鉴权的触发和执行流程示意图；
图5为一种AKMA流程示意图；
图6为场景1中AKMA流程中发生重鉴权的示意图；
图7为场景2中AKMA流程中发生重鉴权的示意图；
图8为本申请提供的一种密钥管理系统的架构示意图；
图9为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理系统的架构示意图；
图10为本申请提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图11为本申请提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图12为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图13为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图14为本申请提供的又一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图15为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图16为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图17为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图18为本申请还提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图；
图19为本申请提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图；
图20为本申请提供的另一种通信装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例的技术方案进行描述。
本申请实施例的技术方案可以应用于各种通信系统，例如：长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)系统、LTE频分双工(frequency division duplex，FDD)系统、LTE时分双工(time division  duplex，TDD)、通用移动通信系统(universal mobile telecommunication system，UMTS)、全球互联微波接入(worldwide interoperability for microwave access，WiMAX)通信系统、第五代(5th generation，5G)系统或新无线(new radio，NR)等。
如图1所示，为5G系统的网络架构示意图。5G系统可包括终端设备、接入网和核心网。
其中，终端设备是一种具有无线收发功能的设备，可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持、穿戴或车载；也可以部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。终端设备可以是手机(mobile phone)、平板电脑(Pad)、带无线收发功能的电脑、虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端设备、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端设备、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、车载终端设备、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端、可穿戴终端设备等等。终端设备有时也可以称为终端、用户设备(user equipment，UE)、接入终端设备、车载终端、工业控制终端、UE单元、UE站、移动站、移动台、远方站、远程终端设备、移动设备、UE代理或UE装置等。终端设备也可以是固定的或者移动的。图1以及本申请中终端设备以UE为例进行介绍。
其中，接入网用于实现接入有关的功能，可以为特定区域的授权用户提供入网功能。接入网在终端设备与核心网之间转发控制信号和用户数据。接入网可以包括接入网络设备，接入网络设备可以是为终端设备提供接入的设备，可以包括无线接入网(radio access network，RAN)设备和AN设备。RAN设备主要是3GPP网络中的无线网络设备，AN设备可以是非3GPP定义的接入网络设备。在采用不同的无线接入技术的系统中，具备基站功能的设备的名称可能会有所不同，例如，在5G系统中，称为RAN或者下一代基站(next-generation Node basestation，gNB)；在LTE系统中，称为演进的节点B(evolved NodeB，eNB或eNodeB)。
其中，核心网负责维护移动网络的签约数据，为UE提供会话管理、移动性管理、策略管理以及安全认证等功能。核心网可以包括如下网元：用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)、认证服务功能(authentication server function，AUSF)、接入和移动性管理功能(access and mobility management function，AMF)、会话管理功能(session management function，SMF)、网络开放功能(network exposure function，NEF)、网络功能仓储功能(network function repository function，NRF)、策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)、统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)和应用功能(application function，AF)。
AMF，主要负责移动网络中的移动性管理，例如用户位置更新、用户注册网络、用户切换等。SMF，主要负责移动网络中的会话管理，例如会话建立、修改、释放。UPF，负责终端设备中用户数据的转发和接收，可以从数据网络接收用户数据，通过接入网络设备传输给终端设备；还可以通过接入网络设备从终端设备接收用户数据，转发至数据网络。PCF，主要支持提供统一的策略框架来控制网络行为，提供策略规则给控制层网络功能，同时负责获取与策略决策相关的用户签约信息。AUSF，用于执行UE的安全认证。NEF，主要用于支持能力和事件的开放。NRF，用于为其它网元提供网络功能实体信息的存储功能和选择功能。UDM，用于存储用户数据，例如签约数据、鉴权/授权数据等。AF与3GPP核心网交互用于提供应用层服务，例如提供关于应用层数据路由，提供接入网络能力开放功能，与策略框架进行交互以提供策略控制，与5G网络的IP多媒体子系统(IP multimedia subsystem，IMS)交互等。
其中，数据网络(data network，DN)用于为用户提供业务服务，可以是私有网络，例如局域网；也可以是不受运营商管控的外部网络，例如互联网(Internet)；还可以是运营商共同 部署的专有网络，例如IMS的网络。终端设备可通过建立的协议数据单元(protocol data unit，PDU)会话，来访问DN。
本申请实施例的技术方案涉及AKAM(authentication and key management for applications)服务。支持AKMA服务的UE与支持AKMA服务的AF进行数据传输时，可以基于AKMA流程的安全保护以提高数据传输的安全性。相比于传统UE和AF的无保护的传输方法，使用AKMA可提高数据传输的安全性。
基于5G系统的网络架构，AKMA架构定义了AKMA流程涉及的网元。如图2所示，为AKAM架构示意图。AKAM架构包括UE、(R)AN、AUSF、AMF、AF、NEF、AKMA的锚点功能(AKMA anchor function，AAnF)和UDM。
图2中，UE与AF进行通信存在三种方式，一种是UE通过(R)AN和AMF与AF进行通信，一种是UE通过AMF与AF进行通信，一种是UE通过Ua*接口直接与AF进行通信。其中，Ua*接口为UE与AF之间的通信接口。
其中，UE可以生成AKMA密钥和AKMA密钥标识信息，并向AF发起应用会话建立请求消息，该应用会话请求消息携带AKMA密钥标识信息。AF可以使用AKMA密钥标识信息向AAnF请求AF与UE之间的通信密钥。AAnF可以向AUSF请求AKMA密钥，并根据AKMA密钥生成AF与UE之间的通信密钥以及该通信密钥的有效时间。AUSF可以生成AKMA密钥。AKMA密钥例如可以是Kakma，Kakma也可以称为AKMA的根密钥；AKMA密钥标识信息可以是任何用于标识该AKMA密钥的信息，例如可以是A-KID(AKMA-Key identifier)或者Kakma ID(Kakma identifier)；AF与UE之间的通信密钥，例如可以是Kaf。AF使用Kaf与UE进行数据传输可以提高该AF与UE之间的数据传输的安全性。
示例性的，AUSF和UE生成AKMA密钥(以Kakma为例)的过程可参见图3所示。该过程具体包括：
步骤101：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权流程(Primary Authentication)
主鉴权，即为UE向5G核心网的注册过程中，UE对AMF和/或AUSF进行鉴权，AUSF对UE进行鉴权的过程，也可以描述为双向鉴权，具体可参见图4所示的流程。具体可以是在注册过程中，核心网设备和终端通过消息交互，终端和核心网设备分别将对方提供的待验证参数，与自己生成的另一个参数进行对比，若对方提供的待验证参数与自身生成的参数相同，则终端和核心网设备之间的鉴权验证通过。
步骤102：UE使用主鉴权过程中生成的中间密钥(以Kausf为例)生成Kakma和AKMA密钥标识信息(以A-KID为例)
UE在对AMF和/或AUSF进行鉴权之后，发起应用会话建立请求之前，使用主鉴权过程中生成的中间密钥如Kausf，生成Kakma以及生成AKMA密钥标识信息如A-KID。
步骤103：AUSF使用Kausf生成Kakma和A-KID
AUSF对UE进行鉴权之后，AUSF可以使用Kausf，生成Kakma，以及生成A-KID。
需要说明的是，AUSF可以是主鉴权流程后直接生成Kakma和A-KID，也可以是在下述图5中AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma时生成Kakma和A-KID，还可以在不同时刻分别生成Kakma和A-KID，本申请对此不作限定。
可以理解的是，UE和AUSF分别在本地生成相同的Kausf、Kakma以及A-KID。
需要说明的是，步骤102和步骤103之间没有时序关系，可以步骤102先执行，步骤103后执行，或者步骤103先执行，步骤102后执行，又或者，可以步骤102和步骤103同时执行，本申请对此不作限制。
示例性的，主鉴权的触发和执行流程可参见图4所示，该流程具体包括：
步骤201：UE通过RAN向AMF发送注册请求(Registration Request)。
其中，注册请求携带UE的身份信息，AMF根据UE的身份信息(例如隐藏的身份标识(subscriber concealed identifier，SUCI))选择AUSF。
在鉴权场景下，AMF可以称为安全锚点功能(Security Anchor Function，SEAF)网元，也就是说，本申请实施例中的AMF皆可以替换为SEAF。
步骤202：AMF向AUSF发送UE认证鉴权请求消息(UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message)。
其中，UE认证鉴权请求消息携带UE的身份信息。
步骤203：AUSF向UDM发送UE鉴权获取请求(UEAuthentication_Get Request)消息，触发主鉴权流程。
UE鉴权获取请求消息中携带UE的身份信息。当身份信息为SUCI时，UDM解析SUCI并获得UE的永久身份标识，并查找UE的根密钥。
步骤204：UDM向AUSF发送UE鉴权获取请求消息的响应消息(Authentication_Get response)
步骤205：AUSF向AMF发送UE认证鉴权请求消息的响应消息(UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response)。UE认证鉴权请求消息的响应消息携带AMF的鉴权参数。
步骤206：AMF向UE发送第一鉴权请求(Authentication-Request)消息。第一鉴权请求消息携带AMF的鉴权参数。
步骤207：UE使用本地保存的根密钥计算鉴权参数，并校验AMF的鉴权参数，校验通过代表核心网可信。校验通过后，UE向AMF发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息(Authentication Response)，第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息中携带UE的鉴权参数。AMF根据UE的鉴权参数，确定鉴权中AMF没有欺骗AUSF。
步骤208：AMF向AUSF发送第二鉴权请求(UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request message)消息，第二鉴权请求消息携带UE的鉴权参数，AUSF校验UE的鉴权参数，校验成功则代表鉴权成功。
步骤209：AUSF根据UE的的鉴权参数对UE进行鉴权，并向AMF发送第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息(UEAuthentication_Authenticate Response)，告知AMF AUSF对UE鉴权的结果。
上述主鉴权流程中，AUSF和UE生成Kausf，可用于AUSF和UE生成Kakma，具体可参见图3所示的过程。
需要说明的是，上述主鉴权流程(即步骤204-209)是对现有技术中5G网络的主鉴权流程的一个简要介绍。5G网络的主鉴权流程具体细节可参考5G AKA(authentication and key agreement)流程或EAP-AKA’(Extensible Authentication Protocol-Authentication and Key Agreement)流程。LTE网络的主鉴权流程具体细节可参考EPS(evolved packet system)AKA流程，本申请不作赘述。
示例性的，AKMA的流程可参见图5所示，该流程具体包括：
步骤301：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权，并生成Kakma和Kakma对应的A-KID。
主鉴权流程以及生成Kakma和A-KID可参考图3和图4中的描述，此处不作赘述。
在UE生成Kakma和A-KID后，AAnF可能会保存Kakma和A-KID。
步骤302：UE向AF发送应用会话建立请求(例如application session establishment request)。
其中，应用会话建立请求携带A-KID。
步骤303：AF在收到应用会话建立请求后，向AAnF发送Kaf请求消息(例如key request)。
其中，Kaf请求消息携带A-KID和应用服务功能网元的标识信息，应用服务功能网元的标识信息例如可以是AF ID。
步骤304：若AAnF保存有A-KID对应的Kakma，那么AAnF直接根据Kakma和AF ID生成Kaf和Kaf的有效时间，并执行步骤307-311。
若AAnF未保存A-KID对应的Kakma，那么执行步骤305-311。
步骤305：AAnF向AUSF发送Kakma密钥请求(例如AKMA key request)。
Kakma密钥请求携带A-KID。
步骤306：AUSF根据A-KID查找对应的Kakma，向AAnF发送Kakma密钥请求的响应消息(例如AKMA key reponse)。
Kakma密钥请求的响应消息携带Kakma。
步骤307：AAnF使用Kakma推演Kaf，进一步的AAnF还会生成Kaf的有效时间。
步骤308：AAnF向AF发送Kaf请求消息的响应消息(例如key response)。
其中，Kaf请求消息的响应消息携带Kaf和Kaf的有效时间。
步骤309：AF在接收到Kaf请求消息的响应消息之后，向UE发送应用会话建立请求的响应消息(例如application session establishment response)。
步骤310：UE接收应用会话建立请求的响应消息后，可以使用Kakma推演Kaf。
需要说明的是，UE推演Kaf可以在接收应用会话建立请求的响应消息后，或者可以在发送应用会话建立请求之后，又或者可以在发送应用会话建立请求之前，本申请对此不作限定。
对于不同AF与同一UE之间的Kaf可以不同，例如AF1与UE1之间的Kaf为Kaf1，AF2与UE1之间的Kaf为Kaf2。
步骤311：UE和AF之间使用Kaf进行数据传输或者身份鉴权，从而提高AF与UE之间的数据传输的安全性。
本申请实施例的技术方案还涉及重鉴权，即UE对核心网设备(在5G中例如可以是AMF和/或AUSF)再次进行鉴权，核心网设备(在5G中例如可以是AUSF)对UE再次进行鉴权。具体可以是核心网设备(在5G中例如可以是AMF)发现某种参数即将无法使用从而触发对UE的重鉴权，某种参数即将无法使用例如可以是NAS(non-access stratum)COUNT即将翻转，或者是根据运营商的配置要求达到了核心网设备(在5G中例如可以是AMF)对UE再次进行鉴权的触发条件。核心网设备对终端进行重鉴权的过程中，核心网设备和终端会进行消息交互，终端和核心网设备分别将对方提供的待验证参数，与自己生成的另一个参数进行对比，若对方提供的待验证参数与自身生成的参数相同，则终端和核心网设备之间的鉴权验证通过。5G重鉴权流程的具体步骤可参考图4所示的步骤202-209。可以理解的是，重鉴权就是在发生过主鉴权之后，由核心网设备再次为这个UE发起主鉴权的过程，本申请中的重鉴权是核心网设备发起的，而UE注册过程中的主鉴权是由UE向核心网设备发送注册请求，再由核心网设备发起的。重鉴权之后，UE和AUSF会生成新的Kausf，旧的Kausf会被删除。相应的，重鉴权之后，旧的Kakma和A-KID会被删除，UE有发起新的应用会话建立请求消息需求时，会生成新的Kakma和A-KID。
在AKMA流程中，Kakma的生存周期可以与UE再次发生主鉴权的间隔周期相同。比 如，UE第一次发生了主鉴权，并生产了Kakma。那么Kakma会一直保存到重鉴权发生时。因为重鉴权的发生无法明确判断，因此Kakma的保存时间也无法判断。而Kaf是有一个明确的有效时间的，进而造成了Kakma和Kaf的过期时间是解耦的，没有办法互相影响。
目前的AKMA流程未考虑重鉴权的发生，进而没有考虑到重鉴权会生成新的Kakma和A-KID所导致的问题。
具体的，在5G网络中存在UE可以通过3GPP接入技术单接入5G核心网的场景。在这个场景下，UE和5G核心网之间交互控制面消息和用户面消息。AKMA业务属于用户面业务，主鉴权和重鉴权属于控制面流程。当UE处于连接态后，可能出现UE和核心网之间一边进行AKMA业务，核心网一边发起对UE发起重鉴权过程。UE侧保存的Kakma和AUSF侧保存的Kakma，或者UE侧生成的Kaf和AAnF生成的Kaf会存在失步的可能。失步，即代表UE侧保存的Kakma和AUSF侧保存的Kakma不一样，或者UE生成的和AF获得的Kaf是不一样的。
在5G网络中还存在UE可以同时通过3GPP接入技术和non-3GPP接入技术多接入5G核心网的场景。在这个场景下，UE可以同时使用2种接入技术时会有如下场景发生：1：UE通过一种接入技术与5G核心网交互控制面NAS消息，UE通过另一个接入技术传递用户面数据；2：UE同时使用2种技术传递不同的DN对应的用户面数据；3：UE同时使用2种接入技术与5G核心网交互控制面NAS消息。同样的，因为AKMA业务属于用户面业务，主鉴权和重鉴权属于控制面流程，那么针对场景1就可能出现UE一边发起AKMA业务，核心网一边发起对UE的重鉴权过程。UE侧保存的Kakma和AUSF侧保存的Kakma，或者UE侧生成的Kaf和AAnF生成的Kaf会存在失步的可能。
针对上述UE侧生成的Kaf和AAnF生成的Kaf失步，本申请实施例提供以下具体场景：
场景1：UE侧生成了一个新的Kakma(记为Kakma-2)，并用新的Kakma生成Kaf-2，但是AAnF却在使用旧的Kakma(记为Kakma-1)生成Kaf-1。
比如，对应AAnF未保有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1的情形，UE发送了应用会话建立请求消息，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1完成后，即AAnF得到了Kakma-1后发生了重鉴权，AAnF使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1，而UE接收应用会话建立请求消息后使用新的Kakma生成的是Kaf-2；
或者，对应AAnF保有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1的情形，UE发送了应用会话建立请求消息，AAnF直接生成Kaf-1后发生了重鉴权，而UE接收应用会话建立请求消息后使用新的Kakma生成的是Kaf-2；
场景2：UE侧使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1，但是AAnF却无法使用A-KID-1找到Kakma-1。
比如，对应AAnF未保有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1的情形，UE发送了应用会话建立请求消息后，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1前发生了重鉴权，AUSF上的Kakma-1被删除，AAnF无法使用A-KID-1找到Kakma-1，而UE可以在发送了应用会话建立请求消息后重鉴权前生成Kaf-1；
或者，对应AAnF保有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1的情形，UE发送了应用会话建立请求消息后，AAnF生成Kaf-1前发生了重鉴权，AAnF上的Kakma-1被删除，而UE可以在发送了应用会话建立请求消息后重鉴权前生成Kaf-1。
场景3：UE侧使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1-1，但是AAnF却使用Kakma-2生成Kaf-2。
比如，对应AAnF未保有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1的情形，UE发送了应用会话建立请 求消息后，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1之前发生重鉴权，AUSF仍保存A-KID-1却生成了Kakma-2，AUSF误以为A-KID-1对应Kakma-2，相应返回给AAnF的是Kakma-2。
这种极端情况可能发生在UE首次请求一个AF的AKMA业务，但却不巧的伴随着重鉴权的发生
如图6所示，为场景1中AKMA流程中发生重鉴权的过程。该过程具体包括如下步骤：
步骤401：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权流程。
UE与AUSF执行主鉴权流程，可参考图3和图4中对主鉴权流程的详细描述，在此不再赘述。
步骤402：UE生成Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
其中，A-KID-1用于标记重鉴权前为Kakma-1生成的密钥标识信息。UE在主鉴权流程之后，使用主鉴权流程中生成的Kausf生成Kakma-1，为Kakma-1生成A-KID-1。
UE生成的A-KID具有唯一性，即A-KID具有全球唯一性，一个A-KID用于唯一标识一个Kakma，不同Kakma对应不同的A-KID。
步骤403：UE向AF1发起应用会话请求，A-KID-1携带在应用会话请求中。
其中，AF1用于标记重鉴权前UE请求建立应用会话的应用功能网元。应用会话请求例如是application session establishment request。
步骤404：AF1收到应用会话请求后向AAnF请求Kaf-1。
对于服务化的接口，AF1向AAnF请求Kaf的请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为key request。该请求消息携带A-KID-1和AF的标识，AF的标识例如可以是AF ID(identifier)。
步骤405：如果AAnF处有保存A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1，则AAnF直接生成Kaf-1和Kaf-1的有效时间，并执行步骤409至414。如果AAnF处没有A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1，则AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1，并执行步骤406至414。
对于服务化的接口，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1的请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为AKMA key request。该请求消息携带A-KID-1。
步骤406：AUSF根据A-KID-1，找到对应的Kakma-1。
步骤407：AUSF将Kakma-1发送给AAnF。
具体的，Kakma-1可以携带在AKMA Key Response消息中发送给AAnF。
步骤408：AAnF使用Kakma生成Kaf-1和Kaf-1的有效时间。
步骤409：AAnF将生成的Kaf-1和Kaf-1的有效时间发送给AF1。
具体的，Kaf-1和Kaf-1的有效时间可以携带在Key response消息中发送给AF1。
步骤410：UE和AUSF之间发生重鉴权。
步骤411：重鉴权后，UE侧的Kakma-1和A-KID-1会被删除，若重鉴权成功后，UE侧会生成Kakma-2。
步骤412：AF1在收到Kaf和Kaf的有效时间后，向UE发送应用会话建立响应。应用会话建立响应例如是Application session establishment Response。
步骤413：UE接收应用会话建立响应，如果UE侧密钥为Kakma-2，则UE推演出来AF密钥为Kaf-2，造成UE侧和AF侧的Kaf失步。如果UE侧Kakma被删除时，则UE侧无法推演出来Kaf。
步骤414：可选的，UE和AF2发起应用会话建立协商过程，A-KID-2会被UE携带向AF2发送的应用会话请求消息中。
如图7所示，为场景2中AKMA流程中发生重鉴权的过程。该过程具体包括如下步骤：
步骤501：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权流程。
UE与AUSF执行主鉴权流程，可参考图3和图4中对主鉴权流程的详细描述，在此不再赘述。
步骤502：UE生成Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
UE生成的A-KID具有唯一性，即A-KID具有全球唯一性，一个A-KID用于唯一标识一个Kakma，不同Kakma对应不同的A-KID。
步骤503：UE向AF1发起应用会话请求，A-KID-1携带在应用会话请求中。
其中，应用会话请求例如是application session establishment request。
步骤504：UE和AUSF之间发生重鉴权；
步骤505：重鉴权后，UE侧和AUSF侧的Kakma-1和A-KID-1会被删除，若重鉴权成功后，UE侧和AUSF侧会生成Kakma-2。
如果AAnF在重鉴权前保有Kakma-1和A-KID-1，重鉴权之后，AAnF中的Kakma-1和A-KID-1会被删除，若重鉴权成功后，AAnF会获取Kakma-2和A-KID-2。
步骤506：AF1收到应用会话请求后向AAnF请求Kaf-1。
对于服务化的接口，AF1向AAnF请求Kaf-1的请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为key request。该请求消息携带A-KID-1和AF的标识。
步骤507：如果AAnF在重鉴权前保有Kakma-1和A-KID-1，因重鉴权后AAnF中的Kakma-1和A-KID-1被删除，AAnF根据A-KID-1无法找到Kakma-1，导致AF侧的Kaf无法生成。
如果AAnF在接收AF1请求Kaf-1的请求消息时未保有Kakma-1和A-KID-1，则AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1。对于服务化的接口，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1的请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为AKMA key request。该请求消息携带A-KID-1。因重鉴权后AUSF中的Kakma-1和A-KID-1被删除，AUSF根据A-KID-1无法找到Kakma-1，进而导致AF侧的Kaf无法生成。
在一种实现方式中，AAnF通过访问UDM查找AUSF的路由信息，所需的标识信息为A-KID-1。因重鉴权后UDM中关于A-KID-1的相关信息被删除，UDM根据A-KID-1无法找到AUSF路由信息，进而导致AF侧的Kaf无法生成。
根据上述图6或图7所示的流程可知，当UE需要与AF建立应用通信时，UE向AF发起应用连接建立流程。在UE侧和AF侧Kaf密钥协商完成之前，UE和核心网发生重鉴权，将导致重鉴权前生成的Kakma被删除，进而导致UE生成的Kaf和AF获取的Kaf失步或者导致AF向AAnF请求AF密钥失败。在重鉴权场景下，如何保证UE和AF侧成功协商AF密钥，从而实现UE和AF之间的安全通信是亟待解决的技术问题。
鉴于此，本申请提供密钥管理方法、设备及系统，以保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
如图8所示，为本申请提供的一种密钥管理系统的架构示意图。该系统包括至少一个终端设备和至少一个应用功能网元。终端设备的描述可参见前述5G系统中对终端设备的具体描述。应用功能网元可以是5G系统中的AF，也可以是未来通信系统中用于实现AF全部或部分功能的网元。
在一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备用于向应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消 息，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；接收来自应用功能网元的第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；以及使用第一密钥推演终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
应用功能网元接收来自终端设备的第一应用会话建立请求消息；以及向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
具体的，终端设备发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，可以不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
在这种方式中，发送重鉴权后，终端设备仍使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥推演终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
在另一种可能的实现方式中，终端设备用于向应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；接收来自应用功能网元的第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；向应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，第二密钥为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。
应用功能网元接收来自终端设备的第一应用会话建立请求消息；向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；以及接收来自终端设备的第二应用会话建立请求消息。
在这种方式中，发生重鉴权前，终端设备使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥的标识信息和应用功能网元发起应用会话建立流程，发送重鉴权后，终端设备使用重鉴权后生成的第二密钥的标识信息重新和该应用功能网元发起应用会话建立流程，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
如图9所示，为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理系统的架构示意图。该系统包括至少一个鉴权服务功能网元和至少一个AKMA锚点功能网元。鉴权服务功能网元可以是5G系统中的AUSF，也可以是未来通信系统中用于实现AUSF全部或部分功能的网元。AKMA锚点功能网元可以是5G系统中的AAnF，也可以是未来通信系统中用于实现AAnF全部或部分功能的网元。
其中，鉴权服务功能网元，用于接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求；发送重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求的响应消息；接收来自AKMA锚点功能网元的第一密钥请求消息，第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；以及向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一密钥。
AKMA锚点功能网元用于接收来自应用服务功能网元的第一请求消息，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一密钥请求消息；接收来自鉴权服务功能网元的第一密钥；使用第一密钥推演终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；以及向应用服务功能网元发送终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
具体的，鉴权服务功能网元用于发送第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，该系统还包括至少一个应用服务功能网元。应用功能网元可 以是5G系统中的AF，也可以是未来通信系统中用于实现AF全部或部分功能的网元。应用服务功能网元用于接收来自终端设备的第一应用会话建立请求消息，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息；向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息；接收来自AKMA锚点功能网元的终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；以及向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
该系统中，发送重鉴权后，鉴权服务功能网元仍向AKMA锚点功能网元发送重鉴权前生成的第一密钥，以使AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证终端设备生成的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
下面将结合图8所示的网络架构，对本申请提供的一种密钥管理方法进行介绍。
如图10所示，为本申请提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤601：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息。
其中，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为AKMA密钥。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备将第一密钥的标识信息保存在第一应用会话的上下文中，也可以说，终端设备将第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用会话进行关联，即终端设备保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用会话的对应关系。
步骤602：收到第一应用会话建立请求消息后，第一应用功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用功能网元的标识信息。
步骤603：收到第一请求消息后，如果AKMA锚点功能网元处保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一密钥的对应关系，则AKMA锚点功能网元根据第一密钥的标识信息确定第一密钥，直接使用确定的第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，并继续执行步骤607-612，可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元处还生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间；
如果AKMA锚点功能网元处未保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一密钥的对应关系，则AKMA锚点功能网元向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一密钥请求消息并继续执行步骤604-612，第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。AKMA锚点功能使用第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，可以实现对于不同应用功能网元与同一终端设备之间的通信密钥不同，例如第一应用功能网元与终端设备之间的通信密钥为第一通信密钥，第二应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥为不同于第一通信密钥的第二通信密钥。
步骤604：收到第一密钥请求消息后，鉴权服务功能网元根据第一密钥的标识信息，确定第一密钥。
需要说明的是，鉴权服务功能网元可以在收到第一密钥请求消息后，生成第一密钥；或 者在主鉴权流程后，根据主鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥直接生成第一密钥。本申请对鉴权服务功能网元生成第一密钥的时间不作限定。
步骤605：鉴权服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一密钥。
步骤606：AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，还生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。具体可参考步骤603中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤607：AKMA锚点功能网元向第一应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元还向第一应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
步骤608：发生重鉴权，其中，终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息。
重鉴权流程具体可参考图2中步骤204-209，第一鉴权请求消息例如可以是图2中步骤206中的第一鉴权请求消息。终端设备接收重鉴权流程中来自安全锚点功能网元的第一鉴权请求消息。
步骤609：终端设备发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
其中，第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息例如可以是图2步骤207中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，保存发送第一应用会话建立请求消息和重鉴权流程的先后关系，具体可以保存在终端设备的上下文中，即将第一应用会话建立请求消息和重鉴权流程的先后关系与终端设备进行关联。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
具体的，终端设备确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息的触发条件可以是以下任意一项或多项：(1)重鉴权成功；(2)重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；(3)当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；(4)不存在可用的终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
也就是说，当重鉴权成功，终端设备确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，终端设备确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但未推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，终端设备确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，终端设备确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
也就是说，终端设备确定重鉴权成功，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者终端设备确定当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到第一应 用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者终端设备确定重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者终端设备确定不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，生成第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，第二密钥为AKMA密钥。可以理解的是，第一密钥为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥，第二密钥为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。需要说明的是，本申请中生成第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息表示第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息可以在同一时刻生成，也可以表示在不同时刻生成。相应的，生成第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息表示第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息可以在同一时刻生成，也可以表示在不同时刻生成。相应的，删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息表示第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息可以在同一时刻删除，也可以表示在不同时刻删除，本申请对此不作限定。该种方式中，终端设备同时保存第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，以及第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
或者，在另一种实现方式中，终端设备发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，确定在重鉴权之前有发起第一应用会话建立请求，暂缓向除第一应用功能网元之外的其他应用功能网元发起应用会话建立请求，直到终端设备和第一应用功能网元完成通信密钥的协商。这种情况下，第一应用会话建立请求流程中，终端设备只需保存第一密钥和第一密钥标识符。等到终端设备和第一应用功能网元完成通信密钥的协商，向其他应用功能网元时发起应用会话建立请求时，终端设备再生成第二密钥。这样，不会存在终端设备上存在多个AKMA密钥的情况，节省了终端设备的存储空间，避免了终端设备选择哪一个AKMA密钥的判断动作。
需要注意的是，如果在步骤603中，AKMA锚点功能网元处保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一密钥的对应关系，则步骤608-609在步骤603之后执行；如果在步骤603中，AKMA锚点功能网元处未保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一密钥的对应关系，则步骤608-609在步骤605之后执行。也就是说，步骤608-609和步骤606-607之间没有时序关系，既可以步骤608-609先执行，步骤606-607后执行，也可以步骤606-607后执行，步骤608-609先执行，又可以步骤606-607和步骤608-609同时执行，本申请对此不作限定。
步骤610：第一应用功能网元向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
终端设备接收第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，确定使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
在终端设备上存在第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息以及第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息时，终端设备确定使用第一密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥可以通过以下方式中的任意一项或多项：(1)当第一应用会话建立请求消息为重鉴权流程前发送的，终端设备确定使用第一密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；(2)当第一应用会话建立请求消息携带的是第一密钥的标识信息，终端设备确定使用第一密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。需要说明的是，对于重鉴权流程后发送的应用会话请求，终端设备确定使用第二密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
也就是说，终端设备确定第一应用会话建立请求消息为重鉴权流程前发送的，从而确定使用第一密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；或者终端设备确定第一应用会话建立请求消息携带的是第一密钥的标识信息，从而确定使用第一密钥推演终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
步骤611：接收第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，终端设备使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，并使用该通信密钥和第一应用功能网元进行安全通信。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。具体可参考步骤603中的描述，此处不作赘述。
在一种实现方式中，步骤611之后，终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息，其中，终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息可以通过以下方式中的任意一项或多项：(1)当携带第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应，终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；(2)当终端设备未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为重鉴权流程之后发送的，终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
也就是说，终端设备确定携带第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应(或者说重鉴权前发出的应用会话建立流程都已完成)，从而删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息；或者终端设备确定未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为重鉴权流程之后发送的(或者说未完成的应用会话建立流程都是重鉴权后发起的)，从而删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
例如，终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息并携带第一密钥的标识信息，向第三应用功能网元发送第三应用会话建立请求消息并携带第一密钥的标识信息。重鉴权之后，终端设备已经收到来自第一应用功能网元的第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息和来自第三应用功能网元的第三应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，并无其他携带第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话建立请求没有得到响应，则终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
又例如，终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息并携带第一密钥的标识信息，重鉴权之后，向第三应用功能网元发送第三应用会话建立请求消息并携带第二密钥的标识信息。终端设备已经收到来自第一应用功能网元的第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，还未收到来自第三应用功能网元的第三应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息为重鉴权流程之后发送的，则终端设备删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤612：可选的，终端设备向第二应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，终端设备仍使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥推演终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
下面结合图2所示的网络架构，为对图10中所提供的密钥管理方法进行详细的说明。如图11所示，为本申请提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤701：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权流程，并且UE生成Kakma-1和Kakma对应的A-KID-1。
主鉴权流程以及UE生成Kakma和A-KID可参考图3和图4中的描述，此处不作赘述。
UE生成的A-KID具有唯一性，即一个A-KID用于标识一个Kakma，A-KID和Kakma 具有一对一的关系，不同Kakma对应不同的A-KID。
步骤702：UE向AF1发送第一应用会话请求消息，A-KID-1携带在第一应用会话请求消息中。
其中，第一应用会话请求消息例如是application session establishment request。
在一种实现方式中，UE可以将A-KID-1保存在第一应用会话的上下文中，也可以说，UE将A-KID-1和第一应用会话进行关联。
步骤703：收到第一应用会话请求消息后，AF1向AAnF发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求UE和AF1之间的通信密钥Kaf1，携带A-KID-1和AF1ID。
对于服务化的接口，第一请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为key request。
步骤704：如果AAnF处保存A-KID-1和Kakma-1的对应关系，则AAnF根据A-KID-1确定Kakma-1，直接使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1，并继续执行步骤709至716，可选的，AAnF还生成Kaf-1的有效时间。
如果AAnF处未保存A-KID-1和Kakma-1的对应关系，则AAnF向AUSF发送Kakma-1请求消息，并继续执行步骤705至716，Kakma-1请求消息携带A-KID-1。
对于服务化的接口，AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1的请求消息为服务化消息，该请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为AKMA key request。
在一种实现方式中，AAnF除了使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1外，还可以使用A-KID-1中的部分或全部，或者AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1。例如，AAnF使用A-KID-1或者A-TID(AKMA-temporary identifier)-1推演Kaf-1，A-KID-1包括A-TID-1，即A-TID-1为A-KID-1的部分。AKMA锚点功能使用AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1，可以实现对于不同AF与同一UE之间Kaf的不同，例如AF1与UE之间的Kaf为Kaf-1，AF2与UE之间的Kaf为Kaf-2。
步骤705：收到Kakma-1请求消息后，AUSF根据A-KID-1，确定Kakma-1。
需要说明的是，AUSF可以在收到Kakma-1请求消息后，生成Kakma-1；或者在主鉴权流程后，根据主鉴权流程中生成的Kausf直接生成Kakma-1。
步骤706：AUSF向AAnF发送Kakma-1。
具体的，Kakma-1可以携带在AKMA Key Response消息中发送给AAnF。
步骤707：AAnF使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1。
可选的，AAnF还生成Kaf-1的有效时间。
在一种实现方式中，AAAnF除了使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1外，还可以使用A-KID-1中的部分或全部，或者AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1。具体可参考步骤704中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤708：AAnF向AF1发送Kaf-1
可选的，AAnF还向AF1发送Kaf-1的有效时间。
具体的，Kaf-1(可选的还包括Kaf-1的有效时间)可以携带在Key response消息中发送给AF1。
步骤709：发生重鉴权流程，其中，UE接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息。
重鉴权流程具体可参考图2中步骤204-209，第一鉴权请求消息例如可以是图2中步骤206中的第一鉴权请求消息。UE接收重鉴权流程中来自AMF的第一鉴权请求消息。
步骤710：UE发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
其中，第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息例如可以是图2步骤207中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，UE发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，保存发送第一应用会话建立请求消息和重鉴权流程的先后关系，具体可以保存在UE的上下文中，即将第一应用会话建立请求消息和重鉴权流程的先后关系与UE进行关联。
在一种实现方式中，UE发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
具体的，UE不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1的触发条件可以是以下任意一项或多项：
(1)重鉴权成功；
(2)在重鉴权之前UE发送第一应用会话请求消息，且未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；
(3)UE上不存在可用的Kaf-1。
其中，当UE不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1的触发条件包括上述(1)和(3)时，UE确定重鉴权成功且UE上不存在可以用的Kaf-1，则删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1；或者当UE不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1的触发条件包括上述(2)和(3)时，UE确定在重鉴权之前发送第一应用会话请求消息，未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，且UE上不存在可用的Kaf-1，则删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
其中，当UE不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1的触发条件包括上述(2)时，UE可以根据所保存的发送第一应用会话建立请求消息和重鉴权流程的先后关系，确定该条件是否满足。
需要说明的是，触发条件可以是UE出厂时预配置在UE上，也可以是网络通过配置信息配置在UE上，又可以是UE在发送第一应用会话建立请求前或者发送第一应用会话建立请求后从别的设备处获取的，本申请对此不作限制。
在一种实现方式中，UE发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，生成Kakma-2和A-KID-2。可以理解的是，Kakma-1为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥，Kakma-2为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。
或者，在另一种实现方式，UE发送第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，确定在重鉴权前向AF1发起第一应用会话请求消息，重鉴权后若需要向其他AF(例如AF3)发起应用会话建立请求，则暂缓向AF3发起的应用会话建立请求，直到UE侧和AF1完成Kaf-1协商后再向AF3发起会话建立请求。在该方式中，在UE侧和AF1进行Kaf协商的过程中，UE保存Kakma-1和对应的A-KID-1以及重鉴权流程中产生的Kausf，在UE侧和AF1完成Kaf协商后以及向AF3发起会话建立请求前，删除Kakma-1和对应的A-KID-1，并根据重鉴权流程中产生的Kausf生成Kakma-2和对应的A-KID-2。这样，UE在同一时刻保存一个Kakma和对应的A-KID，无需保存多个Kakma和对应多个A-KID，减轻UE存储多个Kakma和对应多个A-KID的负担。
关于步骤709-710的步骤与707-708之间的关系，可参考步骤609中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤711：AF1向UE发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息例如是Application session establishment Response。
UE接收来自第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，确定使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1。
UE确定使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1可以通过以下方式中的任意一项或多项：(1)当第一应 用会话建立请求消息为重鉴权流程前发送的，UE确定使用Kakma-1推演Kaf-1；(2)当第一应用会话建立请求消息携带的是A-KID-1，UE确定使用Kakma-1推演Kaf-1。
步骤712：接收第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，UE使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1，并使用Kaf-1和AF1进行安全通信。
在一种实现方式中，UE除了使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1外，还可以使用A-KID-1中的部分或全部，或者AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1。具体可参考步骤704中的描述，此处不作赘述。
在一种实现方式中，步骤712之后，UE删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1，其中，UE删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1通过以下方式中的任意一项或多项：(1)当携带A-KID-的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应，UE删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1；(2)当UE未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为重鉴权流程之后发送的，UE删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
步骤713：可选的，UE向AF2发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，第二应用会话建立请求消息携带A-KID-2。
下面将结合图9所示的网络架构，对本申请提供的另一种密钥管理方法进行介绍。
如图12所示，为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤801：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息。
其中，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为AKMA密钥。
可以理解的是，步骤801之前，终端设备保存第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤802：可选的，终端设备使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
如果终端设备生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥不需要第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息携带的参数，则终端设备生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的时间可以是终端设备生成第一密钥之后，也可以是在终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息之后。这样，终端设备生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥不会受到重鉴权的影响。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。终端设备使用第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，可以实现对于不同应用功能网元与同一终端设备之间的通信密钥不同，例如第一应用功能网元与终端设备之间的通信密钥为第一通信密钥，第二应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥为不同于第一通信密钥的第二通信密钥。
步骤803：发生重鉴权，其中，鉴权服务功能网元接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求。
重鉴权流程具体可参考图2中步骤204-209，第二鉴权请求消息例如可以是图2中步骤208中的第二鉴权请求消息。鉴权服务功能网元接收重鉴权流程中来自安全锚点功能网元的第二鉴权请求消息。
在一种实现方式中，第二鉴权请求携带第一指示，第一指示用于指示不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
其中，第一指示可以是终端设备发送给安全锚点功能网元，进而由安全锚点功能网元发送给鉴权服务功能网元。终端设备向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一指示的触发条件可以是以下 任意一项或多项：(1)重鉴权成功；(2)重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；(3)当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；(4)不存在可用的终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
也就是说，终端设备确定重鉴权成功，从而向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一指示；或者终端设备确定当重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且未收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，从而向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一指示；或者终端设备确定重鉴权流程之前终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求，且收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息但不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，从而确定向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一指示；或者终端设备确定不存在终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，从而确定向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一指示。
步骤804：鉴权服务功能网元发送重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
其中，第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息例如可以是图2步骤209中的第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，鉴权服务功能网元发送第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
其中，鉴权服务功能网元确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息可以通过以下方式中的任一项：(1)鉴权服务功能网元接收来自终端设备的第一指示，根据第一指示，确定不删除删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。第一指示可以携带在步骤803中的第二鉴权请求消息中；(2)当重鉴权流程成功，鉴权服务功能网元确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息，也就是说，鉴权服务功能网元确定重鉴权流程成功，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
其中，鉴权服务功能网元不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息一段时间，该时间的长度可由运营商决定，本申请对此不作限定。
可选的，如果数据管理网元中保有第一密钥的标识信息或第一密钥相关的信息时，如鉴权服务功能网元的路由信息，数据管理网元也继续保有该信息一段时间。
在一种实现方式中，鉴权服务功能网元发送第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，生成第二密钥，第二密钥为AKMA密钥。可以理解的是，第一密钥为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥，第二密钥为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。该种方式中，鉴权服务功能网元同时保存第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，以及第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤805：收到第一应用会话建立请求消息后，第一应用服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用功能网元的标识信息。
步骤806：收到第一请求消息后，如果AKMA锚点功能网元处未保存第一密钥的标识信息和第一密钥的对应关系，AKMA锚点功能网元向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一密钥请求消息。第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元可以通过访问数据管理网元查找鉴权服务功能网元的路由信息，查找鉴权服务功能网元的路由信息所需的标识信息为第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤807：收到第一密钥请求消息后，鉴权服务功能网元根据第一密钥的标识信息，确定 第一密钥。
在一种实现方式中，鉴权服务功能网元同时保存第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，以及第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息，鉴权服务功能网元根据第一密钥请求消息中的第一密钥的标识信息，确定第一密钥。
其中，鉴权服务功能网元可以在收到第一密钥请求消息后，生成第一密钥；或者在主鉴权流程后，根据主鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥直接生成第一密钥。本申请对鉴权服务功能网元生成第一密钥的时间不作限定。
需要说明的是，步骤804-805在步骤807之前执行。也就是说，步骤804-805和806之间没有时序关系，既可以步骤804-805先执行，步骤806后执行，也可以步骤804-805后执行，步骤806先执行，又可以步骤804-805和步骤806同时执行，本申请对此不作限定。
步骤808：鉴权服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一密钥。
步骤809：AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元还生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。具体可参考步骤802中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤810：AKMA锚点功能网元向第一应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元还向第一应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
步骤811：第一应用功能网元向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，鉴权服务功能网元仍向AKMA锚点功能网元发送重鉴权前生成的第一密钥，以使AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证终端设备生成的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
下面结合图2所示的网络架构，对图12中所提供的密钥管理方法进行详细的说明。如图13所示，为本申请提供的另一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤901：UE和AUSF执行主鉴权流程并且UE生成Kakma-1和Kakma对应的A-KID-1。
主鉴权流程以及UE生成Kakma和A-KID可参考图3和图4中的描述，此处不作赘述。
UE生成的A-KID具有唯一性，即一个A-KID用于标识一个Kakma，A-KID和Kakma具有一对一的关系，不同Kakma对应不同的A-KID。
步骤902：UE向AF1发送第一应用会话请求消息，第一应用会话请求消息携带A-KID-1。
其中，第一应用会话请求消息例如是application session establishment request。
步骤903：可选的，UE使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1。
如果UE生成Kaf-1不需要第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息携带的参数，则UE生成Kaf-1的时间可以是UE生成Kakma-1之后，也可以是在UE向AF1发送第一应用会话建立请求消息之后。这样，UE生成Kaf-1不会受到重鉴权的影响。
在一种实现方式中，UE除了使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1外，还可以使用A-KID-1中的部分或全部，或者AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1。例如，UE使用A-KID-1或者A-TID-1推演Kaf-1，A-KID-1包括A-TID-1，即A-TID-1为A-KID-1的部分。UE使用AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1，可以实现对于不同AF与同一UE之间Kaf的不同，例如AF1与UE之间的Kaf为Kaf-1，AF2与UE之间的Kaf为Kaf-2。
步骤904：发生重鉴权，其中，AUSF接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求。
重鉴权流程具体可参考图2中步骤204-209，第二鉴权请求消息例如可以是图2中步骤208中的第二鉴权请求消息。AUSF元接收重鉴权流程中来自AMF的第二鉴权请求消息。
在一种实现方式中，第二鉴权请求携带第一指示，第一指示用于指示不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
其中，第一指示可以是UE发送给AMF，进而AMF发送给AUSF。UE向AUSF发送第一指示的触发条件可参考图12步骤803中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤905：AUSF发送重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
其中，第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息例如可以是图2步骤209中的第二鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，AUSF发送第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
其中，AUSF确定不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1的具体方式可参考图12步骤804中的描述，此处不作赘述。
其中，AUSF不删除Kakma-1和A-KID-1一段时间，该时间的长度可由运营商决定，本申请对此不作限定。
可选的，如果UDM中保有Kakma-1或A-KID-1相关的信息时，如AUSF路由信息，UDM也继续保有该信息一段时间。
在一种实现方式中，AUSF发送第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，生成Kakma-2。可以理解的是，Kakma-1为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥，Kakma-2为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。该种方式中，AUSF同时保存Kakma-2和A-KID-2，以及Kakma-1和A-KID-1。
步骤906：收到第一应用会话请求后，AF1向AAnF发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求Kaf-1。第一请求消息携带A-KID-1和AF1的标识。
对于服务化的接口，第一请求消息为服务化消息，第一请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为key request。
步骤907：收到第一请求消息后，如果AAnF处未保存A-KID-1和Kakma-1的对应关系，AAnF向AUSF发送Kakma-1请求消息。
对于服务化的接口，Kakma-1请求消息为服务化消息，Kakma-1请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为AKMA key request。Kakma-1请求消息携带A-KID-1。
在一种实现方式中，AAnF可以通过访问UDM查找AUSF的路由信息，查找AUSF的路由信息所需的标识信息为A-KID-1。
步骤908：收到第一密钥请求消息后，AUSF根据A-KID-1，确定Kakma-1。
在一种实现方式中，AUSF同时保存Kakma-2和A-KID-2，以及Kakma-1和A-KID-1， AUSF根据第一密钥请求消息中的A-KID-1，确定Kakma-1。
需要说明的是，步骤905-906在步骤908之前执行。关于步骤905-906和步骤907之间时序关系，可参考图12步骤807中的描述。
步骤909：AUSF向AAnF发送Kakma-1。
具体的，Kakma-1可以携带在AKMA Key Response消息中发送给AAnF。
步骤910：AAnF使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1。
可选的，AAnF还生成Kaf-1的有效时间。
在一种实现方式中，AAnF除了使用Kakma-1生成Kaf-1外，还可以使用A-KID-1中的部分或全部，或者AF1ID中的部分或全部生成Kaf-1。具体可参考步骤903中的描述，此处不作赘述。
步骤911：AAnF向AF1发送Kaf-1。
可选的，AAnF还向AF1发送Kaf-1的有效时间。
具体的，Kaf-1(可选的还包括Kaf-1的有效时间)可以携带在Key response消息中发送给AF1。
步骤912：AF向UE发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息例如是Application session establishment Response。
如图14所示，为本申请提供的又一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤1001：重鉴权流程后，第一应用服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用功能网元的标识信息。第一密钥为重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥。
在一种实现方式中，重鉴权流程后，AKMA锚点功能网元不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
其中，AKMA锚点功能网元不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息可以通过以下方式中的任一项：(1)AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自终端设备或鉴权服务功能网元的第二指示，第二指示用于指示不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。(2)当重鉴权流程成功，AKMA锚点功能网元确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息，也就是说，AKMA锚点功能网元确定重鉴权流程成功，从而确定不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
在一种实现方式中，重鉴权流程后，AKMA锚点功能网元获取第二密钥，第二密钥为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。该种方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元同时保存第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，以及第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤1002：AKMA锚点功能网元根据第一密钥的标识信息，确定第一密钥。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元同时保存第二密钥和第二密钥的标识信息，以及第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息，AKMA锚点功能网元根据第一请求消息中的第一密钥的标识信息，确定第一密钥。
步骤1003：AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元还生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元除了使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥外，还可以使用第一密钥的标识信息中的部分或全部，或者第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。AKMA锚点功能网元使用第一应用功能网元的标识信息中的部分或全部生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，可以实现对于不同应用功能网元与同一终端设备之间的通信密钥不同，例如第一应用功能网元与终端设备之间的通信密钥为第一通信密钥，第二应用功能网元与该终端设备之间的通信密钥为不同于第一通信密钥的第二通信密钥。
步骤1004：AKMA锚点功能网元向应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元还向第一应用功能网元发送终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥的有效时间。
步骤1005：第一应用功能网元向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
该方法中，发送重鉴权后，AKMA锚点功能网元仍使用重鉴权前生成的第一密钥生成终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，保证终端设备生成的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥和应用功能网元获取的终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥一致，从而保证终端设备和应用功能网元之间成功协商终端设备和应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，实现终端设备和应用功能网元之间的安全通信。
下面将结合图9所示的网络架构，对本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法进行介绍。
如图15所示，为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤1101：终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息。
其中，第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，第一密钥为AKMA密钥。
步骤1102：发生重鉴权，其中，终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息。
重鉴权流程具体可参考图2中步骤204-209，第一鉴权请求消息例如可以是图2中步骤206中的第一鉴权请求消息。终端设备接收重鉴权流程中来自安全锚点功能网元的第一鉴权请求消息。
步骤1103：终端设备发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
其中，第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息例如可以是图2步骤207中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备在终端设备上设置第一标识，第一标识用于标识终端设备上执行了重鉴权流程；或者第一标识用于标识执行主鉴权流程之前终端设备发送了第一应用会话建立请求消息。
步骤1104：第一应用功能网元向终端设备发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
在一种实现方式中，收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，终端设备删除第一应用会话的上下文。
步骤1105：接收第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。
其中，第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，第二密钥为重鉴权流程后生成的AKMA密钥。
在一种实现方式中，第二应用会话建立请求消息本身指示删除第一应用会话的上下文， 或者第二应用会话建立请求消息携带指示信息，第一应用功能网元根据该指示信息，删除第一应用会话的上下文。
在一种实现方式中，终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息的触发条件可以包括以下任意一项：
(1)终端设备根据第一标识向第一应用服务器发送第二应用会话建立请求消息；
(2)若第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息受到第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥的安全保护，终端设备解安全保护失败，则终端设备向第一应用服务器发送第二应用会话建立请求消息；
(3)若终端设备收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，使用第一应用功能网元和终端设备之间的通信密钥与第一应用功能网元进行安全通信失败，则终端设备向第一应用服务器发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。
(4)终端设备无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥，进而无法使用第一密钥生成终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
(5)终端设备根据第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，确定第一应用会话建立失败。具体可以是第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息本身指示第一应用会话建立失败，或者第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息携带指示信息，使得终端设备根据指示信息，确定第一应用会话建立失败。指示信息可以包括以下任意一项或多项：第三指示、第一失败原因值、第二失败原因值。其中，第三指示用于指示第一应用会话建立失败，第一失败原因值用于指示无法找到鉴权服务功能网元，第二失败原因值用于指示无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥，鉴权服务功能网元用于生成第一密钥。
对于因为无法找到鉴权服务功能网元而导致第一应用会话建立失败，步骤1102和步骤1103之间还可以包括以下步骤：
步骤11021：收到第一应用会话建立请求消息后，第一应用功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用功能网元的标识信息。
步骤11022：AKMA锚点功能网元无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的鉴权服务功能网元。
在一种实现方式中，AKMA锚点功能网元向数据管理网元发送鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息，鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息。AKMA锚点功能网元接收来自数据管理网元的鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息的响应消息，鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求消息的响应消息指示鉴权服务功能网元路径信息请求失败。
步骤11023：AKMA锚点功能网元向第一应用功能网元发送第一请求消息的响应消息，第一请求消息的响应消息指示终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥请求失败。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元向第一应用功能网元发送第一失败原因值。
对于因为无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥而导致第一应用会话建立失败，步骤1102和步骤1103之间还可以包括以下步骤：
步骤11024：鉴权服务功能网元接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求。
步骤11025：鉴权服务功能网元发送重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求的响应消息。
步骤11026：收到第一请求消息后，AKMA锚点功能网元向鉴权服务功能网元发送第一密钥请求消息。
其中，第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息。
步骤11027：收到第一密钥请求消息后，鉴权服务功能网元无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥；
步骤11028：鉴权服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一密钥请求消息的响应消息，第一密钥请求消息的响应消息用于指示第一密钥请求失败。
可选的，鉴权服务功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第二失败原因值，第二失败原因值指示无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥。
或者，对于因为无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥而导致第一应用会话建立失败，步骤1102和步骤1103之间还可以包括以下步骤：
步骤11029：收到第一应用会话建立请求消息后，第一应用功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息。
其中，第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息和第一应用功能网元的标识信息。
步骤110210：AKMA锚点功能网元无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥。
步骤110211：AKMA锚点功能网元向第一应用功能网元发送第一请求消息的响应消息，第一请求消息的响应消息指示终端设备和第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥请求失败。
可选的，AKMA锚点功能网元向应用功能网元发送第二失败原因值，第二失败原因值指示无法确定第一密钥的标识信息对应的第一密钥。
下面结合图2所示的网络架构，对图15中所提供的密钥管理方法进行详细的说明。如图16所示，为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程中，终端设备触发条件(1)(2)(3)向第一应用服务器发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。该流程包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤1201-1209同图11中的步骤701-709，不作赘述。
步骤1210：UE发送重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息。
可选的，UE上在UE上设置flag。其中，该flag可以标识UE进行了重鉴权，也可以标识UE在重鉴权之前发送了第一应用会话建立请求。
步骤1211：收到Kaf(可选的，还收到Kaf的有效时间)后，AF1向UE发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息。
第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息例如是Application session establishment Response。
步骤1212：收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，UE释放第一应用会话，向AF1发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。第二应用会话建立请求消息携带重鉴权后生成的A-KID-2。
其中，UE向AF1发送第二应用会话建立请求消息的触发条件可以包括以下任意一项或多项：
(1)UE上存储有flag；
(2)如果第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息受到Kaf-1的安全保护，UE解安全保护失败；
(3)UE收到第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息后，使用Kakma-2推演Kaf-2，UE使用Kaf-2与AF-1进行认证或者安全通信失败。
可选的，第二应用会话建立请求消携带指示信息，该指示信息指示第一应用会话建立失 败或者指示UE发起应用会话重建立，或者第二应用会话建立请求消息用于UE和AF1之间重新建立应用会话。
在一种实现方式中，UE删除与AF-1建立失败的第一应用会话上下文。
步骤1213：收到第二应用会话建立请求消息后，AF-1删除与UE建立失败的第一应用会话上下文，如删除Kaf-1等信息。
收到第二应用会话建立请求消息后，AF-1和UE基于Kakma-2和/或A-KID-2进行Kaf-2的协商，与现有技术相同，不作赘述。
下面结合图2所示的网络架构，对图15中所提供的密钥管理方法进行详细的说明。如图17所示，为本申请提供的再一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，该流程中，终端设备触发条件(4)向第一应用服务器发送第二应用会话建立请求消息。该流程包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤1301-1306同图13中的步骤901-906，不作赘述。
步骤1307：如果AAnF在重鉴权前保有Kakma-1和A-KID-1，因重鉴权后AAnF中的Kakma-1和A-KID-1被删除，AAnF根据A-KID-1无法找到Kakma-1，AF侧的Kaf-1无法生成。AAnF生成失败指示1并执行步骤1309a-1311a和1312，失败指示1指示Kaf请求失败。可选的，AAnF还生成失败原因值2，失败原因即无法找到A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1，该原因值记为Cause 2。
如果AAnF在接收AF1第一请求消息时未保有Kakma-1和A-KID-1，则AAnF向AUSF请求Kakma-1，并执行步骤1308、1309a-1311a和1312。对于服务化的接口，第一请求消息为服务化消息，第一请求消息的名称为服务化消息名称，具体可以为AKMA key request。第一请求消息携带A-KID-1。
在一种实现方式中，AAnF通过访问UDM查找AUSF的路由信息，查找AUSF的路由信息所需的标识信息为A-KID-1。因重鉴权后UDM中关于A-KID-1的相关信息被删除，UDM根据A-KID-1无法找到AUSF路由信息，向AAnF返回失败指示2，失败指示2指示AUSF的路由信息查找失败，可选的，还返回失败原因值1，失败原因即无法找到AUSF的路由信息，该原因值记为cause 1。AAnF接收失败指示2或失败原因值1中的一个或多个后，执行步骤1309b-1311b和1312。
步骤1308：AUSF无法根据A-KID-1找到对应的Kakma-1，AUSF向AAnF返回失败指示3，失败指示3指示Kakma请求失败，可选的，还返回失败原因值2，失败原因即无法找到A-KID-1对应的Kakma-1，该原因值记为cause 2。
步骤1309a：AAnF将失败指示1或cause 2中的一个或多个发给AF1，失败指示1指示Kaf请求失败。
具体的，失败指示1或cause 2中的一个或多个可以携带在Key response消息中发送给AF1。
步骤1310a：收到失败指示1或cause 2中的一个或多个后，AF1向UE发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，可选的，第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息包括失败指示4或cause 2中的一个或多个，失败指示4指示第一应用会话建立失败。
第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息例如是Application session establishment Response。
步骤1311a：UE收到失败指示4或cause 2中的一个或多个后，释放第一应用会话连接，重新发起应用会话建立过程。
步骤1309b：AAnF将失败指示1或cause1中的一个或多个发给AF，失败指示1指示 Kaf请求失败。
具体的，失败指示1或cause 1中的一个或多个可以携带在Key response消息中发送给AAnF。
步骤1310b：AF收到失败指示1或cause 1中的一个或多个后，向UE发送第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息包括失败指示4或cause 1中的一个或多个，失败指示4指示第一应用会话建立失败。
步骤1311b：UE收到失败指示4或cause 1中的一个或多个后，释放第一应用会话连接，重新发起应用会话建立过程。
步骤1312：UE使用重鉴权后的A-KID-2请求建立应用会话，与现有技术相同，不作赘述。
本申请还提供的一种密钥管理方法的流程示意图，图18为该方法的流程图，该流程包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤1401-1410同图6中的步骤401-410，不作赘述。
步骤1412，重鉴权成功后，UE不删除第一密钥和第一密钥的标识信息。UE使用重鉴权后的第二K AUSF推演第二K AKMA。可以理解的是，UE保存有两套K AKMA和对应的密钥标识信息；
步骤1413，AF向UE发送应用会话建立响应消息，消息中可能携带用于生成K AF的推演参数、用于完整性保护的MAC(message authentication code)1等，其中，推演参数可以是随机数、计数器值等，MAC1的输入密钥可以是K AF，输入参数可以是整条应用会话建立响应消息或者应用会话建立响应消息中的部分信元。
步骤1414，UE接收AF发送的应用会话建立响应消息，并推演K AF。
UE根据推演参数和K AKMA推演K AF。可以理解的是，UE根据推演参数和第一K AKMA推演得到第一K AF，UE根据推演参数和第二K AKMA推演得到第二K AF。应用会话建立响应消息携带的推演参数可以是推演K AF的推演参数的部分或者全部。
步骤1415，UE判断AF使用的密钥K AF。
当应用会话建立响应消息中携带用于完整性保护的MAC1时，UE分别使用第一K AF和第二K AF计算MAC2和MAC3，输入参数和安全算法与MAC1的计算时使用的输入参数和安全算法相同。
此时，UE将MAC1分别与MAC2和MAC3进行比较，当MAC1与MAC2相同时，表示AF使用的密钥为第一K AF，并且应用会话建立响应消息未被篡改，则UE和AF进行后续会话时选择第一K AF，可选删除第二K AF和对应的密钥标识信息；当MAC1与MAC3相同时，表示AF使用的密钥为第二K AF，并且应用会话建立响应消息未被篡改，则UE和AF进行后续会话时选择第二K AF，可选删除第一K AF和对应的密钥标识信息。当MAC1与MAC2和MAC3均不相同时，表示应用会话建立响应消息可能被篡改，则UE丢弃应用会话建立响应消息。UE根据本地配置，UE重新发起应用会话建立过程，即UE重新发送应用会话建立请求消息，消息中携带第二和AF进行后续会话时选择第二K AKMA的密钥标识信息，可选删除第一和第二K AF和对应的密钥标识信息。本地配置可以是在UE一次或者多次收到错误的应用会话建立响应消息。
当应用会话建立响应消息中未携带用于完整性保护的MAC1时，UE分别尝试使用第一K AF和第二K AF与AF进行后续应用会话业务，根据后续应用会话业务成功或失败判断UE选择使用哪一个K AF。可以理解的是K AF可以是UE和AF进行鉴权的凭证，或者进行通信的对 称密钥。后续应用会话业务成功可以是UE使用K AF与AF进行成功鉴权，或者UE与AF使用K AF或其衍生密钥进行通信时安全保护成功。反之，后续应用会话业务失败可以是UE使用K AF与AF进行鉴权失败，或者UE与AF使用K AF或其衍生密钥进行通信时安全保护失败。当UE使用第一K AF，与AF进行后续应用会话成功时，表示AF使用的密钥为第一K AF，则UE和AF进行后续会话时选择第一K AF，可选删除第二K AF和对应的密钥标识信息；当UE使用第一K AF，与AF进行后续应用会话失败时，UE使用第二K AF，与AF进行后续应用会话，如果成功时，表示AF使用的密钥为第二K AF，则UE和AF进行后续会话时选择第二K AF，可选删除第二K AF和对应的密钥标识信息；当UE分别使用第一和第二K AF，与AF进行后续应用会话均失败时，UE根据本地配置，UE重新发起应用会话建立过程，即UE重新发送应用会话建立请求消息，消息中携带第二和AF进行后续会话时选择第二K AKMA的密钥标识信息，可选删除第一和第二K AF和对应的密钥标识信息。本地配置可以是在UE和AF由于两侧K AF不一致发生一次或者多次应用会话失败。
相应于上述方法实施例给出的方法，本申请实施例还提供了密钥管理设备，包括用于执行上述实施例相应的模块。模块可以是软件，也可以是硬件，或者是软件和硬件结合。
参见图19，为本申请提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图。图19所示的通信装置1500包括收发模块1501和处理模块1502，可选的，还包括存储模块1503。
在一种设计中，装置1500为终端设备：
示例性的，收发模块1501用于向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息，该第一应用会话建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；发送该重鉴权流程中的该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；以及接收来自该第一应用功能网元的该第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息；处理模块1502用于使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
可选的，收发模块1501用于发送该第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，处理模块1502用于不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息
该示例中，装置1500用于实现图10-18所示实施例中终端设备或UE的功能，处理模块1502被配置为支持终端设备执行图10-18所示实施例中的方法，收发模块1501用于支持终端设备与其他设备之间的通信，具体可参见图10-18中终端设备或UE的相应描述。
在一种设计中，装置1500为鉴权服务功能网元：
示例性的，收发模块1501用于接收重鉴权流程中的第二鉴权请求；发送该重鉴权流程中的该第二鉴权请求的响应消息；接收来自应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元的第一密钥请求消息，该第一密钥请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；以及向该AKMA锚点功能网元发送该第一密钥。
可选的，收发模块1501用于发送该第二鉴权请求的响应消息后，处理模块1502用于不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
装置1500用于实现图10-18所示实施例中鉴权服务功能网元或AUSF的功能，处理模块1502被配置为支持鉴权服务功能网元执行图10-18所示实施例中的方法，收发模块1501用于支持鉴权服务功能网元与其他设备之间的通信，具体可参见图10-18中鉴权服务功能网元或AUSF的相应描述。
在一种设计中，装置1500为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元：
示例性的，收发模块1501重鉴权流程后，用于接收来自第一应用功能网元的第一请求消 息，该第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，该第一请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，该第一密钥为该重鉴权流程前生成的AKMA密钥；处理模块1502用于使用该第一密钥推演该终端设备和该第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；收发模块1501还用于向该应用功能网元发送该通信密钥。
可选的，该重鉴权流程后，处理模块1502用于不删除该第一密钥和该第一密钥的标识信息。
装置1500用于实现图10-18所示实施例中AKMA锚点功能网元或AAnF的功能，处理模块1502被配置为支持AKMA锚点功能网元执行图10-18所示实施例中的方法，收发模块1501用于支持AKMA锚点功能网元与其他设备之间的通信，具体可参见图10-18中AKMA锚点功能网元或AAnF的相应描述。
请参见图20，为本申请提供的另一种通信装置的结构示意图。图20所示的通信装置1600包括至少一个处理器1601、收发器1602，可选的，还包括存储器1603或总线1604。处理器1601、收发器1602以及存储器1603通过总线1604连接。其中，处理器1601例如可以是中央处理器(central processing unit，CPU)，通用处理器，数字信号处理器(digital signal processor，DSP)，专用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、晶体管逻辑器件、硬件部件或其任意组合。其可以实现或执行结合本申请所描述的各个示例性的逻辑方框、模块和电路。处理器也可以是实现计算功能的组合，例如包括一个或多个微处理器组合，DSP和微处理器的组合等等。总线1604可以是外设部件互联标准(peripheral component interconnect，简称PCI)总线或扩展工业标准结构(extended industry standard architecture，简称EISA)总线等。总线可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图20中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。
本申请实施例还提供的一种芯片系统1700，包括至少一个处理器1701、接口电路1702，处理器1701和接口电路1702相连。
处理器1701可能是一种集成电路芯片，具有信号的处理能力。在实现过程中，上述方法的各步骤可以通过处理器1701中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。上述的处理器1701可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器(DSP)、专用集成电路(ASIC)、现成可编程门阵列(FPGA)或者其它可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件。可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者该处理器也可以是任何常规的处理器等。
接口电路1702可以完成数据、指令或者信息的发送或者接收，处理器1701可以利用接口电路1702接收的数据、指令或者其它信息，进行加工，可以将加工完成信息通过接口电路1702发送出去。
可选的，芯片系统还包括存储器1703，存储器1703可以包括只读存储器和随机存取存储器，并向处理器提供操作指令和数据。存储器1703的一部分还可以包括非易失性随机存取存储器(NVRAM)。
可选的，存储器1703存储了可执行软件模块或者数据结构，处理器1703可以通过调用存储器存储的操作指令(该操作指令可存储在操作系统中)，执行相应的操作。
可选的，芯片系统可以使用在本申请实施例涉及的终端设备、鉴权服务功能网元或者AKMA锚点功能网元中。可选的，接口电路1702用于执行图10至图18所示的实施例中终端设备、鉴权服务功能网元或者AKMA锚点功能网元的接收和发送的步骤。处理器1701用 于执行图10至图18所示的实施例中的终端设备、鉴权服务功能网元或者AKMA锚点功能网元处理的步骤。存储器1703用于存储图10至图18所示的实施例中的终端设备、鉴权服务功能网元或者AKMA锚点功能网元的数据和指令。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质。上述方法实施例中描述的方法可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。如果在软件中实现，则功能可以作为一个或多个指令或代码存储在计算机可读介质上或者在计算机可读介质上传输。计算机可读介质可以包括计算机存储介质和通信介质，还可以包括任何可以将计算机程序从一个地方传送到另一个地方的介质。存储介质可以是可由计算机访问的任何可用介质。
作为一种可选的设计，计算机可读介质可以包括RAM，ROM，EEPROM，CD-ROM或其它光盘存储器，磁盘存储器或其它磁存储设备，或可用于承载的任何其它介质或以指令或数据结构的形式存储所需的程序代码，并且可由计算机访问。而且，任何连接被适当地称为计算机可读介质。例如，如果使用同轴电缆，光纤电缆，双绞线，数字用户线(DSL)或无线技术(如红外，无线电和微波)从网站，服务器或其它远程源传输软件，则同轴电缆，光纤电缆，双绞线，DSL或诸如红外，无线电和微波之类的无线技术包括在介质的定义中。如本文所使用的磁盘和光盘包括光盘(CD)，激光盘，光盘，数字通用光盘(DVD)，软盘和蓝光盘，其中磁盘通常以磁性方式再现数据，而光盘利用激光光学地再现数据。上述的组合也应包括在计算机可读介质的范围内。
本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机程序产品。上述方法实施例中描述的方法可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。如果在软件中实现，可以全部或者部分得通过计算机程序产品的形式实现。计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行上述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照上述方法实施例中描述的流程或功能。上述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、网络设备、用户设备或者其它可编程装置。
可以理解，说明书通篇中提到的“实施例”意味着与实施例有关的特定特征、结构或特性包括在本申请的至少一个实施例中。因此，在整个说明书各个实施例未必一定指相同的实施例。此外，这些特定的特征、结构或特性可以任意适合的方式结合在一个或多个实施例中。可以理解，在本申请的各种实施例中，上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。
可以理解，在本申请中，“当…时”、“若”以及“如果”均指在某种客观情况下装置会做出相应的处理，并非是限定时间，且也不要求装置实现时一定要有判断的动作，也不意味着存在其它限定。
本申请中的“同时”可以理解为在相同的时间点，也可以理解为在一段时间段内，还可以理解为在同一个周期内。
本申请中对于使用单数表示的元素旨在用于表示“一个或多个”，而并非表示“一个且仅一个”，除非有特别说明。本申请中，在没有特别说明的情况下，“至少一个”旨在用于表示“一个或者多个”，“多个”旨在用于表示“两个或两个以上”。
另外，本文中术语“系统”和“网络”在本文中常被可互换使用。本文中术语“和/或”，仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况，其中A可以是单数或者复数，B可以是单数或者复数。
可以理解，在本申请各实施例中，“与A相应的B”表示B与A相关联，根据A可以确定B。但还应理解，根据A确定B并不意味着仅仅根据A确定B，还可以根据A和/或其它信息确定B。
本申请中各表所示的对应关系可以被配置，也可以是预定义的。各表中的信息的取值仅仅是举例，可以配置为其他值，本申请并不限定。在配置信息与各参数的对应关系时，并不一定要求必须配置各表中示意出的所有对应关系。例如，本申请中的表格中，某些行示出的对应关系也可以不配置。又例如，可以基于上述表格做适当的变形调整，例如，拆分，合并等等。上述各表中标题示出参数的名称也可以采用通信装置可理解的其他名称，其参数的取值或表示方式也可以通信装置可理解的其他取值或表示方式。上述各表在实现时，也可以采用其他的数据结构，例如可以采用数组、队列、容器、栈、线性表、指针、链表、树、图、结构体、类、堆、散列表或哈希表等。
本申请中的预定义可以理解为定义、预先定义、存储、预存储、预协商、预配置、固化、或预烧制。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
可以理解，本申请中描述的系统、装置和方法也可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。

Claims (51)

  1. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端设备执行主鉴权流程并生成第一应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥和第一AKMA密钥的标识，所述第一AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第一AKMA密钥；
    所述终端设备向应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息,所述第一应用会话建立请求消息包括所述第一AKMA密钥的标识；
    所述终端设备接收来自所述应用功能网元的所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息包括第一失败指示，所述第一失败指示用于指示应用会话建立失败；
    所述终端设备向所述应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息包括第二AKMA密钥的标识，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识为重鉴权后生成的，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第二AKMA密钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    终端设备执行重鉴权流程。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述重鉴权流程包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自安全锚点功能网元的鉴权请求消息，所述鉴权请求消息包括第一鉴权参数；
    所述终端设备使用本地保存的根密钥计算第二鉴权参数并校验所述安全锚点功能网元的所述第一鉴权参数；
    校验通过后，所述终端设备向所述安全锚点功能网元发送所述重鉴权流程中的所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息，所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息包括第三鉴权参数。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述鉴权请求消息为非接入层NAS message authentication request，所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息为NAS message authentication response。
  5. 根据权利要求3或4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备向所述安全锚点功能网元发送所述重鉴权流程中的所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备生成所述第二AKMA密钥和所述第二AKMA密钥的标识。
  6. 根据权利要求1-5任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息为application session establishment request message，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息为application session establishment response。
  7. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，包括：
    应用功能网元接收来自终端设备的第一应用会话建立请求消息，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息包括第一应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥的标识，所述第一AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第一AKMA密钥；
    所述应用功能网元向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和所述应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；
    所述应用功能网元接收来自所述AKMA锚点功能网元的第二失败指示，所述第二失败指示用于指示请求所述通信密钥失败；
    所述应用功能网元根据所述第二失败指示，向所述终端设备发送所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，所述响应消息包括第一失败指示，所述第一失败指示用于指示应用会话建立失败；
    所述应用功能网元接收来自所述终端设备的第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用 会话建立请求消息包括第二AKMA密钥的标识，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识为重鉴权后生成的，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第二AKMA密钥。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，还包括：
    所述AKMA锚点功能网元接收所述第一请求消息；
    所述AKMA锚点功能网元向所述应用功能网元发送所述第二失败指示。
  9. 根据权利要求7或8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息为application session establishment request message，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息为application session establishment response。
  10. 一种密钥管理方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    终端设备向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话的建立请求消息，所述建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，所述第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；
    所述终端设备接收重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求消息；
    所述终端设备发送所述重鉴权流程中的所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；
    所述终端设备接收来自所述第一应用功能网元的所述建立请求消息的响应消息；
    所述终端设备使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息，包括：
    若所述重鉴权流程成功，所述终端设备不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  13. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息，包括：
    若所述重鉴权流程之前发送了所述建立请求消息，且未收到所述建立请求消息的响应消息，所述终端设备不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  14. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息，包括：
    若所述重鉴权流程之前所述终端设备发送了所述建立请求消息，且已收到所述建立请求消息的响应消息但未推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，所述终端设备不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  15. 根据权利要求11-14任一项所述的方法，其特征在于所述不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息，包括：
    若未推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，所述终端设备不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  16. 根据权利要求10-15任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备接收来自所述建立请求消息的响应消息后，确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，生成第二密钥，所述第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
  18. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥包括：
    当所述终端设备确定所述建立请求消息为所述重鉴权流程前发送的，则所述终端设备确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  19. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥包括：
    当所述终端设备确定所述建立请求消息携带的是所述第一密钥的标识信息，则所述终端设备确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端设备确定所述建立请求消息携带的是所述第一密钥的标识信息，包括：
    所述终端设备根据第一应用会话上下文中的第一密钥的标识信息确定所述建立请求消息携带的是所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  21. 根据权利要求10-20任一所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，保存发送所述建立请求消息和所述重鉴权流程的先后关系。
  22. 根据权利要求10-21中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    当携带所述第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应，所述终端设备删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  23. 根据权利要求10-21中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    当所述终端设备未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为所述重鉴权流程之后发送的，所述终端设备删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  24. 根据权利要求10-23中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端设备发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，所述终端设备向第二应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，所述第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
  25. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括处理单元，发送单元和接收单元：
    所述处理单元用于执行主鉴权流程并生成第一应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥和第一AKMA密钥的标识，所述第一AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第一AKMA密钥；
    所述发送单元用于向应用功能网元发送第一应用会话建立请求消息,所述第一应用会话建立请求消息包括所述第一AKMA密钥的标识；
    所述接收单元用于接收来自所述应用功能网元的所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息包括第一失败指示，所述第一失败指示用于指示应用会话建立失败；
    所述发送单元还用于向所述应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息包括第二AKMA密钥的标识，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识为重鉴权后生成的，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第二AKMA密钥。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的装置，其特征在于，
    所述处理单元还用于执行重鉴权流程。
  27. 根据权利要求26所述的装置，其特征在于，所述重鉴权流程包括：
    接收来自安全锚点功能网元的鉴权请求消息，所述鉴权请求消息包括第一鉴权参数；
    使用本地保存的根密钥计算第二鉴权参数并校验所述安全锚点功能网元的所述第一鉴权 参数；
    校验通过后，向所述安全锚点功能网元发送所述重鉴权流程中的所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息，所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息包括第三鉴权参数。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述鉴权请求消息为非接入层NAS message authentication request，所述鉴权请求消息的响应消息为NAS message authentication response。
  29. 根据权利要求25-28任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于生成所述第二AKMA密钥和所述第二AKMA密钥的标识。
  30. 根据权利要求25-29任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息为application session establishment request message，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息为application session establishment response。
  31. 根据权利要求25-30任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置为终端设备。
  32. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括接收单元，发送单元和处理单元：
    所述接收单元用于接收来自终端设备的第一应用会话建立请求消息，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息包括第一应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥的标识，所述第一AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第一AKMA密钥；
    所述发送单元用于向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和所述应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；
    所述接收单元还用于接收来自所述AKMA锚点功能网元的第二失败指示，所述第二失败指示用于指示请求所述通信密钥失败；
    所述处理单元用于根据所述第二失败指示，通过所述发送单元向所述终端设备发送所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，所述响应消息包括第一失败指示，所述第一失败指示用于指示应用会话建立失败；
    所述接收单元还用于接收来自所述终端设备的第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息包括第二AKMA密钥的标识，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识为重鉴权后生成的，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第二AKMA密钥。
  33. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括应用功能网元和应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA锚点功能网元，其中，
    所述应用功能网元用于：接收来自终端的第一应用会话建立请求消息，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息包括第一应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥的标识，所述第一AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第一AKMA密钥；向AKMA锚点功能网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息用于请求终端设备和所述应用功能网元之间的通信密钥；接收来自所述AKMA锚点功能网元的第二失败指示，所述第二失败指示用于指示请求所述通信密钥失败；根据所述第二失败指示，向所述终端设备发送所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息，所述响应消息包括第一失败指示，所述第一失败指示用于指示应用会话建立失败；以及用于接收来自所述终端设备的第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息包括第二AKMA密钥的标识，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识为重鉴权后生成的，所述第二AKMA密钥的标识用于标识所述第二AKMA密钥；
    所述AKMA锚点功能网元用于接收所述第一请求消息；以及用于向所述应用功能网元发送所述第二失败指示。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息为 application session establishment request message，所述第一应用会话建立请求消息的响应消息为application session establishment response。
  35. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置包括发送单元、接收单元和处理单元；
    所述发送单元，用于向第一应用功能网元发送第一应用会话的建立请求消息，所述建立请求消息携带第一密钥的标识信息，所述第一密钥为应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA密钥；
    所述接收单元，用于接收所述重鉴权流程中的第一鉴权请求；
    所述发送单元，用于发送所述重鉴权流程中的所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息；
    所述处理单元，用于使用所述第一密钥推演终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元用于发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，所述处理单元用于不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  37. 根据权利要求36所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    若所述重鉴权流程成功，所述处理单元用于不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  38. 根据权利要求36所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    若所述重鉴权流程之前发送了所述建立请求消息，且未收到所述建立请求消息的响应消息，所述处理单元用于不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  39. 根据权利要求36所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    若所述重鉴权流程之前所述终端设备发送了所述建立请求消息，且已收到所述建立请求消息的响应消息但未推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，所述处理单元用于不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  40. 根据权利要求36-39任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    若未推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥，所述处理单元用于不删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  41. 根据权利要求35-40任一所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元用于接收来自所述建立请求消息的响应消息后，所述处理单元用于确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  42. 根据权利要求41所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元用于发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，所述处理单元用于生成第二密钥，所述第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
  43. 根据权利要求42所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    当确定所述建立请求消息为所述重鉴权流程前发送的，则所述处理单元用于确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  44. 根据权利要求42所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    当确定所述建立请求消息携带的是所述第一密钥的标识信息，则所述处理单元用于确定使用所述第一密钥推演所述终端设备和所述第一应用功能网元之间的通信密钥。
  45. 根据权利要求44所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述处理单元用于根据第一应用会话上下文中的第一密钥的标识信息确定所述建立请求消息携带的是所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  46. 根据权利要求35-45任一所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元用于发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，所述处理单元用于保存发送所述建立请求消息和所述重鉴权流程的先后关系。
  47. 根据权利要求35-46中任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    当携带所述第一密钥的标识信息的应用会话请求消息都得到了响应，所述处理单元用于删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  48. 根据权利要求35-46中任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    当未得到响应消息的应用会话请求消息都为所述重鉴权流程之后发送的，所述处理单元用于删除所述第一密钥和所述第一密钥的标识信息。
  49. 根据权利要求35-48中任一项所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元用于发送所述第一鉴权请求消息的响应消息后，还用于向第二应用功能网元发送第二应用会话建立请求消息，所述第二应用会话建立请求消息携带第二密钥的标识信息，所述第二密钥为AKMA密钥。
  50. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，包括指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如权利要求1-24任意一项所述的方法。
  51. 一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，其特征在于，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如权利要求1-24任意一项所述的方法。
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