WO2015111107A1 - 認証方法 - Google Patents
認証方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2015111107A1 WO2015111107A1 PCT/JP2014/006011 JP2014006011W WO2015111107A1 WO 2015111107 A1 WO2015111107 A1 WO 2015111107A1 JP 2014006011 W JP2014006011 W JP 2014006011W WO 2015111107 A1 WO2015111107 A1 WO 2015111107A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/44—Program or device authentication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/2803—Home automation networks
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L12/00—Data switching networks
- H04L12/28—Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
- H04L12/46—Interconnection of networks
- H04L12/4604—LAN interconnection over a backbone network, e.g. Internet, Frame Relay
- H04L12/462—LAN interconnection over a bridge based backbone
- H04L12/4625—Single bridge functionality, e.g. connection of two networks over a single bridge
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/101—Access control lists [ACL]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
Definitions
- This disclosure relates to an authentication method for authenticating a device.
- HAN Home Area Network
- PKI Public Key Infrastructure
- the authentication based on PKI authenticates the validity of the target device using a private key (private key) and a public key certificate issued by a certificate authority.
- the certificate authority performs revocation processing of the public key certificate corresponding to the private key, and the public key certificate of the revoked public key certificate A CRL (Certificate Revocation List) that is a document ID (identification information) list is distributed (for example, see Non-Patent Document 3).
- the authentication entity that authenticates the validity of the device searches whether or not the public certificate ID of the public key certificate of the target device is described in the CRL distributed from the certificate authority at the time of authentication. If it is described, it is determined that the device is not valid, and the authentication result is negative.
- Wi-Fi Alliance “Wi-Fi CERTIFIED Wi-Fi Protected Setup: Easing the User Experience for Home and Small Office Wi-FiR Network, 20 June (20th, 20th, 20th, 20th, 20th, 20th, 20th, 20th) Search], Internet ⁇ URL: http: // www. wi-fi.
- an authentication method is an authentication method for at least one device among a plurality of devices connected to a HAN (Home Area Network),
- the first device authenticates the validity of the second device using a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) including identification information and attribute information of the second device of the plurality of devices, and the validity authentication is performed. If negative, the first device revokes the second device.
- CRL Chip Revocation List
- FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram showing a configuration of an authentication system 100.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a controller 120.
- FIG. 4 is a data configuration diagram of device information 300.
- FIG. 4 is a data configuration diagram of controller information 400.
- FIG. 3 is a data configuration diagram of a public key certificate 500.
- FIG. It is a data block diagram of CRL600.
- 3 is a data configuration diagram of a CRL 700.
- 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a device 110.
- FIG. It is a data block diagram of the apparatus information 1000.
- 4 is a data configuration diagram of controller information 1100.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a server 140.
- FIG. 3 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of a server 140.
- FIG. 4 is a data configuration diagram of device information 1300.
- FIG. 3 is a data configuration diagram of a basic CRL 1400.
- FIG. It is a data block diagram of the information 1500 for CRL issuing. It is the flowchart 1 of an apparatus registration process. It is the flowchart 2 of an apparatus registration process. It is a sequence diagram of a device registration process. It is the flowchart 1 of an apparatus CRL update process. It is the flowchart 2 of an apparatus CRL update process. It is a sequence diagram of a device CRL update process. 2 is a system configuration diagram showing a configuration of an authentication system 2200.
- FIG. FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram illustrating how a factory 2220 stores a CRL transmitted from a Web server 2210 in a device 110.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram illustrating a functional configuration of a Web server 2210.
- FIG. It is a figure which shows the Web screen displayed on PC2230 which accesses an apparatus purchase site.
- 6 is a data configuration diagram of a device management table 2600.
- FIG. It is a flowchart of an apparatus purchase process. It is a sequence diagram of apparatus purchase processing. It is the flowchart 1 of a CRL update process at the time of apparatus purchase. It is the flowchart 2 of a CRL update process at the time of apparatus purchase. It is the flowchart 3 of a CRL update process at the time of apparatus purchase. It is a sequence diagram of CRL update processing at the time of device purchase.
- the public key certificate ID of the revoked public key certificate described in the CRL increases, the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the device to be authenticated, which is made when authenticating the device, is The processing amount related to the search for whether or not it is described in the CRL becomes large.
- the data size of the CRL becomes large, when the storage capacity of each device is small, the capacity is exceeded and the necessary CRL cannot be held.
- the present disclosure has been made to solve these problems, and is made when authenticating a device even when the number of revoked public key certificate IDs described in a CRL is relatively large.
- the authenticity of the device is authenticated by suppressing the processing amount related to the search for whether or not the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the device to be authenticated is described in the CRL to a certain extent.
- An authentication method that can revoke the device in the case of a bad result is provided.
- An authentication method is an authentication method for at least one device among a plurality of devices connected to a HAN (Home Area Network), wherein a first device of the plurality of devices is The validity of the second device is authenticated using CRL (Certificate Revocation List) including identification information and attribute information of the second device of the plurality of devices, and the authentication of the validity is negative.
- CRL Chip Revocation List
- the first device revokes the second device.
- the first device may use the attribute information of the second device included in the CRL when searching whether the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the second device is described in the CRL. it can. For this reason, it becomes possible to suppress the processing amount concerning a search to a certain extent.
- an authentication system including a server that issues a CRL, a controller connected to the server via a network, and a device connected to the controller via a HAN will be described.
- the server issues a CRL including identification information and attribute information to the controller and the device connected to the HAN to which the controller is connected.
- the identification information is, for example, a controller ID, a device ID, a certificate ID, and the like.
- the attribute information is, for example, a model, a country of production, a manufacturing company, and the like.
- the controller acquires the CRL issued by the server, uses the acquired CRL to authenticate the validity of the device connected to the HAN to which the controller is connected, and in the case of a negative result, Revokes the device.
- the device acquires the CRL issued by the server via the controller connected to the HAN to which the device is connected, authenticates the validity of the CRL using the acquired CRL, and negatively If the result is negative, the controller is revoked.
- FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram showing the configuration of the authentication system 100.
- the authentication system 100 includes devices 110a to 110f, controllers 120a to 120b, HAN 130a to HAN 130b, a server 140, and a network 150.
- the devices 110a to 110c, the controller 120a, and the HAN 130a are disposed in the home 160a, and the devices 110d to 110f, the controller 120b, and the HAN 130b are disposed in the home 160b.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an example in which one HAN is installed in one home, but a plurality of HANs may be installed in one home.
- FIG. 1 illustrates an example in which only one controller is connected to one HAN, a plurality of controllers may be connected to one HAN.
- the HAN 130a to HAN 130b are networks established in the home and realized by wireless or wired communication, and have a function of mediating communication between connected devices.
- the controller 120a and devices 110a to 110c are connected to the HAN 130a, and the controller 120b and devices 110d to 110f are connected to the HAN 130b.
- HAN 130a to HAN 130b are simply referred to as HAN 130, unless it is necessary to explicitly distinguish HAN 130a to HAN 130b.
- the network 150 is a wireless or wired network constructed between homes, businesses, etc., for example, the Internet, and has a function of mediating communication between connected devices.
- the server 150 and the controllers 120a to 120b are connected to the network 150.
- the controllers 120a to 120b are connected to the HAN 130 and the network 150, (1) a server communication function that communicates with the server 140, and (2) a device communication function that communicates with other devices connected to the connected HAN 130. (3) It has a device control function for controlling the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to be connected, and (4) a device authentication function for authenticating the validity of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to be connected.
- controller 120a to the controller 120b are simply referred to as the controller 120 unless it is necessary to explicitly distinguish the controllers 120a to 120b.
- FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the controller 120.
- the controller 120 includes a communication unit 210, a device control unit 220, an information management unit 230, an authentication processing unit 240, a device information holding unit 250, a controller information holding unit 260, and an authentication. And an information holding unit 270.
- the communication unit 210 is realized by a processor that executes a program, a communication LSI (Large Scale Integration) having a communication function, and a memory, and includes a device control unit 220, an information management unit 230, and an authentication processing unit. 240, a network 150, a function connected to the HAN 130 and communicating with the server 140 via the network 150, and a function communicating with a device connected to the HAN 130 via the HAN 130.
- a communication LSI Large Scale Integration
- the communication unit 210 performs SSL (Secure Socket Layer) communication when communicating with the server 140.
- the communication unit 210 stores certificates and the like necessary for SSL communication.
- the device control unit 220 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 210, and a device control signal for controlling the device 110 transmitted from the server 140 is transmitted to the communication unit 210.
- a device control command is generated, a function for generating a device control command for controlling a device to be controlled based on the device control signal and a device control command when the device control command is generated A function of causing the target device 110 to transmit a control command.
- the device information holding unit 250 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the information management unit 230, and has a function of storing device information.
- FIG. 3 is a data configuration diagram of device information 300 that is an example of device information stored in the device information holding unit 250.
- the device information 300 is configured by associating a device ID 310, a certificate ID 320, a model 330, a country 340, and a company 350.
- the device ID 310 is an identifier for identifying the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected.
- the certificate ID 320 is an identifier for identifying a public key certificate issued from a certificate authority in association with a secret key stored in the device 110 identified by the device ID 310 associated with the certificate ID 320.
- the model 330 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 310, and is information indicating the model. Examples include an air conditioner, a television, and a washing machine.
- the country 340 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 310, and is information indicating the country of production. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- country 340 is information indicating the country of production, but as another example, the country 340 may be a sales country, an available country, or the like. The same applies to “country” appearing in the text below.
- the company 350 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 310, and is information indicating the manufacturing company. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the company 350 is information indicating a manufacturing company, but may be a sales company, a management company, or the like as another example. The same applies to “company” appearing in the text below.
- the controller information holding unit 260 is realized by a memory, connected to the information management unit 230, and has a function of storing controller information.
- FIG. 4 is a data configuration diagram of the controller information 400 which is an example of the controller information stored in the controller information holding unit 260.
- the controller information 400 is configured by associating a controller ID 410, a certificate ID 420, a controller type 430, a country 440, and a company 450.
- the controller ID 410 is an identifier for identifying the controller 120, that is, its own device.
- the certificate ID 420 is an identifier for identifying a public key certificate issued by a certificate authority in association with a private key stored in the device itself.
- the controller type 430 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the own device, and is information indicating the controller type.
- the controller type indicates the model of the controller, and includes, for example, a controller dedicated type having only a function as a controller, a TV function combined type having a TV function in addition to a function as a controller, and the like.
- a controller dedicated type having only a function as a controller
- a TV function combined type having a TV function in addition to a function as a controller, and the like.
- Country 440 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the own device, and is information indicating the country of production. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- the company 450 is one piece of attribute information indicating an attribute of the own device, and is information indicating a manufacturing company. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the authentication information holding unit 270 is realized by a memory, is connected to the authentication processing unit 240, and has a function of storing a secret key, a public key certificate, and a CRL.
- the secret key is embedded in the ROM or the non-volatile memory so that it is not read or rewritten from the outside of the controller 120 when the controller 120 is manufactured.
- the CRL is a CRL issued by the server 140.
- FIG. 5 is a data configuration diagram of a public key certificate 500 which is an example of a public key certificate stored in the authentication information holding unit 270.
- the public key certificate 500 includes a version 510, an issuer 520, a validity period start date and time 530, a validity period end date and time 540, a certificate ID 550, and a signature 560.
- FIG. 6 is a data configuration diagram of a CRL 600 that is an example of a CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270.
- the CRL 600 includes a CRL version 610, an issuer 620, a valid period start date 630, a valid period end date 640, an issue date 650, a next issue date 660, a model 670 to a model 672. And a revoked certificate ID group 680 to a revoked certificate ID group 682, and a signature 690.
- Model 670 to model 672 indicate the model of the device connected to the HAN or the controller type of the controller connected to the HAN. Examples of the model include an air conditioner, a television, and a first type controller.
- the models included in the CRL 600 are limited to the model of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected and the controller type of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected.
- the server 140 issues the CRL 600 to the controller 120
- the model included in the CRL 600 is connected to the model of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 connected to the controller 120 and the HAN 130 connected to the controller 120.
- the controller type is limited to the controller type of the controller 120 (details will be described later).
- the revoked certificate ID group 680 to the revoked certificate ID group 682 are associated with any of model 670 to model 672, respectively. Then, it consists of a revoked public key certificate ID group for the public key certificate revoked by the certificate authority for the associated model device or controller.
- the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 600 is limited to the one associated with the model included in the CRL 600.
- the server 140 issues the CRL 600 to the controller 120, the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 600 is limited to the one associated with the model included in the CRL 600 (details). Will be described later).
- the revoked certificate ID included in the CRL 600 includes the revoked certificate ID group 680 classified as “model: air conditioner 670”, and the revoked certificate ID group 681 classified as “model: television 671”.
- the certificate ID group 682 is classified and described as “model: first type controller 671”.
- the description in which the revoked certificate ID is classified in this way is that the CRL 600 includes the device attribute of the air conditioner model, the device of the television model attribute, and the model attribute of the first type controller. It shows that the corresponding revoked certificate IDs are classified into different tree structures for each of the devices possessed.
- the CRL 600 is an example when the included attribute information of the device 110 or the controller 120 is the model of the device 110 or the controller 120.
- FIG. 7 is a data configuration diagram of a CRL 700, which is another example of a CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270.
- the CRL 700 includes a CRL version 710, an issuer 720, a valid period start date and time 730, a valid period end date and time 740, an issue date 750, a next issue date 760, and a country 770 to a country 772. And a revoked certificate ID group 780 to a revoked certificate ID group 782 and a signature 790.
- Country 770 to country 772 respectively indicate the model of the device connected to the HAN or the country of production of the controller. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- the countries included in the CRL 700 are limited to the country of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected and the country of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected.
- the server 140 issues the CRL 700 to the controller 120
- the country included in the CRL 700 is connected to the country of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected and the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected. This is because it is limited to the country of the controller 120 to be used.
- the revoked certificate ID group 780 to the revoked certificate ID group 782 are associated with any one of the country 770 to the country 772, respectively. And it consists of a revoked public key certificate ID group for a public key certificate revoked by a certificate authority for a device produced in the associated country or a controller produced in the associated country. Yes.
- the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 700 is limited to the one associated with the country included in the CRL 700.
- the server 140 issues the CRL 700 to the controller 120, the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 700 is limited to the one associated with the country included in the CRL 700.
- the CRL 700 is an example in the case where the attribute information of the device 110 or the controller 120 included is the country where the device 110 or the controller 120 is produced.
- FIG. 8 is a data configuration diagram of a CRL 800, which is still another example of a CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270.
- the CRL 800 includes a CRL version 810, an issuer 820, a valid period start date 830, a valid period end date 840, an issue date 850, a next issue date 860, a company 870 to a company 872. And a revoked certificate ID group 880 to a revoked certificate ID group 882, and a signature 890.
- Company 870 to company 872 indicate the device model or controller manufacturer connected to the HAN, respectively. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the companies included in the CRL 800 are limited to the company of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected and the company of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected.
- the revoked certificate ID group 880 to the revoked certificate ID group 882 are associated with one of the company 870 to the company 872, respectively. And it consists of a revoked public key certificate ID group for a public key certificate revoked by the certificate authority for a device manufactured by the associated company or a controller manufactured by the associated company. Yes.
- the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 800 is limited to that associated with the company included in the CRL 800.
- the server 140 issues the CRL 800 to the controller 120, the revoked certificate ID group included in the CRL 800 is limited to the one associated with the company included in the CRL 800.
- the CRL 800 is an example in which the attribute information of the device 110 or the controller 120 included is a manufacturing company in which the device 110 or the controller 120 is manufactured.
- the attribute information of the device 110 or the controller 120 may be a combination of a model, a country, and a company.
- the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 will be described as being the CRL 600, but the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 is the same even if the CRL 700 and the CRL 800 are used, for example.
- the information management unit 230 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 210, the authentication processing unit 240, the device information holding unit 250, and the controller information holding unit 260.
- a function for controlling the device information holding unit 250, a function for managing the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250, a function for controlling the controller information holding unit 260, and a controller stored in the controller information holding unit 260 And a function of managing the information 400.
- the authentication processing unit 240 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 210, the information management unit 230, and the authentication information holding unit 270, and controls the authentication information holding unit 270.
- the devices 110a to 110f are, for example, air conditioners, televisions, washing machines, and the like installed in the home and connected to the HAN 130.
- the devices 110a to 110f are simply referred to as devices 110, unless it is necessary to explicitly distinguish the devices 110a to 110f.
- FIG. 9 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the device 110.
- the device 110 includes a communication unit 910, an information management unit 930, an authentication processing unit 940, a device information holding unit 950, a controller information holding unit 960, an authentication information holding unit 970, An execution unit 980 and an input reception unit 990 are configured.
- the communication unit 910 is realized by a processor that executes a program, a communication LSI having a communication function, and a memory.
- the communication unit 910 includes an execution unit 980, an information management unit 930, an authentication processing unit 940, and a HAN 130. And a function of communicating with a device connected to the HAN 130 via the HAN 130.
- the communication unit 910 When the communication unit 910 receives a device control command for controlling the device 110 from the controller 120, the communication unit 910 sends the device control command to the execution unit 980.
- the input receiving unit 990 is realized by a processor that executes a program, a memory, and a user operation receiving device.
- the input receiving unit 990 is connected to the execution unit 980 and is based on a user operation received by the user operation receiving device. It has a function of generating a control command for controlling the device 110 and sending it to the execution unit 980.
- the execution unit 980 has a function that the device 110 originally has as a device (for example, if the device 110 is an air conditioner, cool air or warm air from the air outlet so that the temperature of the room in which the air conditioner is installed becomes the set temperature.
- the device 110 is a TV
- the TV 110 receives and decodes a TV signal, displays the decoded TV video on a display, and outputs the decoded TV sound from a speaker. Functions, etc.).
- the execution unit 980 executes processing based on the control command.
- the device information holding unit 950 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the information management unit 930, and has a function of storing device information.
- FIG. 10 is a data configuration diagram of device information 1000 that is an example of device information stored in the device information holding unit 950.
- the device information 1000 includes a device ID 1010, a certificate ID 1020, a model 1030, a country 1040, and a company 1050 associated with each other.
- the device ID 1010 is an identifier for identifying the device 110, that is, its own device.
- the certificate ID 1020 is an identifier for identifying the public key certificate ID issued from the certificate authority in association with the private key stored in the device itself.
- the model 1030 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the own device, and is information indicating the model. Examples include an air conditioner, a television, and a washing machine.
- Country 1040 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the own device, and is information indicating the country of production. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- the company 1050 is one piece of attribute information indicating an attribute of the own device, and is information indicating a manufacturing company. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the controller information holding unit 960 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the information management unit 930, and has a function of storing controller information.
- FIG. 11 is a data configuration diagram of controller information 1100, which is an example of controller information stored in the controller information holding unit 960.
- the controller information 1100 is configured by associating a controller ID 1110, a certificate ID 1120, a controller type 1130, a country 1140, and a company 1150.
- Controller ID 1110 is an identifier for identifying the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the device 110 is connected.
- the HAN 130 to which the device 110 is connected is an example in which two controllers are connected. However, if at least one controller is connected, the number of controllers to be connected is not necessarily limited to two. I can't.
- the certificate ID 1120 is an identifier for identifying the public key certificate ID issued from the certificate authority in association with the private key stored in the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1110.
- the controller type 1130 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1110, and is information indicating the controller type.
- the country 1140 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1110, and is information indicating the country of production. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- the company 1150 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1110, and is information indicating the manufacturing company. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the authentication information holding unit 970 is realized by a memory, connected to the authentication processing unit 940, and has a function of storing a secret key, a public key certificate, and a CRL.
- the secret key is embedded in the ROM or the non-volatile memory so that the device 110 is not read or rewritten from outside the device 110 when the device 110 is manufactured.
- the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 is the same as the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 of the controller 120.
- the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 will be described as the CRL 600 shown in FIG. 6, similarly to the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 of the controller 120.
- CRL 700 and CRL 800 are the same as long as they are the same as the CRL stored in the unit 270.
- the information management unit 930 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 910, the authentication processing unit 940, the device information holding unit 950, and the controller information holding unit 960.
- a function for controlling the device information holding unit 950, a function for managing the device information 1000 stored in the device information holding unit 950, a function for controlling the controller information holding unit 960, and a controller stored in the controller information holding unit 960 A function of managing the information 1100.
- the authentication processing unit 940 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 910, the information management unit 930, and the authentication information holding unit 970, and controls the authentication information holding unit 970.
- the server 140 is a computer system connected to the network 150, and (1) a CRL issuing function for issuing a CRL, (2) a controller communication function for communicating with the controller 120, and (3) for controlling the device 110.
- a device control signal generation function for generating the device control signal, and (4) a link function that links and manages the controller 120 and the device 110.
- FIG. 12 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the server 140.
- the server 140 includes a communication unit 1210, a CRL management unit 1230, an encryption processing unit 1240, a device information holding unit 1270, a CRL holding unit 1250, an encryption key holding unit 1260, a device
- the information management unit 1280 includes a device control unit 1290.
- the communication unit 1210 is realized by a processor that executes a program, a communication LSI having a communication function, and a memory, and includes a CRL management unit 1230, a cryptographic processing unit 1240, a device information management unit 1280, and a device.
- the controller 1290 is connected to the network 150 and has a function of communicating with devices connected to the network 150.
- the device control unit 1290 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory.
- the device control unit 1290 generates a device control signal for controlling the device 110, and the communication unit 1210 when the device control signal is generated. And a function of causing the generated device control signal to be transmitted to the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the target device 110 is connected.
- the device information holding unit 1270 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the device information management unit 1280, and has a function of storing device information.
- FIG. 13 is a data configuration diagram of device information 1300 which is an example of device information stored in the device information holding unit 1270.
- the device information 1300 includes a controller ID 1360, a controller type 1370, a controller certificate ID 1380, a device ID 1310, a device certificate ID 1320, a model 1330, a country 1340, and a company 1350. Are associated with each other.
- Controller ID 1360 is an identifier for identifying the controller 120.
- the controller type 1370 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1360, and is information indicating the controller type.
- Attribute information eg, country, company, etc.
- other attribute information eg, country, company, etc.
- the controller certificate ID 1380 is an identifier for identifying the public key certificate issued by the certificate authority in association with the private key stored in the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1360.
- the device ID 1310 is an identifier for identifying the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 identified by the associated controller ID 1360 is connected.
- the device certificate ID 1320 is an identifier for identifying the public key certificate issued from the certificate authority in association with the private key stored in the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 1310.
- the model 1330 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 1310, and is information indicating the model.
- Country 1340 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 310, and is information indicating the country of production.
- the company 1350 is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 identified by the associated device ID 310, and is information indicating the manufacturing company.
- the CRL holding unit 1250 is realized by a memory, is connected to the CRL management unit 1230, and has a function of storing basic CRL and distribution CRL issuing information.
- FIG. 14 is a data configuration diagram of a basic CRL 1400 that is an example of a basic CRL stored in the CRL holding unit 1250.
- the basic CRL 1400 includes a CRL version 1410, an issuer 1420, a valid period start date 1430, a valid period end date 1440, a revoked certificate ID group 1450, and a signature 1460.
- the revoked certificate ID group 1450 includes all public key certificates that have been revoked in the past by the certificate authority.
- FIG. 15 is a data configuration diagram of CRL issuing information 1500 that is an example of CRL issuing information stored in the CRL holding unit 1250.
- the CRL issuing information 1500 is configured by associating a revoked certificate ID 1520, a model 1530, a country 1540, and a company 1550.
- the revoked certificate ID 1520 is an identifier for identifying the public key certificate revoked by the certificate authority.
- the revoked certificate ID 1520 includes all public key certificates that have been revoked in the past by the certificate authority.
- the model 1530 is information indicating the model of the device or the controller type of the controller that is the target of issuing the public key certificate identified by the associated invalid certificate ID 1520.
- Country 1540 is information indicating the country of production of the device or controller that is the target of issuing the public key certificate identified by the associated revoked certificate ID 1520.
- the company 1550 is information indicating a manufacturing company of a device or a controller to which a public key certificate identified by the associated revoked certificate ID 1520 is issued.
- the encryption key holding unit 1260 is realized by a memory, connected to the encryption processing unit 1240, and stores a signature private key.
- the secret key is embedded in a ROM or a non-volatile memory so that it is not read or rewritten from outside the server 140 when the server 140 is manufactured.
- the device information management unit 1280 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 1210, the CRL management unit 1230, and the device information holding unit 1270.
- the device information 1300 is updated and managed based on the function of controlling, the function of associating the controller 120 and the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected, and the associating of the controller 120 and the device 110. It has the function to do.
- the cryptographic processing unit 1240 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 1210, the CRL management unit 1230, and the cryptographic key holding unit 1260, and is stored in the cryptographic key holding unit 1260.
- the CRL has a function of signing the CRL using the encryption key.
- the CRL management unit 1230 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 1210, the device information management unit 1280, the cryptographic processing unit 1240, and the CRL holding unit 1250, and the CRL. It has a function of controlling the holding unit 1250, a function of updating and managing the basic CRL 1400 and the CRL issuing information 1500 stored in the CRL holding unit 1250, and a function of issuing a CRL to be distributed to the controller 120.
- the authentication system 100 performs device registration processing and device CRL update processing as characteristic operations.
- the device registration process is a process performed by the device 110, the controller 120, and the server 140 in cooperation.
- the server 140 110 is a process of registering 110.
- registering a new device 110 by the server 140 means updating the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270 by adding information related to the new device 110.
- 16 and 17 are flowcharts of the device registration process.
- the device registration process starts when a new device 110 is newly connected to the HAN 130.
- this new device 110 is referred to as “device 110X”.
- the device 110X is newly connected to the HAN 130 with respect to the controller 120 connected to the connected HAN 130 (hereinafter simply referred to as “controller 120”). Is transmitted, a device ID of the own device, a public key certificate stored by the own device, and device attribute information which is attribute information of the own device (step S1600).
- the device attribute information is the model of the device 110 and the CRL stored in the device 110 and the controller 120 is the CRL 600.
- the device attribute information is the country of the device 110 and the CRL stored in the device 110 and the controller 120 is CRL 700
- the device attribute information is the company of the device 110 and is stored in the device 110 and the controller 120. The same applies to the case where the CRL to be executed is CRL800.
- the controller 120 When the controller 120 receives the connection request signal, the device ID, the public key certificate, and the device attribute information transmitted from the device 110X, the controller 120 requests the server 140 to issue a new CRL.
- the first CRL issuance request signal shown, the received device attribute information, and the controller attribute information that is the own device's attribute information are transmitted (step S1605).
- the controller attribute information is the controller type of the controller 120. The same applies to the case where the controller attribute information is the country of the controller 120 and the controller attribute information is the company of the controller 120.
- the server 140 determines the model of the device 110X based on the received device attribute information and the controller attribute information.
- the CRL 600 including only the controller type of the controller 120 as attribute information and including the revoked certificate ID group for only the model of the device 110X and the controller type of the controller 120 is generated (hereinafter, the generated CRL 600 is generated). Is called “CRL600X”), and the generated CRL600X is transmitted to the controller 120 (step S1610).
- this CRL 600X is described only for the revoked certificate ID group for only the model of the device 110X and the controller type of the controller 120, the number of revoked certificate IDs is smaller than that of the basic CRL 1400. Yes. For this reason, when searching using a revoked certificate ID, the amount of processing required for the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the basic CRL 1400. Further, since the file size is also reduced, the storage capacity required for storing the CRL 600X can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the basic CRL 1400.
- the controller 120 searches whether or not the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the device 110X is described in the CRL 600X (step S1615).
- step S1615 when the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the device 110X is not described in the CRL 600X (step S1615: No), the controller 120 displays the public key certificate transmitted from the device 110X. The signature of the key certificate is verified (step S1620).
- step S1615 when the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the device 110X is described in the CRL 600X (step S1615: Yes), in the process of step S1620, the public key certificate ID When the verification is not successful (step S1620: No), the controller 120 notifies the device 110X of an error, sets the device 110X as a revoke target, and stores the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250 in the device information 300. Information relating to 110X is not added (step S1625).
- step S1620 if the verification of the public key certificate is successful (step S1620: Yes), the controller 120 generates a random number, and generates the generated random number, its own controller ID, and the device 110X.
- the public key certificate stored in its own device and the CRL 600X are transmitted (step S1630).
- the device 110X Upon receiving the random number, controller ID, public key certificate, and CRL 600X transmitted from the controller 120, the device 110X receives the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the controller 120 in the CRL 600X. Is searched (step S1635).
- step S1635 when the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the controller 120 is not described in the CRL 600X (step S1635: No), the device 110X transmits the public key certificate transmitted from the controller 120. The signature of the key certificate is verified (step S1640).
- step S1635 when the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate transmitted from the controller 120 is described in the CRL 600X (step S1635: Yes), in the process of step S1640, the public key certificate ID When the verification is not successful (step S1640: No), the device 110X notifies the controller 120 of an error, sets the controller 120 as a revocation target, and stores the controller information 1100 stored in the controller information holding unit 960 in the controller information 1100. Information related to 120 is not added (step S1645).
- step S1640 when the verification of the public key certificate is successful (step S1640: Yes), the device 110X generates a signature from the random number transmitted from the controller 120 and the private key stored in the own device. (Step S1650).
- the signature may be, for example, a signature by ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm: see Non-Patent Document 3).
- the device 110X When the signature is generated, the device 110X generates a random number, and transmits the generated signature and the generated random number to the controller 120 (step S1700 (see FIG. 17)).
- the controller 120 When the controller 120 receives the random number and the signature transmitted from the device 110X, the controller 120 verifies the signature transmitted from the device 110X (step S1710).
- step S1710 when the signature verification is not successful (step S1710: No), the controller 120 notifies the device 110X of an error, makes the device 110X a revocation target, and is stored in the device information holding unit 250. The information related to the device 110X is not added to the device information 300 (step S1720).
- step S1710 when the signature verification is successful (step S1710: Yes), the controller 120 generates a signature from the random number transmitted from the device 110X and the private key stored in the own device (step S1730). ), And transmits the generated signature to the device 110X (step S1740).
- the device 110X Upon receiving the signature transmitted from the controller 120, the device 110X verifies the signature transmitted from the controller 120 (step S1750).
- step S1750 If the signature verification is not successful in the process of step S1750 (step S1750: No), the device 110X notifies the controller 120 of an error, makes the controller 120 a revocation target, and is stored in the controller information holding unit 960. Information related to the controller 120 is not added to the controller information 1100 (step S1760).
- step S1750 when the signature verification is successful (step S1750: Yes), the device 110X notifies the controller 120 of success, acquires necessary information from the controller 120, and sends it to the controller information holding unit 960.
- the controller 120 is registered by adding information related to the controller 120 to the stored controller information 1100 (step S1770).
- the controller 120 acquires necessary information from the device 110X, and adds information related to the device 110X to the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250.
- the device 110X is registered, and the information acquired from the device 110X and the controller ID of the own device are transmitted to the server 140 (step S1780).
- the server 140 When the server 140 receives the information of the device 110X and the controller ID of the controller 120, the server 140 associates the device 110X with the controller 120, and stores the controller information of the controller 120 in the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270.
- the device 110X is registered by adding information related to the device 110X in association with the ID (step S1790).
- step S1625 ends, when the process of step S1645 ends, when the process of step S1720 ends, when the process of step S1760 ends, and when the process of step S1790 ends
- the authentication system 100 ends the device registration process.
- FIG. 18 is a sequence diagram of processing performed by the device 110X, the controller 120, and the server 140 in the device registration process.
- step S1615 is No
- the process of step S1620 is Yes
- the process of step S1635 is No
- the process of step S1640 is Yes
- the process of step S1710 is Yes
- the process of step S1750 is Yes.
- the device 110X transmits a connection request signal, a device ID, a public key certificate, and device attribute information to the controller 120 (step S1800: corresponding to step S1600).
- the controller 120 transmits a first CRL issuance request signal, device attribute information, and controller attribute information to the server 140 (step S1805: corresponding to step S1605).
- the server 140 generates CRL 600X including device attribute information (step S1810: corresponding to step S1610), and transmits the generated CRL 600X to the controller 120 (step S1815: corresponding to step S1610).
- the controller 120 confirms that the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the device 110X is not described in the CRL 600X (corresponding to Step S1820: Step S1615: No).
- step S1825 step S1620: Yes, corresponding to step S1630.
- step S1830 equivalent to step S1630).
- the device 110X confirms that the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the controller 120 is not described in the CRL 600X (corresponding to Step S1835: Step S1635: No).
- step S1840 step S1640: Yes, corresponding to step S1650.
- step S1845 equivalent to step S1700
- step S1850 corresponding to step S1700
- step S1855 step S1710: Yes, corresponding to step S1730.
- controller 120 transmits the signature to the device 110X (corresponding to step S1860: step S1740).
- the device 110X verifies the signature (corresponding to step S1865: step S1750: Yes), notifies the controller 120 of success (corresponding to step S1870: corresponding to step S1770), and registers the controller 120 (step S1875: Corresponding to step S1770).
- the controller 120 transmits the controller ID and the device ID to the server 140 (step S1880: corresponding to step S1780), and registers the device 110X (step S1885: corresponding to step S1780).
- the server 140 registers the device 110X (corresponding to step S1890 and step S1790).
- the device CRL update process is a process performed by the device 110, the controller 120, and the server 140 in cooperation, and is a process for updating the CRL stored in the device 110.
- 19 and 20 are flowcharts of the device CRL update process.
- the device CRL update process is performed when a predetermined condition is satisfied (for example, when the device information 300 stored in the controller 120 is updated by executing the device registration process, and a predetermined date and time (for example, CRL The next issue date, the first day of every month, etc. described in (1), etc.) are started when a predetermined operation is performed on the controller 120 or the device 110).
- a predetermined condition for example, when the device information 300 stored in the controller 120 is updated by executing the device registration process, and a predetermined date and time (for example, CRL The next issue date, the first day of every month, etc. described in (1), etc.) are started when a predetermined operation is performed on the controller 120 or the device 110).
- the controller 120 transmits to the server 140 a second CRL issuance request signal indicating that a new CRL issuance is requested and the controller ID of the own device (step S1900).
- the server 140 refers to the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270, and based on the controller ID transmitted from the controller 120, as the device attribute information, the controller type of the controller 120 and the controller 120 A CRL 600 including only the model of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to be connected is generated (hereinafter, the generated CRL 600 is referred to as “CRL600Y”) and transmitted to the controller 120 (step S1905).
- CRL600Y the generated CRL 600 including only the model of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to be connected
- the attribute information of the device 110 is the model
- the attribute information of the controller 120 is the controller type
- the CRL stored in the device 110 and the controller 120 is the CRL 600.
- the attribute information of the controller 120 is the country
- the CRL stored in the device 110 and the controller 120 is the CRL 700
- the attribute information of the device 110 is a company and the attribute of the controller 120
- the information is a company and the CRL stored in the device 110 and the controller 120 is the CRL 800.
- step S1905 is realized by the following processes as an example.
- the server 140 (1) refers to the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270, and based on the controller ID transmitted from the controller 120, the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected. Identify all of Next, (2) referring to the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270, the controller type of the controller 120 and the model of each of the devices 110 are specified. Then, (3) the CRL issuing information 1500 stored in the CRL holding unit 1250 is referred to, and the expired certificate ID associated with the specified controller type and model is extracted. Further, (4) the CRL 600Y is generated so that all the extracted certificate IDs that have been revoked are included, and the cryptographic processing unit 1240 is made to sign the generated CRL 600Y. Finally, (5) the signed CRL 600Y is transmitted to the controller 120.
- this CRL 600Y is described only for the invalid certificate ID group for only the controller type of the controller 120 and the model of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected, compared to the basic CRL 1400.
- the number of revoked certificate IDs is decreasing. For this reason, when searching for a revoked certificate ID, the processing amount required for the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared to using the basic CRL 1400.
- the file size is also small, the storage capacity required to store the CRL 600Y can be suppressed to a certain extent compared to the basic CRL 1400.
- the controller 120 receives the CRL 600Y transmitted from the server 140, and updates the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 with the received CRL 600Y (step S1910).
- the controller 120 refers to the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250 and includes the CRL 600Y in the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected. It is searched whether or not what is described exists (step S1915).
- the CRL 600Y includes attribute information indicating the device model. Since the controller 120 can use the attribute information of the device in this search, the processing amount related to the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the case of using the CRL not including the attribute information of the device. .
- the public key certificate ID to be searched can be limited to the public key certificate ID that matches the attribute information of the corresponding device.
- the search is limited to 680.
- the processing amount related to the search is suppressed to a certain extent.
- step S1915 when the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected is included in the CRL 600Y (step S1915: Yes), the controller 120 The server 140 is notified of the error, the corresponding device 110 (hereinafter referred to as “device 110Y”) is the target of revocation, and the information related to the device 110Y is deleted from the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250. Thus, the registration of the device 110Y is deleted (step S1920).
- the server 140 deletes the registration of the device 110Y by deleting the information related to the device 110Y from the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270 (step S1925).
- the controller 120 further refers to the device information 300 stored in the device information holding unit 250 and is described in the CRL 600Y in the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected. It is searched whether or not there is any (step S1930).
- the CRL 600Y includes attribute information indicating the device model. Since the controller 120 can use the attribute information of the device in this search, the processing amount related to the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the case of using the CRL not including the attribute information of the device. .
- step S1915 if the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected does not exist in the CRL 600Y (step S1915: No), the process of step S1930 In the processing, when there is a public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected that is not described in the CRL 600Y (step S1930: Yes), the controller 120 The CRL 600Y is transmitted to the device 110 to be operated (step S1935).
- the device 110 receives the CRL 600Y transmitted from the controller 120 and verifies the signature of the CRL 600Y (step S1940).
- step S1940 If the signature of CRL 600Y is successfully verified in the process of step S1940 (step S1940: Yes), the device 110 includes the CRL 600Y in the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the device 110 is connected. It is searched whether or not those described in (1) exist.
- the CRL 600Y includes attribute information indicating the controller type of the controller. Since the device 110 can use the attribute information of the controller in this search, the processing amount related to the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the case of using the CRL not including the attribute information of the controller. .
- the public key certificate ID to be searched can be limited to the public key certificate ID that matches the attribute information of the corresponding controller.
- step S1945 when the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the own device is connected includes the one described in the CRL 600Y (step S1945: Yes), the own device All of the other devices 110 connected to the connected HAN 130 and the server 140 are notified of the error, and the corresponding controller 120 is targeted for revocation, from the controller information 1100 stored in the controller information holding unit 960, the corresponding controller By deleting the information related to 120, the registration of the corresponding controller 120 is deleted (step S1950).
- Non-Patent Document 6 As a method for transmitting information to all devices connected to the HAN 130, there are methods generally called broadcast and multicast, for example, a method described in Non-Patent Document 6.
- Notification to the server 140 is performed without using the corresponding controller 120 (for example, when there is another controller 120 that can communicate with the device 110, the method performed through the controller 120, and the device 110 directly In the case where the device 110 also has a function of communicating with the device 140, if there is a method in which the device 110 communicates directly with the server 140, etc., it is desirable to use that method.
- the other device 110 deletes the registration of the corresponding controller 120 by deleting the information related to the corresponding controller 120 from the controller information 1100 stored in the controller information holding unit 960 with the corresponding controller 120 as a revocation target. (Step S2000 (see FIG. 20)).
- the server 140 deletes the information related to the corresponding controller 120 from the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270 (step S2010).
- step S1945 when the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the own device is connected does not exist in the CRL 600Y (step S1945: No), the processing of step S2010 is performed.
- the device 110 compares the CRL 600Y with the CRL 600 (hereinafter referred to as “CRL 600Z”) stored in the authentication information holding unit 970, and determines whether or not there is any contradiction. Verification is performed (step S2020), and when there is a contradiction between both (step S2020: Yes), an unauthorized controller is specified (step S2030).
- Verification example 1 The device 110 compares the issue date of the CRL 600Y with the next issue date of the CRL 600Z. If the next issue date of CRL 600Z is earlier than the issue date of CRL 600Y, it is determined that the next issue date of CRL 600Z has already passed, and it is determined that there is a contradiction between CRLs. Then, the controller 120 that has transmitted the CRL 600Z to the device 110 is identified as an unauthorized controller on the assumption that the CRL 600 has not been updated.
- Verification example 2 The device 110 compares the CRL version of the CRL 600Y with the CRL version of the CRL 600Z. If the two CRL versions do not match, it is determined that there is a contradiction between the CRLs. Then, the controller 120 that has transmitted the CRL 600 with the old CRL version is identified as an unauthorized controller, assuming that the CRL 600 has not been updated.
- the device 110 When the unauthorized controller is specified, the device 110 notifies all of the other devices 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the own device is connected and the server 140 of the error, makes the unauthorized controller a revocation target, and sends it to the controller information holding unit 960.
- the registration of the unauthorized controller is deleted by deleting the information related to the unauthorized controller from the stored controller information 1100 (step S2040).
- the other device 110 sets the unauthorized controller as a revocation target, and deletes the information related to the unauthorized controller from the controller information 1100 stored in the controller information holding unit 960, thereby deleting the unauthorized controller registration (step S2050).
- the server 140 deletes information related to the unauthorized controller from the device information 1300 stored in the device information holding unit 1270 (step S2060).
- the device 110 checks whether or not the controller 120 that is the transmission source of the CRL 600Y is an unauthorized controller (step S2070).
- step S2020 when there is no contradiction between CRL 600Y and CRL 600Z (step S2020: No), and in the process of step S2070, the controller 120 that is the transmission source of CRL 600Y is not an unauthorized controller (step S2070: No).
- the device 110 updates the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 with the CRL 600Y (step S2080).
- step S2080 When the process of step S2080 is completed and when the controller 120 that is the transmission source of the CRL 600Y is an unauthorized controller in the process of step S2070 (step S2070: Yes), the authentication system 100 performs the device CRL update process. Exit.
- FIG. 21 is a sequence diagram of processing performed by the device 110, the controller 120, and the server 140 in the device CRL update processing.
- step S1915 is No
- step S1940 is Yes
- step S1945 is No
- process of step S2020 is No.
- the controller 120 transmits the second CRL issue request signal and the controller ID to the server 140 (step S2100: corresponding to step S1900).
- the server 140 refers to the device information 1300 and generates the CRL 600Y including the attribute information of the device connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected based on the controller ID (step S2110: corresponding to step S1905).
- the generated CRL 600Y is transmitted to the controller 120 (step S2120: corresponding to step S1905).
- the controller 120 updates the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 with the received CRL 600Y (corresponding to step S2130: step S1910).
- the controller 120 confirms that the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected does not exist in the CRL 600Y (step S2140: step S1915: No.), CRL 600Y is transmitted to device 110 (step S2150: corresponding to step S1935).
- the device 110 succeeds by verifying the received signature of the CRL 600Y (corresponding to Step S2160: Step S1940: Yes), and is included in the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the device 110 is connected. , It is confirmed that there is nothing described in CRL 600Y (corresponding to step S2170: step S1945: No).
- the device 110 confirms that there is no contradiction in the CRL (step S2180: corresponding to step S2020: No), and updates the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 with the CRL 600Y (step S2190: step S2080). Corresponding).
- CRLs for example, CRL 600, CRL 700, and CRL 800
- the server 140 include attribute information of devices (device 110 and controller 120) connected to the HAN 130.
- the controller 120 can use the attribute information of the device included in the CRL in the search for whether or not the public key certificate ID of the device 110 is included in the CRL.
- the public key certificate ID that does not have the possibility of being applicable can be excluded from the search target.
- the processing amount related to the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared to the case of searching using the CRL that does not include the device attribute information.
- the device 110 can use the attribute information of the controller included in the CRL in the search for whether or not the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 is included in the CRL.
- the key certificate ID By limiting the key certificate ID to public key certificate IDs that match the attribute information of the corresponding controller, public key certificate IDs that do not have the possibility of being applicable can be excluded from search targets. As a result, the processing amount related to the search can be suppressed to a certain extent as compared with the case where the search is performed using the CRL that does not include the controller attribute information.
- CRLs issued from the server 140 are revoked only for public key certificate IDs that match the attribute information of the devices (device 110, controller 120) connected to the HAN 130. Since only the certificate ID is described, the file size is smaller than a CRL including all revoked certificate IDs. As a result, the storage capacity required to store the CRL in the device 110 and the controller 120 can be suppressed to a certain extent.
- This authentication system 2200 is an example of a configuration in which when a device is newly purchased by a user who uses the authentication system 2200, the device is provided to the user in a state where a CRL for the user is stored in the device. It has become.
- the authentication system 2200 will be described with reference to the drawings, focusing on differences from the authentication system 100 in the embodiment.
- FIG. 22 is a system configuration diagram showing the configuration of the authentication system 2200.
- the authentication system 2200 is modified from the authentication system 100 according to the first embodiment so that a Web server 2210, a factory 2220, and PCs 2230a to 2230b are added.
- PCs 2230a to 2330b are so-called personal computers installed in the home, and are connected to the network 150 and have a function of communicating with the Web server 2210 via the network 150.
- the PCs 2230a to 2330b are so-called personal computers, but they may be so-called portable terminals such as smartphones.
- PCs 2230a to 2230b are simply referred to as PC 2230 except when it is necessary to explicitly distinguish the PCs 2230a to 2230b.
- the factory 2220 is a manufacturing factory that manufactures the device 110, is connected to the network 150, and communicates with the Web server 2210 via the network 150.
- the factory 2220 can store the CRL transmitted from the Web server 2210 in the authentication information holding unit 970 of the device 110 in the manufacturing process of the device 110.
- FIG. 23 is a schematic diagram showing a state in which the factory 2220 stores the CRL transmitted from the Web server 2210 in the device 110.
- the Web server 2210 is a computer system connected to the network 150, and (1) a site management function for managing a device purchase site used by a user who purchases the device 110, and (2) a user who uses the device purchase site.
- the device information management function for acquiring and managing information related to the device 110 to be purchased, which is input by (3), (3) a CRL issuance request function for requesting the server 140 to issue a CRL, and (4) issuing from the server 140
- a CRL transmission function for transmitting the CRL as a CRL to be stored in the device 110 to be manufactured in the factory 2220 is provided.
- FIG. 24 is a block diagram showing a functional configuration of the Web server 2210.
- the Web server 2210 includes a communication unit 2410, a device information management unit 2420, a content management unit 2430, a device information holding unit 2440, and a content holding unit 2450.
- the communication unit 2410 is realized by a processor that executes a program, a communication LSI having a communication function, and a memory, and is connected to the device information management unit 2420, the content management unit 2430, and the network 150.
- the communication unit 2410 performs SSL communication when communicating with the server 140 and the PC 2230.
- the communication unit 2410 stores certificates and the like necessary for SSL communication.
- the content holding unit 2450 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the content management unit 2430, and has a function of storing the content of the website.
- FIG. 25 is an example of a Web screen configured by content stored by the content holding unit 2450 and displayed by the PC 2230 accessing the device purchase site managed by the Web server 2210.
- the user who uses the device purchase site operates the PC 2230 to access the device purchase site, selects the model of the device owned by the user from the models displayed on the Web screen, and selects the device owned by the user. Information about the model is transmitted to the Web server 2210.
- the model is selected when the device 110 is purchased. However, it is not always necessary to select the model at the time of purchase, and the model may be selected in advance or after the fact.
- the selection target is information on the model of the device owned by the user. However, the selection target is not necessarily limited to the model, and may be information on the country of production or information on the manufacturing company. It is also possible to combine models, countries, and companies.
- the device information holding unit 2440 is realized by a memory as an example, is connected to the device information management unit 2420, and has a function of storing a device management table.
- FIG. 26 is a data configuration diagram of a device management table 2600 that is an example of a device management table stored in the device information holding unit 2440.
- the device management table 2600 includes a user ID 2610, a device number. 2620, a model 2630, a country 2640, and a company 2650 are associated with each other.
- User ID 2610 is an identifier for identifying a user who uses the device management site.
- the user ID 2610 is an E-mail address, but any alphanumeric character string set by the user may be used as long as the user can be identified.
- Equipment No. 2620 is information for specifying the device 110 owned by the user identified by the associated user ID 2610.
- Model 2630 is associated with the device No. This is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 specified by 2620, and is information indicating the model. Examples include an air conditioner, a television, and a washing machine.
- Country 2640 is associated with the device No. This is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 specified by 2620, and is information indicating the country of production. For example, a country name, a code for specifying the country, and the like.
- Company 2650 has associated device No. This is one piece of attribute information indicating the attribute of the device 110 specified by 2620, and is information indicating the manufacturing company. For example, a company name, a code identifying the company, and the like.
- the content management unit 2430 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 2410, the device information management unit 2420, and the content holding unit 2450, and is stored in the content holding unit 2450. And a function of acquiring user information transmitted from the PC 2230 used by a user who accesses the device purchase site.
- the device information management unit 2420 is realized by a processor that executes a program and a memory, and is connected to the communication unit 2410, the content management unit 2430, and the device information holding unit 2440, and is acquired by the content management unit 2430.
- the device management table 2600 stored in the device information holding unit 2440 is updated and managed, and the user who accesses the device purchase site using the PC 2230 performs purchase processing of the device 110.
- the communication unit 2410 is controlled to store the CRL in the device 110 to be manufactured. As a function of transmitting to the factory 2220.
- authentication system 2200 performs device purchase processing and device purchase CRL update processing in addition to device CRL update processing in the first embodiment.
- the device purchase process is a process performed in cooperation by the PC 2230, the Web server 2210, the server 140, and the factory 2220.
- the device 110 is purchased by the device 110. This is a process for storing a CRL for the user who wants to perform the operation.
- FIG. 27 is a flowchart of device purchase processing.
- the device purchase process starts when the PC 2230 operated by the user who purchases the device 110 accesses the Web server 2210.
- the PC 2230 transmits a login request signal for requesting login, a user ID, and a password to the Web server 2210 in accordance with a user operation (step S2700).
- the Web server 2210 When receiving the login request signal, the user ID, and the password, the Web server 2210 confirms whether the received combination of the user ID and the password matches the combination of the user ID and the password already registered in the own device. It is checked whether or not (step S2705).
- step S2705 when the set of the user ID and the password matches (step S2705: Yes), the Web server 2210 notifies the PC 2230 of the login success signal indicating the success of login, the content of the device purchase site, Is transmitted (step S2710).
- the PC 2230 displays the screen of the device purchase site (step S2715).
- the PC 2230 receives user information about the device model owned by the user and transmits it to the Web server 2210 (step S2720).
- the Web server 2210 updates the device management table 2600 stored in the device information holding unit 2440 based on the received user information, and refers to the updated device management table 2600.
- CRL generation user information including the model 2630 associated with the user ID 2610 for identifying the user to be generated is generated (step S2725).
- the CRL generation user information includes a model 2630 associated with a user ID 2610 that identifies a corresponding user, but a country 2640 associated with a user ID 2610 that identifies the corresponding user.
- the Web server 2210 transmits to the server 140 a third CRL issue request signal indicating that a new CRL issuance is requested, and the generated CRL generation user information (step S2730). ).
- the server 140 Upon receiving the third CRL issuance request signal and the CRL generation user information, the server 140, based on the received CRL generation user information, adds a new model that includes only the model included in the CRL generation user information as attribute information.
- the CRL 600 is generated, and the generated CRL 600 is transmitted to the web server 2210 (step S2735).
- the Web server 2210 informs the factory 2220 of the device No. that identifies the device 110 to be purchased by the user. Then, the received CRL 600 is transmitted (step S2740).
- the factory 2220 receives the received device No.
- the received CRL 600 is stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 of the device 110 specified by (1), and the device 110 is manufactured (step S2745).
- step S2705 when the pair of the user ID and the password does not match (step S2705: No), the Web server 2210 transmits a login failure signal indicating the login failure to the PC 2230 (step S2750).
- the PC 2230 When receiving the login failure signal, the PC 2230 displays a login failure screen indicating that the login has failed (step S2755).
- the authentication system 2200 ends the device purchase process when the process of step S2755 ends and when the process of step S2745 ends.
- FIG. 28 is a sequence diagram of processes performed by the PC 2230, the Web server 2210, and the server 140 in the device purchase process.
- This figure is a sequence diagram when the process of step S2705 is Yes.
- the PC 2230 transmits a login request signal, a user ID, and a password to the Web server 2210 (step S2800: corresponding to step S2700).
- the Web server 2210 confirms that the combination of the transmitted user ID and password matches the combination of the user ID and password already registered in its own device (step S2810: step S2705: Yes). ), A login success signal and the content of the device purchase site are transmitted to the PC 2230 (step S2820: corresponding to step S2710).
- the PC 2230 displays the screen of the device purchase site and accepts input of user information by an operation performed by the user (step S2830: corresponding to step S2715 and step S2720).
- the PC 2230 transmits user information to the Web server 2210 (step S2840: corresponding to step S2720).
- the Web server 2210 updates the device management table 2600 based on the received user information to generate CRL generation user information (step S2850: corresponding to step S2725).
- the Web server 2210 transmits the third CRL issue request signal and the generated CRL generation user information to the server 140 (step S2860: corresponding to step S2730).
- the server 140 generates a CRL 600 including device attribute information based on the CRL generation user information (step S2870: corresponding to step S2735) and transmits it to the Web server 2210 (step S2880: corresponding to step S2735). .
- the Web server 2210 sends a device No. And the received CRL 600, and the factory 2220 transmits the device No.
- the received CRL 600 is stored in the device 110 specified by (1), and the device 110 is manufactured (corresponding to Step S2890: Step S2740 and Step S2745).
- the CRL update process at the time of device purchase is a process performed by the device 110, the controller 120, and the server 140 in cooperation.
- the device 110 newly purchased by the user using the authentication system 2200 (hereinafter referred to as “new device 110”). ”) Is connected to the HAN 130, the CRL 600 stored in the device 110 (hereinafter referred to as“ existing device 110 ”) already connected to the HAN 130 and the CRL 600 stored in the controller 120 are updated. It is processing.
- 29 to 31 are flowcharts of the CRL update process at the time of device purchase.
- the CRL update process at the time of device purchase starts when the new device 110 is connected to the HAN 130.
- This device CRL update process at the time of device purchase includes processing similar to the processing included in the device CRL update processing in the first embodiment.
- the new device 110 transmits the CRL 600 stored in the own device to all the existing devices 110 and the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the own device is connected (step S2900). ).
- steps S2910 to S3080 will be described as a process in the existing device
- steps S3100 to S3140 will be described as a process in the controller.
- step S2900 When the process in step S2900 is completed, the process in the existing device and the process in the controller are started.
- the existing device 110 when the existing device 110 receives the CRL 600 transmitted from the new device 110, the existing device 110 verifies the signature of the received CRL 600 (step S2910).
- step S2910 when the signature verification of the CRL 600 is successful (step S2910: Yes), the existing device 110 compares the received CRL version of the CRL 600 with the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device. (Step S2920).
- step S2920 When the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is older than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device (step S2920: Yes), the existing device 110 gives an error to the new device 110. Is notified (step S2930).
- step S2920 if the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is not older than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device (step S2920: No), the process proceeds to the process of step S2945.
- step S2945, the processing of step S2950, the processing of step S3000 to the processing of step S3080 are respectively the processing of step S1945 and the processing of step S1950 of the device CRL update processing (see FIGS. 19 and 20) in the first embodiment.
- the process is the same as the process from Step S2000 to Step S2080. Therefore, it has already been explained.
- the controller 120 verifies the signature of the received CRL 600 (step S3100).
- step S3100 when the signature verification of the CRL 600 is successful (step S3100: Yes), the controller 120 compares the received CRL version of the CRL 600 with the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device ( Step S3105).
- step S3105 When the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is older than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device (step S3105: Yes), the existing device 110 gives an error to the new device 110. Is notified (step S3110).
- step S3105 if the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is not older than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device (step S3105: No), the process proceeds to the process of step S3115.
- step S3115 to step S3125 are the same as the processes from step S1915 to step S1925 of the device CRL update process (see FIGS. 19 and 20) in the first embodiment. Therefore, it has already been explained.
- step S3115 if the public key certificate ID of the device 110 connected to the HAN 130 to which the controller 120 is connected does not exist in the received CRL 600 (step S1915: No), When the process of S3125 ends, the controller 120 updates the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 with the received CRL 600 (step S3140).
- step S2910 when verification of the CRL 600 signature is not successful (step S2910: No), when the process of step S2930 ends, and in the process of step S3070, the controller 120 that is the transmission source of the CRL 600 When the controller is an unauthorized controller (step S3070: Yes), when the process of step S3080 is completed, when the verification of the CRL 600 signature is not successful in the process of step S3100 (step S3100: No), step When the process of S3110 is completed and when the process of step S3140 is completed, the authentication system 2200 ends the CRL update process at the time of device purchase.
- FIG. 32 is a sequence diagram of processing performed by the new device 110, the existing device 110, and the controller 120 in the CRL update processing at the time of device purchase.
- step S2910 is Yes
- the process of step S2920 is No
- the process of step S2945 is No
- the process of step S3020 is No
- the process of step S3100 is Yes
- the process of step S3105 is No.
- the sequence diagram when the process of step S3115 is No is shown.
- the new device 110 transmits the CRL 600 stored in the device itself to all the existing devices 110 and the controllers 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the device itself is connected (step S3200).
- Step S3205 Corresponds to step S2900).
- step S3210 corresponding to step S2910: Yes
- the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is more than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored in the own device. It is confirmed that it is not old (corresponding to Step S3215: Step S2920: No).
- the existing device 110 confirms that the public key certificate ID of the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 to which the own device is connected is not described in the CRL 600 (step S3220: step S2945: (Corresponding to No), confirming that there is no contradiction in the CRL (step S3225: corresponding to step S3020: No), and updating the CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 970 with the received CRL 600 (step S3230: step) Corresponding to S3080).
- the controller 120 succeeds in verifying the signature of the received CRL 600 (corresponding to Step S3235: Step S3100: Yes), and the received CRL version of the CRL 600 is more than the CRL version of the CRL 600 stored by itself. It is confirmed that it is not old (corresponding to step S3240: step S3105: No).
- step S3240 step S3115: The CRL stored in the authentication information holding unit 270 is updated with the received CRL 600 (corresponding to No) (step S3250: corresponding to step S3140).
- the other device 110 and the controller 120 connected to the HAN 130 are stored in the purchased device, and the own device stores the CRL. If it is not older than the CRL, the CRL stored in the own device is updated with the CRL stored in the purchased device.
- the device 110 acquires the CRL issued by the server 140 by communicating with the server 140 via the controller 120, but the device 110 receives the CRL issued by the server 140. If it can acquire, it will not necessarily be restricted to the structure acquired via the controller 120.
- the device 110 may have a function of directly communicating with the server 140. As another example, it may be acquired via another terminal having a function of communicating with the server 140 other than the controller 120. As another example, it may be acquired via another device 110 having a function of directly communicating with the server 140.
- the communication between the controller 120 and the device 110 and between the devices 110 are NFC (Near Field Communication) communication, Bluetooth (registered trademark) communication, Wi-Fi Direct (registered trademark) communication, specific low power wireless communication, power line communication. It may be.
- NFC Near Field Communication
- Bluetooth registered trademark
- Wi-Fi Direct registered trademark
- specific low power wireless communication power line communication. It may be.
- the device 110 when the device 110 makes the controller 120 a revocation target, the device 110 notifies the other device 110 and the other controller 120 of an error.
- the received device 110 and controller 120 have a screen display function, a display screen indicating that an unauthorized controller (controller that the device 110 is a revocation target) may be displayed.
- the error code When there is no screen display function, the error code may be displayed or the lamp may be blinked. Further, it is possible to simply ignore a control command from an unauthorized controller without executing it.
- the key for encryption communication may be exchanged between the device 110 and the controller 120 during the device registration process.
- DH Densfie-Hellman
- ECDH ECDH
- the controller 120 may display the power consumption amount of the device 110, the power amount of the storage battery, and the power generation amount of solar power generation.
- the controller 120 may be a distribution board installed at home.
- information indicating a model information indicating a country, and information indicating a company are described as examples. For example, it is not necessarily limited to these. As an example, information indicating a manufacturing year can be considered.
- the constituent elements constituting each device included in the authentication system 100 may be configured by one system LSI.
- the system LSI is an ultra-multifunctional LSI manufactured by integrating a plurality of components on a single chip, and specifically, a computer system including a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, and the like. .
- a computer program is recorded in the RAM.
- the system LSI achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program.
- constituent elements constituting each of the above-described devices may be individually made into one chip, or may be made into one chip so as to include some or all.
- the system LSI is used here, it may be called IC, LSI, super LSI, or ultra LSI depending on the degree of integration. Further, the method of circuit integration is not limited to LSI's, and implementation using dedicated circuitry or general purpose processors is also possible.
- An FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- a reconfigurable processor that can reconfigure the connection and setting of circuit cells inside the LSI may be used.
- each device included in the authentication system 100 may be configured from an IC card or a single module that can be attached to and detached from each device.
- the IC card or module is a computer system that includes a microprocessor, ROM, RAM, and the like.
- the IC card or the module may include the super multifunctional LSI described above.
- the IC card or the module achieves its functions by the microprocessor operating according to the computer program. This IC card or this module may have tamper resistance.
- the computer program or digital signal according to the authentication system 100 is stored in a computer-readable recording medium such as a flexible disk, hard disk, CD-ROM, MO, DVD, DVD-ROM, or DVD-RAM.
- BD Blu-ray (registered trademark) Disc
- semiconductor memory etc. may be used.
- the computer program or digital signal related to the authentication system 100 may be transmitted via an electric communication line, a wireless or wired communication line, a network represented by the Internet, a data broadcast, or the like.
- the computer program or digital signal related to the authentication system 100 is recorded on a computer-readable recording medium and transferred, or the computer program or digital signal related to the authentication system 100 is transferred via a network or the like. By doing so, it may be implemented by another independent computer system.
- An authentication method is an authentication method for at least one device among a plurality of devices connected to a HAN (Home Area Network), and includes a first method of the plurality of devices.
- One device authenticates the validity of the second device using a CRL (Certificate Revocation List) including identification information and attribute information of the second device of the plurality of devices, and denies the validity authentication.
- the first device revokes the second device when it is desired.
- the first device performs a search to determine whether or not the public key certificate ID of the public key certificate of the second device is described in the CRL.
- the attribute information of the second device included in the CRL can be used. For this reason, it becomes possible to suppress the processing amount concerning a search to a certain extent.
- the attribute information may include information related to the model of the second device.
- information on the device model to be authenticated can be used for authentication of the device.
- the information related to the model of the second device may include information indicating that the second device is a model of a device having a function controlled by another device.
- the information related to the model of the second device may include information indicating that the second device is a model of a controller having a function of controlling another device.
- information about the model when the device to be authenticated is a controller can be used for authentication of the device.
- the attribute information may include information related to a country in which the second device is manufactured.
- the attribute information may include information related to a company that manufactured the second device.
- the first device may have a function of communicating with a server outside the HAN, and the CRL may be received by the first device from the server.
- the CRL generated by the server outside the HAN can be used for authentication.
- the first device acquires attribute information about the second device from the second device, transmits the acquired attribute information to the server, and the server transmits the transmitted information.
- the attribute information may be received, a CRL may be generated based on the received attribute information, and the generated CRL may be transmitted to the first device.
- the server can generate the CRL by determining the attribute information included in the CRL based on the device information of the second device.
- the server generates the CRL so as not to include at least a part of information specified not to be used for the validity authentication based on the received device information. It is good.
- the server can suppress the attribute information included in the CRL to a certain extent.
- the CRL classifies the device having the first attribute and the device having the second attribute into different tree structures, and the authentication of the validity is performed by the second device. Only the corresponding tree structure may be searched depending on whether the attribute information is the first attribute or the second attribute.
- the authentication method according to the present disclosure can be widely used for authentication of devices connected to the HAN.
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Abstract
Description
HANに接続される可能性のあるデバイスとして、家庭内に設置された家電やAV機器などの多種多様なデバイスが想定されている。このため、BDプレーヤなどの特定の機器を対象としたCRLと比べて、本システムにおけるCRLに記載される対象となる失効した公開鍵証明書の公開鍵証明書IDが多くなる。
<概要>
以下、本開示に係る認証方法の一態様として、CRLを発行するサーバと、サーバとネットワークで接続されたコントローラと、コントローラとHANで接続された機器とからなる認証システムについて説明する。
図1は、認証システム100の構成を示すシステム構成図である。
認証システム100は、その特徴的な動作として、機器登録処理と、機器CRL更新処理とを行う。
機器登録処理は、機器110と、コントローラ120と、サーバ140とが協働で行う処理であって、新たな機器110が、新たにHAN130に接続された場合に、サーバ140が、その新たな機器110を登録する処理である。ここで、サーバ140が新たな機器110を登録するとは、デバイス情報保持部1270に記憶されるデバイス情報1300に対して、その新たな機器110に係る情報を追加して更新することを言う。
機器CRL更新処理は、機器110と、コントローラ120と、サーバ140とが協働で行う処理であって、機器110の記憶するCRLを更新する処理である。
上記構成の認証システム100において、サーバ140から発行されるCRL(例えば、CRL600、CRL700、CRL800)には、HAN130に接続されるデバイス(機器110、コントローラ120)の属性情報が含まれている。
<概要>
以下、本開示に係る認証方法の一態様として、実施の形態1における認証システム100の一部が変形された認証システム2200について説明する。
図22は、認証システム2200の構成を示すシステム構成図である。
認証システム2200は、その特徴的な動作として、実施の形態1における機器CRL更新処理に加えて、機器購入処理と、機器購入時CRL更新処理とを行う。
機器購入時処理は、PC2230と、Webサーバ2210と、サーバ140と、工場2220とが協働で行う処理であって、機器110が購入される際に、その機器110に、その機器110を購入するユーザ向けのCRLを記憶させる処理である。
機器購入時CRL更新処理は、機器110と、コントローラ120と、サーバ140とが協働で行う処理であって、認証システム2200を利用するユーザが新規に購入した機器110(以下、「新規機器110」と呼ぶ。)をHAN130に接続する場合において、既にHAN130に接続されている機器110(以下、「既存機器110」と呼ぶ。)の記憶するCRL600と、コントローラ120の記憶するCRL600とを更新する処理である。
上記構成の認証システム2200によると、認証システム2200を利用するユーザによって機器が購入された場合に、その購入時点における最新のCRLが、その購入された機器に記憶されることとなる。
以上、本開示に係る認証方法の一態様として、実施の形態1、実施の形態2において、認証システムを例示して説明したが、以下のように変形することも可能であり、実施の形態1、実施の形態2において例示した認証システムで例示された通りの認証方法に限られないことはもちろんである。
110 機器
120 コントローラ
130 HAN
140 サーバ
150 ネットワーク
Claims (10)
- HAN(Home Area Network)に接続される複数のデバイスの内の少なくとも1つのデバイスについての認証方法であって、
前記複数のデバイスの内の第1デバイスが、前記複数のデバイスの内の第2デバイスの識別情報および属性情報を含むCRL(Certificate Revocation List)を用いて、当該第2デバイスの正当性を認証し、
前記正当性の認証が否定的である場合に、前記第1デバイスが、前記第2デバイスをリボークする
ことを特徴とする認証方法。 - 前記属性情報は、前記第2デバイスの機種に係る情報を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載の認証方法。 - 前記第2デバイスの機種に係る情報は、前記第2デバイスが、他のデバイスによって制御される機能を有する機器の機種であることを示す情報を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項2記載の認証方法。 - 前記第2デバイスの機種に係る情報は、前記第2デバイスが、他のデバイスを制御する機能を有するコントローラの機種であることを示す情報を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項2記載の認証方法。 - 前記属性情報は、前記第2デバイスを製造した国に係る情報を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載の認証方法。 - 前記属性情報は、前記第2デバイスを製造した会社に係る情報を含む
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載の認証方法。 - 前記第1デバイスは、前記HAN外部のサーバと通信する機能を有し、
前記CRLは、前記第1デバイスが前記サーバから受信したものである
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載の認証方法。 - 前記第1デバイスが、前記第2デバイスから、前記第2デバイスについての属性情報を取得して、当該取得した属性情報を前記サーバへ送信し、
前記サーバが、前記送信された属性情報を受信して、当該受信した属性情報に基づいてCRLを生成して、当該生成したCRLを、前記第1デバイスに送信する
ことを特徴とする請求項7記載の認証方法。 - 前記サーバは、前記CRLの生成を、前記受信した機器情報に基づいて、前記正当性の認証に利用されないと特定される情報のうちの少なくとも一部が含まれないように行う
ことを特徴とする請求項7記載の認証方法。 - 前記CRLは、第1の属性を有したデバイスと、第2の属性を有したデバイスとを異なる木構造に分類しており、
前記正当性の認証は、前記第2デバイスの属性情報が、前記第1の属性であるか前記第2の属性であるかによって、該当する木構造のみ探索する
ことを特徴とする請求項1記載の認証方法。
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