WO2023046358A1 - System zum bereitstellen eines ausgangssignals basierend auf einem generierten umfeldmodell eines umfelds einer mobilen plattform - Google Patents
System zum bereitstellen eines ausgangssignals basierend auf einem generierten umfeldmodell eines umfelds einer mobilen plattform Download PDFInfo
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- WO2023046358A1 WO2023046358A1 PCT/EP2022/072230 EP2022072230W WO2023046358A1 WO 2023046358 A1 WO2023046358 A1 WO 2023046358A1 EP 2022072230 W EP2022072230 W EP 2022072230W WO 2023046358 A1 WO2023046358 A1 WO 2023046358A1
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- output signal
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- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 claims description 13
- 238000001514 detection method Methods 0.000 description 26
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 11
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 10
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000004807 localization Effects 0.000 description 5
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 4
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 description 4
- 230000015556 catabolic process Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000001816 cooling Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000006731 degradation reaction Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000008447 perception Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000007704 transition Effects 0.000 description 2
- 230000003542 behavioural effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001419 dependent effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000018109 developmental process Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000009977 dual effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000005265 energy consumption Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000007613 environmental effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000003203 everyday effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007274 generation of a signal involved in cell-cell signaling Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000004519 manufacturing process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000002161 passivation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000000717 retained effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000001052 transient effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/18—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits
- G06F11/183—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits by voting, the voting not being performed by the redundant components
- G06F11/184—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits by voting, the voting not being performed by the redundant components where the redundant components implement processing functionality
- G06F11/185—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits by voting, the voting not being performed by the redundant components where the redundant components implement processing functionality and the voting is itself performed redundantly
-
- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/023—Avoiding failures by using redundant parts
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05B—CONTROL OR REGULATING SYSTEMS IN GENERAL; FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS OF SUCH SYSTEMS; MONITORING OR TESTING ARRANGEMENTS FOR SUCH SYSTEMS OR ELEMENTS
- G05B9/00—Safety arrangements
- G05B9/02—Safety arrangements electric
- G05B9/03—Safety arrangements electric with multiple-channel loop, i.e. redundant control systems
Definitions
- ADS Automated Driving Systems
- SDV Self Driving Vehicles
- SAE J3016 level of driving automation
- level 2 The focus of the current developments of the automobile manufacturers is in the area from level 2 to level 4.
- level 3 conditional automation
- Level 4 with high automation
- Level 5 with full automation
- AD automatic driving
- data from various sensors are collected, synthesized and fused to create a model of the current driving situation in environmental perception (EP: environment perception) and vehicle localization (VL: vehicle localisation).
- the model is used by behavioral planning (BP) to To create a route or a trajectory in relation to the current driving situation and the planned trip.
- Actuator management controls the various actuators that follow the calculated path.
- a system with a fault-tolerant design i. H. a fault-tolerant system, is configured to maintain a defined functionality when parts of the system fail, typically having a high degree of redundancy to do so.
- a fail-degraded mode if a part of the system fails, the system can continue intended operation at a reduced “level” instead of failing completely. In the event of a partial failure within such a system, a transition is made from the faulty subsystem to a remaining independent, non-faulty subsystem.
- a high-availability system can include the entire electrical and/or electronic architecture of the vehicle, i. H. including a power supply (PowerNet), communication buses, cooling systems, and in particular errors with a common cause, and configured to continue operation even in the event of failures, so that redundancy in the system with the highest possible availability of the respective services is required even if there is an error.
- PowerNet power supply
- a functionality corresponding to level L3+ (i.e.: L3, L4, L5) requires redundant structures in order to be able to recover after a first error has occurred, e.g. B. an electrical and / or electronic error (E / E error) within an AD system (Automated Driving System: ADS) to allow error limitation and / or degradation and / or full operability.
- E / E error electrical and / or electronic error
- AD system Automatic Driving System: ADS
- a system can be designed so that:
- a respective control unit (main control unit, as primary system, or backup control unit, as secondary system) is configured to detect its own failure and to prevent invalid data from being communicated to further processing stages, such as actuators. To prevent That invalid data is communicated to further processing stages can be defined as passivation or "fail-silent" configuration.
- Further processing stages of the system can be configured, e.g. to recognize an interruption in communication with a previous stage and only accept communication from remaining valid control units.
- E/E electronic and/or electrical failures, related to random transient/permanent hardware (HW)- Failures within the system with a SPFM (single point fault metric) of
- This request can be assigned to a single electronic control unit (ECU) related to the first fault detection.
- ECU electronice control unit
- Each control unit must be able to detect its own E/E failures with an SPFM > 99%.
- the system can respond with its redundant backup ECU (secondary system) to control the vehicle and bring the vehicle to a safe state within an EOTTI (Emergency Operation Tolerance Time Interval). condition with minimal risk.
- EOTTI Ergency Operation Tolerance Time Interval
- a system for providing an output signal based on a generated environment model of an environment of a mobile platform comprising: a first subsystem for generating the output signal, which is configured to be signally coupled to a first sensor system; a second subsystem for generating the output signal, configured to be signally coupled to the first sensor system; wherein the second subsystem is configured to redundantly provide a functionality of the first subsystem a third subsystem for generating the output signal; wherein the third subsystem is configured to be signally coupled to a second sensor system; wherein the third subsystem is configured to redundantly provide the functionality of the first subsystem and/or the second subsystem; a first comparison system signally coupled to an output of the first subsystem and an output of the second subsystem and an output of the third subsystem; a second comparison system signally coupled to the output of the first subsystem and the output of the second subsystem and the output of the third subsystem; wherein the first comparison system and the second comparison system are signally coupled; and the first comparison system and/
- the output signal can be any signal for controlling a downstream system and/or an environment model of the environment of the mobile platform and/or a trajectory that results in particular from planning a route for the mobile platform and/or Be control signals for the mobile platform to, by means of the actuator system, or individual actuators of the actuator system, to drive a trajectory.
- the output signal of the respective subsystem can be a generic signal that is provided to a subsequent further processing system.
- the first comparison system and/or the second comparison system be configured to detect an error in the first subsystem or an error in the second subsystem or an error in the third subsystem and to identify the respective faulty subsystem.
- the first comparison system and/or the second comparison system are configured to have at least one error in the first subsystem and/or at least one error in the second subsystem that is independent of the first subsystem and is unequal and/or at least one error in the first and second subsystems to detect independent and unequal errors of the third subsystem.
- the first comparison system and/or the second comparison system are configured to recognize an unavailability of the first subsystem and/or an unavailability of the second subsystem and/or an unavailability of the third subsystem and the respective unavailable subsystem to identify
- This system is advantageously fault-tolerant to a failure of one of the three subsystems, in particular to random hardware failures, which can be required in particular when used in an at least partially automated driving system (ADS: Automated Driving Systems).
- ADS Automated Driving Systems
- the system is configured to recognize a first error and also to recognize a second error, depending on the respective error scenario.
- the system described for providing an output signal optimizes diagnostic coverage of a first fault compared to availability of functionality.
- error detection always requires detection mechanisms. These detection mechanisms are becoming more and more complex with increasing requirements for a required diagnostic coverage for a specific failure mode. However, such diagnostic mechanisms are themselves exposed to random hardware errors, which in turn can lead to false-positive detections of errors. Therefore, in general, a probability of an accidental hardware failure increases as diagnostic coverage is increased.
- a probability of failure of a CPU lock step in which, with a comparison system that is redundant to a main function block, a correct functionality of the main function block is determined by means of a comparison function block, which indicates that the functionality of the main function block matches the comparison system checks increase the probability of failure of this overall CPU lock step system by more than a factor of two, since the comparison function blocks also have a false-positive error rate in addition to the error rates of the main function block and the comparison system.
- a second occurring error should also be considered for a fault-tolerant system. If a second error occurs in such a system with a redundant subsystem within an emergency operation tolerance time interval (EOTTI), the system is no longer able to safely control the vehicle because there are no other safety elements.
- EOTTI emergency operation tolerance time interval
- a high degree of diagnostic coverage can lead to a lower availability of a control unit with a redundant subsystem, especially if a second fault is also to be covered.
- a solution other than high detection coverage is required. Because an increase in the detection rate of a second error means additional effort, which in turn increases the probability of a second error. This leads to an increased risk of system failure during the emergency operation tolerance time interval (EOTTI). Therefore, higher coverage for second fault detection reduces safety and system availability.
- EOTTI emergency operation tolerance time interval
- the system described here for providing an output signal therefore has advantages compared to a system with a dual-duplex redundancy architecture, in particular with regard to the detection of a second error.
- a system In a dual-duplex redundancy architecture, a system is configured that has two independent system branches, or two independent ECUs (electronic control units), each of which is provided with two redundant function blocks.
- the output signals of the redundant function blocks are compared in each system branch in order to switch off the relevant system branch in the event of an error, ie if the output signals do not match.
- the first electrical and/or electronic failure (E/E) error can be detected with the dual duplex redundancy architecture by comparing the results and can be compensated for by the second system branch.
- the two system branches can each be operated on independent CPUs.
- a control unit with such a dual-duplex redundancy architecture reacts with the fail-silent mechanism and stops communication with actuators to which the system output signal is provided, while the remaining system branch of the control unit continues to have a high detection rate for a further error, but in contrast to the system described here for providing an output signal can no longer compensate for a second error and has an undiminished probability of a second failure.
- a probability of a first electrical error and/or electronic error (E/E-failure: electrical and/or electronic failure) within the system, which can lead to a degradation of the system, can become clear be reduced.
- Such a first electrical and/or electronic failure could, for example, result in initiation of execution of a minimal risk vehicle maneuver such as stopping in an emergency lane.
- SPFM high detection coverage
- E/E fault electronic fault
- the ability of the system to recognize a second error depends on which part of the system described a first error has occurred.
- a high detection coverage for the second error remains if the first error occurs, for example, in the third subsystem and/or the second comparison system or in the first subsystem or the second subsystem, each of which is part of the first electronic control unit.
- ADS Autonomous Driving System
- the energy consumption of the system can be significantly reduced, which reduces CO2 emissions, increases the range for electric vehicles and reduces the cost of a cooling system.
- the weight of the system configured in this way can advantageously be reduced due to the smaller number of hardware components.
- first subsystem and the second subsystem and the first comparison system are part of a first electronic control unit; and the third subsystem and the second comparison system are part of a second electronic control unit.
- the two comparison systems can be reduced to the first electronic control unit and the second electronic control unit, i. H. the respective "compare, select, disable” mechanisms, in order to avoid single point of failure SPOF (English: single point of failure) in relation to availability.
- SPOF Single point of failure
- electrical energy for the first electronic control unit is provided by a first power supply; and electrical energy for the second electronic control unit is provided by a second power supply, and the first power supply and the second power supply are configured to provide the electrical energy of the first power supply independently of the electrical energy of the second power supply. In this way it can be achieved that the system is more fault-tolerant and has higher availability.
- the first sensor system is the same as the second sensor system.
- the first sensor system and/or the second sensor system can have a multiplicity of sensors.
- the second sensor system is a redundant sensor system to the first sensor system. If the first sensor system is redundant to the second sensor system, the system for providing the output signal can thus become more available and fault-tolerant.
- the first electronic control unit is set up and configured with the first power supply to interact with the correspondingly set up and configured second electronic control unit with the second power supply such that the system for providing the output signal is fault-tolerant and highly available.
- the first comparison system and the second comparison system are set up to detect an error in the first subsystem and/or an error in the second subsystem and/or an error in the third subsystem when the respective subsystem determines the environment model.
- the first comparison system is set up, an output signal from the first subsystem or an output signal from the second subsystem, optionally depending on a detected error in the respectively identified first subsystem and/or the second subsystem and/or the third subsystem , to provide an actuator system.
- a valid output signal can thus be provided to the actuator system, which itself can be designed redundantly, even if one of the subsystems has errors.
- the first comparison system is set up, the output signal of the first subsystem and the output signal of the second subsystem, depending on a detected error in the respectively identified first subsystem and/or the second subsystem and/or the third subsystem Provide actuator system.
- a valid output signal can thus be provided to the actuator system, which itself can be designed redundantly, even if one of the subsystems has errors.
- the first comparison system can be used to provide the output signal of the first or the second subsystem to the actuator system with a switch and/or a switch, for switching or switching, be coupled in terms of signal in order to provide the actuator system depending on a detected error of the output signal of the first subsystem and the output signal of the second subsystem.
- the output signal of the first subsystem and the second subsystem can be provided to the changeover switch as an input signal, in which case the changeover switch can be switched by the first comparison system and the output signal of the changeover switch can be provided as an input signal to the switch, which is connected to the actuator system with its output is signal-coupled.
- the second comparison system is set up to provide the actuator system with an output signal from the third subsystem depending on a detected fault in the respectively identified first subsystem and/or the second subsystem and/or the third subsystem.
- a valid output signal can thus be provided to an output of the system, or for example to the actuator system, even if the first comparison system no longer provides the output signal of the first subsystem and the second subsystem to the output of the system, in particular to the actuator system.
- the second comparison system can be signal-coupled to a further switch for switching in order to provide the output signal of the third subsystem to the actuator system depending on a detected error.
- the output signal of the third subsystem can be provided to the further switch as an input signal, wherein the further switch can be switched by the second comparison system and the output signal of the further switch can be signal-coupled as an input signal with its output to the actuator system.
- the system for providing the output signal has a first input for providing a signal of the first sensor system; and a second input for providing a signal of the second sensor system; and has a first computing unit, wherein the first computing unit is set up to generate the output signal and/or an environment model of the environment of the mobile platform by means of the first subsystem and/or the second subsystem.
- the system for providing the output signal has a second processing unit, the second processing unit being set up to generate the output signal and/or the environment model of the environment of the mobile platform by means of the third subsystem.
- the system for providing the output signal has a first output for providing control signals from the first computing unit to the actuator system and/or to a subsequent system; and a second output for providing control signals from the second arithmetic unit to the actuator system and/or to a downstream system, the first arithmetic unit having the first comparison system in order to optionally provide an output signal from the first subsystem or the second subsystem at the first output .
- the second arithmetic unit of the system for providing the output signal has the second comparison system in order to optionally provide an output signal of the third subsystem at the second output of the system for providing the output signal.
- the first processing unit and/or the second processing unit can have one or more systems-on-chip.
- the first processor can have a system-on-chip to provide the functionality of the first subsystem and the second subsystem
- the second processor can have a further system-on-chip to provide the functionality of the third subsystem
- the output signal can be any signal for controlling a downstream system and/or an environment model of the environment of the mobile platform and/or a trajectory that results in particular from planning a route for the mobile platform and/or Control signals for the mobile platform in order to follow a trajectory using the actuator system or individual actuators of the actuator system.
- a control device for use in a vehicle which has one of the systems described above for providing an output signal. Such a control device can also have additional functions.
- the system can easily be integrated into different mobile platforms, such as in particular automated driving systems for driving automation levels 3+, 4 and 5 (SAE J3016).
- a mobile platform, and in particular an at least partially automated vehicle, is proposed, which has a control unit as described above.
- a mobile platform so equipped can realize all the advantages of the system for providing the output signal described above.
- a mobile platform can be understood to mean an at least partially automated system that is mobile and/or a driver assistance system of a vehicle.
- An example can be an at least partially automated vehicle or a vehicle with a driver assistance system. That is, in this context, an at least partially automated system includes a mobile platform in terms of at least partially automated functionality, but a mobile platform also includes vehicles and other mobile machines including driver assistance systems.
- Other examples of mobile platforms can be driver assistance systems with multiple sensors, mobile multi-sensor robots such as robotic vacuum cleaners or lawn mowers, a multi-sensor monitoring system, a manufacturing machine, a personal assistant or an access control system. Each of these systems can be a fully or partially automated system.
- FIG. 1 An exemplary embodiment of the invention is illustrated with reference to FIG. 1 and explained in more detail below. Show it:
- FIG. 1 shows a system for providing an output signal
- FIG. 2 shows an example of a partial failure in the system for providing an output signal
- FIG. 3 further examples of partial failures in the system for providing an output signal.
- FIG. 1 schematically outlines a control unit, in particular for use in a mobile platform, such as in a vehicle, which has a system for providing an output signal based on a generated environment model an environment of a mobile platform.
- the control device can be used to generate an environment model of an environment of the mobile platform.
- the output signal can be any signal for controlling a downstream system and/or an environment model of the environment of the mobile platform and/or a trajectory that results in particular from planning a route for the mobile platform and/or a control signal for be the mobile platform in order to follow a trajectory using the actuator system or individual actuators of the actuator system.
- the system 100 includes a first subsystem 110 operable to generate the output signal and configured to be signally coupled to a first sensor system 102 .
- the system 100 further includes a second output signal generation subsystem 120 configured to be signally coupled to the first sensor system 102 .
- the second subsystem 120 is configured to provide a functionality of the first subsystem 110 redundantly.
- the system 100 further includes a third subsystem 130 for generating the output signal, the third subsystem being configured to be signally coupled to a second sensor system 104 .
- the third subsystem 130 is configured to provide the functionality of the first subsystem 110 and/or the second subsystem 120 in a redundant manner.
- the first and the second subsystem 110, 120 can be coupled in terms of signal to the second sensor system 104 and/or the third subsystem 130 can be coupled in terms of signal to the first sensor system 102; in particular, the first sensor system 102 can be redundant to the second sensor system 104 .
- the first sensor system 102 and the second sensor system 104 may each include a plurality of sensor systems. Alternatively or additionally, the first sensor system 102 can be the same as the second sensor system 104 .
- system 100 includes a first comparison system 210 signally coupled to an output of the first subsystem 110 and an output of the second subsystem 120 and an output of the third subsystem 130 .
- a second comparison system 220 of the system 100 is signally coupled to the output of the first subsystem 110 and the output of the second subsystem 120 and the output of the third subsystem 130 .
- the first comparison system 210 and the second comparison system 220 are signally coupled, as indicated by a double arrow between the comparison systems in FIG is indicated in Figures 1 to 3 in order in particular to provide corresponding comparison results of the respective comparison system with 210, 220, and the first comparison system 210 and the second comparison system 220 are configured to detect at least one error in the first subsystem 110 and/or one error in the second subsystem 120 and /or to detect an error in the third subsystem 130 and in particular to identify the respective faulty subsystem 110, 120, 130.
- the redundantly calculated output signals of the first subsystem 110 and of the second subsystem 120 and of the third subsystem 130 can be compared to detect an error, in particular random hardware failure errors.
- Such a comparison with the first comparison system 210 described and the second comparison system 220 described can also be used to uniquely identify the respective subsystem in which an error has occurred.
- the subsystem with the failure can be deactivated separately, with two redundant subsystems being retained for redundant provision of the output signals, so that another error can be detected.
- the comparison of the output signals themselves can be a simple "bit equal" comparison, e.g. B. by arithmetic checksum test, alternatively or additionally, the comparison of the output signals can also be more complex.
- the second subsystem 120 together with the first comparison system 210 can be understood as a first detection and backup system 125 for the first subsystem 110 and/or the third subsystem 130.
- the third subsystem 130 together with the second comparison system 220 can be understood as a second detection and backup system 135 for the first subsystem 110 and/or the second subsystem 120.
- the first subsystem 110 and the second subsystem 120 and the first comparison system 210 are part of a first electronic control unit 410.
- the third subsystem 130 and the second comparison system 220 are part of a second electronic control unit 420.
- This division, in particular of the two comparison systems 210, 220, into the first electronic control unit and the second electronic control unit, ie the respective "compare, select, disable" Mechanisms can be implemented in such a way that single points of failure in terms of availability are avoided.
- electrical energy for the first electronic control unit 410 is provided by a first power supply 610 and electrical energy for the second electronic control unit 420 is provided by a second power supply 620.
- the first power supply 610 and the second power supply 620 are set up to provide the electrical energy independently of one another.
- the first power supply 610 and the second power supply 620 can supply an actuator system 500, which can contain redundant actuators, with electrical energy in a correspondingly redundant manner in each case to increase the fail-safety system.
- the system for providing the output signal can be designed to be fault-tolerant and highly available by setting up and configuring the first electronic control unit 410 with the first power supply 610, with the correspondingly set up and configured second electronic control unit 420 with the second power supply 620 to cooperate accordingly highly available.
- the first comparison system 210 is equipped with a switch 310, to which the first comparison system 210 is coupled in terms of signal, either an output signal from the first subsystem 110 or an output signal from the second subsystem 120, depending on a detected error in the respectively identified first subsystem 110 and /or the second subsystem 120 and/or the third subsystem 130 to provide an actuator system 500 at an output 415 of the system 100.
- the first comparison system 210 is set up with a switch 320, to which the first comparison system 210 is signal-coupled, the output signal of the first subsystem 110 and the output signal of the second subsystem 120, depending on a detected error in the respectively identified first subsystem 110 and /or the second subsystem 120 and/or the third Subsystem 130, the actuator system 500 at the output 415 of the system 100, according to a "fail silent mechanism" to provide.
- the second comparison system 220 is set up with a switch 330, to which the second comparison system 220 is coupled in terms of signal, an output signal of the third subsystem 130, depending on a detected error in the respectively identified first subsystem 110 and/or the second subsystem 120 and/or the third subsystem 130, the actuator system 500 at an output 425 of the system 100, corresponding to a "fail silent mechanism".
- Figure 2 outlines schematically how the system 100, in the event of an error in the first subsystem 110, connects the redundantly determined output signal of the second subsystem 120 to the output 415 of the system 100 by means of the first comparison system 210, which acts on the changeover switch 310. to provide it to the actuator system 500 instead of the output of the first subsystem 110.
- the first comparison system 210 compares the output signals of the first subsystem 110 and the second subsystem 120 and the third subsystem 130 and, when an error is detected, in particular a random hardware failure error, switches the changeover switch 310 so that the output signal of the second subsystem 120 at the Output 415 of system 100 is provided.
- an error can be detected and identified in the corresponding subsystem of the three subsystems 110, 120, 130.
- the subsystem with the relevant error or failure can be deactivated separately, with two redundant subsystems, namely the second subsystem 120 and the third subsystem 130, for providing the output signals and detecting a second errors are preserved.
- the failed lane (calculation track), or the relevant subsystem 110, 120, 130 separately switched off without both redundant communication channels to the actuators being lost at the same time.
- a high detection range remains for a second failure within an EOTTI after the occurrence of a first failure.
- Figure 3 schematically outlines a reduced detection range for a second failure within an EOTTI of the system 100 in the event of a fault or failure in the first power supply 610 and/or in the event of a fault in the first comparison system 210.
- the first comparison system 210 deactivates the switch 320 so that neither the first subsystem 110 nor the second subsystem 120 provides an output signal at the output 415 of the system 100 for an actuator system 500 .
- the second comparison system 220 is configured and set up to detect and identify both the error in the power supply 610 and the error in the first comparison system 210 and switches the output signal of the third subsystem 130, by means of the switch 330, to which the second comparison system 220 is signal-coupled is, to an output 425 of the system 100, for provision to the actuator system 500.
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Abstract
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CN202280064288.1A CN117980886A (zh) | 2021-09-23 | 2022-08-08 | 用于基于移动平台的环境的生成的环境模型来提供输出信号的系统 |
EP22761530.9A EP4405820A1 (de) | 2021-09-23 | 2022-08-08 | System zum bereitstellen eines ausgangssignals basierend auf einem generierten umfeldmodell eines umfelds einer mobilen plattform |
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DE102021210600.5A DE102021210600A1 (de) | 2021-09-23 | 2021-09-23 | System zum Bereitstellen eines Ausgangssignals basierend auf einem generierten Umfeldmodell eines Umfelds einer mobilen Plattform |
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US20180267549A1 (en) * | 2017-03-17 | 2018-09-20 | Tttech Computertechnik Ag | Error procedure for controlling an autonomous controlled object |
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2022
- 2022-08-08 WO PCT/EP2022/072230 patent/WO2023046358A1/de active Application Filing
- 2022-08-08 EP EP22761530.9A patent/EP4405820A1/de active Pending
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US20180267549A1 (en) * | 2017-03-17 | 2018-09-20 | Tttech Computertechnik Ag | Error procedure for controlling an autonomous controlled object |
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