Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
  • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
  • H04L63/107—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources wherein the security policies are location-dependent, e.g. entities privileges depend on current location or allowing specific operations only from locally connected terminals
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F16/00—Information retrieval; Database structures therefor; File system structures therefor
  • G06F16/10—File systems; File servers
  • G06F16/18—File system types
  • G06F16/182—Distributed file systems
  • G06F16/184—Distributed file systems implemented as replicated file system
  • G06F16/1844—Management specifically adapted to replicated file systems
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
  • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
  • G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
  • G06F9/54—Interprogram communication
  • G06F9/542—Event management; Broadcasting; Multicasting; Notifications
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
  • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
  • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
  • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)

Definitions

• geolocation requirements may exist, such as:
• a single data storage provider e.g. a single cloud provider.
• the cloud provider has control over all of the computer systems and/ or virtual machines (VMs) used for deployment of the aforementioned platform and knows where all of the computer systems and/ or VMs and their attached data storage media are placed.
• VMs virtual machines
• This scenario becomes a lot more complex in scenarios where the platform spans a multitude of cloud providers over multiple locations, or when several on-premise hospital systems are part of the aforementioned connected health platform.
• multiple computer systems /VMs belonging to different computing providers are connected and, therefore, a centralized solution for replication becomes more difficult to design because of the synchronization across computing providers.
• the configuration of the deployed computer systems/VMs is dynamic in such a connected health system, with computer systems and VMs being deployed in or removed from different computing platforms due to different requirements (e.g. availability, backup procedures, or new services).
• a discovery solution which is able to adapt to the dynamicity of the system needs to be in place.
• Various embodiments use multi-authority, attribute -based encryption, which uses particular attributes for authenticating the nodes of a network. For example, a geolocation attribute may be used to authenticate nodes that are located in allowed geographical places, where data can be replicated. Servers receive private keys from regional authorities that can certify their geographic location.
• a computer system or VM in a network may be authenticated by being challenged to decrypt a session key. If the computer system or VM is located in a geographical location in which data replication from the origin device is allowed, independent of the cloud provider or hospital local server, then it will be able to decrypt the session key and becomes a candidate for replication.
• the session keys and/ or their respective secure tunnels may have expiration dates. This contributes to the security of the system, since the encryption key changes periodically. Furthermore this expiration forces re -discovery of new devices/VMs for replication, which keeps the system fresh and adapts to the dynamicity of the connected health system.
• the solution may, in some examples, make use of a public-key infrastructure, where the type of encryption is attribute-based.
• geolocation is one of the attributes.
• An example of a policy involving geolocation attributes is: (US, DE, !CN). According to this example policy, data can be replicated in the United States and in Germany, but not in China. Such policies are already in use without cryptographic enforcement, like in the 'cdmi_geographic_placement' field in the Cloud Data Management Interface (CDMI) specification.
• CDMI Cloud Data Management Interface
• the geolocation policy identifies at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is allowed to be replicated.
• the geolocation policy identifies at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is not allowed to be replicated.
• the method further comprises receiving a message from a different VM within the network domain indicating that the encrypted session key was unable to be decrypted by the different VM.
• the steps of encrypting and broadcasting may be performed in response to expiration of at least one secure tunnel within the network domain.
• the present disclosure also relates to a device comprising: a communications interface, a memory, and a processor configured to perform the method described above.
• the present disclosure also relates to a non-transitory, machine-readable medium encoded with instructions for execution by a processor, the non-transitory machine- readable medium comprising instructions for performing the method described above.
• the present disclosure also relates to a method performed by a virtual machine (VM) for facilitating data replication within a network domain, the method comprising: receiving a message from an origin device, wherein the message includes a session key that is encrypted according to an attribute-based encryption scheme, wherein an attribute used for encrypting the session key comprises a geolocation policy specifying one or more geographic locations; attempting to decrypt the message using a policy key, wherein the policy key is specific to a geographic location in which the VM is located; encrypting a return message according to the policy key; and transmitting the return message back to the origin device.
• VM virtual machine
• the method may further comprise: determining whether the attempt to decrypt the message was successful; and transmitting, to the origin device, an indication that decryption was unsuccessful when it is determined that the attempt was unsuccessful, wherein the steps of encrypting and transmitting the return message are performed when it is determined that the attempt was successful.
• the method may further comprise: identifying a key server assigned to the geographic location in which the VM is located; authenticating with the key server; and receiving the policy key from the key server.
• the method may further comprise: receiving data to be replicated from the origin device; and storing the data to be replicated for later access.
• the present disclosure also relates to a device comprising: a communications interface, a memory, and a processor configured to perform the method described above.
• the present disclosure also relates to a non-transitory machine-readable medium encoded with instructions for execution by a processor, the non-transitory machine- readable medium comprising instructions for performing the method described above.
• computer systems and/ or virtual machines within a network may be considered to be located at nodes of the network.
• Network nodes may be connected to one another wirelessly (e.g. in a cloud environment), or via a wired connection (e.g. within a wired network) .
• the present invention provides a method performed by a device for identifying a network node within a network to which data will be replicated, the method comprising: encrypting a session key according to an attribute -based encryption scheme; broadcasting the encrypted session key within the network; receiving at least one message encrypted using the session key from at least one network node within the network; and selecting a network node from the at least one network node to which data will be replicated.
• the at least one network node may comprise at least one virtual machine.
• the device performing the method may comprise processing apparatus, and/ or a virtual machine.
• An attribute used for encrypting the session key may comprise a geolocation policy specifying one or more geographic locations.
• the geolocation policy may identify at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is allowed to be replicated.
• the geolocation policy may identify at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is not allowed to be replicated.
• the method may further comprise: receiving a message from a particular network node within the network, other than the selected network node, the message indicating that the encrypted session key could not be decrypted by the particular network node.
• the steps of encrypting and broadcasting may be performed in response to the expiration of at least one secure tunnel within the network.
• the present invention provides a method, performed by processing apparatus at a network node, for facilitating data replication within a network, the method comprising: receiving a message from an originating device, wherein the message includes a session key that is encrypted according to an attribute -based encryption scheme; attempting to decrypt the message using a policy key; determining whether the attempt to decrypt the message was successful; and responsive to determining that the attempt to decrypt the message was successful: encrypting a return message according to the policy key; and transmitting the return message to the originating device.
• the method of the second aspect may be performed by a virtual machine.
• the method may further comprise: responsive to determining that the attempt to decrypt the message was unsuccessful: transmitting, to the originating device, an indication that decryption was unsuccessful.
• the method may further comprise: identifying a key server assigned to the geographic location in which the processing apparatus is located; authenticating with the key server; and receiving the policy key from the key server.
• the method may further comprise: receiving data to be replicated from the originating device; and storing the data to be replicated for later access.
• the present invention provides a device comprising a communications interface, a memory, and a processor.
• the processor is configured to perform a method according to the first aspect above and/or a method according to the second aspect above.
• the present invention provides a non-transitory machine-readable medium encoded with instructions for execution by a processor, the non- transitory machine-readable medium comprising instructions for performing a method according to the first aspect above and/ or a method according to the second aspect above.
• Figure 1 is an illustration showing an example of a network containing a plurality of nodes
• Figure 2 is a flowchart showing an example of a method, capable of being performed by an originating device, for identifying a network node within a network
• Figure 3 is an illustration showing an example of an authenticated discovery protocol
• Figure 4 is an illustration showing an example of a multi-cloud infrastructure
• Figure 5 is a flowchart showing a further example of a method, capable of being performed by an originating device, for identifying a network node within a network;
• Figure 6 is a flowchart showing an example of a method, capable of being performed by network node, for facilitating data replication within a network;
• Figure 7 is a flowchart showing a further example of a method, capable of being performed by network node, for facilitating data replication within a network;
• Figure 8 is a flowchart showing a further example of a method, capable of being performed by network node, for facilitating data replication within a network;
• Figure 9 is a flowchart showing a further example of a method, capable of being performed by network node, for facilitating data replication within a network;
• Figure 10 is a simplified schematic of an example of apparatus for performing the methods described herein.
• Figure 11 is a simplified schematic of a non-transitory machine-readable medium and a processor.
• the network 100 includes various nodes 102a-g, each of which is located within one or more buildings, organizations or cloud computing platforms, such as a hospital building (HI or H2), or a cloud computing platform (CCP1 or CCP2).
• the nodes 102 are also distributed throughout various countries, including the United States (US), the Netherlands (NL), Germany (DE) and China (CN).
• US United States
• NL Netherlands
• DE Germany
• CN China
• some of the nodes are connected to one another.
• different connections may exist.
• the network node 102b is within a network of a hospital or hospital group, H2, and is located in the Netherlands
• the network node 102a is within the same hospital group, H2, as the network node 102b, but is located in the United States.
• the node 102a may serve as an originating node, or origin node, which contains data (e.g. medical data relating to a patient) to be replicated at one or more other nodes within the network.
• the data may be subject to one or more restrictions regarding replication, which may be set out in one or more policies.
• the data may be subject to a geolocation policy, such as "(US, DE, !CN)", indicating that the data may be replicated at nodes within the US and Germany, but not at nodes within China. Under such a policy, the data from the originating node 102a may be replicated at the nodes 102e and 102g, but not at the nodes 102b, 102c, 102d or 102f.
• FIG. 2 is a flowchart showing an example of a method 200 for identifying a network node within a network to which data will be replicated.
• the method may be performed by a device containing data to be replicated.
• the device performing the method 200 may be referred to as an originating device, or an origin device, since this device is where the data to be replicated may originate.
• the originating device may be processing apparatus, a computing device or a virtual machine, and the originating device may be referred to as an originating node.
• the data to be replicated may, in some embodiments originate elsewhere, and be transmitted from the originating device.
• the method 200 comprises, at step 202, encrypting a session key according to an attribute -based encryption scheme.
• the session key may be encrypted using known means.
• the encryption step may involve randomly selecting a bit string that qualifies as a symmetric encryption session key and encrypting the bit string according to an attribute-based encryption scheme.
• the session key may be encrypted using any attribute, for example an attribute relating to a node to which data may be replicated.
• an attribute used to encrypt the session key may be a geolocation attribute.
• the attribute used for encrypting the session key may comprise a geolocation policy specifying one or more geographic locations.
• the geolocation policy may identify at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is allowed to be replicated.
• the geolocation policy may identify at least one of the one or more geographic locations as being a location where the data is not allowed to be replicated.
• the term 'geolocation' is intended to refer to a real-world geographic location, such as the location of a network node at which the data is to be replicated.
• the geolocation may be defined in terms of coordinates, a grid reference, a building, a street, a city, a country or a continent.
• the session key may be encrypted using a different attribute.
• the session key may be encrypted using an attribute based on an office number, a department of a company or organization, or the company or organization itself.
• the at least one network node may, in some examples, comprise at least one virtual machine.
• the method 200 comprises broadcasting the encrypted session key within the network.
• the encrypted session key may be broadcast using any suitable known means.
• the key may be transmitted via a network broadcast or a network multicast.
• the method 200 further comprises selecting a network node from the at least one network node to which data will be replicated.
• a single node may be selected for data replication while, in other embodiments, multiple nodes may be selected. The selection of a particular network node for replication is therefore based on whether or not that particular node is capable of encrypting a message using the session key.
• Targets i.e. the rest of the nodes in the network
• All of the targets try to decrypt the broadcast message using their respective private keys and each node's reply may be one of the two values: 1. "Do not understand"
• the node sends to the originating device a message encrypted with the session key: E sesslonKey (src,dst,Policy) .
• E sesslonKey (src,dst,Policy)
• This response is given by nodes considered to be "Candidates”.
• 'src' is the source
• 'dst' is the destination
• the message message is the ciphertext resulting from an encryption (E) of the plaintext 'src, dst, policy' using key 'sessionKey'.
• E encryption
• the node confirms that is able to decrypt the original message, and that it satisfies the policy (as it can use the 'sessionKey' key.
• the node also repeats where the request is coming from ('dst') and what the policy is, and explains who is sending the reply ('src').
• the target sends to the origin an "OK" message and a message encrypted with the session key to show that it meets the requirements in the policy (e.g. that it is located in an allowed geographical location).
• the authenticated discovery protocol depicted in Figure 3 may be integrated within a multi-cloud infrastructure 400, an example of which is depicted in Figure 4.
• the infrastructure 400 is described in terms of a compute abstraction plane 402, a data abstraction plane 404 and a network abstraction plane 406.
• the integration includes deploying in every node (e.g. VM) 102 of a cloud computing platform a component which separately handles data replication.
• the component is referred to as a "Data replication service” 408.
• Such a component 408 is provided with a private key when necessary. This is present in the "Compute" plane 402 of the cloud platform.
• the process described in the example of Figure 4 may be triggered when additional users are using an application (indicated by "App” 410) and therefore load- balancing is needed for a better performance of the system. For example, if many users are using a virtual machine at the same time, then the virtual machine may, at some point fail to handle the load. To prevent this, there multiple virtual machines may be used that each handle a part of the load.
• the data that needs to be replicated may go through the following steps: packaging, encrypt package, transport package, decrypt package and finally un-packaging.
• packaging encrypt package
• transport package decrypt package
• un-packaging For example, for a database, the proposed solution would require a dump of the portion of the database that is to be replicated (e.g. records and columns). Next, this dump file is encrypted, sent via the proposed authenticated discovery protocol to the place where the data will be replicated. Then the received encrypted package is decrypted by the receiving replication node (e.g. VM).
• a connected health system may be deployed as a cloud platform, such as U-cloud, and, therefore, may use the abstraction planes (compute, data, network) as depicted in Figure 4.
• the steps: 1, 2, 3 can be mapped to the protocols steps described in Figure 3 and, therefore, the steps of the method 200.
• the step 206 of receiving a message encrypted using the session key is performed only once a suitable candidate node is found. While one or more nodes may be able to respond to the message broadcasted by the originating device 102a, there may be one or more nodes which do not meet requirements in the policy and, therefore, are unable to respond to the originating device 102a.
• Figure 5 is a flowchart showing an example of a method for identifying a network node within a network to which data will be replicated. Specifically, the method 500 describes an example of a process taking place at the originating device 102a when a network node is not able to respond to the originating device with an encrypted message.
• the method 500 may include the steps 202 to 208 of the method 200.
• the method 500 comprises receiving a message from a particular network node within the network other than the selected network node, the message indicating that the encrypted session key could not be decrypted by the particular network node.
• a network node which is unable to decrypt the session key broadcasted by the originating device may send a message to the originating device confirming that it is unable to decrypt the session key.
• a network node 102b-g in a network 100 may perform various steps in response to a message being broadcast by an originating device 102.
• Figure 6 is a flowchart showing an example of a method 600 for facilitating data replication within a network.
• the method 600 may be performed by processing apparatus at a network node.
• the method 600 comprises, at step 602, receiving a message from an originating device, wherein the message includes a session key that is encrypted according to an attribute-based encryption scheme.
• the message received may be, or include, the session key broadcast by the originating device during step 204 the method 200 above.
• the originating device may also be referred to as an originating device.
• the method 600 comprises attempting to decrypt the message using a policy key.
• a policy key is a secret key used in attribute -based encryption.
• the policy key may be referred to as a secret key.
• the policy key in this example, is a secret key derived from a set of attributes, and the policy key is able to decrypt an attribute -based encryption ciphertext when the policy used for encryption matches these attributes.
• the method comprises, at step 606, determining whether the attempt to decrypt the message was successful.
• the method 600 comprises: responsive to determining that the attempt to decrypt the message is successful: encrypting a return message according to the policy key.
• the method 600 comprises transmitting the return message to the originating device.
• the network node receiving the message from the originating device is able to decrypt the message, then it sends an encrypted message (encrypted using the policy key) to the originating device.
• the policy key is a private (secret) key which is generated according to a particular policy defining the requirements that must be met in order for a network node to replicate data from the originating device.
• FIG. 7 is a flowchart of an example of a method 700 for facilitating data replication within a network.
• the method 700 may include one or more steps of the method 600.
• the method 700 comprises, at step 702, responsive to determining that the attempt to decrypt the message was unsuccessful: transmitting, to the originating device, an indication that decryption was unsuccessful.
• an attribute used for encrypting the session key comprises a geolocation policy specifying one or more geographic locations.
• the policy key may be specific to a geographic location in which the processing apparatus is located.
• FIG 8 is a flowchart of an example of a method 800 for facilitating data replication within a network.
• the method 800 may include one or more steps of the methods 600 and 700.
• the method 800 may comprise, at step 802, identifying a key server assigned to the geographic location in which the processing apparatus is located.
• the method 800 may comprise authenticating with the key server.
• the method 800 may comprise, at step 806, receiving the policy key from the key server.
• a network node may communicate with a key server, such as a key server associated with the node, or associated with the location in which the node is located, and obtain a policy key from the key server.
• a further example method 900 for facilitating data replication within a network is shown in the flowchart of Figure 9.
• the method 900 may comprise one or more of the steps of the methods 600, 700 and 800.
• the method 900 comprises, at step 902, receiving data to be replicated from the originating device.
• the method 900 may comprise storing the data to be replicated for later access.
• the replicated data may be stored in a storage medium associated with the network node.
• the replicated data may be stored in a storage device of a device located at the network node, or in a server associated with the node.
• FIG. 10 is a simplified schematic of an example apparatus, or device for performing the methods described above.
• the device 1000 comprises a communications interface 1002, a memory 1004 and a processor 1006.
• the device 1000 may, for example, comprise a computing device or a server.
• the processor 1006 may be configured to perform steps of the methods 200, 500 described above. In this way, the device 1000 may function as an originating device, or originating node 102a.
• the processor may alternatively be configured to perform steps of the methods 600, 700, 800, 900 described above. In this way, the device 1000 may function as a target, or destination node 102b-g (i.e. a node at which data is to be replicated, or at which a replication attempt may be made).
• a further aspect of the invention relates to a non-transitory machine-readable medium.
• Figure 11 shows, schematically, a non-transitory machine-readable medium 1102 and a processor 1106.
• the non-transitory machine-readable medium 1102 is encoded with instructions 1104 for execution by the processor 1106.
• the non-transitory machine-readable medium comprises instructions for performing any of the methods 200, 500, 600, 700, 800 and/ or 900 described above.
• the systems and methods described herein can achieve a better performance based, at least in part, on the fact that various embodiments embed discovery, authentication and key agreement in a single exchange, two-step protocol, which is more efficient.
• Various embodiments utilize only one protocol exchange, and this one exchange only has to be finished by server that satisfies the discovery broadcast.
• the network node selected for replication authenticates itself to the originating device by being able to decrypt the discovery message that is sent by the origin. The decryption is based on getting a secret key from an attribute- based certification authority.
• the attributes of a node selected for replication do not necessarily need to match the attributes in the policy exacdy.
• Replication in a multi-cloud system may require integration between different types of systems, for example using Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols.
• TLS Transport Layer Security
• Such a requirement is removed by various embodiments described herein.
• the newly inserted platform-independent protocol described herein integrates easily with heterogeneous (e.g. multi-cloud scenarios) systems because it does not rely on close integration between the computing providers.
• Various embodiments are based only on exchange of encrypted content and peer-to-peer connected nodes (e.g. VMs) without relying on possible communications and specifics deployed for the multi-cloud system.
• the discovery phase relies on just sending an encrypted message which is not platform-dependent.
• Various embodiments use a discovery process that is relevant to the current topology at the time of running the protocol, therefore automatically taking into account dynamic changes that may have occurred in the past. Furthermore, various embodiments allow decentralized discovery of places (where data is allowed to be replicated) without the need of having a central entity that orchestrates this discovery.
• Various embodiments do not need to trust the cloud or even a possible multi-cloud deployment that the clouds /multi-cloud system will trustify enforce all the Service Level Agreements (SLAs) and use only the allowed geographical regions for replication.
• the fuzzy authentication approach can split the trust between different certificate authorities or semi-trusted landmarks which release secret keys for different geolocation measurements (e.g. ping, hops, etc.).
• the trust may be dissipated even more by the use of expiration dates on the secure tunnels created between an origin and a replication node. When a secure tunnel expires a new key is negotiated. In this way, the security of the discovery process is enhanced. Furthermore this expiration triggers a discovery process which might reveal better (e.g. closer) replication nodes.
• the user integrates the pieces of the secret keys received from all the KGAs into one secret key. Therefore, a malicious KGA can issue secret keys for limited number of attributes. However, if the key material of a KGA gets compromised, then this still poses a risk because this material can then be combined with other user secret keys to obtain access to material that otherwise would not be accessible.
• a Multi-Authority Key Generation System may be used.
• the user must receive secret keys from multiple KGAs in order to be able to decrypt the discovery message.
• These secret keys are associated with different subsets of geolocation attributes (e.g. ping time, hops number, IP address, DNS).
• a secure distributed key generation solution could also be leveraged for providing the replication nodes with the secret keys.
• a volatile or non-volatile memory may be encoded with instructions for execution by a processor ⁇ e.g., a microprocessor or other similar hardware device) for performing the functionality described herein.
• a processor e.g., a microprocessor or other similar hardware device
• such instructions may correspond, at least in part, to the following pseudocode:
• replReqID random identifier number
• sessionKey generate fresh session key
• discovery_message (replReqID, Policy, sessionKey);
• ciphertext fuzzy_encrypt(Policy, discovery_message);
• geolocation fetch known geolocation from cloud provider
• candidates_VMs decrypt(sessionKey, responses);
• selected_VMs select VMs where to replicate the data
• encrypted_data encrypt(sessionKey, data);

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