WO2019146854A1

WO2019146854A1 - Security device unit for checking firmware verification code of cctv

Info

Publication number: WO2019146854A1
Application number: PCT/KR2018/008038
Authority: WO
Inventors: 박진기; 이창환
Original assignee: (주)아이엔아이
Priority date: 2018-01-24
Filing date: 2018-07-16
Publication date: 2019-08-01
Also published as: KR101853786B1

Abstract

The present invention relates to a security device unit for checking a firmware verification code of a CCTV for preventing firmware installed on the CCTV from being forcibly replaced for malicious purposes, and when providing firmware to be updated, stably providing the firmware to be updated and maintaining security for the firmware to be updated for the CCTV without reinstalling original firmware of the CCTV. Accordingly, the present invention has the effect of preventing image hacking, forgery, illegal activity, etc. of CCTV photographed in real-time by preventing a forced replacement for malicious purposes and the effect of obviating malicious purposes according to a firmware modification from other external equipment or server by stably providing the firmware to be updated and maintaining security when updating the firmware of the CCTV.

Description

A secure device unit that inspects the firmware verification code of the CCTV

The present invention relates to a security device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV, and more particularly, to a security device unit for preventing CCTV from being forcibly replaced for malicious purposes and updating the already installed CCTV without re- The present invention relates to a security device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV to stably provide a firmware to be protected while maintaining security.

The conventional CCTV is configured to transmit the acquired image through a coaxial cable and store it in a DVR (Digital Video Recorder), or to store the NVR (Netwo Video Recorder) through a network system.

CCTV installed in such a structure is deliberately changed to another CCTV easily, and as a result, the control of the administrator is lost, so that there is a problem that the video shot in real time in CCTV is used for hacking, forgery and illegal actions.

Therefore, although a security unit for protecting a real-time shot image from a CCTV terminal is actually required, a security unit for protecting an image from a CCTV terminal is not sufficient.

In addition, updating the firmware of the CCTV has a problem in that it requires a lot of time, effort, and economical expenses because the firmware needs to be updated for each of the installed CCTVs.

Korean Patent Registration No. 10-1630372 entitled " Firmware update system of video security equipment ", which is related to firmware, includes an information registration unit for receiving video security device information from the video security equipment and IP camera information connected to the video security equipment, A problem code assigning unit for assigning a trouble code unique to the problem when reporting a problem from the video security equipment registered by the information registering unit and a control code for testing a problem of the IP camera A remote test unit for requesting a proxy and relaying IP camera response information for a corresponding control command from a video security device reporting a problem and testing an IP camera in which a problem occurs; A patch content storage unit for storing patch content by matching with a code, It relates to the update server, containing patches available that provides a wealth patches matching a problem with code as video surveillance equipment that reports the problem corresponding to the trouble code.

However, according to the conventional technology, the CCTV-related network structure including the CCTV, the NVR, and the server, that is, the CCTV terminal, the network terminal between the CCTV and the NVR, the NVR terminal, the network terminal between the NVR and the server, Since it relates to a technique related to the network terminal and the server terminal between the NVR and the server, there is a problem that the video shot in real time at the CCTV terminal can not prevent hacking, forgery and illegal act of the image, and the like.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION Accordingly, the present invention has been made keeping in mind the above problems occurring in the prior art, and it is an object of the present invention to allow a manager to immediately check for a forced replacement of CCTV for malicious purposes.

Also, the purpose of the present invention is to provide security while maintaining security when updating existing installed CCTV to new firmware.

According to an aspect of the present invention, there is provided a secure device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV, the secure device unit being coupled to a CCTV, A first communication unit for generating a first verification code using a hash value and a first firmware verification key provided in the CCTV and receiving the generated first verification code and unique information of the CCTV, Generating a second firmware verification key from the master firmware verification key using the received unique information of the CCTV in response to an upper version master firmware verification key for generating other firmware verification keys, A hash value group including a plurality of hash values for the firmware included in the other CCTVs including the first hash value for the CCTV is provided, Generates a second hash value from the hash value group using the unique information of the received CCTV, generates a second verification code using the generated second firmware verification key and the second hash value, And the security chip unit determines whether the first verification code and the second verification code are identical.

As described above, the present invention prevents CCTV from being forcibly replaced for malicious purposes, thereby preventing image hacking, forgery, and illegal acts of CCTV captured in real time. In addition, It is possible to eliminate the malicious purpose due to the firmware change from other external equipment or server.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram of a security device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.

2 is an exemplary diagram illustrating the relationship between a master firmware verification key and another firmware verification key according to an embodiment of the present invention.

3 is an exemplary diagram illustrating the relationship between a hash value group and hash values according to an embodiment of the present invention.

4 is a block diagram of a security device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV having a second communication unit according to an embodiment of the present invention

[Description of Symbols]

100: secure device unit 110: first communication unit

120: security chip unit 130: second communication unit

Best Mode for Carrying Out the Invention Hereinafter, a configuration and an operation of a preferred embodiment of the present invention will be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In addition, the CCTV of the present invention is not limited to CCTV, and corresponds to all the cameras for monitoring, tracking, security, etc., including cameras of IP cameras and coaxial cable networks of a network.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram illustrating a security device unit for inspecting a firmware verification code of a CCTV according to an embodiment of the present invention. A security device unit 100 (hereinafter referred to as a security device unit) for inspecting a firmware verification code of the CCTV A first communication unit 110, and a security chip unit 120.

More specifically, the first communication unit 110 generates a first verification code using the first hash value for the first firmware installed in the CCTV and the first firmware verification key provided in the CCTV, And receives the first verification code and the unique information of the CCTV.

For example, the CCTV of the present invention uses a first firmware for the CCTV production and uses the first hash value for the first firmware to prevent the CCTV associated with the secure device unit 100 from being replaced with another CCTV for malicious purposes Generates a first hash value for the first firmware in CCTV production and has a first firmware verification key of the CCTV.

Thus, the CCTV generates the first verification code using the generated first hash value and the first firmware verification key.

At this time, the first communication unit 110 receives the unique information of the CCTV from the CCTV and the first verification code generated in the CCTV.

The security chip 120 may include a first firmware verification key and an upper version master firmware verification key for generating other firmware verification keys, so that the security chip 120 may acquire the master firmware verification key from the master firmware verification key using the received unique information of the CCTV. Generating a second firmware verification key and providing a hash value group including a plurality of hash values for firmware installed in other CCTVs including a first hash value for the first firmware, Generates a second hash value from the hash value group using the unique information, generates a second validation code using the generated second firmware verification key and the second hash value, And the second verification code are the same.

For example, as shown in FIG. 2, assuming that the security chip 120 has produced CCTV1 through CCTVn, each master firmware verification key provides the firmware verification key 1 to the CCTV 1 when the unique information of the CCTV 1 is received If the unique information possessed by the CCTV 2 is provided, the firmware verification key 2 is provided to the CCTV 2. If the unique information possessed by the CCTV 3 is provided, the firmware verification key 3 is provided to the CCTV 3. do.

Accordingly, the security chip 120 can generate the second firmware verification key from the master firmware verification key through the unique information of the CCTV if the unique information of the CCTV is provided according to the provision of the master firmware verification key.

3, assuming that the security chip unit 120 has been produced during CCTV production, that is, from CCTV1 to CCTVn, the hash value 1 for the firmware 1 installed in the CCTV 1, the hash value for the firmware 2 installed in the CCTV 2, Value 2, a hash value 3 for firmware 3 installed in CCTV3, and a hash value n for firmware n installed in CCTVn.

Next, the security chip unit 120 generates a second verification code using the hash value 1 and the firmware verification key 1 through the first communication unit 110, for example, as described with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3 Upon receipt of the generated verification code 1 and the unique information of the CCTV 1, the hash value 2 is generated from the hash value group using the received CCTV 1 unique information, the firmware verification key 2 is generated using the unique information of the CCTV 1, The hash value 2 and the firmware verification key 2 are used to generate the verification code, that is, the verification code 2.

Thereafter, the secure chip unit 120 determines whether the received verification code 1 and verification code 2 are identical.

As a result, the first verification code is generated with the first hash value and the first firmware verification key, and the second verification code uses the unique information of the received CCTV from the master firmware verification key to generate the second firmware verification key Verification key) and has the same value since it is generated from the unique information of the CCTV in the hash value group in the second hash value (same as the first hash value).

If the security chip 120 is combined with another CCTV for malicious purposes, the verification code received from the other CCTV and the verification code identical to the verification code received through the unique information of the CCTV can not be generated, CCTV is judged to be connected with another CCTV for the purpose of preventing CCTV image hacking, image forgery and illegal act.

In particular, the security chip 120 continuously transmits the first verification code and the first request information for receiving the unique information of the CCTV at predetermined time intervals.

For example, since the administrator of the control server can not remotely control the CCTV at any time after the installation of the CCTV, the security chip unit 120 receives the first verification code and the unique information of the CCTV at predetermined intervals The first request information is continuously transmitted to analyze whether the CCTV is combined.

In addition, the secure device unit 100 may further include a second communication unit 130 in the first communication unit 110 and the security chip unit 120.

4, when the second communication unit 130 is further included in the first communication unit 110 and the security chip unit 120, the security chip unit 120 transmits a first session ID And generates second cryptographic data using the second hash value and the unique information of the CCTV when the second verification code is determined in the same manner as the first verification code, Unit generates a first signature value using the first temporary key, and the second communication unit 130 transmits the session ID, the first cipher data, and the first signature value to the control server.

That is, the second communication unit 130 may include a security chip unit 120 (e.g., a security chip unit) to check whether the control server is transmitted from a control server verified in terms of the security chip unit 120, And transmits the first encryption data and the first signature value to the control server.

At this time, the control server includes a temporary key group including a plurality of temporary keys including the first temporary key, and a session ID group matching with temporary keys of each of the temporary key groups, 130 generates a second temporary key from the temporary key group using the first session ID received from the second communication unit 130, decrypts the first encrypted data received from the second communication unit 130, Generates a second signature value using the second temporary key, the decrypted second hash value, and the CCTV unique information, and generates a first signature value and a second signature value, which are received from the second communication unit, And generates a second firmware from the firmware group using the decrypted unique information of the CCTV as a plurality of firmware are included in the already provided firmware group, And it determines the third hash value and the second hash value for the second firmware is the same.

Finally, the first signature value is generated by the second hash value, the unique information of the CCTV received at the secure device unit, the first temporary key of the secure device unit, and the second signature value is the decrypted second hash value, Has the same value as the first signature value because it has the second temporary key (same as the first temporary key of the secure device unit) generated from the unique information of the CCTV and the session ID.

If the hash value and the unique information session ID of the CCTV are provided by making a change by making a remote or forced connection to the security chip 120, the decrypted second hash value, the decrypted CCTV unique information, and the session ID are different And acts to immediately manage the security of the secure device unit.

If the first signature value and the second signature value are the same between the secure device unit 100 and the control server and the first hash value and the third hash value are determined to be equal to each other, Generates second cryptographic data using the fourth hash value for the third firmware and the unique information of the decrypted CCTV to transmit the third firmware to be updated to the CCTV and transmits the fourth hash value and the unique information of the decrypted CCTV And generates a third signature value using the second temporary key, and transmits the generated second cryptographic data, the third signature value, and the third firmware to update the CCTV.

That is, the security device unit 100 provides the third firmware to be stably updated to the CCTV while maintaining security by receiving the third firmware from the verified control server according to the verification with the control server.

Upon receiving the second encryption data, the third signature value, and the third firmware through the second communication unit 130, the security chip unit 120 generates and decrypts the fourth hash value obtained by decoding the second encryption data, Generates the CCTV unique information, generates the fourth signature value generated using the unique information of the CCTV through the decryption, the fourth hash value and the first temporary key, and then generates the fourth signature value using the received third signature value and the generated fourth signature value And transmits the received third firmware to the CCTV if the third signature value and the fourth signature value are the same.

That is, if the generated third signature value and the generated fourth signature value are the same, the secure chip unit 120 may maliciously or deliberately access the malicious firmware to determine whether the malicious firmware has been transmitted. It acts to judge that it is transmitted from the server.

In particular, if the received third firmware is transmitted to the CCTV, the security chip 120 receives and stores the fifth hash value for the third firmware as the third firmware is installed in the CCTV, And continuously transmits second request information for receiving the hash value.

For example, the security chip unit 120 requests the fifth hash value at a predetermined time interval because the CCTV to be updated to the third firmware is deliberately intended to be changed or the firmware change is often difficult to be remotely controlled by another CCTV The second request information is continuously transmitted to analyze whether the CCTV is combined.

While the present invention has been particularly shown and described with reference to exemplary embodiments thereof, it is to be understood that the invention is not limited to the disclosed exemplary embodiments, It is not used to limit the scope.

Therefore, it is intended that the present invention covers the modifications and variations of this invention provided they come within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.

Claims

A secure device unit coupled with a CCTV,

The CCTV generates a first verification code using a first hash value for the first firmware installed in the CCTV and a first firmware verification key provided in the CCTV and receives the generated first verification code and the unique information of the CCTV A first communication unit for communicating with the first communication unit And

Generating a second firmware verification key from the master firmware verification key using the unique information of the received CCTV as the upper firmware master verification key for generating other firmware verification keys including the first firmware verification key is provided And a hash value group including a plurality of hash values for firmware installed in other CCTVs including a first hash value for the first firmware is provided, Value group, generating a second verification code using the generated second firmware verification key and the second hash value, and then generating the second verification code using the generated first firmware verification key and the second verification value, And a security chip unit for determining whether the CCTV firmware is valid.
The wireless communication system according to claim 1,

And the first request information for receiving the first verification code and the unique information of the CCTV is continuously transmitted at predetermined time intervals.
The method according to claim 1,

Wherein the security chip unit generates the first cipher data using the second hash value and the unique information of the CCTV when the first session ID is provided and the second verification code is determined in the same manner as the first verification code, Value and the CCTV unique information and the first temporary key of the secure device unit to generate a first signature value,

And a second communication unit for transmitting the first session ID, the first cipher data, and the first signature value to the control server, wherein the second communication unit checks the firmware verification code of the CCTV.
The system according to claim 3, wherein the control server

A temporary key group including a plurality of temporary keys including the first temporary key is provided and a session ID group matching with temporary keys of each temporary key group is provided so that the first session ID received from the second communication unit Generates the second temporary key from the temporary key group, decrypts the first cipher data received from the second communication unit to generate the second hash value and the unique information of the CCTV, and decrypts the decrypted The second signature value is generated using the first hash value, the second hash value, and the CCTV unique information, and it is determined whether the first signature value and the second signature value received from the second communication unit are the same, The second firmware is generated from the firmware group using the decrypted unique information of the CCTV and the third hash for the generated second firmware Value and the second hash value are the same. &Lt; Desc / Clms Page number 24 >
The system according to claim 4, wherein the control server

When the first signature value and the second signature value are the same and the first hash value and the third hash value are determined to be the same, the control server transmits the third firmware to be transmitted to the CCTV, Generates the second cryptographic data using the fourth hash value for the firmware and the unique information of the decrypted CCTV, generates the third signature value using the fourth hash value, the unique information of the decrypted CCTV and the second temporary key And transmits the generated second cryptographic data, the third signature value, and the third firmware to update the CCTV, and checks the firmware verification code of the CCTV.
6. The security chip unit according to claim 5,

Upon receipt of the second encryption data, the third signature value, and the third firmware through the second communication unit, the fourth hash value obtained by decoding the second encryption data is generated and decrypted to generate the CCTV unique information. Generates a fourth signature value generated using the unique information, the fourth hash value, and the first temporary key, and determines whether the received third signature value is identical to the generated fourth signature value, And transmits the received third firmware to the CCTV if the fourth signature value and the fourth signature value are the same.
7. The apparatus of claim 6,

And transmitting the received third firmware to the CCTV, the method further comprising: receiving a fifth hash value for the third firmware when the third firmware is installed in the CCTV, storing the fifth hash value for the third firmware, And the request information is transmitted continuously. The secure device unit inspects the firmware verification code of the CCTV.