WO2021215373A1 - Système de surveillance d'état de pneu et dispositif de communication embarqué - Google Patents

Système de surveillance d'état de pneu et dispositif de communication embarqué Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021215373A1
WO2021215373A1 PCT/JP2021/015789 JP2021015789W WO2021215373A1 WO 2021215373 A1 WO2021215373 A1 WO 2021215373A1 JP 2021015789 W JP2021015789 W JP 2021015789W WO 2021215373 A1 WO2021215373 A1 WO 2021215373A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
measurement data
security
unit
communication device
vehicle
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PCT/JP2021/015789
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
市川　洋光
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株式会社ブリヂストン
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Publication of WO2021215373A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021215373A1/fr

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    • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
    • B60—VEHICLES IN GENERAL
    • B60C—VEHICLE TYRES; TYRE INFLATION; TYRE CHANGING; CONNECTING VALVES TO INFLATABLE ELASTIC BODIES IN GENERAL; DEVICES OR ARRANGEMENTS RELATED TO TYRES
    • B60C19/00—Tyre parts or constructions not otherwise provided for
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08C—TRANSMISSION SYSTEMS FOR MEASURED VALUES, CONTROL OR SIMILAR SIGNALS
    • G08C17/00—Arrangements for transmitting signals characterised by the use of a wireless electrical link
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to a tire condition monitoring system and an in-vehicle communication device that monitor the condition of tires mounted on a vehicle.
  • a tire condition monitoring device for monitoring the condition of a pneumatic tire (hereinafter, appropriately abbreviated as a tire) mounted on a vehicle, specifically, an internal pressure, a temperature, etc., has been known (see Patent Document 1). ..
  • the receiver of the in-vehicle communication device mounted on the vehicle receives the measurement data transmitted wirelessly via the transmitter of the sensor unit mounted on the tire.
  • Patent Document 2 proposes to transmit measurement data to a cloud server or the like on a communication network and utilize it for vehicle management or the like.
  • wireless communication between the sensor unit and the vehicle is basically one-way communication from the sensor unit to the vehicle.
  • the wireless communication method is generally low in speed and has a large packet loss. For this reason, it is difficult to apply security mechanisms such as periodic security key generation and exchange that are used in general communication networks.
  • the purpose is to provide a tire condition monitoring system and an in-vehicle communication device that can be secured.
  • One aspect of the present disclosure is a sensor unit (sensor unit 110) provided on a tire mounted on a vehicle (vehicle V) and an in-vehicle communication device (in-vehicle communication) mounted on the vehicle and receiving a radio signal from the sensor unit.
  • a tire condition monitoring system (tire condition monitoring system 100) including a device) and a cloud server (cloud server 300) that executes communication with the in-vehicle communication device via a communication network.
  • the sensor unit is the sensor.
  • the holding unit (security key holding unit 117) that holds the security key applied to the measurement data transmitted from the unit to the cloud server via the in-vehicle communication device, and the security that is secured by using the security key.
  • the cloud server includes a transmitter (transmitter 119) that transmits measurement data to the in-vehicle communication device, and the cloud server has a receiving unit (measurement data receiving unit 301) that receives the measurement data relayed by the in-vehicle communication device.
  • the security processing unit (security processing unit 305) that executes security processing for the measurement data using the corresponding key corresponding to the security key, and the result of the security processing by the security processing unit is transmitted to the in-vehicle communication device.
  • the vehicle-mounted communication device includes a processing result transmission unit (processing result transmission unit 307), and the in-vehicle communication device relays the measurement data to the cloud server (measurement data relay unit 123) and the security processing result in the cloud. It includes a processing result receiving unit (processing result receiving unit 125) that receives from the server, and an output unit (measurement data output unit 127) that outputs the measurement data based on the result of the security processing.
  • One aspect of the present disclosure is an in-vehicle communication device mounted on a vehicle and receiving a radio signal from a sensor unit provided on a tire mounted on the vehicle, and measuring data for which security is ensured by using a security key.
  • the receiver that receives from the sensor unit, the relay unit that relays the measurement data to the cloud server, and the result of security processing executed by the cloud server using the corresponding key corresponding to the security key are received from the cloud server.
  • the processing result receiving unit is provided, and the output unit that outputs the measurement data based on the result of the security processing is provided.
  • the security of the measurement data can be ensured even when low-speed one-way wireless communication is applied between the sensor unit and the in-vehicle communication device.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic side view of a vehicle V equipped with a pneumatic tire 10.
  • FIG. 2 is an overall schematic configuration diagram of the tire condition monitoring system 100.
  • FIG. 3 is a functional block configuration diagram of the sensor unit 110.
  • FIG. 4 is a functional block configuration diagram of the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • FIG. 5 is a functional block configuration diagram of the cloud server 300.
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram showing a communication sequence relating to measurement data of the pneumatic tire 10 by the sensor unit 110, the in-vehicle communication device 120, and the cloud server 300.
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram showing a configuration example (No. 1) of a packet including measurement data for which security is ensured.
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram showing a configuration example (No. 2) of a packet including measurement data for which security is ensured.
  • FIG. 1 Schematic configuration of the vehicle FIG. 1 is a schematic side view of the vehicle V on which the pneumatic tire 10 is mounted. As shown in FIG. 1, the pneumatic tire 10 is mounted on the vehicle V. Specifically, the vehicle V is fitted with a pneumatic tire 10 assembled on a rim wheel (not shown).
  • the type of vehicle V is not particularly limited, but in this embodiment, a commercial vehicle such as a truck or a bus is assumed.
  • the pneumatic tire 10 mounted on the vehicle V rolls on the road surface R.
  • a sensor unit 110 is attached to the pneumatic tire 10.
  • the sensor unit 110 may be composed of a plurality of types of sensors.
  • the sensor unit 110 may include an acceleration sensor, an internal pressure sensor, a temperature sensor, and the like, and is battery-powered (not shown).
  • the sensor unit 110 may include a transmitter that transmits a wireless signal.
  • the wireless communication method include a method using an LF wave (low frequency) used in a tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS) and the like, or a method conforming to a short-range wireless communication standard.
  • TPMS tire pressure monitoring system
  • the wireless communication method is basically one-way communication that supports only data transmission from the sensor unit 110 and does not support data reception by the sensor unit 110. Further, the data transmission speed according to the wireless communication method is basically extremely low.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 is mounted on the vehicle V.
  • the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 receives a wireless signal from the sensor unit 110.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 may be realized by an electronic control unit (ECU) mounted on the vehicle V, or may be realized by a separate device or a communication device such as a smartphone.
  • ECU electronice control unit
  • FIG. 2 is an overall schematic configuration diagram of the tire condition monitoring system 100 according to the present embodiment. As shown in FIG. 2, the tire condition monitoring system 100 includes a sensor unit 110, an in-vehicle communication device 120, and a cloud server 300.
  • the sensor unit 110 is provided on the pneumatic tire 10 mounted on the vehicle V. Specifically, the sensor unit 110 is provided inside the tread 20 of the pneumatic tire 10.
  • FIG. 2 shows the cross-sectional shape of the pneumatic tire 10 assembled to the rim wheel along the tire width direction.
  • the sensor unit 110 is attached to the inner surface of the tread 20.
  • the sensor unit 110 may be provided not necessarily on the inner surface of the tread 20, but may be provided, for example, in the vicinity of an air valve (not shown) or on the tire side portion.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 receives a wireless signal from the sensor unit 110. Specifically, the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 receives a radio signal including the measurement data measured by the sensor unit 110.
  • the cloud server 300 executes communication with the in-vehicle communication device 120. Specifically, the cloud server 300 transmits and receives various data to and from the in-vehicle communication device 120 via the wireless base station 200 connected to the network cloud 400. That is, the cloud server 300 can execute communication with the in-vehicle communication device 120 via the communication network.
  • the functions of the cloud server 300 can typically be provided by a server computer installed in a data center on the network cloud 400.
  • the functions of the cloud server 300 may be virtually provided by application services and storage services provided on the network cloud 400.
  • Network cloud 400 is a communication network that enables information transmission by wired communication or wireless communication.
  • the network cloud 400 typically includes the Internet, and can also provide various information providing services (weather, traffic information, etc.) provided on the Internet.
  • FIG. 3 is a functional block configuration diagram of the sensor unit 110.
  • the sensor unit 110 includes an acceleration sensor 111, an internal pressure sensor 113, a temperature sensor 115, a security key holding unit 117, a security processing unit 118, and a transmitter 119.
  • the sensor unit 110 can be configured by hardware modules such as a digital signal processor (DSP) and an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) that realize these functions.
  • DSP digital signal processor
  • ASIC application specific integrated circuit
  • the acceleration sensor 111 detects the acceleration of the pneumatic tire 10 in a predetermined direction.
  • the acceleration sensor 111 detects the acceleration of the pneumatic tire 10 in the tire circumferential direction.
  • the acceleration sensor 111 may detect acceleration in the tire radial direction.
  • the acceleration sensor 111 is provided on the inner surface of the pneumatic tire 10, specifically, at the center of the tread 20 in the tire width direction.
  • a general-purpose acceleration sensor such as a 3-axis acceleration sensor can be used.
  • the internal pressure sensor 113 detects the internal pressure (air pressure) of the pneumatic tire 10 attached to the rim wheel.
  • the temperature sensor 115 detects the temperature on the inner surface of the tread 20.
  • the internal pressure sensor 113 and the temperature sensor 115 are the same as the sensors used in general TPMS (tire pressure monitoring system) and the like.
  • the security key holding unit 117 holds the security key K1 applied to the measurement data measured by the acceleration sensor 111, the internal pressure sensor 113, and the temperature sensor 115.
  • the security key holding unit 117 constitutes a holding unit.
  • the measurement data is transmitted from the sensor unit 110 to the cloud server 300 via the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the security key K1 is written in the security key holding unit 117 at the time of manufacturing the sensor unit 110 and is held so that it cannot be rewritten or accessed from the outside.
  • the type of security key K1 is not particularly limited as long as it can function as a common key according to a general security algorithm (including digital signature and encryption). Further, as will be described later, the corresponding key K2 (common key) paired with the security key K1 is held in the cloud server 300.
  • the security key K1 and the corresponding key K2 a common key cryptosystem with a low processing load is preferable in consideration of the capabilities of the processors and the like constituting the sensor unit 110.
  • the security key K1 and the corresponding key K2 may be a private key / public key cryptosystem.
  • Security processing unit 118 executes security processing using the security key K1. Specifically, the security processing unit 118 can add a digital signature to the measurement data by using the security key K1.
  • the security processing unit 118 can execute the encryption of the measurement data by using the security key K1. By such processing, the security of the measurement data is ensured.
  • the transmitter 119 transmits a wireless signal to the in-vehicle communication device 120. Specifically, the transmitter 119 transmits the measurement data whose security is ensured by using the security key K1 to the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the wireless communication method applied between the sensor unit 110 and the in-vehicle communication device 120 is one-way communication corresponding only to data transmission from the sensor unit 110, and the transmission speed is extremely low.
  • the transmitter 119 transmits a wireless signal including measurement data whose security is ensured by using the security key K1 to the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the measurement data is stored in the payload portion of the packet of the predetermined format, and the radio signal including the packet is transmitted to the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • FIG. 4 is a functional block configuration diagram of the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 includes a receiver 121, a measurement data relay unit 123, a processing result receiving unit 125, and a measurement data output unit 127.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 is realized by hardware such as a processor, a memory, and a communication IF.
  • the receiver 121 receives the radio signal from the sensor unit 110. Specifically, the receiver 121 receives the packet in which the measurement data whose security is ensured is stored by using the security key K1.
  • the measurement data relay unit 123 relays the measurement data (packet) received by the receiver 121 to the cloud server 300.
  • the measurement data relay unit 123 constitutes the relay unit.
  • the measurement data relay unit 123 relays the measurement data whose security is ensured by using the security key K1 to the cloud server 300. That is, the measurement data relay unit 123 relays the measurement data (packet) in a state in which security is ensured, such as the measurement data with a digital signature, to the cloud server 300 without any particular processing.
  • the processing result receiving unit 125 receives the result of security processing for the measurement data relayed to the cloud server 300 from the cloud server 300.
  • the processing result receiving unit 125 receives the result of the security processing executed by the cloud server 300 using the corresponding key K2 corresponding to the security key K1 from the cloud server 300.
  • the result of the security process may indicate whether or not the measurement data relayed to the cloud server 300 has integrity, and indicates whether or not the measurement data may have been tampered with. It may be something like.
  • the measurement data output unit 127 outputs measurement data based on the result of the security processing received by the processing result receiving unit 125.
  • the measurement data output unit 127 constitutes an output unit.
  • the measurement data output unit 127 outputs the measurement data when the measurement data has completeness (or the measurement data has not been tampered with).
  • the output method and output destination of the measurement data are not particularly limited. It may be output to a vehicle V display device, a vehicle control device, or the like, or the measurement data output unit 127 may be provided with a display, an audio signal output device, or the like, and the measurement data may be displayed or output by pseudo-audio.
  • FIG. 5 is a functional block configuration diagram of the cloud server 300.
  • the cloud server 300 includes a measurement data receiving unit 301, a corresponding key holding unit 303, a security processing unit 305, a processing result transmitting unit 307, and a tire condition determining unit 309.
  • these functional blocks can be realized by executing a computer program (software) on hardware such as a server computer.
  • the cloud server 300 includes a processor, a memory, an input device, a display, and an external interface as hardware elements.
  • the computer program (software) may be provided via a communication network, or may be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium such as an optical disk, a hard disk drive, or a flash memory.
  • the measurement data receiving unit 301 receives the measurement data (packet) relayed by the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the measurement data receiving unit 301 constitutes a receiving unit.
  • the measurement data receiving unit 301 receives the measurement data via the radio base station 200 and the network cloud 400. As described above, the measurement data is in a state where security such as encryption is ensured.
  • the corresponding key holding unit 303 holds the corresponding key K2 corresponding to the security key K1 held by the sensor unit 110.
  • the corresponding key K2 may be any as long as it can determine the integrity of the measurement data to which the digital signature is given by using the security key K1 and can decrypt the encrypted measurement data by using the security key K1. That is, depending on the security algorithm applied, the security key K1 and the corresponding key K2 may be the same key.
  • the corresponding key holding unit 303 may hold a plurality of corresponding keys K2 corresponding to a plurality of different security keys K1 for each sensor unit 110, or a security algorithm that can be shared for the plurality of security keys K1. When used, it is not always necessary to hold a plurality of security keys K1 and a corresponding number of corresponding keys K2.
  • the security processing unit 305 executes security processing on the measurement data using the corresponding key K2. Specifically, the security processing unit 305 uses the corresponding key K2 to determine whether or not the measurement data has been tampered with.
  • the security processing unit 305 determines whether or not the measurement data with the digital signature using the security key K1 has been tampered with. If the measurement data is encrypted using the security key K1, the measurement data may be decrypted using the corresponding key K2.
  • the security processing unit 305 measures the measurement data. May be determined to have completeness.
  • the security processing unit 305 determines the sequence number assigned to the packet, and confirms that the value of the sequence number gradually increases (in the case of ascending order). That is, the security processing unit 305 confirms that the sequence number assigned to the sequentially received packets does not return to a small value.
  • the sequence number does not necessarily have to be a serial number in consideration of the occurrence of packet loss and the like.
  • the amount of change in the sequence number is within a predetermined range based on the reception time when the packet is received by the measurement data receiving unit 301, which may be determined according to the packet reception cycle. For example, the time may be several to ten times the packet reception cycle.
  • the packet reception cycle may be interpreted as the same as the transmission cycle of the packet transmitted from the sensor unit 110, and the packet transmitted from the sensor unit 110 has a cycle according to the internal clock of the transmitter 119 of the sensor unit 110. It may be assumed that the signal is transmitted.
  • a so-called replay attack production and transmission of eavesdropped past measurement data
  • the processing result transmission unit 307 transmits the result of the security processing by the security processing unit 305 to the in-vehicle communication device 120. Specifically, the processing result transmission unit 307 can transmit to the in-vehicle communication device 120 whether or not the measurement data has been tampered with, or whether or not the measurement data has completeness.
  • the transmission timing of the result of the security processing may be each time the security processing is performed, and only when the measurement data is tampered with (measurement data is not complete) (or the measurement data is not tampered with (measurement data is complete). Only if you have).
  • the tire condition determination unit 309 determines the condition of the pneumatic tire 10 mounted on the vehicle V based on the measurement data (packet) received by the measurement data reception unit 301.
  • the tire condition determination unit 309 can determine the internal pressure, temperature, or road surface condition (using acceleration data) of the pneumatic tire 10 based on the measurement data whose integrity has been confirmed.
  • the determination result by the tire condition determination unit 309 may be transmitted to the in-vehicle communication device 120 together with the result of the security processing.
  • FIG. 6 shows a communication sequence relating to the measurement data of the pneumatic tire 10 by the sensor unit 110, the in-vehicle communication device 120, and the cloud server 300.
  • the sensor unit 110 transmits measurement data (packets) such as internal pressure and temperature to the in-vehicle communication device 120 at predetermined intervals (S10).
  • measurement data packets
  • the measurement data is digitally signed using the security key K1 held in the sensor unit 110, that is, security is ensured.
  • FIG. 7 shows a configuration example (No. 1) of a packet including measurement data in which security is ensured.
  • FIG. 8 shows a configuration example (No. 2) of a packet including measurement data for which security is ensured.
  • FIG. 7 shows a configuration in which the payload portion of the packet including the measurement data (“measured value” in the figure) is encrypted by a common key (here, referred to as a secret session key).
  • the payload portion contains random numbers including identification information (transmitter ID) of transmitter 119 of the sensor unit 110, numerical values (measured values) of measurement data, other data, and sequence number (SN). May be included.
  • FIG. 8 shows a configuration in which a digital signature (hash) by a common key (secret session key) is given to the payload part of the packet including the measurement data (“measured value” in the figure).
  • the object of the signature may be a payload portion including a transmitter ID, a measured value, other data, and a random number.
  • a part of the payload part may be excluded from the target of encryption or digital signature.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 relays the received measurement data (packet) to the cloud server 300 (S20). As described above, the in-vehicle communication device 120 relays the measurement data (packet) in the state where the security is ensured to the cloud server 300 without any particular processing.
  • the measurement data (packet) is transmitted from the in-vehicle communication device 120 to the cloud server 300 (S30).
  • the cloud server 300 receives the measurement data (packet) and executes security processing on the measurement data (S40). Specifically, the cloud server 300 uses the corresponding key K2 to determine whether or not the measurement data has been tampered with.
  • the cloud server 300 has completeness of the measurement data when the amount of change in the sequence number given to the packet containing the measurement data is within a predetermined range based on the reception time when the packet is received. Then, it may be determined.
  • the cloud server 300 generates the result of security processing for the measurement data (S50). Specifically, the cloud server 300 generates a processing result indicating whether or not the measurement data has been tampered with, or whether or not the measurement data has completeness.
  • the cloud server 300 transmits the generated processing result to the in-vehicle communication device 120 (S60).
  • the cloud server 300 can transmit the processing result each time security processing is performed or when the measurement data is falsified.
  • the in-vehicle communication device 120 displays measurement data based on the received security processing result (S70). Specifically, the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 displays the measurement data on the display device of the vehicle V, or displays the measurement data on the display when the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 includes a display or the like.
  • the sensor unit 110 can transmit the measurement data for which security is ensured to the in-vehicle communication device 120 by using the held security key K1. Further, the in-vehicle communication device 120 relays the measurement data as it is to the cloud server 300.
  • the cloud server 300 can execute security processing on the measurement data using the corresponding key K2 corresponding to the security key K1 and transmit the result of the security processing to the in-vehicle communication device 120.
  • the security processing in the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 is not required, and the two-way communication associated with the security processing between the sensor unit 110 and the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 is not required. That is, according to the tire condition monitoring system 100, the security of the measurement data can be ensured even when one-way low-speed wireless communication is applied from the sensor unit 110 to the in-vehicle communication device.
  • the sensor unit 110 has been increasingly installed in commercial vehicles such as trucks and buses for efficient vehicle V operation management.
  • a malicious third party falsifies the measurement data, disrupts the operation of the vehicle V, eavesdrops on the measurement data, and diverts it for an illegal purpose. ..
  • the tire condition monitoring system 100 According to the tire condition monitoring system 100, such a condition can be prevented.
  • the security key K1 can be a common key for each sensor unit 110, is written at the time of manufacturing the sensor unit 110, and can be held so that it cannot be rewritten or accessed from the outside.
  • the corresponding key K2 corresponding to the security key K1 can also be held according to the cloud server 300.
  • the security process using the security key K1 and the corresponding key K2 does not need to be consciously involved by the user such as the pneumatic tire 10. Further, such security processing can contribute to the efficiency of wireless communication between the sensor unit 110 and the in-vehicle communication device 120 (decrease in packet loss rate, etc.) and the extension of the battery life of the sensor unit 110.
  • the measurement data when the change amount of the sequence number given to the packet including the measurement data is within a predetermined range based on the reception time when the packet is received, the measurement data is complete. Can be determined to have. Therefore, the integrity of the measurement data can be determined at a higher level, and high security can be ensured.
  • the wireless communication method between the sensor unit 110 and the vehicle-mounted communication device 120 is premised on one-way communication that does not correspond to data reception by the sensor unit 110. It may support bidirectional communication.
  • a commercial vehicle such as a truck and a bus is assumed as the type of the vehicle V, but the vehicle V may be a commercial vehicle other than the truck and the bus, for example, a taxi. Alternatively, the vehicle V does not necessarily have to be a commercial vehicle.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Mechanical Engineering (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Arrangements For Transmission Of Measured Signals (AREA)
  • Tires In General (AREA)

Abstract

Un dispositif de communication embarqué reçoit, en provenance d'une unité de capteur (110), des données de mesure dont la sécurité a été assurée à l'aide d'une clé de sécurité. Le dispositif de communication embarqué (120) relaie les données de mesure vers un serveur en nuage (300). En outre, le dispositif de communication embarqué (120) : reçoit, en provenance du serveur en nuage (300), les résultats du traitement de sécurité qui a été exécuté par le serveur en nuage (300) à l'aide d'une clé de correspondance qui correspond à la clé de sécurité; et délivre des données de mesure sur la base du résultat du traitement de sécurité.　
PCT/JP2021/015789 2020-04-22 2021-04-19 Système de surveillance d'état de pneu et dispositif de communication embarqué WO2021215373A1 (fr)

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JP2020075819A JP2021172167A (ja) 2020-04-22 2020-04-22 タイヤ状態監視システム及び車載通信装置
JP2020-075819 2020-04-22

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JP2017162045A (ja) * 2016-03-08 2017-09-14 日本電気株式会社 センサーデータ処理装置、センサーデータ処理システム、センサーデータ処理方法、及び、センサーデータ処理プログラム
JP2018522779A (ja) * 2015-06-10 2018-08-16 タイムティックス テクノロジーズ プライベート リミテッド スマートタイヤ圧監視システム
JP2019096008A (ja) * 2017-11-21 2019-06-20 株式会社テクロック・スマートソリューションズ 測定ソリューションサービス提供システム

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
JP2017520451A (ja) * 2014-06-19 2017-07-27 サルティカ アライド ソリューションズ スンディリアンブルハド 無線タイヤ監視システム
US20170244565A1 (en) * 2014-09-26 2017-08-24 Intel Corporation Securely exchanging vehicular sensor information
JP2018522779A (ja) * 2015-06-10 2018-08-16 タイムティックス テクノロジーズ プライベート リミテッド スマートタイヤ圧監視システム
JP2017162045A (ja) * 2016-03-08 2017-09-14 日本電気株式会社 センサーデータ処理装置、センサーデータ処理システム、センサーデータ処理方法、及び、センサーデータ処理プログラム
JP2019096008A (ja) * 2017-11-21 2019-06-20 株式会社テクロック・スマートソリューションズ 測定ソリューションサービス提供システム

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