WO2017119668A1 - Appareil et procédé de transmission de données permettant la non-répudiation pour un message de transmission - Google Patents

Appareil et procédé de transmission de données permettant la non-répudiation pour un message de transmission Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2017119668A1
WO2017119668A1 PCT/KR2016/015458 KR2016015458W WO2017119668A1 WO 2017119668 A1 WO2017119668 A1 WO 2017119668A1 KR 2016015458 W KR2016015458 W KR 2016015458W WO 2017119668 A1 WO2017119668 A1 WO 2017119668A1
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hash value
hash
message
random strings
random
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PCT/KR2016/015458
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English (en)
Korean (ko)
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김영식
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조선대학교산학협력단
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a security technique for providing a non-repudiation function for a transmission message transmitted by a data transmission device to a data reception device in a network system.
  • a security environment such as verifying the integrity of the message or encrypting the message needs to be established.
  • a security service for checking whether a message delivered from a specific user is delivered by a true user is called a non-repudiation service.
  • non-repudiation services introduced in general online banking services or network systems are mainly digital signature systems using public key cryptography.
  • the message forwarding party encrypts the hash value of the message with its own private key, and then transmits the message and the value encrypted with the private key to the message receiving party.
  • a receiver decrypts the encrypted value with a public key corresponding to the private key, calculates a hash value for the message received from a message transmitter, and compares the decrypted value with the public key to a hash value for the message. If it is determined that the two values are equal to each other, it is proved that the encrypted value received from the message transmission side is really encrypted by the private key of the message transmission side, so that the message is transmitted from the true message transmission side. It is a system to confirm that.
  • An apparatus and method for non-repudiation of a transmission message generate predetermined random strings and perform a chain hash value operation process on the random strings.
  • the generated hash values are stored in a key storage unit, and the chain hash value calculation process is additionally performed on the random strings, thereby generating a verification key and transmitting the verification key to a data receiving apparatus.
  • a data transmission apparatus capable of non repudiation of a transmission message generates t (t is a natural number) random strings and then the t random strings for each of the t random strings
  • a random string generator for allocating sequence information indicating each of the two information sequences; and a chain hash value calculation process based on a predetermined first hash function for each of the t random strings, wherein k is a natural number. Storing the hash values generated in the k chain hash value calculation processes and the number of chain hash value calculations performed to generate the hash values so as to correspond to each other on the key storage unit.
  • a hash value storage unit configured to generate a message hash value by inputting a message to be transmitted to the data receiving device as an input to the selected second hash function, and n data (n is a natural number) of the message hash values.
  • a data converter for generating n numbers by dividing the data contained in the groups into i (i is a natural number) digits, and each of the n numbers among the t random strings; N is selected from the key storage unit with reference to n predetermined operation numbers that are preset to select n random strings to which the same sequence information is assigned and to extract one hash value for each of the n random strings.
  • a concatenation hash value corresponding to a predetermined number of operations corresponding to each random string among the n predetermined numbers of operations A hash value extractor for extracting a total of n hash values by extracting one hash value corresponding to the number of operations and a data transmitter for transmitting the message and the n hash values to the data receiving apparatus; do.
  • a non-repudiable data transmission method for generating a transmission message generates t (t is a natural number) random strings and then, for each of the t random strings, the t random strings Allocating sequence information indicating each of the plurality of random strings, and performing k (k is a natural number) times of a chain hash value calculation process based on a selected first hash function for each of the t random strings;
  • the t random strings are stored on the key storage unit by storing the hash values generated in the operation process and the number of consecutive hash value operations performed to generate the hash values so as to correspond to each other on the key storage unit.
  • n numbers by converting i (i is a natural number) to a number, selecting n random strings to which the same sequence information as each of the n numbers is allocated among the t random strings, and For each of the n random strings, the n random strings are selected from the key storage unit with reference to the n predetermined number of operations that are set in advance to extract one hash value for each of the n random strings.
  • extracting one hash value in which a chain hash value corresponding to a predetermined number of operations corresponding to a random string is stored Extracting a total of n hash values and transmitting the message and the n hash values to the data receiving apparatus.
  • An apparatus and method for non-repudiation of a transmission message generate predetermined random strings and perform a chain hash value operation process on the random strings.
  • the generated hash values are stored in a key storage unit, and the chain hash value calculation process is additionally performed on the random strings, thereby generating a verification key and transmitting the verification key to a data receiving apparatus.
  • sending a message to be transmitted to the data receiving device by digitally signing the message to be transmitted based on the hash values stored in the key storage unit, by inducing the data receiving device to verify the digital signature value based on the verification key,
  • the non-repudiation function for the transmitted message can be provided.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a structure of a data transmission apparatus capable of non-repudiation of a transmission message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a data transmission method capable of non repudiation of a transmission message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a structure of a data transmission apparatus capable of non-repudiation of a transmission message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a non-repudiable data transmission apparatus 110 for a transmission message may include a random string generator 111, a hash value storage 112, and a message hash value.
  • a generator 114, a data converter 115, a hash value extractor 116, and a data transmitter 117 are included.
  • the random string generator 111 generates t (t is a natural number) random strings and allocates sequence information indicating each of the t random strings to each of the t random strings.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 performs k (k is a natural number) times of a chain hash value calculation process based on a predetermined first hash function for each of the t random strings, and performs k times.
  • k is a natural number
  • the key storage unit 113 is stored.
  • K hash values for each of the t random strings and a number of concatenation hash value operations corresponding to each of the k hash values are stored.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 applies the t random strings to each of the t random strings as input to the selected first hash function to supply a hash value. And performing the k-threshold hash value calculation process of calculating the additional hash value by applying the calculated hash value to the selected first hash function again as an input.
  • the message hash value generator 114 generates a message hash value by applying a message to be transmitted to the data receiving apparatus 120 as an input to the selected second hash function.
  • the data converter 115 divides the message hash value into n data groups (n is a natural number), converts the data contained in each group into a number of i (i is a natural number) digits, and converts the number to n numbers. Create them.
  • the hash value extractor 116 selects n random strings to which the same order information is allocated among the n numbers among the t random strings, and extracts one hash value for each of the n random strings. For each of the n random strings, the predetermined number of operations corresponding to each random string among the n predetermined operation numbers is determined from the key storage unit 113 with reference to the n predetermined operation numbers that are set in advance. A total of n hash values are extracted by extracting one hash value corresponding to the number of matching chain hash value operations.
  • the data transmitter 117 transmits the message and the n hash values to the data receiver 120.
  • the data transmission apparatus 110 capable of non repudiation of a transmission message may further include a verification key generator 118 and a verification key transmitter 119.
  • the verification key generator 118 performs k + 1 concatenation hash values on each of the t random strings and computes a k + 1 th concatenation hash value, respectively, for each of the t random strings.
  • the computed k + 1 th concatenation hash value is determined as a verification key for each of the t random strings, and is assigned to each of the t random strings for a verification key for each of the t random strings. Assign the same sequence information as the sequence information.
  • the verification key transmitter 119 transmits a verification key for each of the t random strings to the data receiving apparatus 120.
  • the data receiving device 120 is the predetermined first hash function, the predetermined second hash function, the n predetermined number of operations and the t random number on the memory
  • the message and the n hash values are received from the data transmission apparatus 110 capable of storing non-repudiation of the transmission message, the message is stored in the selected second hash function.
  • the random string generator 111 may generate t (t is a natural number) random strings and then allocate sequence information indicating each of the t random strings to each of the t random strings. Assuming that t is 1024, the random string generator 111 may generate 1024 random strings “s 1 , s 2 ,..., S 1024 ”, and the 1024 random strings may be generated. The order information "1" through "1024" can be allocated, respectively.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 applies the 1024 random strings to each of the 1024 random strings as an input to “f (x)”, which is a selected first hash function, for the 1024 random strings. It is possible to generate hash values "f 1 (s 1 ), f 1 (s 2 ), ..., f 1 (s 1024 )" for each.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 returns the hash values " f 1 (s 1 ), f 1 (s 2 ), ..., f 1 (s 1024 ) "
  • the second hash values "f 2 (s 1 ), f 2 (s 2 ), ..., f 2 (s 1024 )” may be generated as an input to "f (x)".
  • the hash value storage unit 112 performs k (k is a natural number) times of a chain hash value calculation process based on the selected first hash function, for each of the 1024 random strings, and performs the k chain hashes. Each hash value generated in a value calculation process may be generated.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 may select the selected first hash for each of the 1024 random strings.
  • the key storage unit 113 stores the hash values generated in the eight chain hash value calculation processes by performing the chain hash value calculation process based on a function eight times and the number of chain hash value calculations performed to generate the respective hash values.
  • the images may be stored to correspond to each other.
  • information may be stored on the key storage 113 as shown in Table 1 below.
  • the number indicated by the superscript of the hash value indicates the number of consecutive hash value calculations, and the number indicated by the subscript of the random string indicates sequence information indicating each random string.
  • f 3 (s 2 ) means a hash value generated by performing a 3 ′ chain hash value operation on the second random string.
  • the hash value storage unit 112 performs a total hash value calculation process based on the selected first hash function for each of the 1024 random strings a total of eight times, thereby generating hash values generated in each operation process.
  • the number of concatenation hash value calculations for each hash value may be stored on the key storage 113.
  • the verification key generation unit 118 performs the concatenation hash value calculation process nine times on each of the 1024 random strings, calculates a ninth concatenation hash value, and calculates the concatenation of the 1024 random strings.
  • the ninth concatenation hash value is determined as a verification key for each of the 1024 random strings, and at the same time, the same sequence number information is allocated to each of the 1024 random strings for the verification key for each of the 1024 random strings. Order information can be assigned.
  • the verification key generation unit 118 performs the concatenation hash value calculation process nine times on each of the 1024 random strings, as shown in Table 2 below, and performs a ninth concatenation hash on each of the 1024 random strings. You can generate a value.
  • the verification key generation unit 118 determines the ninth concatenation hash value calculated for each of the 1024 random strings as a verification key for each of the 1024 random strings, and at the same time, the 1024 random strings. For each verification key, the same sequence information as the sequence information allocated to each of the 1024 random strings may be allocated.
  • the verification key generation unit 118 performs the random string "s 1 for" f 9 (s 1 ) "".
  • Order information which is the same order information as "”, may be allocated.
  • the verification key transmission unit 119 determines that "f 9 is a verification key for each of the 1024 random strings. (s 1 ), f 9 (s 2 ), ..., f 9 (s 1024 ) "may be transmitted to the data receiving device 120.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 receives “f 9 (s 1 ), f 9 (s 2 ), ..., f 9 (s 1024 ),” which are verification keys for each of the 1024 random strings. Can be stored in memory.
  • Hash values for each of the 1024 random strings as shown in Table 2 are utilized as key values for generating the digital signature value for the message to be transmitted to the data receiving apparatus 110 by the data transmitting apparatus 110, as shown in Table 2 above.
  • a verification key for each of the 1024 random strings is used as a verification key value for the data receiving apparatus 120 to verify the digital signature value.
  • the message hash value generator 114 transmits the message “m” to a predetermined second hash function "h". (x) "as an input to generate the message hash value” h (m) ".
  • the data converter 115 divides the message hash value " h (m) " into n data groups (n is a natural number) and divides data contained in each group by i (i is a natural number). You can generate n numbers by converting them to decimal numbers.
  • the data converter 115 divides the message hash value "h (m)" into eight data groups, A total of eight numbers may be generated by converting data included in each of the eight data groups into a decimal number.
  • the data converter 115 may convert the message hash value "h (m)" into 8 data groups by 1 byte. After dividing by, converting one-byte data included in each data group into a decimal number, a total of eight numbers can be generated.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may select eight random strings to which the same order information is allocated among the eight numbers among the 1024 random strings.
  • the hash value extractor 116 performs one hash value for each of the eight random strings "s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , s 814 ".
  • the predetermined operation corresponding to each of the eight predetermined strings from the key storage unit 113 by referring to the eight selected predetermined number of operations to extract the A total of eight hash values can be extracted by extracting one hash value that corresponds to the number of consecutive hash value calculations corresponding to the number of times.
  • the eight predetermined number of operations that are preset to extract one hash value for each of the eight random strings are " 8 times, 7 times, 6 times, 5 times, 4 times, 3 times, 2 times. Times, once ".
  • the hash value extractor 116 may be configured with respect to “s 32 ” among the eight random strings s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814.
  • Eight hash values generated from the key storage 113 storing the information shown in Table 1 corresponding to the random string "s 32 " are "f 1 (s 32 ), f 2 (s 32 ), and f 3.
  • the hash value extracting unit 116 which are the eight random string "s 32, s 592, s 164, s 7, s 985, s 223, s 327, s 814" of said for "s 592" of Eight hash values "f 1 (s 592 ), f 2 (s 592 ), and f 3 generated from the key storage unit 113 that store the information shown in Table 1 corresponding to the random string" s 592 "are stored.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may select “s 164 ” among the eight random strings “s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814 ”. Eight hash values "f 1 (s 164 ), f 2 (s 164 ), and f 3 generated from the key storage unit 113 having the information shown in Table 1 corresponding to the random string" s 164 "are stored.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may be configured with respect to “s 7 ” among the eight random strings “s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814 ”.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may be configured with respect to “s 985 ” among the eight random strings s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may be configured with respect to “s 223 ” among the eight random strings “s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814 ”.
  • Eight hash values "f 1 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 223 ), and f 3 generated from the key storage unit 113 that store the information shown in Table 1 corresponding to the random string" s 223 "are stored.
  • the hash value extractor 116 may select “s 327 ” among the eight random strings “s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and s 814 ”.
  • the hash value extracting unit 116 is for the "s 814" of the "s 32, s 592, s 164, s 7, s 985, s 223, s 327, s 814" which includes the eight random string Eight hash values "f 1 (s 814 ), f 2 (s 814 ), f generated from the key storage unit 113 storing the information shown in Table 1 corresponding to the random string” s 814 ", f 3 (s 814 ), f 4 (s 814 ), f 5 (s 814 ), f 6 (s 814 ), f 7 (s 814 ), f 8 (s 814 ) ""F 1 ( s814 )" corresponding to the number of consecutive hash value calculations corresponding to the number of times may be extracted.
  • the hash value extractor 116 eventually ends with " f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f from the key store 113. 8 hash values " 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 )" may be extracted.
  • the data transmitter 117 transmits the message “m” to the data receiving apparatus 120, and the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), and f 6 ( s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) ".
  • the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), and f 6 ( s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) ".
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 transmits the message “m” and the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), from the data transmission apparatus 110.
  • f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) "are received from the data transmission apparatus 110 in advance and
  • the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ) and f 6 (s) based on the verification key for each of the 1024 random strings shown in Table 2 already stored in memory.
  • the memory of the data receiving apparatus 120 includes not only a verification key for each of the 1024 random strings shown in Table 2, but also the selected first hash function " f (x) " In the hash function "h (x)" and the hash value extractor 116, the eight random strings “s 32 , s 592 , s 164 , s 7 , s 985 , s 223 , s 327 , and 814 " respectively.
  • the eight selected operations “8 times, 7 times, 6 times, 5 times, 4 times, 3 times, 2 times, 1 times" which were used to extract the hash value for are stored in advance.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may transmit the message “m” and the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), and f 5 (s 7 ). , f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) ”, the message“ m ”is converted into the selected second hash function“ h ( x) "to generate the message hash value" h (m) ".
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 divides the message hash value "h (m)" into eight data groups and converts the data contained in each group into a decimal number to convert the eight verification numbers. Can be generated.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 and the eight verification numbers "32, 592, 164, 7, 985, 223, 327, 814" out of the verification keys for each of the 1024 random strings shown in Table 2 Eight verification keys assigned with the same sequence number may be selected.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may select “f 9 (s 32 ), f 9 (s 592 ), f 9 as the eight verification keys from among the verification keys for each of the 1024 random strings shown in Table 2 above. 164 , f 9 (s 7 ), f 9 (s 985 ), f 9 (s 223 ), f 9 (s 327 ), f 9 (s 814 ) ”can be selected.
  • the data receiving device 120 refers to the eight hashes by referring to the eight predetermined operations "8 times, 7 times, 6 times, 5 times, 4 times, 3 times, 2 times, 1 times".
  • the data receiving device 120 may generate the eight hash values because the eight predetermined number of operations are "eight times, seven times, six times, five times, four times, three times, two times, one time.”
  • f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) may be performed to perform a chain hash value calculation process corresponding to" eight times, seven times, six times, five times, four times, three times, two times, and one time ", respectively.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may determine the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985). ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) ", further performs a chain hash value calculation process based on the first hash function" f (x) "selected above.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may determine the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327), f 1 (s 814) " of the" f 8 (s 32), "a total of” eight times “the chain hash value calculation process is performed to the generated hash by performing "f 8 (s 32)” the chain hash value calculation process once more for because it can determine that the value can be calculated by the ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 32)” .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ). , f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 ) "are the" f 7 (s 592 ) "hash values generated by performing a total of" seven times “chain hash value calculation processes. because it can not confirm the "f 7 (s 592)" by further performing the hash chain value calculation process 2 only once, it is possible to calculate a ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 592)" .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ). , f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 ) "are the" f 6 (s 164 ) "hash values generated by performing a total” six times “chain hash value calculation process. because be confirmed by "f 6 (s 164)" performed only three times more to the chain hash value calculation process for a can be calculated by the ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 164)” .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ). , f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 ) "are the" f 5 (s 7 ) "hash values generated by performing a total of" five times "chain hash value calculation processes. because it is confirmed by "f 5 (s 7)" performs the chain hash value calculation process four times more for a can be calculated by the ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 7)" .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ).
  • "f 4 (s 985 )" of f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ) and f 1 (s 814 ) "are hash values generated by performing a total of" four times "chain hash value calculation processes. because be confirmed by performing "f 4 (s 985)” to the hash chain value calculation process once more for 5, it is possible to calculate a ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 985)” .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ). , f 3 (s 223), f 2 (s 327), f 1 (s 814) " of the” f 3 (s 223), "a total of” three times "chain hash value computation process is performed to the generated hash value that because be confirmed by performing "f 3 (s 223)” to the hash chain value calculation process once more for 6, it is possible to calculate a ninth chain hash value of "f 9 (s 223)" .
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may include the eight hash values “f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985 ). , f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 ) "are the" f 2 (s 327 ) "hash values generated by performing a total” two "chain hash value calculation process. because it can be calculated to check a ninth chain hash value of "f 2 (s 327)” , "f 9 (s 327)” by further performing the hash chain value calculation process only once for 7.
  • the data receiving device 120 is the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 (s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), and f 1 (s 814 ), where "f 1 (s 814 )" is a "one time” chain hash value. Because it can be confirmed that the "f 1 (s 814 )" by performing the chain hash value calculation process only eight more times, it is possible to calculate the ninth chain hash value "f 9 (s 814 )".
  • the data receiving device 120 eventually receives the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), f 4 ( s 985 ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) "as the ninth chained hash values for" f 9 (s 32 ), f 9 (s 592 ), f 9 ( 164 ), f 9 (s 7 ), f 9 (s 985 ), f 9 (s 223 ), f 9 (s 327 ), f 9 (s 814 ) ”.
  • the data receiving apparatus 120 may determine the eight hash values "f 8 (s 32 ), f 7 (s 592 ), f 6 (s 164 ), f 5 (s 7 ), and f 4 (s 985). ), f 3 (s 223 ), f 2 (s 327 ), f 1 (s 814 ) "for the ninth chained hash values" f 9 (s 32 ), f 9 (s 592 ), f 9 ( 164 ), f 9 (s 7 ), f 9 (s 985 ), f 9 (s 223 ), f 9 (s 327 ), f 9 (s 814 ) "and the 1024 random numbers shown in Table 2 above.
  • f 9 (s 223 ), f 9 (s 327 ), and f 9 (s 814 ) are compared to each other and both values are found to be identical, the message “m” is stored in the data transmission apparatus 110. It can be confirmed that the digital signature is based on the hash values that are really stored on the key storage 113, and finally, the authentication for the message "m” can be completed.
  • the data transmission apparatus 110 capable of non repudiation of a transmission message according to an embodiment of the present invention generates predetermined random strings and performs a hash hash operation on the random strings to generate the hash.
  • a verification key is generated to transmit the verification key to the data receiving apparatus 120 and then the data.
  • the data reception device 120 based on the verification key.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart illustrating a data transmission method capable of non repudiation of a transmission message according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • step S210 after generating t (t is a natural number) random strings, sequence information indicating each of the t random strings is allocated to each of the t random strings.
  • each of the t random strings is generated in the k chain hash value calculation process by performing a chain hash value calculation process based on the selected first hash function k times (k is a natural number).
  • K hashes for each of the t random strings on the key storage unit by storing the hash values of and the number of concatenation hash value operations performed to generate the respective hash values corresponding to each other on the key storage unit. Store the values and the number of concatenation hash value operations corresponding to each of the k hash values.
  • step S220 a hash value is calculated by applying the t random strings to the selected first hash function for each of the t random strings.
  • the k hash value calculation process of the method of calculating an additional hash value by applying the calculated hash value as an input back to the selected first hash function may be performed k times.
  • a message hash value is generated by applying a message to be transmitted to the data receiving device as an input to the selected second hash function.
  • step S240 the message hash value is divided into n data groups (n is a natural number), and the data contained in each group is converted into a number of i (i is a natural number) digits to generate n numbers. do.
  • step S250 n random strings to which the same order information is allocated among the n numbers among the t random strings are selected, and in advance to extract one hash value for each of the n random strings.
  • a total of n hash values are extracted by extracting one hash value corresponding to the number of operations.
  • step S260 the message and the n hash values are transmitted to the data receiving device.
  • the data transmission method capable of non repudiation of the transmission message includes k + 1 times the concatenation hash value calculation process for each of the t random strings before step S230. Calculate a k + 1 th concatenation hash value, determine the k + 1 th concatenation hash value calculated for each of the t random strings as a verification key for each of the t random strings, and at the same time, Allocating the same sequence information as the sequence information allocated to each of the t random strings with respect to the verify key for each of the plurality of random strings, and transmitting the verify key for each of the t random strings to the data receiving apparatus.
  • the method may further include transmitting.
  • the data receiving apparatus is configured to store the selected first hash function, the selected second hash function, the n predetermined number of operations and the t random strings on a memory. It may store a verification key for each.
  • the data receiving device when the message and the n hash values are received, the data receiving device generates the message hash value by applying the message as an input to the selected second hash function, and converts the message hash value into n data. After dividing the data into groups, the data contained in each group is converted into the number of i-numbers to generate n verification numbers, and each of the n verification numbers from among the verification keys for each of the t random strings. After selecting n verification keys to which the same sequence information is assigned, the number of concatenation hash value calculations for each of the n hash values is checked with reference to the n predetermined operation numbers, and concatenation for each of the n hash values is performed.
  • the non-repudiation data transmission method according to an embodiment of the present invention may correspond to the configuration of the operation of the non-repudiation data transmission apparatus 110 described above with reference to FIG. 1. Therefore, more detailed description thereof will be omitted.
  • the non-repudiable data transmission method according to an embodiment of the present invention may be implemented as a computer program stored in a storage medium for execution by combining with a computer.
  • a data transmission method capable of non repudiation of a transmission message may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed by various computer means and recorded in a computer readable medium.
  • the computer readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination.
  • Program instructions recorded on the media may be those specially designed and constructed for the purposes of the present invention, or they may be of the kind well-known and available to those having skill in the computer software arts.
  • Examples of computer-readable recording media include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks, and magnetic tape, optical media such as CD-ROMs, DVDs, and magnetic disks, such as floppy disks.
  • Magneto-optical media and hardware devices specifically configured to store and execute program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like.
  • program instructions include not only machine code generated by a compiler, but also high-level language code that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like.
  • the hardware device described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the present invention, and vice versa.

Abstract

L'invention concerne un appareil et un procédé de transmission de données permettant la non-répudiation pour un message de transmission. Selon un mode de réalisation de la présente invention, l'appareil et le procédé de transmission de données permettant la non-répudiation pour le message de transmission : génèrent des chaînes aléatoires prédéterminées ; stockent des valeurs de hachage qui sont générées en exécutant un processus de calcul de valeur de hachage de chaîne pour les chaînes aléatoires dans une unité de stockage de clés ; exécutent en outre le processus de calcul de valeur de hachage de chaîne pour les chaînes aléatoires de manière à générer une clé de vérification ; transmettent la clé de vérification à un dispositif de réception de données ; appliquent une signature électronique pour le message à transmettre au dispositif de réception de données, en se basant sur les valeurs de hachage stockées dans l'unité de stockage de clés ; et transmettent le message doté de la signature électronique au dispositif de réception de données de manière à amener le dispositif de réception de données à vérifier une valeur de signature électronique en se basant sur la clé de vérification, réalisant ainsi une fonction de non-répudiation pour le message de transmission.
PCT/KR2016/015458 2016-01-06 2016-12-29 Appareil et procédé de transmission de données permettant la non-répudiation pour un message de transmission WO2017119668A1 (fr)

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CN113761586A (zh) * 2020-06-28 2021-12-07 北京同邦卓益科技有限公司 基于区块链的物品随机抽检的方法和装置
CN115913787A (zh) * 2023-02-16 2023-04-04 国网浙江省电力有限公司 适用于电力数据的文件加解密传输方法

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