WO2021134528A1 - Anti-secret-photographing traffic monitoring and interference method and device - Google Patents

Anti-secret-photographing traffic monitoring and interference method and device Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021134528A1
WO2021134528A1 PCT/CN2019/130667 CN2019130667W WO2021134528A1 WO 2021134528 A1 WO2021134528 A1 WO 2021134528A1 CN 2019130667 W CN2019130667 W CN 2019130667W WO 2021134528 A1 WO2021134528 A1 WO 2021134528A1
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traffic
suspicious
wireless
list
data packets
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PCT/CN2019/130667
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French (fr)
Chinese (zh)
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李庆远
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李庆远
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Priority to PCT/CN2019/130667 priority Critical patent/WO2021134528A1/en
Publication of WO2021134528A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021134528A1/en

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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L65/00Network arrangements, protocols or services for supporting real-time applications in data packet communication

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method and equipment for anti-sneak camera traffic monitoring and interference, and in particular to a method and equipment for identifying and interfering with the candid camera device by monitoring the wireless device traffic.
  • Cost is the consensus basis for solving many social problems. Some consumers and the media blame the management of public places, such as hotels and shopping malls that are not responsible for inspections. In fact, it is a selfish idea to pass the cost on to others. And because people are selfish by nature (no need to bear major costs, of course people who do everything they can are kind), hotels and shopping malls cannot bear losses for this, and the costs will inevitably be passed on to consumers.
  • the problem is that consumers are not willing to pay for it-when a newly generated fee item cannot increase/improve the experience, users will not be willing to pay, unless they pay a significant price, they will be willing to pay for protective services. Even luxury hotels often leak user data, because the visible investment of luxury is more likely to attract consumers.
  • ⁇ Detect stealth camera with spherical/fisheye lens through mobile phone camera close the light curtains, make the room as dark as possible, and use a flashlight or mobile phone flash to illuminate places where stealth camera may occur, such as ceiling lights in bedrooms, bathrooms, smoke detectors, and beds
  • Opposite routers, power socket openings, small objects, the small white dots found are the spherical/fisheye lens for stealing the camera.
  • the limitation of this method is that some flat lenses have very weak reflections and require consumers to have a keen eye. Some stealth cameras embedded in power sockets cannot see the reflections because they are hidden deep and slightly offset.
  • Targeted sneak shots There are many methods for sneak shots, which are difficult to deal with.
  • Undifferentiated sneak shots Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at indiscriminate sneak shots.
  • the stealth camera can be divided into the following types:
  • the battery-powered sneak shot camera requires manual battery replacement/charging, which is a targeted sneak shot. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at a stealth camera powered by an external power supply.
  • the video storage medium it is divided into memory card and webcast.
  • the memory card needs to be replaced/collected manually, which is a targeted sneak shot. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to the stealth camera through live webcast.
  • the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to a stealth camera that is broadcast live via a wireless network.
  • the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to the stealth camera that is broadcast live via the wireless network.
  • the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at monitoring the flow of wireless devices through wireless signals, identifying and interfering with secretly photographed devices.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a device and a method, including:
  • ⁇ Wireless network card to capture network packets and monitor the traffic of nearby wireless devices
  • the wireless network card of the computer usually lives in the management mode, and if the driver or/and firmware supports it, it can be switched to the monitoring mode. In the monitoring mode, you can monitor the traffic of all nearby wireless devices through the wireless network card. After a suspicious device is discovered, a large number of interference packets can be sent through this wireless network card to block prying eyes. Therefore, the key lies in how to distinguish the characteristics of wireless traffic.
  • the method and the device for identifying the sneak shot device and performing interference by monitoring the flow of the wireless device lies in how to identify the characteristics of the suspicious wireless flow.
  • Traffic characteristic analysis is a very important and difficult subject.
  • Mobile network operators have used traffic characteristic analysis to identify online video live broadcasts to provide service quality control (Quality of Service, QoS).
  • QoS Quality of Service
  • related research results show that there is no 100% accuracy rate to identify specific traffic types.
  • the network traffic can be correlated to specific applications.
  • the payload part of the data packet there will be some special bytes or strings used to indicate the protocol type, and by detecting this part of the special bytes or strings in the data packet, you can match the specific application.
  • DPI technology has a strong impact on encrypted network traffic (especially used in Candidly photographed wireless network live broadcast), can not achieve high-precision and effective identification.
  • the data packet is divided into different streams, and different types of data streams have different traffic behaviors in transmission. the same. Therefore, various parameters can be set for the data flow in the network, the statistical characteristics of each data flow can be studied, and different types of applications can be identified through statistical analysis of various parameters of the flow, and then the network traffic can be marked.
  • Modern network videos are encrypted by default. Even if the embodiment of the present invention is aimed at stealing cameras that are broadcast live over a wireless network, the uploaded video data packets are not encrypted, and encryption must be considered. Therefore, it is not possible to simply intercept the suspicious wireless device data packet, and compare the environment of the hotel, shopping mall and other public places after the video is decoded to determine the existence and specific location of the stealth camera.
  • mobile devices such as mobile phones
  • the built-in display module or wireless network can be connected through the built-in display module or wireless network, and the details of the process of monitoring, identification, elimination, confirmation, and interference can be displayed in cooperation with the APP.

Abstract

Disclosed are an anti-secret-photographing traffic monitoring and interference method and device. The traffic of a wireless device is monitored, so as to identify a secret-photographing device and interfere same.

Description

反偷拍流量监测与干扰的方法和设备Method and equipment for anti-candid camera flow monitoring and interference 发明领域Field of invention
本发明涉及反偷拍流量监测与干扰的方法和设备,具体涉及一种通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的方法和设备。The present invention relates to a method and equipment for anti-sneak camera traffic monitoring and interference, and in particular to a method and equipment for identifying and interfering with the candid camera device by monitoring the wireless device traffic.
背景技术Background technique
随着智能手机普及,微型高清摄像头变得极为廉价,导致偷拍极为猖獗,甚至形成了产业链,不法分子直接通过网络直播进行牟利。对于司法系统而言存在执法成本,而暴力犯罪、重大经济犯罪优先级更高,不能期望依靠简单粗暴的执法解决此问题。With the popularization of smart phones, miniature high-definition cameras have become extremely cheap, leading to rampant sneak shots, and even forming an industrial chain, where criminals directly make profits through live webcasts. For the judicial system, there are law enforcement costs, and violent crimes and major economic crimes have a higher priority. It is not expected to rely on simple and rude law enforcement to solve this problem.
成本是解决很多社会问题的共识基础,有些消费者和媒体归咎于公共场所管理,如酒店、商场没有负责检查,其实是一种把成本转嫁给别人的自私想法。而因为人本性都是自私的(不需要自己承担重大成本的情况下,举手之劳人当然都善良),酒店、商场不可能为此承担亏损,必然把成本转嫁给消费者。而问题是消费者并不愿为之付出成本——一个新产生的收费项目,并不能增加/改善体验时,用户不会愿意付费,除非付出重大代价,才会愿意为了保护性服务付费。即便豪华酒店,也经常泄露用户数据,因为豪华感这些看得到的投资更容易吸引消费者。Cost is the consensus basis for solving many social problems. Some consumers and the media blame the management of public places, such as hotels and shopping malls that are not responsible for inspections. In fact, it is a selfish idea to pass the cost on to others. And because people are selfish by nature (no need to bear major costs, of course people who do everything they can are kind), hotels and shopping malls cannot bear losses for this, and the costs will inevitably be passed on to consumers. The problem is that consumers are not willing to pay for it-when a newly generated fee item cannot increase/improve the experience, users will not be willing to pay, unless they pay a significant price, they will be willing to pay for protective services. Even luxury hotels often leak user data, because the visible investment of luxury is more likely to attract consumers.
因此解决此问题关键在于降低成本。已经有一些方法和设备:Therefore, the key to solving this problem lies in reducing costs. There are already some methods and equipment:
·通过手机摄像头检测具有红外补光的偷拍摄像头:关闭灯光窗帘,使房间尽可能黑暗,找到的红点即为红外补光LED。此方法局限性在于,无法发现没有红外补光的偷拍摄像头。·Detect the stealth camera with infrared supplement light through the mobile phone camera: close the light curtains to make the room as dark as possible, and the red dot found is the infrared supplement light LED. The limitation of this method is that it is impossible to detect a stealth camera without infrared light.
·通过手机摄像头检测具有球形/鱼眼镜头的偷拍摄像头:关闭灯光窗帘,使房间尽可能黑暗,用手电或手机闪光灯照射可能有偷拍摄像头的地方,如卧室、浴室的顶灯、烟雾探测器,床对面路由器、电源插座开孔、小物件,找到的小白点即为偷拍摄像头的球形/鱼眼镜头。此方法局限性在于有些平面镜头反光很微弱,而且需要消费者眼光敏锐,有些嵌入电源插座的偷拍摄像头因为隐藏较深稍微偏点角度就无法看到反光。·Detect stealth camera with spherical/fisheye lens through mobile phone camera: close the light curtains, make the room as dark as possible, and use a flashlight or mobile phone flash to illuminate places where stealth camera may occur, such as ceiling lights in bedrooms, bathrooms, smoke detectors, and beds Opposite routers, power socket openings, small objects, the small white dots found are the spherical/fisheye lens for stealing the camera. The limitation of this method is that some flat lenses have very weak reflections and require consumers to have a keen eye. Some stealth cameras embedded in power sockets cannot see the reflections because they are hidden deep and slightly offset.
·需要长时间工作的偷拍摄像头,不会通过电池供电,需要在隐蔽的地方拉一根电源线接进去,可以用一般的建筑工程适用的电线/金属检测仪找到,然而此方法无法发现隐藏在电器中的偷拍摄像头。·The stealth camera that needs to work for a long time will not be powered by a battery. You need to pull a power cord to connect it in a hidden place. It can be found with a wire/metal detector suitable for general construction projects. However, this method cannot be found hidden in Sneak camera in electrical appliances.
可见,目前并不存在一个简单有限的通用之方法,可以解决所有场景下的偷拍问题。所以我们需要先对问题空间进行基本的划分:It can be seen that there is currently no simple, limited, universal method that can solve the problem of sneak shots in all scenarios. So we need to make a basic division of the problem space first:
·针对性偷拍:偷拍者有多种层出不穷的方法,而很难对付。Targeted sneak shots: There are many methods for sneak shots, which are difficult to deal with.
·无差别偷拍:因此,本发明的实施例主要针对无差别偷拍。· Undifferentiated sneak shots: Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at indiscriminate sneak shots.
而偷拍摄像头,可以分为以下类型:The stealth camera can be divided into the following types:
·根据供电可以分为电池供电和外接电源。电池供电的偷拍摄像头,需要人工更换电池/充电,而属于针对性偷拍。因此,本发明的实施例主要针对外接电源供电的偷拍摄像头。·According to the power supply can be divided into battery power supply and external power supply. The battery-powered sneak shot camera requires manual battery replacement/charging, which is a targeted sneak shot. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at a stealth camera powered by an external power supply.
·根据视频存储介质分为存储卡和网络直播。存储卡需要人工更换/收集,而属于针对性偷拍。因此,本发明的实施例主要针对通过网络直播的偷拍摄像头。·According to the video storage medium, it is divided into memory card and webcast. The memory card needs to be replaced/collected manually, which is a targeted sneak shot. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to the stealth camera through live webcast.
·根据网络直播的物理传输介质分为有线和无线。在公共场合(其实任何房间)隐藏网线和接入的交换机/路由器都是困难的,除非已有专门施工预留和隐藏网线/交换机/路由器,而属于针对性偷拍。因此,本发明的实施例主要针对通过无线网络直播的偷拍摄像头。·According to the physical transmission medium of the webcast, it is divided into wired and wireless. It is difficult to hide the network cable and the connected switch/router in a public place (in fact, any room), unless there is a special construction reserved and hidden network cable/switch/router, which is a targeted sneak shot. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to a stealth camera that is broadcast live via a wireless network.
所以,本发明实施例主要针对通过无线网络直播的偷拍摄像头。Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly directed to the stealth camera that is broadcast live via the wireless network.
发明概述Summary of the invention
对于无差别偷拍摄像头,需要电源输入和无线网络直播输出,因此可以从这两点切入。然而通过电线/金属检测仪寻找电线,首先很难发现隐藏在电器中的偷拍摄像头,其次容易混淆正常的走线。消费者总不能去任何酒店、商场等公共场所都要求电力施工图。因此,本发明实施例主要针对通过无线信号监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰。For the indiscriminate stealing camera, power input and wireless network live broadcast output are required, so you can start from these two points. However, when looking for wires through a wire/metal detector, it is first difficult to find the stealth camera hidden in the electrical appliance, and secondly, it is easy to confuse the normal wiring. Consumers can't go to any hotel, shopping mall and other public places to request electricity construction drawings. Therefore, the embodiments of the present invention are mainly aimed at monitoring the flow of wireless devices through wireless signals, identifying and interfering with secretly photographed devices.
本发明实施例提供了一种设备和方法,包含了:The embodiment of the present invention provides a device and a method, including:
·无线网卡以进行网络抓包,监测附近的无线设备流量·Wireless network card to capture network packets and monitor the traffic of nearby wireless devices
·通过分析流量特征,识别无线网络直播的偷拍摄像头·Identify the stealth camera of the wireless webcast by analyzing the traffic characteristics
·通过无线网络发送大量干扰包,使偷拍摄像头直播接收端无法正常接收数据包,从而阻断观看直播·Send a large number of interference packets through the wireless network, so that the live broadcast receiver of the stealth camera cannot receive the data packets normally, thereby blocking the live broadcast
电脑的无线网卡通常居于管理模式,如果驱动或/和固件支持,可以切换到监测模式。在监测模式下,可以通过无线网卡监测附近的所有无线设备流量。发现了可疑设备之后,可以通过此无线网卡大量发送干扰包,从而阻断偷窥。因此关键在于如何辨别无线流量特征。The wireless network card of the computer usually lives in the management mode, and if the driver or/and firmware supports it, it can be switched to the monitoring mode. In the monitoring mode, you can monitor the traffic of all nearby wireless devices through the wireless network card. After a suspicious device is discovered, a large number of interference packets can be sent through this wireless network card to block prying eyes. Therefore, the key lies in how to distinguish the characteristics of wireless traffic.
在网速足够快的情况下,网页刷新、网络购物、网络音乐、网络视频的流量具有较大的波动性,而且下载网速远大于上传网速。而对于网络直播而言,尤其是通过偷拍摄像头的直播,显而易见没有直播方与观看方的互动,因此,几乎都是上传流量。即便是点对点下载(Peer to Peer,P2P),这种情况也非常罕见(毫不利己纯粹利人,却使用免费公共网络)。When the Internet speed is fast enough, the flow of web page refresh, online shopping, online music, and online video has greater volatility, and the download speed is much higher than the upload speed. For webcasts, especially live broadcasts by stealth cameras, it is obvious that there is no interaction between the live broadcaster and the viewer, so almost all upload traffic. Even if it is a peer-to-peer download (Peer to Peer, P2P), this situation is very rare (it is not self-interested and purely beneficial, but uses a free public network).
然而,应当理解,本发明内容可能不包含本发明的所有方面和实施例该发明内容并不意味着以任何方式进行限制或限制,并且本文公开的本发明将被下列之一理解:本领域普通技术人员包括对其的明显改进和修改。However, it should be understood that the content of the present invention may not include all aspects and embodiments of the present invention. The content of the present invention is not meant to be restricted or restricted in any way, and the present invention disclosed herein will be understood by one of the following: The technical staff includes obvious improvements and modifications.
具体实施方式Detailed ways
现在将在下文中更充分地描述本发明。然而,本发明可以以许多不同的形式实施,并且不应被解释为限于本文所阐述的实施例。但愿,提供这些实施例使得本公开将是彻底和完整的,并且将向本领域技术人员充分地传达本发明的范围。The present invention will now be described more fully hereinafter. However, the present invention can be implemented in many different forms and should not be construed as being limited to the embodiments set forth herein. Hopefully, these embodiments are provided so that this disclosure will be thorough and complete, and will fully convey the scope of the present invention to those skilled in the art.
应当理解,在不脱离所附权利要求书中阐述的精神和范围的情况下,可以对元件的功能和布置进行各种改变。因此,实施例是本发明的示例或实现,而不是唯一的实现。各种出现“一个实施例”,“实施例”或“一些实施例”不一定都指代相同的实施例。虽然可以在单个实施例的上下文中描述本发明的各种特征,但是特征也可以单独地或以任何合适的组合提供。相反的,尽管为了清楚起见,本文中可以在单独的实施例的上下文中描述本发明,但是本发明也可以在单个实施例或实施例的任何组合中实现。It should be understood that various changes can be made to the function and arrangement of elements without departing from the spirit and scope set forth in the appended claims. Therefore, the embodiments are examples or implementations of the present invention, rather than the only implementations. The various appearances of "one embodiment," "an embodiment," or "some embodiments" do not necessarily all refer to the same embodiment. Although various features of the invention may be described in the context of a single embodiment, the features may also be provided individually or in any suitable combination. Conversely, although the invention may be described herein in the context of separate embodiments for the sake of clarity, the invention may also be implemented in a single embodiment or any combination of embodiments.
除非另有定义,本文使用的所有术语(包括技术和科学术语)具有与本发明所属领域的普通技术人员通常理解的相同的含义。将进一步理解的是,诸如在通常使用的字典中定义的那些术语应当被解释为具有与它们在相关技术和本公开的上下文中的含义一致的含义,并且将不被解释为理想化的或过度正式的意义,除非本文中明确地这样定义。Unless otherwise defined, all terms (including technical and scientific terms) used herein have the same meaning as commonly understood by those of ordinary skill in the art to which the present invention belongs. It will be further understood that terms such as those defined in commonly used dictionaries should be interpreted as having meanings consistent with their meanings in the context of related technologies and the present disclosure, and will not be interpreted as idealized or excessive The formal meaning, unless explicitly defined as such in this article.
本发明实施例通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的方法和设备,关键在于如何辨别可疑无线流量特征。In the embodiment of the present invention, the method and the device for identifying the sneak shot device and performing interference by monitoring the flow of the wireless device, the key lies in how to identify the characteristics of the suspicious wireless flow.
流量特征分析是一个很重要、很困难的课题,移动网络运营商都有通过流量特征分析识别网络视频直播从而提供服务质量控制(Quality of Service,QoS)。然而,相关研究结果表明并不存在100%的准确率来识别特定流量类型。例如:Traffic characteristic analysis is a very important and difficult subject. Mobile network operators have used traffic characteristic analysis to identify online video live broadcasts to provide service quality control (Quality of Service, QoS). However, related research results show that there is no 100% accuracy rate to identify specific traffic types. E.g:
1.深度包检测(Deep Paket Inspection,DPI)1.Deep packet inspection (Deep Paket Inspection, DPI)
通过分析数据包载荷中的特征字段,来将网络流量关联到具体的应用。大多数的网络应用,在数据包的载荷部分,都会有一些特殊的字节或者字符串用于表明协议类型,而通过检测数据包中这部分特殊的字节或者字符串,即可匹配特定的应用。By analyzing the characteristic fields in the data packet payload, the network traffic can be correlated to specific applications. In most network applications, in the payload part of the data packet, there will be some special bytes or strings used to indicate the protocol type, and by detecting this part of the special bytes or strings in the data packet, you can match the specific application.
其识别准确度非常高,在准确性、实时性、健壮性方面都取得了令人满意的效果,因此在多数商用系统上得到了广泛的应用但DPI技术对加密的网络流量(尤其是用于偷拍的无线网络直播),无法做到高精度的有效识别。Its recognition accuracy is very high, and satisfactory results have been achieved in terms of accuracy, real-time performance, and robustness. Therefore, it has been widely used in most commercial systems. However, DPI technology has a strong impact on encrypted network traffic (especially used in Candidly photographed wireless network live broadcast), can not achieve high-precision and effective identification.
2.深度流检测(Deep Flow Inspection,DFI)2.Deep Flow Inspection (DFI)
近几年发展起来的一种典型的业务识别技术,它与DPI进行应用层的载荷匹配不同,采用的是一种基于流量行为的识别技术即不同的应用类型体现在会话连接或者数据流上的状态各不相同该技术能够解决DPI技术的执行效率差、加密流量识别率低和频繁升级等问题。A typical service identification technology developed in recent years. It is different from DPI for load matching at the application layer. It uses a traffic behavior-based identification technology, that is, different application types are reflected in session connections or data streams. The status is different. This technology can solve the problems of poor execution efficiency of DPI technology, low recognition rate of encrypted traffic, and frequent upgrades.
根据数据包头的五元组(源端口号,源IP地址,协议名,目的端口,目的IP地址)将数据包分为不同的流,而不同类型的数据流,在传输中的流量行为也不相同。因此,可以对网络中的数据流设置各项参数,研究各个数据流的统计特征,通过对流的各种不同参数的统计分析来识别不同类型的应用,进而标记网络流量。According to the five-tuple of the data packet header (source port number, source IP address, protocol name, destination port, destination IP address), the data packet is divided into different streams, and different types of data streams have different traffic behaviors in transmission. the same. Therefore, various parameters can be set for the data flow in the network, the statistical characteristics of each data flow can be studied, and different types of applications can be identified through statistical analysis of various parameters of the flow, and then the network traffic can be marked.
现代网络视频默认都是加密的,即便本发明实施例针对的,通过无线网络直播的偷拍摄像头,上传视频数据包不加密,也必须考虑加密的情况。因此,不能通过简单的截取可疑无线设备数据包,视频解码后对比所在酒店、商场等公共场所的环境来判断偷拍摄像头是否存在和其具体位置。Modern network videos are encrypted by default. Even if the embodiment of the present invention is aimed at stealing cameras that are broadcast live over a wireless network, the uploaded video data packets are not encrypted, and encryption must be considered. Therefore, it is not possible to simply intercept the suspicious wireless device data packet, and compare the environment of the hotel, shopping mall and other public places after the video is decoded to determine the existence and specific location of the stealth camera.
对于通过无线网络直播的偷拍摄像头,具备几乎都是上传流量的特征而典型的视频通话,上传/下载流量接近。虽然也有单方向视频,相反方向音频的情况,但对于偷拍摄像头,其下载流量几乎都是用于网络传输控制的数据包,流量比音频小的多,很容易辨别。而对于常见的上传为主的应用,例如文件上传,通常持续时间很短。而且也可以通过深度包检测(DPI)监测网络协议,深度流检测(DFI)监测目标IP和端口,以排除对这些合法应用可能造成的误干扰。For stealth cameras that are broadcast live via wireless networks, they have the characteristics of almost all upload traffic, but for typical video calls, the upload/download traffic is close. Although there are cases of unidirectional video and audio in the opposite direction, for stealth cameras, the download traffic is almost all data packets used for network transmission control, and the traffic is much smaller than audio, which is easy to distinguish. For common upload-oriented applications, such as file uploads, the duration is usually very short. It can also monitor network protocols through deep packet inspection (DPI), and deep flow inspection (DFI) to monitor target IP and ports to eliminate possible false interference to these legitimate applications.
然而,伴随着偷拍摄像头的不断升级,监测无线设备流量的策略也需要与时俱进。例如,具有动作检测功能的偷拍摄像头,只有其视野内有物体移动的时候,才会开始偷拍,随着人工智能的飞速发展,甚至有可能出现能区分普通物体和裸露人体的动作检测偷拍摄像头。对于这些越来越智能化的偷拍摄像头,就需要诱使和欺骗其动作检测功能,使其开始拍摄和直播,才能通过本发明实施例描述的方法和设备来识别偷拍设备,以进行干扰。However, with the continuous upgrade of sneaky cameras, strategies for monitoring wireless device traffic also need to keep pace with the times. For example, a sneak shot camera with motion detection function will start sneak shooting only when there is an object moving in its field of view. With the rapid development of artificial intelligence, there may even be a motion detection sneak shot camera that can distinguish between ordinary objects and naked human bodies. For these increasingly intelligent sneak shot cameras, it is necessary to induce and deceive their motion detection functions to start shooting and live broadcasting, and then the method and equipment described in the embodiments of the present invention can be used to identify the sneak shot equipment for interference.
此外,可以通过内置的显示模块或无线网络连接移动设备(如手机),配合APP显示监测、识别、排除、确认、干扰的过程等细节。In addition, mobile devices (such as mobile phones) can be connected through the built-in display module or wireless network, and the details of the process of monitoring, identification, elimination, confirmation, and interference can be displayed in cooperation with the APP.
以上描述仅是本发明的实施例,并不意在限制本发明的范围。根据本公开的权利要求书和说明书的各种变化和修改仍在所要求保护的发明的范围内。此外,每个实施例和权利要求书未必包含了所公开的所有优点或特性。此外,摘要和标题仅用于便于搜索专利文献,并且不旨在以任何方式限制所要求保护的发明的范围。The above description is only an embodiment of the present invention, and is not intended to limit the scope of the present invention. Various changes and modifications according to the claims and specification of the present disclosure are still within the scope of the claimed invention. In addition, each embodiment and claims may not include all the advantages or characteristics disclosed. In addition, the abstract and title are only used to facilitate searching of patent documents and are not intended to limit the scope of the claimed invention in any way.

Claims (6)

  1. 一种通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的方法:A method for identifying and interfering with sneak shots by monitoring the traffic of wireless devices:
    α.所述方法通过无线网卡,监测附近的所有无线设备接收和发送的数据包,记录对应的下载流量和上传流量;α. The method uses a wireless network card to monitor the data packets received and sent by all nearby wireless devices, and record the corresponding download traffic and upload traffic;
    β.在所述无线设备中寻找上传流量远大于下载流量的可疑特征;β. Look for suspicious features in the wireless device that upload traffic is much larger than download traffic;
    γ.所述方法包含常见的合法应用列表,所述列表具有上传流量远大于下载流量的特征,所述列表包含所述合法应用对应的协议、端口和域名,并能联网实时更新所述域名对应的IP列表;γ. The method includes a list of common legal applications, the list has the feature that upload traffic is much larger than download traffic, the list includes the protocol, port, and domain name corresponding to the legal application, and can update the domain name corresponding to the network in real time IP list;
    δ.在具有所述可疑特征的无线设备中,通过监测网络协议、目标IP和端口,对比所述合法应用列表,以排除具有上传流量远大于下载流量特征的合法应用,不能排除的具有所述可疑特征的无线设备裁定为可疑设备;δ. In the wireless device with the suspicious characteristics, by monitoring the network protocol, target IP and port, and comparing the list of legitimate applications, to exclude legitimate applications with the characteristics of uploading traffic far greater than downloading traffic, which cannot be ruled out Wireless devices with suspicious characteristics are ruled as suspicious devices;
    ε.通过所述无线网卡向所述可疑设备持续发送大量数据包以进行干扰,使所述可疑设备无法正常接收无线数据包,从而阻断偷拍。ε. Continuously sending a large number of data packets to the suspicious device through the wireless network card for interference, so that the suspicious device cannot receive wireless data packets normally, thereby blocking sneak shots.
  2. 一种通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的设备,包含了:无线网卡、计算模块、存储模块、供电模块,具有如下特征:A device that monitors the traffic of wireless devices to identify and interfere with sneak shots. It includes: wireless network card, computing module, storage module, and power supply module. It has the following characteristics:
    α.所述设备通过所述无线网卡,监测附近的所有无线设备接收和发送的数据包,在所述存储模块记录对应的下载流量和上传流量;α. The device monitors the data packets received and sent by all nearby wireless devices through the wireless network card, and records the corresponding download traffic and upload traffic in the storage module;
    β.所述设备通过在所述存储模块中的下载流量和上传流量记录中寻找具有上传流量远大于下载流量的可疑特征的所述无线设备;β. The device searches the download traffic and upload traffic records in the storage module for the wireless device with suspicious characteristics that the upload traffic is much larger than the download traffic;
    γ.所述设备的存储模块包含常见的合法应用列表,所述列表具有上传流量远大于下载流量的特征,所述列表包含所述合法应用对应的协议、端口和域名,并能联网实时更新所述域名对应的IP列表;γ. The storage module of the device contains a list of common legal applications, the list has the characteristics of uploading traffic is much larger than the downloading traffic, the list includes the protocol, port and domain name corresponding to the legal application, and it can update the network in real time. The IP list corresponding to the domain name;
    δ.所述设备在具有所述可疑特征的无线设备中,通过监测网络协议、目标IP和端口,对比所述合法应用列表,以排除具有上传流量远大于下载流量特征的合法应用,不能排除的具有所述可疑特征的无线设备裁定为可疑设备;δ. The device compares the list of legitimate applications by monitoring the network protocol, target IP, and port among wireless devices with the suspicious characteristics to exclude legitimate applications that have the characteristics of uploading traffic far greater than downloading traffic, which cannot be excluded The wireless device with the suspicious characteristics is judged to be a suspicious device;
    ε.所述设备通过所述无线网卡向所述可疑设备持续发送大量数据包以进行干扰,使所述可疑设备无法正常接收无线数据包,从而阻断偷拍。ε. The device continuously sends a large number of data packets to the suspicious device through the wireless network card to cause interference, so that the suspicious device cannot receive wireless data packets normally, thereby blocking sneak shots.
  3. 一种通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的设备,包含了:无线网卡、计算模块、存储模块、供电模块,具有如下特征:A device that monitors the traffic of wireless devices to identify and interfere with sneak shots. It includes: wireless network card, computing module, storage module, and power supply module. It has the following characteristics:
    α.所述设备通过所述无线网卡,监测附近的所有无线设备接收和发送的数据包,在所述存储模块记录对应的下载流量和上传流量;α. The device monitors the data packets received and sent by all nearby wireless devices through the wireless network card, and records the corresponding download traffic and upload traffic in the storage module;
    β.所述设备通过在所述存储模块中的下载流量和上传流量记录中寻找具有上传流量远大于下载流量的可疑特征的所述无线设备;β. The device searches the download traffic and upload traffic records in the storage module for the wireless device with suspicious characteristics that the upload traffic is much larger than the download traffic;
    γ.所述设备的存储模块包含常见的合法应用列表,所述列表具有上传流量远大于下载流量的特征,所述列表包含所述合法应用对应的协议、端口和域名,并能联网实时更新所述域名对应的IP列表;γ. The storage module of the device contains a list of common legal applications, the list has the characteristics of uploading traffic is much larger than the downloading traffic, the list includes the protocol, port and domain name corresponding to the legal application, and it can update the network in real time. The IP list corresponding to the domain name;
    δ.所述设备在具有所述可疑特征的无线设备中,通过监测网络协议、目标IP和端口,对比所述合法应用列表,以排除具有上传流量远大于下载流量特征的合法应用,不能排除的具有所述可疑特征的无线设备裁定为可疑设备;δ. The device compares the list of legitimate applications by monitoring the network protocol, target IP, and port among wireless devices with the suspicious characteristics to exclude legitimate applications that have the characteristics of uploading traffic far greater than downloading traffic, which cannot be excluded The wireless device with the suspicious characteristics is judged to be a suspicious device;
    ε.所述设备通过所述无线网卡向所述可疑设备持续发送大量数据包以进行干扰,使所述可疑设备无法正常接收无线数据包,从而阻断偷拍。ε. The device continuously sends a large number of data packets to the suspicious device through the wireless network card to cause interference, so that the suspicious device cannot receive wireless data packets normally, thereby blocking sneak shots.
  4. 如权利要求3所述的设备,进一步包含显示模块,所述设备可以将监测、识别、排除、确认、干扰等细节显示给用户。The device according to claim 3, further comprising a display module, which can display details such as monitoring, identification, elimination, confirmation, interference, etc., to the user.
  5. 一种通过监测无线设备流量,识别偷拍设备并进行干扰的设备,包含了:无线网卡、计算模块、存储模块、供电模块,具有如下特征:A device that monitors the traffic of wireless devices to identify and interfere with sneak shots. It includes: wireless network card, computing module, storage module, and power supply module. It has the following characteristics:
    α.所述设备通过所述无线网卡,监测附近的所有无线设备接收和发送的数据包,在所述存储模块记录对应的下载流量和上传流量;α. The device monitors the data packets received and sent by all nearby wireless devices through the wireless network card, and records the corresponding download traffic and upload traffic in the storage module;
    β.所述设备通过在所述存储模块中的下载流量和上传流量记录中寻找具有上传流量远大于下载流量的可疑特征的所述无线设备;β. The device searches the download traffic and upload traffic records in the storage module for the wireless device with suspicious characteristics that the upload traffic is much larger than the download traffic;
    γ.所述设备的存储模块包含常见的合法应用列表,所述列表具有上传流量远大于下载流量的特征,所述列表包含所述合法应用对应的协议、端口和域名,并能联网实时更新所述域名对应的IP列表;γ. The storage module of the device contains a list of common legal applications, the list has the characteristics of uploading traffic is much larger than the downloading traffic, the list includes the protocol, port and domain name corresponding to the legal application, and it can update the network in real time. The IP list corresponding to the domain name;
    δ.所述设备在具有所述可疑特征的无线设备中,通过监测网络协议、目标IP和端口,对比所述合法应用列表,以排除具有上传流量远大于下载流量特征的合法应用,不能排除的具有所述可疑特征的无线设备裁定为可疑设备;δ. The device compares the list of legitimate applications by monitoring the network protocol, target IP, and port among wireless devices with the suspicious characteristics to exclude legitimate applications that have the characteristics of uploading traffic far greater than downloading traffic, which cannot be excluded The wireless device with the suspicious characteristics is judged to be a suspicious device;
    ε.所述设备通过所述无线网卡向所述可疑设备持续发送大量数据包以进行干扰,使所述可疑设备无法正常接收无线数据包,从而阻断偷拍。ε. The device continuously sends a large number of data packets to the suspicious device through the wireless network card to cause interference, so that the suspicious device cannot receive wireless data packets normally, thereby blocking sneak shots.
  6. 如权利要求5所述的设备,可以通过无线网络连接移动设备,将监测、识别、排除、确认、干扰等细节显示给用户。The device according to claim 5, which can connect to a mobile device via a wireless network, and display details such as monitoring, identification, elimination, confirmation, and interference to the user.
PCT/CN2019/130667 2019-12-31 2019-12-31 Anti-secret-photographing traffic monitoring and interference method and device WO2021134528A1 (en)

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