WO2017120618A1 - Système et procédé de contrôle de trafic aérien de véhicules autonomes - Google Patents

Système et procédé de contrôle de trafic aérien de véhicules autonomes Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017120618A1
WO2017120618A1 PCT/US2017/017117 US2017017117W WO2017120618A1 WO 2017120618 A1 WO2017120618 A1 WO 2017120618A1 US 2017017117 W US2017017117 W US 2017017117W WO 2017120618 A1 WO2017120618 A1 WO 2017120618A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
atc
platform
data
platforms
flight
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Application number
PCT/US2017/017117
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English (en)
Inventor
David Wayne RUSSELL
Original Assignee
Russell David Wayne
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Publication of WO2017120618A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017120618A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0004—Transmission of traffic-related information to or from an aircraft
    • G08G5/0013—Transmission of traffic-related information to or from an aircraft with a ground station
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/003—Flight plan management
    • G08G5/0034—Assembly of a flight plan
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/003—Flight plan management
    • G08G5/0039—Modification of a flight plan
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0043—Traffic management of multiple aircrafts from the ground
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0047—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft
    • G08G5/0056—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft in an emergency situation, e.g. hijacking
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0047—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft
    • G08G5/006—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft in accordance with predefined flight zones, e.g. to avoid prohibited zones
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0047—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft
    • G08G5/0069—Navigation or guidance aids for a single aircraft specially adapted for an unmanned aircraft
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/0073—Surveillance aids
    • G08G5/0082—Surveillance aids for monitoring traffic from a ground station
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G08—SIGNALLING
    • G08G—TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS
    • G08G5/00—Traffic control systems for aircraft, e.g. air-traffic control [ATC]
    • G08G5/02—Automatic approach or landing aids, i.e. systems in which flight data of incoming planes are processed to provide landing data
    • G08G5/025—Navigation or guidance aids

Definitions

  • This invention relates generally to Unmanned Vehicle management and more specifically to a system and method to implement cooperative UAV air traffic control.
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or remote-piloted vehicles are appearing in the sky in exponentially increasing numbers. Autonomous Aerial Vehicles (AAVs) will soon be joining them which do not require remote piloting. With registration of these craft now mandatory in some countries, a safe and effective means of Air Traffic Control (ATC), enforcement of registration laws, and safety for both the public and the aerial vehicles is desired. The ATC can then provide that information to other agencies for threat assessment, air traffic warning and viewing systems, and the distributed air traffic monitoring systems. BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
  • UAV / AAV (AKA drone) ATC is distinguished from the commercial aircraft ATC by several factors.
  • UAVs typically occupy low altitudes, which mean in urban settings they will often be routed through and around anything from buildings to trees, tall antennae and power lines.
  • the drone ATC is a free service of the nation's overall air traffic control administration.
  • one or more third party systems which may implement fee structures are set up to help pay for the overall deployment of monitoring assets and IT infrastructure necessary to make the skies safer.
  • FIG. 1 depicts an overall schematic diagram the data flow for Air Traffic Control (ATC) flight plan generation.
  • ATC Air Traffic Control
  • FIG. 2 depicts a block diagram of the data flow for ATC enforcement of registration requirements.
  • FIG. 3 depicts a block diagram of the data flow for ATC threat assessment. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
  • the first class of vehicles to consider is the AAV.
  • AAVs may be implemented to follow pre-loaded trajectories hereafter referred to as a trackpath.
  • Trackpath data structures may also contain Free Flight Corridor (FFC) information also sometimes referred to as an inverse- geofence which prevents the vehicle from crossing the FFC boundary in the event of malfunction or application of external forces without declaring an emergency.
  • FFC Free Flight Corridor
  • These trackpath spline-based flight plans simply cannot go anywhere but the trajectory specified.
  • Trackpaths are 4- dimensional structures as they specify the timing of the pat as well as the trajectory. Both are required for a meaningful ATC.
  • AAVs may be implemented but are still required to follow only the navigation data they are given by the ATC.
  • a 4-dimensional autorouter is required which has access to all of the previously approved trackpath flight plans. Encryption of this data and the trackpath data structure may be required to ensure that the flight plan data is not altered or corrupted by a hacker or enemy action.
  • the user submits the source and destination locations and desired start of flight time to the ATC.
  • the ATC utilizes the 4D autorouter to find the optimal flight path and start time for that vehicle. This data is then loaded into the vehicle, synchronized with system time, and it launches automatically at the designated time. While en route an IFF module within the AAV broadcasts its information either periodically or upon reception of a "ping" command or both.
  • the IFF broadcast contains information such as but not limited to its FCC identification number, current estimated location, current trackpath ID, and platform status.
  • ATC monitoring modules can be positioned in the Area of Operation (AO) at locations such as but not limited to cell phone towers and structures. This allows the progress of the vehicle to be monitored across its path and correlated against the known flight plans for threat assessment. This information can be updated in real time to the systems such as but not limited to the FAA's ADS-B flight information system, low cost UAV / AAV warning displays in some cases, and the 4D autorouter flight planning systems. Other nationalities may have similar systems or implement the same systems.
  • This part of the ATC allows a UAV pilot to use the Internet via a laptop, smart phone, or other mobile or fixed device to reserve the given area in advance for a given time period. That reservation block is then approved and loaded into the UAV as the inverse of a GPS "no fly" zone. In other words, the UAV can only fly within that envelope, whereas the current Geo- Fencing paradigm only gives the UAV information on where it cannot fly.
  • This block reservation information is utilized by both the 4D autorouting system to keep other aircraft out of the block and by the monitoring system to verify that the platform remains within the block.
  • the block reservation could be on a permanent or other long term basis. The platform would still be required to submit an FAA flightplan request, but it could do so automatically.
  • the ATC monitoring system is deployed to monitor and update the UAV/ AAV traffic in flight. It is this part of the system which allows for real-time updates to the ADS-B and other flight monitoring systems possible as well as the only means for enforcing the registration regulations. Most importantly it allows for detection and threat assessment of unlicensed and/or unrestricted drones within the AO and provides critical additional warning and response times to protect what might be the targets of an unlicensed actor. For example, if an enemy actor flew the drone within a licensed long term block reservation, and then subsequently "spoofed" the GPS in the unit to think it was inside that block when it was not, the monitoring system would recognize the discrepancy and issue a threat warning.
  • UAVs that will be manually flown from a source to destination point outside the direct view of the pilot are given a wider Free Flight Corrior, but the path and waypoint times are still calculated and set by the 4D autorouting system.
  • the primary differences are that the piloted UAV trackpaths are calculated with a larger margin of error, waypoints are listed with times for the pilot, and the trackpath is flagged such that the ATC monitoring system knows of its existence and monitors the vehicle more closely and updates the monitoring data systems more often.
  • the piloted UAV is loaded with a more exact and complex GeoFence envelope, again so that it can only fly within the given trackpath envelope, but the envelope would be more accurate and more complex than the block reservation envelope.
  • the UAV owner may be cited or warned if he cannot pilot the craft within the envelope as detected and documented by the ATC monitoring system.
  • Signatures of flight characteristics can be stored in the registration database such that over time the 4D autorouting system builds data on that particular platform and/or pilot to be used in matching the route to the pilot's abilities. This would lead to an addition in the registration database of both the platform and the listed pilots.
  • UAVs which are not registered or not within their flight envelopes are flagged by the monitoring system and dealt with as required by a threat assessment system.
  • the ATC system may in one embodiment share a national, regional, or global database of all activity, or it may simultaneously be segmented into smaller localized areas.
  • the 4D autorouters have the ability to calculate multiple simultaneous trackpath flight plans within the same area and as long as the computed routes of two or more vehicles that do not directly overlap a practically unlimited number of simultaneous 4D autorouter instances may simultaneously run from the same flight plan database.
  • One additional advantage would be to sort and/or link the database via a k-D Tree to quickly find only the flight plans that impinge on a given area. In other embodiments other data structures might be used to order the data for quick recovery within a given area.
  • the trackpath system provides both the spline-based navigation information and FFC 4D constructs, but it is also a programming system which allows for scene analysis and switching from one trackpath to another based on the analysis system or other variables defined within, detected by, or communicated to the platform.
  • a platform could have a trackpath designed not by the FAA, but by the operator.
  • the trackpath could either be submitted in advance with a set or recurring start time, or it must be submitted at the time of flight for validation.
  • the 4D autorouter performs a set join on all the possible contingencies and/or combinations of the trackpath and tests that combined set against the trackpath database.
  • trackpaths may be prioritized on a first-come-first-served basis, the earlier the reservation might be made the higher the probability of approval. If the same trackpath were submitted just prior to flight, and existing trackpaths in the same area would be given priority and the trackpath might be rejected.
  • a base plus offset calculation is used. If the general area of operation is known, i.e. if the base is within a known area, then the area can be expanded by the set join of the original base area expanded by the maximum offset of the subsequent trackpath. If the trackpath cannot be pre-submitted because the base area is too large or simply not known, then a block reservation of the base plus offset is communicated to the ATC just prior to launch. The more restricted the base plus offset deployment is, the higher the probability of approval.
  • tracking mode may be enabled in a platform. This spawns a block reservation equal to the projected range of the platform. If this is a priority request, such as law enforcement, then overlapping block reservations might be allowed and it is up to the collision avoidance system of each platform to prevent a collision. This is similar to the operation of multiple vehicles within the block reservation of a flight park.
  • the IFF system may request that any or all platforms perform emergency actions such as but not limited to Return to Base (RTB),
  • RTB Return to Base
  • Fig. 1 there is shown an overall diagram of a flight plan generation system.
  • the different illustrative embodiments recognize and take into account a number of different considerations.
  • a number as used herein with reference to items, means one or more items.
  • a number of different considerations means one or more different considerations.
  • “Some number”, as used herein with reference to items, may mean zero or more items.
  • FIG. 1 one possible data flow diagram of requesting a new trackpath is shown.
  • the user / platform operations are shown in the left column and the ATC level functions are shown in the right column.
  • the system begins when the unit is powered up and is disabled from flight by the IFF module until a trackpath is loaded.
  • the user begins by entering the source and destination addresses or latitude / longitude data or a combination of both 100. This could be entered via, for example without limitation, the Internet, telephone processing, voice recognition, mail, email, text message, or by a user interface on the platform itself.
  • the reservation and trackpath could have been made in advance, and the trackpath ID for a particular location and time could be stored in advance.
  • the platform may be capable of storing multiple trackpaths, some of which are conditional or derived at the time of deployment by a "base plus offset" calculation. At power up the platform may be able to automatically request any pending trackpaths from the ATC for this location. This would handle both automated systems such as but not limited to delivery logistics, but also block reservations at known locations.
  • the system first checks the registration information on the platform and optionally the pilot 105 to determine if the platform is registered and pull up any information it might need for the 4D autorouter. If the registration search fails, an error is transmitted to the user 110 via whatever communications means the user utilized in submitting the request and/or other communications channels which may be available such as but not limited to the phone number or email address given in the registration information.
  • any registration data and the source/destination information are passed to a search system 115 which retrieves all existing trackpath and 4D model information from the ATC databases. This initial check can do a quick calculation for any number of situations which might immediately disqualify the requested trackpath. If the trackpath fails this initial search, the user is again notified 120.
  • the data is used to create a hierarchical 4D model 125 of the requested area plus some additional space in case a more roundabout course becomes necessary.
  • the user may specify how much additional space is allowed.
  • the distance may be a constant value or derived from the platform's maximum range, the Area of Operation, local regulations, or other calculated means.
  • the autorouter 130 creates and returns the trackpath data structure 135 including timing and FFC data. This data is transmitted back to the platform 140 and stored in the ATC database so that it can be used to validate future trackpaths and be evaluated by the ATC monitoring network.
  • the transmitted trackpath is encrypted and if possible transmitted directly to the platform's IFF transponder, regardless of what interface the user might have employed to transmit the initial request. This makes it more difficult to intercept the transmission and therefore more difficult to decrypt and alter it.
  • the data is checked for validity then decrypted 150.
  • an encrypted key with is transmitted back to the ATC by the IFF system for final validation of a legal trackpath structure 155. If valid, a return key is transmitted back to the IFF 160.
  • the trackpath structure which may contain a significant amount of data, is transmitted via whatever is the most available and/or economical means available, and only the return key is transmitted directly to the IFF.
  • the IFF passes the trackpath to the platform 170 and enables it to load the path and execute. If the key test fails 165 the error is flagged for the administrator to mark it as a possible hacking detect and the platform and/or the user is notified that the trackpath failed to load.
  • FIG. 2 a flow diagram depicting one of the procedures for the ATC network monitoring system is presented.
  • the monitoring station begins with either transmitting a "ping" or request for IFF data in the Area of Operation (AO) or receiving IFF data in the blind 210.
  • AO Area of Operation
  • receiving IFF data in the blind 210 As one or both may be happening periodically, it is not an important distinction and both paths 210 220 are handled the same way, by reading the GPS data transmitted by the IFF transponder and calculating the bearing and range 230 from the monitoring system to the IFF platform.
  • platforms may be given a variable that directs it to respond to the ping from a given monitoring station some number of times. This minimizes the RF traffic and power usage of the IFF system, but in high traffic environments there may only be a limited number of cameras assigned to the monitoring system and it may take longer to correlate the bearing to the camera image. Hence it may need to respond more than once because the bearing and range will change.
  • the monitor station access the trackpath of the vehicle and therefore determine what the bearing and range should be at any given moment, especially with correlation to the given IFF bearing, range, and time. UAVs with pilots and less accuracy would be more difficult to track and require more resources. This might result in a higher fee structure, if any.
  • the range and bearing monitoring system comprised of some combination of some number of detectors such a but not limited to tilt, pan, zoom camera system, 3D imager, RADAR, FLIR, or LIDAR, possibly one of many available to the monitoring system, can attempt to image and/or the platform for detection 240. If the detector succeeds the IFF data is checked against the registration database 260. Depending on the capability of the detector system in one embodiment the image obtained may also be used to verify the platform model type and run additional analysis of threat signatures. If the detection fails, this means that for some reason the IFF was received but the monitor was unable to verify its position or image it, and an initial threat warning might be transmitted 250. Similarly if the platform was detected but did not have valid registration, then the admin could be provided with the images of the target for follow-up with the user 270.
  • some number of detectors such a but not limited to tilt, pan, zoom camera system, 3D imager, RADAR, FLIR, or LIDAR, possibly one of many available to the monitoring system, can attempt to
  • the platform is validated and the ATC database updated 280 as to the current location and time of the detection.
  • the validation is also logged into the monitor's database 290 such that it may not try to validate the same platform twice.
  • this database is stored only within its own memory and is deleted when the platform exits or is estimated to exit the AO.
  • the platform validation is stored in a global or regional database or a combination of both.
  • FIG. 3 a flow diagram of one embodiment of a threat assessment system is depicted.
  • this system utilizes one or more resources of the overall detector system to constantly scan large areas of the AO to detect AAV or UAV platforms, in particular platforms which may not be transmitting IFF data. The system is triggered when the scanner detects a platform 300.
  • the quality of the detection is highly dependent on the imaging/detection system used and the parameters which define a valid detection. In general the highest accuracy of detection comes from a hierarchical system where the initial detector allows in detections of moderately low confidence and then allows other parts of the system to review and either promote the target for further analysis or discard it.
  • the system looks at the validation database 290 from Figure 2 to see if it had already been identified and validated. If so the target is quickly discarded and the threat level 310 remains 0. If it has not yet been validated, it is either still in the validation process, or it has not yet transmitted its IFF data, so a ping may be sent 320 unless a ping was just about to be sent or just sent from the validation system of Figure 2.
  • the evaluation system delays for a short period to allow the platform(s) to respond. After the delay the validation 305 is checked again, and if still not found is retried some number of times depending on the traffic and threat level tolerance of the AO. Once the timeout is reached, either a second threat level warning is issued to the ATC or an interceptor is launched 325, or both.
  • the interceptor is an Application Specific Autonomous Vehicle (ASAV) designed to quickly intercept, track, and image a detected platform, and as such has a relatively simple trackpath and an enhanced collision avoidance system.
  • ASAV Application Specific Autonomous Vehicle
  • a specialized analysis system applies 3D pattern recognition techniques to the platform to search for threat signatures. If any of or multiples of the signatures match, the threat level is raised accordingly.
  • countermeasures 375 may then be considered. In some embodiments some forms of countermeasures may be deployed automatically. In other embodiments
  • each block in the flowcharts or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code, which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing the specified logical function or functions.
  • the functions noted in a block may occur out of the order noted in the figures. For example, the functions of two blocks shown in succession may be executed substantially concurrently, or the functions of the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon the functionality involved.

Abstract

L'invention concerne la mise en œuvre d'une série de technologies pour créer un système sûr et efficace de contrôle de trafic aérien pour des aéronefs sans pilote (UAV) et des aéronefs autonomes (AAV) en combinant des bases de données d'enregistrement avec des plans de vol autonomes à trajectoires calculés à l'aide de routeurs automatiques 4D.
PCT/US2017/017117 2016-01-06 2017-02-09 Système et procédé de contrôle de trafic aérien de véhicules autonomes WO2017120618A1 (fr)

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US62/275,743 2016-01-06

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CN107808040A (zh) * 2017-10-13 2018-03-16 天津职业技术师范大学 基于变尺度空间邻域评估的无人机模型验证方法
US10693578B1 (en) * 2017-08-02 2020-06-23 Rockwell Collins, Inc. Predictive radio tuning systems and methods for aircraft

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CN107808040A (zh) * 2017-10-13 2018-03-16 天津职业技术师范大学 基于变尺度空间邻域评估的无人机模型验证方法
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