WO2021068369A1 - 一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法 - Google Patents
一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法 Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K1/00—Secret communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
- H04K3/41—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming activation or deactivation time
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
- H04K3/825—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection by jamming
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
- H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
- H04K3/86—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing deceptive jamming or unauthorized interrogation or access, e.g. WLAN access or RFID reading
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L27/00—Modulated-carrier systems
- H04L27/0008—Modulated-carrier systems arrangements for allowing a transmitter or receiver to use more than one type of modulation
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
- H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
- H04W4/30—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes
- H04W4/40—Services specially adapted for particular environments, situations or purposes for vehicles, e.g. vehicle-to-pedestrians [V2P]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/18—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for wireless local area networks or WLAN
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
- H04K2203/22—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for communication related to vehicles
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
- H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
- H04K2203/30—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components
- H04K2203/34—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by the infrastructure components involving multiple cooperating jammers
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/0001—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
- H04L1/0002—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate
- H04L1/0003—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate by switching between different modulation schemes
- H04L1/0005—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the transmission rate by switching between different modulation schemes applied to payload information
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L1/00—Arrangements for detecting or preventing errors in the information received
- H04L1/0001—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff
- H04L1/0009—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the channel coding
- H04L1/0011—Systems modifying transmission characteristics according to link quality, e.g. power backoff by adapting the channel coding applied to payload information
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- Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
- Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
- Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
- Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
- Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of communication security, and in particular to a method for preventing eavesdropping on the Internet of Vehicles based on intermittent coordinated interference.
- the Internet of Vehicles based on Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments can effectively improve traffic safety and improve driving experience, and its development prospects are widely recognized at home and abroad.
- Vehicle information, road information, and entertainment information are transmitted in the Internet of Vehicles through wireless communication between vehicles and between vehicles and roadside equipment, laying the foundation for the realization of various functions of the Internet of Vehicles.
- wireless communication has the characteristics of broadcasting, making various information in the Internet of Vehicles easily eavesdropped by illegal users.
- the information transmitted in the Internet of Vehicles needs to include private information such as vehicle identity, size, location, speed, and direction. Once this information is stolen by illegal users, it will reveal the identity of the vehicle owner, driving track, and parking location.
- Literature [6] proposed a probabilistic cooperative interference technology. When a legitimate user sends every bit of information, the cooperative interfering user transmits an interference signal with probability p. This method can reduce the energy consumption of cooperatively interfering users, but this method is only suitable for static scenarios, and there must be a buffer area to separate legitimate users from illegal users.
- none of the existing background technologies can be applied to the Internet of Vehicles, and the performance in reducing the energy consumption of cooperative interference users needs to be improved.
- the unique communication characteristics of the Internet of Vehicles must be considered, and an anti-eavesdropping method suitable for the Internet of Vehicles with low energy consumption must be designed. .
- the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide an anti-eavesdropping method for the Internet of Vehicles based on intermittent coordinated interference in response to the defects involved in the background art, so that the cooperative interference user can prevent illegal users from eavesdropping on the Internet of Vehicles communication with minimum energy consumption. information.
- a method for preventing eavesdropping on the Internet of Vehicles based on intermittent cooperative interference including the following steps:
- Step 1) on the premise of effectively preventing illegal users V e from eavesdropping on information, an optimization problem is established with the goal of minimizing the energy consumption of coordinated interference users V j:
- Equation (1) is the optimization objective, and equations (2), (3), and (4) are all constraints;
- J D is the time length of an interference time slot;
- J I is the time length of an interference interval ;
- V j transmits interference signals at J D with power P j , and stops transmitting interference signals at J I ;
- J D +J I constitutes an interference period that repeats during legitimate user data transmission; It is the error correction ability of the illegal user Ve; Is the bit error rate of Ve during J D; Is the bit error rate of Ve during J I; It is the shortest physical layer data packet duration in the Internet of Vehicles;
- Step 2) based on the WAVE protocol, analyze the unique communication characteristics of the Internet of Vehicles, and obtain the time structure of the physical layer data packet and the duration of the physical layer data packet of the Internet of Vehicles.
- Step 3 any available power range for the cooperative interference user V j Solve the optimal Minimize the energy consumption of V j;
- Step 4 the user V j uses the power In time length Send interference signals within the length of time Stop sending interference signals inside, and cycle in turn, until the end of the transmission by the legal user.
- step 1) with The calculation formula is related to the modulation method adopted by the legal sender, so that the Q function E b is the energy of each bit of information received by Ve , N 0 is the noise power spectral density, Is the power spectral density of the interference signal received by Ve ,
- 2 is the channel gain between V j and Ve , and B is the channel bandwidth, then:
- step 2) It is related to the modulation method and coding rate adopted by the legal user:
- the present invention adopts the above technical methods and has the following technical effects:
- the Internet of Vehicles anti-eavesdropping method proposed by the present invention can solve the eavesdropping threat from the physical layer. Compared with the anti-eavesdropping method based on high-level encryption, this method does not need to perform complex encryption and decryption operations, and the computational complexity is lower;
- this method proposes an intermittent cooperative interference method.
- the cooperative interference user does not need to send interference signals during the entire process of data packet transmission, just Intermittently send interference signals within a certain period of time. This method can effectively reduce the energy consumption of the cooperative interference user, and is more green and environmentally friendly;
- This method fully takes into account the unique communication characteristics of the Internet of Vehicles, and obtains the time length information of the physical layer data packets of the Internet of Vehicles based on the analysis of the Internet of Vehicles communication protocol. Based on this, the intermittent cooperative interference method is designed to ensure the practicability of the method;
- the present invention can correspondingly formulate different coordinated interference methods to ensure anti-eavesdropping performance, which has good universality.
- Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the intermittent cooperative interference method
- Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) are respectively the packet error rate of illegal users under different physical layer data packet time lengths when the BPSK modulation coding rate is 1/2 and the coding rate is 3/4;
- Figure 3(a) and Figure 3(b) show the energy consumption of cooperatively interfering users under different physical layer data packet time lengths when the BPSK modulation coding rate is 1/2 and the coding rate is 3/4, respectively.
- the present invention discloses a method for preventing eavesdropping on the Internet of Vehicles based on intermittent cooperative interference, which comprises the following steps:
- Step 1) the collaborative interference user V j establishes an optimization problem
- optimization of the target (1) in a length of time J D interference timeslot J I is the length of a time interval of interference, V j P j transmit power to interference signal J D, stop transmitting interference signals in J I, J D +J I constitutes an interference period that recurs during legitimate user data transmission, as shown in Figure 1. Therefore, the meaning of optimization objective (1) is to select the best The energy consumption of V j is minimized.
- Constraint (2) means that V j must ensure that Ve cannot eavesdrop on information.
- V e is the correction capability of unscrupulous users
- the expression of P e is
- Is the bit error rate of Ve during J D Is the bit error rate of Ve during J I.
- the calculation of the bit error rate is related to the modulation method used by the legal sender.
- the four modulation methods that the sender can use in the Internet of Vehicles and their with The calculation formula is shown in Table 1.
- E b is the energy of each bit of information received by Ve
- N 0 is the noise power spectral density
- 2 is the channel gain between V j and Ve
- B is the channel bandwidth.
- Constraint (3) has two meanings. First, the method provided by the present invention is suitable for the bit error rate of Ve during J I Lower than its error correction capability Otherwise, there is no need for coordinated interference, and illegal users will not be able to eavesdrop on information. Second, V j select J D, J I, V e shall ensure that the bit error rate during the time of the JD P j Higher than its error correction capability Otherwise, illegal users cannot be prevented from eavesdropping on information.
- Constraints (4) It is the shortest physical layer data packet duration in the Internet of Vehicles. The meaning of this constraint is to ensure that the transmission of any physical layer data packet is protected by cooperative interference users, and the cooperative interference period must be less than the duration of the shortest physical layer data packet.
- Step 2 based on the WAVE protocol, analyze the unique communication characteristics of the Internet of Vehicles, obtain the time structure of the physical layer data packet and the duration of the physical layer data packet of the Internet of Vehicles, and solve the constraint condition (4) It is related to the modulation mode and coding rate adopted by the legal user, and the results are shown in Table 2:
- Step 3 any available power range for V j Solve to choose the best The energy consumption of V j is minimized.
- the optimal solution can be solved according to formulas (5)-(8) and The optimal results of other modulation methods can also be obtained.
- Step 4 According to the result of step 3 ), V j uses the power In time length Send interference signals within the length of time Stop sending interference signals inside, and cycle in turn, until the end of the transmission by the legal user.
- the parameters describing the network scene mainly include the noise power spectral density N 0 , the channel gain between V j and Ve
- 2 is mainly determined by environmental factors, and B is specified as 10MHz by the IEEE 1609 standard.
- the legal sender uses the BPSK modulation method, the coding efficiency is 1/2, and
- 2 0.685.
- the maximum transmit power of V j It is 760mW. Under the above settings, the study is different Eb, The results of the optimal intermittent cooperative interference method under the values are shown in Table 3.
- Example 2 Observe the anti-eavesdropping performance of the intermittent cooperative interference method designed by the present invention and the energy consumption of cooperative interference users for physical layer data packets of any length of time
- This example uses the WLAN toolkit in MATLAB 2018b, which provides related functions that simulate the physical layer of the Internet of Vehicles.
- the "wlanNonHTConfig" function is used to generate non-HT data packets transmitted in the Internet of Vehicles, and the modulation mode is set to BPSK, and the coding rate is 1/2 and 3/4 respectively.
- the modulation method is BPSK, and the coding rate is 1/2.
- the length of the physical layer data packet sent by the legal sender V t increases from 76 us to 608 us in turn. For each time length, the legal sender sends 2500 data packets.
- the cooperative interference user V j uses the intermittent cooperative interference method designed in the present invention to interfere with the illegal user Ve , and observe the packet error rate of the illegal user Ve (that is, the number of data packets that cannot be correctly decoded by Ve and the transmission of V t The ratio of the total number of data packets) and the energy consumption of co-interfering users.
- the modulation method is BPSK, and the coding rate is 3/4.
- the length of the physical layer data packet sent by the legal sender V t increases from 60 us to 412 us in turn. For each time length, the legal sender sends 2500 data packets.
- the cooperative interference user V j uses the intermittent cooperative interference method designed in the present invention to interfere with the illegal user Ve , and observe the packet error rate of the illegal user Ve (that is, the number of data packets that cannot be correctly decoded by Ve and the transmission of V t The ratio of the total number of data packets) and the energy consumption of co-interfering users.
- the cooperative interference user obtained the optimal intermittent cooperative interference method through the following 4 steps, and interfered with the illegal user.
- Step 1 Cooperate to interfere with user Vj households to establish optimization problems
- Step 2 Based on WAVE protocol analysis to obtain BPSK modulation, when the coding rate is 1/2 and 3/4 respectively Value of
- Step 3 Co-interfering user V j solves the optimal intermittent co-interference method
- Step 3.1 In the constraint (3), Satisfied. by Knowable Is an increasing function of P j. To satisfy constraints We can get P j ⁇ 521.3mW. Therefore, the available power range of V j is P j ⁇ [521.3, 760] mW.
- Step 3.2 In the constraint (2) P e is for J D and Find the partial derivative
- Step 3.3 Put Substitute constraints (4) to get Since the objective function is a decreasing function with respect to J I , in order to minimize the objective function, J I takes the maximum value. Therefore, you can get Substituting into the objective function E can be obtained
- Step 3.4 When the modulation mode is BPSK and the coding rate is 1/2, When the modulation mode is BPSK and the coding rate is 3/4, will Substitute Available
- Step 4 V j is calculated according to the result of step 3 during the legal user data transmission period with the power In time length Send interference signals within the length of time Stop sending interference signals inside, and cycle in turn, until the end of the transmission by the legal user.
- WOJ represents no interference to Ve ;
- IJ represents the intermittent coordinated interference method designed by the present invention;
- CJ represents the traditional continuous coordinated interference method, that is, during the entire data transmission period of the legitimate user, the coordinated interference user continues The transmission interference signal;
- PSE is called the energy saving ratio, which means the ratio of the energy saved by the IJ method to the energy consumed by the CJ method compared with the CJ method;
- APSE is called the average energy saving ratio and represents the average of the PSE value.
- V e is the packet error rate increases as the length of the physical layer data packet time increases. This is because as the time length of the physical layer data packet increases, the number of information bits contained in a physical layer data packet increases, and the probability that some information bits in the data packet received by Ve cannot be decoded correctly increases, resulting in V The packet error rate of e increases.
- the signal-to-noise ratio of Ve is always low due to the cooperative interference users continuously sending interference signals , so the packet error rate of Ve is known to be close to 100%.
- the packet error rate of illegal users when the coding rate is 3/4 is higher than the packet error rate of illegal users when the coding rate is 1/2, which is caused by the coding method, when the coding rate is 3/4
- a physical layer data packet contains more information bits, and packet errors are more likely to occur.
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，首先在有效阻止不法用户Ve窃听信息的前提下，以最小化协同干扰用户Vj能量消耗为目标建立优化问题；然后基于WAVE协议，分析车联网独特的通信特性，获得车联网物理层数据包的时间结构和物理层数据包持续时间长度，并求解车联网中最短的物理层数据包的持续时间；接着对协同干扰用户Vj的任意可用功率范围求解最优的协同干扰方案；最后协同干扰用户Vj在合法用户数据传输期间根据求得的最优协同干扰方案依次周期循环，直至合法用户传输结束。本发明能够使得协同干扰用户以最小的能量消耗阻止不法用户窃听车联网通信信息。
Description
本发明涉及通信安全领域，尤其涉及一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法。
基于车辆环境无线接入(Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments,WAVE)的车联网能有效提高交通安全性，改善驾驶体验，国内外广泛认可其发展前景。车辆信息、道路信息、娱乐信息通过车辆间无线通信以及车辆与路边设备间无线通信在车联网中进行传递，为车联网各项功能的实现奠定基础。然而，无线通信具有广播特性，使得车联网中的各项信息极易被不法用户窃听。根据WAVE协议的规定，车联网中传递的信息需包含车辆身份、尺寸、位置、速度、方向等隐私信息，这些信息一旦被不法用户窃取将泄露车主身份、驾驶轨迹、停车位置等。不法用户可能据此攻击车辆、盗窃车辆，严重威胁车主的人身、财产安全，亟需设计可靠的防窃听方法，解决车联网中的这一威胁。协同干扰是目前广泛采用的一种防窃听技术，文献[1]、[2]、[3]、[4]、[5]分别将协同干扰技术用于认知无线电网络、MIMO网络、无人机网络、能量感知网络、以及5G网络以阻止不法用户窃听信息。文献针对协同干扰用户的选择、波束成形方法的设计、无人机飞行路线的优化、协同干扰用户发射功率分配、以及保密容量分析等方面进行了深入研究。
[1]Q.Gao,Y.Huo,L.Ma,X.Xing,X.Cheng,T.Jing,and H.Liu,“Joint design of jammer selection and beamforming for securing mimo cooperative cognitive radio networks,”IET Communications,vol.11,no.8,pp.1264–1274,2017.
[2]P.Siyari,M.Krunz,and D.N.Nguyen,“Distributed power control in single-stream mimo wiretap interference networks with full-duplex jamming receivers,”IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing,vol.67,no.3,pp.594–608,Feb 2019.
[3]Y.Li,R.Zhang,J.Zhang,S.Gao,and L.Yang,“Cooperative jamming for secure uav communications with partial eavesdropper information,”IEEE Access,vol.7,pp.94 593–94 603,2019.
[4]Z.Mobini,M.Mohammadi,and C.Tellambura,“Wireless-powered full-duplex relay and friendly jamming for secure cooperative communications,”IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,vol.14,no.3,pp.621–634,March 2019.
[5]Y.Huo,X.Fan,L.Ma,X.Cheng,Z.Tian,and D.Chen,“Secure communications in tiered 5g wireless networks with cooperative jamming,”IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,vol.18,no.6,pp.3265–3280,June 2019.
[6]Y.Allouche,E.Arkin,Y.Cassuto,A.Efrat,G.Grebla,J.Mitchell,S.Sankararaman,and M.Segal,“Secure communication through jammers jointly optimized in geography and time,”Pervasive and Mobile Computing,vol.41,pp.83–105,10 2017.
文献[1]-[5]的研究均基于连续性协同干扰技术，要求协同干扰用户在合法用户整个通信过程中持续不断地发射干扰信号，需要协同干扰用户消耗大量能量以阻止不法用户窃听。文献[6]提出了一种概率性协同干扰技术，当合法用户发送每一比特信息时，协同干扰用户以概率p发射干扰信号。该方法可以降低协同干扰用户的能量消耗，但是该方法只适用于静态场景，且必须存在一个缓冲区域将合法用户和不法用户分隔开。综上，已有背景技术均无法应用于车联网，在降低协同干扰用户能量消耗方面的性能有待提升，须考虑车联网独特的通信特性，设计适用于车联网的、能量消耗低的防窃听方法。
发明内容
本发明所要解决的技术问题是针对背景技术中所涉及到的缺陷，提供一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，使得协同干扰用户能够以最小的能量消耗阻止不法用户窃听车联网通信信息。
本发明为解决上述技术问题采用以下技术方法：
一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，包含以下步骤：
步骤1)，在有效阻止不法用户V
e窃听信息的前提下，以最小化协同干扰用户V
j能量消耗为目标建立优化问题：
式(1)为优化目标，式(2)、式(3)、式(4)均为约束条件；式中，J
D为一个干扰时隙的时间长度；J
I为一个干扰间隔的时间长度；V
j在J
D以功率P
j发射干扰信号、在J
I停止发射干扰信号；J
D+J
I构成一个干扰周期在合法用户数据传输期间重复出现；
为不法用户V
e 的纠错能力；
为V
e在J
D期间的误比特率；
为V
e在J
I期间的误比特率；
为车联网中最短的物理层数据包的持续时间；
步骤2)，基于WAVE协议，分析车联网独特的通信特性，获得车联网物理层数据包的时间结构和物理层数据包持续时间长度，求式(4)中的
步骤3)，对协同干扰用户V
j的任意可用功率范围
求解最优的
使得V
j的能量消耗最小；
步骤4)，用户V
j根据步骤3)求解的结果，在合法用户数据传输期间，以功率
在时间长度
内发送干扰信号，在时间长度
内停止发送干扰信号，依次周期循环，直至合法用户传输结束。
作为本发明一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法进一步的优化方案，所述步骤1)中，
和
计算公式与合法发送者采用的调制方式相关，令Q函数
E
b为V
e接收到每比特信息的能量，N
0为噪声功率谱密度，
为V
e接收到的干扰信号的功率谱密度，|h
je|
2为V
j和V
e之间的信道增益，B为信道带宽，则：
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM时，
作为本发明一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法进一步的优化方案，所述步骤2)中，
与合法用户所采用的调制方式和编码率有关：
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM且编码率为3/4时，
作为本发明一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法进一步的优化方案，所述步骤3)中，当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK时，
的计算公式如下：
本发明采用以上技术方法与现有技术相比，具有以下技术效果：
1.本发明提出的车联网防窃听方法可以从物理层解决窃听威胁，与基于高层加密的防窃听方法相比，本方法无需进行复杂的加解密运算，计算复杂度较低；
2.一个数据包部分信息的丢失足以导致整个数据包无法被窃听，基于这一事实，本方法提出间歇性协同干扰方法，协同干扰用户无需在数据包传输的整个过程中发送干扰信号，只需在一定时间段内间歇性的发送干扰信号。本方法可以有效降低协同干扰用户的能量消耗，更加绿色环保；
3.本方法充分考虑到车联网独特的通信特性，基于对车联网通信协议的分析获得车联网物理层数据包的时间长度信息，据此设计间歇性协同干扰方法，确保方法的实用性；
4.在不同网络场景下，针对合法发送者采用的不同调制方式和编码率，本发明可相应地制定不同的协同干扰方法以确保防窃听性能，具有很好的普适性。
图1是间歇性协同干扰方法示意图；
图2(a)、图2(b)分别是BPSK调制编码率为1/2、编码率为3/4时不同物理层数据包 时间长度下不法用户的误包率；
图3(a)、图3(b)分别是BPSK调制编码率为1/2、编码率为3/4时不同物理层数据包时间长度下协同干扰用户的能量消耗。
下面结合附图对本发明的技术方法做进一步的详细说明：
本发明可以以许多不同的形式实现，而不应当认为限于这里所述的实施例。相反，提供这些实施例以便使本公开透彻且完整，并且将向本领域技术人员充分表达本发明的范围。在附图中，为了清楚起见放大了组件。
本发明公开了一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，包含以下步骤：
步骤1)，协同干扰用户V
j建立优化问题
在有效阻止不法用户V
e窃听信息的前提下，以最小化V
j能量消耗为目标建立优化问题：
优化目标(1)中J
D为一个干扰时隙的时间长度，J
I为一个干扰间隔的时间长度，V
j在J
D以功率P
j发射干扰信号，在J
I停止发射干扰信号，J
D+J
I构成一个干扰周期在合法用户数据传输期间重复出现，如图1所示。因此，优化目标(1)的含义为选择最优的
使得V
j的能量消耗最小。
约束条件(2)的含义为V
j须确保V
e无法窃听信息。式中
为不法用户V
e的纠错能力，当V
e接收到信息的误比特率P
e超过其纠错能力，V
e将无法正确解码并窃听信息。P
e表达式为
表1
与
计算公式
约束条件(3)包含两层意义。第一，本发明提供的方法适用于V
e在J
I期间的误比特率
低于其纠错能力
的场景，否则不需要进行协同干扰，不法用户也无法窃听信息。第二，V
j选择J
D、J
I、P
j时须确保V
e在JD期间的误比特率
高于其纠错能力
否则无法阻止不法用户窃听信息。
约束条件(4)中
为车联网中最短的物理层数据包的持续时间。该约束条件的含义是为了保证任意一个物理层数据包的传输都得到协同干扰用户的保护，协同干扰周期必须小于最短物理层数据包的持续时间。
步骤2)，基于WAVE协议，分析车联网独特的通信特性，获得车联网物理层数据包的时间结构和物理层数据包持续时间长度，求解约束条件(4)中的
与合法用户所采用的调制方式和编码率有关，其结果如表2所示：
表2不同调制方式及编码率下的
步骤3)，对V
j的任意可用功率范围
求解选择最优的
使得V
j的能量消耗最小。如，针对BPSK调制方式，可根据公式(5)-(8)求解最优
及
其他调制方式的最优结果亦可求得。
步骤4)，V
j根据步骤3)求解的结果，在合法用户数据传输期间，以功率
在时间长度
内发送干扰信号，在时间长度
内停止发送干扰信号，依次周期循环，直至合法用户传输结束。
实例1 不同网络场景下的最优间歇性协同干扰方法研究
描述网络场景的参数主要包括噪声功率谱密度N
0，V
j和V
e之间的信道增益|h
je|
2，信道带宽B，V
e接收到每比特信息的能量E
b，V
e的接收信噪比
以及不法用户V
e的纠错能力
其中，|h
je|
2主要由环境因素决定，B由IEEE 1609标准规定为10MHz。在本实例中，合法发送者采用BPSK调制方式，编码效率为1/2，|h
je|
2设定为经典值|h
je|
2＝0.685，根据IEEE 802.11标准规定，V
j的最大发射功率为760mW。在上述设定值下，研究不同
Eb、
取值下的最优间歇性协同干扰方法，结果如表3所示。
表3不同网络场景下的最优间歇性协同干扰方法
根据本实例的观察发现：
(1)不法用户V
e的纠错能力
主要影响间歇性协同干扰方法的干扰时隙长度
和干扰间隔长度
随着
的增加，本发明提供的间歇性协同干扰方法会设置更长的干扰时隙
和更短的干扰间隔
(2)Ve接收到每比特信息的能量E
b优先影响协同干扰用户的发射功率
当协同干扰用户的发射功率未达到最大值时，随着E
b的增大，本发明提供的间歇性协同干扰方法会保持
和
不变，优先提高协同干扰用户的发射功率
一旦协同干扰用户的发射功率达到最大值，本发明提供的间歇性协同干扰方法将设置更长的干扰时隙
和更短的干扰间隔
以在E
b增大的情况下确保防窃听性能。
(3)V
e接收信号的信噪比
对
均有影响，随着
的增大，本发明提供的间歇性协同干扰方法将设置更高的发射功率
更长的
以及更短的
实例2 针对任意时间长度的物理层数据包观察本发明设计的间歇性协同干扰方法的防窃听性能及协同干扰用户的能量消耗情况
本实例运用MATLAB 2018b中的WLAN工具包，该工具包提供模拟车联网物理层的相关函数。本实例用“wlanNonHTConfig”函数生成车联网中传输的non-HT数据包，设置调制方式 为BPSK，编码率分别为1/2和3/4。用函数“V2VChannel”生成一个车联网信道，其带宽为10MHz，采样率为10MHz信道的基带采样率，信道时延模型设为“UrbanNLOS”。设置V
j和V
e之间的信道增益|h
je|
2＝0.685，V
e接收到每比特信息的能量E
b＝6×10
-8，Ve的接收信噪比
Ve的纠错能力
在上述设置下，分别进行两组实验：
第一组实验中调制方式为BPSK，编码率为1/2。合法发送者V
t发送的物理层数据包时间长度从76us依次增加至608us，针对每一个时间长度，合法发送者发送2500个数据包。协同干扰用户V
j采用本发明所设计的间歇性协同干扰方法对不法用户V
e进行干扰，观察不法用户V
e的误包率(即V
e不能正确解码的数据包的个数与V
t发送的数据包总数之比)以及协同干扰用户的能量消耗。
第二组实验中调制方式为BPSK，编码率为3/4。合法发送者V
t发送的物理层数据包时间长度从60us依次增加至412us，针对每一个时间长度，合法发送者发送2500个数据包。协同干扰用户V
j采用本发明所设计的间歇性协同干扰方法对不法用户V
e进行干扰，观察不法用户V
e的误包率(即V
e不能正确解码的数据包的个数与V
t发送的数据包总数之比)以及协同干扰用户的能量消耗。
在两组实验中，协同干扰用户通过以下4个步骤获得最优间歇性协同干扰方法，并对不法用户进行干扰。
步骤1：协同干扰用户Vj户建立优化问题
其中
步骤2：基于WAVE协议分析获得BPSK调制、编码率分别为1/2和3/4时
的取值
步骤3：协同干扰用户V
j求解最优的间歇性协同干扰方法
步骤3.1：在约束条件(3)中，
已满足。由
可知
是关于P
j的增函数。为满足约束
可得P
j≥521.3mW。因此，V
j的可用功率范围为P
j∈[521.3，760]mW。
步骤3.2：在约束条件(2)中
P
e分别对J
D及
求偏导
可知P
e是关于J
D和
的增函数，而
是关于P
j的增函数，因此P
e是关于J
D和P
j的增函数。为了获得更大P
e须提高J
D或P
j。然而，J
D或P
j的提高会带来更大的目标函数E。为了最小化目标函数，约束条件
调整为
求解该等式可得
步骤3.3：将
代入约束条件(4)可得
由于目标函数是关于J
I的减函数，为了最小化目标函数，J
I取最大值。因此，可得
代入目标函数E可得
将
代入E，可知E是关于P
j的凸函数。令
求得P
j＝1007mW。因此，在V
j的可用功率范围[521.3，760]mW内，E是关于P
j的减函数，为了最小化目标函数E，取最优发射功率为
步骤3.4：当调制方式为BPSK，编码率1/2时，
当调制方式为BPSK，编码率3/4时，
将
代入
可得
步骤4：V
j根据步骤3求解的结果，在合法用户数据传输期间，以功率
在时间长度
内发送干扰信号，在时间长度
内停止发送干扰信号，依次周期循环，直至合法用户传输结束。
两组实验的实验结果如图2(a)、图2(b)、图3(a)、图3(b)所示。图中WOJ代表不对V
e进行任何干扰；IJ代表采用本发明所设计的间歇性协同干扰方法；CJ代表采用传统的连续性协同干扰方法，即在合法用户整个数据传输期间，协同干扰用户持续不断的发送干扰信号；PSE称为能量节省比，表示与采用CJ方法相比，采用IJ方法所能够节省的能量占采用CJ方法所消耗的能量的比；APSE称为平均能量节省比代表PSE的平均值。
观察图2(a)、图2(b)可以发现采用IJ方法对V
e进行干扰，使得V
e的误包率不低于80％，不法用户窃听到的数据包的正确率不足20％，可见本发明所设计的基于间歇性协同干扰的防窃听方法可以有效阻止不法用户窃听信息。
当不对V
e进行任何干扰(WOJ)或采用IJ方法对V
e进行干扰时，V
e的误包率随着物理层数据包时间长度的增加而增加。这是由于随着物理层数据包时间长度的增加，一个物理层数据包所包含的信息比特数增加，V
e收到的数据包中有部分信息比特无法正确解码的概率增大，从而导致V
e的误包率增加。当采用CJ方法对进行干扰时，由于协同干扰用户持续不断地发送干扰信号，V
e的信噪比始终很低，因此V
e的误包率已知接近100％。采用相同的干扰方法，编码率为3/4时不法用户的误包率高于编码率为1/2时不法用户的误包率，这是由于编码方法导致的，编码率为3/4时一个物理层数据包内包含的信息比特更多，更容易发生误包。
如图3(a)、图3(b)所示，可以发现采用IJ方法或CJ方法，协同干扰用户的能量消耗均随着物理层数据包时间长的增加而增加，这是由于物理层数据包时间长度增加，协同干扰用户需要发送干扰信号的时间也随之增加，从而增大了协同干扰用户的能量消耗。橙色点给出在每一个物理层数据包时间长度下采用IJ方法所能获得的能量节省比，橙色线条为各能量节省比的平均值，可以发现当编码率为1/2时，采用本发明所设计的间歇性协同干扰方法可以节省34.9％的能量，当编码率为3/4时，采用本发明所设计的间歇性协同干扰方法可以节省34.5％的能量，能够很大程度降低协同干扰用户的能量消耗，更加绿色环保。
本技术领域技术人员可以理解的是，除非另外定义，这里使用的所有术语(包括技术术语和科学术语)具有与本发明所属领域中的普通技术人员的一般理解相同的意义。还应该理解的是，诸如通用字典中定义的那些术语应该被理解为具有与现有技术的上下文中的意义一致的意义，并且除非像这里一样定义，不会用理想化或过于正式的含义来解释。
以上所述的具体实施方式，对本发明的目的、技术方法和有益效果进行了进一步详细说明，所应理解的是，以上所述仅为本发明的具体实施方式而已，并不用于限制本发明，凡在本发明的精神和原则之内，所做的任何修改、等同替换、改进等，均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。
Claims (4)
- 一种基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，其特征在于，包含以下步骤：步骤1)，在有效阻止不法用户V e窃听信息的前提下，以最小化协同干扰用户V j能量消耗为目标建立优化问题：
s.t.
式(1)为优化目标，式(2)、式(3)、式(4)均为约束条件；式中，J D为一个干扰时隙的时间长度；J I为一个干扰间隔的时间长度；V j在J D以功率P j发射干扰信号、在J I停止发射干扰信号；J D+J I构成一个干扰周期在合法用户数据传输期间重复出现；为不法用户V e的纠错能力；
为V e在J D期间的误比特率；
为V e在J I期间的误比特率；
为车联网中最短的物理层数据包的持续时间；
步骤2)，基于WAVE协议，分析车联网独特的通信特性，获得车联网物理层数据包的时间结构和物理层数据包持续时间长度，求式(4)中的
步骤3)，对协同用户V j的任意可用功率范围求解最优的
使得V j的能量消耗最小；
步骤4)，用户V j根据步骤3)求解的结果，在合法用户数据传输期间，以功率在时间长度
内发送干扰信号，在时间长度
内停止发送干扰信号，依次周期循环，直至合法用户传输结束。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，其特征在于，所述步骤1)中，和
计算公式与合法发送者采用的调制方式相关，令Q函数
E b为V e接收到每比特信息的能量，N 0为噪声功率谱密度，
为V e接收到的干扰信号的功率谱密度，|h je| 2为V j和V e之间的信道增益，B为信道带宽，则：
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM时，
- 根据权利要求2所述的基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，其特征在于，所述步骤2)中，与合法用户所采用的调制方式和编码率有关：
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为QPSK且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为16-QAM且编码率为3/4时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM且编码率为1/2时，
当合法发送者采用的调制方式为64-QAM且编码率为3/4时，
- 根据权利要求3所述的基于间歇性协同干扰的车联网防窃听方法，其特征在于，所述步骤3)中，当合法发送者采用的调制方式为BPSK时，的计算公式如下：
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