WO2016054990A1 - 安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器 - Google Patents

安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2016054990A1
WO2016054990A1 PCT/CN2015/091235 CN2015091235W WO2016054990A1 WO 2016054990 A1 WO2016054990 A1 WO 2016054990A1 CN 2015091235 W CN2015091235 W CN 2015091235W WO 2016054990 A1 WO2016054990 A1 WO 2016054990A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
verification
information
result
terminal
credential information
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Application number
PCT/CN2015/091235
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
林钧燧
Original Assignee
阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司
林钧燧
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司, 林钧燧 filed Critical 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司
Priority to EP15848953.4A priority Critical patent/EP3206329B1/en
Priority to SG11201702933QA priority patent/SG11201702933QA/en
Priority to JP2017518082A priority patent/JP6967449B2/ja
Priority to KR1020177012520A priority patent/KR102137122B1/ko
Publication of WO2016054990A1 publication Critical patent/WO2016054990A1/zh
Priority to US15/484,061 priority patent/US10721076B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a security verification method, apparatus, terminal, and server.
  • the traditional verification mode is the application server verification, that is, the user sends a preset verification password to the application server through the terminal, and the application server verifies that the verification password is consistent with the password when the user is registered, and then passes the verification.
  • the check password in the above check mode is easily stolen by a malicious third party through a Trojan horse program.
  • the terminal local check may be used instead of the application server check, that is, the terminal sends the school based on the application server.
  • the prompt information is verified, and the user biometric-based fingerprint verification or the dynamic recognition-based gesture verification is performed locally, thereby completing the identity verification of the user, and transmitting the verification result to the server.
  • the terminal local check is used instead of the application server check
  • the malicious third party analog terminal interacts with the server and sends the forged terminal local check result to the server
  • the server cannot determine the terminal as the substitute check mode.
  • the credibility of the local check mode leads to poor reliability of the existing security check mode, and the access security of the network application is not high.
  • the present application provides a security verification method, device, terminal, and server to solve the problem of poor reliability of the security verification method in the prior art.
  • a security verification method comprising:
  • the local check is performed by updating the check mode to obtain the local check result.
  • another security verification method comprising:
  • the replacement credential information is information generated when the terminal replaces the original check mode by using an update check mode, and when the local check result is a security check by the terminal user, the terminal passes the Update the verification result obtained by local verification;
  • the cryptographic check result is verified by the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification is passed, it is determined that the local check result is credible.
  • a security verification apparatus comprising:
  • the verification unit is configured to perform local verification by updating the verification mode when the end user performs security verification, and obtain a local verification result;
  • An encryption unit configured to encrypt the local verification result according to the saved replacement credential information, to obtain an encryption verification result, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification manner;
  • a first sending unit configured to send the cryptographic check result, the local check result, and user information of the terminal user to a server, so that the server corresponds to the user information
  • the server corresponds to the user information
  • another security verification apparatus comprising:
  • a first receiving unit configured to receive a cryptographic check result sent by the terminal, a local check result, and user information of the terminal user, where the cryptographic check result is that the terminal performs the local check result according to the saved replacement credential information. And performing the encryption verification result generated by the encryption, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the terminal replaces the original verification mode by using an update verification manner, where the local verification result is a security check performed by the terminal user. a verification result obtained by the terminal by performing local verification by the update verification manner;
  • An obtaining unit configured to obtain replacement credential information corresponding to the user information
  • a verification unit configured to verify the encrypted verification result by using the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification passes, determining that the local verification result is authentic.
  • a terminal including:
  • processor a memory for storing the processor executable instructions
  • processor is configured to:
  • the local check is performed by updating the check mode to obtain the local check result.
  • a server including:
  • processor a memory for storing the processor executable instructions
  • processor is configured to:
  • the replacement credential information is information generated when the terminal replaces the original check mode by using an update check mode, and when the local check result is a security check by the terminal user, the terminal passes the Update the verification result obtained by local verification;
  • the cryptographic check result is verified by the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification is passed, it is determined that the local check result is credible.
  • both the terminal and the server save the replacement credential information generated for the update verification mode, so when the verification is performed by using the update verification mode, the replacement may be performed.
  • the credential information encrypts the local check result, and the corresponding server can verify the encrypted cryptographic check result transmitted by the terminal by replacing the credential information, and determine that the local check result is credible after the verification is passed.
  • the malicious third party cannot obtain the replacement credential information, and the security check cannot be completed even if the local check result is obtained. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application can improve the reliability of the security check and ensure the access of the network application. safety.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a security check scenario according to an embodiment of the present application
  • 2A is a flowchart of an embodiment of a security verification method of the present application.
  • 2B is a flowchart of an embodiment of a security verification method of the present application.
  • FIG. 3 is a flow chart of another embodiment of a security verification method of the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow chart of another embodiment of a security verification method of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a hardware structural diagram of a device where the security verification device of the present application is located
  • FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an embodiment of a security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • FIG. 8 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • Figure 9 is a block diagram of another embodiment of the security verification device of the present application.
  • first, second, third, etc. may be used to describe various information in this application, such information should not be limited to these terms. These terms are only used to distinguish the same type of information from each other.
  • first information may also be referred to as the second information without departing from the scope of the present application.
  • second information may also be referred to as the first information.
  • word "if” as used herein may be interpreted as "when” or “when” or “in response to a determination.”
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario for implementing security verification according to an embodiment of the present application, where all verification processes between the terminal and the server are completed based on the Internet, and an update check mode is adopted.
  • the terminal and the server save the replacement credential information generated for the update verification mode. Therefore, when the verification is performed by the update verification method, the local verification result can be encrypted by replacing the credential information.
  • the corresponding server can verify the encrypted cryptographic check result transmitted by the terminal by replacing the credential information, and determine that the local check result is trusted after the verification is passed, thereby improving the reliability of the security check and ensuring the access of the network application. Security, the embodiments of the present application are described in detail below.
  • FIG. 2A is a flowchart of an embodiment of a security verification method according to the present application. The embodiment is described from a terminal side that implements security verification:
  • Step 201 When the end user performs the security check, the local check is performed by updating the check mode, and the local check result is obtained.
  • the method of performing security check on the server side may be referred to as an original check mode, and the original check mode is usually verified by the server through the check password saved when the terminal user registers;
  • the method of the security check is called the update check mode, and the update check mode may include the fingerprint check mode, the gesture check mode, and the face gesture check mode.
  • the terminal when the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the terminal may obtain the first original verification credential information in the original verification mode, where the first original verification voucher information may be when the terminal user is registering. Setting a verification password; the terminal generates replacement voucher information for the update verification mode, and transmits the first original verification voucher information, the replacement voucher information, and the user information of the end user to the server, where the replacement voucher information may be a key Or the random string, the user information may be the user name of the terminal user, and further may include the terminal identifier of the terminal, and the terminal user may be uniquely identified by the user information; at the same time, the terminal may locally save the generated replacement credential information, for example, the replacement credential
  • the information is saved to the TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) module or the SE (Security Environment) module.
  • the server may search for the second original verification credential information corresponding to the user information, where the second original verification credential information may be a terminal.
  • the server may save the replacement Change the correspondence between the voucher information and the user information.
  • the terminal can perform local check by updating the check mode to obtain the local check result.
  • the verification prompt information is usually sent by the server to the terminal, and the terminal obtains the local check result in real time according to the check prompt information.
  • Step 202 Encrypt the local check result according to the saved replacement credential information, and obtain a cryptographic check result, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the original check mode is replaced by an update check mode.
  • the terminal may obtain the saved replacement credential information generated for the update check mode, and encrypt the local check result by using the replacement credential information to obtain the encryption check result.
  • a different encryption method may be used. The following is a detailed description of the key and the random string in the embodiment shown in FIG. 3 and FIG. 4, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 203 Send the cryptographic check result, the local check result, and the user information of the terminal user to the server, so that the server determines the local check result when the cryptographic check result is verified by the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information. Trustworthy.
  • both the terminal and the server save the replacement credential information generated for the update verification mode, so when the update verification mode is used for verification,
  • the local verification result is encrypted by replacing the credential information
  • the corresponding server can verify the encrypted encryption verification result transmitted by the terminal by replacing the credential information, and determine that the local verification result is credible after the verification is passed.
  • the embodiment of the present application since the malicious third party cannot obtain the replacement credential information, even if the local verification result is obtained, the security check cannot be completed. Therefore, the embodiment can improve the reliability of the security check and ensure the access security of the network application. Sex.
  • 2B is a flowchart of another embodiment of the security verification method of the present application, which is described from the server side that implements security verification:
  • Step 211 Receive the cryptographic check result sent by the terminal, the local check result, and the end user's User Info.
  • the terminal may obtain the first original verification credential information of the original verification mode, generate replacement credential information for the update verification manner, and The first original verification credential information, the replacement credential information, and the end user's user information are transmitted to the server; after receiving the first original verification credential information, the replacement credential information, and the end user's user information, the server may search for the user information.
  • the server may search for the user information.
  • the server may compare the second original verification voucher information with the first original verification voucher information, the correspondence between the replacement voucher information and the user information may be saved.
  • the terminal When the terminal user performs security check, the terminal will use the local check result obtained by the update check mode, the encrypted check result generated by encrypting the local check result according to the saved replacement credential information, and the user information of the terminal user. To the server.
  • Step 212 Obtain replacement credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the server may search for the correspondence between the saved replacement credential information and the user information, and obtain the corresponding corresponding to the received user information. Replacement credential information.
  • Step 213 Verify the cryptographic verification result by using the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification passes, determine that the local verification result is credible.
  • the server when the server verifies the confidentiality verification result by replacing the credential information, different verification manners may be adopted according to different types of the replacement credential information, and the embodiments shown in FIG. 3 and FIG.
  • the key and the random string are taken as an example for detailed description, and details are not described herein again.
  • the server verifies the cryptographic check result, it can determine that the local check result sent by the terminal is a trusted check result.
  • both the terminal and the server save the replacement credential information generated for the update verification mode, so when the update verification mode is used for verification,
  • the local verification result is encrypted by replacing the credential information
  • the corresponding server can verify the encrypted encryption verification result transmitted by the terminal by replacing the credential information, and determine that the local verification result is credible after the verification is passed.
  • FIG. 3 it is a flowchart of another embodiment of the security verification method of the present application.
  • the embodiment describes the security check by using the interaction between the terminal and the server as an example, the replacement credential information is a public key and a private key. the process of:
  • Step 301 When the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the terminal obtains the first original verification credential information of the original verification mode.
  • the method of performing security check on the server side may be referred to as an original check mode, and the original check mode is usually verified by the server through the check password saved when the terminal user registers;
  • the method of the security check is called the update check mode, and the update check mode may include the fingerprint check mode, the gesture check mode, and the face gesture check mode.
  • the terminal may obtain the first original verification credential information in the original verification mode, where the first original verification voucher information may be when the terminal user is registering.
  • Set the verification password When the original verification mode is used for security verification, the terminal user inputs the user name and the verification password set in the registration on the security verification interface of the terminal, and the terminal can carry the user name and the verification password in the security verification request, and The security verification request is sent to the server, and the server searches for the verification password corresponding to the user name in the saved user registration information. If the verification password is the same as the verification password sent by the terminal, the terminal user can be confirmed to pass. Security check so that the business operations performed by the end user can be released.
  • Step 302 The terminal generates a public key and a private key for updating the verification mode.
  • the terminal may generate a key as the replacement credential information for the update verification mode, including the public key and the private key, and the generated key may be a prior art.
  • a key as the replacement credential information for the update verification mode, including the public key and the private key, and the generated key may be a prior art.
  • Various key generation algorithms in the description are not described herein.
  • Step 303 The terminal saves the private key to a trusted storage area associated with the terminal user.
  • the trusted storage area may include a TEE module or an SE module. After the terminal generates the public key and the private key, the private key may be saved to the trusted storage area.
  • Step 304 The terminal transmits the first original verification credential information, the public key, and the user information of the end user to the server.
  • the user information may be the user name of the terminal user, for example, the user name set when the terminal user is registered, and the user information may further include the terminal identifier of the terminal, for example, the terminal MAC (Media Access Control, media access control layer) An address or the like by which the end user can be uniquely identified.
  • the terminal transmits the obtained first original verification credential information, the generated public key, and the user information of the end user to the server, so that the server verifies the first original verification credential information.
  • Step 305 The server searches for second original verification credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the server For all end users registered at the server, the server stores the correspondence between the user information of the terminal users and the verification password, and the verification password is the verification voucher information.
  • the server may search for the correspondence between the user information and the verification password, and obtain the corresponding information corresponding to the received user information.
  • the check password which is referred to as the second original check credential information in this embodiment.
  • Step 306 The server compares whether the first original verification credential information and the second original verification credential information are consistent.
  • the server compares whether the received first original verification credential information and the found second original verification credential information are consistent, that is, whether the verification password of the terminal user saved by the server and the verification password transmitted by the terminal are compared. The same is to determine whether the object currently being replaced by the security check mode is the end user himself.
  • Step 307 When the first original verification credential information is consistent with the second original verification credential information, the server saves the correspondence between the public key and the user information.
  • the server determines that the first original verification credential information is consistent with the second original verification credential information according to the comparison result, it may be determined that the object currently replaced by the security verification mode is the end user himself, and the server may save the received public key. Correspondence with user information.
  • Step 308 When the terminal user performs security verification, the terminal performs local verification by updating the verification mode to obtain a local verification result.
  • the terminal can perform local check by updating the check mode to obtain the local check result.
  • the server may send the check prompt information to the terminal, and the terminal obtains the local check result in real time according to the check prompt information.
  • the update check mode is the gesture check mode. If the server returns a gesture verification prompt message to the terminal as “2”, the terminal user presents two fingers according to the gesture verification prompt information, and after the terminal recognizes the two fingers by using image recognition processing technology, the recognition result “2” "as a result of local verification.
  • Step 309 The terminal digitally signs the local verification result according to the private key saved in the trusted storage area to obtain signature information.
  • the terminal may obtain the saved private key from the trusted storage area, and use the private key to digitally sign the local verification result.
  • the digital signature technology is an encryption technology that encrypts the digest information with the sender's private key and transmits it to the recipient along with the original text.
  • the receiver can decrypt the encrypted digest information with the sender's public key, and then use HASH (
  • the hash function generates a summary information for the received original text, which is compared with the decrypted summary information. If they are the same, the received information is not modified, so the digital signature can verify the integrity of the information.
  • For the specific process of digitally signing the local verification result in this embodiment refer to the implementation process of the existing digital signature technology, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 310 The terminal sends the signature information, the local verification result, and the user information of the terminal user to the server.
  • Step 311 The server obtains a public key corresponding to the received user information by searching for the saved correspondence.
  • the server when the local verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the server saves the correspondence between the public key and the user information.
  • the server may search for the foregoing correspondence and obtain a public key corresponding to the received user information.
  • Step 312 The server verifies the received signature information by using the found public key. When the verification is passed, it is determined that the received local verification result is trusted.
  • verifying the signature information is a process of decryption.
  • the server can verify the signature information by using the found public key.
  • the specific verification process is consistent with the existing digital signature technology, and will not be described here.
  • the server can determine the received local school.
  • the test result is a credible verification result.
  • the server may determine the accuracy of the verification result.
  • the verification result is accurate, the current user operation of the terminal user may be released.
  • the verification result is inaccurate, the terminal user is prohibited from performing the current business operation.
  • the terminal when the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the terminal saves the private key generated for the update verification mode, and the server saves the public key generated for the update verification mode, so When the verification mode is updated for verification, the terminal can digitally sign the local verification result through the private key, and the corresponding server can verify the signature information transmitted by the terminal through the public key, and determine the local verification result after the verification is passed. Trustworthy. Applying the embodiment of the present application, since the malicious third party cannot obtain the private key and the public key, even if the local verification result is obtained, the security check cannot be completed. Therefore, the embodiment can improve the reliability of the security check and ensure the network application. Access security.
  • FIG. 4 it is a flowchart of another embodiment of the security verification method of the present application.
  • the embodiment describes the security verification process in detail by the interaction between the terminal and the server, taking the replacement credential information as a random string as an example:
  • Step 401 When the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the terminal obtains the first original verification credential information of the original verification mode.
  • step 401 The description of the step 401 is the same as the foregoing step 301, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 402 The terminal generates a random string for updating the verification mode.
  • the terminal may generate a random string as the replacement credential information for the update check mode, which is implemented by the present application.
  • the specific algorithm for generating a random string is not limited.
  • Step 403 The terminal saves the random string to a trusted storage area associated with the terminal user.
  • the trusted storage area may include a TEE module or an SE module, which is generated in the terminal. After the machine string, the random string can be saved to the trusted storage area.
  • Step 404 The terminal transmits the first original verification credential information, the random string, and the user information of the end user to the server.
  • the user information in this embodiment is information that uniquely identifies the terminal user, and may be the user name of the terminal user.
  • Step 405 The server searches for second original verification credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • Step 406 The server compares whether the first original verification credential information and the second original verification credential information are consistent.
  • Step 407 When the first original verification credential information is consistent with the second original verification credential information, the server saves the correspondence between the random string and the user information.
  • the server determines that the first original verification credential information is consistent with the second original verification credential information according to the comparison result, it may be determined that the object currently performing the security verification mode replacement is the end user himself, and the server may save the received random string. Correspondence with user information.
  • Step 408 When the terminal user performs security verification, the terminal performs local verification by updating the verification mode to obtain a local verification result.
  • Step 409 The terminal encrypts the random string and the local check result stored in the trusted storage area by using a message digest algorithm pre-negotiated with the server to obtain a first encrypted data result.
  • the terminal and the server may pre-negotiate a message digest algorithm, which may be specifically a HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code), and the HMAC may use a hash algorithm to use a key sum.
  • a message digest algorithm which may be specifically a HMAC (Hash-based Message Authentication Code)
  • HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication Code
  • a message is input and a message digest is generated as output.
  • the terminal may obtain the saved random string from the trusted storage area, use the random string as a key, and use the local check result as a message, and use the HMAC algorithm to The random string and the local check result are encrypted to generate a first encrypted data knot. fruit.
  • Step 410 The terminal sends the first encrypted data result, the local check result, and the user information of the terminal user to the server.
  • Step 411 The server obtains a random string corresponding to the received user information by searching for the saved correspondence.
  • the server when the local verification mode is replaced by the update verification mode, the server saves the correspondence between the random string and the user information.
  • the server may search for the foregoing correspondence and obtain a random string corresponding to the received user information.
  • Step 412 The server encrypts the found random string and the local check result by using an encryption digest algorithm pre-negotiated with the terminal to obtain a second encrypted data result.
  • the terminal locally encrypts the local check result and the random string by using a message digest algorithm.
  • the server may obtain a message digest algorithm that is pre-negotiated with the terminal, and then receives the received message through the message digest algorithm.
  • the local verification result and the found random string are encrypted to obtain a second encrypted data result.
  • Step 413 The server determines whether the result of the second encrypted data is consistent with the result of the first encrypted data. If they are consistent, the local verification result is determined to be authentic.
  • the server when the server determines that the second encrypted data result is consistent with the first encrypted data result, it may be determined that the local check result is trusted. Further, the server may determine the accuracy of the verification result. When the verification result is accurate, the current user operation of the terminal user may be released. When the verification result is inaccurate, the terminal user is prohibited from performing the current business operation.
  • the terminal and the server save the random string generated for the update verification mode. Therefore, when the verification is performed by using the update verification mode, the terminal can pass the verification.
  • the pre-negotiated message digest algorithm encrypts the random string and the local check result, and the corresponding server can encrypt the local check result transmitted by the random string and the terminal through the same message digest algorithm, and in the two encrypted data.
  • the results are consistent, it is determined that the local verification result is authentic.
  • the present application also provides an embodiment of a security verification device, a terminal, and a server.
  • Embodiments of the security verification apparatus of the present application can be applied to terminals and servers, respectively.
  • the device embodiment may be implemented by software, or may be implemented by hardware or a combination of hardware and software. Taking the software implementation as an example, as a logical means, the processor of the device in which it is located reads the corresponding computer program instructions in the non-volatile memory into the memory. From the hardware level, as shown in FIG. 5, a hardware structure diagram of the device where the security verification device is located, except for the processor, the memory, the network interface, and the non-volatile memory shown in FIG.
  • the device in which the device is located in the embodiment may also include other hardware according to the actual function of the device.
  • the terminal may include a camera, a touch screen, a communication component, etc.
  • the server may include processing the packet. Forwarding chips and so on.
  • FIG. 6 it is a block diagram of an embodiment of a security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • the security verification apparatus may be applied to a terminal, and the apparatus includes: a verification unit 610, an encryption unit 620, and a first sending unit 630.
  • the verification unit 610 is configured to perform local verification by updating the verification mode when the terminal user performs security verification, and obtain a local verification result.
  • the encryption unit 620 is configured to encrypt the local verification result according to the saved replacement credential information, and obtain an encryption verification result, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the original verification mode is replaced by the update verification manner. ;
  • the first sending unit 630 is configured to send the cryptographic check result, the local check result, and user information of the terminal user to a server, so that the server passes the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the server passes the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • FIG. 7 a block diagram of an embodiment of a security verification apparatus of the present application, the security verification apparatus It can be applied to a terminal, and the device includes: an obtaining unit 710, a generating unit 720, a second transmitting unit 730, a saving unit 740, a checking unit 750, an encrypting unit 760, and a first transmitting unit 770.
  • the obtaining unit 710 is configured to obtain first original verification credential information of the original verification mode when the original verification mode is replaced by using the update verification manner;
  • a generating unit 720 configured to generate the replacement credential information for the update verification manner
  • a second sending unit 730 configured to transmit the first original verification credential information, the replacement credential information, and the user information to the server, so that the server finds a second original corresponding to the user information. And verifying the voucher information, and when the second original verification voucher information is consistent with the first original verification voucher information, storing a correspondence between the replacement voucher information and the user information;
  • the saving unit 740 is configured to save the replacement credential information to a trusted storage area associated with the terminal user, where the trusted storage area includes: a TEE module or an SE module;
  • the verification unit 750 is configured to perform local verification by updating the verification mode when the terminal user performs security verification, and obtain a local verification result.
  • the encryption unit 760 is configured to encrypt the local check result according to the saved replacement credential information to obtain a cryptographic check result, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the original check mode is replaced by using the update check mode. ;
  • the first sending unit 770 is configured to send the cryptographic check result, the local check result, and user information of the terminal user to a server, so that the server passes the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the server passes the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the replacement credential information may include: a public key and a private key;
  • the second sending unit 730 may be specifically configured to transmit the public key to the server;
  • the encryption unit 760 may be specifically configured to digitally sign the local verification result according to the saved private key to obtain signature information.
  • the first sending unit 770 may be specifically configured to send the signature information to a server, so that the server verifies the signature information according to a public key corresponding to the user information, Determining that the local verification result is authentic.
  • the replacement credential information may include: a random string
  • the second sending unit 730 may be specifically configured to transmit the random string to the server;
  • the encryption unit 760 may be specifically configured to encrypt the random string and the local check result by using a message digest algorithm pre-negotiated with the server to obtain a first encrypted data result.
  • the first sending unit 770 may be specifically configured to send the first encrypted data result to a server, so that the server obtains a random string corresponding to the user information, and uses the message digest algorithm to Determining the random string corresponding to the user information and the local check result to obtain a second encrypted data result, and determining the local check result when the second encrypted data result is consistent with the first encrypted data result Trustworthy.
  • FIG. 8 it is a block diagram of another embodiment of the security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • the security verification apparatus may be applied to a server, and the apparatus includes: a first receiving unit 810, an obtaining unit 820, and a checking unit 830.
  • the first receiving unit 810 is configured to receive a cryptographic check result sent by the terminal, a local check result, and user information of the terminal user, where the cryptographic check result is that the terminal accesses the local device according to the saved replacement credential information.
  • the result of the verification is a cryptographic check result generated by the encryption, where the replacement credential information is information generated when the terminal replaces the original check mode by using an update check mode, and the local check result is a security check for the end user.
  • the obtaining unit 820 is configured to obtain replacement credential information corresponding to the user information
  • the verification unit 830 is configured to verify the encrypted verification result by using the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification passes, determine that the local verification result is authentic.
  • FIG. 9 it is a block diagram of another embodiment of the security verification apparatus of the present application.
  • the security verification apparatus may be applied to a server, where the apparatus includes: a second receiving unit 910, a searching unit 920, a comparing unit 930, and a saving unit 940.
  • the first receiving unit 950, the obtaining unit 960, and the checking unit 970 may be applied to a server, where the apparatus includes: a second receiving unit 910, a searching unit 920, a comparing unit 930, and a saving unit 940.
  • the first receiving unit 950, the obtaining unit 960, and the checking unit 970 may be applied to a server, where the apparatus includes: a second receiving unit 910, a searching unit 920, a comparing unit 930, and a saving unit 940.
  • the first receiving unit 950, the obtaining unit 960, and the checking unit 970 may be applied to a server, where the apparatus includes: a second receiving unit 910, a searching unit 920,
  • the second receiving unit 910 is configured to replace, by using, the update verification mode by the terminal. Receiving the first original verification credential information, the replacement credential information, and the user information sent by the terminal, where the first original verification credential information is the verification credential information of the original verification mode.
  • the replacement credential information is replacement credential information generated by the terminal for the update verification manner;
  • the searching unit 920 is configured to search for second original verification credential information corresponding to the user information.
  • the comparing unit 930 is configured to compare whether the first original verification credential information and the second original verification credential information are consistent;
  • the saving unit 940 is configured to save a correspondence between the replacement credential information and the user information when the first original verification credential information is consistent with the second original verification credential information;
  • the first receiving unit 950 is configured to receive a cryptographic check result sent by the terminal, a local check result, and user information of the terminal user, where the cryptographic check result is that the terminal performs the local check according to the saved replacement credential information.
  • the cryptographic check result generated by the encryption is performed, and the replacement credential information is information generated when the terminal replaces the original check mode by using an update check mode, where the local check result is used by the terminal user for security check.
  • the obtaining unit 960 is configured to obtain replacement credential information corresponding to the user information
  • the verification unit 970 is configured to verify the encrypted verification result by using the replacement credential information corresponding to the user information, and when the verification passes, determine that the local verification result is authentic.
  • the replacement credential information may include: a public key and a private key;
  • the second receiving unit 910 may be specifically configured to receive the public key sent by the terminal;
  • the first receiving unit 950 may be specifically configured to receive signature information sent by the terminal, where the signature information is signature information obtained by the terminal digitally signing the local verification result according to the saved private key. ;
  • the obtaining unit 960 may be specifically configured to obtain a public key corresponding to the user information by searching for the correspondence relationship;
  • the verification unit 970 may be specifically configured to use a public key pair corresponding to the user information. The signature information is verified.
  • the replacement credential information includes: a random string
  • the second receiving unit 910 may be specifically configured to receive the random string sent by the terminal;
  • the first receiving unit 950 may be specifically configured to receive a first encrypted data result sent by the terminal, where the first encrypted data result is that the terminal compares the random string with a message digest algorithm previously negotiated with a server. Encrypted data result obtained by encrypting the local verification result;
  • the obtaining unit 960 may be specifically configured to obtain a random string corresponding to the user information by searching for the correspondence relationship;
  • the verification unit 970 can include (not shown in FIG. 9):
  • a result encryption subunit configured to encrypt a random string corresponding to the user information and the local check result by using the encryption digest algorithm to obtain a second encrypted data result
  • the result judging subunit is configured to determine whether the second encrypted data result is consistent with the first encrypted data result, and if they are consistent, the verification succeeds.
  • the device embodiment since it basically corresponds to the method embodiment, reference may be made to the partial description of the method embodiment.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, wherein the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, ie may be located A place, or it can be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the modules may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the present application. Those of ordinary skill in the art can understand and implement without any creative effort.
  • both the terminal and the server save the replacement credential information generated for the update verification mode, so when the update verification mode is used for verification,
  • the local verification result is encrypted by replacing the credential information, and the corresponding server can enter the encrypted encryption verification result transmitted by the terminal by replacing the credential information. Verify the line and confirm that the local check result is trusted after the verification is passed.
  • the malicious third party cannot obtain the replacement credential information, and the security check cannot be completed even if the local check result is obtained. Therefore, the embodiment of the present application can improve the reliability of the security check and ensure the access of the network application. safety.

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Abstract

本申请公开了安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器，所述方法包括：在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；根据保存的替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果；将加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使服务器通过与用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对加密校验结果验证通过时，确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得替换凭证信息，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此本申请实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。

Description

安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器 技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器。
背景技术
随着智能终端的发展和网络应用的开发，用户通过终端上安装的各种应用客户端可以对各种网络应用进行访问，在访问过程中，用户往往需要进行身份认证、会员注册、网络交易等，此时应用服务器会对用户身份进行验证。传统的验证方式为应用服务器校验，即用户通过终端向应用服务器发送预设的校验密码，应用服务器验证该校验密码与用户注册时的密码一致时，通过校验。但是上述校验方式中的校验密码容易被恶意第三方通过木马程序窃取，因此现有技术中在校验时，可以采用终端本地校验替代应用服务器校验，即终端基于应用服务器发送的校验提示信息，在终端本地进行基于用户生物特征的指纹校验，或基于动态识别的手势校验等，从而完成对用户的身份校验，并将校验结果发送给服务器。
然而，采用终端本地校验替代应用服务器校验时，当恶意第三方模拟终端与服务器交互，并将伪造的终端本地的校验结果发送给服务器时，服务器由于无法确定作为替代校验方式的终端本地校验方式的可信性，从而导致现有安全校验方式可靠性较差，网络应用的访问安全性不高。
发明内容
本申请提供安全校验方法、装置、终端及服务器，以解决现有技术中安全校验方式可靠性较差的问题。
根据本申请实施例的第一方面，提供一种安全校验方法，所述方法包括：
在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
根据本申请实施例的第二方面，提供另一种安全校验方法，所述方法包括：
接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
根据本申请实施例的第三方面，提供一种安全校验装置，所述装置包括：
校验单元，用于在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
加密单元，用于根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
第一发送单元，用于将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应 的第二替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
根据本申请实施例的第四方面，提供另一种安全校验装置，所述装置包括：
第一接收单元，用于接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
获得单元，用于获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
校验单元，用于通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
根据本申请实施例的第五方面，提供一种终端，包括：
处理器；用于存储所述处理器可执行指令的存储器；
其中，所述处理器被配置为：
在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
根据本申请实施例的第六方面，提供一种服务器，包括：
处理器；用于存储所述处理器可执行指令的存储器；
其中，所述处理器被配置为：
接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
本申请实施例由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器均保存了为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，可以通过替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过替换凭证信息对终端传输的加密后的加密校验结果进行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得替换凭证信息，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此本申请实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
附图说明
图1为本申请实施例的安全校验场景示意图；
图2A为本申请安全校验方法的一个实施例流程图；
图2B为本申请安全校验方法的一个实施例流程图；
图3为本申请安全校验方法的另一个实施例流程图；
图4为本申请安全校验方法的另一个实施例流程图；
图5为本申请安全校验装置所在设备的一种硬件结构图；
图6为本申请安全校验装置的一个实施例框图；
图7为本申请安全校验装置的另一个实施例框图；
图8为本申请安全校验装置的另一个实施例框图；
图9为本申请安全校验装置的另一个实施例框图。
具体实施方式
这里将详细地对示例性实施例进行说明，其示例表示在附图中。下面的描述涉及附图时，除非另有表示，不同附图中的相同数字表示相同或相似的要素。以下示例性实施例中所描述的实施方式并不代表与本申请相一致的所有实施方式。相反，它们仅是与如所附权利要求书中所详述的、本申请的一些方面相一致的装置和方法的例子。
在本申请使用的术语是仅仅出于描述特定实施例的目的，而非旨在限制本申请。在本申请和所附权利要求书中所使用的单数形式的“一种”、“所述”和“该”也旨在包括多数形式，除非上下文清楚地表示其他含义。还应当理解，本文中使用的术语“和/或”是指并包含一个或多个相关联的列出项目的任何或所有可能组合。
应当理解，尽管在本申请可能采用术语第一、第二、第三等来描述各种信息，但这些信息不应限于这些术语。这些术语仅用来将同一类型的信息彼此区分开。例如，在不脱离本申请范围的情况下，第一信息也可以被称为第二信息，类似地，第二信息也可以被称为第一信息。取决于语境，如在此所使用的词语“如果”可以被解释成为“在……时”或“当……时”或“响应于确定”。
在基于互联网通信的场景中，用户可以通过所持终端上安装的各种应用客户端实现对各种网络应用的访问，在访问过程中，用户往往需要进行身份认证、会员注册、网络交易等，为了保证上述访问过程的安全性，需要服务器对用户身份进行安全性校验，现有技术中在进行安全校验时，逐步采用终端本地校验方式替代服务器端校验方式，但是由于替换过程中恶意第三方容易伪造终端本地的校验结果，与服务器进行交互，从而导致安全校验的可靠性较差。参见图1，为本申请实施例实现安全校验的应用场景示意图，其中终端与服务器之间的所有校验过程均基于互联网完成，在采用更新校验方式 替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器均保存了为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，可以通过替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过替换凭证信息对终端传输的加密后的加密校验结果进行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信，以此提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性，下面对本申请实施例进行详细说明。
参见图2A，为本申请安全校验方法的一个实施例的流程图，该实施例从实现安全校验的终端侧进行描述：
步骤201：在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果。
本实施例中，可以将在服务器侧进行安全校验的方式称为原始校验方式，原始校验方式通常由服务器通过终端用户注册时保存的校验密码进行校验；可以将在终端本地进行安全校验的方式称为更新校验方式，更新校验方式可以包括指纹校验方式、手势校验方式、面部姿态校验方式等。
本实施例中在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端可以获得原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息，其中，该第一原始校验凭证信息可以是终端用户在注册时设置的校验密码；终端为更新校验方式生成替换凭证信息，并将该第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和终端用户的用户信息传输至服务器，其中，替换凭证信息可以为密钥或者随机串，用户信息可以为终端用户的用户名，进一步还可以包括终端的终端标识，通过用户信息可以唯一识别该终端用户；同时，终端可以在本地保存生成的替换凭证信息，例如将替换凭证信息保存到TEE(Trusted Execution Environment，可信运行环境)模块或SE(Security Environment，安全环境)模块。服务器在接收到第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和终端用户的用户信息后，可以查找与该用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息，该第二原始校验凭证信息可以是终端用户注册时，由终端向服务器发送的该终端用户设置的校验密码；服务器比较第二原始校验凭证信息与第一原始校验凭证信息一致时，可以保存替 换凭证信息与用户信息之间的对应关系。
在终端用户进行安全校验时，终端可以通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果。在采用更新校验方式进行本地校验时，通常可以由服务器向终端发送校验提示信息，终端根据该校验提示信息实时获得本地校验结果。
步骤202：根据保存的替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，该替换凭证信息为采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息。
本实施例中，终端在得到本地校验结果后，可以获得已经保存的为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，通过该替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果。根据替换凭证信息的类型不同，可以采用不同的加密方式，后续图3和图4示出的实施例中将分别以密钥和随机串为例进行详细描述，在此不再赘述。
步骤203：将加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使服务器通过与该用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对加密校验结果验证通过时，确定本地校验结果可信。
由上述实施例可见，由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器均保存了为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，可以通过替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过替换凭证信息对终端传输的加密后的加密校验结果进行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得替换凭证信息，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此该实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
参见图2B，为本申请安全校验方法的另一个实施例的流程图，该实施例从实现安全校验的服务器侧进行描述：
步骤211：接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的 用户信息。
参见前述步骤201中的描述，在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端可以获得原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息，为更新校验方式生成替换凭证信息，并将该第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和终端用户的用户信息传输至服务器；服务器在接收到第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和终端用户的用户信息后，可以查找与该用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息，服务器比较第二原始校验凭证信息与第一原始校验凭证信息一致时，可以保存替换凭证信息与用户信息之间的对应关系。
在终端用户进行安全校验时，终端将采用更新校验方式获得的本地校验结果、根据保存的替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果、以及终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器。
步骤212：获得与用户信息对应的替换凭证信息。
本实施例中，服务器在接收到加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息后，可以查找保存的替换凭证信息与用户信息之间的对应关系，获得与接收到的用户信息对应的替换凭证信息。
步骤213：通过与用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定本地校验结果可信。
本实施例中，服务器在通过替换凭证信息对较密校验结果进行验证时，根据替换凭证信息的类型不同，可以采用不同的验证方式，后续图3和图4示出的实施例中将分别以密钥和随机串为例进行详细描述，在此不再赘述。当服务器对加密校验结果验证通过时，可以确定终端发送的本地校验结果为可信的校验结果。
由上述实施例可见，由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器均保存了为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，可以通过替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过替换凭证信息对终端传输的加密后的加密校验结果进行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于 恶意第三方无法获得替换凭证信息，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此该实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
参见图3，为本申请安全校验方法的另一个实施例的流程图，该实施例以替换凭证信息是公钥和私钥为例，通过终端与服务器之间的交互详细描述了安全校验的过程：
步骤301：在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端获得原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息。
本实施例中，可以将在服务器侧进行安全校验的方式称为原始校验方式，原始校验方式通常由服务器通过终端用户注册时保存的校验密码进行校验；可以将在终端本地进行安全校验的方式称为更新校验方式，更新校验方式可以包括指纹校验方式、手势校验方式、面部姿态校验方式等。
本实施例中在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端可以获得原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息，其中，该第一原始校验凭证信息可以是终端用户在注册时设置的校验密码。在采用原始校验方式进行安全校验时，终端用户在终端的安全校验界面上输入注册时设置的用户名和校验密码，终端可以在安全校验请求中携带该用户名和校验密码，并将安全校验请求发送至服务器，服务器在保存的用户注册信息中查找与该用户名对应的校验密码，如果查找到的校验密码与终端发送的校验密码相同，则能够确认终端用户通过安全校验，从而可以对终端用户执行的业务操作进行放行。
步骤302：终端为更新校验方式生成公钥和私钥。
本实施例中，在确定采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式后，终端可以为更新校验方式生成作为替换凭证信息的密钥，包括公钥和私钥，生成密钥可以采用现有技术中的各种密钥生成算法，在此不再赘述。
步骤303：终端将私钥保存到与终端用户关联的可信存储区域。
本实施例中可信存储区域可以包括TEE模块或SE模块，在终端生成公钥和私钥后，可以将私钥保存到可信存储区域。
步骤304：终端将第一原始校验凭证信息、公钥和终端用户的用户信息传输至服务器。
本实施例中用户信息可以为终端用户的用户名，例如，终端用户注册时设置的用户名，进一步该用户信息还可以包括终端的终端标识，例如，终端MAC(Media Access Control，介质访问控制层)地址等，通过该用户信息可以唯一识别该终端用户。终端将获得的第一原始校验凭证信息、生成的公钥、以及终端用户的用户信息传输至服务器，以便服务器对第一原始校验凭证信息进行验证。
步骤305：服务器查找与该用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息。
对于所有在服务器注册的终端用户，服务器保存了这些终端用户的用户信息与校验密码的对应关系，该校验密码即为校验凭证信息。本实施例中，当服务器接收到终端传输的第一原始校验凭证信息、公钥、以及终端用户的用户信息，可以查找用户信息与校验密码的对应关系，获得与接收到的用户信息对应的校验密码，该校验密码在本实施例中称为第二原始校验凭证信息。
步骤306：服务器比较第一原始校验凭证信息和第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致。
本实施例中，服务器比较接收到的第一原始校验凭证信息和查找到的第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致，即比较服务器保存的终端用户的校验密码与终端传输的校验密码是否相同，以便确定当前执行安全校验方式替换的对象是否为终端用户本人。
步骤307：当第一原始校验凭证信息与第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，服务器保存公钥与用户信息之间的对应关系。
当服务器根据比较结果确定第一原始校验凭证信息与第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，可以确定当前执行安全校验方式替换的对象为终端用户本人，此时服务器可以保存接收到的公钥与用户信息之间的对应关系。
步骤308：在终端用户进行安全校验时，终端通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果。
在终端用户进行安全校验时，终端可以通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果。在采用更新校验方式进行本地校验时，通常可以由服务器向终端发送校验提示信息，终端根据该校验提示信息实时获得本地校验结果；以更新校验方式是手势校验方式为例，假设服务器向终端返回手势校验提示信息为“2”，则终端用户按照该手势校验提示信息呈现两根手指，终端采用图像识别处理技术识别出该两根手指后，将识别结果“2”作为本地校验结果。
步骤309：终端根据可信存储区域保存的私钥对本地校验结果进行数字签名，获得签名信息。
本实施例中，终端在得到本地校验结果后，可以从可信存储区域中获取保存的私钥，利用该私钥对本地校验结果进行数字签名。数字签名技术是一种加密技术，其可以将摘要信息用发送者的私钥加密，与原文一起传送给接收者，接收者用发送者的公钥能解密被加密的摘要信息，然后用HASH(哈希)函数对收到的原文产生一个摘要信息，与解密的摘要信息对比，如果相同，则说明收到的信息未被修改，因此数字签名能够验证信息的完整性。本实施例对本地校验结果进行数字签名的具体过程可以参见现有数字签名技术的实现过程，在此不再赘述。
步骤310：终端将签名信息、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器。
步骤311：服务器通过查找保存的对应关系获得与接收到的用户信息对应的公钥。
参见前述步骤307，在采用更新校验方式替换本地校验方式时，服务器保存了公钥与用户信息之间的对应关系。本步骤中，服务器在接收到签名信息、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息后，可以查找前述对应关系，获得与接收到的用户信息对应的公钥。
步骤312：服务器通过查找到的公钥对接收到的签名信息进行验证，当验证通过时，确定接收到的本地校验结果可信。
与步骤309中终端本地进行的数字签名过程相对应，对签名信息进行验证是解密的过程。在验证签名信息时，服务器可以通过查找到的公钥对签名信息进行验证，具体验证过程与现有数字签名技术一致，在此不再赘述，在验证通过时，服务器可以确定接收到的本地校验结果为可信的校验结果。
进一步，服务器可以对该校验结果的准确性进行判断，在校验结果准确时，可以对终端用户当前业务操作进行放行，在校验结果不准确时，禁止终端用户执行当前业务操作。
由上述实施例可见，由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端保存了为更新校验方式生成的私钥，而服务器保存了为更新校验方式生成的公钥，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，终端可以通过私钥对本地校验结果进行数字签名，而相应的服务器可以通过公钥对终端传输的签名信息进行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得私钥和公钥，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此该实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
参见图4，为本申请安全校验方法的另一个实施例的流程图，该实施例以替换凭证信息是随机串为例，通过终端与服务器之间的交互详细描述了安全校验的过程：
步骤401：在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端获得原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息。
本步骤401的描述与前述步骤301一致，在此不再赘述。
步骤402：终端为更新校验方式生成随机串。
与图3中生成密钥作为替换凭证信息不同，本实施例中在确定采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式后，终端可以为更新校验方式生成作为替换凭证信息的随机串，本申请实施例对生成随机串的具体算法不进行限制。
步骤403：终端将随机串保存到与终端用户关联的可信存储区域。
本实施例中可信存储区域可以包括TEE模块或SE模块，在终端生成随 机串后，可以将随机串保存到可信存储区域。
步骤404：终端将第一原始校验凭证信息、随机串和终端用户的用户信息传输至服务器。
与步骤304中的描述一致，本实施例中用户信息是唯一识别该终端用户的信息，可以为终端用户的用户名。
步骤405：服务器查找与该用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息。
步骤406：服务器比较第一原始校验凭证信息和第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致。
本实施例中步骤405和步骤406的描述与前述步骤305和步骤306的描述一致，在此不再赘述。
步骤407：当第一原始校验凭证信息与第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，服务器保存随机串与用户信息之间的对应关系。
当服务器根据比较结果确定第一原始校验凭证信息与第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，可以确定当前执行安全校验方式替换的对象为终端用户本人，此时服务器可以保存接收到的随机串与用户信息之间的对应关系。
步骤408：在终端用户进行安全校验时，终端通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果。
本步骤408的描述与前述步骤308的描述一致，在此不再赘述。
步骤409：终端通过与服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法对可信存储区域内保存的随机串和本地校验结果进行加密，获得第一加密数据结果。
本实施例中，终端和服务器可以预先协商消息摘要算法，该消息摘要算法可以具体为HMAC(Hash-based Message Authentication Code，哈希运算消息认证码)，HMAC可以利用哈希算法以一个密钥和一个消息为输入，生成一个消息摘要作为输出。
本实施例中，终端在得到本地校验结果后，可以从可信存储区域中获取保存的随机串，将该随机串作为一个密钥，将本地校验结果作为一个消息，通过HMAC算法对该随机串和本地校验结果进行加密，生成第一加密数据结 果。
步骤410：终端将第一加密数据结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器。
步骤411：服务器通过查找保存的对应关系获得与接收到的用户信息对应的随机串。
参见前述步骤407，在采用更新校验方式替换本地校验方式时，服务器保存了随机串与用户信息之间的对应关系。本步骤中，服务器在接收到第一加密数据结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息后，可以查找前述对应关系，获得与接收到的用户信息对应的随机串。
步骤412：服务器通过与终端预先协商的加密摘要算法对查找到的随机串和本地校验结果进行加密，获得第二加密数据结果。
与步骤409中终端本地通过消息摘要算法对本地校验结果和随机串进行加密的过程相对应，本步骤中服务器可以获得与终端预先协商的消息摘要算法，然后通过该消息摘要算法对接收到的本地校验结果和查找到的随机串进行加密得到第二加密数据结果。
步骤413：服务器判断第二加密数据结果与第一加密数据结果是否一致，如果一致，确定本地校验结果可信。
本实施例中当服务器判断第二加密数据结果与第一加密数据结果一致时，可以确定本地校验结果可信。进一步，服务器可以对该校验结果的准确性进行判断，在校验结果准确时，可以对终端用户当前业务操作进行放行，在校验结果不准确时，禁止终端用户执行当前业务操作。
由上述实施例可见，由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器保存了为更新校验方式生成的随机串，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，终端可以通过预先协商的消息摘要算法对随机串和本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过同样的消息摘要算法对随机串和终端传输的本地校验结果进行加密，并在两个加密后的数据结果一致时确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得随机串，以及 终端与服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此该实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
与本申请安全校验方法的实施例相对应，本申请还提供了安全校验装置、终端及服务器的实施例。
本申请安全校验装置的实施例可以分别应用在终端和服务器上。装置实施例可以通过软件实现，也可以通过硬件或者软硬件结合的方式实现。以软件实现为例，作为一个逻辑意义上的装置，是通过其所在设备的处理器将非易失性存储器中对应的计算机程序指令读取到内存中运行形成的。从硬件层面而言，如图5所示，为本申请安全校验装置所在设备的一种硬件结构图，除了图5所示的处理器、内存、网络接口、以及非易失性存储器之外，实施例中装置所在的设备通常根据该设备的实际功能，还可以包括其他硬件，如对于终端来说，可能包括摄像头、触摸屏子、通信组件等，对于服务器来说，可能包括负责处理报文的转发芯片等等。
参见图6，为本申请安全校验装置的一个实施例框图，该安全校验装置可以应用在终端上，该装置包括：校验单元610、加密单元620和第一发送单元630。
其中，校验单元610，用于在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
加密单元620，用于根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
第一发送单元630，用于将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
参见图7，为本申请安全校验装置的一个实施例框图，该安全校验装置 可以应用在终端上，该装置包括：获得单元710、生成单元720、第二发送单元730、保存单元740、校验单元750、加密单元760和第一发送单元770。
其中，获得单元710，用于在采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，获得所述原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息；
生成单元720，用于为所述更新校验方式生成所述替换凭证信息；
第二发送单元730，用于将所述第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息传输至所述服务器，以使所述服务器查找到与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息，且所述第二原始校验凭证信息与所述第一原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息的对应关系；
保存单元740，用于将所述替换凭证信息保存到与所述终端用户关联的可信存储区域；其中，所述可信存储区域包括：TEE模块或SE模块；
校验单元750，用于在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
加密单元760，用于根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
第一发送单元770，用于将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
在一个可选的实现方式中：
所述替换凭证信息可以包括：公钥和私钥；
所述第二发送单元730，可以具体用于将所述公钥传输至所述服务器；
所述加密单元760，可以具体用于根据保存的所述私钥对所述本地校验结果进行数字签名，获得签名信息；
所述第一发送单元770，可以具体用于将所述签名信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器根据与所述用户信息对应的公钥对所述签名信息验证通过后， 确定所述本地校验结果可信。
在另一个可选的实现方式中：
所述替换凭证信息可以包括：随机串；
所述第二发送单元730，可以具体用于将所述随机串传输至所述服务器；
所述加密单元760，可以具体用于通过与所述服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法对所述随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第一加密数据结果；
所述第一发送单元770，可以具体用于将所述第一加密数据结果发送至服务器，以使所述服务器获得与所述用户信息对应的随机串，并通过所述消息摘要算法对与所述用户信息对应的随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第二加密数据结果，且所述第二加密数据结果与所述第一加密数据结果一致时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
参见图8，为本申请安全校验装置的另一个实施例框图，该安全校验装置可以应用在服务器上，该装置包括：第一接收单元810、获得单元820和校验单元830。
其中，第一接收单元810，用于接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
获得单元820，用于获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
校验单元830，用于通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
参见图9，为本申请安全校验装置的另一个实施例框图，该安全校验装置可以应用在服务器上，该装置包括：第二接收单元910、查找单元920、比较单元930、保存单元940、第一接收单元950、获得单元960和校验单元970。
其中，第二接收单元910，用于在所述终端采用所述更新校验方式替换 原始校验方式时，接收所述终端发送的第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息，所述第一原始校验凭证信息为所述原始校验方式的校验凭证信息，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端为所述更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息；
查找单元920，用于查找与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息；
比较单元930，用于比较所述第一原始校验凭证信息和所述第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致；
保存单元940，用于当所述第一原始校验凭证信息与所述第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息之间的对应关系；
第一接收单元950，用于接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
获得单元960，用于获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
校验单元970，用于通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
在一个可选的实现方式中：
所述替换凭证信息可以包括：公钥和私钥；
所述第二接收单元910，可以具体用于接收所述终端发送的所述公钥；
所述第一接收单元950，可以具体用于接收所述终端发送的签名信息，所述签名信息为所述终端根据保存的所述私钥对所述本地校验结果进行数字签名获得的签名信息；
所述获得单元960，可以具体用于通过查找所述对应关系获得与所述用户信息对应的公钥；
所述校验单元970，可以具体用于通过与所述用户信息对应的公钥对所 述签名信息进行验证。
在另一个可选的实现方式中：
所述替换凭证信息包括：随机串；
所述第二接收单元910，可以具体用于接收所述终端发送的所述随机串；
所述第一接收单元950，可以具体用于接收所述终端发送的第一加密数据结果，所述第一加密数据结果为所述终端通过与服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法对所述随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密获得的加密数据结果；
所述获得单元960，可以具体用于通过查找所述对应关系获得与所述用户信息对应的随机串；
所述校验单元970可以包括(图9中未示出)：
结果加密子单元，用于通过所述加密摘要算法对与所述用户信息对应的随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第二加密数据结果；
结果判断子单元，用于判断所述第二加密数据结果与所述第一加密数据结果是否一致，如果一致，则验证通过。
上述装置中各个单元的功能和作用的实现过程具体详见上述方法中对应步骤的实现过程，在此不再赘述。
对于装置实施例而言，由于其基本对应于方法实施例，所以相关之处参见方法实施例的部分说明即可。以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，其中所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部模块来实现本申请方案的目的。本领域普通技术人员在不付出创造性劳动的情况下，即可以理解并实施。
由上述实施例可见，由于在采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，终端和服务器均保存了为更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息，因此在采用更新校验方式进行校验时，可以通过替换凭证信息对本地校验结果进行加密，而相应的服务器可以通过替换凭证信息对终端传输的加密后的加密校验结果进 行验证，并在验证通过后确定本地校验结果可信。应用本申请实施例，由于恶意第三方无法获得替换凭证信息，即使其获取了本地校验结果也无法完成安全校验，因此本申请实施例可以提高安全校验的可靠性，保证网络应用的访问安全性。
本领域技术人员在考虑说明书及实践这里公开的发明后，将容易想到本申请的其它实施方案。本申请旨在涵盖本申请的任何变型、用途或者适应性变化，这些变型、用途或者适应性变化遵循本申请的一般性原理并包括本申请未公开的本技术领域中的公知常识或惯用技术手段。说明书和实施例仅被视为示例性的，本申请的真正范围和精神由下面的权利要求指出。
应当理解的是，本申请并不局限于上面已经描述并在附图中示出的精确结构，并且可以在不脱离其范围进行各种修改和改变。本申请的范围仅由所附的权利要求来限制。

Claims (16)

  1. 一种安全校验方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
    根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
    将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，获得所述原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息；
    为所述更新校验方式生成所述替换凭证信息；
    将所述第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息传输至所述服务器，以使所述服务器查找到与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息，且所述第二原始校验凭证信息与所述第一原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息的对应关系。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    将所述替换凭证信息保存到与所述终端用户关联的可信存储区域；其中，所述可信存储区域包括：可信运行环境TEE模块或安全环境SE模块。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述替换凭证信息包括：公钥和私钥；
    所述将替换凭证信息传输至所述服务器，具体为：将所述公钥传输至所述服务器；
    所述根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密 校验结果，具体为：根据保存的所述私钥对所述本地校验结果进行数字签名，获得签名信息；
    所述将所述加密校验结果发送至服务器，具体为：将所述签名信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器根据与所述用户信息对应的公钥对所述签名信息验证通过后，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  5. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述替换凭证信息包括：随机串；
    所述将所述替换凭证信息传输至所述服务器，具体为：将所述随机串传输至所述服务器；
    所述根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，具体为：通过与所述服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法对所述随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第一加密数据结果；
    所述将所述加密校验结果发送至服务器，具体为：将所述第一加密数据结果发送至服务器，以使所述服务器获得与所述用户信息对应的随机串，并通过所述消息摘要算法对与所述用户信息对应的随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第二加密数据结果，且所述第二加密数据结果与所述第一加密数据结果一致时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  6. 一种安全校验方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
    获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
    通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在所述终端采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，接收所述终端发送的第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息，所述第一原始校验凭证信息为所述原始校验方式的校验凭证信息，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端为所述更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息；
    查找与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息；
    比较所述第一原始校验凭证信息和所述第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致；
    当所述第一原始校验凭证信息与所述第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息之间的对应关系。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，所述替换凭证信息包括：公钥和私钥；
    所述接收所述终端发送的替换凭证信息，具体为：接收所述终端发送的所述公钥；
    所述接收终端发送的加密校验结果，具体为：接收所述终端发送的签名信息，所述签名信息为所述终端根据保存的所述私钥对所述本地校验结果进行数字签名获得的签名信息；
    所述获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息，具体为：通过查找所述对应关系获得与所述用户信息对应的公钥；
    所述通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，具体为：通过与所述用户信息对应的公钥对所述签名信息进行验证。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，所述替换凭证信息包括：随机串；
    所述接收所述终端发送的替换凭证信息，具体为：接收所述终端发送的所述随机串；
    所述接收终端发送的加密校验结果，具体为：接收所述终端发送的第一加密数据结果，所述第一加密数据结果为所述终端通过与服务器预先协商的消息摘要算法对所述随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密获得的加密数据结 果；
    所述获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息，具体为：通过查找所述对应关系获得与所述用户信息对应的随机串；
    所述通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，包括：
    通过所述加密摘要算法对与所述用户信息对应的随机串和所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得第二加密数据结果；
    判断所述第二加密数据结果与所述第一加密数据结果是否一致，如果一致，则验证通过。
  10. 一种安全校验装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    校验单元，用于在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本地校验结果；
    加密单元，用于根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
    第一发送单元，用于将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的第二替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    获得单元，用于在采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，获得所述原始校验方式的第一原始校验凭证信息；
    生成单元，用于为所述更新校验方式生成所述替换凭证信息；
    第二发送单元，用于将所述第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息传输至所述服务器，以使所述服务器查找到与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息，且所述第二原始校验凭证信息与所述第一原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息的对应关系。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    保存单元，用于将所述替换凭证信息保存到与所述终端用户关联的可信存储区域；其中，所述可信存储区域包括：TEE模块或SE模块。
  13. 一种安全校验装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    第一接收单元，用于接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
    获得单元，用于获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
    校验单元，用于通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置还包括：
    第二接收单元，用于在所述终端采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时，接收所述终端发送的第一原始校验凭证信息、替换凭证信息和所述用户信息，所述第一原始校验凭证信息为所述原始校验方式的校验凭证信息，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端为所述更新校验方式生成的替换凭证信息；
    查找单元，用于查找与所述用户信息对应的第二原始校验凭证信息；
    比较单元，用于比较所述第一原始校验凭证信息和所述第二原始校验凭证信息是否一致；
    保存单元，用于当所述第一原始校验凭证信息与所述第二原始校验凭证信息一致时，保存所述替换凭证信息与所述用户信息之间的对应关系。
  15. 一种终端，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器；用于存储所述处理器可执行指令的存储器；
    其中，所述处理器被配置为：
    在终端用户进行安全校验时，通过更新校验方式进行本地校验，获得本 地校验结果；
    根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密，获得加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为采用所述更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息；
    将所述加密校验结果、所述本地校验结果和所述终端用户的用户信息发送至服务器，以使所述服务器通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
  16. 一种服务器，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器；用于存储所述处理器可执行指令的存储器；
    其中，所述处理器被配置为：
    接收终端发送的加密校验结果、本地校验结果和终端用户的用户信息，所述加密校验结果为所述终端根据保存的替换凭证信息对所述本地校验结果进行加密生成的加密校验结果，所述替换凭证信息为所述终端采用更新校验方式替换原始校验方式时生成的信息，所述本地校验结果为所述终端用户进行安全校验时，由所述终端通过所述更新校验方式进行本地校验获得的校验结果；
    获得与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息；
    通过与所述用户信息对应的替换凭证信息对所述加密校验结果进行验证，当验证通过时，确定所述本地校验结果可信。
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