WO2017080182A1 - 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络 - Google Patents

数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2017080182A1
WO2017080182A1 PCT/CN2016/083374 CN2016083374W WO2017080182A1 WO 2017080182 A1 WO2017080182 A1 WO 2017080182A1 CN 2016083374 W CN2016083374 W CN 2016083374W WO 2017080182 A1 WO2017080182 A1 WO 2017080182A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
bus
message
encrypted
data
bus message
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2016/083374
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
徐勇
李丹
李文锐
林伟
邹禹
勾晓菲
刘鹏
Original Assignee
乐视控股（北京）有限公司
乐卡汽车智能科技（北京）有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 乐视控股（北京）有限公司, 乐卡汽车智能科技（北京）有限公司 filed Critical 乐视控股（北京）有限公司
Publication of WO2017080182A1 publication Critical patent/WO2017080182A1/zh

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/40—Bus networks
    • H04L2012/40208—Bus networks characterized by the use of a particular bus standard
    • H04L2012/40215—Controller Area Network CAN

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to communication technologies, and in particular, to a data transmission and reception method, a transmitting end, a receiving end, and a CAN bus network.
  • the Controller Area Network (CAN) bus protocol is an ISO internationally standardized serial communication protocol.
  • the CAN bus belongs to the category of industrial fieldbus.
  • the CAN bus data communication has outstanding real-time and flexibility compared to the general communication bus. Due to its good performance and unique design, the CAN bus has received more and more attention, especially in the automotive field.
  • the car consists of four systems, the engine, the chassis, the body and the appliances. Each system contains multiple Electronic Control Units (ECUs). Communication between these ECUs is required, and communication relies on a variety of different bus protocols, including the CAN bus.
  • ECUs Electronic Control Units
  • the CAN bus is the most important bus inside the body and is the backbone of the car. It connects modules such as engine control systems, transmission control systems, automatic cruise control, instrument clusters and body control modules.
  • modules such as engine control systems, transmission control systems, automatic cruise control, instrument clusters and body control modules.
  • the inventors have found that the current CAN bus is increasingly being attacked to cause information leakage, thereby posing a threat to traffic safety.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a data transmission and reception method, a transmitting end, a receiving end, and a CAN bus network, which are used to solve the technical problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack and information leakage.
  • a data sending method including:
  • the to-be-sent message is sent on the CAN bus in a broadcast manner.
  • a data receiving method including:
  • a sender including:
  • An ECU interface for acquiring a CAN bus message generated by the ECU
  • An encryption module configured to encrypt a data field in the CAN bus message to obtain a to-be-sent message
  • a bus interface for transmitting the to-be-sent message on the CAN bus in a broadcast manner.
  • a receiving end including:
  • a listening module for intercepting the CAN bus and obtaining an encrypted CAN bus message of the ECU
  • a decryption module configured to decrypt a data field in the encrypted CAN bus message to obtain a to-be-received message
  • a sending module configured to send the to-be-received message to the ECU.
  • a CAN bus network comprising: a transmitting end as described above, a receiving end as described above, an ECU, and a CAN bus;
  • the transmitting end is respectively connected to the ECU and the CAN bus;
  • the receiving end is respectively connected to the ECU and the CAN bus.
  • the data sending and receiving method, the transmitting end, the receiving end and the CAN bus network provided by the embodiments of the present invention encrypt the data domain in the CAN bus message, so that the data domain is transmitted in the ciphertext form during the transmission process, and is enhanced.
  • the security of the CAN bus message solves the technical problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack and information leakage. This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, the brake, the gearbox and the engine may be out of control. To threaten driving safety, after adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided.
  • Figure 1 shows a typical CAN message format
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a data sending method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a data receiving method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a transmitting end 40 according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of another transmitting end 40 according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a receiving end 60 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of another receiving end 60 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a CAN bus network according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention.
  • CAN messages consist of seven different Bit Fields: Start of (SOF), Arbitration Field, Control Field, Data Field, Loop Quadratic Redundancy Check (CRC) field, acknowledgement (ACK) field, and end of (EOF).
  • SOF Start of
  • CRC Loop Quadratic Redundancy Check
  • ACK acknowledgement
  • EEF end of
  • Figure 1 shows the format of a typical CAN message, as shown in Figure 1:
  • the start of the frame can be 1 bit in length.
  • the arbitration domain consists of a 1-bit identity (ID) and a Remote Transmission Request (RTR) bit, which can be 12 bits in length.
  • the control field consists of 6 bits, including 2 reserved bits r, where the first reserved bit can be used as an Identifier Extension (IDE) and a 4-bit data length.
  • IDE Identifier Extension
  • DLC Data length code
  • the data field can be 0-64 bits in length.
  • the CRC field consists of a 15-bit CRC check code field and a recessive bit CRC delimiter (Delimiter, DEL), which can be composed of 0-64 bits.
  • the response field is composed of an ACK gap sent by the sender and a recessive bit of the response DEL.
  • each message is terminated by a series of seven recessive bit end-of-frame fields. In this way, the receiving end can correctly detect the end of the transmission of one frame of the message.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a data sending method according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention.
  • the method in this embodiment may be performed by a node in a CAN bus network, where at least one ECU exists in each node of the CAN bus network. As shown in Figure 2, it includes:
  • Step 201 Acquire a CAN bus message generated by the ECU.
  • the structure of the CAN bus message is as shown in FIG. 1 , including the data domain.
  • the data domain is transmitted in plain text, causing more and more attacks on the CAN bus to cause information leakage, thereby posing a threat to traffic safety.
  • Step 202 Encrypt the data field in the CAN bus message to obtain a packet to be sent.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm may be used to encrypt a data field in a CAN bus message, such as an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES).
  • AES Advanced Encryption Standard
  • the data field in the CAN bus message includes an encryption indication bit and a data bit, and the encryption indication bit is used to indicate whether the message is encrypted, wherein the data bit is used to carry data. Therefore, before step 202, the method further includes confirming, according to the indication of the encryption indication bit of the data field in the CAN bus message, that the CAN bus message is encrypted.
  • the encryption indication bit is the first bit in the data field. For example, if the value of the encryption indication bit is 0, the message is not encrypted, and step 202 is not needed; if the encryption indication is If the value is 1, it indicates that the message is encrypted. Then, step 202 is performed. In step 202, the data bits in the data field in the message are encrypted.
  • Step 203 Send the to-be-sent message on the CAN bus in a broadcast manner.
  • a node on the CAN bus transmits data, it broadcasts to all nodes in the network in the form of messages. For each node, whether the packet is sent to itself, whether it is sent to itself, and then the packet obtained by the interception compares the difference between the identity of the identity identifier and the packet arbitration domain, if the same The message obtained by the interception is sent to itself, otherwise it is not sent to itself.
  • step 203 the method further includes:
  • the CRC sequence is obtained according to the start domain, the arbitration domain, the control domain, and the data domain of the frame, and the CRC field value in the packet is compared with the calculated CRC sequence to obtain a comparison result.
  • the RTR bit in the arbitration domain must be "dominant” in the data frame and "recessive" in the remote frame. It is a sign that distinguishes between data frames and remote frames. After verification, confirm that the message to be sent is correct, and then send it.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, the brake, the gearbox and the engine may be out of control. To threaten driving safety, after adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a data receiving method according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • the method in this embodiment is a data receiving method corresponding to the data sending method provided in Embodiment 1, and the data receiving method may be performed by Node execution in the CAN bus network, in the CAN There is at least one ECU for each node in the bus network, as shown in Figure 3, including:
  • Step 301 Listening to the CAN bus to obtain an encrypted CAN bus message of the ECU.
  • the CAN bus For the CAN bus to listen, obtain an encrypted CAN bus message whose value of the arbitration domain is the same as the identity code of the ECU. This is because when a node on the CAN bus transmits data, it broadcasts it to all nodes in the network in the form of messages. For each node, whether the packet is sent to itself, whether it is sent to itself, and then the packet obtained by the interception compares the difference between the identity of the identity identifier and the packet arbitration domain, if the same The message obtained by the interception is sent to itself, otherwise it is not sent to itself.
  • Step 302 Decrypt a data field in the encrypted CAN bus message to obtain a to-be-received message.
  • the data bits in the encrypted CAN bus message may be decrypted using the same symmetric encryption algorithm as provided by the encryption step, such as AES encryption.
  • the encryption mentioned in the embodiments of the present invention may also adopt an asymmetric algorithm, which is not limited in the embodiments of the present invention.
  • the data field in the encrypted CAN bus message includes an encryption indication bit and a data bit, and the encryption indication bit is used to indicate whether the message is encrypted, wherein the data bit is used to carry data.
  • the method further includes confirming, according to the indication of the encrypted indication bit of the data field in the encrypted CAN bus message, that the encrypted CAN bus message is encrypted.
  • the encryption indication bit is the first bit in the data field. For example, if the value of the encryption indication bit is 0, the message is not encrypted, and step 302 is not required; if the encryption is performed, If the value of the indication is 1, it indicates that the message is encrypted. Then, step 302 is performed. In step 302, the data bits in the data field in the message are decrypted.
  • Step 303 Send the to-be-received message to the ECU.
  • the ECU obtains a message to be received, and further performs a corresponding operation according to the data field in the to-be-received message.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, it may cause braking and change. The speedbox and the engine are out of control, threatening driving safety. After adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided.
  • only the CAN bus message of the ECU related to traffic safety in the CAN bus network is encrypted, thereby improving the transmission efficiency of the CAN bus message and ensuring the cost of the CAN bus not only while ensuring security.
  • the transmitting end 40 includes an ECU interface 41, an encryption module 42, and a bus interface 43.
  • the ECU interface 41 is configured to acquire a CAN bus message generated by the ECU.
  • the ECU when the ECU generates a CAN bus message, the ECU sends the CAN bus message to the ECU interface 41 of the transmitting end 40 in this embodiment, so that the transmitting end 40 in the embodiment receives the CAN bus message. .
  • the encryption module 42 is configured to encrypt the data field in the CAN bus message acquired by the ECU interface 41 to obtain a message to be sent.
  • the encryption module 42 may use a symmetric encryption algorithm to encrypt a data field in a CAN bus message, such as AES.
  • the bus interface 43 is configured to send the to-be-sent message obtained by the encryption module 42 on the CAN bus in a broadcast manner.
  • the bus interface 43 broadcasts to all nodes in the network in the form of a message. For each node, whether the packet is sent to itself, whether it is sent to itself, and then the packet obtained by the interception compares the difference between the identity of the identity identifier and the packet arbitration domain, if the same The message obtained by the interception is sent to itself, otherwise it is not sent to itself.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, the brake, the gearbox and the engine may be out of control. To threaten driving safety, after adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of another transmitting end 40 according to Embodiment 4 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 5, the transmitting end 40 further includes: a check module 44, based on the previous embodiment.
  • the verification module 44 is configured to perform validity check on the to-be-sent packet according to the arbitration domain and the CRC domain in the to-be-transmitted packet obtained by the encryption module 42.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message includes an encryption indication bit and a data bit, and the encryption indication bit is used to indicate whether the message is encrypted; and the data bit is used to carry data.
  • the encryption indication bit is the first bit in the data field. For example, if the value of the encryption indication bit is 0, the message is not encrypted, and the encryption module 42 is not required to be encrypted. If the value of the encryption indication is 1, it indicates that the message is encrypted, and the encryption module 42 is required to encrypt. In the encryption module 42, the data bits in the data field in the message are encrypted.
  • the sending end 40 further includes: a determining module 45.
  • the determining module 45 is configured to confirm whether the CAN bus message needs to be encrypted according to the indication of the encryption indication bit of the data field in the CAN bus message obtained by the ECU interface 41.
  • the determining module 45 if the CAN bus message is encrypted according to the indication of the encrypted indication bit of the data field in the CAN bus message, sends the CAN bus message to the encryption module 42; otherwise, the school passes the school.
  • the verification module 44 transmits the CAN bus message to the bus interface 43.
  • the determining module 45 sends the CAN bus message to the encryption module 42, and in the encryption module 42, the data bits in the data field in the CAN bus message are encrypted.
  • the encryption module 42 is specifically configured to encrypt data bits in the CAN bus message by using AES encryption.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in the form of ciphertext during the transmission process, thereby enhancing the security of the CAN bus message. It solves the technical problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack and information leakage. This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, the brake, the gearbox and the engine may be out of control. To threaten driving safety, after adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided. At the same time, only the CAN bus message of the ECU related to traffic safety in the CAN bus network is encrypted, thereby improving the transmission efficiency of the CAN bus message and ensuring the cost of the CAN bus not only while ensuring security.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a receiving end 60 according to Embodiment 5 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the method includes: a listening module 61, a decrypting module 62, and a sending module 63.
  • the listening module 61 is configured to listen to the CAN bus and obtain an encrypted CAN bus message of the ECU.
  • the listening module 61 listens to the CAN bus, and obtains an encrypted CAN bus message whose value of the arbitration domain is the same as the identity code of the ECU. This is because when a node on the CAN bus transmits data, it broadcasts it to all nodes in the network in the form of messages. For each node, whether the packet is sent to itself, whether it is sent to itself, and then the packet obtained by the interception compares the difference between the identity of the identity identifier and the packet arbitration domain, if the same The message obtained by the interception is sent to itself, otherwise it is not sent to itself.
  • the decryption module 62 is configured to decrypt the data field in the encrypted CAN bus message obtained by the intercepting module 61 to obtain a message to be received.
  • the data bits in the encrypted CAN bus message may be decrypted using the same symmetric encryption algorithm as provided by the encryption step, such as AES encryption.
  • the sending module 63 is configured to send, to the ECU, a to-be-received message obtained by decrypting the decryption module 62.
  • the ECU obtains the to-be-received message through the sending module 63, and performs corresponding operations according to the data field in the to-be-received message.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because, In the prior art, CAN bus messages are transmitted in clear text, resulting in easy interception, cracking and forgery. In particular, forged messages appear on the CAN bus, which may cause brakes, gearboxes and engines to run out of control, threatening traffic safety. After adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such an accident can be avoided.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of another receiving end 60 according to Embodiment 6 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the receiving end 60 encrypts a data field in a CAN bus message including encryption according to the previous embodiment. An indication bit and a data bit, the encryption indication bit is used to indicate whether the message is encrypted; and the data bit is used to carry data.
  • the encryption indication bit is the first bit in the data field. For example, if the value of the encryption indication bit is 0, the message is not encrypted, and the decryption module 62 is not required to decrypt. If the value of the encryption indication is 1, it indicates that the message is encrypted, and the decryption module 62 is required to decrypt. In the decryption module 62, the data bits in the data field in the message are decrypted.
  • the receiving end 60 further includes: a determining module 64.
  • the determining module 64 is configured to determine, according to the indication of the encrypted indication bit of the data field in the encrypted CAN bus message obtained by the intercepting module 61, whether the encrypted CAN bus message is encrypted.
  • the determining module 64 sends the encrypted CAN bus message to the sending module 63; if the encryption indication is A value of 1, indicating that the encrypted CAN bus message is encrypted, the determining module 64 sends the encrypted CAN bus message to the decryption module 62, and in the decryption module 62, the data bits in the data field in the encrypted CAN bus message are performed. Decrypt.
  • the decryption module 62 is specifically configured to decrypt the data bits in the encrypted CAN bus message by using AES encryption.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged. In particular, if the forged message appears on the CAN bus, it may cause braking and change. The speedbox and the engine are out of control, threatening driving safety. After adopting the scheme in this embodiment, such accidents can be avoided.
  • only the CAN bus message of the ECU related to traffic safety in the CAN bus network is encrypted, thereby improving the transmission efficiency of the CAN bus message and ensuring the cost of the CAN bus not only while ensuring security.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a CAN bus network according to Embodiment 7 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 8, the transmitting terminal 40 and the receiving end 60, and the ECU 80 and the CAN bus are included in the foregoing embodiment. The transmitting end 40 and the receiving end 60 are integrated in the communication interface 81. For convenience of representation, the CAN bus is represented by only one thick line in FIG.
  • the transmitting end 40 is connected to the ECU 80 and the CAN bus, respectively.
  • the receiving end 60 is connected to the ECU 80 and the CAN bus, respectively.
  • FIG. 8 is only a schematic diagram of a possible CAN bus network.
  • the ECU 80 in the CAN bus network can be connected to the CAN bus through the transmitting end 40 and the receiving end 60, or can be directly connected to the CAN bus, that is, Not all messages sent by ECU 80 need to be encrypted.
  • Not all messages sent by ECU 80 need to be encrypted.
  • only the messages transmitted by the ECU 80 relating to driving safety are encrypted and transmitted, so that the ECUs 80 are connected to the CAN bus through the transmitting end 40 and the receiving end 60.
  • the transmitting end 40 and the receiving end 60 in this embodiment are integrated in one processing unit, and may be physically present separately.
  • the above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of hardware plus software functional units.
  • the data field in the CAN bus message is transmitted in cipher text during the transmission process, which enhances the security of the CAN bus message and solves the problem that the CAN bus is vulnerable to attack.
  • Technical issues with information leakage This is because the CAN bus message in the prior art is transmitted in clear text, which is easy to be intercepted, cracked and forged.
  • the brake, the gearbox and the engine may be out of control. , threatening driving safety, after adopting the scheme in this embodiment, it is avoidable Avoid such accidents.
  • the aforementioned program can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the program when executed, performs the steps including the foregoing method embodiments; and the foregoing storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a ROM, a RAM, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Power Engineering (AREA)
  • Small-Scale Networks (AREA)

Abstract

本发明提供了数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。

Description

数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络
本专利申请要求申请日为2015年11月11日、申请号为2015107662623的中国专利申请的优先权，并将上述专利申请以引用的方式全文引入本文中。
技术领域
本发明涉及通信技术，尤其涉及一种数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络。
背景技术
控制器局域网络(Controller Area Network，CAN)总线协议是ISO国际标准化的串行通信协议。CAN总线属于工业现场总线的范畴。与一般的通信总线相比，CAN总线的数据通信具有突出的实时性和灵活性。由于其良好的性能及独特的设计，CAN总线越来越受到人们的重视，尤其在汽车领域上被广泛应用。
汽车由四个系统组成，发动机、底盘、车身和电器。每个系统都包含多个电子控制单元(Electronic Control Unit，ECU)。这些ECU之间需要通信，而通信依赖于各种不同的总线协议，其中便包括CAN总线。
CAN总线是车身内部最重要的总线，是目前汽车内部的主干网络。它连接了诸如发动机控制系统、变速箱控制系统、自动巡航控制、仪表盘和车身控制模块等模块。但发明人发现，目前CAN总线越来越多地受到攻击导致信息泄露，从而对行车安全造成威胁。
发明内容
本发明实施例提供了一种数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络，用于解决CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。
为达到上述目的，本发明的实施例采用如下技术方案：
第一方面，提供了一种数据发送方法，包括：
获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文；
对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文；
以广播方式在CAN总线上发送所述待发送报文。
第二方面，提供了一种数据接收方法，包括：
对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文；
对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文；
向所述ECU发送所述待接收报文。
第三方面，提供了一种发送端，包括：
ECU接口，用于获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文；
加密模块，用于对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文；
总线接口，用于以广播方式在CAN总线上发送所述待发送报文。
第四方面，提供了一种接收端，包括：
侦听模块，用于对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文；
解密模块，用于对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文；
发送模块，用于向所述ECU发送所述待接收报文。
第五方面，提供了一种CAN总线网络，包括：如上所述的发送端、如上所述的接收端、ECU和CAN总线；
所述发送端分别与所述ECU和CAN总线连接；
所述接收端分别与所述ECU和CAN总线连接。
本发明实施例提供的数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。
上述说明仅是本发明技术方案的概述，为了能够更清楚了解本发明的技术手段，而可依照说明书的内容予以实施，并且为了让本发明的上述和其它目的、特征和优点能够更明显易懂，以下特举本发明的具体实施方式。
附图说明
通过阅读下文优选实施方式的详细描述，各种其他的优点和益处对于本领域普通技术人员将变得清楚明了。附图仅用于示出优选实施方式的目的，而并不认为是对本发明的限制。而且在整个附图中，用相同的参考符号表示相同的部件。在附图中：
图1为一种典型的CAN报文的格式；
图2为本发明实施例一提供的一种数据发送方法的流程示意图；
图3为本发明实施例二提供的一种数据接收方法的流程示意图；
图4为本发明实施例三提供的一种发送端40的结构示意图；
图5为本发明实施例四提供的另一种发送端40的结构示意图；
图6为本发明实施例五提供的一种接收端60的结构示意图；
图7为本发明实施例六提供的另一种接收端60的结构示意图；
图8为本发明实施例七提供的一种CAN总线网络的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将参照附图更详细地描述本公开的示例性实施例。虽然附图中显示了本公开的示例性实施例，然而应当理解，可以以各种形式实现本公开而不应被这里阐述的实施例所限制。相反，提供这些实施例是为了能够更透彻地理解本公开，并且能够将本公开的范围完整的传达给本领域的技术人员。
通常，CAN报文由七种不同的位域(Bit Field)组成：帧起始(Start of，SOF)、仲裁域(Arbitration Field)、控制域(Control Field)、数据域(Data Field)、循环冗余校验(cyclic Redundancy Check，CRC)域、应答(ACK)域和帧结束(End of，EOF)。图1为一种典型的CAN报文的格式，如图1所示：
帧起始，其长度可以为1位。
仲裁域，由1l位身份标识(Identity，ID)和远程发送请求(Remote Transmission Request，RTR)位组成，长度可以为12位。
控制域，由6位组成，包括2个保留位r，其中，第一个保留位可以作为身份标识符扩展(Identifier Extension，IDE)和以及4位数据长 度码(Data length code，DLC)。
数据域，其长度可以为0-64位。
CRC域，由15位CRC校验码域及一个隐性位CRC界定符(Delimiter，DEL)，其组成长度可以为0-64位。
应答域，由发送端发出的ACK间隙及应答DEL隐性位组成。
EOF，每一个报文均由一串七个隐性位的帧结束域结尾。这样，接收端可以正确检测到一帧报文的传输结束。
然而，CAN总线越来越多地受到攻击导致信息泄露，从而对行车安全造成威胁，这是因为现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，针对这种情况给出了解决方案，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。
下面结合附图对本发明实施例对数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和CAN总线网络进行详细描述。
实施例一
图2为本发明实施例一提供的一种数据发送方法的流程示意图，本实施例中的方法，可以由CAN总线网络中的节点执行，在该CAN总线网络中每一个节点存在至少一个ECU，如图2所示，包括：
步骤201、获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文。
具体的，CAN总线报文的结构如图1所示，包括数据域，现有技术中数据域以明文传递，造成CAN总线越来越多地受到攻击导致信息泄露，从而对行车安全造成威胁。
步骤202、对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文。
具体的，可以采用对称加密算法，对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，例如高级加密标准(Advanced Encryption Standard，AES)。
进一步，CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密，其中，数据位，用于携带数据。从而在步骤202之前，还包括根据所述CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述CAN总线报文加密。作为一种可能的实 现方式，加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位，例如：若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明报文未加密，则不需要执行步骤202；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明报文加密，则执行步骤202，在步骤202中，对报文中的数据域中的数据位进行加密。
步骤203、以广播方式在CAN总线上发送所述待发送报文。
具体的，当CAN总线上一个节点发送数据时，它以报文形式广播给网络中所有节点。对每个节点来说，无论该报文是否是发给自身都对其进行侦听，然后对侦听获得的报文，比对自身身份标识与报文仲裁域取值的异同，若相同则侦听获得的报文是发给自身，否则，不是发给自身。
进一步，步骤203之前，还包括：
根据所述待发送报文中的仲裁域和CRC域，对所述待发送报文进行合法性校验。
具体的，根据帧的起始域、仲裁域、控制域、数据域计算获得CRC序列，将报文中的CRC域取值与计算获得的CRC序列进行比较获得比较结果。另外，仲裁域中的RTR位在数据帧里必须为“显性”，而在远程帧里必须为“隐性”。它是区别数据帧和远程帧的标志。经过校验，确认待发送报文无误后，进行发送。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。
实施例二
图3为本发明实施例二提供的一种数据接收方法的流程示意图，本实施例中的方法，是与实施例一所提供的数据发送方法相对应的数据接收方法，该数据接收方法可以由CAN总线网络中的节点执行，在该CAN 总线网络中每一个节点存在至少一个ECU，如图3所示，包括：
步骤301、对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文。
具体的，对所述CAN总线侦听，获得仲裁域的取值与所述ECU的身份识别码相同的加密CAN总线报文。这是由于当CAN总线上一个节点发送数据时，它以报文形式广播给网络中所有节点。对每个节点来说，无论该报文是否是发给自身都对其进行侦听，然后对侦听获得的报文，比对自身身份标识与报文仲裁域取值的异同，若相同则侦听获得的报文是发给自身，否则，不是发给自身。
步骤302、对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文。
具体的，可以采用与加密步骤所提供的相同的对称加密算法，例如AES加密法，对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据位进行解密。
需要说明的是，本发明各实施例所提及的加密，除采用对称算法外，还可以采用非对称算法，本发明各实施例中对此不做限定。
进一步，加密CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密，其中，数据位，用于携带数据。则在步骤302之前，还包括根据所述加密CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述加密CAN总线报文加密。作为一种可能的实现方式加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位，例如：若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明报文未加密，则不需要执行步骤302；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明报文加密，则执行步骤302，在步骤302中，对报文中的数据域中的数据位进行解密。
步骤303、向所述ECU发送所述待接收报文。
具体的，ECU从而获得待接收报文，进而根据该待接收报文中的数据域进行相应的操作。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变 速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。同时，仅对CAN总线网络中涉及到行车安全的ECU的CAN总线报文进行加密，从而不仅在保证安全性的同时提高了CAN总线报文的传输效率，而且节约了CAN总线的成本。
实施例三
图4为本发明实施例三提供的一种发送端40的结构示意图，如图4所示，该发送端40包括：ECU接口41、加密模块42和总线接口43。
ECU接口41，用于获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文。
具体的，当ECU生成需要发送CAN总线报文时，ECU将该CAN总线报文发送至本实施例中发送端40的ECU接口41，从而本实施例中的发送端40接收到CAN总线报文。
加密模块42，用于对ECU接口41所获取的CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文。
具体的，加密模块42可以采用对称加密算法，对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，例如AES。
总线接口43，用于以广播方式在CAN总线上发送加密模块42所获得的待发送报文。
具体的，当CAN总线上一个节点发送数据时，总线接口43以报文形式广播给网络中所有节点。对每个节点来说，无论该报文是否是发给自身都对其进行侦听，然后对侦听获得的报文，比对自身身份标识与报文仲裁域取值的异同，若相同则侦听获得的报文是发给自身，否则，不是发给自身。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。
实施例四
图5为本发明实施例四提供的另一种发送端40的结构示意图，如图5所示，该发送端40在上一实施例的基础上，进一步包括：校验模块44。
校验模块44，用于根据加密模块42所获得的待发送报文中的仲裁域和CRC域，对所述待发送报文进行合法性校验。
进一步，CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据。
作为一种可能的实现方式，加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位，例如：若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明报文未加密，则不需要加密模块42加密；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明报文加密，则需要加密模块42加密，在加密模块42中，对报文中的数据域中的数据位进行加密。
则所述发送端40，还包括：判断模块45。
判断模块45，用于根据ECU接口41所获得的CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述CAN总线报文是否需要加密。
具体的，判断模块45若根据所述CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述CAN总线报文加密，则向加密模块42发送所述CAN总线报文；否则，通过校验模块44向总线接口43发送所述CAN总线报文。
作为一种可能的实现方式，若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明CAN总线报文未加密，判断模块45向总线接口43发送所述CAN总线报文；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明CAN总线报文加密，判断模块45向加密模块42发送所述CAN总线报文，在加密模块42中，对CAN总线报文中的数据域中的数据位进行加密。
相应的，加密模块42，具体用于采用AES加密法，对所述CAN总线报文中的数据位进行加密。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性， 解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。同时，仅对CAN总线网络中涉及到行车安全的ECU的CAN总线报文进行加密，从而不仅在保证安全性的同时提高了CAN总线报文的传输效率，而且节约了CAN总线的成本。
实施例五
图6为本发明实施例五提供的一种接收端60的结构示意图，如图6所示，包括：侦听模块61、解密模块62和发送模块63。
侦听模块61，用于对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文。
具体的，侦听模块61对所述CAN总线侦听，获得仲裁域的取值与所述ECU的身份识别码相同的加密CAN总线报文。这是由于当CAN总线上一个节点发送数据时，它以报文形式广播给网络中所有节点。对每个节点来说，无论该报文是否是发给自身都对其进行侦听，然后对侦听获得的报文，比对自身身份标识与报文仲裁域取值的异同，若相同则侦听获得的报文是发给自身，否则，不是发给自身。
解密模块62，用于对侦听模块61获得的加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文。
具体的，可以采用与加密步骤所提供的相同的对称加密算法，例如AES加密法，对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据位进行解密。
发送模块63，用于向所述ECU发送解密模块62解密获得的待接收报文。
具体的，ECU从而通过发送模块63获得待接收报文，进而根据该待接收报文中的数据域进行相应的操作。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于， 现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。
实施例六
图7为本发明实施例六提供的另一种接收端60的结构示意图，如图6所示，该接收端60在上一实施例的基础上，加密CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据。
作为一种可能的实现方式，加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位，例如：若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明报文未加密，则不需要解密模块62解密；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明报文加密，则需要解密模块62解密，在解密模块62中，对报文中的数据域中的数据位进行解密。
相应的，该接收端60进一步包括：判断模块64。
判断模块64，用于根据侦听模块61获得的加密CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，判断所述加密CAN总线报文是否加密。
作为一种可能的实现方式，若加密指示位的取值为0，则说明加密CAN总线报文未加密，判断模块64向发送模块63发送所述加密CAN总线报文；若加密指示为的取值为1，则说明加密CAN总线报文加密，判断模块64向解密模块62发送所述加密CAN总线报文，在解密模块62中，对加密CAN总线报文中的数据域中的数据位进行解密。
相应的，解密模块62，具体用于采用AES加密法，对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据位进行解密。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变 速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避免此类事故发生。同时，仅对CAN总线网络中涉及到行车安全的ECU的CAN总线报文进行加密，从而不仅在保证安全性的同时提高了CAN总线报文的传输效率，而且节约了CAN总线的成本。
实施例七
图8为本发明实施例七提供的一种CAN总线网络的结构示意图，如图8所示，包括如前述实施例所述的发送端40和接收端60，以及ECU80和CAN总线。其中，发送端40和接收端60集成在通信接口81中，为便于表示，图8中仅用一条粗线表示CAN总线。
其中，发送端40分别与所述ECU80和CAN总线连接。
接收端60分别与所述ECU80和CAN总线连接。
需要说明的是，图8仅作为一种可能的CAN总线网络的示意，CAN总线网络中的ECU80可以通过发送端40和接收端60与CAN总线连接，也可以直接与CAN总线连接，也就是说，并不是所有ECU80所发送的报文都需要进行加密传送。作为一种可能的情况，仅对涉及行车安全的ECU80所发送报文进行加密传送，从而这些ECU80通过发送端40和接收端60与CAN总线连接。
由于仅对CAN总线网络中涉及到行车安全的ECU的CAN总线报文进行加密，从而不仅在保证安全性的同时提高了CAN总线报文的传输效率，而且节约了CAN总线的成本。
另外，在本实施例中的发送端40和接收端60集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是单独物理存在。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用硬件加软件功能单元的形式实现。
本实施例中，通过对CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，从而在传输过程中，数据域以密文形式传递，增强了CAN总线报文的安全性，解决了CAN总线容易受到攻击导致信息泄漏的技术问题。这是由于，现有技术中CAN总线报文以明文形式传递，导致容易被侦听、破解和伪造，特别是伪造的报文出现在CAN总线上后，将可能导致刹车、变速箱和发动机失控，威胁行车安全，采用本实施例中的方案后，则可避 免此类事故发生。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解：实现上述各方法实施例的全部或部分步骤可以通过程序指令相关的硬件来完成。前述的程序可以存储于一计算机可读取存储介质中。该程序在执行时，执行包括上述各方法实施例的步骤；而前述的存储介质包括：ROM、RAM、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
最后应说明的是：以上各实施例仅用以说明本发明的技术方案，而非对其限制；尽管参照前述各实施例对本发明进行了详细的说明，本领域的普通技术人员应当理解：其依然可以对前述各实施例所记载的技术方案进行修改，或者对其中部分或者全部技术特征进行等同替换；而这些修改或者替换，并不使相应技术方案的本质脱离本发明各实施例技术方案的范围。

Claims (19)

  1. 一种数据发送方法，其特征在于，包括：
    获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文；
    对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文；
    以广播方式在CAN总线上发送所述待发送报文。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的数据发送方法，其特征在于，所述CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据；
    则所述对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文之前，还包括：
    根据所述CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述CAN总线报文加密。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的数据发送方法，其特征在于，所述加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位。
  4. 根据权利要求2所述的数据发送方法，其特征在于，所述对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，包括：
    采用AES加密法，对所述CAN总线报文中的数据位进行加密。
  5. 根据权利要求1-4任一项所述的数据发送方法，其特征在于，所述对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文之后，还包括：
    根据所述待发送报文中的仲裁域和CRC域，对所述待发送报文进行合法性校验。
  6. 一种数据接收方法，其特征在于，包括：
    对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文；
    对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文；
    向所述ECU发送所述待接收报文。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的数据接收方法，其特征在于，所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据；
    则对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文 之前，还包括：
    根据所述加密CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，确认所述加密CAN总线报文加密。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的数据接收方法，其特征在于，所述加密指示位为所述数据域中的第一比特位。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的数据接收方法，其特征在于，所述对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，包括：
    采用AES加密法，对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据位进行解密。
  10. 根据权利要求6-8任一项所述的数据接收方法，其特征在于，所述对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文，包括：
    对所述CAN总线侦听，获得仲裁域的取值与所述ECU的身份识别码相同的加密CAN总线报文。
  11. 一种发送端，其特征在于，包括：
    ECU接口，用于获取ECU生成的CAN总线报文；
    加密模块，用于对所述CAN总线报文中的数据域进行加密，获得待发送报文；
    总线接口，用于以广播方式在CAN总线上发送所述待发送报文。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的发送端，其特征在于，所述CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据；
    则所述发送端，还包括：
    判断模块，用于根据所述CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，判断所述CAN总线报文是否加密。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的发送端，其特征在于，
    所述加密模块，具体用于采用AES加密法，对所述CAN总线报文中的数据位进行加密。
  14. 根据权利要求11-13任一项所述的发送端，其特征在于，所述发送端，还包括：
    校验模块，用于根据所述待发送报文中的仲裁域和CRC域，对所述待发送报文进行合法性校验。
  15. 一种接收端，其特征在于，包括：
    侦听模块，用于对CAN总线进行侦听，获得ECU的加密CAN总线报文；
    解密模块，用于对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域进行解密，获得待接收报文；
    发送模块，用于向所述ECU发送所述待接收报文。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的接收端，其特征在于，所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据域包括加密指示位和数据位，所述加密指示位，用于指示所述报文是否加密；所述数据位，用于携带数据；
    则所述接收端，还包括：
    判断模块，用于根据所述加密CAN总线报文中数据域的加密指示位的指示，判断所述加密CAN总线报文是否加密。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的接收端，其特征在于，
    所述解密模块，具体用于采用AES加密法，对所述加密CAN总线报文中的数据位进行解密。
  18. 根据权利要求15-17任一项所述的接收端，其特征在于，
    所述侦听模块，具体用于对所述CAN总线侦听，获得仲裁域的取值与所述ECU的身份识别码相同的加密CAN总线报文。
  19. 一种CAN总线网络，包括：如权利要求11-14任一项所述的发送端、如权利要求15-18任一项所述的接收端、ECU和CAN总线；
    所述发送端分别与所述ECU和CAN总线连接；
    所述接收端分别与所述ECU和CAN总线连接。
PCT/CN2016/083374 2015-11-11 2016-05-25 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络 WO2017080182A1 (zh)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201510766262.3 2015-11-11
CN201510766262.3A CN105897669A (zh) 2015-11-11 2015-11-11 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2017080182A1 true WO2017080182A1 (zh) 2017-05-18

Family

ID=57001877

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2016/083374 WO2017080182A1 (zh) 2015-11-11 2016-05-25 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络

Country Status (3)

Country Link
US (1) US20170134394A1 (zh)
CN (1) CN105897669A (zh)
WO (1) WO2017080182A1 (zh)

Families Citing this family (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN106549940B (zh) * 2016-10-13 2019-11-26 北京奇虎科技有限公司 车辆数据传输方法及系统
CN108011708B (zh) * 2016-10-28 2021-05-25 长城汽车股份有限公司 基于汽车总线的报文加密方法、车辆的控制器及车辆
CN106740569B (zh) * 2016-11-28 2019-07-02 安徽星凯龙客车有限公司 一种整车控制系统多点式校验算法
CN106953796B (zh) * 2017-04-13 2021-01-01 北京汽车集团有限公司 安全网关、数据处理方法、装置、车辆网络系统及车辆
CN107426285B (zh) * 2017-05-19 2022-11-25 北京智联安行科技有限公司 一种车载can总线安全防护方法和装置
WO2018214487A1 (zh) * 2017-05-25 2018-11-29 华为技术有限公司 一种控制器区域网总线安全通信方法、装置及系统
CN108965218B (zh) * 2017-05-25 2020-09-29 华为技术有限公司 一种控制器区域网总线安全通信方法、装置及系统
US10791125B2 (en) * 2018-01-03 2020-09-29 Ford Global Technologies, Llc End-to-end controller protection and message authentication
CN110661746B (zh) * 2018-06-28 2022-03-18 中车株洲电力机车研究所有限公司 一种列车can总线通信安全加密方法、解密方法
CN111447165B (zh) * 2018-12-29 2023-10-31 北京奇虎科技有限公司 车辆安全防护方法及装置
SG10201901191YA (en) * 2019-02-12 2020-09-29 Blocksane Pte Ltd System and Method of Protecting Transmitted Data in the NMEA Protocols In Vehicle Control Systems
CN110351281B (zh) * 2019-07-15 2021-01-05 珠海格力电器股份有限公司 一种通用数据帧解析方法、装置及设备
US11295036B2 (en) 2019-12-09 2022-04-05 Nxp Usa, Inc. Method of using protocol CRC to implement end to end protection of a CAN message
CN111049852B (zh) * 2019-12-24 2020-12-08 国家计算机网络与信息安全管理中心 Can总线协议解析方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质
CN111210539B (zh) * 2020-01-02 2023-09-19 浙江吉利新能源商用车集团有限公司 一种动力蓄电池数据分析系统
CN113098746B (zh) * 2021-03-31 2022-05-03 三一汽车起重机械有限公司 作业机械can总线通信方法和装置
CN115643037B (zh) * 2021-07-20 2024-04-19 广州汽车集团股份有限公司 车载can总线通信方法、装置和系统
CN114422181A (zh) * 2021-12-11 2022-04-29 浙江吉利控股集团有限公司 一种车辆数据报文安全通信方法
CN114567521A (zh) * 2022-02-28 2022-05-31 湖南三一中型起重机械有限公司 Can总线通信方法、发送装置、接收装置及汽车

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101911604A (zh) * 2007-12-31 2010-12-08 克拉克设备公司 控制区域网数据加密系统和方法
CN103166943A (zh) * 2011-12-19 2013-06-19 北汽福田汽车股份有限公司 一种对电子控制单元ecu目标文件加密传输的方法及系统
CN104029652A (zh) * 2014-06-25 2014-09-10 奇瑞汽车股份有限公司 一种can总线汽车发动机防盗系统及其认证方法
CN104767618A (zh) * 2015-04-03 2015-07-08 清华大学 一种基于广播的can总线认证方法及系统

Family Cites Families (5)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2003034425A1 (en) * 2001-10-12 2003-04-24 Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. Apparatus and method for reading or writing block-wise stored user data
CN102035845B (zh) * 2010-12-20 2012-07-18 西安西电捷通无线网络通信股份有限公司 支持链路层保密传输的交换设备及其数据处理方法
CN105577364B (zh) * 2011-10-27 2019-11-05 华为技术有限公司 一种加密方法、解密方法和相关装置
CN104601329B (zh) * 2014-12-26 2018-10-26 深圳市金溢科技股份有限公司 车载终端、车辆信息发布系统及方法
US11115433B2 (en) * 2015-06-29 2021-09-07 Argus Cyber Security Ltd. System and method for content based anomaly detection in an in-vehicle communication network

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101911604A (zh) * 2007-12-31 2010-12-08 克拉克设备公司 控制区域网数据加密系统和方法
CN103166943A (zh) * 2011-12-19 2013-06-19 北汽福田汽车股份有限公司 一种对电子控制单元ecu目标文件加密传输的方法及系统
CN104029652A (zh) * 2014-06-25 2014-09-10 奇瑞汽车股份有限公司 一种can总线汽车发动机防盗系统及其认证方法
CN104767618A (zh) * 2015-04-03 2015-07-08 清华大学 一种基于广播的can总线认证方法及系统

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN105897669A (zh) 2016-08-24
US20170134394A1 (en) 2017-05-11

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
WO2017080182A1 (zh) 数据发送、接收方法、发送端、接收端和can总线网络
CN108347331B (zh) 车联网系统中T_Box设备与ECU设备进行安全通信的方法与设备
US20210119981A1 (en) Apparatus for use in a can system
US10095634B2 (en) In-vehicle network (IVN) device and method for operating an IVN device
CN104717201B (zh) 网络装置以及网络系统
EP2775660B1 (en) Message authentication method in communication system and communication system
KR101356476B1 (ko) 차량용 데이터의 인증 및 획득 방법
EP3432511B1 (en) Communication network system, vehicle, counter-value notification node, counter-value sharing method, and computer program
CN111049803A (zh) 基于车载can总线通讯系统数据加密及平台安全访问的方法
CN113542428B (zh) 车辆数据上传方法、装置、车辆、系统及存储介质
KR101269086B1 (ko) 차량용 데이터의 인증 및 획득 방법 및 시스템
CN112134702B (zh) 车内网安全通信发送、接收方法及装置
WO2021222445A1 (en) Method and system for addition of assurance information to v2x messaging
KR101481403B1 (ko) 차량용 데이터의 인증 및 획득 방법
CN115277219A (zh) 消息加密方法、解密方法、装置及存储介质
CN113632419A (zh) 用于对要在总线系统（bu）、特别是机动车辆的总线系统中传输的至少一个数据分组进行生成和认证检查的装置和方法
KR101705639B1 (ko) 차량 네트워크 시스템에서의 메시지 송수신 방법
EP3713190B1 (en) Secure bridging of controller area network buses
CN113328919A (zh) 一种can总线标识符、通信方法以及通信系统
JP2023519059A (ja) ネットワークのセキュリティ手段を高めるネットワーク上におけるデータ交換のための方法およびシステムおよびその種のシステムを包含する乗り物
JP2018029352A (ja) 通信ネットワークシステム、車両、カウンタ値通知ノード、カウンタ値共有方法、及びコンピュータプログラム
Ansari et al. IntelliCAN: Attack-resilient controller area network (CAN) for secure automobiles
JP6203798B2 (ja) 車載制御システム、車両、管理装置、車載コンピュータ、データ共有方法、及びコンピュータプログラム
Carsten et al. A system to recognize intruders in controller area network (can)
Shannon et al. Blockchain based distributed key provisioning and secure communication over CAN FD

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 16863363

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 16863363

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1