CN107493570A - A kind of the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems and method of identity-based group label - Google Patents
A kind of the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems and method of identity-based group label Download PDFInfo
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
- H04L63/0421—Anonymous communication, i.e. the party's identifiers are hidden from the other party or parties, e.g. using an anonymizer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
- H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
- H04L9/3273—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response for mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
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Abstract
The present invention provides a kind of the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems and method of identity-based group label, third party's trust center receives the application for registration of mobile node, local mobility anchor and Mobile Access Gateway, public private key pair is issued for the Mobile Access Gateway in PMIPv6 networks, local mobility anchor, and is that mobile node issues group members certificate as group master；When mobile node accesses the Mobile Access Gateway in PMIPv6 networks first between mobile node initial access authentication；When switching in same PMIPv6 networks between Mobile Access Gateway, mobile node calculates the assumed name and private key of mobile node according to anonymous common key, the group members certificate issued by local mobility anchor, and switches certification with the identity of the assumed name to realize in PMIPv6 networks.Proxy Signature Scheme of the invention by identity-based; apply during the mobile management of PMIPv6 agreements, public key certificate is cancelled in using for identity-based group ranking technology, reduces storage and the legitimate verification of public key certificate; the anonymity of mobile node is realized simultaneously, protects privacy.
Description
Technical field
The invention belongs to technical field of network security, the anonymous accesses of PMIPV6 of more particularly to a kind of identity-based group label are recognized
Demonstrate,prove system and method.
Background technology
In recent years, network had become a very important part in people's daily life.Set along with wireless mobile
Standby Fast Growth, people can realize the access of network by mobile device in any place at any time, experience inhomogeneity
The network service of type.Mobile IP v 6 ensure that no matter mobile IP v 6 equipment is located at where and its with mobile IP v 6 equipment communication
Whether he equipment supports mobile IP v 6, and all mobile IPv 6 node can be conducted interviews all the time.It has compared with mobile IPv 4
The advantages that bigger address space, routing optimality, ingress filtering and dynamic mobile agent discovery.Proxy mobile IPv 6 is as movement
IPv6 extension, it is maximum the characteristics of be a simplified the control of network-side, reduce the process that user participates in mobile management.Simultaneously
Due to its shorter switching delay and relatively low signaling consumption, PMIPv6 increasingly becomes the focus of people's research.
However, in order that PMIPv6 can be popularized quickly, it has to face such as man-in-the-middle attack, Replay Attack, refuses
A series of security threats such as exhausted service attack, spoof attack, the privacy and communication security for how ensureing the network entity then turn into
It has in face of the problem of.In order to solve this problem, many experts and scholars solve this using centralized authentication mode
One problem, so-called centralized certification, i.e. being mutually authenticated between PMIPv6 entities each time, will pass through aaa server.This is just
The certification pressure of aaa server is increased, simultaneously because authentication information needs long-distance transmissions, is waited which results in entity true
Recognize overlong time；In order to solve this problem, the local authentication service directly participated in without aaa server is suggested, but herein
During, in order to prove the legitimacy of entity identities, these schemes also want direct or indirect checking to come from verification process
The legitimacy of the certificate of aaa server, the security of this not only preservation to certificate propose requirement, also created of a relatively high
Calculation cost.The true identity of most variations mobile entity is completely exposed to other side in such scheme simultaneously, profit
With the true identity being exposed, opponent can be with the positional information and mobile status of the legal mobile entity of exact knowledge, while opponent
The legal entity that is easier to disguise oneself as illegally is accessed.
The content of the invention
In view of the deficienciess of the prior art, the present invention provides the identity-based group PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems of label
And method.
Technical scheme is as follows：
A kind of PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems of identity-based group label, including：Third party's trust center STR and some
Individual PMIPv6 networks, each PMIPv6 networks are interior to include a local mobility anchor LMA, several Mobile Access Gateways MAG, and
Several mobile node MNs moved in PMIPv6 networks or between different PMIPv6 networks；Third party's trust center STR is generated
And issue common parameter；
Third party's trust center STR is credible for every other entity member acquiescence, receives mobile node MN, local movement
Anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG application for registration, for the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in PMIPv6 networks, local mobility anchor
LMA issues public private key pair, and is that mobile node MN issues group members certificate as group master；
It is initial between mobile node MN when mobile node MN accesses the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in PMIPv6 networks first
Access authentication：Mobile Access Gateway MAG is represented and is utilized mobile node MN between PMIPv6 networks and mobile node MN where it
Group members certificates constructing group ranking, Mobile Access Gateway MAG common signature is mutually authenticated, in Mobile Access Gateway
After the completion of MAG certifications, the group members certificate of legal mobile node MN is sent to connected by Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Ground mobile anchor LMA calculates the anonymous common key of mobile node MN, ensures the switching access of legal mobile node MN；
When mobile node MN switches between the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in same PMIPv6 networks, mobile node MN root
The assumed name and private key of mobile node MN are calculated according to anonymous common key, the group members certificate issued by local mobility anchor LMA, and with the vacation
The identity of name switches certification to realize in PMIPv6 networks.
The method that the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentications of identity-based group's label are carried out using described system, including：
Step 1：Third party's trust center STR is generated and is issued common parameter；
Step 2：Mobile node MN, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG are to third party trust center STR Shens
It please register, issue public private key pair for Mobile Access Gateway MAG, the local mobility anchor LMA in PMIPv6 networks, and be used as group master
Group members certificate is issued for mobile node MN；
Step 3：Monitor mobile node MN state in which in each PMIPv6 networks：If mobile node MN is in initial shape
State is state when mobile node MN accesses PMIPv6 networks first, then performs step 4；If mobile node MN is in same
Mobile status in PMIPv6 networks, then perform step 5；
Step 4：When mobile node MN accesses the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in PMIPv6 networks first with mobile node MN it
Between initial access authentication：Mobile Access Gateway MAG is represented and is utilized movement between PMIPv6 networks and mobile node MN where it
Node M N group members certificates constructing group ranking, Mobile Access Gateway MAG common signature are mutually authenticated, and are accessed mobile
After the completion of gateway MAG certifications, the group members certificate of legal mobile node MN is sent to and is connected thereto by Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Local mobility anchor LMA calculate mobile node MN anonymous common key, ensure legal mobile node MN switching access；
Step 5：When mobile node MN switches between the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in same PMIPv6 networks, movable joint
Point MN calculates the assumed name and private key of mobile node MN according to anonymous common key, the group members certificate issued by local mobility anchor LMA, and
Certification is switched to realize in PMIPv6 networks with the identity of the assumed name.
The mobile node M applies for the registration of as follows to third party's trust center STR：
First, mobile node MN selection random number rMN∈Z* q, random number N1∈Z* q, mobile node MN and third party trust
Shared key K between the STR of centerMN-STRAnd multiple random number xi∈Z* q(i=1 ... n)；Mobile node MN calculates application and added
Enter group variable M={ rs of third party's trust center STR as group masterMNxiP, xiP, rMNP}；Mobile node MN is believed using third party
Appoint center STR public key PKSTR, by the identity ID of mobile node MNMN, mobile node MN and third party's trust center STR it
Between shared key KMN-STR, group's variable M and random number N1Encrypt, obtain ciphertext CMN-STR；
Then, mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center STR；
Third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext CMN-STR, and generate mobile node MN work
For multiple group members certificate Cert of group membersMN_i={ Si, EXPMN, rMNxiP } (i ... n), wherein Si=SKSTRH2(EXPMN,
rMNxiP), EXPMNFor group members certificate CertMN_iThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt N1And CertMN_iObtain close
Literary CSTR-MN；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-MNIt is sent to MN；
Finally, mobile node MN is receiving the ciphertext C from third party's trust center STRSTR-MNAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MN
And verify ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N1If be proved to be successful, group members certificate Cert is storedMN_i, now mobile node
MN registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
The local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG apply for the registration of as follows to third party's trust center STR：
First, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG selection random numbers rMN/MAG∈Z* q, random number N2∈Z* q、
Shared key K between local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG and third party's trust center STRLMA/MAG-STR；It is local
Mobile anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG calculates rMN/MAGP；And utilize third party's trust center STR public key PKSTR, will be local
Mobile anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG identity IDLMA/MAG, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG with
Shared key K between third party's trust center STRLMA/MAG-STR、rLMA/MAGP and random number N2Encrypt, obtain ciphertext
CLMA/MAG-STR；
Then, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is by ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center
STR；
Third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STR, and generate local movement
Anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAG=SKSTRPKLMA/MAG, wherein public key PKLMA/MAG=H2(IDLMA/MAG||
EXPLMA/MAG, rLMA/MAGP), H2The hash function defined for third party's trust center STR, EXPLMA/MAGRepresent local mobility anchor
LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt SKLMA/MAG,
EXPLMA/MAGAnd N2Obtain ciphertext CSTR-LMA/MAG；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-LMA/MAGIt is sent to local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Network
Close MAG；
Finally, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is receiving the ciphertext from third party's trust center STR
CSTR-LMA/MAGAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MNAnd verify ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N2If be proved to be successful, local move is stored
Dynamic anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGWith term of validity EXPLMA/MAG, now local mobility anchor LMA and movement
Access gateway MAG registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
The step 4, including：
Step 4.1：Mobile node MN selects random number N3、xiP, and by N3、xiGroup members certificate Cert corresponding to PMN_iTogether
Time stamp T1Generate group ranking SignMN；
Step 4.2：Mobile node MN is by group ranking SignMN, group members certificate CertMN_i, time stamp T1And random number N3Hair
Give Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.3：The time stamp T S that Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 checking mobile node MNs are sent1：If time stamp T S1No
Fresh, then Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 checkings movement
The group members certificate Cert that node M N is sentMN_iAnd group ranking SignMN：If illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refusals
The access request of mobile node MN, otherwise perform step 4.4；
Step 4.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is by the group members certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iIt is sent to local movement
Anchor LMA；
Step 4.5：Local mobility anchor LMA passes through mobile node MN group members certificate CertMN_iInterior information calculates movement
Node M N anonymous common keyShared key K between local mobility anchor LMA and mobile node MNLMA-MN, it is local mobile
Anchor LMA utilizes shared key KLMA-MNCalculate the ciphertext C for including mobile node MN anonymous common keyLMA-MN；Local mobility anchor LMA is deposited
Store up group members certificate CertMN_iWith corresponding shared key KLMA-MN；
Step 4.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNAnd rLMAP sends back Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.7：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 selects random number N 4 first, then utilizes the private key SK of oneselfMAG1It will move
Dynamic access gateway MAG1 identity IDMAG1, local mobility anchor LMA identity IDLMA、rMAG1P、rLMAP, the term of validity
EXPMAG1, current time stamp T2Signed to obtain signature SignMAG1, then calculate mobile node MN and Mobile Access Gateway
Shared key K between MAG1MAG1-MN, finally with shared key KMAG1-MNEncrypted random number N3、N4, obtain ciphertext CMAG1-MN；
Step 4.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 will sign SignMAG1, ciphertext CMAG1-MN、CLMA-MNAnd IDMAG1、IDLMA、
rMAG1P、rLMAP、EXPMAG1、T2Send jointly to mobile node MN；
Step 4.9：The time stamp T that mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is sent2：If the time stamp T2It is not new
Fresh, then mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise the term of validity of mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 private keys
EXPMAG1If not in the range of the term of validity, mobile node MN stops access request, and otherwise mobile node MN checking movement connects
Function Access Gateway MAG1 signatures SignMAG1Validity, if illegal, mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise movable joint
Point MN is calculated and the shared key K between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1, local mobility anchor LMAMN-MAG1, KMN-LMA；With shared close
Key KMN-MAG1Decrypt ciphertext CMAG1-MN, confirm random number N3And obtain N4, decryption ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain the anonymity of mobile node MN
Public keyAnd preserve local mobility anchor LMA identity IDLMAWith the anonymous common key of mobile node MNUtilize
Shared key K between mobile node MN and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1MN-MAG1By random number N4Do encryption and obtain ciphertext
CMN-MAG1；
Step 4.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG1It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.11：Receiving ciphertext CMN-MAG1Afterwards, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 uses shared key K firstMN-MAG1Decryption
CMN-MAG1Random number is obtained, if the random number is equal to N4, then certification success, between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 and mobile node MN
Authentication relationship be established, otherwise authentification failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN.
The step 5, including：
Step 5.1：Mobile node MN randomly chooses SMN∈Z* q, calculate the assumed name of mobile node MNAnd mobile node
MN private keyMobile node MN selects random number N5, and to the random number N5, time stamp T3, and group members certificate
CertMN_iWith private keySignature obtains the Sign that signsMN；
Step 5.2：Mobile node MN will sign SignMN, assumed nameTime stamp T3, group members certificate CertMN_iWith
And random number N5Send jointly to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.3：The time stamp T that Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 checking mobile node MNs are sent3If the time stamp T3It is not new
Fresh, then Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, and otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 verifies movable joint
The signature Sign that point MN is sentMNIf illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, no
Then perform step 5.4；
Step 5.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by the group members certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iAnd Mobile Access Network
Close MAG2 arranging key parameter rMAG2P is sent to local mobility anchor LMA；
Step 5.5：Local mobility anchor LMA is according to group members certificate CertMN_iTake out shared key KLMA-MN, and utilize and be somebody's turn to do
Shared key encryption Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 key agreement parameter rMAG2P obtains ciphertext CLMA-MN；
Step 5.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNSend back Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.7：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 selects random number N6, calculate shared key KMAG2-MN, and it is shared close using this
Key encrypted random number N5、N6, and time stamp T4Obtain ciphertext CMAG2-MN；
Step 5.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by ciphertext CLMA-MN, ciphertext CMAG2-MNIt is sent to mobile node MN；
Step 5.9：Mobile node MN uses shared key KMN-LMADecrypt ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain Mobile Access Gateway MAG2
Shared arranging key, then mobile node MN according to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 shared arranging key calculate mobile node MN
With Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 shared key KMN-MAG2, and according to shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMAG2-MN, obtain with
Machine number N5、N6If random number N5Checking does not stop access request by then mobile node MN, and otherwise, mobile node MN is with shared
Key KMN-MAG2Encrypted random number N6Obtain ciphertext CMN-MAG2；
Step 5.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG2It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.11：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 uses shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMN-MAG2Random number is obtained, if
The random number is equal to N6, then certification success, the authentication relationship between Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 and mobile node MN is established, no
Then authentification failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuse the access request of mobile node MN.
Beneficial effect：
Proxy Signature Scheme of the invention by identity-based, apply among the mobile management process of PMIPv6 agreements, base
In identity group ranking technology with public key certificate is eliminated, reduce storage and the legitimate verification of public key certificate, at the same it is real
Show the anonymity of mobile node MN, protect MN privacy.The design of stratification ensure that the division of labor between each entity is clear and definite, subtract
STR and LMA calculating and certification cost are lacked.Our scheme not only ensure that the security of verification process but also possess higher effect
Rate.
Brief description of the drawings
Fig. 1 is the PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication system Organization Charts that the identity-based group of the specific embodiment of the invention signs；
Fig. 2 is that the mobile node MN of the specific embodiment of the invention is shown to third party's trust center STR application for registration flows
It is intended to；
Fig. 3 is during the local mobility anchor LMA or Mobile Access Gateway MAG of the specific embodiment of the invention trust to third party
Heart STR application for registration schematic flow sheets；
Fig. 4 is the Mobile Access Gateway that the mobile node MN of the specific embodiment of the invention accesses in PMIPv6 networks first
MAG1 schematic flow sheet；
Fig. 5 is the schematic flow sheet of access authentication procedure in the domain of the specific embodiment of the invention.
Embodiment
The embodiment of the present invention is elaborated below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
Present embodiment is that PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication systems and method that identity-based group signs are applied into PMIPv6
Network access authentication link, while access authentication of user is realized, the security and efficiency of the verification process that adequately protects.Such as figure
The PMIPv6 anonymous access authentication systems of identity-based group label shown in 1 include：Third party's trust center STR and several
PMIPv6 networks, each PMIPv6 networks are interior to include a local mobility anchor LMA (Local Mobility Anchor, LMA)
(LMA1, LMA2), several Mobile Access Gateways MAG (Mobile Access Gateway, MAG) (MAG1~MAG4), and
Several mobile node MNs moved in PMIPv6 networks or between different PMIPv6 networks；Third party's trust center STR passes through
Network is connected with local mobility anchor LMA, local mobility anchor LMA connection Mobile Access Gateways MAG.
The framework of whole system is divided into four layers：First layer is system root of trust (System-trust Root, STR), as
Third party's trust center, it is credible for all entity members acquiescence in PMIPv6 networks；Generate and issue common parameter, to institute
There are entity identities in PMIPv6 networks to be examined, be that all entity members in PMIPv6 networks promulgate public private key pair, and
Third party's trust center is that legal mobile node MN issues group members card as the main group ranking mechanism with identity-based of group
Book, to ensure the realization of the subsequently anonymous access procedure of mobile node MN；The second layer is local mobility anchor LMA, respectively with third party
Trust center STR, Mobile Access Gateway MAG connections, establish with Mobile Access Gateway MAG bidirectional tunnels to forward packet,
It is responsible on the basis of mobile node MN binding state, assists legal mobile node MN to generate variable assumed name；For movement
Access gateway MAG certificates, anonymous common key is calculated for legal mobile node MN, participating in switching certification in PMIPv6 networks is
Legal mobile node MN calculates anonymous common key；Third layer is Mobile Access Gateway MAG, and shape is moved instead of mobile node MN
State management, the private key issued using third party's trust center STR calculate signature represents the PMIPv6 networks at place directly with movement
Node M N is mutually authenticated, it is ensured that legal mobile node MN access, is ensured between local mobility anchor LMA and mobile node MN
Securely communicate；4th layer is mobile node MN, as the son from a PMIPv6 network or Mobile Access Gateway MAG compositions
Net is switched to the mobile device for the subnet that another PMIPv6 network or Mobile Access Gateway MAG are formed, (mobile in home network
The PMIPv6 networks that node M N is initially accessed) and the field network PMIPv6 networks of access (subsequent movement node M N) internetwork roaming
Or switch movement between different Mobile Access Gateway MAG, by being mutually authenticated with Mobile Access Gateway MAG to realize PMIPv6
The access of network, row information of going forward side by side exchange, ensures the bipartite safety and reliability of certification.
It is initial between mobile node MN when mobile node MN accesses the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in PMIPv6 networks first
Access authentication：Mobile Access Gateway MAG is represented and is utilized mobile node MN between PMIPv6 networks and mobile node MN where it
Group members certificates constructing group ranking, Mobile Access Gateway MAG common signature is mutually authenticated, in Mobile Access Gateway
After the completion of MAG certifications, the group members certificate of legal mobile node MN is sent to connected by Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Ground mobile anchor LMA calculates the anonymous common key of mobile node MN, ensures the switching access of legal mobile node MN.Mobile node MN
When switching between the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in same PMIPv6 networks, mobile node MN is issued according to by local mobility anchor LMA
The anonymous common key of hair, group members certificate calculate the assumed name and private key of mobile node MN, and is realized with the identity of the assumed name
Switching certification in PMIPv6 networks.
For convenience of subsequent descriptions, mark and explanation as shown in table 1 are provided.
The correlated identities of table 1 and explanation
In the present embodiment with group's label of Chen X, Zhang F, Konidala D M et al. identity-baseds proposed
Name scheme, the short signature scheme that referred to as IDGS schemes, Dan Boneh, Ben Lynn, Hovav Shacham et al. propose, letter
Referred to as IBS schemes, while the Identity based encryption scheme that can also use Dan B, Franklin M et al. to propose in the present invention
Abbreviation BF schemes and the AES symmetric encryption schemes generally used now.
A kind of PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication methods of identity-based group label, including：
Step 1：Third party's trust center STR is generated and is issued common parameter；
The process for generating and issuing common parameter is as follows：
First, the addition cyclic group G of a q rank is generated1, a same rank be q multiplicative cyclic group GTWith a bilinearity
To e：G1×G1→GT；
Afterwards, a first P ∈ G of generation is selected1With third party's trust center STR private keyIt is thereinFor 1
To the positive integer of q-1 scopes；
Then, third party's trust center STR public key P is calculatedpub=SKSTRP；
In addition, define three secure hash function H1：{ 0,1 }*×G1- ＞ Z* q, H2：{ 0,1 }*×G1- ＞ G1, H3：0,
1}*- ＞ G1；
Finally, generate and issue common parameter Para={ G1, GT, q, e, P, PPub, H1, H2, H3}。
Step 2：Mobile node MN, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG are to third party trust center STR Shens
It please register, issue public private key pair for Mobile Access Gateway MAG, the local mobility anchor LMA in PMIPv6 networks, and be used as group master
Group members certificate is issued for mobile node MN；
The process that mobile node MN as shown in Figure 2 is applied for the registration of to third party's trust center STR is as follows：
First, mobile node MN selection random number rMN∈Z* q, random number N1∈Z* q, mobile node MN and third party trust
Shared key K between the STR of centerMN-STRAnd multiple random number xi∈Z* q(i=1 ... n)；Mobile node MN calculates application and added
Enter group variable M={ rs of third party's trust center STR as group masterMNxiP, xiP, rMNP}；Mobile node MN is believed using third party
Appoint center STR public key PKSTR, using the BF AESs of the identity-based of Boneh D and Franklin design, by movable joint
Point MN identity IDMN, shared key K between mobile node MN and third party's trust center STRMN-STR, group's variable M with
And random number N1Encrypt, obtain ciphertext CMN-STR=Enc_BF_PKSTR={ IDMN, KMN-STR, M, N1}；
Then, mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center STR；
Receiving ciphertext CMN-STRAfterwards, third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext CMN-STR, and
And multiple certificate Certs of the generation mobile node MN as group membersMN_i={ Si, EXPMN, rMNxiP } (i ... n), wherein Si=
SKsTRH2(EXPMN, rMNxiP), EXPMNFor certificate CertMN_iThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt N1And CertMN_i
Obtain ciphertext CSTR-MN=Enc_AES_KSTR-MN{N1, CertMN_i}；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-MNIt is sent to MN；
Finally, mobile node MN is receiving the ciphertext C from third party's trust center STRSTR-MNAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MN
And verify ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N1If be proved to be successful, group members certificate Cert is storedMN_i, now mobile node
MN registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
Local mobility anchor LMA or Mobile Access Gateway MAG as shown in Figure 3 applies for the registration of to third party's trust center STR
Process it is as follows：
First, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG selection random numbers rMN/MAG∈Z* q, random number N2∈Z* q、
Shared key K between local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG and third party's trust center STRLMA/MAG-STR；It is local
Mobile anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG calculates rMN/MAGP；And utilize third party's trust center STR public key PKSTR, use
The BF AESs of the identity-based of Boneh D and Franklin design, by local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Identity IDLMA/MAG, it is shared between local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG and third party's trust center STR
Key KLMA/MAG-STR、rLMA/MAGP and random number N2Encrypt, obtain ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STR=Enc_BF_PKSTR{IDLMA/MAG,
KLMA/MAG-STR, rLMA/MAGP, N2}；
Then, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is by ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center
STR；
Receiving CLMA/MAG-STRAfterwards, third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext
CLMA/MAG-STR, and generate local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAG=SKSTRPKLMA/MAG, its
Middle public key PKLMA/MAG=H2(IDLMA/MAG||EXPLMA/MAG, rLMA/MAGP), EXPLMA/MAGRepresent that local mobility anchor LMA and movement connect
Function Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt SKLMA/MAG, EXPLMA/MAGAnd N2Obtain close
Literary CSTR-LMA/MAG=Enc_AES_KSTR-LMA/MAG{SKLMA/MAG, EXPLMA/MA, N2}；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-LMA/MAGIt is sent to local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Network
Close MAG；
Finally, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is receiving the ciphertext from third party's trust center STR
CSTR-LMA/MAGAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MNAnd verify ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N2If be proved to be successful, local move is stored
Dynamic anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGWith term of validity EXPLMA/MAG, now local mobility anchor LMA and movement
Access gateway MAG registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
Step 3：Monitor mobile node MN state in which in each PMIPv6 networks：If mobile node MN is in initial shape
State is state when mobile node MN accesses PMIPv6 networks first, then performs step 4；If mobile node MN is in same
Mobile status in PMIPv6 networks, then perform step 5；
Step 4：The Mobile Access Gateway MAG that mobile node MN accesses in PMIPv6 networks first, Mobile Access Gateway MAG
The initial access authentication between mobile node MN；
So that mobile node MN accesses the Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 in PMIPv6 networks first as an example, the step 4, such as scheme
Shown in 4, including：
Step 4.1：Mobile node MN selects random number N3、xiP, and by N3、xiCertificate Cert corresponding to PMN_iSame timestamp
T1Utilize IDGS algorithms (algorithm is signed by the group of the identity-based of Chaum and van Heijst designs) generation group ranking SignMN=
GroupSign_IDGS_xiP{CertMN_i, T1, N3}；
Step 4.2：Mobile node MN is by group ranking SignMN, certificate CertMN_i, time stamp T1And random number N3It is sent to shifting
Dynamic access gateway MAG1；
Step 4.3：The time stamp T S that Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 checking mobile node MNs are sent1：If time stamp T S1No
Fresh, then Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 checkings movement
The certificate Cert that node M N is sentMN_iAnd group ranking SignMN：If illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refusal movable joints
Point MN access request, otherwise perform step 4.4；
Step 4.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is by the certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iIt is sent to local mobility anchor LMA；
Step 4.5：Local mobility anchor LMA passes through mobile node MN certificate CertMN_iInterior Si calculates mobile node MN
Anonymous common keyCertificate of utility Cert simultaneouslyMN_iInterior rMNxiP calculates local mobility anchor LMA and mobile node
Shared key K between MNLMA-MN=rLMArMNxiP, shared key KLMA-MNIt is by mobile node MN according to DH Diffie-Hellman
Session key agreement parameter and local mobility anchor LMA the secret value that is calculated of private key, local mobility anchor LMA was using should
Shared key KLMA-MNCalculate the ciphertext for including mobile node MN anonymous common key
Local mobility anchor LMA Store Credentials CertMN_iWith corresponding shared key KLMA-MN；
Step 4.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNAnd rLMAP sends back Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.7：After the message from local mobility anchor LMA is received, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is selected at random first
Number N4, then utilizes the private key SK of oneselfMAG1By Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 identity IDMAG1, local mobility anchor LMA
Identity IDLMA、rMAG1P、rLMAP, term of validity EXPMAG1, current time stamp T2Signed to obtain signature SignMAG1=
Sign_IBS_SKMAG1{IDMAG1, IDLMA, rMAG1P, rLMAP, EXPMAG1, T2, wherein IBS is to be set by Chaum and van Heijst
The id-based signatures algorithm of meter, then calculate the shared key between mobile node MN and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1
KMAG1-MN=rMAG1rMNxiP, shared key KMAG1-MNIt is by the session key agreement of mobile node MN according to DH Diffie-Hellman
The secret value that parameter and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 private key are calculated, finally with shared key KMAG1-MNEncryption with
Machine number N3、N4, obtain ciphertext CMAG1-MN=Enc_AES_KMAG1-MN{N3, N4}；
Step 4.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 will sign SignMAG1, ciphertext CMAG1-MN、CLMA-MNAnd IDMAG1、IDLMA、
rMAG1P、rLMAP、EXPMAG1、T2Send jointly to mobile node MN；
Step 4.9：The time stamp T that mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is sent2：If the time stamp T2It is not new
Fresh, then mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise the term of validity of mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 private keys
EXPMAG1If not in the range of the term of validity, mobile node MN stops access request, and otherwise mobile node MN checking movement connects
Function Access Gateway MAG1 signatures SignMAG1Validity, if illegal, mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise movable joint
Point MN is calculated and the shared key K between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1, local mobility anchor LMAMN-MAG1=rMNxirMAG1P, KMN-LMA
=rMNxirLMAP；With shared key KMN-MAG1Decrypt ciphertext CMAG1-MN, confirm random number N3And obtain N4, decrypt ciphertext
CLMA-MN, obtain the anonymous common key of mobile node MNAnd preserve local mobility anchor LMA identity IDLMAAnd movable joint
Point MN anonymous common keyUtilize the shared key K between mobile node MN and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1MN-MAG1Will be with
Machine number N4Do encryption and obtain ciphertext CMN-MAG1=Enc_AES_KMN-MAG1{N4}；
Step 4.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG1It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.11：Receiving ciphertext CMN-MAG1Afterwards, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 uses shared key K firstMN-MAG1Decryption
CMN-MAG1Random number is obtained, if the random number is equal to N4, then certification success, between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 and mobile node MN
Authentication relationship be established, otherwise authentification failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN.
Step 5：The current Mobile Access Gateway MAG connected sends out oneself shared key between mobile node MN
Mobile Access Gateway MAG to be accessed in same PMIPv6 networks is given, performs switching certification in PMIPv6 networks；
Mobile access is switched to from Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 in the PMIPv6 networks being currently accessed with mobile node MN
Exemplified by gateway MAG2, as shown in figure 5, step 5 includes：
Step 5.1：Mobile node MN randomly chooses SMN∈Z* q, calculate the assumed name of mobile node MNAnd shifting
Dynamic node M N private keySi=SKSTRH2(EXPMN, rMNxiP), EXPMNFor mobile node MN as group into
The term of validity of member, rMNxiP is the value in group's variable M that third party's trust center STR is obtained at mobile node MN；For
The anonymous common key of mobile node MN；Mobile node MN selects random number N5, and to the random number N5, time stamp T3, and certificate
CertMN_iWith private keySigned{CertMN_, N5, rMAG1P, rLMAP,
EXPMAG1, T3}；
Step 5.2：Mobile node MN will sign SignMN, assumed nameTime stamp T3, certificate CertMN_iIt is and random
Number N5Send jointly to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.3：The time stamp T that Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 checking mobile node MNs are sent3If the time stamp T3It is not new
Fresh, then Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, and otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 verifies movable joint
The signature Sign that point MN is sentMNIf illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, no
Then perform step 5.4；
Step 5.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by the certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iAnd Mobile Access Gateway MAG2
Arranging key parameter rMAG2P is sent to local mobility anchor LMA；
Step 5.5：Local mobility anchor LMA is according to certificate CertMN_iTake out shared key KLMA-MN, and it is shared close using this
Key encryption Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 key agreement parameter rMAG2P obtains ciphertext CLMA-MN=Enc_AES_KLMA-MN{rMAG2P}；
Step 5.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNSend back Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.7：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 selects random number N6, calculate shared key KMAG2-MN, and it is shared close using this
Key encrypted random number N5、N6, and time stamp T4Obtain ciphertext CMAG2-MN=Enc_AES_KLMA-MN{N5, N6}；
Step 5.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by ciphertext CLMA-MN, ciphertext CMAG2-MNIt is sent to mobile node MN；
Step 5.9：Mobile node MN uses shared key KMN-LMADecrypt ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain Mobile Access Gateway MAG2
Shared arranging key, then mobile node MN according to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 shared arranging key calculate mobile node MN
With Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 shared key KMN-MAG2, and according to shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMAG2-MN, obtain with
Machine number N5、N6If random number N5Checking does not stop access request by then mobile node MN, and otherwise, mobile node MN is with shared
Key KMN-MAG2Encrypted random number N6Obtain ciphertext CMN-MAG2=Enc_AES_KMN-MAG2{N6}；
Step 5.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG2It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.11：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 uses shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMN-MAG2Random number is obtained, if
The random number is equal to N6, then certification success, the authentication relationship between Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 and mobile node MN is established, no
Then authentification failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuse the access request of mobile node MN.
Claims (6)
1. a kind of PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication systems of identity-based group label, including：Third party's trust center STR and several
PMIPv6 networks, each PMIPv6 networks are interior to include a local mobility anchor LMA, several Mobile Access Gateways MAG, Yi Ji
Several mobile node MNs moved in PMIPv6 networks or between different PMIPv6 networks；Third party's trust center STR is generated simultaneously
Issue common parameter；Characterized in that,
Third party's trust center STR is credible for every other entity member acquiescence, receives mobile node MN, local mobility anchor
LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG application for registration, it is Mobile Access Gateway MAG, local mobility anchor LMA in PMIPv6 networks
Public private key pair is issued, and is that mobile node MN issues group members certificate as group master；
It is initially accessed during the Mobile Access Gateway MAG that mobile node MN accesses in PMIPv6 networks first between mobile node MN
Certification：Mobile Access Gateway MAG represents the group that mobile node MN is utilized between PMIPv6 networks and mobile node MN where it
Member certifications generate group ranking, and Mobile Access Gateway MAG common signature is mutually authenticated, recognized in Mobile Access Gateway MAG
After the completion of card, the group members certificate of legal mobile node MN is sent to connected local shifting by Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Dynamic anchor LMA calculates the anonymous common key of mobile node MN, ensures the switching access of legal mobile node MN；
When mobile node MN switches between the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in same PMIPv6 networks, mobile node MN according to by
Anonymous common key that local mobility anchor LMA is issued, group members certificate calculate the assumed name and private key of mobile node MN, and with the assumed name
Identity switches certification to realize in PMIPv6 networks.
2. carrying out the method for the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentications of identity-based group's label using the system described in claim 1, it is special
Sign is, including：
Step 1：Third party's trust center STR is generated and is issued common parameter；
Step 2：Mobile node MN, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG apply noting to third party's trust center STR
Volume, public private key pair is issued for Mobile Access Gateway MAG, the local mobility anchor LMA in PMIPv6 networks, and be shifting as group master
Dynamic node M N issues group members certificate；
Step 3：Monitor mobile node MN state in which in each PMIPv6 networks：If mobile node MN is in original state
Mobile node MN accesses state during PMIPv6 networks first, then performs step 4；If mobile node MN is in same PMIPv6
Mobile status in network, then perform step 5；
Step 4：When mobile node MN accesses the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in PMIPv6 networks first between mobile node MN just
Beginning access authentication：Mobile Access Gateway MAG is represented and is utilized mobile node between PMIPv6 networks and mobile node MN where it
MN group members certificates constructing group ranking, Mobile Access Gateway MAG common signature is mutually authenticated, in Mobile Access Gateway
After the completion of MAG certifications, the group members certificate of legal mobile node MN is sent to connected by Mobile Access Gateway MAG
Ground mobile anchor LMA calculates the anonymous common key of mobile node MN, ensures the switching access of legal mobile node MN；
Step 5：When mobile node MN switches between the Mobile Access Gateway MAG in same PMIPv6 networks, mobile node MN
Anonymous common key, group members certificate according to being issued by local mobility anchor LMA calculate the assumed name and private key of mobile node MN, and with this
The identity of assumed name switches certification to realize in PMIPv6 networks.
3. according to the method for claim 2, it is characterised in that the mobile node M applies to third party's trust center STR
Registration is as follows：
First, mobile node MN selection random number rMN∈Z* q, random number N1∈Z* q, mobile node MN and third party's trust center
Shared key K between STRMN-STRAnd multiple random number xi∈Z* q(i=1 ... n)；Mobile node MN calculates application and adds the
Group variable M={ rs of tripartite's trust center STR as group masterMNxiP, xiP, rMNP}；During mobile node MN is trusted using third party
Heart STR public key PKSTR, by the identity ID of mobile node MNMN, between mobile node MN and third party's trust center STR
Shared key KMN-STR, group's variable M and random number N1Encrypt, obtain ciphertext CMN-STR；
Then, mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center STR；
Third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext CMN-STR, and mobile node MN is generated as group
Multiple group members certificate Cert of memberMN_i={ Si, EXPMN, rMNxiP } (i ... n), wherein Si=SKsTRH2(EXPMN, rMNxiP),
EXPMNFor group members certificate CertMN_iThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt N1And CertMN_iObtain ciphertext CSTR-MN；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-MNIt is sent to MN；
Finally, mobile node MN is receiving the ciphertext C from third party's trust center STRSTR-MNAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MNAnd test
Demonstrate,prove ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N1If be proved to be successful, group members certificate Cert is storedMN_i, now mobile node MN
Registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
4. according to the method for claim 2, it is characterised in that the local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG to
Third party's trust center STR applies for the registration of as follows：
First, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG selection random numbers rMN/MAG∈Z* q, random number N2∈Z* q, it is local
Shared key K between mobile anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG and third party's trust center STRLMA/MAG-STR；It is local mobile
Anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG calculates rMN/MAGP；And utilize third party's trust center STR public key PKSTR, by local movement
Anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG identity IDLMA/MAG, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG and the 3rd
Shared key K between square trust center STRLMA/MAG-STR、rLMA/MAGP and random number N2Encrypt, obtain ciphertext
CLMA/MAG-STR；
Then, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is by ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STRIt is sent to third party's trust center STR；
Third party's trust center STR uses the private key SK of oneselfSTRDecrypt ciphertext CLMA/MAG-STR, and generate local mobility anchor LMA
With Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAG=SKSTRPKLMA/MAG, wherein public key PKLMA/MAG=H2(IDLMA/MAG||
EXPLMA/MAG, rLMA/MAGP), H2The hash function defined for third party's trust center STR, EXPLMA/MAGRepresent local mobility anchor
LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGThe term of validity；With shared key KMN-STREncrypt SKLMA/MAG,
EXPLMA/MAGAnd N2Obtain ciphertext CSTR-LMA/MAG；
Then, third party's trust center STR is by ciphertext CSTR-LMA/MAGIt is sent to local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway
MAG；
Finally, local mobility anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG is receiving the ciphertext from third party's trust center STR
CSTR-LMA/MAGAfterwards, ciphertext C is decryptedSTR-MNAnd verify ciphertext CSTR-MNIn random number N2If be proved to be successful, local move is stored
Dynamic anchor LMA and Mobile Access Gateway MAG private key SKLMA/MAGWith term of validity EXPLMA/MAG, now local mobility anchor LMA and movement
Access gateway MAG registration process is completed, if checking is unsuccessful, registration failure.
5. according to the method for claim 2, it is characterised in that the step 4, including：
Step 4.1：Mobile node MN selects random number N3、xiP, and by N3、xiGroup members certificate Cert corresponding to PMN_iThe same time
Stab T1Generate group ranking SignMN；
Step 4.2：Mobile node MN is by group ranking SignMN, group members certificate CertMN_i, time stamp T1And random number N3It is sent to
Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.3：The time stamp T S that Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 checking mobile node MNs are sent1：If time stamp T S1It is stale,
Then Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, and otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 verifies mobile node MN
The group members certificate Cert of transmissionMN_iAnd group ranking SignMN：If illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refusal movable joints
Point MN access request, otherwise perform step 4.4；
Step 4.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is by the group members certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iIt is sent to local mobility anchor
LMA；
Step 4.5：Local mobility anchor LMA passes through mobile node MN group members certificate CertMN_iInterior information calculates mobile node MN
Anonymous common keyShared key K between local mobility anchor LMA and mobile node MNLMA-MN；Local mobility anchor LMA profits
With shared key KLMA-MNCalculate the ciphertext C for including mobile node MN anonymous common keyLMA-MN；Local mobility anchor LMA store group into
Member's certificate CertMN_iWith corresponding shared key KLMA-MN；
Step 4.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNAnd rLMAP sends back Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.7：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 selects random number N first4, then utilize the private key SK of oneselfMAG1Accessed mobile
Gateway MAG1 identity IDMAG1, local mobility anchor LMA identity IDLMA、rMAG1P、rLMAP, term of validity EXPMAG1, when
Preceding time stamp T2Signed to obtain signature SignMAG1, then calculate being total between mobile node MN and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1
Enjoy key KMAG1-MN, finally with shared key KMAG1-MNEncrypted random number N3、N4, obtain ciphertext CMAG1-MN；
Step 4.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 will sign SignMAG1, ciphertext CMAG1-MN、CLMA-MNAnd IDMAG1、IDLMA、rMAG1P、
rLMAP、EXPMAG1、T2Send jointly to mobile node MN；
Step 4.9：The time stamp T that mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 is sent2：If the time stamp T2It is stale, then
Mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise the term of validity EXP of mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 private keysMAG1,
If not in the range of the term of validity, mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise mobile node MN checking Mobile Access Gateway
MAG1 signatures SignMAG1Validity, if illegal, mobile node MN stops access request, otherwise mobile node MN meter
Calculation and the shared key K between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1, local mobility anchor LMAMN-MAG1, KMN-LMA；With shared key
KMN-MAG1Decrypt ciphertext CMAG1-MN, confirm random number N3And obtain N4, decryption ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain the anonymous public of mobile node MN
KeyAnd preserve local mobility anchor LMA identity IDLMAWith the anonymous common key of mobile node MNUtilize movement
Shared key K between node M N and Mobile Access Gateway MAG1MN-MAG1By random number N4Do encryption and obtain ciphertext CMN-MAG1；
Step 4.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG1It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG1；
Step 4.11：Receiving ciphertext CMN-MAG1Afterwards, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 uses shared key K firstMN-MAG1Decryption
CMN-MAG1Random number is obtained, if the random number is equal to N4, then certification success, between Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 and mobile node MN
Authentication relationship be established, otherwise authentification failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG1 refuses the access request of mobile node MN.
6. according to the method for claim 2, it is characterised in that the step 5, including：
Step 5.1：Mobile node MN randomly chooses SMN∈Z* q, calculate the assumed name of mobile node MNWith mobile node MN
Private keyMobile node MN selects random number N5, and to the random number N5, time stamp T3, and group members certificate CertMN_i
With private keySignature obtains the Sign that signsMN；
Step 5.2：Mobile node MN will sign SignMN, assumed nameTime stamp T3, group members certificate CertMN_iIt is and random
Number N5Send jointly to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.3：The time stamp T that Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 checking mobile node MNs are sent3If the time stamp T3It is stale, then
Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, and otherwise Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 verifies mobile node MN hair
The signature Sign sentMNIf illegal, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuses the access request of mobile node MN, otherwise performs
Step 5.4；
Step 5.4：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by the group members certificate Cert of mobile node MNMN_iAnd Mobile Access Gateway
MAG2 arranging key parameter rMAG2P is sent to local mobility anchor LMA；
Step 5.5：Local mobility anchor LMA is according to group members certificate CertMN_iTake out shared key KLMA-MN, and it is shared close using this
Key encryption Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 key agreement parameter rMAG2P obtains ciphertext CLMA-MN；
Step 5.6：Local mobility anchor LMA is by ciphertext CLMA-MNSend back Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.7：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 selects random number N6, calculate shared key KMAG2-MN, and added using the shared key
Close random number N5、N6, and time stamp T4Obtain ciphertext CMAG2-MN；
Step 5.8：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 is by ciphertext CLMA-MN, ciphertext CMAG2-MNIt is sent to mobile node MN；
Step 5.9：Mobile node MN uses shared key KMN-LMADecrypt ciphertext CLMA-MN, obtain being total to for Mobile Access Gateway MAG2
Arranging key is enjoyed, then mobile node MN calculates mobile node MN with moving according to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 shared arranging key
Dynamic access gateway MAG2 shared key KMN-MAG2, and according to shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMAG2-MN, obtain random number
N5、N6If random number N5Checking does not stop access request by then mobile node MN, and otherwise, mobile node MN uses shared key
KMN-MAG2Encrypted random number N6Obtain ciphertext CMN-MAG2；
Step 5.10：Mobile node MN is by ciphertext CMN-MAG2It is sent to Mobile Access Gateway MAG2；
Step 5.11：Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 uses shared key KMN-MAG2Decrypt ciphertext CMN-MAG2Random number is obtained, if should be with
Machine number is equal to N6, then certification success, the authentication relationship between Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 and mobile node MN are established, otherwise recognized
Card failure, Mobile Access Gateway MAG2 refuse the access request of mobile node MN.
Priority Applications (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710584037.7A CN107493570B (en) | 2017-07-18 | 2017-07-18 | A kind of the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and method for identity-based group label |
| PCT/CN2018/087570 WO2019015387A1 (en) | 2017-07-18 | 2018-05-18 | Group identity signature based pmipv6 anonymous access authentication system and method |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201710584037.7A CN107493570B (en) | 2017-07-18 | 2017-07-18 | A kind of the PMIPV6 anonymous access authentication system and method for identity-based group label |
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| Publication Number | Publication Date |
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| CN107493570B CN107493570B (en) | 2019-10-11 |
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Cited By (6)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| WO2019015387A1 (en) * | 2017-07-18 | 2019-01-24 | 东北大学 | Group identity signature based pmipv6 anonymous access authentication system and method |
| CN109640299A (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2019-04-16 | 浙江工商大学 | It is a kind of to guarantee that M2M communication is complete and the polymerization and system of failure tolerant |
| CN109743172A (en) * | 2018-12-06 | 2019-05-10 | 国网山东省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Based on alliance's block chain V2G network cross-domain authentication method, information data processing terminal |
| WO2019137030A1 (en) * | 2018-01-11 | 2019-07-18 | 华为技术有限公司 | Safety certification method, related device and system |
| CN111786797A (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2020-10-16 | 四川阵风科技有限公司 | Time effectiveness verification method for three-party communication |
| CN114448714A (en) * | 2022-02-25 | 2022-05-06 | 百果园技术(新加坡)有限公司 | Data encryption and decryption method, device, equipment and storage medium |
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| CN114978540A (en) * | 2022-05-19 | 2022-08-30 | 广西电网有限责任公司电力科学研究院 | PMU (phasor measurement Unit) system authentication method based on SM2 algorithm |
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| WO2019015387A1 (en) * | 2017-07-18 | 2019-01-24 | 东北大学 | Group identity signature based pmipv6 anonymous access authentication system and method |
| WO2019137030A1 (en) * | 2018-01-11 | 2019-07-18 | 华为技术有限公司 | Safety certification method, related device and system |
| CN109743172A (en) * | 2018-12-06 | 2019-05-10 | 国网山东省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Based on alliance's block chain V2G network cross-domain authentication method, information data processing terminal |
| CN109743172B (en) * | 2018-12-06 | 2021-10-15 | 国网山东省电力公司电力科学研究院 | Cross-domain network authentication method based on alliance block chain V2G and information data processing terminal |
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| CN109640299B (en) * | 2019-01-31 | 2021-09-21 | 浙江工商大学 | Aggregation method and system for ensuring M2M communication integrity and fault tolerance |
| CN111786797A (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2020-10-16 | 四川阵风科技有限公司 | Time effectiveness verification method for three-party communication |
| CN111786797B (en) * | 2020-07-03 | 2022-10-18 | 四川阵风科技有限公司 | Time effectiveness verification method for three-party communication |
| CN114448714A (en) * | 2022-02-25 | 2022-05-06 | 百果园技术(新加坡)有限公司 | Data encryption and decryption method, device, equipment and storage medium |
| CN114448714B (en) * | 2022-02-25 | 2024-02-13 | 百果园技术(新加坡)有限公司 | Data encryption and decryption method, device, equipment and storage medium |
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| WO2019015387A1 (en) | 2019-01-24 |
| CN107493570B (en) | 2019-10-11 |
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