WO2022107216A1 - トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置 - Google Patents

トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2022107216A1
WO2022107216A1 PCT/JP2020/042832 JP2020042832W WO2022107216A1 WO 2022107216 A1 WO2022107216 A1 WO 2022107216A1 JP 2020042832 W JP2020042832 W JP 2020042832W WO 2022107216 A1 WO2022107216 A1 WO 2022107216A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
transaction
transactions
generated
blockchain networks
generation process
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/JP2020/042832
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
芽生恵 山岡
正信 森永
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Fujitsu Ltd
Original Assignee
Fujitsu Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Fujitsu Ltd filed Critical Fujitsu Ltd
Priority to JP2022563282A priority Critical patent/JPWO2022107216A1/ja
Priority to EP20962380.0A priority patent/EP4250110A1/en
Priority to PCT/JP2020/042832 priority patent/WO2022107216A1/ja
Priority to CN202080106323.2A priority patent/CN116324725A/zh
Publication of WO2022107216A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022107216A1/ja
Priority to US18/300,438 priority patent/US20230252457A1/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

Links

Images

Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/02—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols involving a neutral party, e.g. certification authority, notary or trusted third party [TTP]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
    • G06F9/50—Allocation of resources, e.g. of the central processing unit [CPU]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3297—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving time stamps, e.g. generation of time stamps
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a transaction control method, a transaction control program, and an information processing apparatus.
  • BC Blockchain
  • CC Connection Chain
  • BC it may be operated so that a third party can access the ledger.
  • information related to personal privacy such as "who used what service", for example, information related to the relationship between the source and destination of the transaction may be known to a third party.
  • a tumbler As a first method to conceal the relationship between the source and destination of a transaction from a third party, in other words, to prevent the transaction to be concealed from being identified, multiple transactions are aggregated in a servicer called a tumbler. Mixing is known. However, in mixing, in the CC that is a tumbler, a transaction wait for executing the mixing occurs, so that the transaction execution delay may occur.
  • the occurrence of transaction execution delay due to mixing is suppressed by recruiting participants for mixing without waiting for the transaction for mixing to occur naturally as in the first method.
  • the method of doing is known.
  • the CC generates a second transaction for concealing the first transaction in order to execute mixing for the first transaction to be concealed.
  • the execution cost for executing the first transaction to be concealed may increase as compared with the first method.
  • the execution cost is, for example, a cost (commission) for executing a transaction in BC.
  • the execution cost may include, for example, a processing load in one or both of BC and CC, a network load, and the like in addition to or in place of the cost.
  • one of the purposes of the present invention is to reduce the execution cost of the second transaction for concealing the first transaction to be concealed.
  • the computer may execute the following processing.
  • the process is a computer that controls transactions by receiving a plurality of transactions generated in a plurality of blockchain networks and transmitting the plurality of transactions to the blockchain network corresponding to the destination of each of the plurality of transactions. Is executed, and the transaction control is concealed by the execution cost for executing a transaction in each of the plurality of blockchain networks and one or both of the source and the destination in the plurality of blockchain networks. It may include a process of controlling the number of second transactions for concealing the first transaction generated by each of the plurality of blockchain networks based on the blockchain network that generated the first transaction.
  • the present invention can reduce the execution cost of the second transaction for concealing the first transaction to be concealed.
  • FIG. 1 It is a figure which shows the comparative example of the execution cost of the impersonation transaction by the method which concerns on one Embodiment, and the execution cost of the impersonation transaction when the second comparative example is used.
  • HW hardware
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram showing an example of a blockchain connected network 100.
  • a case where a user A of a cooking recipe exchange BC110 purchases a product of a user B of a douujinshi value exchange BC130 using the tokens accumulated in the BC110 is taken as an example.
  • the CC120 moves the token of the user A to the representative account CA121 (CA # 0) of the CC120 on the BC110 in response to the request from the user A.
  • the CC 120 moves the token having the same value as the token transferred to the CA 121 to the representative account CA 122 (CA # 1) of the CC 120 on the BC 130, and transfers the token from the CA 122 to the account of the user B.
  • a transaction record such as “2020.07.14 12:00, User A ⁇ CA # 0” is set in the transaction ledger 111 on BC110, and “2020.07” is set in the transaction ledger 131 on BC130.
  • a transaction record such as .14 12:00, CA # 1 ⁇ User B ”is set.
  • BC may be operated so that a third party can access the ledger.
  • a third party for example, when a public chain is used, or when a consortium chain is used and mutual evaluation is performed based on transaction records, a third party is allowed to access the ledger. If so, etc.
  • the information related to individual privacy such as "who used what service” in a single BC or multiple BCs via CC is the third. Will be known to others.
  • the third party can know the information regarding the relationship between the sender and the recipient of the transaction, that is, the information related to the privacy of the individual, which indicates that the user A has used the service of the user B. It is possible.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram for explaining an example of the above-mentioned first method, and is a diagram showing an example of a case where the CC 120 shown in FIG. 1 has a function of a tumbler 123 for mixing.
  • the tumbler 123 mixes k transactions (k is an integer of 2 or more) of users A, C, and E of the source BC 110, and users B, D, and the destination BC 130. Mix k transactions to F.
  • k transactions is an integer of 2 or more
  • the tumbler 123 mixes the first transaction by generating a second transaction for concealing the first transaction to be concealed by the second method described above. It is possible to do it.
  • a second transaction that is originally unnecessary is executed, so that the total execution cost incurred for executing the first transaction to be concealed may increase. be.
  • a service that mixes a transaction across CCs connecting a plurality of BCs is assumed.
  • execution cost is incurred for each transaction
  • the transaction execution cost is different for each BC
  • the execution cost for each BC is disclosed. Disclosure of execution costs may be obtained, for example, in CC.
  • the confidential transaction to be executed may be referred to as "authentic transaction".
  • the genuine transaction is an example of the first transaction.
  • Examples of the transaction to be concealed include a transaction to conceal information about a sender / receiver, for example, a sender / receiver to a third party.
  • the sender / receiver may be, for example, one or both of the source and the destination (destination) of the transaction, and is an example of information regarding the relationship between the source and the destination of the transaction.
  • the remittance person may be, for example, one or both of the remittance source and the remittance destination (destination) of the transaction.
  • a method of generating a fake transaction in BC which has the lowest execution cost, can be considered.
  • all spoofed transactions are output from one BC having the lowest execution cost. Therefore, the genuine transaction can be identified by a third party unless the sender of the genuine transaction is the sender on the same BC as the sender of the fake transaction. Therefore, the sender / receiver of the genuine transaction may not be kept secret, and it may be difficult to protect the information related to the privacy of the individual related to the genuine transaction.
  • a method of generating all spoofed transactions on the same BC as the sender of the genuine transaction can be considered.
  • the higher the execution cost (cost) of the BC to which the genuine transaction is remitted the higher the cost of the spoofed transaction.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram for explaining an operation example of the system 1 according to the embodiment.
  • the system 1 for example, a blockchain connected network can be mentioned.
  • the system 1 may optionally include a plurality of (six in FIG. 3) blockchains (BC) 11-1 to 11-6 and a connection chain (CC) 12.
  • BC11-1 to 11-6 are not distinguished, they are simply referred to as BC11.
  • BC11-1 to 11-6 is an example of a blockchain network in which an execution cost is incurred for each transaction, and it is assumed that these execution costs are open to the public. Further, the transaction execution costs in BC11-1 to 11-6 are set individually, in other words, they may be different from each other.
  • Each BC11 can be one or both of the source and destination of the transaction, but in the example of FIG. 3, for convenience, BC11-1 to 11-3 are the BCs of the source of the transaction, and BC11-4 to 11 It is assumed that -6 is the BC to which the transaction is sent.
  • the BC of the transmission source may be described as “source BC”
  • the BC of the destination may be described as "destination BC”.
  • the remittance source BC which is an example of the source BC
  • the remittance destination BC which is an example of the destination BC
  • remittance destination BC which is an example of the destination BC
  • CC12 is a network that connects a plurality of BC11s to each other, and may provide, for example, a service that mixes transactions transmitted and received between BC11s.
  • the CC12 may acquire the transaction execution cost in each of the plurality of BC11s.
  • CC12 may generate more spoofed transactions, for example, BC11 having a lower execution cost.
  • CC12 causes BC11 to generate k-1 spoofed transactions so that BC11 with a smaller execution cost causes more spoofed transactions in k transactions mixed from the viewpoint of a third party. good.
  • the execution cost of the source BC11-1 is the lowest among the sources BC11-1 to 11-3, and the execution cost of the source BC11-3 is the source BC11-1 to 11-11. Highest in -3.
  • the execution cost of the destination BC11-4 is the lowest among the destinations BC11-4 to 11-6, and the execution cost of the destination BC11-6 is the lowest among the destinations BC11-4 to 11-6. high.
  • a total of 6 (k) transactions are generated, 3 for BC11-1, 2 for BC11-2, and 1 for BC11-3. Any one of these six transactions is a genuine transaction, and the remaining five (k-1 transactions) are spoofed transactions.
  • the six transactions are mixed in CC12 and transmitted to the destination BC11-4 to 11-6 of each transaction.
  • BC11-4 At the destination BC11, of the total of 6 (k) transactions including 1 genuine transaction and 5 (k-1) spoofed transactions, 3 are BC11-4 and 2 are BC11. One is transmitted to -5 and one is transmitted to BC11-6.
  • the CC12 generates a transaction from all BC11s that are the targets of the mixing service.
  • BC11 which has a low execution cost, while suppressing the unique identification of the genuine transaction, so that the execution cost of the transaction can be reduced.
  • the total execution cost of the genuine transaction generated in the system 1 (multiple BC11s) and the spoofed transaction associated therewith is kept to a constant or substantially constant value regardless of which BC11 the authentic transaction is generated in. be able to.
  • the non-uniformity of the total execution cost according to the difference in BC11 of the user who issues the authentic transaction can be equalized among BC11. Therefore, when the service for concealing the authentic transaction is operated with a constant or substantially constant provision fee, it is possible to guarantee the fairness between users belonging to BC11 different from each other and the validity of the provision fee.
  • FIG. 4 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration example of the system 1 according to the embodiment.
  • the CC 12 is communicably connected to each of a plurality of (three in the example of FIG. 4) terminal devices 13 and a plurality of (one in the example of FIG. 4) BC11. It's okay.
  • the terminal device 13 is an example of a computer used by each of the applicant for the genuine transaction and the mixing collaborator.
  • FIG. 4 shows an example in which three terminal devices 13 are connected to one BC 11, but in reality, the system 1 includes a plurality of other terminal devices 13 and one or more other BC 11s. You can do it.
  • CC12 schematically includes a memory unit 2, a transaction number determination unit 3, a transaction generation request unit 4, a connection chain account (CA; CC Account) monitoring unit 5, and an asset transfer unit 6. You may be prepared.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3, the transaction generation request unit 4, the CA monitoring unit 5, and the asset transfer unit 6 are examples of control units, and at least one of these receives transactions transmitted from a plurality of BC11s. , May be at least part of the function of the tumbler that controls the transaction to send to multiple BC11s to the destination of each transaction.
  • the memory unit 2 has a storage area for storing various data used by the CC 12.
  • the memory unit 2 may optionally store the genuine transaction information 2a, the mixing collaborator information 2b, the execution cost information 2c, and the request information 2d.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram showing an example of the data structure of the genuine transaction information 2a.
  • the genuine transaction is, for example, a transaction to be concealed issued to a predetermined reception desk (for example, an address) in CC12.
  • the CC 12 may store the transaction information received at the predetermined reception window in the memory unit 2 as the genuine transaction information 2a.
  • the genuine transaction information 2a is exemplified by "remittance source ID (Identifier)", “remittance source blockchain”, “remittance destination ID”, “remittance destination blockchain”, and “remittance amount”.
  • the item of "contact information” may be included.
  • the "remittance source ID" is an example of the identification information of the sender (for example, "user A"), and may be, for example, the address of the sender in the remittance source BC11. As an example, "A's address” may be set in the "remittance source ID”.
  • the "remittance source blockchain” is an example of the identification information of the remittance source BC11, and an identifier such as "BC4" may be set, for example.
  • the "remittance destination ID" is an example of the identification information of the recipient (for example, "user B"), and may be, for example, the address of the recipient at the remittance destination BC11. As an example, "B's address” may be set in the "remittance destination ID”.
  • the "remittance destination blockchain” is an example of the identification information of the remittance destination BC11, and an identifier such as "BC2" may be set, for example.
  • the "remittance amount” is the remittance amount of the sender, and for example, the amount of virtual currency such as "500 coin” may be set.
  • the "contact information” is the contact information of the sender, and an e-mail address such as "sender@XX.XX.XX" may be set.
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram showing an example of the data structure of the mixing collaborator information 2b of each BC11.
  • the mixing collaborator is a user of each BC11 registered as a collaborator who generates a second transaction for concealing the first transaction in order to execute mixing for the first transaction to be concealed.
  • the mixing collaborator information 2b is, for example, "remittance source ID”, “remittance source blockchain”, “remittance destination ID”, “remittance destination blockchain”, “remittance amount”, and , May include the item "Contacts”.
  • the "remittance source ID" is an example of the identification information of the mixing collaborator (for example, "user C"), and may be, for example, the address of the mixing collaborator in the remittance source BC11. As an example, "C's address” may be set in the "remittance source ID”.
  • the "remittance source blockchain” is an example of the identification information of the remittance source BC11, and for example, an identifier such as "BC1" may be set.
  • the "remittance destination ID" is an example of the identification information of the mixing collaborator (for example, "user D"), and may be, for example, the address of the mixing collaborator at the remittance destination BC11. As an example, "D's address” may be set in the "remittance destination ID”.
  • the "remittance destination blockchain” is an example of the identification information of the remittance destination BC11, and for example, an identifier such as "BC3" may be set.
  • the “remittance amount” is an amount that can be remitted by the mixing collaborator, and for example, a threshold value, a range, or a fixed amount such as "1000 coin or less” or "500 coin” may be set.
  • the "contact information” is a contact information for a mixing cooperation request to a mixing collaborator, and for example, an e-mail address such as "helper@XX.XX.XX" may be set.
  • the mixing collaborator may be registered in the mixing collaborator information 2b so as to send money to the two BC11 addresses owned by one collaborator. It should be noted that such registration is permitted only when the addresses on the two BC11s are not associated with one mixing collaborator.
  • the remittance amount is set to be "1000 coins or less" of the total assets of the mixing cooperator at the remittance source BC11. May be done. Further, in the mixing cooperator information 2b, a fixed amount such as the amount "500 coin” that the mixing cooperator was trying to remit may be set as the remittance amount.
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram showing an example of execution cost information 2c.
  • the execution cost information 2c is information indicating the execution cost of the transaction in each of the BC11s acquired by the CC12 from each BC11.
  • the execution cost information 2c may include the items of "blockchain” and "execution cost” as an example.
  • the "blockchain” may be each identification information of BC11, for example, an identifier such as "BC1".
  • Executecution cost is the relative execution cost of each BC11.
  • the "execution cost” may be determined, for example, on the basis of a virtual currency on the CC12 based on the conversion rate of the value on each BC11. In the example of FIG. 7, it is assumed that "coin” is used as a unit of virtual currency (virtual currency).
  • the execution cost may include, for example, a processing load on one or both of BC11 and CC12, a network load, and the like, in addition to or in place of the above-mentioned fee (cost).
  • the execution cost information 2c illustrated in FIG. 7 is a list in which BC11 is sorted in ascending order of execution cost.
  • the execution cost “C 1 ” of “BC 1” is the smallest and the execution cost “C N ” of “BCN” is the largest.
  • N is the number of BC11s contained in the system 1, for example, the number of BC11s to be mixed by CC12.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 performs a process of determining the number of transactions to be generated in each BC11 for mixing based on the execution cost of each BC11 and the privacy parameter k. For example, the transaction number determination unit 3 determines the number of transactions generated in each BC11 so that the relationship between the execution cost of each BC11 and the number of transactions generated on each BC11 follows a predetermined function, for example, a predetermined decreasing function. You may decide.
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram for explaining an example of processing by the transaction number determination unit 3.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 determines the number of transactions “T 1 ” to “ TN-1 ” for each BC 11 so that the total number of transactions is k.
  • TN is the minimum (minimum) number of transactions "T min " generated in BC11 having the maximum execution cost, and may be a predetermined value.
  • the number of transactions “T min ” is an example of the second privacy parameter for adjusting the trade-off between the concealment effect of the genuine transaction and the reduction effect of the execution cost.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 substitutes the execution costs “C 1 ” to “C N-1 ” of each of “BC1” to “BCN-1” into the variable x based on the monotonic decrease function f (x). Therefore, the number of transactions “T 1 ” to “T N-1 ” generated in each of “BC1” to “BCN-1” may be calculated.
  • the transaction number calculation process of each BC11 may include, for example, the following processes (i) and (ii).
  • T mim " "C N " x a + b (1)
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 substitutes “C 1 ”,..., “C N-1 ” for the monotonic decrease function f (x), and calculates “T 1 ”,..., “T N-1 ”. do. Since "T 1 ", ..., And "T N-1 " can be real numbers, the transaction number determination unit 3 may use rounding, for example, as rounding to the nearest whole number for the calculation result. Rounding may include recording the rounded fraction (the difference between the calculated real number and the number of rounded transactions).
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 sets "T 1 ", ..., “T N-1” calculated by the illustrated calculation process and the second privacy parameter "T min "("T N ") into “BC1". ⁇ Output as the number of transactions generated in each of "BCN”.
  • FIG. 10 is a diagram showing an example of calculating the number of transactions for each BC11 by the calculation process according to the embodiment.
  • FIG. 11 is a diagram showing a comparison example between the execution cost of the fake transaction by the method according to the embodiment and the execution cost of the fake transaction when the second comparative example described above is used.
  • FIG. 11 it is assumed that a genuine transaction request is generated four times in total, once from each BC11.
  • the calculation conditions in the example of FIG. 11 and the number of transactions for each BC11 by the method according to the embodiment are the same as in the example of FIG.
  • the execution cost of the spoofed transaction is the execution cost of BC11 in which the genuine transaction occurs ⁇ “k-1” each time the genuine transaction occurs. Therefore, when a genuine transaction request is generated four times in total, one from each BC11, the total cost becomes “190” in the second comparative example.
  • the execution cost of the spoofed transaction in “BC1” is equivalent to one of the genuine transactions.
  • the authentic transaction request is generated four times in total, the total cost is the total cost in the method according to one embodiment. It becomes "138".
  • the method according to one embodiment can reduce the execution cost of the impersonation transaction of "52" as compared with the case of the second comparative example.
  • the inconvenience described in the first and second comparative examples described above is prevented from being uniquely identified as a genuine transaction, and confidentiality is ensured. At the same time, the execution cost of the spoofed transaction can be reduced.
  • Various functions with two and b may be used.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 determines the mixing cooperation request destination to the mixing collaborator based on the transaction number T generated in each BC11 determined by the transaction number determination unit 3, and mixes with the request destination. Perform the process of requesting.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 may specify a mixing collaborator who satisfies the condition of the determined number of transactions T by referring to the genuine transaction information 2a and the mixing collaborator information 2b. Then, the transaction generation request unit 4 notifies the contact information of the applicant for the genuine transaction and the specified mixing collaborator of the request for mixing cooperation requesting the occurrence of the transaction (for example, sending an e-mail). good.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 may store, for example, information regarding the genuine transaction of the applicant who is the target of the request and the impersonation transaction of the mixing collaborator as the request information 2d in the memory unit 2.
  • FIG. 12 is a diagram showing an example of the data structure of the request information 2d.
  • the request information 2d may have the same data structure as the genuine transaction information 2a or the mixing collaborator information 2b shown in FIG. 5 or FIG.
  • the request information 2d is a plurality of transactions generated in each BC11 by the request.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 may generate the request information 2d and update the mixing cooperator information 2b for the mixing cooperator who sent the request.
  • the update of the mixing collaborator information 2b may include, for example, excluding the collaborators who have cooperated in mixing from the list once.
  • Each of the genuine transaction applicant and the mixing collaborator requested by the transaction generation request unit 4 performs transaction execution processing on their own remittance source BC11 using the terminal device 13.
  • the transaction execution process may be realized by, for example, various known methods.
  • the CA monitoring unit 5 monitors the connection chain account (CA) and monitors whether or not the genuine transaction and the fake transaction requested by the mixing collaborator are executed based on the request information 2d.
  • CA connection chain account
  • the CA monitoring unit 5 may confirm that the remittance amount equivalent to the remittance amount of each remittance source BC11 has been made from all the remittance source IDs included in the request information 2d.
  • the CA monitoring unit 5 confirms that the payment equivalent to “500 coin” has been made from the “E's address” to the CA of “BC4”.
  • the CA monitoring unit 5 may notify the asset transfer unit 6 of "start of transfer" (for example, transmission of a message).
  • the asset transfer unit 6 executes the asset transfer process based on the request information 2d in response to the reception of the "transfer start" message from the CA monitoring unit 5.
  • the asset transfer unit 6 applies to the remittance destination BC11 for a transaction requesting payment equivalent to the remittance amount from the CA of all the remittance destination BC11 included in the request information 2d to each remittance destination ID. ..
  • the asset transfer unit 6 applies to "BC2" for a transaction requesting a deposit equivalent to "500 coin” from the CA of "BC2" to "F's address".
  • the asset transfer unit 6 may execute the asset transfer process for all the entries set in the request information 2d and end the process.
  • processing by the CA monitoring unit 5 and the asset transfer unit 6 may be realized by, for example, various known methods.
  • one or both of the CA monitoring unit 5 and the asset transfer unit 6 may control transaction mixing by the same method as CC120 according to the second method described above.
  • FIG. 13 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the transaction number determination processing in the CC12
  • FIG. 14 is an operation example of the transaction generation request processing in the CC12. It is a flowchart.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 of the CC 12 has a privacy parameter k, an execution cost of each BC 11 “C 1 ”, ..., “C N ” (execution cost information). (Refer to 2c) and acquire the minimum number of transactions “T min ” (step S1).
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 calculates solutions a and b of the following simultaneous equations (equations (3) and (4)) (step S2).
  • k (“C 1 ” +... + “C N ”) ⁇ a + b (3)
  • T min " "C N " x a + b (4)
  • the transaction number determination unit 3 performs rounding, for example, rounding to "T i ", and records the difference " ⁇ i " in, for example, the memory unit 2 (step S5).
  • step S12 the transaction number determination unit 3 outputs the transaction numbers “T 1 ”, ..., “ TN-1 ” generated in each BC11, for example, notifies the transaction generation request unit 4, and the process ends.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 selects a mixing collaborator from the mixing collaborator information 2b according to the number of transactions “T 1 ”, ..., “ TN-1 ” (step S22). For example, the transaction generation request unit 4 mixes so that the number of transactions to BC11 of the remittance source and the remittance destination is "T 1 ", ..., "T N-1 " and "T N " including the genuine transaction. You may choose a collaborator. At this time, the transaction generation requesting unit 4 may select, for example, only the mixing collaborators who can remit the same amount as the remittance amount of the genuine transaction from the candidates of the mixing collaborators in the mixing collaborator information 2b.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 determines in step S22 whether or not there is a mixing collaborator who satisfies the above conditions (whether or not a mixing collaborator who satisfies the conditions is selected) (step S23).
  • step S23 If there is no mixing collaborator satisfying the conditions (NO in step S23), the transaction generation requesting unit 4 waits until the mixing collaborator information 2b is updated (step S24), and the process is stepped. Move to S22.
  • the transaction generation requesting unit 4 requests the applicant for the genuine transaction and the selected mixing collaborator to execute the transaction (YES). Step S25).
  • the transaction generation request unit 4 updates the mixing collaborator information 2b (step S26), and the process ends.
  • the transaction generation requesting unit 4 may store the information of the requesting applicant and the mixing collaborator as the request information 2d in the memory unit 2.
  • Each of the requesting genuine transaction applicant and the mixing collaborator may perform transaction execution processing on the remittance source BC11 by the terminal device 13 used by the applicant.
  • the CC12 may mix the transactions that have occurred by the CA monitoring unit 5 and the asset transfer unit 6.
  • Modification Example [1-5-1] First Modification Example The method according to the first embodiment is, for example, when the probability of occurrence of a genuine transaction is uniform on BC11 or the execution cost is high. This is effective when many genuine transactions occur on BC11.
  • the method according to one embodiment which is an example of the first generation process, is used based on the occurrence status of the past authentic transaction, or the second comparison, which is an example of the second generation process.
  • a method for further reducing the execution cost by switching (selecting) whether to use the example method will be described.
  • FIG. 16 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration example of the system 1A according to the first modification.
  • the system 1A may include CC12A instead of CC12 shown in FIG.
  • the CC12A may include a memory unit 2A and a transaction generation request unit 4A, which are different from the memory unit 2 and the transaction generation request unit 4 shown in FIG. 4, and may also include a generation method selection unit 7.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3, the transaction generation request unit 4A, the CA monitoring unit 5, the asset transfer unit 6, and the generation method selection unit 7 are examples of the control unit.
  • the memory unit 2A may store the genuine transaction request (request) history 2e and the generation method information 2f in addition to the information stored in the memory unit 2.
  • FIG. 17 is a diagram showing an example of the data structure of the genuine transaction request history 2e.
  • the genuine transaction request history 2e may include the items of “reception date”, “remittance source blockchain”, and “remittance destination blockchain”, for example.
  • the "reception date” is the date (or date and time) when the mixing request for the genuine transaction is received, and a date such as "2020.09.02" may be set.
  • Remittance source blockchain is an identifier of the remittance source BC11 such as "BC1”.
  • the “remittance destination blockchain” is an identifier of the remittance destination BC11 such as "BC3”.
  • the generation method information 2f is information indicating a generation method of a fake transaction in the next predetermined period, and for example, a value indicating "second comparative example” or “method according to one embodiment" may be set.
  • the predetermined period is a preset time and is an example of the first predetermined period.
  • the predetermined period may be, for example, several minutes to several days or more depending on the operation and usage mode of the system 1A.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 selects a fake transaction generation method in the next predetermined period from the past genuine transaction request based on the genuine transaction request history 2e, and for example, "second comparative example” and “one embodiment”. Outputs a value indicating one of the "methods". For example, the generation method selection unit 7 may store the output generation method in the generation method information 2f.
  • the generation method selection process by the generation method selection unit 7 may include, for example, the following processes (I) and (II).
  • the generation method selection unit 7 is a method according to one embodiment and a second comparative example for each of the latest n (n is an integer of 1 or more) predetermined periods from the genuine transaction request history 2e. Calculate the execution cost of the spoofed transaction that occurs when each method of the above method is adopted.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 determines a method in which the execution cost is frequently reduced in the latest n predetermined periods as a fake transaction generation method in the next predetermined period. That is, the generation method selection unit 7 selects the fake transaction generation method for the next predetermined period based on the comparison result between the execution cost by the method according to one embodiment and the execution cost by the method of the second comparative example.
  • n may be, for example, an odd number, but is not limited to this, and may be an even number.
  • FIG. 18 is a diagram for explaining an example of the generation method selection process by the generation method selection unit 7.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 uses the following generation method as the method according to the embodiment (which is the winner of the majority vote) in which the number of times the method has a low execution cost is large in n predetermined periods. Adopt as.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 may decide the method to be adopted in the next predetermined period by weighting so as to emphasize the most recent predetermined period instead of the simple majority vote in the n predetermined periods. ..
  • the transaction generation request unit 4A makes the above-mentioned request to the applicant and the mixing collaborator based on the transaction number T generated in each BC11 determined by the transaction number determination unit 3 by using the generation method indicated by the generation method information 2f. ..
  • FIG. 19 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the selection process of the generation method in the CC12A
  • FIG. 20 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the request processing for the occurrence of a transaction in the CC12A.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 acquires the authentic transaction request history 2e, the information of n predetermined periods, and the information of the privacy parameter k (step S31).
  • the generation method selection unit 7 sets an initial value “0” for each of the variable “MethodA” for the second comparative example and the variable “MethodB” for the method according to the embodiment (step S32).
  • the second comparative example will be referred to as method A
  • the method according to one embodiment will be referred to as method B.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 distributes past genuine transaction requests to n predetermined periods based on the reception date (step S33).
  • the generation method selection unit 7 sets the initial value “1” in the variable i which is an integer of 1 to N (step S34). Then, the generation method selection unit 7 calculates the execution cost “CA” of the camouflaged transaction when the method A is adopted in the period i (step S35). Further, the generation method selection unit 7 calculates the execution cost “CB” of the camouflaged transaction when the method B is adopted in the period i (step S36).
  • the generation method selection unit 7 determines whether or not “C A ” ⁇ “C B ” (step S37), and if “C A ” ⁇ “C B ” is not (NO in step S37), it is set to “Method A”. 1 is added (step S38), and the process proceeds to step S40. On the other hand, when “C A “ ⁇ ”C B " (YES in step S37), the generation method selection unit 7 adds 1 to "Method B" (step S39), and the process shifts to step S40.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 adds 1 to i (step S41), and the process shifts to step S35.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 determines whether or not “MethodA” ⁇ “MethodB” (step S42).
  • the generation method selection unit 7 When “MethodA” ⁇ "MethodB” is not satisfied (NO in step S42), the generation method selection unit 7 outputs information indicating the method A (denoted as [method A]), for example, to the memory unit 2A as the generation method information 2f. It is stored (step S43), and the process ends.
  • the generation method selection unit 7 When “MethodA” ⁇ "MethodB” (YES in step S42), the generation method selection unit 7 outputs information indicating method B (denoted as [method B]) (step S44), and the process ends.
  • the transaction generation request unit 4A has the genuine transaction information 2a, the mixing collaborator information 2b, the privacy parameter k, the generation method information 2f, and the number of transactions “T 1 ”, ..., “T N- ”. 1 ”(and“ T N ”) is acquired (step S51).
  • the transaction generation request unit 4A confirms the method indicated by the generation method information 2f. For example, the transaction generation request unit 4A determines whether or not the generation method information 2f is information indicating the method B (step S52).
  • step S52 When the generation method information 2f is information indicating the method B (YES in step S52), the process proceeds to step S22.
  • the generation method information 2f is information indicating the method A (NO in step S52)
  • the transaction generation request unit 4A has a mixing cooperation of "k-1" people who have the same remittance source BC11 and remittance destination BC11 of the genuine transaction. Person is selected from the mixing collaborator information 2b (step S53), and the process proceeds to step S23.
  • a genuine transaction occurs when a user uses a token earned on BC11. Therefore, on BC11 where transactions are active, it can be expected that there will be many token earners and many requests for genuine transactions. In addition, there is often a time lag between the time a user earns an asset and the time the user uses it.
  • the number of genuine transactions in the next predetermined period is predicted based on the total number of transactions on BC11 (in the past multiple predetermined periods), and the predicted genuine transactions are calculated.
  • a method for determining a fake transaction generation method for the next predetermined period based on the number will be described.
  • the predetermined period according to the second modification is an example of the second predetermined period, and may be the same as or different from the predetermined period according to the first modification.
  • FIG. 21 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration example of the system 1B according to the second modification.
  • system 1B may include CC12B instead of CC12A shown in FIG.
  • the CC12B may include a memory unit 2B and a generation method selection unit 7B that are different from the memory unit 2A and the generation method selection unit 7 shown in FIG.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3, the transaction generation request unit 4A, the CA monitoring unit 5, the asset transfer unit 6, and the generation method selection unit 7B are examples of the control unit.
  • the memory unit 2B may store the total transaction history 2g in addition to the information stored in the memory unit 2A.
  • FIG. 22 is a diagram showing an example of a data structure having a total transaction history of 2 g. As shown in FIG. 22, the total transaction history 2g may optionally include the items of “blockchain name”, “period” and “number of transactions” for each BC11.
  • the "blockchain name” is the name of BC11 that is the target of the entry, and an identifier such as "BC1" may be set.
  • the "period” is a transaction aggregation period, and a period such as "September 2020" (1 month) may be set.
  • the "number of transactions” is the number of transactions that occurred during the "period” on BC11 of the "blockchain name", and a numerical value such as "562,367" may be set.
  • the total transaction history 2g is not limited to this.
  • the “total assets” or the like moved during the "period” on BC11 of the "blockchain name” may be set in the total transaction history 2g.
  • the “total assets” may be set to a numerical value converted into a virtual value on CC12B determined based on the conversion rate of the value between BC11s.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B selects a fake transaction generation method in the next predetermined period based on the genuine transaction request history 2e and the total transaction history 2g, and for example, "second comparative example” and “one embodiment". A value indicating one of the "methods related to" is output.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B may store the generation method to be output in the generation method information 2f.
  • the generation method selection process by the generation method selection unit 7B may include, for example, the following processes (III) to (V).
  • the generation method selection unit 7B correlates between the total number of transactions in each BC11 in the past and the number of genuine transactions that have occurred in the past at different periods. BC11 showing a high value is extracted.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B is 2 The comparison may be performed by shifting the period or more. Further, the generation method selection unit 7B may calculate a plurality of correlations and determine the optimum period as the shift period.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B sets the authenticity of the next predetermined period from the total number of transactions on the BC11 in the past with respect to the BC11 in which the high correlation was found in the above (III). Predict (calculate) the number of transactions. For example, the generation method selection unit 7B may perform regression analysis using the total number of transactions as the explanatory variable and the number of genuine transactions as the objective variable, and calculate the number of genuine transactions in the next predetermined period from the total number of past transactions. The generation method selection unit 7B may predict the number of genuine transactions in the next predetermined period based on at least one of the total number of transactions on the past BC11 and the total assets moved on the past BC11.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B calculates the execution cost of the spoofed transaction that occurs when the method according to one embodiment and each method of the second comparative example are adopted based on the predicted number of genuine transactions. do. Then, the generation method selection unit 7B adopts the method having the smaller calculated execution cost as the generation method of the fake transaction for the next predetermined period.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B may calculate the number of genuine transactions of BC11 that did not show a high correlation in (III) by using the value of the previous predetermined period.
  • FIG. 25 is a flowchart for explaining an operation example of the selection process of the generation method in CC12B.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B has a genuine transaction request history 2e, a total transaction history 2g in each BC11, a privacy parameter k, a threshold value t for determining correlation, period information, and the number of transactions to be generated.
  • the information of "T 1 ", ..., "T N-1 " (and “T N ”) is acquired (step S61).
  • the period information may include, for example, information of a variable M (M is an integer of 2 or more) that divides the past date and time into a plurality of periods, and information of a variable m that identifies each divided period.
  • M an integer of 2 or more
  • m identifies each divided period.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B adds 1 to i (step S68), and the process shifts to step S63.
  • the generation method selection unit 7B determines the impersonation transaction when the method A is adopted in the period “M + 1” based on the values of “tr 1 ” to “tr N ”.
  • the execution cost “ CA ” is calculated (step S69).
  • the generation method selection unit 7B calculates the execution cost “C B ” of the camouflaged transaction when the method B is adopted in the period “M + 1” based on the values of “tr 1 ” to “tr N ” (step). S70).
  • the generation method selection unit 7B determines whether or not “C A ” ⁇ “C B ” (step S71), and if “C A ” ⁇ “C B ” is not (NO in step S71), indicates method A.
  • Information (denoted as [method A]) is output, for example, stored in the memory unit 2B as generation method information 2f (step S72), and the process ends.
  • step S71 When “CA” ⁇ "CB” (YES in step S71), the generation method selection unit 7B outputs information indicating method B (denoted as [method B ]) (step S73), and the process ends. do.
  • each of CC12, 12A, and 12B of the systems 1, 1A, and 1B described above may be a virtual server (VM; Virtual Machine) or a physical server. You may. Further, each function of CC12, 12A and 12B may be realized by one computer or may be realized by two or more computers. Further, at least a part of each function of CC12, 12A and 12B may be realized by using HW (Hardware) resource and NW (Network) resource provided by the cloud environment.
  • HW Hardware
  • NW Network
  • FIG. 26 is a block diagram showing a hardware (HW) configuration example of the computer 10 that realizes the respective functions of CC12, 12A, and 12B.
  • HW hardware
  • the computer 10 is exemplified by a processor 10a, a memory 10b, a storage unit 10c, an IF (Interface) unit 10d, an I / O (Input / Output) unit 10e, and a reading unit. It may be provided with 10f.
  • the processor 10a is an example of an arithmetic processing unit that performs various controls and operations.
  • the processor 10a may be connected to each block in the computer 10 so as to be communicable with each other by the bus 10i.
  • the processor 10a may be a multi-processor including a plurality of processors, a multi-core processor having a plurality of processor cores, or a configuration having a plurality of multi-core processors.
  • Examples of the processor 10a include integrated circuits (ICs) such as CPUs, MPUs, GPUs, APUs, DSPs, ASICs, and FPGAs. As the processor 10a, two or more combinations of these integrated circuits may be used.
  • ICs integrated circuits
  • MPU is an abbreviation for Micro Processing Unit
  • GPU is an abbreviation for Graphics Processing Unit
  • APU is an abbreviation for Accelerated Processing Unit.
  • DSP is an abbreviation for Digital Signal Processor
  • ASIC is an abbreviation for Application Specific IC
  • FPGA is an abbreviation for Field-Programmable Gate Array.
  • the memory 10b is an example of HW that stores information such as various data and programs.
  • Examples of the memory 10b include one or both of a volatile memory such as DRAM (Dynamic Random Access Memory) and a non-volatile memory such as PM (Persistent Memory).
  • the storage unit 10c is an example of HW that stores information such as various data and programs.
  • Examples of the storage unit 10c include a magnetic disk device such as an HDD (Hard Disk Drive), a semiconductor drive device such as an SSD (Solid State Drive), and various storage devices such as a non-volatile memory.
  • Examples of the non-volatile memory include flash memory, SCM (Storage Class Memory), ROM (Read Only Memory) and the like.
  • the various information stored in the memory units 2, 2A and 2B shown in FIGS. 4, 16 and 21 and various parameters such as the privacy parameter k are stored in the storage area of one or both of the memory unit 10b and the storage unit 10c. It may be stored in.
  • the storage unit 10c may store a program 10g (transaction control program) that realizes all or a part of various functions of the computer 10.
  • the processor 10a included in the CC12, 12A and 12B expands the program 10g stored in the storage unit 10c into the memory 10b and executes it, thereby executing the transaction number determination unit 3, the transaction generation request units 4 and 4A, and CA monitoring.
  • Functions as a unit 5, an asset transfer unit 6, a generation method selection unit 7 and 7B can be realized.
  • the IF unit 10d is at least one of a network in CC12, 12A and 12B, a network between CC12, 12A and 12B and each BC11, and a network between CC12, 12A and 12B and each terminal device 13.
  • a communication IF that controls connection and communication.
  • the IF unit 10d may include an adapter compliant with LAN (Local Area Network) such as Ethernet (registered trademark) or optical communication such as FC (Fibre Channel).
  • the adapter may support one or both wireless and wired communication methods.
  • CC12, 12A and 12B may be communicably connected to each of BC11 and the terminal device 13 via the IF unit 10d.
  • the program 10g may be downloaded from the network to the computer 10 via the communication IF and stored in the storage unit 10c.
  • the I / O unit 10e may include one or both of an input device and an output device.
  • Examples of the input device include a keyboard, a mouse, a touch panel, and the like.
  • Examples of the output device include a monitor, a projector, a printer and the like.
  • the reading unit 10f is an example of a reader that reads data and program information recorded on the recording medium 10h.
  • the reading unit 10f may include a connection terminal or device to which the recording medium 10h can be connected or inserted.
  • Examples of the reading unit 10f include an adapter compliant with USB (Universal Serial Bus), a drive device for accessing a recording disk, a card reader for accessing a flash memory such as an SD card, and the like.
  • the program 10g may be stored in the recording medium 10h, or the reading unit 10f may read the program 10g from the recording medium 10h and store it in the storage unit 10c.
  • Examples of the recording medium 10h include non-temporary computer-readable recording media such as magnetic / optical disks and flash memories.
  • Examples of the magnetic / optical disk include flexible discs, CDs (Compact Discs), DVDs (Digital Versatile Discs), Blu-ray discs, HVDs (Holographic Versatile Discs), and the like.
  • Examples of the flash memory include semiconductor memories such as USB memory and SD card.
  • the above-mentioned HW configuration of the computer 10 is an example. Therefore, the increase / decrease of HW (for example, addition or deletion of arbitrary blocks), division, integration in any combination, addition or deletion of buses, etc. may be appropriately performed in the computer 10. For example, in CC12, 12A and 12B, at least one of the I / O unit 10e and the reading unit 10f may be omitted.
  • CC12, 12A, and 12B request the mixing collaborator of each BC11 to generate a spoofed transaction, but the present invention is limited to this. is not.
  • CC12, 12A and 12B eg, a tumbler function
  • each of CC12, 12A and 12B shown in FIGS. 4, 16 and 21 may be merged in any combination or may be divided respectively.
  • each of CC12, 12A and 12B shown in FIGS. 4, 16 and 21 may have a configuration in which a plurality of devices cooperate with each other via a network to realize each processing function.
  • the memory units 2, 2A and 2B may be DB (Database) servers.
  • the transaction number determination unit 3, the transaction generation request units 4 and 4A, the CA monitoring unit 5, the asset transfer unit 6, and the generation method selection units 7 and 7B are one or both (combinations) of the application server and the Web server. You may.
  • a plurality of computers for example, a DB server, an application server, and a Web server may cooperate with each other via a network to realize each processing function as CC12, 12A, and 12B.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Finance (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)
PCT/JP2020/042832 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置 Ceased WO2022107216A1 (ja)

Priority Applications (5)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2022563282A JPWO2022107216A1 (https=) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17
EP20962380.0A EP4250110A1 (en) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 Transaction control method, transaction control program, and information processing device
PCT/JP2020/042832 WO2022107216A1 (ja) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置
CN202080106323.2A CN116324725A (zh) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 事务控制方法、事务控制程序、以及信息处理装置
US18/300,438 US20230252457A1 (en) 2020-11-17 2023-04-14 Method for transaction control, computer-readable recording medium having stored therein transaction control program, and information processing apparatus

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/JP2020/042832 WO2022107216A1 (ja) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置

Related Child Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
US18/300,438 Continuation US20230252457A1 (en) 2020-11-17 2023-04-14 Method for transaction control, computer-readable recording medium having stored therein transaction control program, and information processing apparatus

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2022107216A1 true WO2022107216A1 (ja) 2022-05-27

Family

ID=81708504

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/JP2020/042832 Ceased WO2022107216A1 (ja) 2020-11-17 2020-11-17 トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置

Country Status (5)

Country Link
US (1) US20230252457A1 (https=)
EP (1) EP4250110A1 (https=)
JP (1) JPWO2022107216A1 (https=)
CN (1) CN116324725A (https=)
WO (1) WO2022107216A1 (https=)

Families Citing this family (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US12020241B1 (en) * 2020-08-06 2024-06-25 Citibank, N.A. Systems and methods for multi-entity blockchain-based event break prevention

Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2019053712A (ja) 2017-09-15 2019-04-04 パナソニック インテレクチュアル プロパティ コーポレーション オブ アメリカＰａｎａｓｏｎｉｃ Ｉｎｔｅｌｌｅｃｔｕａｌ Ｐｒｏｐｅｒｔｙ Ｃｏｒｐｏｒａｔｉｏｎ ｏｆ Ａｍｅｒｉｃａ 電子投票システム、及び、制御方法

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11277390B2 (en) * 2015-01-26 2022-03-15 Listat Ltd. Decentralized cybersecure privacy network for cloud communication, computing and global e-commerce
US10818122B2 (en) * 2017-09-15 2020-10-27 Panasonic Intellectual Property Corporation Of America Electronic voting system and control method
CN111046437A (zh) * 2019-10-31 2020-04-21 中国科学院计算技术研究所 基于同构多链的区块链并行事务处理方法及系统、终端

Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2019053712A (ja) 2017-09-15 2019-04-04 パナソニック インテレクチュアル プロパティ コーポレーション オブ アメリカＰａｎａｓｏｎｉｃ Ｉｎｔｅｌｌｅｃｔｕａｌ Ｐｒｏｐｅｒｔｙ Ｃｏｒｐｏｒａｔｉｏｎ ｏｆ Ａｍｅｒｉｃａ 電子投票システム、及び、制御方法

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
UNE, MASASHI: "Difficulty and anonymity of transactions in cryptocurrency: research trends and challenges", FINANCIAL RESEARCH, vol. 38, no. 3, 22 July 2019 (2019-07-22), Japan, pages 127 - 152, XP009537432 *

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN116324725A (zh) 2023-06-23
JPWO2022107216A1 (https=) 2022-05-27
US20230252457A1 (en) 2023-08-10
EP4250110A1 (en) 2023-09-27

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
US11087372B2 (en) Benefit allocation method, apparatus, and electronic device
KR101826969B1 (ko) 버스트 모드 제어
RU2709673C2 (ru) Способы и устройство для распределенной базы данных в сети
US20180121909A1 (en) System and method to dynamically setup a private sub-blockchain based on agility of transaction processing
JP5000456B2 (ja) 資源管理システム、資源管理装置およびその方法
Padmavathi et al. Secure P2P intelligent network transaction using litecoin
US10003640B2 (en) Virtual world subgroup determination and segmentation for performance scalability
TW201216073A (en) System and method for sharing network storage and computing resource
Aggarwal et al. Solving user priority in cloud computing using enhanced optimization algorithm in workflow scheduling
Chu Deep resource allocation for a massively multiplayer online finance of tourism gamification in metaverse
US10419359B2 (en) Resource path monitoring
WO2022189780A1 (en) Improved blockchain relying on advanced consensus
WO2022107216A1 (ja) トランザクション制御方法、トランザクション制御プログラム、及び、情報処理装置
KR100506686B1 (ko) 분산컴퓨팅을 수행한 정보처리기에 대한 기여도 보상시스템 및 기여도 보상 방법
Rojo-Rivas et al. Kriper: A blockchain network with permissioned storage
JP7381137B1 (ja) プログラム、方法、及び情報処理装置
US10033817B2 (en) Stateless technique for distributing data uploads
CN114422575B (zh) 处理网络请求的方法和装置
JP6935567B1 (ja) 情報取引管理システム、方法およびプログラム
JP7327781B2 (ja) マッチング支援装置、マッチング支援方法、コンピュータプログラム及び記録媒体
JP2021140577A (ja) 情報共有支援方法、及び情報共有支援システム
CN111835863B (zh) 电子资源处理方法、装置、设备及存储介质
JP4060807B2 (ja) コンテンツ流通管理システム、サービス管理装置、コンテンツ流通管理方法、およびプログラム
JP2023008646A (ja) 情報処理システム、情報処理方法、及びプログラム
KR20250135550A (ko) 블록체인 네트워크에서 노드 장치 및 이의 동작 방법

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 20962380

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

ENP Entry into the national phase

Ref document number: 2022563282

Country of ref document: JP

Kind code of ref document: A

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

ENP Entry into the national phase

Ref document number: 2020962380

Country of ref document: EP

Effective date: 20230619