WO2022268270A1 - Steuereinrichtung sowie assistenzsystem für ein fahrzeug - Google Patents
Steuereinrichtung sowie assistenzsystem für ein fahrzeug Download PDFInfo
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- WO2022268270A1 WO2022268270A1 PCT/DE2022/200132 DE2022200132W WO2022268270A1 WO 2022268270 A1 WO2022268270 A1 WO 2022268270A1 DE 2022200132 W DE2022200132 W DE 2022200132W WO 2022268270 A1 WO2022268270 A1 WO 2022268270A1
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- platform
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- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 22
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 16
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G05—CONTROLLING; REGULATING
- G05D—SYSTEMS FOR CONTROLLING OR REGULATING NON-ELECTRIC VARIABLES
- G05D1/00—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots
- G05D1/0055—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements
- G05D1/0077—Control of position, course, altitude or attitude of land, water, air or space vehicles, e.g. using automatic pilots with safety arrangements using redundant signals or controls
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/02—Ensuring safety in case of control system failures, e.g. by diagnosing, circumventing or fixing failures
- B60W50/0205—Diagnosing or detecting failures; Failure detection models
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- B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
- B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
- B60W—CONJOINT CONTROL OF VEHICLE SUB-UNITS OF DIFFERENT TYPE OR DIFFERENT FUNCTION; CONTROL SYSTEMS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR HYBRID VEHICLES; ROAD VEHICLE DRIVE CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR PURPOSES NOT RELATED TO THE CONTROL OF A PARTICULAR SUB-UNIT
- B60W50/00—Details of control systems for road vehicle drive control not related to the control of a particular sub-unit, e.g. process diagnostic or vehicle driver interfaces
- B60W50/04—Monitoring the functioning of the control system
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
- G06F11/0751—Error or fault detection not based on redundancy
- G06F11/0754—Error or fault detection not based on redundancy by exceeding limits
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- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/18—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits
- G06F11/183—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits by voting, the voting not being performed by the redundant components
- G06F11/184—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using passive fault-masking of the redundant circuits by voting, the voting not being performed by the redundant components where the redundant components implement processing functionality
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- G—PHYSICS
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- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
- G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
- G06F11/2035—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant without idle spare hardware
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
- G06F11/16—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware
- G06F11/20—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements
- G06F11/202—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant
- G06F11/2048—Error detection or correction of the data by redundancy in hardware using active fault-masking, e.g. by switching out faulty elements or by switching in spare elements where processing functionality is redundant where the redundant components share neither address space nor persistent storage
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- G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
- G06F11/30—Monitoring
- G06F11/3003—Monitoring arrangements specially adapted to the computing system or computing system component being monitored
- G06F11/3013—Monitoring arrangements specially adapted to the computing system or computing system component being monitored where the computing system is an embedded system, i.e. a combination of hardware and software dedicated to perform a certain function in mobile devices, printers, automotive or aircraft systems
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a control device, in particular for a vehicle, and an assistance system for (partially) autonomous driving for a vehicle, which includes a control device according to the invention.
- Modern means of transport such as motor vehicles or motorcycles are increasingly being equipped with driver assistance systems that use sensor systems to detect the environment, recognize the traffic situation and support the driver, e.g. B. by a braking or steering intervention or by the output of a visual or acoustic warning.
- Radar sensors, lidar sensors, camera sensors or the like are regularly used as sensor systems for detecting the surroundings. From the sensor data determined by the sensors, conclusions can then be drawn about the environment, e.g. B. an object and / or environment classification or an environment model can be created.
- Due to current automation trends in the automotive industry especially in the area of such assistance systems through to autonomous driving, the complexity of electronic and electrical components and the requirements for their availability and functional safety are increasing rapidly.
- the error-free function of the individual components and the error-free cooperation of these components is decisive for error-free transport operations.
- the hardware and software architecture is of particular importance when different components and functionalities and subfunctionalities work together.
- a route or a trajectory to be driven (driving trajectory) and corresponding Driving commands are calculated that allow the vehicle to follow this driving trajectory.
- the system In a system with level 3, level 4 or level 5 automation, it is assumed that the system also provides such a (valid, ie checked) travel trajectory and corresponding travel commands if an error occurs in the hardware.
- the driving trajectory is usually calculated by software running on a dedicated system-on-chip (SoC).
- SoC system-on-chip
- a second SoC calculates a reference trajectory or a reference corridor for the cross-check. If the travel trajectory and the reference trajectory do not match, control is transferred to a so-called fallback level or a fallback system.
- the fallback level itself usually consists of two SoCs, one for calculating the travel trajectory and one for calculating the reference trajectory.
- ECU Electronic Control Unit
- SoC SoCs
- the fallback level itself usually consists of two SoCs, one for calculating the travel trajectory and one for calculating the reference trajectory.
- two separate electronic control units ECU; Electronic Control Unit
- SoC SoCs
- material expenditure and material costs e.g. four SoC, two housings and the like
- high production costs two separate ECUs
- power consumption two separate power consumption and thus high electricity costs.
- a further transfer of control to the fallback level can lead to uncertainties, since the transfer can take up to several 100 ms, for example.
- DE 10 2018 209 833 A1 discloses a method for controlling a safety-relevant process, with at least two microcontrollers being used for at least two control strands, with each of the at least two microcontrollers being designed to control the safety-relevant process.
- the microcontrollers process the data from at least one sensor that records the real behavior of the respective control train. Furthermore, the data of the respective sensor or data derived from it are exchanged between the two microcontrollers, with each Microcontroller a decision-making module is provided, which checks whether the data from the sensors are consistent.
- the object of the present invention is now to provide a generic control device and a corresponding assistance system for (partially) autonomous driving, with which the disadvantages of the prior art can be overcome, the cost of materials and power consumption being simpler and cheaper way be reduced.
- the control device can be used in particular for a vehicle and includes a calculation area and a checking area, with the calculation area being set up to calculate trajectories and to output driving commands.
- the checking area comprises two separate checking platforms, the checking platforms each comprising a driving command and input monitor for monitoring the calculated trajectories and a communication device for connecting the checking platforms to one another and to the calculation area.
- the central control device can be implemented by a single SoC or, alternatively, by a multichip module comprising a number of individual ICs (chiplets).
- a top platform and a fallback platform are provided as checking platforms. This will enable a seamless handover from normal operating mode to emergency mode without delay in the event of a computing platform failure. This results in the advantage that a quick switchover of the controller in the event of an error is further promoted or made possible.
- the checking platforms or main platform and fallback platform are logically and/or functionally identical.
- the monitoring platforms or the main platform and fallback platform carry out the monitoring in parallel.
- the checking platform can have at least one safety unit for fault detection, with a checking platform being brought into a fail-safe state by the safety unit as soon as the safety unit detects a fault in this checking platform.
- the security unit of the main platform sends information about its internal status to the fallback platform and vice versa.
- the driving command and input monitoring expediently includes a safety unit which receives error messages from the checking platform and puts the corresponding checking platform into a fail-safe state as soon as the safety unit has been notified of an error.
- the driving command and input monitoring can have a central processing unit, which can be implemented in the FLARDWARE lockstep.
- the calculation area includes several, in particular three, independent computer platforms. As a result, only three (braid performance)
- a computer platform preferably comprises a processing unit for data processing, a memory, in particular for storing programs and/or data of the processing unit, and a communication device, in particular for communication or data transmission of units in the calculation area and/or units in the checking area.
- Each computer platform can expediently calculate the trajectories and the respective driving command independently of the other computer platforms. Furthermore, each computer platform of the calculation area can be supplied via a separate supply voltage.
- Each computer platform of the calculation area preferably has a separate clock generation system. This avoids the probability of an overall system failure due to the failure of a clock generation system.
- the communication between and within the calculation area and the checking area can be protected or encoded using EC codes and/or end-to-end ECC/EDC codes.
- the communication device can be designed as a “Network-on-Chip” (NoC).
- NoC Network-on-chip
- a “network-on-chip” is a network-based communication subsystem on an integrated circuit (IC) or IC component, which is usually used between modules in a “system-on-a-chip” (SoC).
- SoC system-on-a-chip
- the term “Network-on-Chip” (NoC) refers to the needs-based adaptation of the network between the computing units, which are qualitatively designed as needed in terms of latency, bandwidth, safety and security requirements.
- iSd invention under “Network-on-Chip” (NoC) is not the networking of Modules with known bus systems understood (such as. B. CAN, Flexray, Ethernet), z. B. be sought in previous solutions with distributed control units.
- the calculated trajectory and the respective driving command can be checked by means of a comparison test, in particular a 2oo3 comparison.
- the comparison process enables a deviation or tolerance in value and time between the data received from the three computer platforms.
- any other comparison method known from the prior art can also be used, e.g. B. also 2oo4 or the like.
- a triple function and a comparison of the results can be effected by replicated comparison units.
- FIG. 1 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of a vehicle with a control device according to the invention
- FIG. 2 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of a driving safety concept of an autonomous L3/L4 system according to the prior art
- FIG. 3 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of a control device according to the invention comprising a calculation area and a checking area;
- FIG. 4 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of a driving command and input monitoring of a control device according to the invention
- 5 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of the supply principle of a control device according to the invention
- FIG. 6 shows a simplified schematic representation of an embodiment of the clock generation principle of a control device according to the invention.
- Reference numeral 1 in Fig. 1 designates a vehicle with various actuators (steering 3, motor 4, brake 5), which has a control device 2 according to the invention (ECU, Electronic Control Unit or ADCU, Assisted and Automated Driving Control Unit), through which a ( partially) automated control of the ego vehicle 1 can take place, e.g. B. in that the control device 2 can access the actuators of the ego vehicle 1 .
- the control device 2 has a memory unit, e.g. B. to store an algorithm, control instructions or patterns.
- the ego vehicle 1 has sensors for detecting the surroundings: a radar sensor 6, a lidar sensor 7 and a front camera 8 as well as several ultrasonic sensors 9a-9d, whose sensor data are used for detecting the surroundings and objects, so that various assistance functions, such as e.g. B. Emergency brake assistant (EBA, Electronic Brake Assist), distance following control (ACC, Adaptive Cruise Control), lane keeping control or a lane keeping assistant (LKA, Lane Keep Assist), parking assistant or the like can be realized.
- EBA Emergency brake assistant
- ACC Adaptive Cruise Control
- LKA Lane Keep Assist
- parking assistant or the like
- the assistance functions are executed via the control device 2 or the algorithm stored there.
- FIG. 2 shows an embodiment of the basic principle of a driving safety concept of an autonomous L3/L4 system according to the prior art.
- the concept provides for a main path 101 and a fallback level 102, the trajectory to be traveled being calculated via the main path 101 (trajectory calculation 106).
- Main path 101 and fallback level 102 are configured as two separate control devices, which include a total of four high-performance SoCs.
- the main path 101 includes a monitor 107, which checks the course of the calculated trajectory and whether this is likely to go into an idle state if an internal error occurs.
- a decision-maker module 110 exchanges status information and monitoring data with a decision-making module 111 of the fallback level 102.
- the fallback level 102 takes over vehicle control if the main path 101 fails, so that route control, steering control, braking system control and drive train control can take place via a redundant communication channel (e.g. via CAN connection), with the fallback level 102 also having a trajectory calculation 108 and a monitor 107 for this purpose includes.
- the actuators (steering 103, motor 104, brake 105) thus receive commands from both paths.
- the design with two separate control devices and four high-performance SoCs results in negative effects with regard to energy consumption and costs.
- control device 2 shows an embodiment of a control device 2 according to the invention, which has a calculation area 10 (compute domain or high-performance computing zone with triplication SW lockstep) and a checking area 11 (check/input/output or
- the calculation area 10 calculates the lanes or trajectories and outputs the corresponding driving recommendations or driving commands.
- the verification section 11 verifies the integrity of the input data received from the vehicle's external control devices and sensors and makes the verified input data available to the calculation section 10 . It can be implemented using a SoC (single chip) or an MCM (multichip module) with a number of chips or chiplets.
- An MCM usually includes several individual (micro) chips (or "dies”), which are housed next to each other (i.e. planar) in a common housing.
- the checking area 11 makes available to the calculation area 10 both the simply received input data and the input data redundantly received via both communication controllers 16a and 16b, as they occur in zone-based vehicle architectures with redundant networks.
- checking section 11 checks the output data calculated by the calculating section 10 .
- security-related Calculates additional information (e.g. checksums, time stamp, message number) for output data that can be sent to external control units and actuator control units (e.g. control units for steering, engine or brakes) of the vehicle.
- the computing area 10 consists of three independent computer platforms 12a-12c.
- Each computer platform 12a-12c preferably comprises processing units (e.g. CPU (Central Processing Unit or main processor), GPU (Graphics Processing Unit or graphics processor), dedicated co-processors as AI (Artificial Intelligence) accelerators, DSP (Digital Signal Processor), memory (e.g. RAM (Random-Access Memory) or SRAM (Static Random-Access Memory or static RAM) or DRAM (Dynamic Random-Access Memory or dynamic RAM) for storing the tasks to be executed by the processing units
- CPU Central Processing Unit or main processor
- GPU Graphics Processing Unit or graphics processor
- dedicated co-processors as AI (Artificial Intelligence) accelerators
- DSP Digital Signal Processor
- memory e.g. RAM (Random-Access Memory) or SRAM (Static Random-Access Memory or static RAM) or DRAM (Dynamic Random-Access Memory or dynamic RAM) for storing the tasks to be executed by the processing units
- the communication device can be configured as a so-called “network on a chip” or “network-on-chip” (NoC). be designed.
- NoC network-on-chip
- Each computer platform runs software for trajectory planning and the calculation of the respective driving command independently of the (two) other computer platforms.
- the project archives and the commands are then sent to the inspection area 11.
- the content of the messages can B. be protected by EC codes (ECC: Error Correction Code).
- ECC Error Correction Code
- End-to-end ECC/EDC codes are protected.
- the response to an ECC/EDC error is programmable.
- the verification area 11 comprises two separate verification platforms, a main platform 13 and a backup platform 14, which are preferably logically and/or functionally identical.
- Each verification platform includes driving command and input monitoring (Driving command & input monitor) 15a, 15b and a communication controller 16a, 16b (z. B. Ethernet, FlexRay, CAN or the like) and also a communication device (z. B. NoC, as shown in Fig. 3) to to connect the components to each other and to the calculation area 10.
- Each driving command and input monitor 15a, 15b includes flardware and software for checking the integrity of the input data received from sensors (e.g. checksums, time stamp, message ID or the like) and providing verified data for calculating the domain in a buffer memory, e.g Comparing the roadway with the driving command and adding safety-relevant additional information (e.g. checksums, time stamp, message number or the like) for data that can be transmitted to an external control unit or ECU.
- sensors e.g. checksums, time stamp, message ID or the like
- safety-relevant additional information e.g. checksums, time stamp, message number or the like
- the trajectory and the driving command can e.g. B. be checked by a "2oo3" (two out of three / two out of three) comparison majority vote.
- the comparison process enables a deviation or tolerance in value and time between the data received from the three computer platforms.
- the driving command and input monitor 15a, 15b contains hardware and/or software for permanent self-monitoring for correct operation, as shown in FIG. 4 using the driving command and input monitor 15a.
- the central processing unit e.g. CPU, processor, microcontrollers or the like
- the central processing unit is implemented in hardware lockstep and correct operation is monitored by comparison units.
- lockstep describes the method for error tolerance and error detection in the hardware, which is achieved by using several identical or similar units such as CPU cores in multi-core processors.
- the memory units (RAM) can z. B. be protected by ECC codes that are calculated and / or checked by ECC / EDC checking units 17a, 17b.
- the interconnect communication is also protected by end-to-end ECC/EDC codes, which are read by a special ECC/EDC checker or security module 18 (Security Module) calculated and/or verified. If one of the (hardware) safety mechanisms mentioned above detects a malfunction, the ECC/EDC checking unit 17a, 17b signals the malfunction to a safety unit 19. The safety unit 19 then brings the corresponding checking platform into a fail-safe state—a so-called fail-silent state. State, that is, in a state in which the function is not performed. Accordingly, this system represents a fail-silent system, which is a type of system that either provides the correct service or function or no service or function at all.
- the security unit 19 of the main platform 13 sends information about its internal status to the fallback level or the fallback platform 14 and vice versa, in particular at definable intervals.
- the "normal", i. H. error-free, operating mode all the actions mentioned are carried out in parallel by the main platform 13 and by the backup platform 14.
- the sending of data to external controllers can be disabled in the normal operating mode for the backup platform 14 if required.
- a safety unit 19 of a verification platform i.e. the main platform 13 or the backup platform 14
- detects an error it puts the corresponding verification platform into a fail-silent state and signals this to the safety unit 16 of the other verification platform via a constantly evaluated signal .
- the safety unit 19 of the main platform 13 detects an error, puts the corresponding main platform 13 into a fail-silent state and signals this to the safety unit 19 of the backup platform 14 via a constantly evaluated signal.
- each of the three computer platforms of the calculation area 10 can be supplied via separate supply voltages, as shown in FIG.
- the three supply voltages V1-V3 resulting from the separate supply voltages come from two independent supply networks 20a, 20b in the vehicle, which can have overvoltage protection 21a, 21b.
- the two checking platforms of the checking area 11 are also operated via two separate supply voltages. In the event of undervoltage, the supplied area or domain can be set to "reset" (ie reset).
- the clock generation system can include a CMU (clock multiplier unit) with PLL (phase-locked loops).
- CMU clock multiplier unit
- PLL phase-locked loops
- the present invention provides a system that is able to detect the occurrence of a system internal fault and still continue normal operation (unless a second independent fault occurs).
- the present invention can thus be used expressly in addition to the area of driver assistance systems in all areas in which an operationally reliable system is required for safety-critical purposes, e.g. B. in aviation, shipping, chemical production processes, power plants and the like.
- the present invention can find application in all areas where a fail-safe system can be beneficial for commercial/disposable purposes (industrial automation, building automation, and the like).
- the present invention enables the control to be switched over without delay in the event of an error—which represents a particular problem in the field of automated driving. This must usually be done within a few milliseconds between the currently used signal chain (e.g. the main platform) and a redundant secondary path (e.g. fallback platform) - otherwise the vehicle would be "driverless” for too long a period of time.
- a redundant secondary path e.g. fallback platform
- an (almost) delay-free switchover cannot easily be achieved in a conventional manner.
- the defective path is determined, whereby it is not sufficient to reinitialize (“perform a reset"), since the system will probably find itself in the defective path again even after the reset.
- the redundant path preferably has the same architecture as the primary path.
- the fail-silent state can also be used, taking into account that due to the architecture described (in particular due to the design as an overall system on a SoC or MCM), there are many possibilities to use the diagnosis option to determine the error or the faulty circuit part - and thus also the availability of the system - to increase. In contrast, this cannot usually be implemented using separate ECU systems.
- the chip used in this case can B. clocked in the range of> 500 MHz. Error-free synchronization can be made possible by simply duplicating the logic (in the synchronized or delayed lock step).
- An advantageous combination of the use of the two error mechanisms lock step for logic and CPU and error detection or ECC (Error Correcting Code) for the memory and regular structures is therefore not readily possible.
- ECC Error Correcting Code
- it has been shown that the combination of the two known mechanisms can reduce the cost and energy consumption to a particular extent.
- the simple use of duplication cannot identify the defective path and provide a reliable statement that a defect was/is present.
- the solution shown thus describes a new type of solution Realization in order to achieve the required switching time and diagnostic options and thus represents a special contribution, especially in the field of control devices.
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Abstract
Description
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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CN202280039950.8A CN117425881A (zh) | 2021-06-22 | 2022-06-15 | 用于车辆的控制装置以及辅助系统 |
EP22743733.2A EP4359933A1 (de) | 2021-06-22 | 2022-06-15 | Steuereinrichtung sowie assistenzsystem für ein fahrzeug |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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DE102021206379.9 | 2021-06-22 | ||
DE102021206379.9A DE102021206379A1 (de) | 2021-06-22 | 2021-06-22 | Steuereinrichtung sowie Assistenzsystem für ein Fahrzeug |
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WO2022268270A1 true WO2022268270A1 (de) | 2022-12-29 |
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PCT/DE2022/200132 WO2022268270A1 (de) | 2021-06-22 | 2022-06-15 | Steuereinrichtung sowie assistenzsystem für ein fahrzeug |
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EP (1) | EP4359933A1 (de) |
CN (1) | CN117425881A (de) |
DE (1) | DE102021206379A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2022268270A1 (de) |
Citations (9)
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DE102008004206A1 (de) * | 2008-01-14 | 2009-07-16 | Robert Bosch Gmbh | Anordnung und Verfahren zur Fehlererkennung und -behandlung in einem Steuergerät in einem Kraftfahrzeug |
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EP2482149A2 (de) * | 2011-02-01 | 2012-08-01 | Keihin Corporation | Elektronische Steuereinheit |
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DE102016102259A1 (de) | 2016-02-10 | 2017-08-10 | Hella Kgaa Hueck & Co. | Rechner- und Funktionsarchitektur zur Erhöhung der Ausfallsicherheit einer Hilfskraftlenkung |
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2021
- 2021-06-22 DE DE102021206379.9A patent/DE102021206379A1/de active Pending
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- 2022-06-15 CN CN202280039950.8A patent/CN117425881A/zh active Pending
- 2022-06-15 WO PCT/DE2022/200132 patent/WO2022268270A1/de active Application Filing
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US20130007513A1 (en) | 2010-03-23 | 2013-01-03 | Adrian Traskov | Redundant two-processor controller and control method |
US20130024721A1 (en) | 2010-03-23 | 2013-01-24 | Lukusa Didier Kabulepa | Control computer system, method for controlling a control computer system, and use of a control computer system |
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CN117425881A (zh) | 2024-01-19 |
DE102021206379A1 (de) | 2022-12-22 |
EP4359933A1 (de) | 2024-05-01 |
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