WO2015015300A2 - Procédé de gestion de la sécurité dans un système double connectivité - Google Patents

Procédé de gestion de la sécurité dans un système double connectivité Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2015015300A2
WO2015015300A2 PCT/IB2014/001839 IB2014001839W WO2015015300A2 WO 2015015300 A2 WO2015015300 A2 WO 2015015300A2 IB 2014001839 W IB2014001839 W IB 2014001839W WO 2015015300 A2 WO2015015300 A2 WO 2015015300A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
senb
user equipment
menb
rrc connection
security
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2014/001839
Other languages
English (en)
Other versions
WO2015015300A3 (fr
Inventor
Yun DENG
Pingping Wen
Chandrika Worrall
Original Assignee
Alcatel Lucent
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Alcatel Lucent filed Critical Alcatel Lucent
Publication of WO2015015300A2 publication Critical patent/WO2015015300A2/fr
Publication of WO2015015300A3 publication Critical patent/WO2015015300A3/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/15—Setup of multiple wireless link connections
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W74/00—Wireless channel access
    • H04W74/08—Non-scheduled access, e.g. ALOHA
    • H04W74/0833—Random access procedures, e.g. with 4-step access

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the wireless communication technology, and particularly to a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a macro eNB, a secondary eNB and a user equipment of a wireless communication network.
  • Fig. l illustrates a schematic diagram 100 of a network architecture in the prior art, and as can be apparent, in such a network environment, a macro cell 110 provides underlying network coverage (as illustrated by a dotted background in the figure), and in the meantime, for example, small cells 121 , 122, 123 and 124 at small power (that is, with small network coverage (areas illustrated by oblique lines in the figure)) provide a possible network access at a higher speed.
  • the UE within the communal coverage may establish communication connections with the macro cell and the secondary cell simultaneously.
  • 3 GPP has identified potential protocol architectures to support dual connectivity for UE with MeNB (Master eNB) and SeNB (Secondary eNB).
  • MeNB Master eNB
  • SeNB Secondary eNB
  • Option CI Only the MeNB generates the final RRC messages to be sent towards the UE after the coordination of Radio Resource Management (RRM) functions between MeNB and SeNB.
  • RRM Radio Resource Management
  • Both MeNB and SeNB can generate final RRC messages to be sent towards the UE after the coordination of RRM functions between MeNB and SeNB and may send those messages directly to the UE (depending on L2 architecture) and the UE replies accordingly.
  • S l-U terminates in SeNB + independent PDCPs (no bearer split);
  • S l-U terminates in MeNB + no bearer split in MeNB + independent PDCP at SeNB;
  • S l-U terminates in MeNB + bearer split in MeNB + independent PDCPs for split bearers;
  • SeNB can generate RRC messages to be sent towards UE directly (i.e. Option C2), SeNB must have PDCP entity, which can ensure the RRC message security.
  • PDCP entity For the alternative user plane architectures, 1 A, 2A, 2B, 3A and 3B require PDCP entity in SeNB. 2C, 2D, 3C and 3D make PDCP entity in MeNB.
  • the architecture combination is C1+ 2C, 2D, 3C or 3D
  • one security key is sufficient.
  • two security keys are necessary.
  • the architecture combination C1+ 1A, 2A, 2B, 3A or 3B only data needs different security key; for the architecture combination C2+ 2C, 2D, 3C or 3D, only SRB in SeNB needs different security key.
  • the current specification only deals with the scenario that the network provides one security key for UE. As mentioned above, it is necessary to deal with two security keys for dual connectivity.
  • a first aspect of the invention proposes a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a MeNB of a wireless communication system, wherein the wireless communication system includes the MeNB, a SeNB and a user equipment, the method comprising:
  • the MeNB determining to establish a second RRC connection for the user equipment and the SeNB, so as to form dual connectivity
  • the MeNB or the SeNB selecting a security algorithm used for the SeNB and the MeNB sending RRC connection configuration including the security algorithm to the user equipment to indicate the SeNB to establish the second RRC connection with the user equipment according to the RRC connection configuration, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity.
  • the method according to the present invention may establish respective RRC connection between the MeNB and the user equipment and between the SeNB and the user equipment by using different security algorithms.
  • RRC connection in the context is named as a first RRC connection and a second RRC connection.
  • the method, before the step (B), further comprises:
  • the MeNB may receive information about the security key used in access network node from the core network node, for example, MME (Mobility Management Entity).
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • the step (D) further comprises generating a second security key used for the second RRC connection based on the first security key.
  • a second security key is derived from the first security key used for the first RRC connection.
  • the second security key may be used for the second RRC connection to improve the security of the second RRC connection.
  • the second security key is generated for the second RRC connection based on the downlink frequency and physical cell identifier of the cell managed by the SeNB and the managed cell is the serving cell of the user equipment used for establishing the second RRC connection.
  • the second security key may be generated based on the first security key in any other known ways.
  • step (D) if the security algorithm used for the SeNB is selected by the MeNB, then the MeNB firstly obtains a configuration list of ciphering algorithm and integrity algorithm used in the SeNB and the MeNB sends the selected security algorithm used for the SeNB to the SeNB; or
  • the MeNB sends the security capability of the user equipment to the SeNB and the SeNB sends the selected security algorithm used for the SeNB to the MeNB.
  • the security algorithm used for the second RRC connection is selected by the MeNB or the SeNB. Due to different selection entities, the information needed to be acquired is also different.
  • the method comprises the following step after the step (D):
  • the MeNB receiving UE context modification request used for updating the first security key and the second security key from the core network node and updating the first security key and the second security key according to the UE context modification request.
  • the MeNB sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment after receiving the UE context modification request, so as to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key and receive a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction after the updating is done and to indicate the MeNB to send UE context modification response to the core network node; and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key after receiving the UE context modification request, such that the SeNB indicates the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to reconfigure the second RRC connection in the meantime.
  • the UE context modification request contains the security capability of the user equipment and the security capability comprises the supported ciphering algorithm and integrity algorithm, and the MeNB or the SeNB selects security algorithm used for the SeNB and sends it to the user equipment via the SeNB.
  • the MeNB sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment after receiving the UE context modification request, so as to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key and the user equipment deems that the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment is deactivated and stops to transmit data to the SeNB and the MeNB receives a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction from the user equipment after the updating is done and the MeNB sends UE context modification response to the core network node; and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key after receiving the UE context modification request and the MeNB sends medium access layer control signaling MAC CE to the user equipment to activate the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment after receiving the first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction, and the user equipment performs random access to access the SeNB.
  • the SeNB sends security mode instruction to the user equipment and indicates the user equipment to perform the second RRC connection reconfiguration after receiving a corresponding security mode complete instruction from the user equipment, when the security algorithm of the SeNB changes.
  • the MeNB in the step (E), sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment, after receiving the UE context modification request, to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key, and the user equipment deems that the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment is deactivated and stops to transmit data to the SeNB and the MeNB receives a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction from the user equipment after the updating is done and the MeNB sends UE context modification response to the core network node; and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key after receiving the UE context modification request and the MeNB receives a first information from the SeNB and the MeNB indicates the user equipment to perform the second RRC connection reconfiguration and sends medium access layer control signaling MAC CE to the user equipment to activate the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment after receiving the first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction, and the user equipment performs random access to access the SeNB.
  • the first information contains resource allocation information in the SeNB and a security algorithm needed to be updated.
  • a second aspect of the invention provides a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a SeNB of a wireless communication system, wherein the wireless communication system includes a MeNB, the SeNB and a user equipment, the method comprising:
  • the security algorithm used for the SeNB being selected by the MeNB or the SeNB and the MeNB sending RRC connection configuration including security algorithm to the user equipment;
  • the SeNB establishing a second RRC connection with the user equipment according to the RRC connection configuration, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity.
  • the MeNB generates a second security key used for the second RRC connection based on the first security key received by the MeNB from a core network node.
  • a third aspect of the invention provides a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a user equipment of a wireless communication system, wherein the wireless communication system includes a MeNB, a SeNB and the user equipment, the method comprising:
  • the user equipment establishing a second RRC connection with the SeNB according to RRC connection configuration of security algorithm used for the SeNB, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity, wherein the security algorithm is selected by the MeNB or the SeNB.
  • Fig. l illustrates a schematic diagram of the network architecture in which the method of security handling may be applied
  • Fig.2 illustrates a flow diagram 200 of one embodiment of the method according to the present invention
  • Fig.3 illustrates a flow diagram 300 of another embodiment of the method according to the present invention.
  • Fig.4 illustrates a flow diagram 400 of still another embodiment of the method according to the present invention.
  • Fig.5 illustrates a flow diagram 500 of still another embodiment of the method according to the present invention.
  • Fig. l illustrates a schematic diagram of the network architecture in which the method of security handling may be applied. A repeated description of Fig. l is omitted because it is already described in the part "Background of the Invention".
  • Fig.2 illustrates a flow diagram 200 of one embodiment of the method according to the present invention.
  • a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a MeNB of a wireless communication system according to the present invention comprises:
  • step 220 the MeNB establishes a first RRC connection with the user equipment
  • the MeNB determines to establish a second RRC connection for the user equipment and the SeNB, so as to form dual connectivity
  • the MeNB or the SeNB selects a security algorithm used for the SeNB and in step 250 the MeNB sends RRC connection configuration including the security algorithm to the user equipment to indicate the SeNB to establish the second RRC connection with the user equipment according to the RRC connection configuration in step 260, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity.
  • the method according to the present invention may establish respective RRC connection between the MeNB and the user equipment and between the SeNB and the user equipment by using different security algorithms.
  • RRC connection in the context is named as a first RRC connection and a second RRC connection.
  • the method before the step 220, further comprises:
  • the MeNB receives a first security key used for the first RRC connection from a core network node.
  • the MeNB may receive information about the security key used in access network node from the core network node, for example, MME (Mobility Management Entity).
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • the step 240 further comprises generating a second security key KeNB* used for the second RRC connection based on the first security key KeNB.
  • a second security key is derived from the first security key used for the first RRC connection.
  • the second security key may be used for the second RRC connection to improve the security of the second RRC connection.
  • the second security key is generated for the second RRC connection based on the downlink frequency and physical cell identifier of the cell managed by the SeNB and the managed cell is the serving cell of the user equipment used for establishing the second RRC connection.
  • the second security key may be generated based on the first security key in any other known ways.
  • the MeNB in the step 240, if the security algorithm used for the SeNB is selected by the MeNB, then the MeNB firstly obtains a configuration list of ciphering algorithm and integrity algorithm used in the SeNB and the MeNB sends the selected security algorithm used for the SeNB to the SeNB; or
  • the MeNB sends the security capability of the user equipment to the SeNB and the SeNB sends the selected security algorithm used for the SeNB to the MeNB.
  • the security algorithm used for the second RRC connection is selected by the MeNB or the SeNB. Due to different selection entities, the information needed to be acquired is also different.
  • the principle is that the MeNB or the SeNB determines the security algorithm according to the security capability of the user equipment and the security configuration list supported by the SeNB.
  • the method comprises the following step after the step 260:
  • the MeNB receiving UE context modification request used for updating the first security key and the second security key from the core network node and updating the first security key and the second security key according to the UE context modification request.
  • the MeNB sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment (in step 330) after receiving the UE context modification request (in step 320), so as to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key and receive a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction (in step 354) after the updating is done and to indicate the MeNB to send UE context modification response to the core network node (in step 350); and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key (in step 360) after receiving the UE context modification request, such that the SeNB indicates the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to reconfigure the second RRC connection (in steps 370 and 380) in the meantime.
  • the SeNB could report successful updating of the second security key to the MeNB after the updating of the second security key is done.
  • the UE context modification request contains the security capability of the user equipment and the security capability comprises the supported ciphering algorithm and integrity algorithm, and the MeNB or the SeNB selects security algorithm used for the SeNB and sends it to the user equipment via the SeNB.
  • Fig.4 illustrates a flow diagram 400 of still another embodiment of the method according to the present invention.
  • the MeNB sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment (in step 430) after receiving the UE context modification request (in step 420), so as to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key and the user equipment deems that the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment is deactivated and stops to transmit data to the SeNB (in step 440) and the MeNB receives a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction from the user equipment (in step 450) after the updating is done and the MeNB sends UE context modification response to the core network node (in step 460); and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key (in step 470) after receiving the UE context modification request and the MeNB sends medium access layer control signaling MAC CE to the user equipment to activate the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment (in step 410).
  • the SeNB sends security mode instruction to the user equipment (in step 492) and indicates the user equipment to perform the second RRC connection reconfiguration (in steps 496 and 498) after receiving a corresponding security mode complete instruction from the user equipment (in step 494), when the security algorithm of the SeNB changes.
  • the MeNB after dual connectivity is established(in step 510), the MeNB sends a first RRC connection reconfiguration instruction to the user equipment (in step 530), after receiving the UE context modification request (in step 520), to indicate the user equipment to perform intra-cell handover to update the first security key, and the user equipment deems that the cell of the SeNB served for the user equipment is deactivated and stops to transmit data to the SeNB (in step 540) and the MeNB receives a first RRC connection reconfiguration complete instruction from the user equipment (in step 550) after the updating is done and the MeNB sends UE context modification response to the core network node (in step 560); and the MeNB informs the SeNB to update the second security key (in step 570) after receiving the UE context modification request and the MeNB receives a first information from the SeNB (in step 580) and the MeNB indicates the user equipment to perform the second RRC connection reconfiguration (in step 582) and sends medium access layer control signaling MAC CE to the user equipment
  • the user equipment needs to perform random access when the user equipment accesses the SeNB, because the ahead of uplink schedules of the user equipment in the cell managed by the MeNB and the cell managed by the SeNB are different. Therefore, the user equipment needs not to perform random access when the user equipment accesses the SeNB, because the ahead of uplink schedules of the user equipment in the cell managed by the MeNB and the cell managed by the SeNB are the same.
  • the first information contains resource allocation information in the SeNB and a security algorithm needed to be updated.
  • a second aspect of the invention provides a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a SeNB of a wireless communication system, wherein the wireless communication system includes a MeNB, the SeNB and a user equipment, the method comprising:
  • the security algorithm used for the SeNB being selected by the MeNB or the SeNB and the MeNB sending RRC connection configuration including security algorithm to the user equipment;
  • the SeNB establishing a second RRC connection with the user equipment according to the RRC connection configuration, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity.
  • the MeNB generates a second security key used for the second RRC connection based on the first security key received by the MeNB from a core network node.
  • a third aspect of the invention provides a method of supporting security handling for dual connectivity in a user equipment of a wireless communication system, wherein the wireless communication system includes a MeNB, a SeNB and the user equipment, the method comprising:
  • the user equipment establishing a second RRC connection with the SeNB according to RRC connection configuration of security algorithm used for the SeNB, such that the user equipment possesses dual connectivity, wherein the security algorithm is selected by the MeNB or the SeNB.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de gestion de la sécurité dans le MeNB d'un système de communication sans fil double connectivité. Le système de communication sans fil comprend le MeNB, un SeNB et un équipement d'utilisateur. Le procédé comprend les étapes suivantes : le MeNB établit une première connexion RRC avec l'équipement d'utilisateur ; le MeNB détermine l'établissement d'une seconde connexion RRC pour l'équipement d'utilisateur et le SeNB, de sorte à former une double connectivité ; et le MeNB ou le SeNB sélectionnent un algorithme de sécurité pour le SeNB et le MeNB en envoyant des informations de configuration de connexion RRC comprenant l'algorithme de sécurité, à l'équipement d'utilisateur, pour indiquer au SeNB d'établir la seconde connexion RRC avec l'équipement d'utilisateur d'après les informations de configuration de connexion RRC, si bien que l'équipement d'utilisateur ait une double connectivité. Le procédé selon l'invention peut établir une connexion RRC respective entre le MeNB et l'équipement d'utilisateur, et entre le SeNB et l'équipement d'utilisateur, au moyen de différents algorithmes de sécurité.
PCT/IB2014/001839 2013-08-02 2014-08-01 Procédé de gestion de la sécurité dans un système double connectivité WO2015015300A2 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201310337478.9 2013-08-02
CN201310337478.9A CN104349312B (zh) 2013-08-02 2013-08-02 用于支持双连接的安全处理的方法

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WO2015015300A2 true WO2015015300A2 (fr) 2015-02-05
WO2015015300A3 WO2015015300A3 (fr) 2015-07-02

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