WO2021203318A1 - Procédés, dispositifs, et support lisible par ordinateur pour la communication - Google Patents

Procédés, dispositifs, et support lisible par ordinateur pour la communication Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021203318A1
WO2021203318A1 PCT/CN2020/083808 CN2020083808W WO2021203318A1 WO 2021203318 A1 WO2021203318 A1 WO 2021203318A1 CN 2020083808 W CN2020083808 W CN 2020083808W WO 2021203318 A1 WO2021203318 A1 WO 2021203318A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
network device
source network
target network
configuration
terminal device
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Application number
PCT/CN2020/083808
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English (en)
Inventor
Lin Liang
Gang Wang
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Nec Corporation
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Priority to PCT/CN2020/083808 priority Critical patent/WO2021203318A1/fr
Publication of WO2021203318A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021203318A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/16—Performing reselection for specific purposes
    • H04W36/18—Performing reselection for specific purposes for allowing seamless reselection, e.g. soft reselection
    • H04W36/185—Performing reselection for specific purposes for allowing seamless reselection, e.g. soft reselection using make before break
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/0005—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off
    • H04W36/0011—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection
    • H04W36/0033—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information
    • H04W36/0038—Control or signalling for completing the hand-off for data sessions of end-to-end connection with transfer of context information of security context information

Definitions

  • Embodiments of the present disclosure generally relate to the field of telecommunication, and in particular, to methods, devices, and computer readable medium for communication.
  • a handover is a process in telecommunications and mobile communications in which a connected cellular call or a data session is transferred from one cell site (base station) to another without disconnecting the session.
  • Handovers are a core element in planning and deploying cellular networks. It allows users to create data sessions or connect phone calls on the move. This process keeps the calls and data sessions connected even if a user moves from one cell site to another. There may be interruption time during the handover. Different technologies to overcome the interruption time have been proposed.
  • example embodiments of the present disclosure provide a solution of performing handover.
  • a method for communication comprises in response to receiving, at a terminal device and from a source network device, a command to handover from the source network device to a target network device, connecting with the target network device while maintaining a connection with the source network device.
  • the method further comprises determining based on the command whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to the source network device.
  • the method also comprises in accordance with a determination that the security key is unchanged, transmitting, to the target network device, a protocol data unit unsuccessfully received by the source network device.
  • a method for communication comprises transmitting, at a source network device and to a terminal device, a command to handover from the source network device to the target network device, the command indicating whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to the source network device.
  • a method for communication comprises determining, at a target network device, whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to a source network device. The method also comprises in accordance with a determination that the security key is unchanged, receiving, at the target network device and from a terminal device, a protocol data unit unsuccessfully received by the source network device.
  • a terminal device comprises a processing unit; and a memory coupled to the processing unit and storing instructions thereon, the instructions, when executed by the processing unit, causing the terminal device to perform acts comprising: in response to receiving, from a source network device, a command to handover from the source network device to a target network device, connecting with the target network device while maintaining a connection with the source network device; determining based on the command whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to the source network device; and in accordance with a determination that the security key is unchanged, transmitting, to the target network device, a protocol data unit unsuccessfully received by the source network device.
  • a source network device comprises a processing unit; and a memory coupled to the processing unit and storing instructions thereon, the instructions, when executed by the processing unit, causing the source network device to perform acts comprising: transmitting, at a source network device and to a terminal device, a command to handover from the source network device to the target network device, the command indicating whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to the source network device.
  • a target network device comprises a processing unit; and a memory coupled to the processing unit and storing instructions thereon, the instructions, when executed by the processing unit, causing the target network device to perform acts comprising: determining whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to a source network device; and in accordance with a determination that the security key is unchanged, receiving, at the target network device and from a terminal device, a protocol data unit unsuccessfully received by the source network device.
  • a computer readable medium having instructions stored thereon, the instructions, when executed on at least one processor, causing the at least one processor to carry out the method according to any one of the first aspect, second aspect or third aspect.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of a communication device according to conventional technologies
  • Fig. 2 is a schematic diagram of a communication device according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of a communication environment in which embodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented
  • Fig. 4 illustrates a signaling flow for reporting candidate beams according to some embodiments of the present disclosure
  • Fig. 5 is a flowchart of an example method in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Figs. 6A-6C illustrate packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) entities in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure, respectively;
  • Fig. 7 is a flowchart of an example method in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 8 is a flowchart of an example method in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 9 is a flowchart of an example method in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 10 is a flowchart of an example method in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 11 is a simplified block diagram of a device that is suitable for implementing embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the term “network device” refers to a device which is capable of providing or hosting a cell or coverage where terminal devices can communicate.
  • a network device include, but not limited to, a Node B (NodeB or NB) , an Evolved NodeB (eNodeB or eNB) , a NodeB in new radio access (gNB) a Remote Radio Unit (RRU) , a radio head (RH) , a remote radio head (RRH) , a low power node such as a femto node, a pico node, a satellite network device, an aircraft network device, and the like.
  • NodeB Node B
  • eNodeB or eNB Evolved NodeB
  • gNB NodeB in new radio access
  • RRU Remote Radio Unit
  • RH radio head
  • RRH remote radio head
  • a low power node such as a femto node, a pico node, a satellite network
  • terminal device refers to any device having wireless or wired communication capabilities.
  • Examples of the terminal device include, but not limited to, user equipment (UE) , personal computers, desktops, mobile phones, cellular phones, smart phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs) , portable computers, tablets, wearable devices, internet of things (IoT) devices, Internet of Everything (IoE) devices, machine type communication (MTC) devices, device on vehicle for V2X communication where X means pedestrian, vehicle, or infrastructure/network, or image capture devices such as digital cameras, gaming devices, music storage and playback appliances, or Internet appliances enabling wireless or wired Internet access and browsing and the like.
  • UE user equipment
  • Communications discussed herein may use conform to any suitable standards including, but not limited to, New Radio Access (NR) , Long Term Evolution (LTE) , LTE-Evolution, LTE-Advanced (LTE-A) , Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) , Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) , cdma2000, and Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and the like.
  • NR New Radio Access
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE-A LTE-Evolution
  • WCDMA Wideband Code Division Multiple Access
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • the communications may be performed according to any generation communication protocols either currently known or to be developed in the future. Examples of the communication protocols include, but not limited to, the first generation (1G) , the second generation (2G) , 2.5G, 2.85G, the third generation (3G) , the fourth generation (4G) , 4.5G, the fifth generation (5G) communication protocols.
  • the techniques described herein may be used for the
  • values, procedures, or apparatus are referred to as “best, ” “lowest, ” “highest, ” “minimum, ” “maximum, ” or the like. It will be appreciated that such descriptions are intended to indicate that a selection among many used functional alternatives can be made, and such selections need not be better, smaller, higher, or otherwise preferable to other selections.
  • DAPS Handover is a handover procedure that maintains the source gNB connection after reception of RRC message for handover and until releasing the source cell after successful random access to the target gNB.
  • the terminal device may create a medium access control (MAC) entity for the target network device and may establish a radio link control (RLC) entity and an associated logical channel for each data radio bearer configured with DAPS.
  • MAC medium access control
  • RLC radio link control
  • a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) entity 101 has been created for the source network device.
  • the PDCP function module 101 may comprise a compression/decompression module 1010-1, a ciphering/deciphering module 1020-1 and an integrity protection/verification module 1030-1.
  • the PDCP function module 101 may associate with the RLC entity 1040-1.
  • a new PDCP function module 102 may be created for the target network device after the terminal device receives the DAPS handover command.
  • the PDCP function module 102 may comprise a compression/decompression module 1010-2, a ciphering/deciphering module 1020-2 and an integrity protection/verification module 1030-2.
  • the PDCP entity 102 may associate with the RLC entity 1040-2.
  • the security keys of the source network device and the target network device may be different.
  • the security key of the target network device may remain the same as the security key of the source network device.
  • a CU 210 may connect with more than one DU, for example, the DUs 220-1 and 220-2.
  • the CU 210 may comprise a service data adaptation protocol (SDAP) module 2101 and a PDCP entity 2102.
  • SDAP service data adaptation protocol
  • the DU 220-1 may comprise a RLC module 2201-1 and a MAC module 2202-1
  • the DU 220-2 may comprise a RLC module 2201-2 and a MAC module 2202-2. If the terminal device is to handover from the DU 220-1 to the DU 220-2, which is called intra-gNB-CU handover, the security key may not be changed.
  • the terminal device may have to recompress and re-encrypt all unacknowledged UL packets when they are retransmitted to the target cell.
  • the header compression results may be different, which leads to PDCP protocol data unit (PDU) with different data content ciphered by the same security key using the same COUNT value.
  • PDU PDCP protocol data unit
  • key stream re-use i.e., by taking the XOR of the encrypted UL packet sent on the source and target cell, an attacker can learn information about the contents of the UL packet.
  • DL downlink
  • DL downlink
  • the duplicated transmission of packets by the source and target cells may also lead to the same security issue.
  • the source network device and the terminal device may start to send initialization and refresh (IR) packets upon the transmission/reception of handover command and they continue to send IR packets during the handover.
  • IR initialization and refresh
  • the packet before the DAPS handover may not be based on IR packet and will be retransmitted to the target network device.
  • a terminal device receives an indication concerning whether a security for a target network device is changed with respect to a source network device. If the security key is not changed, the terminal device transmits a PDU which is unsuccessfully transmitted to the source network device to the target network device. Further, there may be only one PDCP function module for the source network device and the target network device. In this way, security issues can be addressed. Further, resources can also be saved.
  • Fig. 3 illustrates a schematic diagram of a communication system in which embodiments of the present disclosure can be implemented.
  • the communication system 300 which is a part of a communication network, comprises a terminal device 310-1, a terminal device 310-2, ..., a terminal device 310-N, which can be collectively referred to as “terminal device (s) 310. ”
  • the number N can be any suitable integer number.
  • the communication system 300 further comprises network terminal device 320-1, a network device 320-2, ..., a network device 320-M, which can be collectively referred to as “network device (s) 320. ”
  • the number M can be any suitable integer number.
  • the network devices 320 and the terminal devices 310 can communicate data and control information to each other.
  • the network device 320-1 can be regarded as a source network device and the network device 320-2 can be regarded as a target network device.
  • the numbers of terminal devices and network devices shown in Fig. 3 are given for the purpose of illustration without suggesting any limitations. Only as an example, as shown in Fig. 3, the network devices 320 may connect to one or more centralized unit 330.
  • the source network device 320-1 and the target network device 320-2 may belong to one gNB.
  • Communications in the communication system 300 may be implemented according to any proper communication protocol (s) , comprising, but not limited to, cellular communication protocols of the first generation (1G) , the second generation (2G) , the third generation (3G) , the fourth generation (4G) and the fifth generation (5G) and on the like, wireless local network communication protocols such as Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 and the like, and/or any other protocols currently known or to be developed in the future.
  • s cellular communication protocols of the first generation (1G) , the second generation (2G) , the third generation (3G) , the fourth generation (4G) and the fifth generation (5G) and on the like, wireless local network communication protocols such as Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 and the like, and/or any other protocols currently known or to be developed in the future.
  • IEEE Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers
  • the communication may utilize any proper wireless communication technology, comprising but not limited to: Code Divided Multiple Address (CDMA) , Frequency Divided Multiple Address (FDMA) , Time Divided Multiple Address (TDMA) , Frequency Divided Duplexer (FDD) , Time Divided Duplexer (TDD) , Multiple-Input Multiple-Output (MIMO) , Orthogonal Frequency Divided Multiple Access (OFDMA) and/or any other technologies currently known or to be developed in the future.
  • CDMA Code Divided Multiple Address
  • FDMA Frequency Divided Multiple Address
  • TDMA Time Divided Multiple Address
  • FDD Frequency Divided Duplexer
  • TDD Time Divided Duplexer
  • MIMO Multiple-Input Multiple-Output
  • OFDMA Orthogonal Frequency Divided Multiple Access
  • Fig. 4 shows a signaling chart illustrating interactions 400 among network devices according to some example embodiments of the present disclosure. Only for the purpose of discussion, the process 400 will be described with reference to Fig. 3.
  • the process 400 may involve the terminal device 310-1 and the network devices 320-1 and 320-2 in Fig. 3.
  • the source network device 320-1 transmits 4010 a command to the terminal device 310-1 to handover from the source network device 320-1 to a target network device 320-2.
  • the command may be transmitted via radio resource control (RRC) signaling.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • the source network device 320-1 may transmit the command indicating the DAPS.
  • the terminal device 310-1 connects 4020 with the target network device 320-2 while maintaining the connection with the source network device 320-1.
  • the source network device 320-1 determines 4030 whether the security key for the target network device 320-2 is changed based on the command. For example, if the handover is an intra-gNB-CU handover, an indication in the command may indicate that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1. In other embodiments, if there is no such indication in the command, the source network device 320-1 may also determine that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1.
  • the indication may explicitly indicate that the security key for the target 320-2 is changed.
  • the RRC layer of the terminal device 310-1 may inform the PDCP layer of the terminal device 310-1 to perform uplink data switch with the securely key change or without security key change.
  • the RRC layer of the terminal device 310-1 may inform the PDCP layer of the terminal device 310-1 that the security key is unchanged during configuring the PDCP function module for the target network device 320-2.
  • the RRC layer may inform the PDCP layer that the security key is unchanged before the uplink data switching.
  • the source network device 320-1 may still transmit 4040 downlink data to the terminal device 310-1.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may also transmit uplink data to the source network device 320-1.
  • the terminal device 310-1 transmits 4060 uplink data to the target network device 320-2.
  • the target network device 320-2 may also transmit downlink data to the terminal device 310-1.
  • the terminal device 310-1 if the terminal device 310-1 does not transmit data to the source network device 320-1 successfully, the terminal device 310-1 needs to retransmit the data to the target network device 320-2. For example, if the security key is unchanged, the terminal deice 310-2 may transmit a PDU which is not transmitted to the source network device 320-1 successfully to the target network device 320-2.
  • the PDU may be previously submitted to the acknowledged mode (AM) RLC entity associated with the source network device 320-1 in ascending order of the associated COUNT values for which the successful delivery has not been confirmed by lower layers to the AM RLC entity associated with the target network device 320-2. In this way, it addresses security issues caused by the unchanged security key.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform the transmission of PDCP data service data unit (SDU) to the AM RLC entity associate with the target network device 320-2.
  • SDU PDCP data service data unit
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform the transmission of PDCP SDU to the target network device 320-2 by processing header compression, ciphering and integrity protection.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform retransmission of data in SDU.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform retransmission or transmission of all the PDCP SDUs already associated with PDCP SNs in ascending order of the COUNT values associated to the PDCP SDU prior to uplink data switching to the RLC entity associated with the target network device 320-2 by processing header compression, ciphering and integrity protection.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may disregard the handover command. In other words, in this embodiment, for DAPS handover, the security key must be changed. Further, the terminal device 310-1 may consider it as reconfiguration failure. In other words, if the command indicates that the security is not changed, the terminal device 310-1 may determine that the RRC configuration associated with the command as a RRC configuration failure, which means the terminal device 310-1 is unable to comply with the configuration in the command. In this situation, the terminal device 310-1 may perform a RRC reconfiguration procedure. Only as an example, if the terminal device 310-1 determines the RRC configuration failure, the terminal device 310-1 may continue using the configuration prior to the reception of the command.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform the actions upon going to RRC_IDLE. If the AS security has been activated but SRB2 and at least one data radio bearer have not been setup, the terminal device 310-1 may perform the actions upon going to RRC_IDLE with release cause ‘RRC connection failure. ’ The terminal device 310-1 may initiate the connection re-establishment procedure upon which the reconfiguration procedure ends. In this way, the security key must be changed, thereby no security problems caused.
  • Fig. 5 shows a flowchart of an example method 500 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. Only for the purpose of illustrations, the method 300 can be implemented at a terminal device 310-1 as shown in Fig. 3.
  • the terminal device 310-1 connects with the target network device 320-2 while maintaining the connection with the source network device 320-1 if the terminal device 310-1 receives a command to the terminal device 310-1 to handover from the source network device 320-1 to a target network device 320-2.
  • the command may be transmitted via radio resource control (RRC) signaling.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • the source network device 320-1 may transmit the command indicating the DAPS.
  • the terminal device 310-1 determines whether the security key is changed based on the command. For example, if the handover is an intra-gNB-CU handover, an indication in the command may indicate that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1. In other embodiments, if there is no such indication in the command, the source network device 320-1 may also determine that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1. Alternatively, the indication may explicitly indicate that the security key for the target 320-2 is changed.
  • the RRC layer of the terminal device 310-1 may inform the PDCP layer of the terminal device 310-1 to perform uplink data switch with the securely key change or without security key change.
  • the source network device 320-1 may still transmit 4040 data to the terminal device 310-1.
  • the RRC layer of the terminal device 310-1 may inform the PDCP layer of the terminal device 310-1 that the security key is unchanged during configuring the PDCP function module for the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 transmits data to the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 if the terminal device 310-1 does not transmit data to the source network device 320-1 successfully, the terminal device 310-1 needs to retransmit the data to the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal deice 310-2 may transmit a PDU which is not transmitted to the source network device 320-1 successfully to the target network device 320-2.
  • the PDU may be previously submitted to the AM RLC entity associated with the source network device 320-1 in ascending order of the associated COUNT values for which the successful delivery has not been confirmed by lower layers to the AM RLC entity associated with the target network device 320-2. In this way, it addresses security issues caused by the unchanged security key.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform the transmission of PDCP data service data unit (SDU) to the AM RLC entity associate with the target network device 320-2.
  • SDU PDCP data service data unit
  • the terminal device 310-1 may perform retransmission of data in SDU.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may disregard the handover command. Further, the terminal device 310-1 may consider it as reconfiguration failure. In this way, the security key must be changed, thereby no security problems caused.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may configure PDCP function module for the target network device 320-2 after receiving command.
  • the terminal device 130-1 may configure the PDCP function module 320-1 to associate with the RLC module of the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 has a PDCP function module 610 which is associated with the RLC module 6040-1 of the source network device 320-1.
  • the PDCP function module 610 may have a compression/decompression module 6010-1, a ciphering/deciphering module 6020-1 and an integrity protection/verification module 6030-1.
  • the terminal device 310-1 does not need to configure another PDCP function module for the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may configure the PDCP function module 610 to associate with the RLC module 6040-2 of the target network device 320-2. In this way, no extra resources (for example, calculating capabilities and/or processing capabilities) are wasted while the security issues can also been addressed.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may create a PDCP function module for the target network device 320-2 after receiving command.
  • a PDCP function module 620 can be created for the target network device 320-2.
  • the PDCP function module 620 may comprise a compression/decompression module 6010-2, a ciphering/deciphering module 6020-2 and an integrity protection/verification module 6030-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may deactivate at least part of the PDCP function module 620.
  • the compression/decompression module 6010-2 can be deactivated.
  • all of the modules in the PDCP function module 620 can be deactivated, which is shown in Fig. 6C. In this way, it ensures that the retransmissions to the source network device and the target network device are the same, thereby improving security of the retransmission.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may process uplink data to be transmitted to the target network device 320-2 based on a processing configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may process uplink data to be transmitted to the target network device 320-2 based on a processing configuration for the target network device 320-2.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may transmit the processed uplink data to the target network device 320-2.
  • Fig. 7 shows a flowchart of an example method 700 for processing the uplink data in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The method 700 is described with the reference to Fig. 6A-6C.
  • the compression/decompression module 6010-1 may perform header compression for the uplink data (for example, PDCP SDU) based on a header compression protocol configuration for the source network device 320-1 regardless to which network devices the data is transmitted.
  • the compression/decompression module 6010-1 may perform header compression for the uplink data (for example, PDCP SDU) based on a header compression protocol configuration for the target network device 320-2. In this way, the header compression for the data to the source and target network devices is the same.
  • the compressed uplink data may be ciphered based on a ciphering configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the compressed uplink data may be ciphered based on a ciphering configuration for the target network device 320-2.
  • the ciphering/deciphering module 6020-1 may cipher the compressed uplink data.
  • the ciphering/deciphering module 6020-2 in the PDCP function module 620 may cipher the compressed uplink data.
  • an integrity protection may be performed for the ciphered uplink data based on an integrity protection configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the integrity protection may be performed for the ciphered uplink data based on an integrity protection configuration for the target network device 320-2.
  • the integrity protection/verification module 6030-1 may perform the integrity protection for the compressed uplink data.
  • the integrity protection /verification module 6030-2 in the PDCP function module 620 may perform the integrity protection for the compressed uplink data.
  • the terminal device 310-1 may receive downlink data from the target network device 320-2. If the security key is unchanged, the terminal device 310-1 may process the downlink data based on a processing configuration for the source network device 320-1. Alternatively, the terminal device 310-1 may process the downlink data based on a processing configuration for the target network device 320-2.
  • Fig. 8 shows a flowchart of an example method 800 for processing the downlink data in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. The method 800 is described with the reference to Fig. 6A-6C.
  • the compression/decompression module 6010-1 may perform header decompression for the downlink data (for example, PDCP SDU) based on a header compression protocol configuration for the source network device 320-1 regardless from which network devices the data is received.
  • PDCP SDU header compression protocol configuration
  • the compression/decompression module 6010-2 in the PDCP function module 620 may decompress the downlink data based on a further header compression protocol configuration for the target network device 320-2. If the downlink data cannot be decompressed, the compression/decompression module 6010-1 in the PDCP function module 610 may perform the header decompression based on the header compression protocol configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the decompressed downlink data may be deciphered based on a ciphering configuration for the source network device 320-1. In some embodiments, the deciphering may be performed based on a further ciphering configuration of the target network device 320-2. In some embodiments, if there is no separate PDCP function module 620 for the target network device 320-2 or the separate PDCP function module 620 is deactivated, the ciphering/deciphering module 6020-1 may decipher the compressed downlink data. Alternatively, the ciphering/deciphering module 6020-2 in the PDCP function module 620 may decipher the compressed downlink data.
  • a verification may be performed for the deciphered uplink data based on a verification configuration for the source network device 320-1. In some embodiments, the verification may be performed based on a further verification configuration of the target network device 320-2. In some embodiments, if there is no separate PDCP function module 620 for the target network device 320-2 or the separate PDCP function module 620 is deactivated, the integrity protection /verification module 6030-1 may perform the verification for the compressed downlink data. Alternatively, the integrity protection /verification module 6030-2 in the PDCP function module 620 may perform the verification for the compressed downlink data.
  • Fig. 9 shows a flowchart of an example method 900 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. Only for the purpose of illustrations, the method 900 can be implemented at a source network device 320-1 as shown in Fig. 3.
  • the source network device 320-1 transmits a command to the terminal device 310-1 to handover from the source network device 320-1 to a target network device 320-2.
  • the source network device 320-1 may transmit the command indicating the DAPS.
  • the command may indicate whether the security key is changed.
  • the handover is an intra-gNB-CU handover
  • an indication in the command may indicate that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1. In other embodiments, if there is no such indication in the command, it indicates that the security key for the target network device 320-2 is unchanged with respect to the source network device 310-1.
  • Fig. 10 shows a flowchart of an example method 1000 in accordance with an embodiment of the present disclosure. Only for the purpose of illustrations, the method 1000 can be implemented at a target network device 320-2 as shown in Fig. 3.
  • the target network device 320-2 determines whether a security key for the target network device is changed with respect to the source network device 320-2
  • the target network device 320-2 receives, to the terminal device 310-1, a protocol data unit unsuccessfully transmitted to the source network device 320-2 if the security key is unchanged. In this way, it can ensure the retransmitted packets by the target network device 320-2 are the same as the first transmission in the source network device 320-1.
  • the network shall ensure the duplicated transmitted PDCP PDUs with the same COUNT value from the source network device 320-1 and target network device 320-2 are the same.
  • the target network device 320-2 may use IR packet during the handover.
  • the network shall ensure the retransmitted packets by the target network device 320-2 are the same as the first transmission in the source network device 320-1, for example, by retransmitting PDCP PDU.
  • the target network device 320-2 may receive uplink data from the terminal device 310-1. If the security key is unchanged, the target network device 320-2 may process the uplink data based on a processing configuration for the source network device 320-1. For example, the centralized unit 330 of the target network device 320-2 may perform header decompression for the uplink data based on a header compression protocol configuration for the source network device 320-1. The header decompression may be performed by the CU (not shown) of the target network device 320-2. The centralized unit 330 of the network device 320-2 may decipher the decompressed uplink data based a ciphering configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the centralized unit 330 of the network device 320-2 may perform verification for the deciphered uplink data based on a integrity protection configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • One or more of the header decompression, deciphering or verification may be performed by the CU of the target network device 320-2.
  • the centralized unit 330 of the target network device 320-2 may process downlink data to be transmitted to the terminal device 310-1 based on a processing configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the target network device 320-2 may transmit the processed downlink data to the terminal device 310-1.
  • the centralized unit 330 of the target network device 320-2 may perform header compression for the downlink data based on a header compression protocol configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the centralized unit 330 of the network device 320-2 may cipher the compressed downlink data based a ciphering configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • the centralized unit 330 of the network device 320-2 may perform an integrity protection for the ciphered downlink data based on a integrity protection configuration for the source network device 320-1.
  • One or more of the header compression, ciphering or integrity protection may be performed by the CU of the target network device 320-2.
  • Fig. 11 is a simplified block diagram of a device 1100 that is suitable for implementing embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the device 1100 can be considered as a further example implementation of the terminal device 310 and the network device 320 as shown in Fig. 3. Accordingly, the device 1100 can be implemented at or as at least a part of the terminal device 310 or the network device 120.
  • the device 1100 includes a processor 1110, a memory 1120 coupled to the processor 1110, a suitable transmitter (TX) and receiver (RX) 1140 coupled to the processor 1110, and a communication interface coupled to the TX/RX 1140.
  • the memory 1120 stores at least a part of a program 1130.
  • the TX/RX 1140 is for bidirectional communications.
  • the TX/RX 1140 has at least one antenna to facilitate communication, though in practice an Access Node mentioned in this application may have several ones.
  • the communication interface may represent any interface that is necessary for communication with other network elements, such as X2 interface for bidirectional communications between eNBs, S1 interface for communication between a Mobility Management Entity (MME) /Serving Gateway (S-GW) and the eNB, Un interface for communication between the eNB and a relay node (RN) , or Uu interface for communication between the eNB and a terminal device.
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • S-GW Serving Gateway
  • Un interface for communication between the eNB and a relay node (RN)
  • Uu interface for communication between the eNB and a terminal device.
  • the program 1130 is assumed to include program instructions that, when executed by the associated processor 1110, enable the device 1100 to operate in accordance with the embodiments of the present disclosure, as discussed herein with reference to Fig. 3 to 10.
  • the embodiments herein may be implemented by computer software executable by the processor 1110 of the device 1100, or by hardware, or by a combination of software and hardware.
  • the processor 1110 may be configured to implement various embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • a combination of the processor 1110 and memory 1120 may form processing means 1150 adapted to implement various embodiments of the present disclosure.
  • the memory 1120 may be of any type suitable to the local technical network and may be implemented using any suitable data storage technology, such as a non-transitory computer readable storage medium, semiconductor-based memory devices, magnetic memory devices and systems, optical memory devices and systems, fixed memory and removable memory, as non-limiting examples. While only one memory 1120 is shown in the device 1100, there may be several physically distinct memory modules in the device 1100.
  • the processor 1110 may be of any type suitable to the local technical network, and may include one or more of general purpose computers, special purpose computers, microprocessors, digital signal processors (DSPs) and processors based on multicore processor architecture, as non-limiting examples.
  • the device 1100 may have multiple processors, such as an application specific integrated circuit chip that is slaved in time to a clock which synchronizes the main processor.
  • various embodiments of the present disclosure may be implemented in hardware or special purpose circuits, software, logic or any combination thereof. Some aspects may be implemented in hardware, while other aspects may be implemented in firmware or software which may be executed by a controller, microprocessor or other computing device. While various aspects of embodiments of the present disclosure are illustrated and described as block diagrams, flowcharts, or using some other pictorial representation, it will be appreciated that the blocks, apparatus, systems, techniques or methods described herein may be implemented in, as non-limiting examples, hardware, software, firmware, special purpose circuits or logic, general purpose hardware or controller or other computing devices, or some combination thereof.
  • the present disclosure also provides at least one computer program product tangibly stored on a non-transitory computer readable storage medium.
  • the computer program product includes computer-executable instructions, such as those included in program modules, being executed in a device on a target real or virtual processor, to carry out the process or method as described above with reference to any of Figs. 4-10.
  • program modules include routines, programs, libraries, objects, classes, components, data structures, or the like that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.
  • the functionality of the program modules may be combined or split between program modules as desired in various embodiments.
  • Machine-executable instructions for program modules may be executed within a local or distributed device. In a distributed device, program modules may be located in both local and remote storage media.
  • Program code for carrying out methods of the present disclosure may be written in any combination of one or more programming languages. These program codes may be provided to a processor or controller of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, or other programmable data processing apparatus, such that the program codes, when executed by the processor or controller, cause the functions/operations specified in the flowcharts and/or block diagrams to be implemented.
  • the program code may execute entirely on a machine, partly on the machine, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the machine and partly on a remote machine or entirely on the remote machine or server.
  • the above program code may be embodied on a machine readable medium, which may be any tangible medium that may contain, or store a program for use by or in connection with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
  • the machine readable medium may be a machine readable signal medium or a machine readable storage medium.
  • a machine readable medium may include but not limited to an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.
  • machine readable storage medium More specific examples of the machine readable storage medium would include an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM) , a read-only memory (ROM) , an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or Flash memory) , an optical fiber, a portable compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) , an optical storage device, a magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing.
  • RAM random access memory
  • ROM read-only memory
  • EPROM or Flash memory erasable programmable read-only memory
  • CD-ROM portable compact disc read-only memory
  • magnetic storage device or any suitable combination of the foregoing.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Selon des modes de réalisation, la présente invention se rapporte à la communication. Selon des modes de réalisation de la présente invention, un dispositif terminal reçoit une indication concernant le fait qu'une clé de sécurité pour un dispositif de réseau cible est changée par rapport à un dispositif de réseau source. Si la clé de sécurité n'est pas changée, le dispositif terminal transmet au dispositif de réseau cible une PDU dont la transmission au dispositif de réseau source a échoué. De cette manière, des problèmes de sécurité peuvent être résolus. En outre, cela peut économiser des ressources.
PCT/CN2020/083808 2020-04-08 2020-04-08 Procédés, dispositifs, et support lisible par ordinateur pour la communication WO2021203318A1 (fr)

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