WO2019015387A1 - Group identity signature based pmipv6 anonymous access authentication system and method - Google Patents

Abstract

The present invention provides a group identity signature based PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and a method. The method comprises: accepting by a third-party trusted center applications for registration from mobile nodes, local mobility anchors and mobile access gateways, issuing public and private key pairs for the mobile access gateways in PMIPv6 networks and the local mobility anchors, and as a group owner, issuing group membership certificates for the mobile nodes; implementing initial access authentication on the mobile nodes when the mobile nodes access for the first time the mobile access gateways in the PMIPv6 networks; and when the mobile nodes are switched among the mobile access gateways in the same PMIPv6 network, calculating by the mobile nodes pseudonyms and private keys of the mobile nodes according to anonymous public keys issued by the local mobility anchors and the group membership certificates, and implementing switching authentication in the PMIPv6 network by an identity of the pseudonyms. According to the present invention, an identity-based agent signature solution is applied to the mobile management process of a PMIPv6 protocol, and a public key certificate is canceled by using a group identity signature technology, thus reducing the storage and the authentication of the legality of the public key certificate, achieving the anonymity of mobile nodes, and realizing privacy protection.

Description

PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and method based on identity group signing Technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of network security, and in particular relates to a PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and method based on identity group sign.

Background technique

In recent years, the Internet has become a very important part of people's daily lives. With the rapid growth of wireless mobile devices, people can access the network and experience different types of network services at any time and with the help of mobile devices. Mobile IPv6 ensures that mobile IPv6 nodes are always accessible regardless of where the mobile IPv6 device is located and whether other devices communicating with the mobile IPv6 device support Mobile IPv6. Compared with mobile IPv4, it has the advantages of larger address space, route optimization, ingress filtering and dynamic mobile agent discovery. As the extension of mobile IPv6, the proxy mobile IPv6 is characterized by simplifying the control of the network and reducing the user's participation in the mobility management process. At the same time, due to its short handover delay and low signaling overhead, PMIPv6 has become a hot research topic.

However, in order to make PMIPv6 popular, it has to face a series of security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks, replay attacks, denial of service attacks, and camouflage attacks. How to ensure the privacy and communication security of the network entity becomes a necessity. The problem facing. In order to solve this problem, many experts and scholars use a centralized authentication method to solve this problem. The so-called centralized authentication, that is, each mutual authentication between PMIPv6 entities, must pass through the AAA server. This increases the authentication pressure of the AAA server, and because the authentication information needs to be transmitted over long distances, this causes the entity to wait for the confirmation time to be too long; in order to solve this problem, the local authentication service without the direct participation of the AAA server is proposed, but In this process, in order to prove the legality of the entity identity, these schemes must directly or indirectly verify the validity of the certificate from the AAA server during the authentication process, which not only requires the security of the certificate to be preserved, but also causes A relatively high computational cost. At the same time, in most of the above schemes, the real identity of the mobile entity is completely exposed to the other party. With the exposed real identity, the adversary can accurately know the location information and the mobile state of the legal mobile entity, and the adversary is more likely to disguise as a legal entity. Illegal access.

Summary of the invention

In view of the deficiencies of the prior art, the present invention provides a PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and method based on identity group sign.

The technical solution of the present invention is as follows:

An identity group-based PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system includes: a third-party trust center STR and a plurality of PMIPv6 networks, each of which includes a local mobility anchor LMA, a plurality of mobile access gateways MAG, and PMIPv6 a plurality of mobile nodes MN moving within the network or between different PMIPv6 networks; the third-party trust center STR generates and issues public parameters;

The third-party trust center STR is trusted by all other entity members by default, accepts the registration request of the mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG, and issues public and private for the mobile access gateway MAG and the local mobility anchor LMA in the PMIPv6 network. Key pair, and as a group owner, issue a group member certificate for the mobile node MN;

Initial access authentication between the mobile node MN and the mobile node MN when the mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network: the mobile access gateway MAG represents the group using the mobile node MN between the PMIPv6 network and the mobile node MN The member certificate generates a group signature, and the common signature of the mobile access gateway MAG performs mutual authentication. After the mobile access gateway MAG authentication is completed, the mobile access gateway MAG sends the group membership certificate of the legitimate mobile node MN to the local mobile connected thereto. The anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN to ensure the handover access of the legitimate mobile node MN;

When the mobile node MN switches between the mobile access gateways MAG in the same PMIPv6 network, the mobile node MN calculates the pseudonym and the private key of the mobile node MN according to the anonymous public key and the group member certificate issued by the local mobile anchor LMA, and The identity of the pseudonym is used to implement handover authentication within the PMIPv6 network.

The method for performing the identity group-based PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication by using the system includes:

Step 1: The third-party trust center STR generates and publishes public parameters;

Step 2: The mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG apply for registration with the third-party trust center STR, and issue a public-private key pair for the mobile access gateway MAG and the local mobility anchor LMA in the PMIPv6 network, and serve as the group owner. Issue a group member certificate for the mobile node MN;

Step 3: Monitor the status of the mobile node MN in each PMIPv6 network: if the mobile node MN is in the initial state, that is, the state when the mobile node MN first accesses the PMIPv6 network, perform step 4; if the mobile node MN is in the same PMIPv6 network Move state, go to step 5;

Step 4: Initial access authentication between the mobile node MN and the mobile node MN when the mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network: the mobile access gateway MAG uses the mobile node between the PMIPv6 network and the mobile node MN The group member certificate of the MN generates a group signature, and the common signature of the mobile access gateway MAG performs mutual authentication. After the mobile access gateway MAG authentication is completed, the mobile access gateway MAG sends the group membership certificate of the legal mobile node MN to the connection. The local mobile anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN to ensure the handover access of the legitimate mobile node MN;

Step 5: When the mobile node MN switches between the mobile access gateways MAG in the same PMIPv6 network, the mobile node MN calculates the pseudonym and the private key of the mobile node MN according to the anonymous public key and the group member certificate issued by the local mobility anchor LMA. The pseudo-name is used to implement the handover authentication in the PMIPv6 network.

The mobile node M applies for registration to the third party trust center STR as follows:

First, the mobile node MN selects the random number r _MN ∈Z ^* _q , the random number N ₁ ∈Z ^* _q , the shared key K _MN-STR between the mobile node MN and the third-party trust center STR, and a plurality of random numbers x _i ∈Z ^* _q (i=1...n); the mobile node MN calculates a group variable M={r _MN x _i P,x _i P,r _MN P} applied to join the third-party trust center STR as the group owner; the mobile node MN Using the public key PK _{STR of the} third-party trust center STR, the shared key K _MN-STR , the group variable M, and the random number N ₁ between the identity ID _MN of the mobile node MN, the mobile node MN, and the third-party trust center STR Do encryption and get ciphertext C _MN-STR ;

Then, the mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-STR to the third party trust center STR;

The third-party trust center STR decrypts the ciphertext C _MN- STR using its own private key SK _STR and generates a plurality of group member certificates Cert _{MN_i} = {S _i , EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P} of the mobile node MN as a group member (i...n), where S _i =SK _STR H ₂ (EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P), EXP _MN is the validity period of the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} ; encrypting N ₁ and Cert _{MN_i} using the shared key K _MN-STR Obtained ciphertext C _STR-MN ;

Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-MN to the MN;

Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-MN from the third-party trust center STR, the mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verifies the random number N ₁ in the ciphertext C _STR-MN , if the verification succeeds, The storage group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , at this time, the registration process of the mobile node MN is completed, and if the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.

The local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG apply to the third party trust center STR for registration as follows:

First, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG select a random number r _MN/MAG ∈Z ^* _q , a random number N ₂ ∈Z ^* _q , a local mobility anchor LMA, and a mobile access gateway MAG and a third-party trust center STR The shared key K _LMA/MAG-STR ; the local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG calculate r _MN/MAG P; and use the public key PK _STR of the third-party trust center STR to connect the local mobile anchor LMA and mobile Shared key K _LMA/MAG-STR , r _LMA/MA GP, and random number N ₂ between the identity identifier ID _{LMA/MAG of} the gateway MAG, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG and the third party trust center STR Do encryption and get ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR ;

Then, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG send the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR to the third party trust center STR;

The third-party trust center STR decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR with its own private key SK _STR and generates the private key SK _LMA/MAG =SK _STR PK _{LMA/MAG of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway _MAG , wherein Public key PK _LMA/MAG =H ₂ (ID _LMA/MAG ||EXP _LMA/MAG , r _LMA/MA GP), H ₂ is a hash function defined by the third-party trust center STR, and EXP _LMA/MAG represents the local mobile anchor The validity period of the private key SK _LMA/MAG of the LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG; the ciphertext C _{STR-LMA/MAG is} obtained by encrypting SK _LMA/MAG with the shared key K _MN-STR , EXP _LMA/MAG and N ₂ ;

Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG to the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG;

Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG from the third-party trust center STR, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG decrypt the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verify the randomness in the ciphertext C _STR-MN . The number N ₂ , if the verification is successful, stores the private key SK _{LMA/MAG of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway _MAG and the expiration date _EXPMA/MAG , at which time the registration process of the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG is completed. If the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.

The step 4 includes:

Step 4.1: The mobile node MN selects the random number N ₃ , x _i P, and generates the group signature Sign _MN by the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} corresponding to N ₃ and x _i P with the time stamp T ₁ ;

Step 4.2: The mobile node MN sends the group signature Sign _MN , the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , the timestamp T ₁ and the random number N ₃ to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.3: The mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies the timestamp TS ₁ sent by the mobile node MN: if the timestamp TS _{1 is} not fresh, the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise the mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies group membership certificate sent by the mobile node MN _Cert MN_i and group signature Sign _MN: If not legal, the mobile access gateway MAG1 refuse the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 4.4;

Step 4.4: The mobile access gateway _MAG1 sends the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN to the local mobility anchor LMA;

Step 4.5: The local mobility anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN by using the information in the mobile node MN group member certificate Cert _{MN_i}

And the shared key K _LMA- MN between the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA uses the shared key K _{LMA-MN to} calculate the ciphertext C _LMA-MN containing the anonymous public key of the mobile node _MN ; Mobile anchor LMA storage group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} and corresponding shared key K _LMA-MN ;

Step 4.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and r _LMA P back to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.7: The mobile access gateway MAG1 first selects the random number N4, and then uses its own private key SK _MAG1 to identify the identity ID of the mobile access gateway MAG1, _MAG1 , the local mobility anchor LMA, the identity ID _LMA , r _MAG1 P, r _LMA. P, the expiration date EXP _MAG1 , the current timestamp T ₂ is signed to obtain the signature Sign _MAG1 , and then the shared key K _MAG1-MN between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG1 is calculated, and finally encrypted using the shared key K _MAG1-MN The ciphertext C _{MAG1-MN is} obtained by random numbers N ₃ and N ₄ ;

Step 4.8: The mobile access gateway MAG1 sends the signature Sign _MAG1 , the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN , the C _LMA-MN and the ID _MAG1 , the ID _LMA , the r _MAG1 P, the r _LMA P, the EXP _MAG1 and the T ₂ to the mobile node MN. ;

Step 4.9: The mobile node MN verifies the timestamp T ₂ sent by the mobile access gateway MAG1: if the timestamp T _{2 is} not fresh, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the private key of the mobile access gateway MAG1 Validity period EXP _MAG1 , if not within the validity period, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the validity of the mobile access gateway MAG1 signature Sign _MAG1 , if not, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise The mobile node MN calculates the shared key K _MN-MAG1 , K _MN- LMA between the mobile access gateway MAG1 and the local mobility anchor LMA; decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN using the shared key K _{MN-MAG1 to} confirm the random number N ₃ and obtain N ₄ , decrypt the ciphertext C _LMA-MN , obtain the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN

And save a local mobility anchor LMA identity ID _LMA and the mobile node MN anonymous public key

The ciphertext C _{MN-MAG1 is} obtained by encrypting the random number N ₄ by using the shared key K _MN- MAG1 between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway _MAG1 ;

Step 4.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1 to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.11: after receiving the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1, first Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 using the shared key K _MN-MAG1 decryption C _MN-MAG1 obtains the random number, if the random number is equal to N _4, the authentication is successful, the mobile The authentication relationship between the access gateway MAG1 and the mobile node MN is established. Otherwise, the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.

The step 5 includes:

Step 5.1: The mobile node MN randomly selects S _MN ∈Z ^* _q to calculate the pseudonym of the mobile node MN

And the private key of the mobile node MN

The mobile node MN selects the random number N ₅ and applies the private key to the random number N ₅ , the time stamp T ₃ , and the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i}

The signature is signed by Sign _MN ;

Step 5.2: The mobile node MN will sign Sign _MN , pseudonym

The timestamp T ₃ , the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} and the random number N ₅ are sent together to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.3: Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 to verify the time stamp T ₃ sent by the mobile node MN, if the timestamp T ₃ is not fresh, the Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, mobile access gateway or verification MAG2 Sign the mobile node MN _MN signature transmitted, if not legal, the mobile access gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 5.4;

Step 5.4: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN and the negotiation key parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 to the local mobility anchor LMA;

Step 5.5: The local mobility anchor LMA takes the shared key K _LMA-MN according to the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , and encrypts the key negotiation parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 by using the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _LMA-MN ;

Step 5.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN back to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.7: The mobile access gateway MAG2 selects the random number N ₆ , calculates the shared key K _MAG2-MN , and encrypts the random number N ₅ , N ₆ and the time stamp T ₄ using the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN ;

Step 5.8: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN to the mobile node MN;

Step 5.9: The mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA- MN by using the shared key K _{MN-LMA to} obtain the shared negotiation key of the mobile access gateway MAG2, and then the mobile node MN calculates the shared negotiation key according to the mobile access gateway MAG2. The shared key K _{MN-MAG2 of the} mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG2, and decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN according to the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain random numbers N ₅ , N ₆ , if the random number N ₅ If the verification fails, the mobile node MN stops the access request. Otherwise, the mobile node MN encrypts the random number N ₆ using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 ;

Step 5.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.11: The mobile access gateway MAG2 decrypts the ciphertext C _MN- MAG2 using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain a random number. If the random number is equal to N ₆ , the authentication is successful, and between the mobile access gateway MAG2 and the mobile node MN. The authentication relationship is established, otherwise the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG2 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.

Beneficial effects:

The invention applies the identity-based proxy signature scheme in the mobile management process of the PMIPv6 protocol, cancels the public key certificate based on the application of the identity group signature technology, reduces the storage and legality verification of the public key certificate, and realizes the mobile node. MN's anonymity protects MN's privacy. The hierarchical design ensures a clear division of labor between entities, reducing the computational and certification costs of STR and LMA. Our solution ensures both the security of the certification process and the high efficiency.

DRAWINGS

1 is a structural diagram of an identity group-based PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication system according to an embodiment of the present invention;

2 is a schematic diagram of a process for applying for registration by a mobile node MN to a third-party trust center STR according to an embodiment of the present invention;

3 is a schematic diagram of a process for applying for registration by a local mobility anchor LMA or a mobile access gateway MAG to a third-party trust center STR according to an embodiment of the present invention;

4 is a schematic flowchart of a mobile node MN accessing a mobile access gateway MAG1 in a PMIPv6 network for the first time according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of an intra-domain access authentication process according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Detailed ways

The specific embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In this embodiment, the PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication system and method based on the identity group sign are applied to the PMIPv6 network access authentication link, and the user access authentication is fully protected, and the security and efficiency of the authentication process are fully protected. The identity group-based PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication system shown in FIG. 1 includes: a third-party trust center STR and a plurality of PMIPv6 networks, each of which includes a Local Mobility Anchor (LMA) (LMA1). , LMA2), several mobile access gateways (MAGs) (MAG1 to MAG4), and several mobile nodes MN moving between PMIPv6 networks or between different PMIPv6 networks; third-party trust centers STR through the network The local mobility anchor LMA connection, the local mobility anchor LMA connects to the mobile access gateway MAG.

The architecture of the whole system is divided into four layers: the first layer is the System-trust root (STR), which acts as a third-party trust center and is trusted by default for all entity members in the PMIPv6 network; generates and publishes public parameters. The identity of all entities in the PMIPv6 network is reviewed, and public and private key pairs are issued for all entity members in the PMIPv6 network, and the third-party trust center uses the identity-based group signature mechanism as the group owner to issue group membership certificates to the legal mobile node MN to ensure The implementation of the subsequent anonymous access process of the mobile node MN; the second layer is the local mobility anchor LMA, which is respectively connected with the third-party trust center STR and the mobile access gateway MAG, and establishes a bidirectional tunnel with the mobile access gateway MAG to forward the data packet. Responsible for managing the binding state of the mobile node MN, assisting the legitimate mobile node MN to generate a variable pseudonym; issuing a certificate for the mobile access gateway MAG, calculating an anonymous public key for the legitimate mobile node MN, and participating in the handover authentication in the PMIPv6 network Calculate the anonymous public key for the legitimate mobile node MN; the third layer is the mobile access gateway MAG, instead of the mobile node MN Mobile state management, using the private key issued by the third-party trust center STR to calculate the signature of the PMIPv6 network in which the signature represents the mutual authentication with the mobile node MN, ensuring the access of the legitimate mobile node MN, and ensuring the local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile node MN. Secure communication; the fourth layer is the mobile node MN, which is a mobile device that is switched from a subnet composed of one PMIPv6 network or mobile access gateway MAG to another subnet composed of PMIPv6 network or mobile access gateway MAG. The network (the PMIPv6 network initially accessed by the mobile node MN) and the foreign network (the PMIPv6 network accessed by the subsequent mobile node MN) roam or switch between different mobile access gateways MAG, through mutual interaction with the mobile access gateway MAG Authentication to access the PMIPv6 network and exchange information to ensure the security and reliability between the two parties.

Initial access authentication between the mobile node MN and the mobile node MN when the mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network: the mobile access gateway MAG represents the group using the mobile node MN between the PMIPv6 network and the mobile node MN The member certificate generates a group signature, and the common signature of the mobile access gateway MAG performs mutual authentication. After the mobile access gateway MAG authentication is completed, the mobile access gateway MAG sends the group membership certificate of the legitimate mobile node MN to the local mobile connected thereto. The anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN to ensure the handover access of the legitimate mobile node MN. When the mobile node MN switches between the mobile access gateways MAG in the same PMIPv6 network, the mobile node MN calculates the pseudonym and the private key of the mobile node MN according to the anonymous public key and the group member certificate issued by the local mobile anchor LMA, and The identity of the pseudonym is used to implement handover authentication within the PMIPv6 network.

For the convenience of the subsequent description, the identification and description as shown in Table 1 are given.

Table 1 Related signs and descriptions

In this embodiment, an identity-based group signature scheme proposed by Chen X, Zhang F, Konidala D M et al., referred to as IDGS scheme, Dan Boneh, Ben Lynn, Hovav Shacham et al., short signature scheme, referred to as IBS, is used. At the same time, in the present invention, the identity-based encryption scheme proposed by Dan B, Franklin M et al. is referred to as the BF scheme and the AES symmetric encryption scheme currently in common use.

A PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication method based on identity group signing, comprising:

Step 1: The third-party trust center STR generates and publishes public parameters;

The process of generating and publishing public parameters is as follows:

First, a q-order addition cycle group G ₁ , a multiplication cycle group G _{T of the} same order q, and a bilinear pair e: G ₁ × G ₁ → G _{T are} generated;

After that, select a private key of the generating element P∈G ₁ and the third-party trust center STR.

one of them

a positive integer ranging from 1 to q-1;

Then, calculate the public key P _pub =SK _STR P of the third-party trust center STR;

In addition, three secure hash functions H _{1 are} defined: {0, 1} ^* × G ₁ -> Z ^* _q , H ₂ : {0, 1} ^* × G ₁ -> G ₁ , H ₃ : {0, 1} ^* -> G ₁ ;

Finally, the public parameters Para={G ₁ , G _T , q, e, P, P _Pub , H ₁ , H ₂ , H ₃ } are generated and published.

Step 2: The mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG apply for registration with the third-party trust center STR, and issue a public-private key pair for the mobile access gateway MAG and the local mobility anchor LMA in the PMIPv6 network, and serve as the group owner. Issue a group member certificate for the mobile node MN;

The process of applying for registration by the mobile node MN as shown in FIG. 2 to the third-party trust center STR is as follows:

First, the mobile node MN selects the random number r _MN ∈Z ^* _q , the random number N ₁ ∈Z ^* _q , the shared key K _MN-STR between the mobile node MN and the third-party trust center STR, and a plurality of random numbers x _i ∈Z ^* _q (i=1...n); the mobile node MN calculates a group variable M={r _MN x _i P,x _i P,r _MN P} applied to join the third-party trust center STR as the group owner; the mobile node MN Using the public key PK _STR of the third-party trust center STR, using the identity-based BF encryption algorithm designed by Boneh D and Franklin, the shared secret between the identity ID _MN of the mobile node MN, the mobile node MN and the third-party trust center STR Key K _MN-STR , group variable M and random number N _{1 are} encrypted to obtain ciphertext C _MN-STR = Enc_BF_PK _STR = {ID _MN , K _MN-STR , M, N ₁ };

Then, the mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-STR to the third party trust center STR;

Upon receipt of the ciphertext C _MN-STR, a trusted third party to use his private key center STR _STR SK to decrypt the ciphertext C _MN-STR, and generates a plurality of the mobile node MN as a group member certificate _Cert MN_i = {S _i, EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P}(i...n), where S _i =SK _STR H ₂ (EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P), EXP _MN is the validity period of the certificate Cert _{MN_i} ; using the shared key K _{MN- STR} encryption N ₁ and Cert _{MN_i} get ciphertext C _STR-MN = Enc_AES_K _STR-MN {N ₁ , Cert _{MN_i} };

Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-MN to the MN;

Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-MN from the third-party trust center STR, the mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verifies the random number N ₁ in the ciphertext C _STR-MN , if the verification succeeds, The storage group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , at this time, the registration process of the mobile node MN is completed, and if the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.

The process of applying for registration by the local mobile anchor LMA or the mobile access gateway MAG as shown in FIG. 3 to the third-party trust center STR is as follows:

First, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG select a random number r _MN/MAG ∈Z ^* _q , a random number N ₂ ∈Z ^* _q , a local mobility anchor LMA, and a mobile access gateway MAG and a third-party trust center STR The shared key K _LMA/MAG-STR ; the local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG calculate r _MN/MAG P; and utilize the public key PK _STR of the third-party trust center STR, based on the design of Boneh D and Franklin The BF encryption algorithm of the identity, the shared key K _LMA/ between the local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG identity ID _LMA/MAG , the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG and the third party trust center STR _MAG-STR , r _LMA/MA GP and random number N _{2 are} encrypted to obtain ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR = Enc_BF_PK _STR {ID _LMA/MAG , K _LMA/MAG-STR , r _LMA/MAG P, N ₂ };

Then, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG send the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR to the third party trust center STR;

After receiving the C _LMA/MAG-STR , the third-party trust center STR decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR with its own private key SK _STR and generates the private key SK _{LMA of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG. _/MAG =SK _ST RPK _LMA/MAG , where public key PK _LMA/MAG =H ₂ (ID _LMA/MAG ||EXP _LMA/MAG , r _LMA/MAG P), EXP _LMA/MAG represents local mobile anchor LMA and mobile The validity period of the private key SK _LMA/MAG of the access gateway MAG; encrypting SK _LMA/MAG with the shared key K _MN-STR , and obtaining the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG = Enc_AES_K _{STR-LMA/ using the} EXP _LMA/MAG and N _{2 MAG} {SK _LMA/MAG , EXP _LMA/MA , N ₂ };

Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG to the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG;

Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG from the third-party trust center STR, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG decrypt the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verify the randomness in the ciphertext C _STR-MN . The number N ₂ , if the verification is successful, stores the private key SK _{LMA/MAG of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway _MAG and the expiration date _EXPMA/MAG , at which time the registration process of the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG is completed. If the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.

Step 3: Monitor the status of the mobile node MN in each PMIPv6 network: if the mobile node MN is in the initial state, that is, the state when the mobile node MN first accesses the PMIPv6 network, perform step 4; if the mobile node MN is in the same PMIPv6 network Move state, go to step 5;

Step 4: The mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network, and the initial access authentication between the mobile access gateway MAG and the mobile node MN;

For example, the mobile terminal MN accesses the mobile access gateway MAG1 in the PMIPv6 network for the first time. The step 4, as shown in FIG. 4, includes:

Step 4.1: The mobile node MN selects the random number N ₃ , x _i P, and the certificate Cert _{MN_i} corresponding to N ₃ , x _i P is the same as the time stamp T ₁ using the IDGS algorithm (identity-based group sign designed by Chaum and van Heijst) Algorithm) generating a group signature Sign _MN = GroupSign_IDGS_x _i P{Cert _{MN_i} , T ₁ , N ₃ };

Step 4.2: The mobile node MN sends the group signature Sign _MN , the certificate Cert _{MN_i} , the timestamp T ₁ and the random number N ₃ to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.3: The mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies the timestamp TS ₁ sent by the mobile node MN: if the timestamp TS _{1 is} not fresh, the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise the mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies certificate sent by the mobile node MN and group signature _Cert MN_i Sign _MN: if not valid, the mobile access gateway MAG1 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 4.4;

Step 4.4: The mobile access gateway _MAG1 sends the certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN to the local mobility anchor LMA;

Step 4.5: The local mobility anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN through the Si in the mobile node MN certificate Cert _{MN_i}

At the same time, using the r _MN x _i P in the certificate Cert _{MN_i} , the shared key K _LMA-MN = r _LMA r _MN x _i P between the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile node MN is calculated, and the shared key K _LMA-MN is based on The DH key exchange algorithm calculates the secret value of the session key negotiation parameter of the mobile node MN and the private key of the local mobility anchor LMA, and the local mobility anchor LMA uses the shared key K _{LMA-MN to} calculate the anonymous node including the mobile node MN. Key ciphertext

Local mobile anchor LMA storage certificate Cert _{MN_i} and corresponding shared key K _LMA-MN ;

Step 4.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and r _LMA P back to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.7: After receiving the message from the local mobility anchor LMA, the mobile access gateway MAG1 first selects the random number N4, and then uses its own private key SK _MAG1 to identify the identity ID _{MAG1 of the} mobile access gateway _MAG1 and the local mobility anchor LMA. identity _{ID LMA, r MAG1 P, r} LMA P, validity EXP _MAG1, the current timestamp T ₂ obtained signed signature _{Sign MAG1 = Sign_IBS_SK MAG1 {ID MAG1} , ID LMA, r MAG1 P, r LMA P, EXP MAG1, T ₂ }, where IBS is an identity-based signature algorithm designed by Chaum and van Heijst, and then calculates a shared key K _MAG1-MN =r _MAG1 r _MN x _i P between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG1, The shared key K _MAG1-MN is a secret value obtained by calculating the session key negotiation parameter of the mobile node MN and the private key of the mobile access gateway MAG1 according to the DH key exchange algorithm, and finally encrypting by using the shared key K _MAG1-MN Random numbers N ₃ , N ₄ , to obtain ciphertext C _MAG1-MN = Enc_AES_K MAG1 _-MN {N ₃ , N ₄ };

Step 4.8: The mobile access gateway MAG1 sends the signature Sign _MAG1 , the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN , the C _LMA-MN and the ID _MAG1 , the ID _LMA , the r _MAG1 P, the r _LMA P, the EXP _MAG1 and the T ₂ to the mobile node MN. ;

Step 4.9: The mobile node MN verifies the timestamp T ₂ sent by the mobile access gateway MAG1: if the timestamp T _{2 is} not fresh, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the private key of the mobile access gateway MAG1 Validity period EXP _MAG1 , if not within the validity period, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the validity of the mobile access gateway MAG1 signature Sign _MAG1 , if not, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise The mobile node MN calculates a shared key K _MN-MAG1 = r _MN x _i r _MAG1 P, K _MN-LMA = r _MN x _i r _LMA P between the mobile access gateway MAG1 and the local mobility anchor LMA; The key K _MN-MAG1 decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN , confirms the random number N ₃ and obtains N ₄ , decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA-MN , and obtains the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN.

And save a local mobility anchor LMA identity ID _LMA and the mobile node MN anonymous public key

Using the shared key K _MN- MAG1 between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG1 to encrypt the random number N ₄ to obtain the ciphertext C _MN- MAG1 =Enc_AES_K _MN-MAG1 {N ₄ };

Step 4.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1 to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

Step 4.11: after receiving the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1, first Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 using the shared key K _MN-MAG1 decryption C _MN-MAG1 obtains the random number, if the random number is equal to N _4, the authentication is successful, the mobile The authentication relationship between the access gateway MAG1 and the mobile node MN is established. Otherwise, the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.

Step 5: The mobile access gateway MAG that is currently connected sends the shared key between itself and the mobile node MN to the mobile access gateway MAG to be accessed in the same PMIPv6 network, and performs handover authentication in the PMIPv6 network;

For example, as shown in FIG. 5, the mobile node MN switches from the mobile access gateway MAG1 to the mobile access gateway MAG2 in the currently accessed PMIPv6 network. Step 5 includes:

Step 5.1: The mobile node MN randomly selects S _MN ∈Z ^* _q to calculate the pseudonym of the mobile node MN

And the private key of the mobile node MN

S _i =SK _STR H ₂ (EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P), EXP _MN is the validity period of the mobile node MN as a group member, and r _MN x _i P is the group variable obtained by the third party trust center STR from the mobile node MN The value in M;

An anonymous public key for the mobile node MN; the mobile node MN selects the random number N ₅ and applies the private key to the random number N ₅ , the time stamp T ₃ , and the certificate Cert _{MN_i}

Signature is signed

Step 5.2: The mobile node MN will sign SignMN, pseudonym

The timestamp T ₃ , the certificate Cert _{MN_i} and the random number N ₅ are sent together to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.3: Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 to verify the time stamp T ₃ sent by the mobile node MN, if the timestamp T ₃ is not fresh, the Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, mobile access gateway or verification MAG2 Sign the mobile node MN _MN signature transmitted, if not legal, the mobile access gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 5.4;

Step 5.4: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN and the negotiation key parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 to the local mobility anchor LMA;

Step 5.5: The local mobility anchor LMA _takes out the shared key K _LMA-MN according to the certificate Cert _{MN_i} , and encrypts the key negotiation parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 with the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _LMA-MN =Enc_AES_K _{LMA -MN} {r _MAG2 P};

Step 5.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN back to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.7: The mobile access gateway MAG2 selects the random number N ₆ , calculates the shared key K _MAG2-MN , and encrypts the random number N ₅ , N ₆ and the time stamp T ₄ using the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN =Enc_AES_K _LMA-MN {N ₅ ,N ₆ };

Step 5.8: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN to the mobile node MN;

Step 5.9: The mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA- MN by using the shared key K _{MN-LMA to} obtain the shared negotiation key of the mobile access gateway MAG2, and then the mobile node MN calculates the shared negotiation key according to the mobile access gateway MAG2. The shared key K _{MN-MAG2 of the} mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG2, and decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN according to the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain random numbers N ₅ , N ₆ , if the random number N ₅ If the verification fails, the mobile node MN stops the access request. Otherwise, the mobile node MN encrypts the random number N ₆ using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 =Enc_AES_ K _MN-MAG2 {N ₆ };

Step 5.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

Step 5.11: The mobile access gateway MAG2 decrypts the ciphertext C _MN- MAG2 using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain a random number. If the random number is equal to N ₆ , the authentication is successful, and between the mobile access gateway MAG2 and the mobile node MN. The authentication relationship is established, otherwise the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG2 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.

Claims (6)

1. An identity group-based PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system includes: a third-party trust center STR and a plurality of PMIPv6 networks, each of which includes a local mobility anchor LMA, a plurality of mobile access gateways MAG, and PMIPv6 a plurality of mobile nodes MN moving within the network or between different PMIPv6 networks; the third-party trust center STR generates and issues public parameters;

   The third-party trust center STR is trusted by all other entity members by default, accepts the registration request of the mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG, and issues public and private for the mobile access gateway MAG and the local mobility anchor LMA in the PMIPv6 network. Key pair, and as a group owner, issue a group member certificate for the mobile node MN;

   Initial access authentication between the mobile node MN and the mobile node MN when the mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network: the mobile access gateway MAG represents the group using the mobile node MN between the PMIPv6 network and the mobile node MN The member certificate generates a group signature, and the common signature of the mobile access gateway MAG performs mutual authentication. After the mobile access gateway MAG authentication is completed, the mobile access gateway MAG sends the group membership certificate of the legitimate mobile node MN to the local mobile connected thereto. The anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN to ensure the handover access of the legitimate mobile node MN;

   When the mobile node MN switches between the mobile access gateways MAG in the same PMIPv6 network, the mobile node MN calculates the pseudonym and the private key of the mobile node MN according to the anonymous public key and the group member certificate issued by the local mobile anchor LMA, and The identity of the pseudonym is used to implement handover authentication within the PMIPv6 network.
2. The method for performing the identity group-based PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication by using the system of claim 1 is characterized in that it comprises:

   Step 1: The third-party trust center STR generates and publishes public parameters;

   Step 2: The mobile node MN, the local mobility anchor LMA, and the mobile access gateway MAG apply for registration with the third-party trust center STR, and issue a public-private key pair for the mobile access gateway MAG and the local mobility anchor LMA in the PMIPv6 network, and serve as the group owner. Issue a group member certificate for the mobile node MN;

   Step 3: Monitor the status of the mobile node MN in each PMIPv6 network: if the mobile node MN is in the initial state, that is, the state when the mobile node MN first accesses the PMIPv6 network, perform step 4; if the mobile node MN is in the same PMIPv6 network Move state, go to step 5;

   Step 4: Initial access authentication between the mobile node MN and the mobile node MN when the mobile node MN first accesses the mobile access gateway MAG in the PMIPv6 network: the mobile access gateway MAG uses the mobile node between the PMIPv6 network and the mobile node MN The group member certificate of the MN generates a group signature, and the common signature of the mobile access gateway MAG performs mutual authentication. After the mobile access gateway MAG authentication is completed, the mobile access gateway MAG sends the group membership certificate of the legal mobile node MN to the connection. The local mobile anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN to ensure the handover access of the legitimate mobile node MN;

   Step 5: When the mobile node MN switches between the mobile access gateways MAG in the same PMIPv6 network, the mobile node MN calculates the pseudonym and the private key of the mobile node MN according to the anonymous public key and the group member certificate issued by the local mobility anchor LMA. The pseudo-name is used to implement the handover authentication in the PMIPv6 network.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the mobile node M applies for registration to a third-party trust center STR as follows:

   First, the mobile node MN selects the random number r _MN ∈Z ^* _q , the random number N ₁ ∈Z ^* _q , the shared key K _MN-STR between the mobile node MN and the third-party trust center STR, and a plurality of random numbers x _i ∈Z ^* _q (i=1...n); the mobile node MN calculates a group variable M={r _MN x _i P,x _i P,r _MN P} applied to join the third-party trust center STR as the group owner; the mobile node MN Using the public key PK _{STR of the} third-party trust center STR, the shared key K _MN-STR , the group variable M, and the random number N ₁ between the identity ID _MN of the mobile node MN, the mobile node MN, and the third-party trust center STR Do encryption and get ciphertext C _MN-STR ;

   Then, the mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-STR to the third party trust center STR;

   The third-party trust center STR decrypts the ciphertext C _MN- STR using its own private key SK _STR and generates a plurality of group member certificates Cert _{MN_i} = {S _i , EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P} of the mobile node MN as a group member (i...n), where S _i =SK _STR H ₂ (EXP _MN , r _MN x _i P), EXP _MN is the validity period of the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} ; encrypting N ₁ and Cert _{MN_i} using the shared key K _MN-STR Obtained ciphertext C _STR-MN ;

   Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-MN to the MN;

   Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-MN from the third-party trust center STR, the mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verifies the random number N ₁ in the ciphertext C _STR-MN , if the verification succeeds, The storage group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , at this time, the registration process of the mobile node MN is completed, and if the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.
4. The method of claim 2, wherein the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG apply to the third party trust center STR for registration as follows:

   First, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG select a random number r _MN/MAG ∈Z ^* _q , a random number N ₂ ∈Z ^* _q , a local mobility anchor LMA, and a mobile access gateway MAG and a third-party trust center STR The shared key K _LMA/MAG-STR ; the local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG calculate r _MN/MAG P; and use the public key PK _STR of the third-party trust center STR to connect the local mobile anchor LMA and mobile Shared key K _LMA/MAG-STR , r _LMA/MAG P and random number N ₂ between the identity identifier ID _{LMA/MAG of} the gateway MAG, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG and the third party trust center STR Do encryption and get ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR ;

   Then, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG send the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR to the third party trust center STR;

   The third-party trust center STR decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA/MAG-STR with its own private key SK _STR and generates the private key SK _LMA/MAG =SK _STR PK _{LMA/MAG of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway _MAG , wherein Public key PK _LMA/MAG =H ₂ (ID _LMA/MAG ||EXP _LMA/MAG , r _LMA/MAG P), H ₂ is a hash function defined by the third-party trust center STR, and EXP _LMA/MAG represents the local mobile anchor The validity period of the private key SK _LMA/MAG of the LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG; the ciphertext C _{STR-LMA/MAG is} obtained by encrypting SK _LMA/MAG with the shared key K _MN-STR , EXP _LMA/MAG and N ₂ ;

   Then, the third party trust center STR sends the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG to the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG;

   Finally, after receiving the ciphertext C _STR-LMA/MAG from the third-party trust center STR, the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG decrypt the ciphertext C _STR-MN and verify the randomness in the ciphertext C _STR-MN . The number N ₂ , if the verification is successful, stores the private key SK _{LMA/MAG of the} local mobile anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway _MAG and the expiration date _EXPMA/MAG , at which time the registration process of the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile access gateway MAG is completed. If the verification is unsuccessful, the registration fails.
5. The method of claim 2, wherein the step 4 comprises:

   Step 4.1: The mobile node MN selects the random number N ₃ , x _i P, and generates the group signature Sign _MN by the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} corresponding to N ₃ and x _i P with the time stamp T ₁ ;

   Step 4.2: The mobile node MN sends the group signature Sign _MN , the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , the timestamp T ₁ and the random number N ₃ to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

   Step 4.3: The mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies the timestamp TS ₁ sent by the mobile node MN: if the timestamp TS _{1 is} not fresh, the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise the mobile access gateway MAG1 verifies group membership certificate sent by the mobile node MN _Cert MN_i and group signature Sign _MN: If not legal, the mobile access gateway MAG1 refuse the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 4.4;

   Step 4.4: The mobile access gateway _MAG1 sends the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN to the local mobility anchor LMA;

   Step 4.5: The local mobility anchor LMA calculates the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN by using the information in the mobile node MN group member certificate Cert _{MN_i}

   

   The shared key K _LMA- MN between the local mobility anchor LMA and the mobile node MN; the local mobility anchor LMA uses the shared key K _{LMA-MN to} calculate the ciphertext C _LMA-MN containing the anonymous public key of the mobile node _MN ; local mobile Anchor LMA storage group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} and corresponding shared key K _LMA-MN ;

   Step 4.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and r _LMA P back to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

   Step 4.7: Select the first Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 random number N _4, and then use their private key SK to the mobile access gateway MAG1 _MAG1 identity ID _MAG1, the Local Mobility Anchor LMA identity ID _LMA, r _MAG1 P, r _{The LMA} P, the expiration date EXP _MAG1 , the current timestamp T ₂ are signed to obtain the signature Sign _MAG1 , then the shared key K _MAG1-MN between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG1 is calculated, and finally the shared key K _{MAG1-MN is used.} Encrypting random numbers N ₃ and N ₄ to obtain ciphertext C _MAG1-MN ;

   Step 4.8: The mobile access gateway MAG1 sends the signature Sign _MAG1 , the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN , the C _LMA-MN and the ID _MAG1 , the ID _LMA , the r _MAG1 P, the r _LMA P, the EXP _MAG1 and the T ₂ to the mobile node MN. ;

   Step 4.9: The mobile node MN verifies the timestamp T ₂ sent by the mobile access gateway MAG1: if the timestamp T _{2 is} not fresh, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the private key of the mobile access gateway MAG1 Validity period EXP _MAG1 , if not within the validity period, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise the mobile node MN verifies the validity of the mobile access gateway MAG1 signature Sign _MAG1 , if not, the mobile node MN stops the access request, otherwise The mobile node MN calculates the shared key K _MN-MAG1 , K _MN- LMA between the mobile access gateway MAG1 and the local mobility anchor LMA; decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG1-MN using the shared key K _{MN-MAG1 to} confirm the random number N ₃ and obtain N ₄ , decrypt the ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN

   

   And save the identity of the local mobile anchor LMA IDLMA and the anonymous public key of the mobile node MN

   

   The ciphertext C _{MN-MAG1 is} obtained by encrypting the random number N ₄ by using the shared key K _MN- MAG1 between the mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway _MAG1 ;

   Step 4.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1 to the mobile access gateway MAG1;

   Step 4.11: after receiving the ciphertext C _MN-MAG1, first Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 using the shared key K _MN-MAG1 decryption C _MN-MAG1 obtains the random number, if the random number is equal to N _4, the authentication is successful, the mobile The authentication relationship between the access gateway MAG1 and the mobile node MN is established. Otherwise, the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG1 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.
6. The method of claim 2, wherein the step 5 comprises:

   Step 5.1: The mobile node MN randomly selects S _MN ∈Z ^* _q to calculate the pseudonym of the mobile node MN

   

   And the private key of the mobile node MN

   

   The mobile node MN selects the random number N ₅ and applies the private key to the random number N ₅ , the time stamp T ₃ , and the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i}

   

   The signature is signed by Sign _MN ;

   Step 5.2: The mobile node MN will sign SignMN, pseudonym

   

   The timestamp T ₃ , the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} and the random number N ₅ are sent together to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

   Step 5.3: Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 to verify the time stamp T ₃ sent by the mobile node MN, if the timestamp T ₃ is not fresh, the Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, mobile access gateway or verification MAG2 Sign the mobile node MN _MN signature transmitted, if not legal, the mobile access gateway MAG2 reject the access request of the mobile node MN, otherwise step 5.4;

   Step 5.4: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i of the} mobile node MN and the negotiation key parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 to the local mobility anchor LMA;

   Step 5.5: The local mobility anchor LMA takes the shared key K _LMA-MN according to the group member certificate Cert _{MN_i} , and encrypts the key negotiation parameter r _MAG2 P of the mobile access gateway MAG2 by using the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _LMA-MN ;

   Step 5.6: The local mobility anchor LMA sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN back to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

   Step 5.7: The mobile access gateway MAG2 selects the random number N ₆ , calculates the shared key K _MAG2-MN , and encrypts the random number N ₅ , N ₆ and the time stamp T ₄ using the shared key to obtain the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN ;

   Step 5.8: The mobile access gateway MAG2 sends the ciphertext C _LMA-MN and the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN to the mobile node MN;

   Step 5.9: The mobile node MN decrypts the ciphertext C _LMA- MN by using the shared key K _{MN-LMA to} obtain the shared negotiation key of the mobile access gateway MAG2, and then the mobile node MN calculates the shared negotiation key according to the mobile access gateway MAG2. The shared key K _{MN-MAG2 of the} mobile node MN and the mobile access gateway MAG2, and decrypts the ciphertext C _MAG2-MN according to the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain random numbers N ₅ , N ₆ , if the random number N ₅ If the verification fails, the mobile node MN stops the access request. Otherwise, the mobile node MN encrypts the random number N ₆ using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 ;

   Step 5.10: The mobile node MN sends the ciphertext C _MN-MAG2 to the mobile access gateway MAG2;

   Step 5.11: The mobile access gateway MAG2 decrypts the ciphertext C _MN- MAG2 using the shared key K _{MN-MAG2 to} obtain a random number. If the random number is equal to N ₆ , the authentication is successful, and between the mobile access gateway MAG2 and the mobile node MN. The authentication relationship is established, otherwise the authentication fails, and the mobile access gateway MAG2 rejects the access request of the mobile node MN.

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