WO2023098209A1 - 一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统 - Google Patents

一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2023098209A1
WO2023098209A1 PCT/CN2022/117619 CN2022117619W WO2023098209A1 WO 2023098209 A1 WO2023098209 A1 WO 2023098209A1 CN 2022117619 W CN2022117619 W CN 2022117619W WO 2023098209 A1 WO2023098209 A1 WO 2023098209A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
node
message
security protection
security
integrity
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PCT/CN2022/117619
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张戬
Original Assignee
荣耀终端有限公司
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Priority to EP22900018.7A priority Critical patent/EP4369759A1/en
Publication of WO2023098209A1 publication Critical patent/WO2023098209A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/19—Connection re-establishment

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of communication technologies, and in particular, to a data transmission protection method, device, and system.
  • the sending end may transmit the data to the receiving end after performing encryption protection and integrity protection on the data.
  • encryption protection is used to prevent data from being eavesdropped and illegally obtained during transmission
  • integrity protection is used to perform integrity verification on data to determine whether data has been tampered with during transmission. After the receiving end decrypts the received encrypted data and passes the integrity verification, it can continue the subsequent communication process.
  • the present application provides a data transmission protection method, device and system, which can simplify the process of security verification and integrity verification while ensuring the security and integrity of data transmission.
  • a data transmission protection method includes: the first node sends information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the first node to the second node; wherein, the information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node The capability information is used by the second node to verify the integrity of the data from the first node.
  • network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities, so as to facilitate the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node serves as the serving base station of the user equipment (User Equipment, UE), and requests the UE's radio resource control ( radio resource control (RRC) context
  • the security parameters such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.
  • the security parameters can be accurately selected for data For security protection.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the above-mentioned first node sends a security parameter of the first node to the second node through a communication interface establishment request message; wherein, the security parameter of the first node is used to represent the security protection supported by the first node capability information.
  • This application does not limit the specific manner of sharing the supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the first node may share the supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing a communication interface with the second node.
  • the above method further includes: the first node receives from the second node information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • the second node may also share its supported security protection capabilities with the first node.
  • the above communication interface setup request message is an Xn interface setup request message (Xn Setup Request message).
  • Xn Setup Request message Xn Setup Request message
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the above-mentioned first node obtains the information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the second node by receiving the Xn interface setup response message from the second node.
  • This application does not limit the specific way of sharing the supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node can establish a response message (Xn Setup Response message) through the communication interface, and share the supported security protection capabilities with the first node.
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the above-mentioned first node sends the security parameter of the first node to the second node through a configuration update message.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node through a configuration update message.
  • the above configuration update message is a next generation radio access network node configuration update message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message); the above method also includes: the first node receives the next generation from the second node Radio access network node configuration update confirmation message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message).
  • NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message This application does not limit the specific configuration update message.
  • the configuration update message may be NG-RAN Node Configuration Update information.
  • the configuration update message is sent by the first node to the second node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated.
  • This application does not limit the specific timing for the first node to share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the first node can share with the second node when the security protection capabilities it supports are updated to ensure real-time security protection capabilities renew.
  • the above method further includes: when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated, the first node sends information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node to the second node. Based on the sharing of security protection capabilities between network nodes, in order to ensure real-time updates of security protection capabilities, network nodes can also update their latest supported security protection capabilities to other network nodes when their supported security protection capabilities are updated.
  • the above method further includes: the first node sends information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information about the security protection capability supported by the second node to the third node.
  • a network node may share its own security protection capabilities and/or security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to facilitate synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the above method further includes: the first node sends a broadcast message; wherein, the broadcast message carries information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or used to represent information supported by the second node. information about its security capabilities.
  • the network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities it supports and/or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network nodes in real time, so that when there is a need for data/information transmission, an appropriate security algorithm is selected Security protection for data/signaling.
  • the above security parameters of the first node include one or more of the following: encryption algorithms supported by the first node, integrity protection algorithms supported by the first node, security encryption algorithms supported by the first node key calculation parameters, and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the first node.
  • the security parameters of the above nodes can include encryption algorithms and security key calculation parameters for security protection, and integrity protection algorithms and integrity key calculations for integrity protection parameter.
  • the security parameters of the first node include: a first index identifier, where the first index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the first node.
  • the present application does not limit the specific forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters.
  • the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters may be expressed in the form of an index (index) identifier.
  • the above method further includes: the first node receives a radio resource control recovery request message (RRRCesumeRequest message) from the UE, and the RRCResumeRequest message includes: Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier (Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier, I -RNTI), message integrity authentication code (Message Authentication Code for Integrity, MAC-I) and request reason (Resume Cause); the first node determines that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node; the first node sends the message to the second node Send a restore UE context request message (Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message), the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the cell identity, I-RNTI, MAC-I and request reason of the target cell.
  • the anchor base station such as the second node
  • the RRCResumeRequest message includes: Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier (Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier, I -RNTI), message integrity authentication code
  • the UE may perform security protection and security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information broadcast by the first node for representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or the information for representing the security protection capability supported by the second node Integrity protection.
  • the above RRCResumeRequest message and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message also carry a second index (index) identifier, and the second index identifier is used to represent the integrity used by the UE to perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message Protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters.
  • the UE or the first node may indicate to the second node that when the UE performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message The integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters used.
  • the present application does not limit the specific expression forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters, for example, they may be expressed in the form of an index (index) identifier.
  • the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and one or more of the following information is encapsulated in the Container: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request reason, cell identity, The second index identifier.
  • the above method further includes: the first node receives a recovery context failure message (Retrieve Context failure message) from the second node, and the retrieve Context failure message carries security information used to represent the latest support of the second node.
  • Protection capability information the first node sends a radio resource control release message (RRCRelease message) to the UE, and the RRCRelease message carries information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, which is used by the UE according to the latest security protection capability supported by the second node The information of the security protection capability performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message again. Based on this, when the integrity verification fails, the UE can re-protect the integrity of the data to be transmitted according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, and then re-initiate the request to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.
  • the above method further includes: the first node receives a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause); the first node sends the radio resource to the UE A control rejection message (RRCReject message), the RRCReject message carries a waiting time, and is used to instruct the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting time.
  • the first node can reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again; or the first node can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the message for an error response.
  • the above method further includes: the first node receives a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure reason; the first node sends a RRCRelease message to the UE, and the RRCRelease message contains Carrying has a failure reason.
  • the failure reason is a security protection algorithm mismatch or an integrity verification failure.
  • the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within a preset time period.
  • a data transmission protection method includes: the second node receives from the first node the information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the first node; the second node sends the information used to represent the Information about security protection capabilities supported by the second node.
  • network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities, so as to facilitate the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node serves as the serving base station of the UE, and requests the RRC context of the UE from the anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, it can accurately select the connection with the second node.
  • the security parameters (such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the node provide security protection for data.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the above-mentioned second node establishes a request message through the communication interface, and obtains the security parameters of the first node from the first node; wherein, the security parameters of the first node are used to represent the security protection supported by the first node capability information.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing a communication interface with the second node.
  • the above-mentioned second node establishes a response message through the communication interface, and sends the second node's security parameters to the first node; wherein, the second node's security parameters are used to represent the security protection supported by the second node capability information.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the first node when initially establishing a communication interface with the first node.
  • the communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message
  • the communication interface establishment response message is an Xn Setup Response message.
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the second node obtains the security parameters of the first node from the first node through a configuration update message, and the second node sends the second node's security parameters to the first node through a configuration update confirmation message. security parameters.
  • the above configuration update message is an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message
  • the above configuration update confirmation message is an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message.
  • This application does not limit the specific configuration update message. Taking the first node and the second node as NG-RAN equipment as an example, the configuration update message can be NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message, and the configuration update confirmation message can be NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message.
  • the above method further includes: when the security protection capability supported by the second node is updated, the second node sends information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node to the first node. Based on the sharing of security protection capabilities between network nodes, in order to ensure real-time updates of security protection capabilities, network nodes can also update their latest supported security protection capabilities to other network nodes when their supported security protection capabilities are updated.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information about the security protection capability supported by the second node to the third node.
  • a network node may share its own security protection capabilities and/or security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to facilitate synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a broadcast message; wherein, the broadcast message carries information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or used to represent information supported by the second node. information about its security capabilities.
  • the network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities it supports and/or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network nodes in real time, so that when there is a need for data/information transmission, an appropriate security algorithm is selected Security protection for data/signaling.
  • the above-mentioned security parameters of the second node include one or more of the following: an encryption algorithm supported by the second node, an integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node, a security encryption algorithm supported by the second node key calculation parameters, and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the second node.
  • the security parameters of the above nodes can include encryption algorithms and security key calculation parameters for security protection, and integrity protection algorithms and integrity key calculations for integrity protection parameter.
  • the above method further includes: the second node receives the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message from the first node, and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the cell identity of the target cell, I-RNTI, MAC-I and the request reason; the second node performs integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • the information carried in the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is used by the UE to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or the information broadcast by the first node and/or the second node and/or to represent the second
  • the information of the security protection capability supported by the node is protected for security and integrity.
  • the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message also carries a second index (index) identifier, and the second index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and Integrity key calculation parameters.
  • the UE or the first node may indicate to the second node that when the UE performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message The integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters used.
  • the present application does not limit the specific expression forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters, for example, they may be expressed in the form of an index (index) identifier.
  • the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and one or more of the following information is encapsulated in the Container: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request reason, cell identity, The second index identifier.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the retrieve Context failure message carries information for representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, when the integrity verification of the second node fails, according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, the first node instructs the UE to perform integrity protection on the data to be transmitted again, and then re-initiate the request to ensure integrity verification successfully passed.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause).
  • the first node can reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again; or the first node can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the message for an error response.
  • the first node may instruct the UE to take corresponding measures according to specific reasons.
  • the failure reason is a security protection algorithm mismatch or an integrity verification failure. For example, if the failure reason is integrity verification failure, the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within a preset time period.
  • a data transmission protection method includes: the first node sends to the second node information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node; the second node sends information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node to the first node Information about the security protection capabilities supported by the second node.
  • network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities to facilitate the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node serves as the serving base station of the UE, and requests the RRC context of the UE from the anchor base station of the UE, such as the first node, it can accurately select the connection with the second node.
  • the security parameters (such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the node provide security protection for data.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the above method further includes: the first node sends a broadcast message; wherein, the broadcast message carries information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or used to represent information supported by the second node. information about its security capabilities.
  • the network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities it supports and/or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network nodes in real time, so that when there is a need for data/information transmission, an appropriate security algorithm is selected Security protection for data/signaling.
  • the above method further includes: the UE performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and the information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node , RRCResumeRequest message includes: I-RNTI, MAC-I and request reason (Resume Cause); UE sends RRCResumeRequest message to first node; The first node determines that the anchor base station of UE is the second node; The first node sends the second node Send the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, the retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the cell identity, I-RNTI, MAC-I and request reason of the target cell; the second node responds to the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST according to the security protection capabilities supported by the second node The integrity of the message is verified. Based on the above security protection capability sharing solution, when the UE needs to restore the RRC connection, it can request the anchor base station
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the retrieve Context failure message carries information for representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node; the first The node sends a radio resource control release message (RRCRelease message) to the UE.
  • the RRCRelease message carries information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, and is used by the UE to respond to the RRCResumeRequest according to the information on the latest security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • the message is re-secured. Based on this, when the integrity verification fails, the UE can re-protect the integrity of the data to be transmitted according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, and then re-initiate the request to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause); the first node sends a radio resource control message to the UE A rejection message (RRCReject message), the RRCReject message carries a waiting time, and is used to instruct the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting time.
  • the first node can reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again; or the first node can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the message for an error response.
  • the above method further includes: the second node sends a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause); the first node sends a RRCRelease message to the UE,
  • the failure reason is carried in the RRCRelease message.
  • the failure reason is a security protection algorithm mismatch or an integrity verification failure.
  • the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within a preset time period.
  • a first node in a fourth aspect, includes: a communication unit, configured to send information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node to a second node; wherein, used to represent the information supported by the first node The security protection capability information is used by the second node to verify the integrity of the data from the first node.
  • network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities to facilitate the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • security parameters such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is specifically configured to: send the security parameter of the first node to the second node through the communication interface establishment request message; wherein, the security parameter of the first node is used to indicate that the first node supports information about its security capabilities.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes. For example, the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing a communication interface with the second node.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive information from the second node that is used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • the second node may also share its supported security protection capabilities with the first node.
  • the above communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message.
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive an Xn Setup Response message from the second node, so as to obtain information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • This application does not limit the specific method of sharing the supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node can share the supported security protection capabilities with the first node through the Xn Setup Response message.
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, which depends on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the communication unit is specifically configured to: send information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node to the second node when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated.
  • This application does not limit the specific timing for the first node to share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the first node can share with the second node when the security protection capabilities it supports are updated to ensure real-time security protection capabilities renew.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is further configured to: when the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated, send information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the first node to the second node. Based on the sharing of security protection capabilities between network nodes, in order to ensure real-time updates of security protection capabilities, network nodes can also update their latest supported security protection capabilities to other network nodes when their supported security protection capabilities are updated.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is further configured to: send information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information about the security protection capability supported by the second node to the third node.
  • a network node may share its own security protection capabilities and/or security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to facilitate synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is further configured to: send a broadcast message; wherein, the broadcast message carries information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node. Information on security protection capabilities.
  • the network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities it supports and/or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network nodes in real time, so that when there is a need for data/information transmission, an appropriate security algorithm is selected Security protection for data/signaling.
  • the above security parameters of the first node include one or more of the following: encryption algorithms supported by the first node, integrity protection algorithms supported by the first node, security encryption algorithms supported by the first node key calculation parameters, and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the first node.
  • the security parameters of the above nodes can include encryption algorithms and security key calculation parameters for security protection, and integrity protection algorithms and integrity key calculations for integrity protection parameter.
  • the security parameters of the first node include: a first index identifier, where the first index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the first node.
  • the present application does not limit the specific forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters.
  • the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters may be expressed in the form of an index (index) identifier.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive an RRCResumeRequest message from the UE, where the RRCResumeRequest message includes: I-RNTI, MAC-I and a request reason (Resume Cause); the first node determines the anchor point of the UE The base station is the second node; the first node sends a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message to the second node, and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the cell identity, I-RNTI, MAC-I and request reason of the target cell.
  • the UE when the UE needs to restore the RRC connection, it can request the anchor base station (such as the second node) to restore the RRC context through the serving base station (such as the first node).
  • the UE may perform security protection and security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the information broadcast by the first node for representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or the information for representing the security protection capability supported by the second node Integrity protection.
  • the above RRCResumeRequest message and the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message also carry a second index (index) identifier, and the second index identifier is used to represent the integrity used by the UE to perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message Protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters.
  • the UE or the first node may indicate to the second node that when the UE performs security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message The integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters used.
  • the present application does not limit the specific expression forms of the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity key calculation parameters, for example, they may be expressed in the form of an index (index) identifier.
  • the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message includes a message body container Container, and one or more of the following information is encapsulated in the Container: I-RNTI, MAC-I, request reason, cell identity, The second index identifier.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, where the Retrieve Context failure message carries information for representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node;
  • the UE sends an RRCRelease message, and the RRCRelease message carries information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node, and is used for the UE to perform security protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the latest security protection capability information supported by the second node.
  • the UE can re-protect the integrity of the data to be transmitted according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, and then re-initiate the request to ensure the smooth passing of the integrity verification.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause); and send an RRCReject message to the UE, and the RRCReject message Carrying the waiting time in , it is used to instruct the UE not to repeatedly send the RRCResumeRequest message within the waiting time.
  • the first node can reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again; or the first node can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the message for an error response.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: receive a Retrieve Context failure message from the second node, the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure reason; and send a RRCRelease message to the UE, and the RRCRelease message carries a failure reason.
  • the failure reason is a security protection algorithm mismatch or an integrity verification failure.
  • the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within a preset time period.
  • a second node in a fifth aspect, includes: a communication unit configured to receive information from the first node used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the first node; Information representing the security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • network nodes share their supported security protection capabilities to facilitate the synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • security parameters such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is specifically configured to: obtain the security parameter of the first node from the first node through the communication interface establishment request message; wherein, the security parameter of the first node is used to indicate that the first node supports information about its security capabilities.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes. For example, the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node when initially establishing a communication interface with the second node.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is specifically configured to: establish a response message through a communication interface, and send the security parameter of the second node to the first node; wherein, the security parameter of the second node is used to indicate that the second node supports information about its security capabilities.
  • the present application does not limit the specific manner of sharing supported security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the second node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the first node when initially establishing a communication interface with the first node.
  • the communication interface establishment request message is an Xn Setup Request message
  • the communication interface establishment response message is an Xn Setup Response message.
  • the present application does not limit the specific type of the communication interface, depending on the specific structures and functions of the first node and the second node.
  • the communication interface is an Xn interface.
  • the first node may share its supported security protection capabilities with the second node.
  • the above communication unit is specifically configured to: acquire the security parameters of the first node from the first node through a configuration update message, and send the security parameters of the second node to the first node through a configuration update confirmation message. security parameters.
  • the above communication unit is further configured to: when the security protection capability supported by the second node is updated, send information representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node to the first node.
  • network nodes Based on the sharing of security protection capabilities between network nodes, in order to ensure real-time updates of security protection capabilities, network nodes can also update their latest supported security protection capabilities to other network nodes when their supported security protection capabilities are updated.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is further configured to: send information representing the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information about the security protection capability supported by the second node to the third node.
  • a network node may share its own security protection capabilities and/or security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes with other network nodes, so as to facilitate synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • the above-mentioned communication unit is specifically configured to: send a broadcast message; wherein, the broadcast message carries information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or information used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node. Information on security protection capabilities.
  • the network node broadcasts the security protection capabilities it supports and/or the security protection capabilities supported by other network nodes to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capabilities of the network nodes in real time, so that when there is a need for data/information transmission, an appropriate security algorithm is selected Security protection for data/signaling.
  • the communication unit is specifically configured to: receive the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message from the first node, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the cell identity of the target cell, I-RNTI, MAC-I and Request reason; the above-mentioned second node also includes: a processing unit, configured to perform integrity verification on the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • the information carried in the above Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is used by the UE to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node and/or the information broadcast by the first node and/or the second node and/or to represent the second
  • the information of the security protection capability supported by the node is protected for security and integrity.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: send a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, and the Retrieve Context failure message carries information for representing the latest security protection capability supported by the second node. Based on this, when the integrity verification of the second node fails, according to the security protection algorithm indicated by the second node, the first node instructs the UE to perform integrity protection on the data to be transmitted again, and then re-initiate the request to ensure integrity verification successfully passed.
  • the communication unit is further configured to: send a Retrieve Context failure message to the first node, where the Retrieve Context failure message carries a failure cause (failure cause).
  • the first node can reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again; or the first node can refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period, so as to ensure that the message for an error response.
  • the first node may instruct the UE to take corresponding measures according to specific reasons.
  • the failure reason is a security protection algorithm mismatch or an integrity verification failure. For example, if the failure reason is integrity verification failure, the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within the preset time period.
  • a first node in a sixth aspect, includes: a memory for storing a computer program; a transceiver for receiving or sending a radio signal; a processor for executing the computer program, so that the first The node executes the method in any possible implementation manner of the first aspect.
  • a second node in a seventh aspect, includes: a memory for storing a computer program; a transceiver for receiving or sending a radio signal; a processor for executing the computer program, so that the second The node executes the method in any possible implementation manner of the first aspect.
  • a communication system where the communication system includes a UE, such as the first node in any possible implementation manner of the fourth aspect or the sixth aspect, and any possible implementation manner of the fifth aspect or the seventh aspect The second node in the implementation.
  • a computer-readable storage medium is provided.
  • Computer program code is stored on the computer-readable storage medium.
  • the processor implements any one of the first aspect or the second aspect. method in one possible implementation.
  • a chip system the chip system includes a processor, a memory, and computer program code is stored in the memory; when the computer program code is executed by the processor, the processor implements the first aspect or the first aspect.
  • the system-on-a-chip may consist of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • a computer program product comprising computer instructions.
  • the computer instructions When the computer instructions are run on the computer, the computer is made to implement the method in any possible implementation manner of the first aspect or the second aspect.
  • FIG. 1 is a communication network architecture diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a hardware structure of a user equipment (User Equipment, UE) provided by an embodiment of the present application;
  • UE User Equipment
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an interaction process in which a UE requests to resume a radio resource control (RRC) connection provided by an embodiment of the present application;
  • RRC radio resource control
  • Figure 4 is an example diagram of two RRC recovery request message formats provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5A is a synchronous interaction diagram 1 of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5B is a synchronous interaction diagram for exchanging the security protection capabilities supported by each of the network nodes when establishing the initial Xn connection provided by the embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG. 6A is the second synchronous interaction diagram of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6B is an interactive diagram of the security protection capability supported by the network node through the Xn interface update provided by the embodiment of the present application;
  • Fig. 7 is a synchronous interaction diagram 3 of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • Fig. 8 is a synchronous interaction diagram 4 of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 9 is an interaction diagram 1 of a network node broadcasting a security protection capability of a network node to a UE according to an embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG. 10 is an interaction diagram 2 in which the network node broadcasts the security protection capability of the network node to the UE according to the embodiment of the present application;
  • FIG. 11 is the fifth synchronous interaction diagram of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 12 is a first schematic diagram of the interaction process of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 13 is a second schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram of information formats of two protection index (index) identifiers provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 15A is a schematic diagram of an information format of a protection MAC layer message provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 15B is a schematic diagram of an information format of another protection MAC layer message provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 16 is a third schematic diagram of the interaction process of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 17 is a fourth schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 18 is a fifth schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • first and second are used for descriptive purposes only, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying relative importance or implicitly specifying the quantity of indicated technical features. Thus, a feature defined as “first” and “second” may explicitly or implicitly include one or more of these features. In the description of this embodiment, unless otherwise specified, “plurality” means two or more.
  • the embodiment of the present application can be applied to but not limited to the following communication systems: narrowband Internet of Things (Narrow Band-Internet Of Things, NB-IoT) system, wireless local area network (Wireless Local Access Network, WLAN) system, long-term evolution (Long Term Evolution, LTE ) system, the fifth generation mobile communication (5th Generation Mobile Networks Or 5th Generation Wireless Systems, 5G) is also called the new air interface (New Radio, NR) system, or the communication system after 5G, such as 6G system, device-to-device (Device To Device, D2D) communication system, Internet of Vehicles, etc.
  • 5G narrowband Internet of Things
  • WLAN Wireless Local Access Network
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • 5G Fifth Generation Mobile Networks Or 5th Generation Wireless Systems
  • 5G is also called the new air interface (New Radio, NR) system
  • 5G such as 6G system, device-to-device (Device To Device, D2D) communication system, Internet of Vehicles, etc.
  • FIG. 1 shows a communication network architecture diagram provided by an embodiment of the present application.
  • Figure 1 takes the network service architecture of the 5G system as an example to show the interaction between network functions and entities and the corresponding interfaces.
  • the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) of the 5G system is based on the service
  • the network functions and entities included in the service-based architecture mainly include: user equipment (User Equipment, UE), access network (Access Network, AN) or radio access network (Radio Access Network, RAN) , user plane function (User Plane Function, UPF), data network (Data Network, DN), access management function (Access Management Function, AMF), session management function SMF, authentication service function (Authentication Server Function, AUSF), policy Policy Control Function (PCF), Application Function (AF), Network Slice Selection Function (NSSF), Unified Data Management (UDM), Network Exposure Function , NEF) and Network Repository Function (NRF).
  • UE User Equipment
  • Access Network Access Network
  • RAN Radio Access Network
  • UPF User Plane
  • UE, AN/RAN, UPF and DN are generally called user plane network functions and entities (or user plane network elements), and other parts are generally called control plane network functions and entities (or control plane network elements) .
  • the processing function of the control plane network element in a network is defined by 3GPP.
  • the control plane network element has the functional behavior defined by 3GPP and the interface defined by 3GPP.
  • the network function can be used as a network element running on dedicated hardware, or running on the A software instance on dedicated hardware, or a virtual function instantiated on a suitable platform, such as a cloud infrastructure, is implemented.
  • AN/RAN can be various forms of base stations, such as: macro base stations, micro base stations (also known as "small stations"), distributed unit-control units (Distribute Unit-Control Unit, DU-CU), etc.
  • the above-mentioned base station can also be a wireless controller in a cloud radio access network (Cloud Radio Access Network, CRAN) scenario, or a relay station, an access point, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, or a public land mobile network (Public Land Mobile Network) that will evolve in the future.
  • Land Mobile Network, PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
  • AN/RAN can also be Broadband Network Gateway (BNG), aggregation switch, non-3GPP access equipment, etc.
  • BNG Broadband Network Gateway
  • AN/RAN is mainly responsible for wireless resource management on the air interface side, classification of uplink and downlink data, Quality Of Service (QoS) management, data compression and encryption, and completion of signaling processing with control plane network elements or with user plane function network elements Data forwarding and other functions.
  • QoS Quality Of Service
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific form and structure of the AN/RAN. For example, in systems adopting different wireless access technologies, the names of equipment with base station functions may be different.
  • the base station can be an evolved universal terrestrial radio access network (Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network, E-UTRAN) device in LTE, such as an evolved node B (Evolutional NodeB, eNB or e-NodeB), or it can be a 5G Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN) equipment (such as gNB) in the system.
  • E-UTRAN evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • NG-RAN Next Generation Radio Access Network
  • UPF It is mainly responsible for packet routing and forwarding, as well as QoS processing of user plane data or accounting information statistics.
  • the transmission resources and scheduling functions that provide services for UE in UPF are managed and controlled by SMF.
  • DN is the network used to transmit data.
  • the DN may be an operator service network, an Internet access or a third-party service network, and the like.
  • AMF It is mainly responsible for the processing of control plane messages, such as: access control, mobility management, lawful interception, access authentication/authorization, etc.
  • the functions of the AMF mainly include: 1) processing the access network control plane; 2) processing NAS messages, responsible for NAS encryption protection and integrity protection; 3) registration management; 4) connection management; Intrusion management; 6) Mobility management; 7) Legal information interception; 8) Providing session management messages between UE and SMF; 9) Realizing transparent transmission for routed session management (SM) messages, similar to transparent transmission agents; 10 ) access authentication; 11) access authorization; 12) forwarding SMS messages (short messages) between UE and SMSF; 13) interacting with AUSF and UE to obtain UE authentication intermediate key; 14) Compute specific keys for accessing the network.
  • SM routed session management
  • SMF mainly used for session management, UE's Internet Protocol (IP) address allocation and management, selection of manageable user plane functions, policy control and charging function interface endpoints, downlink data notification, etc.
  • IP Internet Protocol
  • PCF It is mainly used to provide UE, AMF or SMF with parameters related to UE policy rules, AM policy rules and SM policy rules, manage user subscription information, and connect to UDM to access subscriber information related to policy decisions, etc.
  • NRF It is mainly used to provide internal/external addressing functions, receive query requests from other network elements for certain types of network elements, and return information about relevant network elements.
  • AUSF Mainly responsible for network security, used to generate keys, realize two-way authentication for UE, and support a unified authentication framework.
  • AF used to provide services, mainly used for: 1) application impact on business routing; 2) exposure of access network capabilities; 3) interaction with policy framework for policy control.
  • NSSF Mainly used for the selection and management of Network Slice Instance (NSI), determine the mapping between allowed network slice information and used network slice information, and determine the configured network slice information and subscribed network slice information mapping.
  • NSI Network Slice Instance
  • NEF It is an interface network element for two-way information exchange between internal and external entities in the network. It is also a logical unit for internal information distribution and aggregation. It mainly includes three capabilities: monitoring capability, supply capability, and policy/billing capability.
  • UDM It consists of two parts, one is called the application front end (FE), and the other is called the user data warehouse (UDR).
  • FE application front end
  • UDR user data warehouse
  • the data to be transmitted can be transmitted through the PDU session (that is, the communication bearer described in the specification) established between the UE and the DN, and the transmission will pass through two network functional entities (R)AN and UPF, UE and (R) ANs use some air interface technology to communicate with each other, N1 is the interface between UE and AMF, N2 is the interface between (R)AN and AMF, N3 is the interface between (R)AN and UPF, N4 is SMF The interface between UPF and UPF, N6 is the interface between UPF and DN; Namf is the service-based interface presented by AMF, Nsmf is the service-based interface presented by SMF, Nausf is the service-based interface presented by AUSF, and Nnssf is NSSF Nnef is the service-based interface presented by NEF, Nnrf is the service-based interface presented by NRF, Npcf is the service-based interface presented by PCF, Nudm is the service-based interface presented by UDM
  • Security key including encryption key and decryption key.
  • the parameter input when the sender encrypts and protects the plaintext according to the encryption algorithm to generate the ciphertext is the encryption key.
  • the receiving end can decrypt the ciphertext according to the encryption algorithm and the decryption key.
  • the receiver can decrypt the ciphertext according to the same encryption algorithm and security key.
  • Integrity protection key the parameter input by the sender when performing integrity protection on plaintext or ciphertext according to the integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving end can perform integrity verification on the integrity-protected data according to the same integrity protection algorithm and integrity protection key.
  • Integrity protection of plaintext or ciphertext is used to check the integrity of the data to determine whether the data has been tampered with during transmission.
  • Security algorithm also called encryption algorithm, which is used to encrypt and protect data.
  • the security algorithm may include: an encryption algorithm and a decryption algorithm.
  • Integrity protection algorithm an algorithm used for data integrity protection.
  • the integrity protection algorithm is an access stratum (Access Stratum, AS) integrity protection algorithm.
  • CONNECTED state also called connected state.
  • the connection status means that the radio resource control (RRC) connection has been established, so it is also called RRC_CONNECTED.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • the UE is in the connected state, the connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station) and the core network (such as an access management function (AMF) unit) is established. If there is data to be transmitted, it can be directly transmitted through The established connection is complete.
  • the RRC connection is used to process control plane messages between the UE and the access network.
  • Inactive (INACTIVE) state also called an inactive state (RRC_INACTIVE) or a third state.
  • the inactive state means that the RRC connection between the UE and the access network (such as the base station) has been disconnected, but the connection between the UE's access network (such as the base station) and the core network (such as the AMF) has not been disconnected.
  • the UE is in a deactivated state, if there is data to be transmitted, the RRC connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station) needs to be restored before data transmission can be performed.
  • the UE's RRC context (Context) is suspended (Suspend) on the terminal and the base station side, for example, it is saved in the last cell where the UE resides before entering the inactive (INACTIVE) state , or in the last cell (also called the anchor cell) that serves the UE.
  • the UE can acquire the RRC context of the UE by initiating an RRC recovery request (such as RRCResumeRequest), so as to restore the RRC connection according to the RRC context.
  • the RRC context of the UE includes the security context of the UE, UE capability information, and the like.
  • Idle (IDLE) state also called idle state (RRC_IDLE).
  • the idle state means that the RRC connection between the UE and the access network (such as the base station) has not been established, and the connection between the UE's access network (such as the base station) and the core network (such as the AMF) has not been established.
  • the UE is in the idle state, if there is data to be transmitted, it is necessary to establish a connection between the UE and the access network (such as a base station), and a connection between the UE's access network (such as a base station) and the core network (such as AMF). connection for data transmission.
  • Serving base station the base station to which the cell where the UE currently resides belongs, or the base station that currently provides services for the UE.
  • Anchor base station before the UE enters the inactive (INACTIVE) state, the base station that belongs to the last cell where the UE resides, or the base station that provides services for the UE last.
  • the UE for uplink transmission, the UE can be the encryption end and the integrity protection end, and the user plane network function and entity (or user plane network element) can be the decryption end and the integrity verification end. end.
  • the user plane network functions and entities can be the encryption end and the integrity protection end, and the UE can be the decryption end and the integrity verification end.
  • system and "network” used in the embodiments of the present application may be used interchangeably.
  • Base station Base Station
  • wireless base station eNB
  • gNB gNodeB
  • cell ector
  • cell group e.g., cell group
  • carrier carrier
  • Base stations are sometimes called by terms such as fixed station, NodeB, eNodeB (eNB), access point, transmission point, reception point, cell, pico cell, femto cell, and small cell.
  • a base station may house one or more (eg three) cells (also called sectors).
  • the entire coverage area of the base station can be divided into multiple smaller areas, and each smaller area can also be connected by a base station subsystem (for example, a small indoor base station (Remote Radio Head) Head, RRH))) to provide communication services.
  • a base station subsystem for example, a small indoor base station (Remote Radio Head) Head, RRH)
  • RRH Remote Radio Head
  • the term "cell” or “sector” refers to a part or the entire coverage area of a base station and/or a base station subsystem that provides communication services in the coverage.
  • mobile station Mobile Station, MS
  • user terminal user terminal
  • user equipment User Equipment, UE
  • terminal can be used interchangeably.
  • a mobile station is also sometimes referred to by those skilled in the art as subscriber station, mobile unit, subscriber unit, wireless unit, remote unit, mobile device, wireless device, wireless communication device, remote device, mobile subscriber station, access terminal, mobile terminal, wireless terminal, remote terminal, handset, user agent, mobile client, client, or some other appropriate term.
  • the wireless base station in the embodiment of the present application may also be replaced by a user terminal.
  • each mode/embodiment of the present disclosure can also be applied to a configuration in which communication between a radio base station and a user terminal is replaced with communication between multiple user terminals (Device-to-Device, D2D).
  • the functions of the radio base station can be regarded as the functions of the user terminal.
  • words like "up” and “down” can be replaced with "side”.
  • uplink channels can also be replaced by side channels.
  • the user terminal in the embodiment of the present application can also be replaced by a wireless base station.
  • the above-mentioned functions of the user terminal can be regarded as functions of the radio base station.
  • the UE may be a desktop device, a laptop device, a handheld device, a wearable device, a smart home device, a computing device, a vehicle-mounted device, etc. with a wireless connection function.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific type and structure of the UE.
  • FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a hardware structure of a UE.
  • the structure of the UE can be as shown in Figure 2, and the UE can include: a processor 210, an external memory interface 220, an internal memory 221, and a universal serial bus (universal serial bus, USB) Interface 230, charging management module 240, power management module 241, battery 242, antenna 1, antenna 2, mobile communication module 250, wireless communication module 260, audio module 270, speaker 270A, receiver 270B, microphone 270C, earphone jack 270D, sensor Module 280, button 290, motor 291, indicator 292, camera 293, display screen 294, and subscriber identification module (subscriber identification module, SIM) card interface 295, etc.
  • SIM subscriber identification module
  • the sensor module 280 may include a pressure sensor 280A, a gyro sensor 280B, an air pressure sensor 280C, a magnetic sensor 280D, an acceleration sensor 280E, a distance sensor 280F, a proximity light sensor 280G, a fingerprint sensor 280H, a temperature sensor 280J, a touch sensor 280K, and an ambient light sensor.
  • the structure shown in this embodiment does not constitute a specific limitation on the UE.
  • the UE may include more or fewer components than shown, or combine some components, or separate some components, or arrange different components.
  • the illustrated components can be realized in hardware, software or a combination of software and hardware.
  • the processor 210 may include one or more processing units, for example: the processor 210 may include an application processor (application processor, AP), a Modem, a graphics processing unit (graphics processing unit, GPU), an image signal processor (image signal processor) , ISP), controller, video codec, digital signal processor (digital signal processor, DSP), baseband processor, and/or neural network processor (neural-network processing unit, NPU), etc. Wherein, different processing units may be independent devices, or may be integrated in one or more processors.
  • application processor application processor, AP
  • Modem graphics processing unit
  • GPU graphics processing unit
  • image signal processor image signal processor
  • ISP image signal processor
  • controller video codec
  • digital signal processor digital signal processor
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • baseband processor baseband processor
  • neural network processor neural-network processing unit
  • the charging management module 240 is configured to receive charging input from the charger.
  • the charger may be a wireless charger or a wired charger.
  • the power management module 241 is used for connecting the battery 242 , the charging management module 240 and the processor 210 .
  • the power management module 241 receives the input from the battery 242 and/or the charging management module 240 to provide power for the processor 210 , the internal memory 221 , the display screen 294 , the camera 293 , and the wireless communication module 260 .
  • the wireless communication function of the UE can be realized by the antenna 1, the antenna 2, the mobile communication module 250, the wireless communication module 260, a modem, and a baseband processor.
  • Antenna 1 and Antenna 2 are used to transmit and receive electromagnetic wave signals.
  • Each antenna in the UE can be used to cover single or multiple communication frequency bands. Different antennas can also be multiplexed to improve the utilization of the antennas.
  • the mobile communication module 250 can provide wireless communication solutions including 2G/3G/4G/5G applied to the UE.
  • the wireless communication module 260 can provide wireless local area networks (wireless local area networks, WLAN) (such as wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi) network), bluetooth (bluetooth, BT), global navigation satellite system ( Global navigation satellite system (GNSS), frequency modulation (frequency modulation, FM), near field communication (near field communication, NFC), infrared technology (infrared, IR) and other wireless communication solutions.
  • the wireless communication module 260 may be one or more devices integrating at least one communication processing module.
  • the wireless communication module 260 receives electromagnetic waves via the antenna 2 , frequency-modulates and filters the electromagnetic wave signals, and sends the processed signals to the processor 210 .
  • the wireless communication module 260 can also receive the signal to be sent from the processor 210 , frequency-modulate it, amplify it, and convert it into electromagnetic waves through the antenna 2 to radiate out.
  • the wireless communication module 260 may be used for the UE to send a request for resuming the RRC connection to the network node, and to receive a response message from the network node.
  • the UE realizes the display function through the GPU, the display screen 294, and the application processor.
  • the GPU is a microprocessor for image processing, and is connected to the display screen 294 and the application processor.
  • the display screen 294 is used to display images, videos and the like.
  • a series of graphical user interfaces can be displayed on the display screen 294 of the UE.
  • the UE can realize the shooting function through ISP, camera 293 , video codec, GPU, display screen 294 and application processor.
  • Camera 293 is used to capture still images or video.
  • the external memory interface 220 can be used to connect an external memory card, such as a Micro SD card, to expand the storage capacity of the UE.
  • an external memory card such as a Micro SD card
  • the internal memory 221 may be used to store computer-executable program codes including instructions.
  • the processor 210 executes various functional applications and data processing of the UE by executing instructions stored in the internal memory 221 .
  • the UE can implement audio functions through the audio module 270, the speaker 270A, the receiver 270B, the microphone 270C, the earphone interface 270D, and the application processor. Such as music playback, recording, etc.
  • the UE may also include a pressure sensor 280A, an air pressure sensor 280C, a gyro sensor 280B, a magnetic sensor 280D, an acceleration sensor 280E, a distance sensor 280F, a proximity light sensor 280G, an ambient light sensor 280L, a fingerprint sensor 280H, a temperature sensor 280J, a touch sensor 280K, bone conduction sensor 280M, button 290, motor 291, indicator 292, etc.
  • the SIM card interface 295 is used for connecting a SIM card.
  • the SIM card can be connected and separated from the UE by being inserted into the SIM card interface 295 or pulled out from the SIM card interface 295 .
  • the UE can support 1 or N SIM card interfaces, where N is a positive integer greater than 1.
  • SIM card interface 295 can support Nano SIM card, Micro SIM card, SIM card etc. Multiple cards can be inserted into the same SIM card interface 295 at the same time.
  • the SIM card interface 295 is also compatible with external memory cards. The UE interacts with the network through the SIM card to implement functions such as calling and data communication.
  • an operating system such as an iOS operating system, an Android operating system, and a Windows operating system, runs on the above-mentioned components.
  • Applications can be installed and run on this operating system. In some other embodiments, there may be multiple operating systems running in the UE.
  • the hardware modules included in the UE shown in FIG. 2 are only described as examples, and do not limit the specific structure of the UE.
  • the UE provided in the embodiment of the present application may also include other hardware modules that have an interactive relationship with the hardware modules shown in the figure, which is not specifically limited here.
  • the UE may also include a flashlight, a micro projection device, and the like.
  • the UE may also include components such as a keyboard and a mouse.
  • the sender does not perform encryption protection or integrity protection on all the data to be transmitted, but only performs encryption protection or integrity protection on a part of the data to be transmitted. For this case, there is still a risk of data being tampered with during transmission.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an interaction process in which a UE requests to resume an RRC connection according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the UE may send a RRCResumeRequset message to the current serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) to request the RRC context of the UE.
  • the current serving base station such as Serving-gNB
  • the information carried in the RRCResumeRequset message includes Resume Identity (request identifier), Resume message integrity authentication code (Message Authentication Code for Integrity, MAC-I) (or shortResumeMAC-I , hereinafter referred to as MAC-I) and Resume Cause (that is, the reason for the request).
  • Resume Identity request identifier
  • Resume message integrity authentication code Message Authentication Code for Integrity, MAC-I
  • MAC-I ShortResumeMAC-I , hereinafter referred to as MAC-I
  • Resume Cause that is, the reason for the request.
  • Resume Identity is used to identify the RRC context of the network side equipment.
  • the Resume Identity may be an inactive radio network temporary identifier (Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier, I-RNTI).
  • FIG. 4 is an example diagram of two RRC recovery request message formats provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the spare bit is shown in (a) of FIG. 4 or (b) of FIG. 4 .
  • the I-RNTI may include ShortI-RNTI (as shown in (a) in FIG. 4 ) and FullI-RNTI (as shown in (b) in FIG. 4 ).
  • I-RNTI can be configured to the UE by a network-side device (such as an anchor base station) in an RRCRelease message, or can be broadcast by a network-side device (such as a serving base station), such as a system information block (System Information Block, SIB) 1 message Indicated by useFullResumeID.
  • SIB System Information Block
  • the SIB1 message includes useFullResumeID, it means using FullI-RNTII; if the SIB1 message does not include useFullResumeID, it means using ShortI-RNTI.
  • the FullI-RNTI is 40bits, and the ShortI-RNTI is 24bits.
  • the FullI-RNTI may be composed of UE ID, gNB ID and a public land mobile communication network (Public Land Mobile Network, PLMN).
  • PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
  • MAC-I is used by network-side devices to verify message validity and message integrity.
  • the MAC-I can be calculated by the UE according to the security algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm.
  • MAC-I may be 16 bits.
  • the UE may calculate the MAC-I based on the following parameters: KRRCint, KEY, BEARER, DIRECTION, COUNT and MESSAGE.
  • KRRCint is the integrity protection key.
  • KEY can be set to KRRCint value.
  • VarResumeMAC-Input can be set to VarResumeMAC-Input, wherein VarResumeMAC-Input can be calculated based on the following parameters: source physical cell identification (Physical cell identification, PCI), target cell ID (cell-ID), source cell wireless network temporary identification (Cell- Radio Network Temporary Identity, C-RNTI).
  • source physical cell identification Physical cell identification, PCI
  • target cell ID cell-ID
  • source cell wireless network temporary identification Cell- Radio Network Temporary Identity, C-RNTI
  • the UE may send a RRCResumeRequest message to the current serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) through Signaling Radio Bearers (SRB), such as SRB0.
  • SRB Signaling Radio Bearers
  • the format of the RRCResumeRequset message may be as shown in (a) or (b) in FIG. 4 .
  • the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) is not the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) of the UE, the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) determines the anchor base station of the UE according to the Resume Identity carried in the RRCResumeRequest message (such as Anchor-gNB), and request the RRC context of the UE from the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) of the UE.
  • the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) sends a restore UE context request message (Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message) to the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) of the UE to request the RRC context.
  • the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the target cell ID (cell-ID) and the Resume Identity, MAC-I and Resume Cause from the UE.
  • the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) determines that the anchor base station of the UE is different from the serving base station according to the Resume Identity carried in the RRCResumeRequset message, it can determine the anchor base station of the UE through the Resume Identity.
  • the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) verifies MAC-I to perform message legality verification and message integrity verification. If the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) passes the verification of the validity and message integrity of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, as shown in S303 in Figure 3, the anchor base station (such as Anchor-gNB) sends a request to the serving base station (such as Serving- gNB) sends a Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message. Among them, the Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message carries the RRC context of the UE.
  • the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) sends an RRCResume message to the UE to restore the RRC connected (CONNECTED) state of the UE.
  • the UE resumes the CONNECTED state.
  • send an RRCResumeComplete message to the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) to notify the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) that the UE has resumed the connected (CONNECTED) state (as shown in S306 in FIG. 3 ).
  • the serving base station such as Serving-gNB
  • the serving base station (such as Serving-gNB) determines that the UE has resumed the connected (CONNECTED) state, it can continue to process the subsequent work flow.
  • the serving base station can indicate the interface address (Xn-U address indication) to the anchor base station, the AMF unit serving base station can switch the downlink route according to the request of the serving base station, and the anchor base station can release the RRC context of the UE, etc.
  • the integrity of the request reason (such as Resume Cause) is not protected in the conventional recovery RRC request process, so if the request reason (such as Resume Cause) is tampered with, it will cause the verification of the network side device to fail, resulting in the recovery of the UE RRC request failed.
  • the request reason such as Resume Cause
  • the request reason such as Resume Cause
  • the UE requests to restore the service type used by RRC to initiate data transmission and a malicious attacker changes the service type in the request reason to periodic location update, it will cause the UE to fail to restore the RRC request, resulting in the failure of the UE to initiate
  • the business of transferring data fails. Therefore, how to ensure that data is not tampered with during transmission is also a problem that needs to be considered and solved urgently.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides a data transmission protection method, which provides a unified
  • the solution can ensure the privacy and integrity of data in the process of transmission while simplifying the communication technology upgrade, the introduction of new communication mechanisms, different security protection capabilities of UEs, and different security protection capabilities of network nodes.
  • the processing and computing power of integrity verification can ensure the privacy and integrity of data in the process of transmission while simplifying the communication technology upgrade, the introduction of new communication mechanisms, different security protection capabilities of UEs, and different security protection capabilities of network nodes.
  • a data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application will be specifically introduced below in combination with specific embodiments.
  • the security protection capabilities supported by each network node can be shared to ensure the synchronization of the security protection capabilities between the network nodes and avoid redundant parameter transmission and iterative security decoding attempts on the network side.
  • the network node is a base station.
  • Base stations such as macro base stations, micro base stations, DU-CUs, wireless controllers, relay stations, access points, BNGs, convergence switches, E-UTRAN equipment, eNBs, gNBs, etc. are not limited in this application.
  • network nodes notify each other of their respective supported security protection capabilities, so as to ensure synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes.
  • network nodes may exchange security protection capabilities supported by each when establishing an initial connection.
  • an initial connection is established between network nodes, for example, a communication interface is initially established between network nodes.
  • the type of the communication interface depends on the specific equipment and is not limited in this application.
  • the communication interface between gNB 1 and gNB 2 is the Xn interface.
  • FIG. 5A is the first synchronous interaction diagram of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application can be implemented based on the steps shown in S501-S504:
  • the first node sends a communication interface establishment request message to the second node.
  • the communication interface establishment request message carries the security parameters of the first node.
  • the communication interface establishment request message is used to request establishment of the communication interface.
  • the communication interface establishment request message is such as the Xn interface establishment request message (Xn Setup Request message).
  • the security parameter of the first node is used to represent the security protection capability supported by the first node.
  • the security parameters of the first node may include but not limited to one or more of the following: the encryption algorithm supported by the first node, the integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, the encryption algorithm supported by the first node Required calculation parameters (also called security key calculation parameters), and required calculation parameters (also called integrity key calculation parameters) for the integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node.
  • the security parameter of the first node may further include an index (index) identifier.
  • the Index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters currently supported by the first node.
  • the security parameter of the first node may further include indication information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the first node, for example, a message domain of the integrity protection supported by the first node.
  • the second node sends a communication interface establishment response message to the first node.
  • the communication interface establishment response message carries the security parameters of the second node.
  • the communication interface establishment response message is used to notify that the establishment of the communication interface is agreed.
  • the communication interface establishment request message is such as an Xn interface establishment response message (Xn Setup Response message).
  • the security parameter of the second node is used to represent the security protection capability supported by the second node.
  • the security parameters of the second node may include but not limited to one or more of the following: the encryption algorithm supported by the second node, the integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node, the encryption algorithm supported by the second node required calculation parameters (also called security key calculation parameters), and required calculation parameters (also called integrity key calculation parameters) for the integrity protection algorithm supported by the second node.
  • the security parameter of the second node may further include an index (index) identifier.
  • the Index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters currently supported by the second node.
  • the security parameter of the second node may further include indication information used to characterize the security protection capability supported by the second node, for example, a message domain of the integrity protection supported by the second node.
  • S503 The first node saves the security parameters of the second node.
  • S504 The second node saves the security parameters of the first node.
  • the first node and the second node save the security parameters of the opposite end, which can be used for but not limited to one or more of the following: for reference during subsequent decryption and integrity check, for sharing with other network nodes, for UE shared.
  • FIG. 5B is a synchronous interaction diagram 1 for exchanging security protection capabilities supported by each network node when an initial Xn connection is established according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the Serving-gNB and the Anchor-gNB can obtain the security protection capability of the opposite end through S501-S504.
  • S501-S504 are as follows:
  • S501 Serving-gNB sends an Xn Setup Request message to Anchor-gNB.
  • the Xn Setup Request message carries the security parameters of Serving-gNB.
  • Anchor-gNB sends an Xn Setup Response message to Serving-gNB.
  • the Xn Setup Response message carries the security parameters of the Anchor-gNB.
  • S503 The Serving-gNB saves the security parameters of the Anchor-gNB.
  • S504 The Anchor-gNB saves the security parameters of the Serving-gNB.
  • FIG. 5A and FIG. 5B are only used as an example of network nodes notifying each other of their supported security protection capabilities, and do not limit the specific timing relationship of each step.
  • S504 can also be executed simultaneously with S502 or S503, or occur before S502.
  • the first node serves as the serving base station of the UE, and sends
  • the first node may send all the security parameters it supports (such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc. ) to the second node.
  • the transmission of too many redundant parameters will cause a waste of communication resources and increase the transmission delay.
  • too many redundant parameters will cause the second node to continuously iterate when performing decryption and integrity verification. Attempts, thus complicating the processing of the second node and wasting computing power.
  • the security protection capabilities between the first node and the second node can be synchronized.
  • data or signaling is transmitted between the first node and the second node, for example, when the first node serves as the serving base station of the UE, and requests the RRC context of the UE from the anchor base station of the UE, such as the second node, it can Accurately select security parameters (such as encryption algorithm, integrity protection algorithm, security key calculation parameters, key calculation parameters, etc.) that match the security protection capabilities supported by the second node to securely protect data.
  • the second node can directly perform decryption and integrity verification according to the security parameters that match the security protection capabilities it supports, which not only avoids the transmission of redundant parameters, but also simplifies the decryption and integrity verification process, saving decryption and integrity verification. sex verification computing power.
  • the network node (such as the first node) may update the security protection capability it supports to other network nodes (including the second node) when the security protection capability it supports is updated.
  • a data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application can be implemented based on the steps shown in S601-S603:
  • the first node When the security protection capability supported by the first node is updated, the first node sends a configuration update message to the second node.
  • the configuration update message carries the latest security parameters of the first node.
  • the latest security parameters of the first node are used to represent the latest security protection capabilities supported by the first node.
  • the latest security parameter of the first node is the updated security parameter corresponding to the security protection capability supported by the first node.
  • the update of the security protection capability may include, but is not limited to, the addition/deletion/modification of security algorithms (such as encryption algorithms, integrity protection algorithms), Security key calculation parameters or key calculation parameters.
  • the latest security parameters of the first node may include but not limited to one or more of the following: the latest encryption algorithm supported by the first node, the latest integrity protection algorithm supported by the first node, the updated The updated security key calculation parameters of the first node and the updated integrity key calculation parameters of the first node.
  • the security parameter of the first node may further include an index (index) identifier.
  • the Index identifier is used to represent the latest integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the first node.
  • the security parameter of the first node may further include indication information used to characterize the latest security protection capability supported by the first node, for example, the message field of the integrity protection latest supported by the first node.
  • a communication interface between the first node and the second node has been established.
  • the first node can send a configuration update message to the second node through the Xn interface, such as NG-RAN RAN node configuration update message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message).
  • NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message
  • S602 The second node sends a configuration update confirmation message to the first node.
  • the configuration update acknowledgment message is used to confirm receipt of the latest security parameters of the first node from the first node.
  • the configuration update confirmation message is such as the NG-RAN node configuration update confirmation message (NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message).
  • S603 The second node saves the latest security parameters of the first node.
  • the second node saves the latest security parameters of the first node, which can be used for but not limited to one or more of the following: reference in subsequent decryption and integrity check, sharing with other network nodes, and sharing with UE .
  • FIG. 6B is an interaction diagram of the security protection capabilities supported by the network node through the Xn interface update provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • the Serving-gNB may update the security protection capability supported by the Anchor-gNB through S601-S603.
  • S601-S603 are as follows:
  • the Serving-gNB sends an NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message to the Anchor-gNB when the security protection capability it supports is updated. Among them, the NG-RAN Node Configuration Update message carries the latest security parameters of Serving-gNB.
  • Anchor-gNB sends NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge message to Serving-gNB.
  • S603 The Anchor-gNB saves the latest security parameters of the Serving-gNB.
  • FIG. 6A and FIG. 6B are only examples of security protection capabilities supported by updates between network nodes, and do not limit the specific timing relationship of each step.
  • S603 shown in FIG. 6A or FIG. 6B may also occur before S602, or be executed simultaneously with S602.
  • FIG. 6B may also be executed on the basis of the method shown in FIG. 5B .
  • the Serving-gNB and Anchor-gNB exchange their respective supported security protection capabilities when establishing the initial Xn connection, if the security protection capabilities supported by Serving-gNB are updated, Serving-gNB sends information to other network nodes (including Anchor-gNB) Update the security protection capabilities it supports.
  • FIG. 7 is a synchronous interaction diagram 3 of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can be implemented based on the steps shown in S701-S707, wherein S701-S704 is similar to S501-S504 in Figure 5B, and S705-S707 is similar to the steps in Figure 6B S601-S603 are similar.
  • the network node may also multicast the security protection capabilities supported by itself to the multicast domain through a multicast message.
  • the multicast message is a broadcast message (such as an SIB message), and the multicast domain is a broadcast domain; or the multicast message is a multicast message, and the multicast domain is a multicast domain.
  • the network node may update the security protection capabilities it supports to the user equipment in the multicast domain.
  • the network node may update the security protection capabilities it supports to the user equipment in the broadcast domain.
  • the user equipment in the broadcast domain is, for example, a cell residing in a network node.
  • FIG. 8 is a synchronous interaction diagram 4 of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S801-S805, wherein, S801-S804 is similar to S501-S504 in Figure 5B, and S805 is as follows:
  • the Serving-gNB sends a broadcast message, and correspondingly, the UE receives the broadcast message of the Serving-gNB.
  • the broadcast message carries the security parameters of the Serving-gNB and/or the Anchor-gNB.
  • the Serving-gNB may send a broadcast message to all UEs residing in the cell of the Serving-gNB.
  • the broadcast message is an SIB message.
  • the security parameters of the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) and/or the Anchor-gNB (that is, the second node) carried in the broadcast message are used by the UE to know the first node and/or the second node when there is a subsequent need.
  • a network node may update its supported security protection capabilities to the multicast domain when the supported security protection capabilities are updated.
  • FIG. 9 is an interaction diagram 1 of a network node broadcasting a security protection capability of a network node to a UE according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • the Serving-gNB of the UE broadcasts its latest security parameters to the UE through a broadcast message.
  • the first node may also update the security protection capabilities it supports to the user equipment in the multicast domain.
  • FIG. 10 is an interaction diagram 2 of the network node broadcasting the security protection capability of the network node to the UE according to the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1001-S1004, where S1001-S1003 is similar to S601-S603 in Figure 6B, and S1004 is as follows:
  • the Serving-gNB of the UE sends a broadcast message to the UE.
  • the broadcast message carries the latest security parameters of the Serving-gNB.
  • the network node when the security protection capability supported by the network node is updated, the network node broadcasts its latest supported security protection capability to ensure that the UE side updates the security protection capability of the network node in real time, thereby When there is a need for data/information transmission, select an appropriate security algorithm to protect the data/signaling.
  • the network node (such as the first node) may also share the security protection capability supported by itself and/or the security protection capability supported by other network nodes with other network nodes (such as the third node).
  • a network node such as the second node
  • shares its self-supported security protection capabilities with other network nodes such as the third node
  • the security protection capabilities are sent to the network node (such as the third node).
  • the first node and/or the second node may share its own security protection capability and/or security protection supported by other network nodes with the third node through a configuration update message.
  • Capabilities Taking the Serving-gNB where the third node is the UE as an example, FIG. 11 is the fifth synchronous interaction diagram of security protection capabilities between network nodes provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1101-S1104, S1105 and/or S1106, and S1107, wherein, S1101-S1104 is the same as S501- S504 is similar, and S1105-S1107 are as follows:
  • S1105 The first node sends a configuration update message to the Serving-gNB.
  • the configuration update message carries security parameters of the first node and/or the second node.
  • the second node sends a configuration update message to the Serving-gNB.
  • the configuration update message carries security parameters of the first node and/or the second node.
  • the Serving-gNB saves the security parameters of the first node and/or the second node.
  • network nodes share security protection capabilities supported by themselves or other network nodes to ensure synchronization of security protection capabilities between network nodes. Based on this, a more convenient and accurate decryption and integrity verification process can be provided during data or signaling transmission.
  • the Serving-gNB may further send a broadcast message to UEs residing in the cell of the Serving-gNB, wherein the broadcast message carries one or more of the following: first The security parameter of the node, the security parameter of the second node or the security parameter of the Serving-gNB.
  • the UE when there is a data/information transmission requirement, the UE may select an appropriate security algorithm to perform security protection on data/signaling. Especially in some important messages used to restore the connection, such as the RRCResumeRequest message used to restore the RRC connection, a more complete mechanism is needed to ensure the safe and reliable transmission of the message.
  • the UE in the inactive (INACTIVE) state is recovering
  • the following S1201-S1204 can be performed:
  • S1201 The UE performs encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the UE may perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message according to the AS encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm in the AS security context saved by the UE.
  • the encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm in the AS security context may be negotiated and determined after the AS security is established between the UE and the network node (such as the UE's anchor base station, that is, the second node).
  • the UE may select a security protection algorithm according to the security parameters of the second node, and encrypt and protect the RRCResumeRequest message sexual protection.
  • the security protection capability supported by the network node may change. Therefore, if the UE obtains the the security parameters of the second node, then the UE can select a security protection algorithm according to the security parameters carried in the broadcast message.
  • the UE can use the integrity protection parameters configured in the RRC_Release message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • integrity protection parameters including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters
  • the UE has configured integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, but the integrity protection parameters are different from the integrity protection parameters in the security parameters carried in the received broadcast message The parameters are inconsistent. In this case, if the UE can support the security protection capability indicated by the broadcast message, the UE can use the integrity protection parameters in the security parameters carried in the broadcast message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • integrity protection parameters including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters
  • the UE If the UE is not configured with integrity protection parameters (including integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters) in the RRC_Release message, but the UE can support the security protection capabilities indicated in the broadcast message, the UE can use the security protection capabilities carried in the broadcast message.
  • the integrity protection parameter in the parameter performs encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the UE can use the default integrity protection parameters , performing encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the default integrity protection parameters such as the integrity protection parameters last used by the UE, are not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the RRC_Release message is sent to the UE by the anchor base station of the UE when the UE enters the inactive (INACTIVE) state from the connected (CONNECTED) state.
  • the UE may Use the integrity protection parameters configured in the RRC_Release message to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the RRCResumeRequest message.
  • the UE may use the default integrity protection parameters to encrypt and protect the RRCResumeRequest message and integrity protection.
  • the UE sends a RRCResumeRequset message to the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node).
  • the RRCResumeRequset message has been encrypted and integrity protected by the UE.
  • the information carried in the RRCResumeRequset message includes: Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI), MAC-I and Resume Cause.
  • the MAC-I carried in the RRCResumeRequset message may be an enhanced MAC-I.
  • the enhanced MAC-I is used for network-side equipment to perform message legality verification and message integrity verification.
  • Enhanced MAC-I is related to Resume Cause.
  • the enhanced MAC-I can be calculated based on the following parameters: KRRCint, KEY, BEARER, DIRECTION, COUNT, and enhanced MESSAGE.
  • KRRCint is the integrity protection key.
  • KEY can be set to KRRCint value.
  • BEARER, DIRECTIO, and COUNT can all be set to 1.
  • Enhanced MESSAGE such as Enhanced VarResumeMAC-Input.
  • the enhanced VarResumeMAC-Input can be calculated based on the following parameters: source PCI, target cell ID (cell-ID), source cell C-RNTI and Resume Cause value.
  • the Resume Cause value may be explicitly defined.
  • the Resume Cause value may be indicated by a reserved bit of the Resume Cause (for example, currently, the Resume Cause also includes a 5 bit reserved bit).
  • a new parameter may be extended to indicate the value of Resume Cause.
  • the message format after expanding the new parameters may be as follows:
  • MO-SDT Mobile Originating-Small Data Transmission
  • Yet another exemplary message format after expanding the new parameter may be as follows:
  • Slicing means that the Resume Cause is a slicing business.
  • the Resume Cause value may be indicated by extending the message body.
  • the format of the extended message body may be as follows: for example, it carries indication information that the UE has completed measurement, etc., and reserves an extended space for the message body to facilitate subsequent extensions.
  • the extended message body can be as follows:
  • the nonCriticalExtension uses the reserved bit of the RRCResumeRequest message body (the spare bit shown in Figure 4(a) or Figure 4(b)) to carry the indication information that the UE has completed the measurement.
  • the Resume Cause value may be defined implicitly.
  • the Resume Cause value can be implicitly indicated through the division of random access channel (Random Access Channel, RACH) resources.
  • RACH Random Access Channel
  • the value of the Resume Cause is "0001" to indicate that the Resume Cause is to initiate a small packet transmission service.
  • the Serving-gNB determines that the anchor base station of the UE is different from the serving base station according to the Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI) carried in the RRCResumeRequset message, it can determine the anchor base station of the UE through the Resume Identity. Assuming that the anchor base station of the UE is the second node, the Serving-gNB performs the following S1203.
  • the Resume Identity such as I-RNTI
  • S1203 Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) sends a Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message to Anchor-gNB (that is, the second node).
  • the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is used to request the RRC context of the UE.
  • the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message carries the target cell ID (cell-ID), Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI), MAC-I and Resume Cause from the UE.
  • the Serving-gNB may send The Anchor-gNB sends the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE, so that the Anchor-gNB performs integrity verification based on the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE.
  • the Serving-gNB may carry the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • the Serving-gNB may carry the index identifier in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • the MAC-I carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message is an enhanced MAC-I.
  • Similar secure transmissions such as a message body container (Container) may be used mechanism, after encapsulating the information to be carried, send it to the Anchor-gNB through the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • Container message body container
  • the message body container can be encapsulated but not limited to one or more of the following parameters: Resume Identity (such as I-RNTI), MAC-I, Resume Cause, the integrity protection algorithm adopted by the UE, Integrity key calculation parameters used by the UE.
  • Resume Identity such as I-RNTI
  • MAC-I MAC-I
  • Resume Cause the integrity protection algorithm adopted by the UE
  • Integrity key calculation parameters used by the UE.
  • Anchor-gNB that is, the second node decrypts and verifies the integrity of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message.
  • the Anchor-gNB may perform integrity verification based on the source PCI, target cell ID (cell-ID), source cell C-RNTI Calculate the MAC-I with the Resume Cause value to verify whether the MAC-I is consistent with the enhanced MAC-I carried in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message. For example, if they are consistent, the integrity verification is passed; if not, the integrity verification is not passed.
  • the Anchor-gNB obtains the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE from the Serving-gNB, for example, if the Anchor-gNB receives from the Serving-gNB in the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message Carrying the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters (such as index identifier) adopted by the UE, the Anchor-gNB can adopt the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters that match the UE, and respond to the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST The integrity of the information carried in the message is verified.
  • Anchor-gNB passes the integrity verification of the Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST message, the Anchor-gNB executes S1205, the Serving-gNB executes S1206, and the UE executes S1207.
  • Anchor-gNB that is, the second node
  • Serving-gNB that is, the first node
  • the Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE message carries the RRC context of the UE.
  • the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) sends an RRCResume message to the UE.
  • the RRCResume message is used to indicate to resume the RRC connected (CONNECTED) state of the UE.
  • S1207 The UE restores the connected (CONNECTED) state.
  • the UE may also send an RRCResumeComplete message to the Serving-gNB to notify the Serving-gNB that the UE has resumed the CONNECTED state.
  • the network node (such as Serving-gNB, Anchor-gNB or AMF unit, etc.) can continue to process the subsequent work flow.
  • the Serving-gNB can indicate the interface address (Xn-U address indication) to the Anchor-gNB
  • the AMF unit can switch the downlink route according to the request of the Serving-gNB
  • the Anchor-gNB can release the RRC context of the UE, etc.
  • FIG. 13 is a second schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided in the embodiment of the present application may also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1301-S1308.
  • S1301-S1308 are similar to S1201-S1208 in FIG. 12 .
  • the RRCResumeRequset message sent by the Serving-gNB to the Anchor-gNB also carries an index (index) identifier.
  • the Index identifier is used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the RRCResumeRequset message sent by the UE.
  • the UE uses the encryption integrity algorithm (Ecryption Integrity Agorithm, EIA) to protect the integrity of the RRCResumeRequset message, and the security key calculation parameters include the reason why the UE requests to resume the RRC connection, the UE can carry Index 1 in the RRCResumeRequset message for Inform the Serving-gNB UE of the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted.
  • EIA encryption Integrity Agorithm
  • the security key calculation parameters include the new service type that the UE will initiate, and the UE can carry the Index in the RRCResumeRequset message 2. It is used to notify the Serving-gNB UE of the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted.
  • the UE may carry the above index identifier in the reserved bits of the RRCResumeRequset message.
  • the UE may carry the above index identifier in the RRCResumeRequset extended message body.
  • the format of the RRCResumeRequset extended message body may be as follows:
  • the ResumeIKArithmetic-capability-Index is an index identifier used to represent the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the RRCResumeRequset message sent by the UE.
  • the UE may define a medium access control layer control element (Medium Access Control Control Element, MAC_CE), so as to carry the above index identifier through the MAC_CE.
  • MAC_CE Medium Access Control Control Element
  • MAC_CE may include a first field and a second field.
  • the first field is used to carry a logical channel identification (Logical Channel Identification, LCID)
  • the second field is used to carry an index identification.
  • LCID is used to indicate logical channel data.
  • the LCID is used to indicate that the MAC_CE carries an index identifier.
  • the index identifier may be 8 bits.
  • LCID 8-bit LCID
  • LCID 64
  • LCID of 64 may be used to indicate a timing advance command (Timing Advance Command)
  • an LCID of 60 may be used to indicate a discontinuous reception (Discontinuous Reception, DRX) command, and the like.
  • DRX discontinuous Reception
  • some of the values of the LCID may also be reserved bits. Taking a 16-bit LCID as an example, among 2 16 (that is, 256) possible values of the LCID, 000-244 are usually reserved bits. For details, reference may be made to the introduction in the conventional technology.
  • the MAC_CE also includes reserved bits, as shown in (a) in FIG. 14 , R is a reserved bit.
  • the index identifier may also be carried by reserved bits of the MAC_CE.
  • MAC_CE includes 2 bits reserved.
  • the 2-bit reserved bits can carry 4 index identifiers, for example, when the 2-bit reserved bits are "00", “01", “10” and "11", different index identifiers are respectively indicated.
  • the UE notifies the Serving-gNB of the integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters adopted by the UE by carrying the index identifier in the RRCResumeRequset message.
  • the method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also perform integrity protection on messages at the MAC layer.
  • the UE may carry MAC-I derivative calculation input parameters through MAC_CE, as shown in FIG. 15A .
  • the input parameters of the MAC-I derivative calculation include the MAC layer message multiplexed with the RRCResumeRequest message and other messages of the MAC layer.
  • MAC_CE can carry multiple MAC-I derived calculation input parameters, as shown in Figure 15B.
  • the reserved bit R as shown in FIG. 15B may be used to carry the index identifier.
  • FIG. 16 is a third schematic diagram of the interaction process of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 16, a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1601-S1608, wherein, S1601-S1604 is similar to S1301-S1304 in Figure 13, and S1605-S1608 is as follows :
  • Anchor-gNB that is, the second node
  • Serving-gNB that is, the first node
  • the Retrieve Context failure message (that is, the context recovery failure message) is used to indicate that the request to obtain the RRC context fails.
  • the Retrieve Context failure message may carry the index identifier of the Anchor-gNB.
  • the index identifier of the Anchor-gNB is used to represent the latest integrity protection algorithm and integrity key calculation parameters supported by the Anchor-gNB.
  • the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) sends an RRCRelease message to the UE.
  • the RRCRelease message carries the index identifier of the Anchor-gNB.
  • the UE can re-encrypt and integrity-protect the RRCResumeRequest message according to the Anchor-gNB index identifier carried in the RRCRelease message (as shown in S1607 in Figure 16), and re-initiate the RRC connection recovery request (as shown in Figure 16 shown in S1608).
  • FIG. 17 is a fourth schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1701-S1706, wherein, S1701-S1704 is similar to S1301-S1304 in Figure 13, and S1705-S1706 is as follows :
  • Anchor-gNB that is, the second node
  • Serving-gNB that is, the first node
  • the Retrieve Context failure message is used to indicate that the request to obtain the RRC context fails.
  • the Retrieve Context failure message may carry a failure cause (failure cause) value.
  • Failure cause failure cause
  • failure cause such as security protection algorithm mismatch or integrity verification failure, etc.
  • the Anchor-gNB can facilitate the Serving-gNB to know the specific reason, so as to respond accordingly. For example, if the failure cause (failure cause) is integrity verification failure, it is speculated that the possibility that the message has been tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to ensure that the network node responds incorrectly to the falsified message, the Serving-gNB may reject the request when the UE frequently initiates the same request again. Alternatively, the Serving-gNB may refuse to respond to the same request initiated by the UE within a preset time period.
  • the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) sends an RRCReject message to the UE.
  • the RRCReject message is used to indicate that the request to obtain the RRC context fails.
  • the RRCReject message may carry a waiting time (wait time), which is used to indicate that the UE will not initiate the same request within the waiting time.
  • FIG. 18 is a fifth schematic diagram of the interaction flow of the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application.
  • a data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application can also be implemented based on the steps shown in S1801-S1806, wherein S1801-S1804 is similar to S1301-S1304 in Figure 13, and S1805 is similar to the steps in Figure 17 S1705 is similar, and S1806 is as follows:
  • the Serving-gNB (that is, the first node) sends an RRCRelease message to the UE.
  • the RRCRelease message is used to indicate that the request to obtain the RRC context fails.
  • the RRCRelease message may carry a failure cause (failure cause) value, which is used to notify the UE of the specific reason for the failure of the RRC context request, so as to facilitate the UE to respond accordingly.
  • the failure cause may include a mismatch of security protection algorithms or a failure of integrity verification. For example, if the failure reason is integrity verification failure, the UE speculates that the possibility of the message being tampered with is relatively high. For this kind of request, in order to prevent the message from being tampered with again when the request is initiated again, the UE may not initiate the same request within a preset time period.
  • the data transmission protection method shown in Figure 12, Figure 13, Figure 16, and Figure 17 can be based on a network node similar to that shown in Figure 5A, Figure 5B, Figure 6A, Figure 6B, Figure 7 or Figure 8
  • the synchronization of the security protection capabilities between devices can also be performed based on a conventional data transmission mechanism, which is not limited in this application.
  • the data transmission protection method provided by the embodiment of the present application provides a unified solution, which can be used in various situations such as communication technology upgrades, introduction of new communication mechanisms, different security protection capabilities of UEs, and different security protection capabilities of network nodes. In this way, while ensuring the privacy and integrity of data during transmission, it simplifies the processing and computing power of integrity verification.
  • the disclosed system, device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are only illustrative.
  • the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
  • multiple units or components can be Incorporation may either be integrated into another system, or some features may be omitted, or not implemented.
  • the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces, and the indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Part or all of the units can be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.
  • each functional unit in each embodiment of this embodiment may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may physically exist separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the above-mentioned integrated units can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional units.
  • the integrated unit is realized in the form of a software function unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of this embodiment is essentially or part of the contribution to the prior art or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium
  • several instructions are included to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) or a processor execute all or part of the steps of the method described in each embodiment.
  • the aforementioned storage medium includes: flash memory, removable hard disk, read-only memory, random access memory, magnetic disk or optical disk, and other media capable of storing program codes.

Abstract

本申请公开了一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统，涉及通信技术领域，可以在保证数据传输的安全性和完整性的同时，简化安全验证和完整性验证的过程。本申请公开的方案中，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在进行数据或信令传输时，便可以选择匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护，或者选择匹配的安全参数对数据进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。

Description

一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统
本申请要求于2021年12月03日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为202111470899.X、发明名称为“一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请实施例涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统。
背景技术
通信安全问题一直是移动通信领域备受关注的问题。为了保证数据在传输过程中的私密性和完整性，作为一种实现方式，发送端可以在对数据进行加密保护和完整性保护之后传输至接收端。其中，加密保护用于避免数据在传输过程中避免被窃听和被非法获取，完整性保护用于对数据进行完整性校验，以判断数据在传输过程中是否被篡改。接收端在对接收到的加密数据进行解密和完整性验证通过之后，便可以继续后续的通信流程。
但是，随着网络环境的愈加复杂化，以及通信技术、网络设备或终端设备的不断更新升级，在信息传输过程中的加密保护和完整性保护过程中，存在安全保护能力不同步、安全保护不全面导致的信息容易被篡改等较多问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种数据传输保护方法、设备及系统，可以在保证数据传输的安全性和完整性的同时，简化安全验证和完整性验证的过程。
为达到上述目的，本申请实施例采用如下技术方案：
第一方面，提供一种数据传输保护方法，该方法包括：第一节点向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；其中，用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息用于第二节点对来自第一节点的数据进行完整性验证。
上述第一方面提供的方案，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在网络节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第二节点作为用户设备(User Equipment，UE)的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第一节点请求UE的无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点通过通信接口建立请求消息，向第二节点发送第一节点的安全参数；其中，第一节点的安全参数用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立通信接口时，向第二节点共享其支持 的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自第二节点的，用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。为了保证网络节点之间安全保护能力的同步，第二节点也可以向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn接口建立请求消息(Xn Setup Request消息)。本申请不限定通信接口的具体类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立Xn接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点通过接收来自第二节点的Xn接口建立响应消息，获取用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，例如第二节点可以通过通信接口建立响应消息(Xn Setup Response消息)，向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。另外，本申请也不限定通信接口的具体类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点通过配置更新消息，向第二节点发送第一节点的安全参数。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第一节点可以通过配置更新消息向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述配置更新消息是下一代无线接入网节点配置更新消息(NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息)；上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自第二节点的下一代无线接入网节点配置更新确认消息(NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge消息)。本申请不限定具体配置更新消息，以第一节点和第二节点是下一代无线接入网(Next Generation Radio Access Network，NG-RAN)设备为例，配置更新消息可以是NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述配置更新消息由第一节点在第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时发送给第二节点。本申请不限定第一节点向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力的具体时机，例如第一节点可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向第二节点共享，以保证安全保护能力的实时更新。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点在第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于上述网络节点之间的安全保护能力的共享，为了保证安全保护能力的实时更新，网络节点还可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向其他网络节点更新其最新支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点向第三节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。作为一种实现方式，网络节点可以向其它网络节点共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点发送广播消息；其中，广播消息中携带有用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。网络节点通过广播其支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网 络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点的安全参数包括以下中的一个或多个：第一节点支持的加密算法、第一节点支持的完整性保护算法、第一节点支持的安全密钥计算参数、第一节点支持的完整性密钥计算参数。为了保证数据传输的安全性和完整性，上述节点的安全参数可以包括用于进行安全保护的加密算法和安全密钥计算参数，以及用于完整性保护的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点的安全参数包括：第一索引标识，第一索引标识用于表征第一节点支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。本申请不限定完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的具体形式，示例性的，完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数可以以索引(index)标识的形式来表示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自UE的无线资源控制恢复请求消息(RRCResumeRequest消息)，RRCResumeRequest消息包括：非激活无线网络临时标识(Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier，I-RNTI)、消息完整性鉴权码(Message Authentication Code for Integrity，MAC-I)和请求原因(Resume Cause)；第一节点确定UE的锚点基站是第二节点；第一节点向第二节点发送恢复UE上下文请求消息(Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息)，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因。基于上述安全保护能力共享的方案，UE可以在有RRC连接恢复需求时，通过服务基站(如第一节点)向锚点基站(如第二节点)请求恢复RRC上下文。
在一些示例性，UE可以根据第一节点广播的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护和完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述RRCResumeRequest消息和Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中还携带有第二索引(index)标识，第二索引标识用于表征UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。为了简化网络设备对消息进行完整性验证的过程，例如减少迭代网络侧冗余的传输参数设计和迭代的安全解码尝试，UE或第一节点可以向第二节点指示UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。另外，本申请不限定完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的具体表示形式，例如可以以索引(index)标识的形式来表示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中包括消息体容器Container，Container中封装有以下信息中的一种或多种：I-RNTI、MAC-I、请求原因、小区标识、第二索引标识。通过将上述重要信息封装在Container中进行传输，可以进一步保护数据传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自第二节点的恢复上下文失败消息(Retrieve Context failure消息)，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息；第一节点向UE发送无线资源控制释放消息(RRCRelease消息)，RRCRelease消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最 新支持的安全保护能力的信息，用于UE根据第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息对RRCResumeRequest消息重新进行安全保护。基于此，UE可以在完整性验证不通过时，根据第二节点指示的安全保护算法，重新对待传输数据进行完整性保护，进而重新发起请求，以保证完整性验证的顺利通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自第二节点的Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)；第一节点向UE发送无线资源控制拒绝消息(RRCReject消息)，RRCReject消息中携带有等待时长，用于指示UE在等待时长内不要重复发送RRCResumeRequest消息。通过该方案，第一节点可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求；或者第一节点可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应，以保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点接收来自第二节点的Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因；第一节点向UE发送RRCRelease消息，RRCRelease消息中携带有失败原因。通过该方法，可以在上下文请求失败时，方便UE根据具体原因进行相应应对。示例性的，失败原因如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
第二方面，提供一种数据传输保护方法，该方法包括：第二节点接收来自第一节点的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；第二节点向第一节点发送用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
上述第二方面提供的方案，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在网络节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第二节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第一节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第二节点通过通信接口建立请求消息，从第一节点获取第一节点的安全参数；其中，第一节点的安全参数用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立通信接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第二节点通过通信接口建立响应消息，向第一节点发送第二节点的安全参数；其中，第二节点的安全参数用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第二节点可以在与第一节点初始建立通信接口时，向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn Setup Request消息，上述通信接口建立响应消息是Xn Setup Response消息。本申请不限定通信接口的具体类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立Xn接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第二节点通过配置更新消息，从第一节点获取第一节点的安全参数，以及，第二节点通过配置更新确认消息，向第一节点发送第二节点的安全参数。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述配置更新消息是NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息，上述配置更新确认消息是NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge消息。本申请不限定具体配置更新消息，以第一节点和第二节点是NG-RAN设备为例，配置更新消息可以是NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息，配置更新确认消息可以是NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge消息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点在第二节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第一节点发送用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于上述网络节点之间的安全保护能力的共享，为了保证安全保护能力的实时更新，网络节点还可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向其他网络节点更新其最新支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第三节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。作为一种实现方式，网络节点可以向其它网络节点共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点发送广播消息；其中，广播消息中携带有用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。网络节点通过广播其支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第二节点的安全参数包括以下中的一个或多个：第二节点支持的加密算法、第二节点支持的完整性保护算法、第二节点支持的安全密钥计算参数、第二节点支持的完整性密钥计算参数。为了保证数据传输的安全性和完整性，上述节点的安全参数可以包括用于进行安全保护的加密算法和安全密钥计算参数，以及用于完整性保护的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点接收来自第一节点的Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因；第二节点对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息进行完整性验证。
在一些示例中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的信息由UE根据第一节点和/或第二节点广播的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息进行安全保护和完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中还携带有第二索引(index)标识，第二索引标识用于表征UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。为了简化网络设备对消息进行完整性验证的过程，例如减少迭代网络侧冗余的传输参数设计和迭代的安全解码尝试，UE或第一节点可以向第二节点指示UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。另外，本申请不限定完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的具体表示形式，例如可以以索引(index)标识的形式来表示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中包括消息体容器Container，Container中封装有以下信息中的一种或多种：I-RNTI、MAC-I、请求原因、小区标识、第二索引标识。通过将上述重要信息封装在Container中进行传输，可以进一步保护数据传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于此，第一节点可以在第二节点完整性验证不通过时，根据第二节点指示的安全保护算法，指示UE重新对待传输数据进行完整性保护，进而重新发起请求，以保证完整性验证的顺利通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)。通过该方案，第一节点可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求；或者第一节点可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应，以保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应。或者，第一节点可以指示UE根据具体原因进行相应应对。示例性的，失败原因如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
第三方面，提供一种数据传输保护方法，该方法包括：第一节点向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；第二节点向第一节点发送用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
上述第三方面提供的方案，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在网络节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第二节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第一节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第一节点发送广播消息；其中，广播消息中携带有用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。网络节点通过广播其支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网 络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：UE根据用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护，RRCResumeRequest消息包括：I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因(Resume Cause)；UE向第一节点发送RRCResumeRequest消息；第一节点确定UE的锚点基站是第二节点；第一节点向第二节点发送Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因；第二节点根据第二节点支持的安全保护能力，对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息进行完整性验证。基于上述安全保护能力共享的方案，UE可以在有RRC连接恢复需求时，通过服务基站(如第一节点)向锚点基站(如第二节点)请求恢复RRC上下文。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息；第一节点向UE发送无线资源控制释放消息(RRCRelease消息)，RRCRelease消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息，用于UE根据第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息对RRCResumeRequest消息重新进行安全保护。基于此，UE可以在完整性验证不通过时，根据第二节点指示的安全保护算法，重新对待传输数据进行完整性保护，进而重新发起请求，以保证完整性验证的顺利通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)；第一节点向UE发送无线资源控制拒绝消息(RRCReject消息)，RRCReject消息中携带有等待时长，用于指示UE在等待时长内不要重复发送RRCResumeRequest消息。通过该方案，第一节点可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求；或者第一节点可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应，以保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述方法还包括：第二节点向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)；第一节点向UE发送RRCRelease消息，RRCRelease消息中携带有失败原因。通过该方法，可以在上下文请求失败时，方便UE根据具体原因进行相应应对。示例性的，失败原因如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
第四方面，提供一种第一节点，该第一节点包括：通信单元，用于向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；其中，用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息用于第二节点对来自第一节点的数据进行完整性验证。
上述第四方面提供的方案，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在网络节点之间进行数据或信令传 输时，例如第二节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第一节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：通过通信接口建立请求消息，向第二节点发送第一节点的安全参数；其中，第一节点的安全参数用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立通信接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自第二节点的，用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。为了保证网络节点之间安全保护能力的同步，第二节点也可以向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn Setup Request消息。本申请不限定通信接口的具体类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立Xn接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自第二节点的Xn Setup Response消息，以获取用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，例如第二节点可以通过Xn Setup Response消息，向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。另外，本申请也不限定通信接口的具体类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：在第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定第一节点向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力的具体时机，例如第一节点可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向第二节点共享，以保证安全保护能力的实时更新。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：在第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第二节点发送用于表征第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于上述网络节点之间的安全保护能力的共享，为了保证安全保护能力的实时更新，网络节点还可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向其他网络节点更新其最新支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：向第三节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。作为一种实现方式，网络节点可以向其它网络节点共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：发送广播消息；其中，广播消 息中携带有用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。网络节点通过广播其支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点的安全参数包括以下中的一个或多个：第一节点支持的加密算法、第一节点支持的完整性保护算法、第一节点支持的安全密钥计算参数、第一节点支持的完整性密钥计算参数。为了保证数据传输的安全性和完整性，上述节点的安全参数可以包括用于进行安全保护的加密算法和安全密钥计算参数，以及用于完整性保护的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述第一节点的安全参数包括：第一索引标识，第一索引标识用于表征第一节点支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。本申请不限定完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的具体形式，示例性的，完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数可以以索引(index)标识的形式来表示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自UE的RRCResumeRequest消息，RRCResumeRequest消息包括：I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因(Resume Cause)；第一节点确定UE的锚点基站是第二节点；第一节点向第二节点发送Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因。基于上述安全保护能力共享的方案，UE可以在有RRC连接恢复需求时，通过服务基站(如第一节点)向锚点基站(如第二节点)请求恢复RRC上下文。
在一些示例性，UE可以根据第一节点广播的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护和完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述RRCResumeRequest消息和Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中还携带有第二索引(index)标识，第二索引标识用于表征UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。为了简化网络设备对消息进行完整性验证的过程，例如减少迭代网络侧冗余的传输参数设计和迭代的安全解码尝试，UE或第一节点可以向第二节点指示UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。另外，本申请不限定完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的具体表示形式，例如可以以索引(index)标识的形式来表示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中包括消息体容器Container，Container中封装有以下信息中的一种或多种：I-RNTI、MAC-I、请求原因、小区标识、第二索引标识。通过将上述重要信息封装在Container中进行传输，可以进一步保护数据传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自第二节点的Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息；以及向UE发送RRCRelease消息，RRCRelease消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息，用于UE根据第二节点最新支 持的安全保护能力的信息对RRCResumeRequest消息重新进行安全保护。基于此，UE可以在完整性验证不通过时，根据第二节点指示的安全保护算法，重新对待传输数据进行完整性保护，进而重新发起请求，以保证完整性验证的顺利通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自第二节点的Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)；以及向UE发送RRCReject消息，RRCReject消息中携带有等待时长，用于指示UE在等待时长内不要重复发送RRCResumeRequest消息。通过该方案，第一节点可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求；或者第一节点可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应，以保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：接收来自第二节点的Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因；以及向UE发送RRCRelease消息，RRCRelease消息中携带有失败原因。通过该方法，可以在上下文请求失败时，方便UE根据具体原因进行相应应对。示例性的，失败原因如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
第五方面，提供一种第二节点，该第二节点包括：通信单元，用于接收来自第一节点的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；以及向第一节点发送用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
上述第五方面提供的方案，网络节点之间通过共享其支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，在网络节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第二节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第一节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：通过通信接口建立请求消息，从第一节点获取第一节点的安全参数；其中，第一节点的安全参数用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立通信接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：通过通信接口建立响应消息，向第一节点发送第二节点的安全参数；其中，第二节点的安全参数用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。本申请不限定网络节点之间共享支持的安全保护能力的具体方式，示例性的，第二节点可以在与第一节点初始建立通信接口时，向第一节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn Setup Request消息，上述通信接口建立响应消息是Xn Setup Response消息。本申请不限定通信接口的具体 类型，视第一节点和第二节点的具体结构和功能而定，示例性的，通信接口如Xn接口。第一节点可以在与第二节点初始建立Xn接口时，向第二节点共享其支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：通过配置更新消息，从第一节点获取第一节点的安全参数，以及，通过配置更新确认消息，向第一节点发送第二节点的安全参数。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：在第二节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第一节点发送用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于上述网络节点之间的安全保护能力的共享，为了保证安全保护能力的实时更新，网络节点还可以在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时向其他网络节点更新其最新支持的安全保护能力。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：向第三节点发送用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。作为一种实现方式，网络节点可以向其它网络节点共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以便于网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：发送广播消息；其中，广播消息中携带有用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。网络节点通过广播其支持的安全保护能力和/或其他网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元具体用于：接收来自第一节点的Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、I-RNTI、MAC-I和请求原因；上述第二节点还包括：处理单元，用于对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息进行完整性验证。
在一些示例中，上述Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的信息由UE根据第一节点和/或第二节点广播的用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息进行安全保护和完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有用于表征第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。基于此，第一节点可以在第二节点完整性验证不通过时，根据第二节点指示的安全保护算法，指示UE重新对待传输数据进行完整性保护，进而重新发起请求，以保证完整性验证的顺利通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，上述通信单元还用于：向第一节点发送Retrieve Context failure消息，Retrieve Context failure消息中携带有失败原因(failure cause)。通过该方案，第一节点可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求；或者第一节点可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应，以保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应。或者，第一节点可以指示UE根据具体原因进行相应应对。示例性的，失败原因如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发 起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
第六方面，提供一种第一节点，该第一节点包括：存储器，用于存储计算机程序；收发器，用于接收或发送无线电信号；处理器，用于执行所述计算机程序，使得第一节点执行如第一方面任一种可能的实现方式中的方法。
第七方面，提供一种第二节点，该第二节点包括：存储器，用于存储计算机程序；收发器，用于接收或发送无线电信号；处理器，用于执行所述计算机程序，使得第二节点执行如第一方面任一种可能的实现方式中的方法。
第八方面，提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括UE，如第四方面或第六方面任一种可能的实现方式中第一节点，以及如第五方面或第七方面任一种可能的实现方式中第二节点。
第九方面，提供一种计算机可读存储介质，该计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序代码，该计算机程序代码被处理器执行时，使得处理器实现如第一方面或第二方面任一种可能的实现方式中的方法。
第十方面，提供一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器、存储器，存储器中存储有计算机程序代码；所述计算机程序代码被所述处理器执行时，使得处理器实现如第一方面或第二方面任一种可能的实现方式中的方法。该芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其它分立器件。
第十一方面，提供一种计算机程序产品，该计算机程序产品包括计算机指令。当该计算机指令在计算机上运行时，使得计算机实现如第一方面或第二方面任一种可能的实现方式中的方法。
附图说明
图1为本申请实施例提供的一种通信网络架构图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的一种用户设备(User Equipment，UE)的硬件结构示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的一种UE请求恢复无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)连接的交互过程示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的两种RRC恢复请求消息格式示例图；
图5A为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图一；
图5B为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间在建立初始Xn连接时交换各自支持的安全保护能力的同步交互图；
图6A为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图二；
图6B为本申请实施例提供的网络节点通过Xn接口更新支持的安全保护能力的交互图；
图7为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图三；
图8为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图四；
图9为本申请实施例提供的网络节点向UE广播网络节点的安全保护能力交互图一；
图10为本申请实施例提供的网络节点向UE广播网络节点的安全保护能力交互图二；
图11为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图五；
图12为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图一；
图13为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图二；
图14为本申请实施例提供的两种保护索引(index)标识的信息格式示意图；
图15A为本申请实施例提供的一种保护MAC层消息的信息格式示意图；
图15B为本申请实施例提供的另一种保护MAC层消息的信息格式示意图；
图16为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图三；
图17为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图四；
图18为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图五。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本申请实施例中的附图，对本申请实施例中的技术方案进行描述。其中，在本申请实施例的描述中，除非另有说明，“/”表示或的意思，例如，A/B可以表示A或B；本文中的“和/或”仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。另外，在本申请实施例的描述中，“多个”是指两个或多于两个。
以下，术语“第一”、“第二”仅用于描述目的，而不能理解为指示或暗示相对重要性或者隐含指明所指示的技术特征的数量。由此，限定有“第一”、“第二”的特征可以明示或者隐含地包括一个或者更多个该特征。在本实施例的描述中，除非另有说明，“多个”的含义是两个或两个以上。
本申请实施例可以适用但不限于以下通信系统：窄带物联网(Narrow Band-Internet Of Things，NB-IoT)系统、无线局域网(Wireless Local Access Network，WLAN)系统、长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)系统、第五代移动通信(5th Generation Mobile Networks Or 5th Generation Wireless Systems，5G)也称为新空口(New Radio，NR)系统、或者5G之后的通信系统，例如6G系统、设备到设备(Device To Device，D2D)通信系统、车联网等。
请参考图1，图1示出了本申请实施例提供的一种通信网络架构图。其中，图1以5G系统的网络服务架构为例展示了网络功能和实体之间的交互关系以及对应的接口，该5G系统的第三代合作伙伴项目(The 3rd Generation Partnership Project，3GPP)基于服务的网络架构(Service-Based Architecture，SBA)包含的网络功能和实体主要包括：用户设备(User Equipment，UE)、接入网(Access Network，AN)或无线接入网(Radio Access Network，RAN)、用户面功能(User Plane Function，UPF)、数据网络(Data Network，DN)、接入管理功能(Access Management Function，AMF)、会话管理功能SMF、认证服务功能(Authentication Server Function，AUSF)、策略控制功能(Policy Control Function，PCF)、应用功能(Application Function，AF)、网络切片选择功能(Network Slice Selection Function，NSSF)、统一数据管理(Unified Data Management，UDM)、网络开放功能(Network Exposure Function，NEF)和网络存储功能(Network Repository Function，NRF)。
其中，UE、AN/RAN、UPF和DN一般被称为用户面网络功能和实体(或者用户面网元)，其它的部分则一般被称为控制面网络功能和实体(或者控制面网元)。控 制面网元由3GPP定义了在一个网络里的处理功能，控制面网元具有3GPP定义的功能行为和3GPP定义的接口，网络功能能够作为一个运行在专有硬件上的网络元素，或者运行在专有硬件上的软件实例，或者在一个合适平台上进行实例化的虚拟功能，比如在一个云基础设备被实施。
下面对各个网元的主要功能做具体介绍。
AN/RAN：AN/RAN可以是各种形式的基站，例如：宏基站，微基站(也称为“小站”)，分散单元-控制单元(Distribute Unit-Control Unit，DU-CU)等。另外，上述基站还可以是云无线接入网络(Cloud Radio Access Network，CRAN)场景下的无线控制器，或者中继站、接入点、车载设备、可穿戴设备或者未来演进的公共陆地移动网络(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)网络中的网络设备等。AN/RAN也可以是宽带网络业务网关(Broadband Network Gateway，BNG)，汇聚交换机，非3GPP接入设备等。AN/RAN主要负责空口侧的无线资源管理、上下行数据分类、服务质量(Quality Of Service，QoS)管理、数据压缩和加密、与控制面网元完成信令处理或与用户面功能网元完成数据转发等功能。本申请实施例对AN/RAN的具体形态和结构不做限定。如，在采用不同的无线接入技术的系统中，具备基站功能的设备的名称可能会有所不同。例如，基站可以是LTE中的演进型通用陆地无线接入网(Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network，E-UTRAN)设备，如演进型节点B(Evolutional NodeB，eNB或e-NodeB)，也可以是5G系统中的下一代无线接入网(Next Generation Radio Access Network，NG-RAN)设备(如gNB)等。
UPF：主要负责分组路由和转发，以及用户面数据的QoS处理或计费信息统计等。UPF中为UE提供服务的传输资源和调度功能由SMF管理和控制。
DN：DN是用于传输数据的网络。例如：DN可以是运营商服务网络、互联网接入或第三方服务网络等。
AMF：主要负责控制面消息的处理，例如：接入控制、移动性管理、合法监听、接入鉴权/授权等。具体的，AMF的功能主要有：1)对接入网控制面进行处理；2)对NAS消息进行处理，负责NAS加密保护和完整性保护；3)注册管理；4)连接管理；5)接入性管理；6)移动性管理；7)合法信息截获；8)在UE与SMF之间提供会话管理消息；9)对于路由的会话管理(SM)消息实现透传，类似透传代理；10)接入鉴权；11)接入授权；12)在UE与短消息服务功能SMSF之间转发SMS消息(短消息)；13)与AUSF和UE交互，获得UE鉴权中间密钥；14)计算接入网络的特定密钥。
SMF：主要用于会话管理，UE的网络互连协议(Internet Protocol，IP)地址分配和管理，选择可管理用户平面功能，策略控制和收费功能接口的终结点，下行数据通知等。
PCF：主要用于向UE，AMF或SMF分别提供UE策略规则，AM策略规则以及SM策略规则相关的参数，管理用户订阅信息，对接UDM以访问与策略决策相关的订阅用户信息等。
NRF：主要用于提供内部/外部寻址功能，接收其它网元对某类网元的查询请求并返回相关网元的信息等。
AUSF：主要负责网络安全，用于产生密钥，实现对于UE的双向鉴权，支持统一的鉴权框架。
AF：用于提供服务，主要用于：1)对于业务路由的应用影响；2)访问网络能力曝光；3)与策略框架交互进行策略管控。
NSSF：主要用于网络切片实例(Network Slice Instance，NSI)的选择和管理，确定允许的网络切片信息与使用的网络切片信息的映射，以及确定已配置的网络切片信息与已订阅的网络切片信息的映射。
NEF：是网络内部与外部实体进行信息双向交互的接口网元，同时也是内部信息分发汇总的逻辑单元，主要包含三种能力：监控能力、供给能力、策略/计费能力。
UDM：由两部分构成，一部分叫应用前端(FE)，另一部分叫用户数据仓库(UDR)。
其中，待传输数据可以通过UE和DN之间建立的PDU会话(即说明书中所述的通信承载)进行传输，传输会经过(R)AN和UPF这两个网络功能实体，UE和(R)AN之间采用某种空口技术相互通信，N1为UE和AMF之间的接口，N2为(R)AN和AMF之间的接口，N3为(R)AN和UPF之间的接口，N4为SMF和UPF之间的接口，N6为UPF为DN之间的接口；Namf为AMF展现的基于服务的接口，Nsmf为SMF展现的基于服务的接口，Nausf为AUSF展现的基于服务的接口，Nnssf为NSSF展现的基于服务的接口，Nnef为NEF展现的基于服务的接口，Nnrf为NRF展现的基于服务的接口，Npcf为PCF展现的基于服务的接口，Nudm为UDM展现的基于服务的接口，Naf为AF展现的基于服务的接口。
对于UPF、DN、AUSF、NSSF、NEF、NRF和UDM等网元的功能等的介绍，可以参考常规技术中的解释和说明，这里不做赘述。
为方便理解，以下对本申请涉及的几个术语做简单介绍。
1、安全密钥：包括加密密钥和解密密钥。发送端根据加密算法对明文进行加密保护以生成密文时输入的参数即加密密钥。接收端可以根据加密算法和解密密钥对密文进行解密。
例如，在一些情况下，若使用对称加密的方法，加密密钥和解密密钥是相同的，那么接收端可以根据相同的加密算法和安全密钥对密文进行解密。
通过对明文进行加密保护用于避免数据在传输过程中避免被窃听和被非法获取。
2、完整性保护密钥：发送端根据完整性保护算法对明文或密文进行完整性保护时输入的参数。接收端可以根据相同的完整性保护算法和完整性保护密钥对进行了完整性保护的数据进行完整性验证。
通过对明文或密文进行完整性保护用于对数据进行完整性校验，以判断数据在传输过程中是否被篡改。
3、安全算法：也称加密算法，用于在对数据进行加密保护时使用的算法。例如，安全算法可以包括：加密算法和解密算法。
4、完整性保护算法：用于在对数据进行完整性保护时使用的算法。
其中，完整性保护算法如接入层(Access Stratum，AS)完整性保护算法。
5、连接(CONNECTED)状态：也称连接态。连接状态是指无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)连接已建立，因此也称RRC_CONNECTED。当UE处于连接 状态时，UE与接入网(如基站)以及核心网(如接入管理功能(access management function，AMF)单元)之间的连接均建立，若有数据需要传输，可以直接通过已建立的连接完成。其中，RRC连接用于处理UE和接入网之间的控制面消息。
6、非激活(INACTIVE)状态：也称去激活态(RRC_INACTIVE)或者第三态。非激活状态是指UE与接入网(如基站)之间的RRC连接已断开，但是UE的接入网(如基站)与核心网(如AMF)之间的连接未断开。当UE处于去激活状态时，若有数据需要传输，需要先恢复UE与接入网(如基站)之间的RRC连接，才能进行数据传输。
当UE进入非激活(INACTIVE)状态后，UE的RRC上下文(Context)在终端和基站侧被挂起(Suspend)，例如被保存在UE进入非激活(INACTIVE)状态之前所驻留的最后一个小区，或者最后为UE提供服务的小区(也称锚点小区)中。当有数据和/或信令传输需求时，UE可以通过发起RRC恢复请求(如RRCResumeRequest)获取UE的RRC上下文，以根据RRC上下文恢复RRC连接。其中，UE的RRC上下文如UE的安全上下文，UE能力信息等。
7、空闲(IDLE)状态：也称空闲态(RRC_IDLE)。空闲状态是指UE与接入网(如基站)之间的RRC连接未建立，且UE的接入网(如基站)与核心网(如AMF)之间的连接未建立。当UE处于空闲状态时，若有数据需要传输，需要先建立UE与接入网(如基站)之间的连接，以及UE的接入网(如基站)与核心网(如AMF)之间的连接，才能进行数据传输。
8、服务基站：UE当前所驻留的小区所属的基站，或者当前为UE提供服务的基站。
9、锚点基站：UE进入非激活(INACTIVE)状态之前，所驻留的最后一个小区所属的基站，或者最后为UE提供服务的基站。
可以理解的是，在本申请实施例中，对于上行传输来说，UE可以是加密端和完整性保护端，用户面网络功能和实体(或者用户面网元)可以是解密端和完整性验证端。对于下行传输来说，用户面网络功能和实体(或者用户面网元)可以是加密端和完整性保护端，UE可以是解密端和完整性验证端。
在本申请实施例中使用的“系统”和“网络”这样的用语可以互换使用。
在本申请实施例中，“基站(Base Station，BS)”、“无线基站”、“eNB”、“gNB”、“小区”、“扇区”、“小区组”、“载波”以及“分量载波”这样的用语可以互换使用。基站有时也以固定台(fixed station)、NodeB、eNodeB(eNB)、接入点(access point)、发送点、接收点、小区、微微小区、毫微微小区、小小区等用语来称呼。基站可以容纳一个或多个(例如三个)小区(也称为扇区)。当基站容纳多个小区时，基站的整个覆盖区域可以划分为多个更小的区域，每个更小的区域也可以通过基站子系统(例如，室内用小型基站(射频拉远头(Remote Radio Head，RRH)))来提供通信服务。“小区”或“扇区”这样的用语是指在该覆盖中进行通信服务的基站和/或基站子系统的覆盖区域的一部分或整体。
在本申请实施例中，“移动台(Mobile Station，MS)”、“用户终端(user terminal)”、“用户装置(User Equipment,UE)”以及“终端”这样的用语可以互换使用。移动台有时 也被本领域技术人员以用户台、移动单元、用户单元、无线单元、远程单元、移动设备、无线设备、无线通信设备、远程设备、移动用户台、接入终端、移动终端、无线终端、远程终端、手持机、用户代理、移动客户端、客户端或者若干其它适当的用语来称呼。
此外，本申请实施例中的无线基站也可以用用户终端来替换。例如，对于将无线基站和用户终端间的通信替换为多个用户终端间(Device-to-Device，D2D)的通信的结构，也可以应用本公开的各方式/实施方式。此时，可以将无线基站所具有的功能当作用户终端所具有的功能。此外，“上行”和“下行”等文字也可以替换为“侧”。例如，上行信道也可以替换为侧信道。同样，本申请实施例中的用户终端也可以用无线基站来替换。此时，可以将上述的用户终端所具有的功能当作无线基站所具有的功能。
其中，在本申请实施例中，UE可以是具有无线连接功能的桌面型设备、膝上型设备、手持型设备、可穿戴设备、智能家居设备、计算设备和车载型设备等。例如，上网本、平板电脑、智能手表、个人计算机(Personal Computer，PC)、超级移动个人计算机(Ultra-Mobile Personal Computer，UMPC)、智能相机、上网本、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)、蜂窝电话、无绳电话、会话启动协议(Session Initiation Protocol，SIP)电话、无线本地环路(Wireless Local Loop，WLL)站、便携式多媒体播放器(Portable Multimedia Player，PMP)、(Augmented Reality，AR)/虚拟现实(Virtual Reality，VR)设备、飞行器上的无线设备、机器人上的无线设备、工业控制中的无线设备、远程医疗中的无线设备、智能电网中的无线设备、智慧城市(Smart City)中的无线设备、智慧家庭(Smart Home)中的无线设备等。本申请实施例对UE的具体类型和结构等不作限定。
请参考图2，图2示出了一种UE的硬件结构示意图。如图2所示，在一些实施例中，UE的结构可以如图2所示，UE可以包括：处理器210，外部存储器接口220，内部存储器221，通用串行总线(universal serial bus，USB)接口230，充电管理模块240，电源管理模块241，电池242，天线1，天线2，移动通信模块250，无线通信模块260，音频模块270，扬声器270A，受话器270B，麦克风270C，耳机接口270D，传感器模块280，按键290，马达291，指示器292，摄像头293，显示屏294，以及用户标识模块(subscriber identification module，SIM)卡接口295等。其中传感器模块280可以包括压力传感器280A，陀螺仪传感器280B，气压传感器280C，磁传感器280D，加速度传感器280E，距离传感器280F，接近光传感器280G，指纹传感器280H，温度传感器280J，触摸传感器280K，环境光传感器280L，骨传导传感器280M等。
可以理解的是，本实施例示意的结构并不构成对UE的具体限定。在另一些实施例中，UE可以包括比图示更多或更少的部件，或者组合某些部件，或者拆分某些部件，或者不同的部件布置。图示的部件可以以硬件，软件或软件和硬件的组合实现。
处理器210可以包括一个或多个处理单元，例如：处理器210可以包括应用处理器(application processor，AP)，Modem，图形处理器(graphics processing unit，GPU)，图像信号处理器(image signal processor，ISP)，控制器，视频编解码器，数字信号处理器(digital signal processor，DSP)，基带处理器，和/或神经网络处理器(neural-network processing unit，NPU)等。其中，不同的处理单元可以是独立的器件， 也可以集成在一个或多个处理器中。
充电管理模块240用于从充电器接收充电输入。其中，充电器可以是无线充电器，也可以是有线充电器。
电源管理模块241用于连接电池242，充电管理模块240与处理器210。电源管理模块241接收电池242和/或充电管理模块240的输入，为处理器210，内部存储器221，显示屏294，摄像头293，和无线通信模块260等供电。
UE的无线通信功能可以通过天线1，天线2，移动通信模块250，无线通信模块260，调制解调器以及基带处理器等实现。
天线1和天线2用于发射和接收电磁波信号。UE中的每个天线可用于覆盖单个或多个通信频带。不同的天线还可以复用，以提高天线的利用率。
移动通信模块250可以提供应用在UE上的包括2G/3G/4G/5G等无线通信的解决方案。
无线通信模块260可以提供应用在UE上的包括无线局域网(wireless local area networks，WLAN)(如无线保真(wireless fidelity，Wi-Fi)网络)，蓝牙(bluetooth，BT)，全球导航卫星系统(global navigation satellite system，GNSS)，调频(frequency modulation，FM)，近距离无线通信技术(near field communication，NFC)，红外技术(infrared，IR)等无线通信的解决方案。无线通信模块260可以是集成至少一个通信处理模块的一个或多个器件。无线通信模块260经由天线2接收电磁波，将电磁波信号调频以及滤波处理，将处理后的信号发送到处理器210。无线通信模块260还可以从处理器210接收待发送的信号，对其进行调频，放大，经天线2转为电磁波辐射出去。
在本申请实施例中，无线通信模块260可用于UE向网络节点发送恢复RRC连接的请求，以及接收网络节点的响应消息。
UE通过GPU，显示屏294，以及应用处理器等实现显示功能。GPU为图像处理的微处理器，连接显示屏294和应用处理器。
显示屏294用于显示图像，视频等。UE的显示屏294上可以显示一系列图形用户界面(graphical user interface，GUI)。
UE可以通过ISP，摄像头293，视频编解码器，GPU，显示屏294以及应用处理器等实现拍摄功能。
摄像头293用于捕获静态图像或视频。
外部存储器接口220可以用于连接外部存储卡，例如Micro SD卡，实现扩展UE的存储能力。
内部存储器221可以用于存储计算机可执行程序代码，所述可执行程序代码包括指令。处理器210通过运行存储在内部存储器221的指令，从而执行UE的各种功能应用以及数据处理。
UE可以通过音频模块270，扬声器270A，受话器270B，麦克风270C，耳机接口270D，以及应用处理器等实现音频功能。例如音乐播放，录音等。UE还可以包括压力传感器280A，气压传感器280C，陀螺仪传感器280B，磁传传感器280D，加速度传感器280E，距离传感器280F，接近光传感器280G，环境光传感器280L，指纹传感 器280H，温度传感器280J，触摸传感器280K，骨传导传感器280M，按键290，马达291，指示器292等。
SIM卡接口295用于连接SIM卡。SIM卡可以通过插入SIM卡接口295，或从SIM卡接口295拔出，实现和UE的接触和分离。UE可以支持1个或N个SIM卡接口，N为大于1的正整数。SIM卡接口295可以支持Nano SIM卡，Micro SIM卡，SIM卡等。同一个SIM卡接口295可以同时插入多张卡。SIM卡接口295也可以兼容外部存储卡。UE通过SIM卡和网络交互，实现通话以及数据通信等功能。
另外，在上述部件之上，运行有操作系统，例如iOS操作系统，Android操作系统，Windows操作系统等。在该操作系统上可以安装运行应用程序。在另一些实施例中，UE内运行的操作系统可以有多个。
应理解，图2所示UE包括的硬件模块只是示例性地描述，并不对UE的具体结构做出限定。事实上，本申请实施例提供的UE中还可以包含其它与图中示意的硬件模块具有交互关系的其它硬件模块，这里不作具体限定。例如，UE还可以包括闪光灯、微型投影装置等。又如，若UE是PC，那么UE还可以包括键盘、鼠标等部件。
可以理解，随着网络环境的愈加复杂化，以及通信技术、网络设备或终端设备的不断更新升级，在信息传输过程中的加密保护和完整性保护过程中，存在安全保护能力不同步、安全保护不全面导致的信息容易被篡改等较多问题。
例如，在一些新机制(如RAN切片(slice)、小包传输(Small Data Transmission)、定位(Position)或覆盖增强等机制)引入后，新机制的引入将会改变一些消息体(如RRCResumeRequest消息体)的结构，在这种情况下，如何保护消息的完整性？
又如，对于安全保护能力不同的UE，如何避免由于加密输入参数的不同导致网络侧冗余的传输参数设计和迭代的安全解码尝试？
又如，如何保证网络节点之间安全保护能力的同步，以避免网络侧冗余的传输参数设计和迭代的安全解码尝试？类似上述问题均急需我们思考和解决。
又如，在一些数据和/或信令传输过程中，发送端并非对所有的待传输数据进行加密保护或者完整性保护，而是仅对待传输数据中的一部分进行加密保护或者完整性保护。对于这种情况，数据在传输过程中仍然有被篡改的风险。
以5G NR中的恢复无线资源控制(Radio Resource Control，RRC)连接流程为例，处于非激活(INACTIVE)状态的UE向网络侧设备请求恢复RRC连接，以进入连接(CONNECTED)状态来进行数据和/或信令传输。图3为本申请实施例提供的一种UE请求恢复RRC连接的交互过程示意图。如图3中S301所示，UE可以向当前服务基站(如Serving-gNB)发送RRCResumeRequset消息，以请求UE的RRC上下文。为了保证RRCResumeRequset消息在网络侧设备被正确识别，RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的信息包括Resume Identity(即请求标识)、Resume消息完整性鉴权码(Message Authentication Code for Integrity，MAC-I)(或者shortResumeMAC-I，以下简称MAC-I)和Resume Cause(即请求原因)。
其中，Resume Identity用于进行网络侧设备进行RRC上下文识别。示例性的，Resume Identity可以如非激活无线网络临时标识(Inactive Radio Network Temporary Identifier，I-RNTI)。
在一些情况下，RRCResumeRequset消息中还包括预留比特。示例性的，图4为本申请实施例提供的两种RRC恢复请求消息格式示例图。如图4中(a)或图4中(b)所示spare比特。
如图4所示，I-RNTI可以包括ShortI-RNTI(如图4中(a)所示)和FullI-RNTI(如图4中(b)所示)。I-RNTI可以由网络侧设备(如锚点基站)在RRCRelease消息中配置给UE，或者可以由网络侧设备(如服务基站)在广播消息，如系统信息块(System Information Block，SIB)1消息中通过useFullResumeID指示。例如，若SIB1消息中包括useFullResumeID则表示使用FullI-RNTII；若SIB1消息中不包括useFullResumeID则表示使用ShortI-RNTI。示例性的，FullI-RNTI为40bits，ShortI-RNTI为24bits。示例性的，FullI-RNTI可以由UE ID、gNB ID和陆上公用移动通信网(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)构成。
MAC-I用于网络侧设备进行消息合法性验证和消息完整性验证。示例性的，MAC-I可以由UE根据安全算法和完整性保护算法计算得到。示例性的，MAC-I可以为16bits。作为一种示例，UE可以基于以下参数计算得到MAC-I：KRRCint、KEY、BEARER、DIRECTION、COUNT和MESSAGE。其中，KRRCint为完整性保护密钥。KEY可以设置为KRRCint值。MESSAGE可以设置为VarResumeMAC-Input，其中VarResumeMAC-Input可以由基于以下参数计算得到：源物理小区标识(Physical cell identification，PCI)、目标小区ID(cell-ID)、源小区无线网络临时标识(Cell-Radio Network Temporary Identity，C-RNTI)。
作为一种可能的实现方式，UE可以通过信令无线承载(Signalling Radio Bearers，SRB)，如SRB0向当前服务基站(如Serving-gNB)发送RRCResumeRequset消息。示例性的，RRCResumeRequset消息格式可以如图4中(a)或者图4中(b)所示。
进一步的，若服务基站(如Serving-gNB)不是UE的锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)，则服务基站(如Serving-gNB)根据RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的Resume Identity确定UE的锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)，并且向UE的锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)请求UE的RRC上下文。如图3中S302所示，服务基站(如Serving-gNB)向UE的锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)发送恢复UE上下文请求消息(Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息)，用于请求RRC上下文。其中，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区ID(cell-ID)以及来自UE的Resume Identity、MAC-I和Resume Cause。
其中，服务基站(如Serving-gNB)在根据RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的Resume Identity确定UE的锚点基站与服务基站不同时，可以通过该Resume Identity确定UE的锚点基站。
进一步的，锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)在接收到来自服务基站(如Serving-gNB)的Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息之后，通过验证MAC-I以进行消息合法性验证和消息完整性验证。若锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息的合法性和消息完整性验证通过，如图3中S303所示，锚点基站(如Anchor-gNB)向服务基站(如Serving-gNB)发送Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE消息。其中，Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE消息中携带有UE的RRC上下文。
进一步的，如图3中S304所示，服务基站(如Serving-gNB)在获取UE的RRC上下文之后，向UE发送RRCResume消息，以恢复UE的RRC连接(CONNECTED)状态。如图S305所示，UE接收到RRCResume消息之后，恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态。以及，向服务基站(如Serving-gNB)发送RRCResumeComplete消息，以通知服务基站(如Serving-gNB)UE已恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态(如图3中S306所示)。以及，进一步的，如图3所示，服务基站(如Serving-gNB)在确定UE已恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态之后，可以继续处理后续工作流程。例如，服务基站可以向锚点基站进行接口地址指示(Xn-U address indication)，AMF单元服务基站可以根据服务基站的请求切换下行路由，以及锚点基站可以释放UE的RRC上下文等。
但是，常规的恢复RRC请求流程中并未对请求原因(如Resume Cause)进行完整性保护，因此若该请求原因(如Resume Cause)被篡改，会导致网络侧设备验证失败，从而导致UE的恢复RRC请求失败。例如，若UE请求恢复RRC用于发起传输数据的业务类型，而恶意攻击者将请求原因中的业务类型篡改为周期性位置更新，则会导致UE恢复RRC请求失败，从而导致UE想要发起的传输数据的业务失败。因此，如何保证数据在传输过程中不被篡改也是一个急需思考和解决的问题。
为了保证在考虑系统前向兼容性(Forwards Compatibility)设计等各种情况下数据在传输过程中的私密性和完整性，本申请实施例提供一种数据传输保护方法，该方法提供了一种统一的解决方案，可以在通信技术升级、新的通信机制引入、UE安全保护能力不同、网络节点安全保护能力不同等多种情况下，在保证数据在传输过程中的私密性和完整性的同时简化完整性验证的处理过程和算力。
以下将结合具体实施例，对本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法作具体介绍。
在本申请一些实施例中，网络节点之间可以共享各自支持的安全保护能力，以保证网络节点之间安全保护能力的同步，避免网络侧冗余的参数传输以及迭代的安全解码尝试。
其中，网络节点如基站。基站如宏基站、微基站、DU-CU、无线控制器、中继站、接入点、BNG、汇聚交换机、E-UTRAN设备、eNB、gNB等，本申请不限定。
在一些实施例中，网络节点之间通过互相通知各自支持的安全保护能力，以保证网络节点之间安全保护能力的同步。
在一种可能的实现方式中，网络节点(如第一节点和第二节点)之间可以在建立初始连接时交换各自支持的安全保护能力。
其中，网络节点之间建立初始连接如网络节点之间初始建立通信接口。通信接口类型视具体设备而定，本申请不限定。例如，gNB 1和gNB 2之间的通信接口为Xn接口。
图5A为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图一。如图5A所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法可以基于S501-S504所示步骤实现：
S501：第一节点向第二节点发送通信接口建立请求消息。其中，通信接口建立请求消息中携带有第一节点的安全参数。
其中，通信接口建立请求消息用于请求建立通信接口。以第一节点和第二节点之 间的通信接口为Xn接口为例，通信接口建立请求消息如Xn接口建立请求消息(Xn Setup Request消息)。
其中，第一节点的安全参数用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力。
作为一种示例，第一节点的安全参数可以包括但不限于以下中的一个或多个：第一节点支持的加密算法、第一节点支持的完整性保护算法、第一节点支持的加密算法所需的计算参数(也称安全密钥计算参数)、第一节点支持的完整性保护算法所需的计算参数(也称完整性密钥计算参数)。
作为另一种示例，第一节点的安全参数还可以包括索引(index)标识。Index标识用于表征第一节点当前支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
作为另一种示例，第一节点的安全参数还可以包括用于表征第一节点支持的安全保护能力的指示信息，例如第一节点支持的完整性保护的消息域。
S502：第二节点向第一节点发送通信接口建立响应消息。其中，通信接口建立响应消息中携带有第二节点的安全参数。
其中，通信接口建立响应消息用于通知同意建立通信接口。以第一节点和第二节点之间的通信接口为Xn接口为例，通信接口建立请求消息如Xn接口建立响应消息(Xn Setup Response消息)。
其中，第二节点的安全参数用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力。
作为一种示例，第二节点的安全参数可以包括但不限于以下中的一个或多个：第二节点支持的加密算法、第二节点支持的完整性保护算法、第二节点支持的加密算法所需的计算参数(也称安全密钥计算参数)、第二节点支持的完整性保护算法所需的计算参数(也称完整性密钥计算参数)。
作为另一种示例，第二节点的安全参数还可以包括索引(index)标识。Index标识用于表征第二节点当前支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
作为另一种示例，第二节点的安全参数还可以包括用于表征第二节点支持的安全保护能力的指示信息，例如第二节点支持的完整性保护的消息域。
S503：第一节点保存第二节点的安全参数。
S504：第二节点保存第一节点的安全参数。
其中，第一节点和第二节点保存对端的安全参数可以用于但不限于以下中的一种或多种：在后续进行解密和完整性校验时进行参考、向其它网络节点共享、向UE共享。
以第一节点是UE的Serving-gNB，第二节点是UE的Anchor-gNB，通信接口建立请求消息如Xn Setup Request消息为例，Serving-gNB和Anchor-gNB可以在建立初始Xn连接时交换各自支持的安全保护能力。图5B为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间在建立初始Xn连接时交换各自支持的安全保护能力的同步交互图一。如图5B所示，Serving-gNB和Anchor-gNB可以通过S501-S504获取对端的安全保护能力。其中，S501-S504具体如下所示：
S501：Serving-gNB向Anchor-gNB发送Xn Setup Request消息。其中，Xn Setup Request消息中携带有Serving-gNB的安全参数。
S502：Anchor-gNB向Serving-gNB发送Xn Setup Response消息。其中，Xn Setup Response消息中携带有Anchor-gNB的安全参数。
S503：Serving-gNB保存Anchor-gNB的安全参数。
S504：Anchor-gNB保存Serving-gNB的安全参数。
需要说明的是，在本申请中，图5A和图5B仅作为一种网络节点之间互相通知各自支持的安全保护能力的示例，并不对各个步骤的具体时序关系作限定。例如，S504还可以与S502或者S503同时执行，或者发生在S502之前。
可以理解，若第一节点与第二节点之间的安全保护能力不同步时，在第一节点与第二节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第一节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第二节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，第一节点可能会将其所支持的所有安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)发送给第二节点。在这种情况下，过多的冗余参数的传输会造成通信资源的浪费和传输时延的增加，另外，过多的冗余参数会造成第二节点进行解密和完整性验证时需要不断迭代尝试，由此造成了第二节点处理过程的复杂化和算力的浪费。
而基于本申请实施例提供的方法，在第一节点与第二节点交换了各自支持的安全保护能力之后，第一节点与第二节点之间的安全保护能力便可以同步。基于此，在第一节点与第二节点之间进行数据或信令传输时，例如第一节点作为UE的服务基站，向UE的锚点基站如第二节点请求UE的RRC上下文时，便可以准确选择与第二节点支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数(如加密算法、完整性保护算法、安全密钥计算参数、密钥计算参数等)对数据进行安全保护。进一步的，第二节点可以直接根据与其支持的安全保护能力匹配的安全参数进行解密和完整性验证，既避免了冗余参数的传输，又简化了解密和完整性验证过程，节省了解密和完整性验证算力。
在另一种可能的实现方式中，网络节点(如第一节点)可以在其所支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向其它网络节点(包括第二节点)更新其所支持的安全保护能力。
如图6A所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法可以基于S601-S603所示步骤实现：
S601：第一节点在其所支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向第二节点发送配置更新消息。其中，配置更新消息中携带有第一节点最新的安全参数。
其中，第一节点最新的安全参数用于表征第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力。第一节点最新的安全参数即更新后的第一节点所支持的安全保护能力所对应的安全参数。
在本申请实施例中，安全保护能力有更新可以包括但不限定于由于网络节点间应用层配置的更新等原因造成的增加/删除/修改了安全算法(如加密算法、完整性保护算法)、安全密钥计算参数或者密钥计算参数。
其中，在本申请实施例中，第一节点最新的安全参数可以包括但不限于以下中的一个或多个：第一节点最新支持的加密算法、第一节点最新支持的完整性保护算法、更新后的第一节点的安全密钥计算参数、更新后的第一节点的完整性密钥计算参数。
作为另一种示例，第一节点的安全参数还可以包括索引(index)标识。Index标识用于表征第一节点最新支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
作为另一种示例，第一节点的安全参数还可以包括用于表征第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的指示信息，例如第一节点最新支持的完整性保护的消息域。
作为一种示例，在本申请实施例中，第一节点与第二节点之间的通信接口已建立。 以第一节点和第二节点是NG-RAN，第一节点和第二节点之间的通信接口为Xn接口为例，第一节点可以通过Xn接口向第二节点发送配置更新消息，如NG-RAN节点配置更新消息(NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息)。
S602：第二节点向第一节点发送配置更新确认消息。
其中，配置更新确认消息用于确认接收到来自第一节点最新的第一节点的安全参数。以第一节点和第二节点是NG-RAN为例，配置更新确认消息如NG-RAN节点配置更新确认消息(NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge消息)。
S603：第二节点保存第一节点最新的安全参数。
其中，第二节点保存第一节点最新的安全参数可以用于但不限于以下中的一种或多种：在后续进行解密和完整性校验时进行参考、向其它网络节点共享、向UE共享。
以第一节点是UE的Serving-gNB，第二节点是UE的Anchor-gNB为例，图6B为本申请实施例提供的网络节点通过Xn接口更新支持的安全保护能力的交互图。如图6B所示，在Serving-gNB支持的安全保护能力有更新时，Serving-gNB可以通过S601-S603向Anchor-gNB更其支持的安全保护能力。其中，S601-S603具体如下所示：
S601：Serving-gNB在其所支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向Anchor-gNB发送NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息。其中，NG-RAN Node Configuration Update消息中携带有Serving-gNB最新的安全参数。
S602：Anchor-gNB向Serving-gNB发送NG-RAN Node Configuration Update Acknowledge消息。
S603：Anchor-gNB保存Serving-gNB最新的安全参数。
需要说明的是，在本申请中，图6A和图6B仅作为一种网络节点之间更新支持的安全保护能力的示例，并不对各个步骤的具体时序关系作限定。例如，图6A或图6B所示S603还可以发生在S602之前，或者与S602同时执行。
需要说明的是，上述图6B所示方法还可以在图5B所示方法的基础上执行。在Serving-gNB和Anchor-gNB之间在建立初始Xn连接时交换各自支持的安全保护能力之后，若Serving-gNB支持的安全保护能力有更新，Serving-gNB向其它网络节点(包括Anchor-gNB)更新其所支持的安全保护能力。图7为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图三。如图7所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法可以基于S701-S707所示步骤实现，其中S701-S704与图5B中的S501-S504类似，S705-S707与图6B中的S601-S603类似。
在一些实施例中，网络节点还可以通过多播消息向多播域多播其自身所支持的安全保护能力。其中，多播消息如广播消息(如SIB消息)，多播域如广播域；或者多播消息如组播消息，多播域如组播域。
作为一种示例，网络节点可以向多播域内的用户设备更新其所支持的安全保护能力。
例如，网络节点可以在图5A所示方法的基础上向广播域内的用户设备更新其所支持的安全保护能力。其中，广播域内的用户设备如驻留在网络节点内的小区。以第一节点是UE的Serving-gNB，第二节点是UE的Anchor-gNB为例，图8为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图四。如图8所示，本申请实施例提 供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S801-S805所示步骤实现，其中，S801-S804与图5B中的S501-S504类似，S805如下所示：
S805：Serving-gNB发送广播消息，对应的，UE接收Serving-gNB的广播消息。其中，广播消息中携带有Serving-gNB和/或Anchor-gNB的安全参数。
例如，Serving-gNB可以向驻留在Serving-gNB的小区内的所有UE发送广播消息。
示例性的，广播消息如SIB消息。
其中，广播消息中携带的Serving-gNB(即第一节点)和/或Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)的安全参数用于UE在后续有需求时，知道第一节点和/或第二节点支持的安全保护能力，以便启用相匹配的加密能力和完整性保护能力。
作为一种示例，网络节点可以在其所支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向多播域更新其所支持的安全保护能力。以第一节点是UE的Serving-gNB为例，图9为本申请实施例提供的网络节点向UE广播网络节点的安全保护能力交互图一。如图9中S901所示，UE的Serving-gNB在其支持的安全保护能力有更新时，通过广播消息向UE广播其最新的安全参数。又如，第一节点还可以在图6B所示方法的基础上向多播域内的用户设备更新其所支持的安全保护能力。以第一节点是UE的Serving-gNB，第二节点是UE的Anchor-gNB为例，图10为本申请实施例提供的网络节点向UE广播网络节点的安全保护能力交互图二。如图10所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1001-S1004所示步骤实现，其中S1001-S1003与图6B中的S601-S603类似，S1004如下所示：
S1004：UE的Serving-gNB向UE发送广播消息。其中，广播消息中携带有Serving-gNB最新的安全参数。
可以理解，基于本申请实施例提供的方法，网络节点在其所支持的安全保护能力有更新时，通过广播其最新支持的安全保护能力，以保证UE侧实时更新网络节点的安全保护能力，从而在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。
在一些实施例中，网络节点(如第一节点)还可以向其它网络节点(如第三节点)共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其它网络节点支持的安全保护能力。
例如，网络节点(如第二节点)可以在向其它网络节点(如第三节点)共享其自身支持的安全保护能力时，将其本地保存的一个或多个网络节点(如第一节点)支持的安全保护能力一起发送给该网络节点(如第三节点)。
示例性的，第一节点和/或第二节点可以在图5A所示方法的基础上，通过配置更新消息向第三节点共享其自身支持的安全保护能力和/或其它网络节点支持的安全保护能力以第三节点是UE的Serving-gNB为例，图11为本申请实施例提供的网络节点间安全保护能力的同步交互图五。如图11所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1101-S1104，S1105和/或S1106，以及S1107所示步骤实现，其中，S1101-S1104与图5A中的S501-S504类似，S1105-S1107如下所示：
S1105：第一节点向Serving-gNB发送配置更新消息。其中，配置更新消息中携带有第一节点和/或第二节点的安全参数。
S1106：第二节点向Serving-gNB发送配置更新消息。其中，配置更新消息中携带 有第一节点和/或第二节点的安全参数。
S1107：Serving-gNB保存第一节点和/或第二节点的安全参数。
可以理解，基于本申请实施例提供的方法，网络节点之间通过共享其自身或其它网络节点支持的安全保护能力，以保证网络节点之间的安全保护能力的同步。基于此，可在数据或信令传输过程中，提供更加便捷、准确的解密和完整性验证过程。
进一步的，如图11中S1108所示，Serving-gNB还可以进一步向驻留在Serving-gNB的小区内的UE发送广播消息，其中广播消息中携带有以下中的一种或多种：第一节点的安全参数、第二节点的安全参数或Serving-gNB的安全参数。
可以理解，在本申请实施例中，UE可以在有数据/信息传输需求时，选择合适的安全算法对数据/信令进行安全保护。特别是在在一些用于恢复连接的重要消息中，例如用于恢复RRC连接的RRCResumeRequest消息中，则需要更完善的机制确保该消息的安全可靠传输。
以5G NR中的恢复RRC连接流程为例，假设第一节点是UE的服务基站，第二节点是UE的锚点基站，如图12所示，处于非激活(INACTIVE)状态的UE在有恢复RRC连接需求时，可以执行以下S1201-S1204：
S1201：UE对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
在一些实施例中，UE可以根据其保存的AS安全上下文中的AS加密算法和完整性保护算法，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。其中，AS安全上下文中的加密算法和完整性保护算法可以在UE与网络节点(如UE的锚点基站，即第二节点)建立AS安全之后协商确定。
在一些实施例中，若UE通过读取广播消息(如SIB消息)，获取了第二节点的安全参数，UE可以根据第二节点的安全参数选择安全保护算法，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
可以理解，即使UE保存的AS安全上下文中包括UE与第二节点之前协商确定的安全参数选择安全保护算法，但是网络节点支持的安全保护能力可能会发生变化，因此，若UE通过广播消息获取了第二节点的安全参数，那么UE可以根据广播消息中携带的安全参数选择安全保护算法。
例如，若UE在RRC_Release消息中已经配置了完整性保护参数(包括完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数)，且该完整性保护参数与接收到的广播消息中携带的安全参数中的完整性保护参数一致，对于这种情况，UE可以采用在RRC_Release消息中配置的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
若UE在RRC_Release消息中已经配置了完整性保护参数(包括完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数)，但是该完整性保护参数与接收到的广播消息中携带的安全参数中的完整性保护参数不一致，对于这种情况，若UE能够支持广播消息所指示的安全保护能力，UE可以采用广播消息中携带的安全参数中的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
若UE在RRC_Release消息中未配置有完整性保护参数(包括完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数)，但是UE能够支持广播消息所指示的安全保护能力，UE可以采用广播消息中携带的安全参数中的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进 行加密保护和完整性保护。
若UE在RRC_Release消息中未配置有完整性保护参数(包括完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数)，且UE不支持广播消息所指示的安全保护能力，UE可以采用默认的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。其中，默认的完整性保护参数如UE最近一次使用的完整性保护参数等，本申请实施例不限定。
其中，RRC_Release消息由UE的锚点基站在UE从连接(CONNECTED)状态进入非激活(INACTIVE)状态时，发送给UE。
在另一些实施例中，若UE不知道第二节点支持的安全保护能力，但是UE在RRC_Release消息中已经配置了完整性保护参数(包括完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数)，UE可以采用在RRC_Release消息中配置的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
在另一些实施例中，若UE不知道第二节点支持的安全保护能力，且UE在RRC_Release消息中未配置有完整性保护参数，UE可以采用默认的完整性保护参数，对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护。
S1202：UE向Serving-gNB(即第一节点)发送RRCResumeRequset消息。
其中，RRCResumeRequset消息已由UE进行加密保护和完整性保护。RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的信息包括：Resume Identity(如I-RNTI)、MAC-I和Resume Cause。
在本申请一些实施例中，为了防止RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的Resume Cause被篡改，RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的MAC-I可以是增强型MAC-I。其中，增强型MAC-I用于网络侧设备进行消息合法性验证和消息完整性验证。增强型MAC-I与Resume Cause相关。
作为一种示例，在本申请实施例中，可以基于以下参数计算得到增强型MAC-I：KRRCint、KEY、BEARER、DIRECTION、COUNT和增强型MESSAGE。其中，KRRCint为完整性保护密钥。KEY可以设置为KRRCint值。BEARER、DIRECTIO和COUNT均可以设置为1。增强型MESSAGE如增强型VarResumeMAC-Input。其中，增强型VarResumeMAC-Input可以由基于以下参数计算得到：源PCI、目标小区ID(cell-ID)、源小区C-RNTI和Resume Cause值。通过将Resume Cause值作为为计算MAC-I的参数，可以有效的对Resume Cause进行保护，以防止Resume Cause被恶意篡改。
在本申请一些实施例中，可以以显式形式定义Resume Cause值。
例如，在一些实施例中，可以通过Resume Cause的预留位(示例性的，目前Resume Cause还包括5bit预留位)指示Resume Cause值。
又如，在一些实施例中，可以通过扩展新的参数，以指示Resume Cause值。示例性的，扩展新参数后的消息格式可以如下所示：
ResumeCause::＝ENUMERATED{emergency,highPriorityAccess,mt-Access,mo-Signalling,mo-Data,mo-VoiceCall,mo-VideoCall,mo-SMS,MO-SDT,rna-Update,mps-PriorityAccess,mcs-PriorityAccess,spare1,spare2,spare3,spare4,spare5}。
其中，上述示例中，MO-SDT(Mobile Originating-Small Data Transmission)即表 示Resume Cause是小包传输。
又一示例性的，扩展新参数后的消息格式可以如下所示：
ResumeCause::＝ENUMERATED{emergency,highPriorityAccess,mt-Access,mo-Signalling,mo-Data,mo-VoiceCall,mo-VideoCall,mo-SMS,Slicing,rna-Update,mps-PriorityAccess,mcs-PriorityAccess,spare1,spare2,spare3,spare4,spare5}。
其中，上述示例中，Slicing即表示Resume Cause是切片业务。
又如，在一些实施例中，可以通过扩展消息体，指示Resume Cause值。示例性的，扩展消息体的格式可以如下所示：如携带UE已经测量完成的指示信息等，并预留扩展空间消息体，方便后续扩展。
示例性的，扩展后的消息体可以如下所示：
Figure PCTCN2022117619-appb-000001
其中，在上述消息体中，nonCriticalExtension利用了RRCResumeRequest消息体的预留比特位(如图4中(a)或图4中(b)所示spare比特)携带了UE已经测量完成的指示信息。
在本申请一些实施例中，可以以隐式形式定义Resume Cause值。
例如，对于一些业务，如RAN切片(slice)业务、小包传输(Small Data Transmission)业务等，可以通过随机接入信道(Random Access Channel，RACH)资源的划分隐式指示Resume Cause值。示例性的，Resume Cause值为“0001”用于指示Resume Cause为发起小包传输业务。
需要说明的是，在本申请实施例中，上述增强型MAC-I、增强型MESSAGE和增强型VarResumeMAC-Input仅为了与常规的MAC-I、MESSAGE和VarResumeMAC-Input区分，本申请不限定具体的名称，可以视具体命名规则而定。
若Serving-gNB根据RRCResumeRequset消息中携带的Resume Identity(如I-RNTI)确定UE的锚点基站与服务基站不同时，可以通过该Resume Identity确定UE的锚点 基站。假设UE的锚点基站是第二节点，Serving-gNB执行以下S1203。
S1203：Serving-gNB(即第一节点)向Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)发送Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息。
其中，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息用于请求UE的RRC上下文。Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有目标小区ID(cell-ID)以及来自UE的Resume Identity(如I-RNTI)、MAC-I和Resume Cause。
在一些实施例中，若Serving-gNB接收到来自UE的RRCResumeRequset消息中携带有用于表征UE发送的RRCResumeRequset消息所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的index标识，Serving-gNB可以向Anchor-gNB发送UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数，以便Anchor-gNB基于UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数进行完整性验证。
例如，Serving-gNB可以在Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。又如，Serving-gNB可以在Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带index标识。
在一些实施例中，Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的MAC-I如增强型MAC-I。
在一些实施例中，为了进一步保护Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数等信息的安全性，可以采用消息体容器(Container)等类似安全传输机制，对要携带的信息进行封装后，通过Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息发送给Anchor-gNB。
其中，消息体容器(Container)中可以封装但不限定于以下参数中的一种或多种：Resume Identity(如I-RNTI)、MAC-I、Resume Cause、UE所采用的完整性保护算法、UE所采用的完整性密钥计算参数。
S1204：Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息进行解密和完整性验证。
在一些实施例中，若Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有增强型MAC-I，Anchor-gNB在进行完整性验证时，可以基于源PCI、目标小区ID(cell-ID)、源小区C-RNTI和Resume Cause值计算MAC-I，以验证该MAC-I是否与Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的增强型MAC-I一致。例如，若一致，则完整性验证通过；若不一致，则完整性验证不通过。
在一些实施例中，若Anchor-gNB从Serving-gNB获取了UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数，例如若Anchor-gNB从Serving-gNB接收到的Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带有UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数(如索引标识)，Anchor-gNB可以采用与UE相匹配的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数，对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息中携带的信息进行完整性验证。
若Anchor-gNB对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息完整性验证通过，Anchor-gNB执行S1205，Serving-gNB执行S1206，以及UE执行S1207。
S1205：Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)向Serving-gNB(即第一节点)发送Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE消息。
其中，Retrieve UE CONTEXT RESPONSE消息中携带有UE的RRC上下文。
S1206：Serving-gNB(即第一节点)向UE发送RRCResume消息。
其中，RRCResume消息用于指示恢复UE的RRC连接(CONNECTED)状态。
S1207：UE恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态。
进一步的，如图12中S1208所示所示，在UE恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态之后，UE还可以向Serving-gNB发送RRCResumeComplete消息，以通知Serving-gNB UE已恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态。
进一步的，在UE恢复连接(CONNECTED)状态之后，网络节点(如Serving-gNB、Anchor-gNB或AMF单元等)可以继续处理后续工作流程。例如，Serving-gNB可以向Anchor-gNB进行接口地址指示(Xn-U address indication)，AMF单元可以根据Serving-gNB的请求切换下行路由，以及Anchor-gNB可以释放UE的RRC上下文等。
图13为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图二。如图13所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1301-S1308所示步骤实现。其中，S1301-S1308与图12中的S1201-S1208类似。如图13所示，Serving-gNB向Anchor-gNB发送的RRCResumeRequset消息中还携带有索引(index)标识。Index标识用于表征UE发送的RRCResumeRequset消息所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
例如，若UE采用加密完整性算法(Ecryption Integrity Agorithm，EIA)对RRCResumeRequset消息进行完整性保护，安全密钥计算参数包括UE请求恢复RRC连接的原因，UE可以在RRCResumeRequset消息中携带Index 1，用于通知Serving-gNB UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。又如，若UE采用5G NR完整性保护算法(Integrity Algorithm for NR，NIA)对RRCResumeRequset消息进行完整性保护，安全密钥计算参数包括UE即将发起的新业务类型，UE可以在RRCResumeRequset消息中携带Index 2，用于通知Serving-gNB UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
作为一种示例，UE可以在RRCResumeRequset消息的预留位中携带上述index标识。
作为另一种示例，UE可以在RRCResumeRequset扩展消息体中携带上述index标识。
示例性的，UE在RRCResumeRequset扩展消息体中携带上述index标识时，RRCResumeRequset扩展消息体的格式可以如下所示：
RRCResumeRequest-RelX::＝SEQUENCE{
   ResumeIKArithmetic-capability—Index IT STRING(SIZE(8))
}。
其中，ResumeIKArithmetic-capability—Index即用于表征UE发送的RRCResumeRequset消息所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数的index标识。
在本申请另一些实施例中，UE可以定义媒体访问控制层控制元素(Medium Access Control Control Element，MAC_CE)，以通过该MAC_CE携带上述index标识。
作为一种示例，MAC_CE可以包括第一字段和第二字段。其中，如图14中的(a) 所示，第一字段用于携带逻辑信道标识(Logical Channel Identification，LCID)，第二字段用于携带索引标识。其中，LCID用于指示逻辑信道数据。在本申请实施例中，LCID用于指示该MAC_CE中携带有索引标识。示例性的，索引标识可以为8bit。
可以理解，8bit的LCID存在2 8(即64)个可能的取值，如00-63。其中，LCID的64个取值中，一些可以用于指示逻辑信道数据。例如，LCID为64可以用于指示时间提前命令(Timing Advance Command)，LCID为60可以用于指示非连续接收(Discontinuous Reception，DRX)命令等。当然，LCID的取值中，一些也可能是预留比特。以16bit的LCID为例，LCID的2 16(即256)个可能的取值中，000-244通常为预留比特。具体可以参考常规技术中的介绍。
在一些示例中，MAC_CE中还包括预留位，如图14中的(a)所示，R为预留位。
作为另一种示例，为了节省MAC_CE编码开销，还可以通过MAC_CE的预留比特携带index标识。如图14中的(b)所示，MAC_CE包括2bit预留位。通过该2bit预留位可以携带4中index标识，例如在该2bit预留位为“00”、“01”、“10”和“11”时分别指示不同的index标识。
可以理解，在一些情况下，例如在处于非激活状态的UE从基站1(即锚点基站)覆盖的区域移动到基站2覆盖的区域，且驻留在基站2管辖的小区上时，基站2并不知道UE与基站1(即锚点基站)所协商的安全保护算法，在基站1向基站2请求UE的RRC上下文时，便会存在安全保护能力不同步的问题。而在本申请实施例中，UE通过在RRCResumeRequset消息中携带index标识，以通知Serving-gNB UE所采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
进一步的，在本申请一些实施例中，为了进一步保证与RRCResumeRequset消息复用MAC层的其它消息的完整性，以防止MAC消息被篡改造成的网络节点对UE请求的误解等问题，导致请求失败、数据传输效率低甚至失败等问题，本申请实施例提供的方法还可以对MAC层的消息进行完整性保护。
示例性的，UE可以通过MAC_CE携带MAC-I衍生计算输入参数，如图15A所示。其中，MAC-I衍生计算输入参数包含与RRCResumeRequest消息等消息复用MAC层的MAC层消息。
在一些情况中，若存在多个MAC层消息与RRCResumeRequest消息等消息复用MAC层，MAC_CE可以携带多个MAC-I衍生计算输入参数，如图15B中MAC-I衍生计算输入参数1和MAC-I衍生计算输入参数2所示。其中，如图15B中所示预留位R可以用于携带index标识。
在一些实施例中，若Anchor-gNB对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST消息完整性验证通过，但是Anchor-gNB确定UE采用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数与Anchor-gNB最新支持的安全保护能力不匹配，Anchor-gNB还可以发起重认证指示。图16为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图三。如图16所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1601-S1608所示步骤实现，其中，S1601-S1604与图13中的S1301-S1304类似，S1605-S1608如下所示：
S1605：Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)向Serving-gNB(即第一节点)发送Retrieve Context failure消息。
其中，Retrieve Context failure消息(即恢复上下文失败消息)用于指示获取RRC上下文请求失败。
在一些实施例中，如图16所示，Retrieve Context failure消息中可以携带有Anchor-gNB的index标识。Anchor-gNB的index标识用于表征Anchor-gNB最新支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
S1606：Serving-gNB(即第一节点)向UE发送RRCRelease消息。
其中，如图16所示，RRCRelease消息中携带有Anchor-gNB的index标识。
进一步的，UE可以根据RRCRelease消息中携带的Anchor-gNB的index标识重新对RRCResumeRequest消息进行加密保护和完整性保护(如图16中S1607所示)，以及重新发起恢复RRC连接的请求(如图16中S1608所示)。
若Anchor-gNB对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST完整性验证失败，作为一种可能的实现方式，Anchor-gNB还可以向Serving-gNB反馈失败原因(failure cause)值。图17为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图四。如图17所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1701-S1706所示步骤实现，其中，S1701-S1704与图13中的S1301-S1304类似，S1705-S1706如下所示：
S1705：Anchor-gNB(即第二节点)向Serving-gNB(即第一节点)发送Retrieve Context failure消息。
其中，Retrieve Context failure消息用于指示获取RRC上下文请求失败。
在一些实施例中，如图16所示，Retrieve Context failure消息中可以携带有失败原因(failure cause)值。失败原因(failure cause)如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。
Anchor-gNB通过向Serving-gNB发送失败原因(failure cause)值，可以方便Serving-gNB知晓具体原因，以进行相应应对。例如，若失败原因(failure cause)是完整性验证失败，则推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了保证网络节点对被篡改过的消息进行错误响应，Serving-gNB可以在UE再次频繁发起相同请求时，拒绝该请求。或者，Serving-gNB可以在预设时长内，拒绝对UE发起的相同请求作响应。
S1706：Serving-gNB(即第一节点)向UE发送RRCReject消息。
其中，RRCReject消息用于指示获取RRC上下文请求失败。
在一些实施例中，如图17所示，RRCReject消息中可以携带有等待时长(wait time)，用于指示UE在该等待时长内不再发起相同请求。
若Anchor-gNB对Retrieve UE CONTEXT REQUEST完整性验证失败，作为一种可能的实现方式，Anchor-gNB还可以通过Serving-gNB向UE反馈失败原因(failure cause)值。图18为本申请实施例提供的数据传输保护方法交互流程示意图五。如图18所示，本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法还可以基于S1801-S1806所示步骤实现，其中，S1801-S1804与图13中的S1301-S1304类似，S1805与图17中的S1705类似，S1806如下所示：
S1806：Serving-gNB(即第一节点)向UE发送RRCRelease消息。
其中，RRCRelease消息用于指示获取RRC上下文请求失败。
在一些实施例中，如图18所示，RRCRelease消息中可以携带有失败原因(failure cause)值，用于通知UE RRC上下文请求失败的具体原因，以方便UE进行相应应对。其中，失败原因(failure cause)如安全保护算法不匹配或完整性验证失败等。例如，若失败原因是完整性验证失败，UE推测消息被篡改的可能性比较大。对于这种请求，为了避免再次发起请求时消息再次被篡改，UE可以在预设时长内不再发起相同请求。
其中，在本申请实施例中，图12、图13、图16、图17所示数据传输保护方法可以基于类似图5A、图5B、图6A、图6B、图7或图8所示网络节点间安全保护能力的同步进行，也可以基于常规的数据传输机制进行，本申请不限定。
需要说明的是，本申请上述实施例仅以对用于恢复RRC连接的RRCResumeRequest消息进行完整性保护以及完整性验证作为示例，本申请提供的数据传输保护方法还可以适用于其它数据/信令传输流程中。
本申请实施例提供的一种数据传输保护方法，通过提供一种统一的解决方案，可以在通信技术升级、新的通信机制引入、UE安全保护能力不同、网络节点安全保护能力不同等多种情况下，在保证数据在传输过程中的私密性和完整性的同时简化完整性验证的处理过程和算力。
通过以上的实施方式的描述，所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，仅以上述各功能模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述功能分配由不同的功能模块完成，即将装置的内部结构划分成不同的功能模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分功能。上述描述的系统，装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
在本实施例所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的系统，装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述模块或单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本实施例各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能单元的形式实现。
所述集成的单元如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本实施例的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的全部或部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)或处理器执行各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：快闪存储器、移动硬盘、 只读存储器、随机存取存储器、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何在本申请揭露的技术范围内的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (29)

  1. 一种数据传输保护方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    第一节点向第二节点发送用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；
    其中，用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息用于所述第二节点对来自所述第一节点的数据进行完整性验证。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一节点通过通信接口建立请求消息，向所述第二节点发送所述第一节点的安全参数；
    其中，所述第一节点的安全参数用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn接口建立请求消息。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一节点通过配置更新消息，向所述第二节点发送所述第一节点的安全参数；
    其中，所述第一节点的安全参数用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述配置更新消息是下一代无线接入网节点配置更新消息；所述方法还包括：
    所述第一节点接收来自所述第二节点的下一代无线接入网节点配置更新确认消息。
  6. 根据权利要求1-5中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一节点在所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向所述第二节点发送用于表征所述第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  7. 根据权利要求1-6中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一节点发送广播消息；
    其中，所述广播消息中携带有用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息和/或用于表征所述第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  8. 根据权利要求1-7中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述第一节点的安全参数包括：第一索引标识，所述第一索引标识用于表征所述第一节点支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
  9. 根据权利要求1-8中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一节点接收来自用户设备UE的无线资源控制恢复请求消息，所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息包括：非激活无线网络临时标识I-RNTI、消息完整性鉴权码MAC-I和请求原因；
    所述第一节点确定所述UE的锚点基站是所述第二节点；
    所述第一节点向所述第二节点发送恢复UE上下文请求消息，所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、所述I-RNTI、所述MAC-I和所述请求原因。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息和所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中还携带有第二索引标识，所述第二索引标识用于表征所述UE对所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息进 行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，
    所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中包括消息体容器Container，所述Container中封装有以下信息中的一种或多种：I-RNTI、MAC-I、请求原因、小区标识、所述第二索引标识。
  12. 根据权利要求9-11中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一节点接收来自所述第二节点的恢复上下文失败消息，所述恢复上下文失败消息中携带有用于表征所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息；
    所述第一节点向所述UE发送无线资源控制释放消息，所述无线资源控制释放消息中携带有用于表征所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息，用于所述UE根据所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息对所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息重新进行安全保护。
  13. 一种第一节点，其特征在于，所述第一节点包括：
    通信单元，用于向第二节点发送用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息；
    其中，用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息用于所述第二节点对来自所述第一节点的数据进行完整性验证。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信单元具体用于：
    向所述第二节点发送通信接口建立请求消息，所述通信接口建立请求消息包括所述第一节点的安全参数；
    其中，所述第一节点的安全参数用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信接口建立请求消息是Xn接口建立请求消息。
  16. 根据权利要求13所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信单元具体用于：
    向所述第二节点发送配置更新消息，所述配置更新消息包括所述第一节点的安全参数；
    其中，所述第一节点的安全参数用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述配置更新消息是下一代无线接入网节点配置更新消息；所述通信单元还用于：
    接收来自所述第二节点的下一代无线接入网节点配置更新确认消息。
  18. 根据权利要求13-17中任一项所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信单元还用于：
    在所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力有更新时，向所述第二节点发送用于表征所述第一节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  19. 根据权利要求13-18中任一项所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信单元还用于：发送广播消息；
    其中，所述广播消息中携带有用于表征所述第一节点支持的安全保护能力的信息 和/或用于表征所述第二节点支持的安全保护能力的信息。
  20. 根据权利要求13-19中任一项所述的第一节点，其特征在于，
    所述第一节点的安全参数包括：第一索引标识，所述第一索引标识用于表征所述第一节点支持的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
  21. 根据权利要求13-20中任一项所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述第一节点还包括：处理单元；所述通信单元还用于：接收来自用户设备UE的无线资源控制恢复请求消息；以及，在所述处理单元确定所述UE的锚点基站是所述第二节点时，向所述第二节点发送恢复UE上下文请求消息；
    其中，所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息包括：非激活无线网络临时标识I-RNTI、消息完整性鉴权码MAC-I和请求原因；所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中携带有目标小区的小区标识、所述I-RNTI、所述MAC-I和所述请求原因。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的第一节点，其特征在于，
    所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息和所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中还携带有第二索引标识，所述第二索引标识用于表征所述UE对所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息进行安全保护时所使用的完整性保护算法和完整性密钥计算参数。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的第一节点，其特征在于，
    所述恢复UE上下文请求消息中包括消息体容器Container，所述Container中封装有以下信息中的一种或多种：I-RNTI、MAC-I、请求原因、小区标识、所述第二索引标识。
  24. 根据权利要求21-23中任一项所述的第一节点，其特征在于，所述通信单元还用于：
    接收来自所述第二节点的恢复上下文失败消息，所述恢复上下文失败消息中携带有用于表征所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息；以及，
    向所述UE发送无线资源控制释放消息，所述无线资源控制释放消息中携带有用于表征所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息，用于所述UE根据所述第二节点最新支持的安全保护能力的信息对所述无线资源控制恢复请求消息重新进行安全保护。
  25. 一种第一节点，其特征在于，所述第一节点包括：
    存储器，用于存储计算机程序；
    收发器，用于接收或发送无线电信号；
    处理器，用于执行所述计算机程序，使得所述第一节点实现如权利要求1-12中任一项所述的方法。
  26. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，所述通信系统包括：用户设备UE、第二节点，以及如权利要求13-24或25中任一项所述的第一节点。
  27. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机可读存储介质上存储有计算机程序代码，所述计算机程序代码被处理电路执行时实现如权利要求1-12任一项所述的方法。
  28. 一种芯片系统，其特征在于，所述芯片系统包括处理电路、存储介质，所述存储介质中存储有计算机程序代码；所述计算机程序代码被所述处理电路执行时实现 如权利要求1-12中任一项所述的方法。
  29. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品用于在计算机上运行，以实现如权利要求1-12中任一项所述的方法。
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