WO2023045489A1 - 一种强化量子密钥分发网络的安全性的方法及装置 - Google Patents
一种强化量子密钥分发网络的安全性的方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0855—Quantum cryptography involving additional nodes, e.g. quantum relays, repeaters, intermediate nodes or remote nodes
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
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- H—ELECTRICITY
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
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- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
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Definitions
- the invention relates to the field of quantum communication, in particular to a method and device for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network.
- Quantum Key Distribution is a technology that uses quantum mechanical properties to ensure communication security, so that both parties to the communication can generate and share a random, secure key to encrypt and decrypt messages. It has a wide range of applications in practical cryptography, information security, national defense and other fields, as well as in various secure communication environments.
- trusted relay nodes are usually used to extend the communication distance and coverage in quantum communication networks. For example, the "Beijing-Shanghai Trunk Line" quantum communication backbone network that was completed and put into use in 2017 is based on the trusted relay scheme.
- Embodiments of the present invention provide a method and device for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network. Using this method, the requirements for the reliability of relay nodes in quantum key distribution are reduced, thereby enhancing the security of quantum communication networks; and the additional calculation consumption generated by using this method is also very small.
- the technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the above technical problems is as follows: on the one hand, it provides a method for strengthening the security of the quantum key distribution network, and the quantum key distribution network includes a first node, a second node and at least one relay nodes, the first node and the second node realize the quantum key distribution in the first stage through at least one relay node, the first node and the second node have a shared first key pool, and the first node A key pool includes several keys, and the method is executed on any one of the first node and the second node, and the method includes:
- a first random character string is generated, and the length of the first random character string is equal to the length of the first key;
- the first algorithm is an AES key expansion algorithm.
- the first random character string is a pseudo-random character string.
- the first bit operation is an XOR/XOR operation.
- performing the preset first bit operation on the first key and the first random character string includes, for every several bits in the first key and the first random character string A preset first bit operation is performed on the corresponding bit.
- the length of the seed key is smaller than the length of the first key.
- determining the seed key from the first key pool includes: determining the seed key from the first key pool according to information corresponding to the seed key published by the peer node.
- the method further includes, after the seed key is determined from the key pool, releasing the corresponding information of the seed key to the peer node.
- the method further includes saving the second key in the first key pool.
- the upper limit of computing power of the relay node is determined based on a first algorithm.
- the first node and the second node have a shared first key pool, including that the first node and the second node respectively have a local backup of the first key pool;
- the determining the seed key from the first key pool includes determining the seed key from a local backup of the first key pool.
- a device for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network includes a first node, a second node and at least one relay node, the first node and the second node
- the quantum key distribution of the first stage is realized by at least one relay node, the first node and the second node have a shared first key pool, and the first key pool includes several keys, so
- the device is implemented on any one of the first node and the second node, and the device includes:
- the distribution key acquisition unit is configured to acquire the first key obtained after the quantum key distribution in the first stage
- a seed key determination unit configured to determine a seed key from the first key pool
- the random character string determination unit is configured to generate a first random character string according to the seed key application and the first algorithm predetermined by the peer node, and the length of the first random character string is equal to the length of the first key;
- the final key determination unit is configured to perform a preset first bit operation on the first key and the first random character string to obtain a second key.
- a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed in a computer, it causes the computer to execute the method described in the first aspect.
- a computing device including a memory and a processor, wherein executable code is stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the executable code, the method described in the first aspect is implemented .
- Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario of long-distance quantum key distribution using an existing trusted relay scheme provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a scene of long-distance quantum key distribution using a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 5 is a flowchart of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by another embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 6 is a structural diagram of a device for enhancing the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- the quantum key distribution network mentioned in this specification refers to the quantum communication network that realizes or is used for quantum key distribution.
- a communication line linking two participant nodes that distribute keys is determined, and all intermediate (relay) nodes on this line need to be trusted.
- each participant node and relay node performs QKD with its adjacent nodes, and each relay node obtains two strings of keys based on QKD, and each participant node obtains a string of keys.
- each relay node calculates the bit-by-bit XOR result of the two strings of keys and publishes it for the purpose of exchanging keys.
- the two user terminals perform XOR calculations on the keys in their hands and the results announced by all relay nodes to obtain the final key, thus completing the key distribution between the two participating nodes. For example, FIG.
- FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a scenario of long-distance quantum key distribution using an existing trusted relay scheme provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- the key distribution between the nodes is through, for example, relay node 1 ... relay node m among m
- the participant node 1 first obtains the key D1 with the relay node 1 through QKD between the two nodes.
- the relay node 1 and the relay node 2 obtain the key D2 through the QKD between the two nodes, and the relay node 2 publishes the XOR result P1 of the two keys D1 and D2 obtained by it to all nodes.
- relay node 2 and relay node 3 repeat similar behaviors, that is, obtain the key D3 through QKD between the two nodes, and relay node 3 announces the XOR result P2 of the two keys D2 and D3 obtained by it to all nodes .
- the following nodes repeat similar behaviors in turn until the last relay node m and participant node 2 get the key Dm through QKD, and the relay node m discloses the XOR result Pm of the two keys Dm-1 and Dm it knows .
- the participant node 2 can obtain the original key D1 of the participant node 1 based on the key Dm it knows, which can be expressed as
- relay node 1 knows the final key D1 distributed between the two participants (obtained initially by relay node 1 and participant node 1 through QKD), and each relay node after relay node 1 can
- the key D1 is obtained in the same way as the participant node 2, that is, according to the key known by the node and the published information of all relay nodes in front of it, D1 is obtained through the XOR operation.
- the relay node 2 can be obtained according to Get D1
- the relay node 3 can according to Get D1... and so on for other relay nodes.
- the calculation resources consumed are almost negligible.
- FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- the security enhancement scheme of the quantum key distribution network is based on the existing shared key pool of each participant terminal (node), some of which have been pre-distributed among users.
- the key pool is a shared resource used in many cryptographic protocols, including information negotiation. Therefore, in actual production occasions, the key pool is often an existing resource rather than an additionally required resource.
- each participant node through the existing key distribution scheme in the quantum communication network Distribute the first key among the terminals (symbol represents a vector, is the vectorized representation of the first key), where, d 1 ...d n are bits included in the first key.
- the relay node is not required to be fully trusted. In one embodiment, for example, computing resources of relay nodes may be restricted based on computing power estimation.
- each participant node can take out a key of several bits from the shared key pool as a seed string.
- the length of the seed character string can be determined according to the specific generation algorithm of the pseudo-random character string adopted in the subsequent steps.
- each participant node can according to the seed string (For example, its length is k, k ⁇ n), based on the same classical algorithm (for example, AES key expansion algorithm), generate a pseudo-random character string with a length of n bits, for example in, f 1 ... f n are the bits contained in the pseudo-random number string.
- the seed string For example, its length is k, k ⁇ n
- the same classical algorithm for example, AES key expansion algorithm
- each participant node obtains the n-bit-long final key distributed between each participant node through, for example, an XOR operation between the first key and the auxiliary character string in It is an XOR operation (or called modulo 2 addition).
- Fig. 3 shows a schematic diagram of a scene of long-distance quantum key distribution by using a method for enhancing the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- each relay node can obtain the first key D1 in the same way as the participant node 2 (which may correspond to the ), but each relay node does not know the pseudo-random string F (its vectorized representation is ), and then the final key K distributed between participant node 1 and participant node 2 cannot be obtained according to F and D1 (its vectorized expression is ). That is to say, for relay nodes other than each participant node, the final key cannot be obtained through the conventional calculation method in the existing trusted relay scheme, so the final key distributed among the participants is important for Each relay node is kept secret.
- the advantages of adopting this method are: first, the final key is kept secret for each relay node, which improves the security of quantum key distribution. Second, even in the scenario where the relay node uses technical means to crack the final key, because for the relay node, the seed string is undisclosed, so the pseudo-random number string it generates Also unknown. Although relay nodes can get value, want to know the final key must also know For relay nodes, this is equivalent to cracking the algorithm used to generate pseudo-random numbers, which often requires a large amount of computing resources (usually exponential). Therefore, even if the relay node is untrustworthy, as long as it does not have enough computing resources, it is impossible to obtain the information of the final key, and it cannot threaten the security of the quantum communication network.
- the enhanced security scheme provided by the embodiment of this specification it is not necessary to ensure that the relay node is completely trusted, but only to limit the computing resources it can use.
- the scheme requires to ensure the complete trustworthiness of the relay node, which is relatively easy to achieve.
- the generated The length of the consumed key is usually much smaller than n, by generate
- the process also has a classical and mature method, and the above operations can be performed in the distribution key of the quantum communication network, basically without spending extra time.
- the computing resources consumed by the XOR operation to generate the final key are very small. That is, with this approach, the increased overall resource consumption is very small.
- FIG. 4 is a flowchart of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention.
- the quantum key distribution network includes a first node, a second node and at least one relay node, and the first node and the second node realize the quantum key distribution in the first stage through at least one relay node, and the second node A node and a second node have a shared first key pool, the first key pool includes several keys, and the method is executed on any one of the first node and the second node, as shown in Figure 4 , the method at least includes the following steps:
- Step 41 obtaining the first key obtained after the quantum key distribution in the first stage
- Step 42 determine the seed key from the first key pool
- Step 43 according to the seed key application, and the first algorithm predetermined by the peer node, generate a first random character string, the length of the first random character string is equal to the length of the first key;
- Step 44 Perform a preset first bit operation on the first key and the first random character string to obtain a second key.
- step 41 the first key obtained after the quantum key distribution in the first stage is obtained.
- the quantum key distribution in the first stage is the quantum key distribution using the relay terminal in the prior art, for example, it can be the key distribution process in Figure 1, and the first key distributed by it is , for example, can be D1 in FIG. 1 .
- the operations performed by each participant node and relay node can be the corresponding operations performed by them in the existing trusted relay scheme.
- relay nodes it is not required to be completely trusted.
- the security of the distribution network can be further improved by limiting the computing power of the relay nodes. Therefore, in one embodiment, the upper limit of the computing power of the relay node can be determined based on the specific random string generation algorithm adopted in the subsequent steps.
- the algorithm complexity can be determined according to the specific generation algorithm first; then, according to the algorithm complexity, it can be determined, for example, within a predetermined time, to crack a predetermined amount of random character strings generated according to the algorithm.
- the computing power (computing power) in units of FLOPS (Floating-point Operations Per Second, the number of floating-point operations performed per second) or GOPS (Giga Operations Per Second, the number of billions of operations performed per second) ;
- the computing power of the relay node is not enough to complete the cracking through the method of hardware or software limitation. In fact, because the computing power needed to crack the random string generation algorithm is often very large, it is very difficult for the relay node to obtain the final key if it intends to communicate within a relatively short communication time, and it is more restrictive to restrict it. easy.
- each participant node can obtain the first key after data post-processing.
- each node including the participant node (the first node and the second node) and the relay node does not specifically refer to a participant, or a node in the quantum key distribution network that plays the role of the above-mentioned relay
- a terminal device which may be any computing device of a participant, or any computing device that acts as a relay, including but not limited to servers, workstations, minicomputers, mobile processing terminals, etc., may also be a coordination of multiple computing devices Work.
- each node may also include a quantum-classical hybrid server, which includes a quantum processor and a classical processor , the quantum operation part can be executed by the quantum processor, and the security enhancement part can be executed by the classical processor.
- step 32 a seed key is determined from the first key pool.
- the seed key is known by each participant node but not by the relay node.
- the first key pool may have different sharing methods. For example, in one embodiment, each participant may have a local backup of the first key pool. Furthermore, each participant can respectively determine the seed key from the local backup of the first key pool.
- seed keys of different lengths can be determined according to different specific random string generation algorithms and different encryption strengths used in subsequent steps.
- the length of the determined seed key can usually be smaller than the first key.
- step 33 a first random character string is generated according to the seed key application and the first algorithm predetermined by the peer node.
- a first algorithm may be applied to the seed key to obtain a first random character string. Since the seed key and the first algorithm are known to the execution node and its peer node (that is, the node of another participant of the key distribution), the execution node and its peer node can use the same seed key key and the first algorithm to generate the same random string.
- the length of the first random string is equal to the length of the first key.
- the specific algorithm (first algorithm) used to generate the first random character string may be different, which is not limited in this specification.
- the first algorithm may be AES (Advanced
- the first algorithm may also be an SM4 (State Secret 4) key expansion algorithm.
- SM4 State Secret 4
- random strings are often pseudo-random strings generated based on algorithms, rather than strictly random strings in the true mathematical sense.
- the first random character string may be a pseudo-random character string.
- the generated random character string is essentially a pseudo-random character string.
- the AES key expansion result can be used to obtain random characters string.
- the result of AES key expansion may also be trimmed so that its length is equal to the length of the random string.
- step 41 is not limited to be performed before steps 42 and 43 . In different embodiments, for example, step 41 may also be performed after steps 42 and 43 and before step 44 , or be performed in parallel with steps 42 and 43 .
- step 44 a preset first bit operation is performed on the first key and the first random character string to obtain a second key.
- the first key obtained in step 41 and the bit operation obtained in step 43 can be used to obtain the final key (second key).
- This final key is kept secret from the relay node and is also difficult for the relay node to crack normally with its own resources.
- the first bit manipulation operation may be a different bit manipulation operation.
- the first bit operation may preferably be an XOR/XOR operation. The reason is that when the input bits of the bit operation are evenly distributed, the distribution of '0' and '1' in the obtained output results tends to be 1:1.
- the specific manner of implementing the first operation for the first key and the first random character string may be different. For example, in one embodiment, a bit-by-bit exclusive OR operation may be performed on the first key and the first random character string. In another embodiment, for every several bits in the first key and corresponding bits in the first random character string, a preset first bit operation can be performed. In different embodiments, the first bit operation may also be a bit operation agreed between all participants. For example, in one embodiment, each participant agrees on a first operation, and the first bit operation can generate a two-bit output according to two two-bit inputs.
- each participant may also agree on a second operation, for example, the second operation may be applied to pairs of three or more bits, and its essence may be, for example, to select from two input bit strings A string, exchange the position of each bit in it, and then perform a bitwise XOR with the other to get the output result.
- the rules for exchanging bit positions may also be pre-agreed by all parties involved. For example, for a three-bit string expressed as 'a1a2a3', the result of exchanging the bit positions of it may be the pre-agreed 'a1a3a2' or 'a2a3a1' in different examples.
- the final key (second key) may also be saved in a key pool shared by all participants, that is, the first key pool.
- Fig. 5 is a flowchart of a method for strengthening the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by another embodiment of the present invention.
- one of the participating parties may publish the corresponding information of the seed key to the other participating party after determining the seed key from the first key storehouse, for example, it may be its The location of the determined seed key in the shared key store.
- other participants may determine the seed key from the first key store according to the corresponding information of the seed key. Therefore, each participant can respectively obtain the same first random character string according to the same seed key, and then respectively obtain the same final key.
- the nodes of Alice and Bob can obtain the first key through several relay nodes (step 51 ).
- Alice's node after extracting the seed key from its local key pool (step 53), sends the position of the seed key in the key pool to Bob's terminal through a public channel (step 55), thereby Make party Bob obtain the same seed key from his local key pool according to the location information (step 56). Then, Alice's and Bob's terminals respectively generate random character strings according to the obtained seed keys (in step 57 and step 58 respectively). Finally, Alice's and Bob's terminals can respectively perform a preset bit operation such as XOR operation on the first key and the random character string to obtain the final key (respectively in step 59 and step 5A).
- a preset bit operation such as XOR operation
- the method for enhancing the security of the quantum key distribution network has the following advantages:
- the final key is kept secret for each relay node, so the relay node does not need to be fully trusted.
- Relay nodes need a lot of computing resources to obtain the final key, and it is more convenient to limit the upper limit of computing resources of relay nodes.
- the implementation of this method consumes very little additional computing resources and will not significantly increase the computing burden of the quantum key distribution network.
- Fig. 6 is a structural diagram of a method and device for enhancing the security of a quantum key distribution network provided by an embodiment of the present invention
- the quantum key distribution network includes a first node, a second node and at least one relay node, The first node and the second node realize the quantum key distribution in the first stage through at least one relay node, the first node and the second node have a shared first key pool, and the first key The key pool includes several keys, and the device is implemented on any one of the first node and the second node.
- the device 600 includes:
- the distribution key acquisition unit 61 is configured to acquire the first key obtained after the quantum key distribution in the first stage;
- the seed key determining unit 62 is configured to determine a seed key from the first key pool
- the random character string determination unit 63 is configured to generate a first random character string according to the seed key application and the first algorithm predetermined by the peer node, and the length of the first random character string is equal to the length of the first key ;
- the final key determination unit 64 is configured to perform a preset first bit operation on the first key and the first random character string to obtain a second key.
- a computer-readable medium including a computer program stored thereon, and the computer executes the above-mentioned method when running.
- a computing device including a memory and a processor, where executable codes are stored in the memory, and when the processor executes the executable codes, the foregoing method is implemented.
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read-only memory
- EEPROM electrically programmable ROM
- EEPROM electrically erasable programmable ROM
- registers hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other Any other known storage medium.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (14)
- 一种强化量子密钥分发网络的安全性的方法,所述量子密钥分发网络包括第一节点、第二节点和至少一个中继节点,所述第一节点和第二节点通过至少一个所述中继节点实现第一阶段的量子密钥分发,所述第一节点和第二节点具有共享的第一密钥池,所述第一密钥池中包括若干密钥,所述方法在第一节点和第二节点中任意一个上执行,所述方法包括:获取所述第一阶段的量子密钥分发后得到的第一密钥;从所述第一密钥池中确定出种子密钥;根据种子密钥施加,与对端节点预先确定的第一算法,生成第一随机字符串,所述第一随机字符串的长度等于第一密钥的长度;对第一密钥和所述第一随机字符串,进行预设的第一比特运算操作,得到第二密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述第一算法为AES密钥扩展算法。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,第一随机字符串为伪随机字符串。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述第一比特运算操作为异或/同或运算。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述对第一密钥和第一随机字符串,进行预设的第一比特运算操作,包括,对于所述第一密钥中每若干个比特、以及第一随机字符串中的对应比特,进行预设的第一比特运算操作。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述种子密钥的长度小于所述第一密钥的长度。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,从第一密钥池中确定出种子密钥,包括:根据对端节点公布的、所述种子密钥的对应信息,从第一密钥池中确定出种子密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,在从密钥池中确定出种子密钥之后,还包括:向对端节点公布,所述种子密钥的对应信息。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,还包括,将第二密钥保存到第一密钥池。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述中继节点的算力上限,基于第一算法确定。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其中,所述第一节点和第二节点拥有共享的第一密钥池,包括,第一节点和第二节点分别拥有第一密钥池的本地备份;所述从第一密钥池中确定出种子密钥,包括,从第一密钥池的本地备份中确定出种子密钥。
- 一种强化量子密钥分发网络的安全性的装置,所述量子密钥分发网络包括第一节点、第二节点和至少一个中继节点,所述第一节点和第二节点通过至少一个所述中继节点实现第一阶段的量子密钥分发,所述第一节点和第二节点具有共享的第一密钥池,所述第一密钥池中包括若干密钥,所述装置在第一节点和第二节点中任意一个上实施,所述装置包括:分发密钥获取单元,配置为,获取所述第一阶段的量子密钥分发后得到的第一密钥;种子密钥确定单元,配置为,从所述第一密钥池中确定出种子密钥;随机字符串确定单元,配置为,根据种子密钥施加,与对端节点预先确定的第一算法,生成第一随机字符串,所述第一随机字符串的长度等于第一密钥的长度;最终密钥确定单元,配置为,对第一密钥和所述第一随机字符串,进行预设的第一比特运算操作,得到第二密钥。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其上存储有计算机程序,当所述计算机程序在计算机中执行时,令计算机执行权利要求1-11中任一项的所述的方法。
- 一种计算设备,包括存储器和处理器,所述存储器中存储有可执行代码,所述处理器执行所述可执行代码时,实现权利要求1-11中任一项所述的方法。
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