WO2015118805A1 - Terminal de positionnement - Google Patents

Terminal de positionnement Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015118805A1
WO2015118805A1 PCT/JP2015/000180 JP2015000180W WO2015118805A1 WO 2015118805 A1 WO2015118805 A1 WO 2015118805A1 JP 2015000180 W JP2015000180 W JP 2015000180W WO 2015118805 A1 WO2015118805 A1 WO 2015118805A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
positioning
authentication
satellite
signal quality
signal
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PCT/JP2015/000180
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English (en)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
正剛 隈部
貴久 山城
Original Assignee
株式会社デンソー
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 株式会社デンソー filed Critical 株式会社デンソー
Priority to DE112015000708.3T priority Critical patent/DE112015000708B4/de
Priority to CN201580007477.5A priority patent/CN105980884B/zh
Publication of WO2015118805A1 publication Critical patent/WO2015118805A1/fr

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/42—Determining position
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G01—MEASURING; TESTING
    • G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
    • G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
    • G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
    • G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
    • G01S19/396—Determining accuracy or reliability of position or pseudorange measurements

Definitions

  • This disclosure relates to a positioning terminal that measures the position of its own terminal based on a signal received from an artificial satellite used in a satellite positioning system.
  • positioning terminals that receive a signal from an artificial satellite used in a satellite positioning system and determine the position of the terminal itself are known.
  • Patent Document 1 proposes a technique for authenticating whether a signal received by the terminal itself is a legitimate signal from an artificial satellite used in the satellite positioning system.
  • the positioning terminal accesses the authentication center database, and authenticates the target artificial satellite based on the satellite number and the satellite time included in the signal received by the terminal from the artificial satellite. Get the data used for. Then, the positioning terminal uses the data acquired from the authentication center to authenticate whether the signal received by the terminal itself is a regular signal from the artificial satellite used in the satellite positioning system. Note that the authentication process here involves a complicated calculation process.
  • the positioning terminal determines whether the transmission source is an artificial satellite used in the satellite positioning system for each of the transmission sources of the signal received by the terminal itself.
  • a configuration for determining is also conceivable (an application example). For example, when the signal received by the terminal is a regular signal from an artificial satellite used in the satellite positioning system, it is determined that the transmission source of the signal is an artificial satellite used in the satellite positioning system.
  • the signal from the transmission source determined to be the artificial satellite that is, the signal from the authenticated transmission source
  • the signal from the authenticated transmission source is not a signal generated by the simulator, but a signal from the artificial satellite.
  • the positioning result using the signal from the authenticated transmission source is not falsified by the malicious person in the position indicated by the positioning result than the positioning result using the signal from the unauthenticated transmission source. It can be said that it is highly reliable from the viewpoint of.
  • the positioning terminal in the application example needs to authenticate each of a plurality of artificial satellites that are the transmission source of the signal received by the own terminal, and for all the transmission sources of the signal received by the own terminal. In order to perform this authentication process, more time is required. Therefore, even if it is a legitimate artificial satellite, there may be an unauthenticated state.
  • the quality of the signal from the authenticated sender is not always good.
  • a signal from an authenticated transmission source includes a relatively large error due to multipath, ionosphere, or the like, the accuracy of a positioning result using the signal is deteriorated.
  • the satellites used in the satellite positioning system are included in the sources that have not been authenticated, and the signals from the satellites that have not been authenticated are already certified.
  • the signal from the transmission source is not affected by multipath or ionosphere. In other words, the positioning accuracy itself may be improved by using a signal from an unauthenticated artificial satellite for positioning.
  • the positioning accuracy is higher. In other words, there is a demand for more accurate positioning while ensuring the normality reliability for the positioning result.
  • An object of the present disclosure is to provide a positioning terminal that can perform positioning with higher accuracy while ensuring normality reliability with respect to a positioning result.
  • the positioning terminal is provided to include the following components.
  • a satellite receiver that receives signals from multiple artificial satellites used in satellite positioning systems.
  • An authentication data acquisition unit that acquires, from an authentication center, authentication data necessary for authenticating whether or not the transmission source of the signal received by the satellite receiver is an artificial satellite.
  • a transmission source authentication unit that authenticates whether or not the transmission source of the signal received by the satellite receiver is an artificial satellite, using the authentication data acquired by the authentication data acquisition unit.
  • An authentication priority positioning unit that preferentially uses a signal received from a transmission source authenticated by a transmission source authentication unit among signals received from a plurality of transmission sources by a satellite receiver.
  • a signal quality evaluation unit that evaluates, for each transmission source, signal quality that indicates a small possibility of giving an error to a positioning result when positioning is performed using a signal transmitted by the transmission source.
  • a signal quality priority positioning unit that preferentially uses a signal received from a transmission source with better signal quality among signals received from a plurality of transmission sources by a satellite receiver.
  • Positioning result selection unit that uses the position indicated by either the signal quality priority positioning result, which is the result of positioning by the signal quality priority positioning unit, or the authentication priority positioning result, which is the result of positioning by the authentication priority positioning unit, as the current position .
  • the positioning result selection unit may perform signal quality priority positioning when the signal quality priority positioning result satisfies an allowable condition for estimating that the signal source used by the signal quality priority positioning unit is a satellite.
  • the position indicated by the result is adopted as the current position.
  • the position indicated by the authentication priority positioning result is adopted as the current position.
  • the permissible condition is for determining whether or not the transmission source of the signal used for signal quality priority positioning can be estimated as an artificial satellite.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result is a positioning result using a signal transmitted from a transmission source estimated to be an artificial satellite.
  • the signal quality priority positioning unit is a result of positioning using a signal from a transmission source having a better signal quality among the transmission sources of the signal received by the satellite receiver. Therefore, it can be said that the signal quality priority positioning result that satisfies the allowable condition represents the current position of the positioning terminal with higher accuracy than the authentication priority positioning result.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result that satisfies the permissible condition can be made more accurate while ensuring the normality reliability for the positioning result.
  • FIG. 1 shows an example of a schematic structure of the authentication type positioning system in embodiment Block diagram showing an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication center Block diagram showing an example of schematic configuration of in-vehicle device
  • FIG. 1 shows an example of the data which manages the authentication state and signal quality data for every GPS satellite 2 which has been captured
  • the flowchart figure which shows an example of the flow of the authentication related process in vehicle equipment
  • the flowchart figure which shows an example of the flow of the positioning related process in vehicle equipment
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a schematic configuration of an authentication type positioning system 1 in the present embodiment.
  • the authentication positioning system 1 includes a monitor station 110, an authentication center 120, a master control station 130, an in-vehicle device (In-Vehicle Apparatus) 200, and a service center 300.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 is also referred to as a positioning terminal.
  • a portable positioning terminal brought into the vehicle may be used instead of the in-vehicle device 200.
  • the monitor station 110 receives GPS radio waves (also referred to as signals) transmitted from GPS satellites 2a to 2f included in a GPS (Global Positioning System) which is one of satellite positioning systems. That is, the GPS satellites 2a to 2f are GPS satellites captured by the monitor station among many GPS satellites included in the GPS. Hereinafter, the GPS satellites 2a to 2f are expressed as GPS satellites 2 when not distinguished from each other.
  • GPS Global Positioning System
  • the GPS radio wave transmitted by the GPS satellite 2 includes a navigation message M.
  • the navigation message M transmitted from each GPS satellite 2 includes a satellite clock correction parameter, detailed orbit data of the GPS satellite 2 (ie, ephemeris data), ionospheric correction parameters, and rough orbit data of all GPS satellites (ie, almanac data). Is included.
  • the GPS radio wave includes data (referred to as GPS time) indicating the transmission time at the GPS satellite 2. Since the ephemeridas data of each GPS satellite 2 is different, naturally, each data included in the navigation message M transmitted by each of the GPS satellites 2a to 2f is different.
  • the monitor station 110 demodulates the received GPS radio wave and extracts the navigation message M. Then, the monitor station 110 sequentially sends the extracted navigation message M to the authentication center 120.
  • the authentication center 120 generates a RAND (reference authentication navigation data: Reference Authentication Navigation Data) message from the navigation message M. Then, parity data corresponding to the navigation message M and the RAND message is created from the created RAND message and the H matrix that is the encryption key.
  • RAND reference authentication navigation data: Reference Authentication Navigation Data
  • the authentication center 120 is configured to be able to communicate with the monitor station 110, the master control station 130, the in-vehicle device 200, and the like. For example, the authentication center 120 sends a signal including the created parity data to the master control station 130. A detailed description of the authentication center 120 will be given later with reference to FIG.
  • the master control station 130 transmits the parity data received from the authentication center 120 to the quasi-zenith satellite (hereinafter, QZS satellite) 3.
  • the QZS satellite 3 broadcasts a navigation message N including parity data toward the ground.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 is a navigation message authentication (NMA: navigation message authentication) type in-vehicle device.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 communicates with the authentication center 120 and performs authentication processing that the navigation message M received from the GPS satellite 2 is a regular navigation message. Then, the GPS satellite 2 that is the transmission source of the navigation message M determined to be a regular navigation message is determined to be a regular GPS satellite 2.
  • the GPS satellite 2 determined to be a regular GPS satellite 2 is also expressed as an authenticated GPS satellite 2.
  • a state where the authentication is not completed is expressed as authentication NG or authentication incomplete.
  • the authentication process is sequentially performed on the transmission sources of all the received navigation messages M. However, since the authentication process takes time, until the authentication of all GPS satellites 2 used for positioning is completed. A situation occurs in which only some GPS satellites 2 are authenticated. Further, even if the GPS satellite 2 is transmitting the normal navigation message M, the state determined as authentication NG continues until it is determined as authentication OK as a result of the authentication process. Detailed description of the authentication process will be given later with reference to FIG.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 measures the current position of the own device using GPS radio waves received from a plurality of GPS satellites 2.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 is configured to use GPS radio waves received from at least four GPS satellites 2 for positioning of the current position.
  • the number of GPS satellites 2 necessary for positioning is referred to as the number of positioning required satellites.
  • the number of positioning required satellites is four, but is not limited thereto.
  • the number of positioning required satellites may be three.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 calculates the ratio of the authenticated GPS satellites 2 (hereinafter referred to as “authentication level”) among the GPS satellites 2 used for positioning. Then, the calculated authentication level is assigned to position data (also referred to as position information) indicating the measured current position, and wirelessly transmitted to the outside. A detailed description of the in-vehicle device 200 will be given later with reference to FIG.
  • the service center 300 is a center that is provided outside the vehicle and is managed by a service provider that provides a service using position data transmitted from the in-vehicle device 200. For example, as a service using position data, when it is determined that a vehicle equipped with the vehicle-mounted device 200 is parked in a toll parking area, or when it is determined that the vehicle has traveled on a toll road, the user of the vehicle A service that automatically charges the user is assumed.
  • the service center 300 determines whether or not to use the position data for the process using the position data according to the authentication level given to the position data transmitted from the in-vehicle device 200. For example, if the authentication level is equal to or higher than a predetermined threshold, the location data is used to provide a service. On the other hand, if the authentication level is lower than the predetermined threshold, the location data is used. Nor does it provide that service.
  • An example of a charging process for charging for parking in a roadside toll parking area or traveling on a toll road is as follows. Position data for which the authentication level is less than a predetermined threshold and is determined not to be charged is not automatically charged even if it falls within the chargeable area. On the other hand, if the authentication level is determined to be a certain threshold and the location data determined to be subject to accounting is applicable to the area subject to accounting, the location data is automatically charged. .
  • Automatic billing refers to a process of withdrawing parking fees, toll road tolls, etc. from a bank account or credit card registered in advance.
  • the authentication center 120 includes a control circuit 122, a data storage unit 124, and a communication unit 126.
  • the control circuit 122 is a computer including a CPU, a ROM, a RAM, and the like, and controls the data storage unit 124 and the communication unit 126. In addition, various functions are realized by the CPU executing programs stored in the ROM while using the temporary storage function of the RAM. More specifically, the control circuit 122 includes a RAND message generator 1221, a SEED value generator 1222, an H matrix generator 1223, a parity generator 1224, and a signal processor 1225 as functional blocks. The functions of these units 1221 to 1225 may be the same as the functions disclosed in Patent Document 1.
  • the RAND message generator 1221 creates a RAND message from the navigation message M acquired from the monitor station 110.
  • TOW Time Of Week
  • TOC Time Of Week
  • AS Flag which is an anti-spoof flag
  • PRN Pseudo Random Noise
  • the RAND message generator 1221 generates a RAND message every 6 seconds for each of the GPS satellites 2 from which the monitor station 110 receives the navigation message M.
  • the SEED value generation unit 1222 generates a SEED value by generating a random number with the PC clock as an input.
  • the H matrix generation unit 1223 uses the SEED value generated by the SEED value generation unit 1222 to generate an H matrix for generating a parity bit that is uniquely determined from input data.
  • the H matrix is a matrix, and the number of rows and columns are values corresponding to the number of bits of input data and the number of parity bits.
  • a known hash function may be used as the H matrix.
  • a parity check matrix for performing LDPC (Low Density Parity Check) encoding may be used.
  • the parity generation unit 1224 calculates parity data based on the RAND message generated by the RAND message generation unit 1221 and the H matrix calculated by the H matrix generation unit 1223. That is, the parity data is calculated by multiplying the RAND message by this H matrix.
  • the signal processing unit 1225 associates the parity data generated by the parity generation unit 1224 with the RAND message used for the calculation, and inserts it into the navigation message N transmitted from the QZS satellite 3. Then, the inserted navigation message N is sent to the master control station 130.
  • the navigation message N transmitted by the QZS satellite 3 includes parity data and RAND message corresponding to each GPS satellite 2. That is, the signal processing unit 1225 inserts parity data and RAND message corresponding to each GPS satellite 2 into the navigation message N.
  • the signal processing unit 1225 associates the parity data calculated by the parity generation unit 1224, the RAND message used for calculating the parity data, the H matrix, and the SEED value used for calculating the H matrix in accordance with the signal insertion. And stored in the data storage unit 124.
  • the signal processing unit 1225 inserts the RAND message and parity data into the navigation message N that causes the QZS satellite 3 to transmit each time the RAND message generation unit 1221 generates the RAND message. Therefore, the RAND message generation unit 1221, the SEED value generation unit 1222, the H matrix generation unit 1223, and the parity generation unit 1224 also execute processing each time the RAND message generation unit 1221 generates a RAND message.
  • the H matrix selection unit 1226 selects the H corresponding to the received PRNID and TOW from the H matrix stored in the data storage unit 124. Select a matrix. Then, the selected H matrix is returned to the in-vehicle device 200.
  • the transmission / reception of the H matrix between the authentication center 120 and the in-vehicle device 200 is performed by encrypted secure communication.
  • a public key cryptosystem may be used, and the authentication center 120 may transmit the H matrix encrypted using the public key distributed from the in-vehicle device 200 to the in-vehicle device 200.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 decrypts the H matrix encrypted using the secret key corresponding to the public key used by the authentication center 120.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 includes a communication unit 210, a control circuit 220, and a satellite receiver 230.
  • the communication unit 210 includes a reception unit 211 and a transmission unit 212.
  • the communication unit 210 has a narrow area communication function and a wide area communication function.
  • the narrow area communication function has a communication distance of several hundred meters, for example.
  • the wide-area communication function has a communication distance of several kilometers, for example, and can communicate with other communication devices in the communication area of the public communication network by communicating with the base station of the public communication network. Communication with the authentication center 120 and the service center 300 is performed by the wide area communication function. Further, when communicating with the authentication center 120 or the service center 300 via a roadside device (not shown), a narrow area communication function may be used.
  • the satellite receiver 230 receives radio waves transmitted by the GPS satellite 2 and the QZS satellite 3 at regular intervals.
  • the received radio wave is demodulated and output to the control circuit 220. That is, the satellite receiver 230 sequentially receives the navigation message M transmitted from the GPS satellite 2 and the navigation message N transmitted from the QZS satellite 3 and outputs them to the control circuit 220.
  • the control circuit 220 is a computer including a CPU, ROM, RAM, and the like, and controls the communication unit 210 and the satellite receiver 230. Further, when the CPU executes the program stored in the ROM while using the temporary storage function of the RAM, the authentication-related processing shown in FIG. 5, the positioning-related processing shown in FIG. 6, and the position data shown in FIG. Execute transmission processing.
  • the memory 221 is a rewritable storage medium and is realized by, for example, an EEPROM or a RAM included in the control circuit 220.
  • the memory 221 stores position data indicating the current position and data of the GPS satellite 2 that is receiving radio waves (also referred to as information, reception satellite data, and reception satellite information).
  • the current position is represented by, for example, a well-known geodetic coordinate system or ECEF coordinate system.
  • the geodetic coordinate system represents the current position by (latitude, longitude, altitude).
  • the ECEF coordinate system is the right-handed Y-axis so that the center of gravity of the earth is the origin, the north pole direction of the earth's rotation axis is the Z axis, and the direction of the Greenwich meridian perpendicular to the Z axis is the X axis.
  • a coordinate system including an axis for example, a WGS84 coordinate system may be used.
  • An arbitrary point P in the ECEF coordinate system is represented by (X, Y, Z).
  • the current position calculated in the ECEF coordinate system is converted into a geodetic coordinate system as necessary.
  • Received satellite data is received for each captured GPS satellite 2 from the GPS satellite 2 and authentication status data (also referred to as authentication status information) indicating whether or not the GPS satellite 2 has been authenticated.
  • Signal quality data also referred to as signal quality information
  • S / N, elevation angle, and pseudorange residual ⁇ d are adopted as indices representing the quality of signals received from the GPS satellite 2. That is, the values of these indices are stored as signal quality data.
  • the elevation angle is an angle formed by a straight line connecting the GPS satellite 2 and the current position with respect to the ground plane with the current position as a reference.
  • the smaller the elevation angle the more the measurement distance error (that is, the pseudo-range residual described later).
  • ⁇ d increases.
  • the pseudorange residual ⁇ d tends to decrease as the elevation angle increases. Since the pseudorange residual ⁇ d is affected by various effects such as multipath, a distance error may occur more than the GPS satellite 2 having a small elevation angle even if the elevation angle is large.
  • the position of the GPS satellite 2 can be specified from the data included in the navigation message M, and the current position may be a value calculated by a positioning related process described later.
  • the current position in the ECEF coordinate system is P0 (X0, Y0, Z0)
  • the position PG of the GPS satellite 2 is (XG, YG, ZG).
  • the authentication status data represents the reliability of the transmission source itself (referred to as transmission source reliability) from the viewpoint of whether or not the transmission source is a legitimate GPS satellite 2.
  • the transmission source reliability contributes to the reliability (normality reliability) with respect to the positioning result from the viewpoint of whether the position data indicated by the positioning result has been tampered with.
  • the signal quality data represents reliability (positioning accuracy reliability) from the viewpoint of whether or not the accuracy of the positioning result using the signal is reliable.
  • the memory 221 stores the authentication state data and the data representing the signal quality data described above in association with the PRNID of the GPS satellite 2 that is the transmission source, for example, as shown in FIG.
  • the authentication status data and signal quality data for each GPS satellite 2 being captured which is stored in the memory 221, are sequentially updated in the positioning related processing described later.
  • authentication-related processing processing related to authentication (hereinafter referred to as authentication-related processing) related to authentication that the signal received by the satellite receiver 230 is a regular navigation message received from the GPS satellite 2
  • authentication-related processing processing related to authentication that the signal received by the satellite receiver 230 is a regular navigation message received from the GPS satellite 2
  • the in-vehicle device 200 may receive a radio wave transmitted by a simulator that artificially generates a signal transmitted by the GPS satellite 2 in addition to a signal transmitted by the regular GPS satellite 2.
  • the in-vehicle device 200 performs positioning using the radio wave transmitted by the transmission source (assumed to be an unauthorized transmission source) pretending to be the GPS satellite 2, the position indicated by the positioning result is greatly different from the actual position. It may be different.
  • the radio wave transmitted from the non-regular transmission source is used for positioning, there is a problem that the service center 300 or the like cannot properly charge for providing the service using the position data.
  • the authentication-related process is based on such a background and is intended to determine whether or not the transmission source of the signal received by the in-vehicle device 200 is the regular GPS satellite 2. For convenience, the following description will be continued assuming that the GPS satellite 2 includes this non-authorized transmission source.
  • each section is expressed as, for example, S1.
  • each section can be divided into a plurality of subsections, while a plurality of sections can be combined into one section.
  • each section can be referred to as a device, module, or means.
  • each of the above sections or a combination thereof includes not only (i) a section of software combined with a hardware unit (eg, a computer), but also (ii) hardware (eg, an integrated circuit, As a section of (wiring logic circuit), it can be realized with or without the function of related devices.
  • the hardware section can be included inside the microcomputer.
  • the navigation message N received from the QZS satellite 3 by the satellite receiver 230 is acquired.
  • a RAND message and parity data corresponding to the RAND message are extracted from the navigation message N acquired in S1, and these two types of data are stored in association with each other. Note that it is not necessary to store all the bits of the RAND message, and it is sufficient that at least the PRNID and TOW included in the RAND message are associated with the parity data.
  • the navigation message N in this embodiment includes a RAND message for each GPS satellite 2 and parity data corresponding to the RAND message. Therefore, the parity data of each GPS satellite 2 is acquired by this S2.
  • the parity data received by these navigation messages N is referred to as received parity data in order to distinguish it from comparison parity data described later.
  • the navigation message M received by the satellite receiver 230 from the GPS satellite 2 is acquired.
  • the PRNID and TOW included in the navigation message M received in S3 are transmitted from the transmission unit 212 to the authentication center 120 together with the public key used for the secret communication.
  • the authentication center 120 encrypts the H matrix determined by the PRNID and TOW with the public key and transmits the encrypted H matrix to the in-vehicle device 200.
  • the H matrix transmitted from the authentication center 120 is acquired from the receiving unit 211.
  • the encrypted H matrix acquired in S5 is decrypted with the secret key.
  • S5 to S7 are also referred to as an authentication data acquisition unit.
  • parity data (this is referred to as comparative parity data) is created from the RAND message created in S8 and the H matrix decoded in S7 by the same process as the process performed by the parity generation unit 1224.
  • the H matrix decrypted in S6 is the same as the H matrix used by the authentication center 120 to create parity data.
  • the parity generation unit 1224 of the authentication center 120 calculates parity data from the H matrix and the RAND message.
  • the comparison parity data created in S9 matches the received parity data saved in S2
  • the RAND message created in S8 is the same as the RAND message created by the authentication center 120. If the RAND messages match, the navigation message M that is the source of the RAND message created in S8 is the navigation message that is the source of the RAND message generated by the RAND message generator 1221 of the authentication center 120. It means that it matches with M.
  • the comparison parity data created in S9 matches the received parity data saved in S2, it means that the navigation message M acquired in S3 is a regular navigation message M acquired by the authentication center 120. To do.
  • S10 If the comparison parity data created in S9 matches the received parity data saved in S2 (YES in S10), the process proceeds to S11 and authentication is established. If it is determined that the authentication is established in S11, the authentication state data of the GPS satellite 2 in the memory 221 is set to authenticated, and the process proceeds to S13.
  • S10 to 11 are also referred to as a transmission source authentication unit.
  • the process proceeds to S12 and authentication is not established. If the authentication is not established, the authentication status data of the GPS satellite 2 is left unauthenticated, and the process proceeds to S13.
  • S13 it is determined whether or not all the captured GPS satellites 2 have been authenticated. If all the captured GPS satellites 2 have been authenticated (YES in S13), the processing shown in FIG. 5 is terminated. On the other hand, if at least one GPS satellite 2 that has not been authenticated is present among all the captured GPS satellites 2 (NO in S13), the process returns to S2 and the process is repeated.
  • Positioning-related processing a series of processing for positioning based on the navigation message M received by the satellite receiver 230 in the control circuit 220 of the in-vehicle device 200 (hereinafter referred to as positioning-related processing) will be described using the flowchart shown in FIG. .
  • the flowchart of FIG. 6 may be executed sequentially (for example, every 100 ms) when the satellite receiver 230 is receiving signals from the GPS satellites 2 having the number of positioning required satellites (four in this case).
  • an authentication priority positioning satellite selection process is performed, and the process proceeds to S22.
  • the authenticated GPS satellite 2 is preferentially selected as the transmission source of the signal used for positioning.
  • the selected GPS satellite 2 is referred to as an authentication priority positioning satellite.
  • the certified GPS satellites 2 those whose signal quality is determined not to reach a predetermined level still have four or more certified GPS satellites 2 even if the GPS satellite 2 is excluded. In some cases, it may be excluded from the authentication priority positioning satellite.
  • the threshold value used for determining whether or not to exclude the GPS satellite 2 having a low signal quality from the authentication priority positioning satellites may be appropriately designed for each index representing the signal quality. For example, when the pseudorange residual ⁇ d is a certain value (for example, 200 m) or more, it may be determined that the signal quality has not reached a predetermined level.
  • the number of certified GPS satellites 2 is less than four, all the certified GPS satellites 2 are selected. Then, the shortage relative to the number of positioning required satellites is selected from the unauthenticated GPS satellites 2. For example, when there are only three GPS satellites 2 that have been authenticated, one is selected from the unauthenticated GPS satellites 2. The unauthenticated GPS satellites 2 selected as the shortage relative to the number of positioning required satellites may be selected with priority given to the unauthenticated GPS satellites 2 having good signal quality.
  • the current position is calculated by a known method using the signal transmitted by the GPS satellite 2 selected in S21.
  • the positioning calculation using the signal transmitted by the authentication priority positioning satellite performed in S22 is referred to as authentication priority positioning calculation.
  • authentication priority positioning result in order to distinguish the calculation result in S22 from the calculation result in S24 described later, it is referred to as an authentication priority positioning result.
  • the calculated authentication priority positioning result is stored in the memory 221 with a time stamp indicating the positioning time. This S22 is also referred to as an authentication priority positioning unit.
  • signal quality priority positioning satellite selection processing is performed, and the process proceeds to S24.
  • the signal quality priority positioning satellite selection process in S23 the signal quality data for each GPS satellite 2 stored in the memory 221 is referred to regardless of whether or not the GPS satellite 2 is used for positioning.
  • the GPS satellite 2 with better signal quality is preferentially selected.
  • the comparison of the good signal quality is performed by giving priority to the item of the pseudorange residual ⁇ d as an example. That is, the items of the pseudo distance residual ⁇ d may be arranged in ascending order using the sort key, and the items having the smallest pseudo distance residual ⁇ d may be selected. If there are those having the same pseudorange residual ⁇ d, they are compared by S / N, and it is determined that the signal quality is better when the S / N is larger. If there are a plurality of GPS satellites 2 having the same pseudorange residual ⁇ d and S / N, it is determined that the signal quality is better when the elevation angle is larger.
  • the GPS satellite 2b 13
  • the GPS satellite 2c 14
  • the GPS satellite 2e 16
  • the pseudo-range residual ⁇ d has the highest priority, but is not limited thereto.
  • S / N may be given top priority.
  • a function that weights each index representing signal quality such as the pseudorange residual ⁇ d, S / N, and elevation angle, and evaluates the signal quality comprehensively from each parameter may be used. That is, a function that increases the output value as the pseudorange residual ⁇ d is smaller, the S / N is larger, and the elevation angle is larger is designed by using the pseudorange residual ⁇ d, S / N, and the elevation angle as variables.
  • the GPS satellite 2 having a large function output value may be selected with priority.
  • the current position is calculated by a well-known method using the signal transmitted by the GPS satellite 2 selected in S23.
  • the positioning calculation using the signal transmitted by the signal quality priority satellite performed in S24 is referred to as signal quality priority positioning calculation.
  • the positioning result by the signal quality priority positioning calculation is referred to as a signal quality priority positioning result in distinction from the authentication priority positioning result described above.
  • the calculated signal quality priority positioning result is associated with a time stamp and stored in the memory 221 separately from the authentication priority positioning result. This S24 is also referred to as a signal quality priority positioning unit.
  • the authentication priority positioning result calculated in S22 is compared with the signal quality priority positioning result calculated in S25, and when the signal quality priority positioning result satisfies a predetermined allowable condition with respect to the authentication priority positioning result.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result is adopted as the current position.
  • This S25 is also referred to as a positioning result selection unit.
  • the allowable condition here is a condition that allows the use of the signal quality priority positioning result as the current position, and whether the signal source used for the signal quality priority positioning calculation process is a regular GPS satellite 2 or not.
  • This is a condition for estimating. That is, it is a condition for guaranteeing a certain level of reliability of reliability for positioning results using the GPS satellite 2 that prioritizes signal quality.
  • the background for setting this allowable condition will be described next.
  • transmission sources that have not been authenticated are included, and the transmission sources that have not been authenticated include regular GPS satellites. 2 and two types of non-regular transmission sources are conceivable.
  • the positioning result using the signal transmitted by the regular GPS satellite 2 includes an error due to the influence of the ionosphere, multipath, etc., and represents a position relatively close to the actual position.
  • the authorized GPS satellite 2 that has not been authenticated includes one having higher positioning accuracy reliability than the authenticated GPS satellite 2.
  • the regular GPS satellite 2 with high positioning accuracy reliability is selected in the authentication priority positioning satellite selection process after the authentication is completed, but until the authentication is completed, it is used for the authentication priority positioning. It is not selected in the satellite selection process.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result is more likely to indicate a point closer to the actual position than the authentication priority positioning result.
  • the point indicated by the signal quality priority positioning result is expected to be a point relatively close to the point indicated by the authentication priority positioning result.
  • the permissible condition assumes the situation described above, and paradoxically, if the point indicated by the signal quality priority positioning result is near the point indicated by the authentication priority positioning result, paradoxically, the signal quality priority positioning is performed.
  • the transmission sources selected in the satellite selection process are estimated to be regular GPS satellites 2. Thus, the reliability of normality is also guaranteed to some extent for the positioning result (that is, the signal quality priority positioning result).
  • the permissible condition may be that the permissible condition is satisfied when the point indicated by the signal quality priority positioning result is within a certain distance (for example, 100 m) from the point indicated by the authentication priority positioning result.
  • a certain distance for example, 100 m
  • the satellite time for example, TOW
  • the positioning result adopted in S25 is stored in the memory 221 as the current position, and the process proceeds to S27.
  • the calculated current position is stored in the memory 221 by associating data (that is, a time stamp) of the time when the current position is measured.
  • the signal quality data of each captured GPS satellite 2 is updated, and this flow ends. More specifically, the pseudo-range residual ⁇ d and elevation angle of each GPS satellite 2 are calculated and updated using the current position stored in S26.
  • the S / N may be updated every time a signal from each transmission source is received. This S27 is also referred to as a signal quality evaluation unit.
  • position data transmission processing processing related to transmission of position data to the service center 300 (hereinafter, position data transmission processing) in the control circuit 220 of the in-vehicle device 200 will be described with reference to the flowchart shown in FIG.
  • position data transmission processing in addition to the position data indicating the current position calculated in the positioning related process, an authentication level that is the number and ratio of the certified GPS satellites 2 among the GPS satellites 2 used for positioning is also given.
  • the flowchart of FIG. 7 may be configured to start when a position data request signal is received from the service center 300, or may be configured to start at a constant cycle.
  • an authentication level that is a ratio of the authenticated GPS satellites 2 among the GPS satellites 2 used for positioning of the current position acquired in S31 is calculated. For example, if there are four GPS satellites 2 used for positioning and one GPS satellite 2 has been authenticated, the authentication level is 25%. This S32 is also referred to as an authentication level calculation unit.
  • the authentication level may be the number of authenticated GPS satellites 2 among the GPS satellites 2 used for positioning the current position. The higher the authentication level, the lower the possibility that the position indicated by the positioning result is falsified, that is, the higher the reliability of normality.
  • transmission data including the position data and time stamp indicating the read current position and the authentication level calculated in S32 is generated.
  • the format of the transmission data may be designed as appropriate.
  • the transmission data may include a traveling direction and a vehicle speed of a vehicle on which the in-vehicle device 200 is mounted.
  • the vehicle speed may be a configuration that uses a sensor that is detected by a wheel speed sensor, or may be a configuration that is specified by calculating a moving distance per unit time of the vehicle from position data of a plurality of points arranged in time series. .
  • the traveling direction of the vehicle may be configured using a gyroscope detection result, or the direction in which the approximate line obtained by the least square method extends from the position data of a plurality of points arranged in time series is determined by the vehicle. It is good also as a structure specified as an advancing direction.
  • S34 the transmission data generated in S33 is transmitted via the transmission unit 212, and the flow ends.
  • This S34 is also referred to as a positioning result transmission processing unit. Note that the flow of the positioning-related processing shown in FIG. 7 is an example, and of course, the present invention is not limited to this and may be implemented with appropriate changes.
  • the position data indicated by the signal quality priority positioning result is adopted as the current position (S25).
  • the allowable condition is for determining whether or not the transmission source of the signal used for the signal quality priority positioning can be estimated as an artificial satellite.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result is a positioning result using a signal transmitted from a transmission source estimated to be an artificial satellite.
  • the signal quality priority positioning unit is a result of positioning using a signal from a transmission source having a better signal quality among the transmission sources of the signal received by the satellite receiver. Therefore, it can be said that the signal quality priority positioning result that satisfies the allowable condition represents the current position of the positioning terminal with higher accuracy than the authentication priority positioning result.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result that satisfies the permissible condition can be made more accurate while ensuring the normality reliability for the positioning result.
  • the service center 300 that performs processing using the position data transmitted from the in-vehicle device 200, whether or not to execute the processing that uses the position data according to the level of the authentication level given to the position data. Judgment can be made. For example, billing processing with high reliability of required location data is not executed unless the authentication level is high, whereas a game or route guidance with low reliability of required location data has a low authentication level. Even it can be executed.
  • positioning results can be flexibly adapted according to the reliability of the positioning results required for those applications and systems. Can be used for
  • the authentication level when transmitting the signal quality priority positioning result as the current position may be determined as follows.
  • the authentication level of the authentication priority positioning result compared with the signal quality priority positioning result is obtained in S25.
  • the authentication priority of the authentication priority positioning result may be the ratio of the authenticated GPS satellites 2 among the GPS satellites 2 used for the authentication priority positioning calculation processing.
  • the signal quality priority positioning result may be obtained by multiplying the authentication level of the authentication priority positioning result by a predetermined authentication level coefficient ⁇ .
  • the authentication level of the signal quality priority positioning result includes the ratio of the certified GPS satellites 2 of the GPS satellites 2 used for the signal quality priority positioning calculation process and the GPS satellites 2 used for the authentication priority positioning calculation process. It is good also as an average value of the ratio of the GPS satellites 2 that have been authenticated.
  • the current position that is, the positioning result selected in S25 is transmitted to the service center 300.
  • the present invention is not limited to this.
  • the service center 300 which is the position data receiving side can select which of the authentication priority positioning result and the signal quality priority positioning result is used. Therefore, the in-vehicle device 200 may transmit both the authentication priority positioning result and the signal quality priority positioning result together with the authentication level.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
  • Remote Sensing (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un appareil embarqué dans un véhicule (200) qui compare des résultats de positionnement (résultats de positionnement priorisant l'authentification) qui utilisent des satellites GPS authentifiés (2) d'une manière prioritaire, et des résultats de positionnement (résultats de positionnement priorisant la qualité de signal) qui utilisent des signaux reçus à partir de satellites GPS ayant une qualité de signal favorable indépendamment du fait que ces derniers ont été ou non authentifiés. En outre, dans le cas où la position indiquée par les résultats de positionnement priorisant la qualité de signal se situe à une certaine distance (par exemple 100 m) de la position indiquée par les résultats de positionnement priorisant l'authentification, les données de position indiquées par les résultats de positionnement priorisant la qualité de signal sont utilisées en tant que position actuelle.
PCT/JP2015/000180 2014-02-06 2015-01-16 Terminal de positionnement WO2015118805A1 (fr)

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DE112015000708.3T DE112015000708B4 (de) 2014-02-06 2015-01-16 Ortungsendgerät
CN201580007477.5A CN105980884B (zh) 2014-02-06 2015-01-16 定位终端

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JP2014021630A JP6291883B2 (ja) 2014-02-06 2014-02-06 測位端末

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JP2015148518A (ja) 2015-08-20
DE112015000708B4 (de) 2024-02-22
CN105980884A (zh) 2016-09-28
JP6291883B2 (ja) 2018-03-14
CN105980884B (zh) 2017-10-03
DE112015000708T5 (de) 2016-11-03

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