WO2021020794A2 - 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템 - Google Patents
원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2021020794A2 WO2021020794A2 PCT/KR2020/009588 KR2020009588W WO2021020794A2 WO 2021020794 A2 WO2021020794 A2 WO 2021020794A2 KR 2020009588 W KR2020009588 W KR 2020009588W WO 2021020794 A2 WO2021020794 A2 WO 2021020794A2
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/90—Details of database functions independent of the retrieved data types
- G06F16/901—Indexing; Data structures therefor; Storage structures
- G06F16/9024—Graphs; Linked lists
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
- G06F16/90—Details of database functions independent of the retrieved data types
- G06F16/901—Indexing; Data structures therefor; Storage structures
- G06F16/9027—Trees
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
- H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
- H04L9/0833—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key
- H04L9/0836—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP] involving conference or group key using tree structure or hierarchical structure
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a ledger pruning system, and more specifically, to a ledger verifiable pruning system.
- Distributed ledgers such as existing blockchains and DAGs (directed acyclic graphs) increase the size of the ledgers over time, leading to a significant lack of storage.
- the size of the distributed ledger created per day is 0.5 kByte/Tx * 4 kTx/sec * 60 sec/min * 60 min/hour * 24 hours/day, which is 172.8 GB/day.
- pruning is performed to delete data from a few years ago, and each node only retains data from a few years ago.
- the pruned data is used in a way that the old data is managed separately by the foundation and distributed whenever a request is made.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a pruning system capable of verifying a ledger.
- a root hash value R n-1 of the previous subtree is converted into the data block T n according to a linked list method.
- h(T i ) of the Skew Merkle Tree To sequentially perform hash value calculations to calculate the latest root hash value of the Skud Merkle tree, and compare the calculated latest root hash value with the latest known root hash value R n. It may be configured to further include a node authenticity verification module that verifies whether k is authentic or not.
- the verifiable pruning system of the ledger includes a root hash value R n-1 of the previous subtree in the data block T n according to a linked list method.
- the jump link R n-(base ⁇ offset) are summed and hashed to calculate h(h(T n )
- tree) may be configured to include a hierarchical-skewed merkle tree generation module.
- the jump link R n-(base ⁇ offset) is a root hash value on a node at a predetermined past point in the h-skew merkle tree, and the base is to allocate jump links at predetermined intervals. It is the shortest distance of the predetermined jump link, and the offset may be configured based on n% of the current node position.
- the distance (dist) of the jump links may be configured to be calculated as the base offset (base offset) value.
- the h-skew merkle tree generation module may be configured to allocate the jump link for each node of offset + (base offset ) *k.
- k may be composed of a positive integer.
- the node authenticity proof module is configured to prove whether a hash value R y or a data block T y exists in the h-skew Merkle tree according to the following procedure, 1) the latest root hash value R head From the link (node) within a predetermined distance in the past view direction, search for a jump link or link (node) that exists in the most past view among links (nodes) that are the same as the view point of R y or in the future, and 2) the above Based on the link (node) within a predetermined distance in the direction of the past from the jump link or the hash value of the link that exists at the searched past time point, the link (node) that is the same as the time point of R y or exists at the most past time point among links (nodes) in the future Search for a jump link or link (node), 3) repeat the process 2) until it reaches R y , and 4) use the T y to repeat the searched jump link in 2) and 3) or For a set of
- the predetermined distance may be a base.
- the ledger structure is configured as a skew merkle tree, and it is configured to store and manage only the latest data and verify the authenticity of transactions submitted by other nodes, thereby minimizing the increase in ledger size. There is an effect that can be maintained.
- the h-skew Merkle tree is configured to check whether the hash values calculated by two or more computation paths are identical to each other, so that it is possible to check whether a newly added jump link is forged.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a pruning system capable of verifying a ledger according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- 2 is a structural diagram of an existing Merkle tree.
- 3 and 4 are conceptual diagrams of an algorithm for generating a skew merkle tree according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- 5 to 10 are conceptual diagrams of an h-skew Merkle tree generation algorithm according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- first, second, A, and B may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. These terms are used only for the purpose of distinguishing one component from another component. For example, without departing from the scope of the present invention, a first element may be referred to as a second element, and similarly, a second element may be referred to as a first element.
- the term and/or includes a combination of a plurality of related listed items or any of a plurality of related listed items.
- FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a ledger verifiable pruning system according to an embodiment of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a structural diagram of an existing Merkle tree
- FIGS. 3 and 4 are skew merkle trees according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIGS. 5 to 10 are conceptual diagrams of an h-skew Merkle tree generation algorithm according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the certifiable pruning system of a ledger is a skewed merkle tree generation module 110 or a hierarchical-skewed merkle tree. It may be configured to include a generation module 120 and a node authenticity verification module 130.
- the merkle tree is also called a hash tree, and has a tree data structure composed of cryptographic hash values.
- the Merkle tree is a hash value (eg, H 6 , H 7 , H 8 , root) for certain data (eg, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 ) It is used to prove that it was included in the Merkle tree. That is, it is sufficient to calculate and verify the hash value along the path to the root node. If the final calculated value matches the root hash value, it is proven. For example, to verify H 1 , the hash value is calculated along the path using H 2 and H 8 , and the verification result is verified if it matches the root hash value.
- H 1 the hash value is calculated along the path using H 2 and H 8 , and the verification result is verified if it matches the root hash value.
- the data size of the hash value (H 6 , H 7 , H 8 , root) is small, but the original data (H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , H 5 ) has a relatively large data size.
- the ledger's verifiable pruning system uses a skew merkle tree structure upgraded from this rather than the conventional Merkle tree structure, and an h-skew merkle tree structure that is more upgraded from the skew merkle tree structure. It is configured to perform pruning to delete and to completely prove the authenticity of old data with only this upgraded Merkle tree structure.
- each node can verify the authenticity of all data while holding only the latest data, for example, one day of data.
- the distributed ledger system has a transaction processing speed of 4 kTx/sec per day, only 172.8 GB of data accumulated per day is stored in the node, all previous data is pruned, and the pruned data is It is configured to completely verify the authenticity by using the stored data, that is, the root hash value of the Skew Merkle tree.
- the h-skew Merkle tree structure has a much shorter proof length for very old data over several years than the skew merkle tree structure.
- the size of the proof data increases as time goes by, in the present invention, the size of the proof itself can be reduced to reduce the computational burden required for verification and the time taken for verification.
- the skew merkle tree generation module 110 may be configured to generate a skew merkle tree having a binary merkle tree structure using data blocks. .
- the skew merkle tree generation module 110 has the form of a binary merkle tree structure in which a data block T n and a root hash value R n-1 of a previous subtree are paired. It can be configured to create a tree.
- Each node of the Skew Merkle Tree stores an initial data block T 1 and a root hash value R n-1 .
- the skew merkle tree generation module 110 is configured to expand the skew merkle tree by calculating the root hash value of each node by h(h(T n )
- the skew merkle tree generation module 110 is first configured to include a root hash value R n-1 of the previous subtree according to a linked list method in a newly created data block T n . I can.
- R n-1 ) is sequentially stored.
- a skew merkle tree can be seen as a combination of a linked list and a binary merkle tree.
- the hash value R 1 is a hashed value by adding the first data block T 1 and the root hash initial value R 0 .
- the hash value R 2 is the hashed value of the second data block T 2 and the most recent root hash value R 1 . Since T 2 includes the most recent root hash value R 1 by the linked list method, R 2 can be calculated by hashing T 2 and R 1 . In this way, R 2 is added to the T 3 data block and the above process is repeated to expand and generate the Skew Merkle tree.
- the node authenticity verification module 130 of FIG. 1 may be configured to verify the authenticity of a specific node in the past on the skew merkle tree.
- R4 included therein is obtained from T 4 , the latest data block of the Skew Merkle Tree.
- R 1 contained therein is obtained from the given T 2 for verification. And it can be calculated by hashing a T 2 of h (T 2) and combined hash and if the R 1 and h (T 2) calculating the R 2.
- T 3 hash value h (T 3) is known in advance, it is possible to calculate the R 3 in the same manner, h (T 4) can be calculated also R 4, if know in advance, using the R 3. If R 4 calculated in this way is the same as R 4 obtained above, it can be proved that T 2, which is the target of verification, is a node included in the Skew Merkle Tree.
- Skude Merkle Tree also has its drawbacks. Since each node of the skew merkle tree holds only the hash value of the previous subtree according to the linked list method, in the verification process, as shown in FIG. 4, it is necessary to calculate and calculate one by one for all nodes. Skew Merkle Tree is advantageous for verifying recent data, but has the disadvantage of increasing the computational load due to the large number of computational steps for hundreds of billions of transactions per year. To compensate for this, an h-skew Merkle tree can be used.
- the h-skew merkle tree generation module 120 of FIG. 1 is configured to further retain information on the root hash value of a node much earlier than that in addition to each node holding the root hash value of the previous node, as shown in FIG. do.
- the root hash value of the far earlier node is defined as a jump link as a link referring to the past tree. That is, the jump link is the past root hash value.
- the jump link has an exponential distance between nodes. It is possible to skip a long operation step for verification and immediately verify a data block of the past jump link. In other words, the size of the proof is reduced and the number of calculation steps is significantly reduced, enabling rapid verification of nodes several years ago.
- Each node value Rn of the h-skew Merkle tree further holding the jump link of FIG. 5 may be summarized as h(h(T n )
- R n-(base ⁇ offset) is a jump link that is the hash value of the node at some point in the past.
- the base is the shortest distance of the jump link predetermined in order to allocate the jump link at predetermined intervals. If the base is 3, jump links are allocated at intervals of 3 nodes.
- the offset is the remainder of the value obtained by dividing the position n of the current node by the base, that is, n% base.
- FIG. 5 a jump link with a base of 3 and an offset of 1 is illustrated.
- the distance of the jump link is 3 as a base offset, that is, 3 1 .
- R 4 the value of R 4 can be obtained by hashing after summing the hash value of T 4 , the previous hash value R 3, and the jump link R 1 .
- jump links may not be assigned to nodes other than the above nodes.
- FIG. 8 shows a state in which the jump link assignment of FIG. 7 is completed.
- the assignment of the jump link indicates that each offset is repeatedly performed until it reaches the base.
- the verification of the block may be performed as follows.
- R head is R 59
- the link (node) R 58 and R 57 equal to the distance of base 3 are referenced to the appropriate distance from R 59 , that is, the distance of offset 3 from R 57 , that is 3 Among the jump links of 3 , the most past link R 30 in the future rather than R 8 is searched and searched.
- the link (node) R 29 equal to the appropriate distance, that is, the distance of the base 3 is searched again. Offset distance again from 2 R 29 That is, the query by searching for a jump in the R 11 link 32 link jump R 20 and R 20 of the jump link.
- the jump link R 11 becomes the oldest link in the future than R 8 among the jump links of offset 2 based on R 29 .
- the root hash value is calculated in order in the future direction. If the final calculated root hash value coincides with R 59 on the h-skew Merkle tree, it is proved that T 8 exists on the h-skew Merkle tree.
- 10 is an actual implementation example, and shows an h-skew Merkle tree with a base of 10. Since the jump link is offset by 10, the distance of the jump link increases to 10, 10 2 and 10 3 , and if the distance is 1999, it can be reached with only 28 steps.
- the ledger's verifiable pruning system can completely verify data with only the hash value even without directly holding all data blocks, the amount of data stored can be significantly reduced. Because the size of the ledger also grows tremendously over time, search and calculation using jump links is urgently needed.
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Claims (7)
- 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝(verifiable pruning) 시스템에 있어서,링크드 리스트(linked list) 방식에 따라 상기 이전 서브 트리의 루트 해쉬(root hash)값 Rn-1을 상기 데이터 블록(data block) Tn에 포함시키고, 상기 루트 해쉬값 Rn-1이 포함된 데이터 블록 Tn을 해쉬하여 h(Tn)을 산출하고, 산출된 h(Tn)과 이전 서브 트리의 루트 해쉬값 Rn-1을 합산한 후 해쉬하여 h(h(Tn)|Rn-1)을 산출하고, 산출된 h(h(Tn)|Rn-1)을 이진 머클 트리(binary merkle tree) 구조의 각 노드에 순차적으로 추가하여 스큐드 머클 트리(skewed merkle tree)를 확장 생성하는 스큐드 머클 트리 생성 모듈을 포함하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 제1항에 있어서,과거 소정의 데이터 블록 Tk가 상기 스큐드 머클 트리에 포함되어 있는지 검증하기 위해 상기 Tk와 상기 스큐드 머클 트리의 소정 루트 해쉬값 h(Ti)(여기서, k<i<=n)를 이용하여 순차적으로 해쉬값 연산을 수행하여 상기 스큐드 머클 트리의 최신 루트 해쉬값을 산출하고, 산출된 최신 루트 해쉬값이 미리 알고 있는 최신 루트 해쉬값 Rn과 일치하는지 대비하여 상기 블록 Tk의 진위 여부를 검증하는 노드 진위 증명 모듈을 더 포함하는 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝(verifiable pruning) 시스템에 있어서,링크드 리스트(linked list) 방식에 따라 상기 이전 서브 트리의 루트 해쉬(root hash)값 Rn-1을 상기 데이터 블록(data block) Tn에 포함시키고, 상기 루트 해쉬값 Rn-1이 포함된 데이터 블록 Tn을 해쉬하여 h(Tn)을 산출하고, 산출된 h(Tn)과 이전 서브 트리의 루트 해쉬값 Rn-1과 점프 링크(jump link) Rn-(베이스^오프셋)을 합산한 후 해쉬하여 h(h(Tn)|Rn-1|Rn-(베이스^오프셋))을 산출하고, 산출된 h(h(Tn)|Rn-1|Rn-(베이스^오프셋))을 이진 머클 트리(binary merkle tree) 구조의 각 노드에 순차적으로 추가하여 h-스큐드 머클 트리(hierarchical-skewed merkle tree)를 확장 생성하는 h-스큐드 머클 트리(hierarchical-skewed merkle tree) 생성 모듈을 포함하고,상기 점프 링크 Rn-(베이스^오프셋)은,상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리 상의 소정 과거 시점의 노드 상의 루트 해쉬값이며,상기 베이스(base)는,소정 간격마다 점프 링크를 할당하기 위해 미리 정해진 점프 링크의 최단 거리이고,상기 오프셋(offset)은,현재 노드의 위치 n%베이스이고,상기 점프 링크의 거리(dist)는,베이스오프셋(baseoffset) 값으로 산출되도록 구성되는 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 제3항에 있어서, 상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리 생성 모듈은,오프셋+(베이스오프셋)*k의 노드마다 상기 점프 링크를 할당하도록 구성되며,상기 k는 양의 정수로 구성되는 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 제3항에 있어서,과거 소정의 데이터 블록 Tk가 상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리에 포함되어 있는지 검증하기 위해 상기 Tk와 상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리의 소정 루트 해쉬값 h(Ti)(여기서, k<i<=n)를 이용하여 순차적으로 해쉬값 연산을 수행하여 상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리의 최신 루트 해쉬값을 산출하고, 산출된 최신 루트 해쉬값이 미리 알고 있는 최신 루트 해쉬값 Rn과 일치하는지 대비하여 상기 블록 Tk의 진위 여부를 검증하는 노드 진위 증명 모듈을 더 포함하도록 구성되는 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 제5항에 있어서, 상기 노드 진위 증명 모듈은,하기의 절차에 따라 상기 h-스큐드 머클 트리에 해쉬값 Ry 또는 데이터 블록 Ty가 존재하는지 여부를 증명하도록 구성되며,1) 최신의 루트 해쉬값 Rhead로부터 과거 시점 방향의 소정 거리 내 링크(노드)를 기준으로 Ry의 시점과 같거나 미래에 있는 링크(노드) 중 가장 과거 시점에 존재하는 점프 링크 또는 링크(노드)를 검색하고,2) 상기 검색된 가장 과거 시점에 존재하는 점프 링크 또는 링크의 해쉬값으로부터 과거 시점 방향의 소정 거리 내 링크(노드)를 기준으로 Ry의 시점과 같거나 미래에 있는 링크(노드) 중 가장 과거 시점에 존재하는 점프 링크 또는 링크(노드)를 검색하고,3) 2) 과정을 상기 Ry에 도달할 때까지 반복하고,4) 상기 Ty를 이용하여 상기 2) 및 3)에서 반복하여 검색된 점프 링크 또는 링크(노드)의 집합에 대해 차례로 미래 방향으로 향하는 루트 해쉬를 계산한다.5) 최종 산출된 루트 해쉬값이 상기 Rhead와 동일한지 대비하고, 대비 결과 동일하면 상기 해쉬값 Ry 또는 데이터 블록 Ty가 h-스큐드 머클 트리에 존재하는 것으로 증명되는 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
- 제6항에 있어서, 상기 소정 거리는,베이스인 것을 특징으로 하는 원장의 증명 가능 프루닝 시스템.
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CA3146179A CA3146179A1 (en) | 2019-08-01 | 2020-07-21 | Ledger verifiable-pruning system |
US17/627,139 US11949801B2 (en) | 2019-08-01 | 2020-07-21 | Ledger verifiable-pruning system |
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