WO2015008521A1 - コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、コンピューター・プログラム、並びにコンテンツ伝送システム - Google Patents
コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、コンピューター・プログラム、並びにコンテンツ伝送システム Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2015008521A1 WO2015008521A1 PCT/JP2014/062018 JP2014062018W WO2015008521A1 WO 2015008521 A1 WO2015008521 A1 WO 2015008521A1 JP 2014062018 W JP2014062018 W JP 2014062018W WO 2015008521 A1 WO2015008521 A1 WO 2015008521A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- content
- key
- authentication
- shared key
- receiving device
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims description 275
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 title claims description 186
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 title claims description 30
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 54
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 53
- 238000013507 mapping Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000004422 calculation algorithm Methods 0.000 abstract description 19
- 238000013509 system migration Methods 0.000 abstract description 5
- 238000013508 migration Methods 0.000 abstract 1
- 230000005012 migration Effects 0.000 abstract 1
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 40
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 description 37
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 36
- 230000007704 transition Effects 0.000 description 30
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 28
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 20
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 description 10
- 238000007906 compression Methods 0.000 description 6
- 230000006835 compression Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000005728 strengthening Methods 0.000 description 6
- 206010000210 abortion Diseases 0.000 description 5
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000009471 action Effects 0.000 description 4
- 230000000694 effects Effects 0.000 description 4
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000008859 change Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000005259 measurement Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000012360 testing method Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000002159 abnormal effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000002730 additional effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000008901 benefit Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012790 confirmation Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000013144 data compression Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004904 long-term response Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007246 mechanism Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000013259 porous coordination polymer Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000003672 processing method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000006467 substitution reaction Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000013589 supplement Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000004083 survival effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/10—Protecting distributed programs or content, e.g. vending or licensing of copyrighted material ; Digital rights management [DRM]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0869—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities for achieving mutual authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/10—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
- H04L63/105—Multiple levels of security
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
- H04L9/16—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
- H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
Definitions
- the technology disclosed in the present specification is a content transmission apparatus and content transmission for encrypting and transmitting content to be protected, such as copyright, using a key shared according to a predetermined mutual authentication and key exchange algorithm such as DTCP.
- the present invention relates to a method, a content receiving apparatus and a content receiving method, a computer program, and a content transmission system.
- An object of the technology disclosed in the present specification is to provide an excellent content transmission device and content transmission method, content reception device and content reception method capable of suitably encrypting and transmitting content to be protected such as copyright.
- a further object of the technology disclosed in the present specification is to provide an excellent content transmission device and content transmission method, content reception device and content reception method, and computer program capable of performing a transition to a safer system with a small load. And providing a content transmission system.
- An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and shared key delivery with the content receiving device according to a predetermined transmission standard;
- a content providing unit that encrypts and transmits content to the content receiving device using an encryption key generated from the shared key;
- Comprising The authentication / key sharing unit switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content receiving device has a predetermined security strength. It is a content transmission device.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device handles the first content in the content reception device having the predetermined security strength.
- a first shared key that can be delivered is delivered, and a second shared key that cannot handle the first content is delivered to the content receiving device that does not have the predetermined security strength.
- the content providing unit encrypts and transmits the first content with an encryption key generated from the first shared key, but encrypts the first content with the encryption key generated from the second shared key. It is configured not to transmit.
- the predetermined security strengthening measure ensures that the security of more weak parts other than the encryption method is ensured. is there.
- the first shared key and the second shared key generate an encryption key according to a first encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit delivers the first shared key or the second shared key to a content receiving apparatus that supports only the first encryption method, but corresponds to the second encryption method.
- the content receiving device is configured to deliver a shared key for generating an encryption key according to the second encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device according to claim 2 is stored in a device certificate transmitted from the content reception device during mutual authentication. Based on the ES flag, the content receiving device is configured to determine whether or not the device has the predetermined security strength.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device stores the CAPABILITY field of the payload of a command sent from the content reception device during mutual authentication. Based on the stored ES flag, it is configured to determine whether or not the content receiving device is a device having the predetermined security strength.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device stores the CAPABILITY field of the payload of a command sent from the content reception device during mutual authentication. Based on the stored NS flag, it is configured to determine whether or not the content receiving device is compatible with the second encryption method.
- the CAPABILITY field is calculated from the data of the field using the secret key of the content reception device. It is configured to be accompanied by a digital signature.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device stores the ES flag in the device certificate transmitted from the content reception device.
- the mutual authentication process is interrupted as an error.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content transmission device includes a second CAPABILITY field in a payload of a command to be sent to the content reception device during mutual authentication.
- An NS flag indicating whether or not the encryption method is supported is stored, and an electronic signature calculated from the data in the field is used with its own private key.
- the predetermined transmission standard is DTCP (Digital Transmission Content Protection) or DTCP-IP (DTCP mapping to IP).
- the technique according to claim 12 of the present application is An authentication / key sharing step for performing mutual authentication and delivery of a shared key with the content receiving device according to a predetermined transmission standard; A content providing step of encrypting and transmitting content to the content receiving device using an encryption key generated from the shared key; Have In the authentication / key sharing step, the shared key to be transferred is switched depending on whether or not the content receiving device has a predetermined security strength. This is a content transmission method.
- the technique according to claim 13 of the present application is An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and reception of a shared key with a content transmission device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard; A content acquisition unit for acquiring content encrypted and transmitted using an encryption key generated from the received shared key; Comprising The authentication / key sharing unit receives a first shared key that can handle the first content in response to having a predetermined security strength, The content acquisition unit acquires the first content encrypted and transmitted with the encryption key generated from the first shared key; It is a content receiving device.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content receiving device includes the device certificate sent to the content transmitting device at the time of mutual authentication in the device certificate. It is configured to store an ES flag indicating whether security strength is present.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content receiving device is configured so that the authentication / key sharing unit in the CAPABILITY field of a payload of a command to be sent to the content transmitting device at the time of mutual authentication. It is configured to store at least one of the ES flag indicating whether or not it has the predetermined security strength and the NS flag indicating whether or not it corresponds to the encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit of the content receiving device is calculated from the data of the field using the private key in the CAPABILITY field. It is configured to be accompanied by an electronic signature.
- An authentication / key sharing step for mutual authentication and reception of a shared key with a content transmission device according to a predetermined transmission standard A content acquisition step of acquiring content encrypted and transmitted using an encryption key generated from the received shared key; Have In the authentication / key sharing step, a shared key corresponding to having own security strength is received. This is a content receiving method.
- the technique described in claim 18 of the present application is: An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and shared key delivery with the content receiving device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard; A content providing unit that encrypts and transmits content to the content receiving device using an encryption key generated from the shared key; Written in computer readable form to make the computer work as The authentication / key sharing unit switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content receiving device has a predetermined security strength. It is a computer program.
- the technology described in claim 19 of the present application is: An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and reception of a shared key with a content transmission device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard; A content acquisition unit for acquiring content encrypted and transmitted using an encryption key generated from the received shared key; Written in computer readable form to make the computer work as The authentication / key sharing unit receives a shared key according to the fact that the user has a predetermined security strength; It is a computer program.
- the computer program according to the claims of the present application defines a computer program written in a computer-readable format so as to realize predetermined processing on a computer.
- a cooperative operation is exhibited on the computer, and the same operational effects as the content transmission device according to claim 1 of the present application are obtained. Can do.
- the technique described in claim 20 of the present application is: It is composed of a content transmitting device and a content receiving device that perform mutual authentication and exchange of a shared key, and encrypt and transmit content using an encryption key generated from the shared key,
- the content transmission device switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content reception device has a predetermined security strength. It is a content transmission system.
- system here refers to a logical collection of a plurality of devices (or functional modules that realize specific functions), and each device or functional module is in a single housing. It does not matter whether or not.
- an excellent content transmission device and content transmission method, content reception device and content reception method, computer program, and the like which can implement a transition to a safer system with a small load.
- a content transmission system can be provided.
- the content transmission system to which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied can reduce the burden on the device until the complete transition by performing the transition to a more secure system with a new encryption method step by step.
- FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a content transmission system 100 to which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied.
- FIG. 2 is a diagram schematically illustrating another configuration example of the content transmission system 200 to which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied.
- FIG. 3 is a diagram schematically illustrating a functional configuration of the content transmission apparatus 300 that operates as a source device.
- FIG. 4 is a diagram schematically illustrating a functional configuration of the content receiving apparatus 400 that operates as a sink device.
- FIG. 5 is a diagram schematically illustrating an overall procedure when content transmission is performed between a source device and a sink device.
- FIG. 6 is a diagram schematically showing the contents of the content list browsing phase (SEQ501).
- FIG. 7 is a diagram showing the contents of the AKE procedure phase (SEQ502) by full authentication.
- FIG. 8 shows the contents of the AKE (RA-AKE) procedure phase (SEQ502) performed at the time of remote access.
- FIG. 9 is a diagram showing the contents of the AKE (MOVE RTT-AKE) procedure phase (SEQ502) for moving content (MOVE) by remote access.
- FIG. 10 shows the contents of the Protected RTT Protocol procedure (SEQ906).
- FIG. 11 is a diagram schematically showing the contents of the content transmission phase (SEQ503).
- FIG. 12 is a diagram schematically showing the flow of content encryption, transmission, and decryption based on the DTCP specification and the DTCP-IP specification.
- FIG. 13 is a diagram schematically showing a time chart 1300 for switching the content transmission system from the conventional encryption method to the new encryption method.
- FIG. 14 is a diagram illustrating a correspondence relationship between source and sink device encryption schemes and transmittable content.
- FIG. 15 is a diagram showing the format of Device Certificate.
- FIG. 16 is a diagram illustrating a state in which an ES flag is defined in Device Certificate.
- FIG. 17 is a diagram illustrating a specific configuration example of the payload including the ES flag and the NS flag.
- FIG. 18 is a diagram illustrating a specific configuration example of the payload including the NS flag.
- FIG. 19 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure for the source device to determine the common key.
- FIG. 20 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure for preferentially executing a new encryption method on the sink device side.
- FIG. 21 is a flowchart showing a processing procedure for preferentially executing a new encryption method on the source device side.
- FIG. 22 is a diagram showing a configuration of a computer program distribution system 2200.
- FIG. 23 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a personal computer 2300 that can operate as the server 201 or a DTCP Source device.
- FIG. 24 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a recorder 2400 that can operate as the server 201 or the DTCP Source device.
- FIG. 25 is a diagram illustrating a configuration example of a network access server (NAS) 2500 that can operate as the server 201 or a DTCP Source device.
- NAS network access server
- the technique disclosed in this specification is intended to reduce the burden by allowing the transition to a safer system in stages. Specifically, by making it possible to handle high-value content only during a certain system transition period for a device in the transition stage that has been subjected to predetermined security enhancement measures, the time problem required for the transition is avoided, The transition to a safer system is facilitated.
- the device to which a predetermined security enhancement measure is applied is a device that can only handle, for example, a conventional encryption algorithm, but can secure the security of a weaker part other than the encryption method.
- DTCP Digital Transmission Content Protection
- DTCP negotiates an authentication protocol between devices at the time of content transmission and a transmission protocol for encrypted content.
- the regulation stipulates that DTCP-compliant devices do not send out compressed content that is easy to handle in an unencrypted state outside the device, and that the key exchange required to decrypt the encrypted content is a predetermined mutual authentication and key exchange ( This includes performing in accordance with the Authentication and Key Exchange (AKE) algorithm, and limiting the range of devices that perform key exchange using the AKE command.
- DTCP was originally defined for content transmission on a home network using IEEE 1394 or the like as a transmission path. Recently, DTCP-IP (DTCP mapping to IP), which ported DTCP technology to an IP network. The development of DTCP + that incorporates the remote access function is also underway.
- FIG. 1 schematically shows a configuration example of a content transmission system 100 to which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied.
- the illustrated content transmission system 100 includes a server 101, a terminal 102, and a terminal 103 connected on a home network 110 laid in a home.
- a server 101 a terminal 102
- a terminal 103 connected on a home network 110 laid in a home.
- FIG. 1 for simplicity, only one server and two terminals are depicted, but it is also assumed that two or more servers and three or more terminals are installed on the home network. .
- the server 101 is a device that provides content to the terminals 102 and 103.
- the server 101 is, for example, a set top box, a recorder, a television receiver, a personal computer, a network access server (NAS), or the like.
- the server 101 is, for example, broadcast content received or recorded by terrestrial digital broadcasting, commercial content such as a movie read from a recording medium (not shown) such as a Blu-ray disc, and a content server (not shown) on the Internet.
- the content downloaded from is provided to the terminals 102 and 103.
- Terminals 102 and 103 are devices that request content from the server 101 via the home network 110, and correspond to multi-function mobile terminals such as mobile phones, smartphones, and tablets.
- the terminal 102 may accumulate the content downloaded from the server 101 and further provide it to the terminal 103. Examples of forms for providing content include streaming and content movement (MOVE).
- MOVE streaming and content movement
- different types of devices such as the server 101 and the terminal 102 are interconnected via the home network 110 in accordance with a protocol defined in, for example, DLNA (Digital Living Network Alliance).
- the communication procedure at the time of mutual connection between the server 101 and the terminal 102 is based on, for example, UPnP (Universal Plug and Play), and processing such as device discovery is performed.
- UPnP Universal Plug and Play
- processing such as device discovery is performed.
- UPnP Universal Plug and Play
- the server 101 encrypts and transmits the requested content using an encryption key generated from the shared key.
- the server 101 that provides content corresponds to a DTCP source device, and the terminal 102 that uses the content corresponds to a DTCP sink device.
- mutual authentication and shared key sharing are performed according to the AKE algorithm, and then the content is encrypted and transmitted.
- the terminal 102 is a DTCP source device
- the terminal 103 is a DTCP sink device.
- the terminals 102 and 103 want to access the server 101 from outside the home network 110 such as where they are away (remote access), it is necessary to register the terminals 102 and 103 in the server 101 in advance in the home network 110. (See below).
- FIG. 2 schematically shows another configuration example of the content transmission system 200 to which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied.
- the illustrated content transmission system 200 includes a server 201 and a terminal 202 connected to a home network 210 installed in a home, and a terminal 203 connected to an external network 220 such as the Internet.
- the home network 210 and the external network 220 are interconnected via a router 230 according to an IP (Internet Protocol) protocol.
- IP Internet Protocol
- the server 201 is a set-top box, a recorder, a television receiver, a personal computer, a network access server (NAS), or the like.
- the server 201 provides broadcast content and commercial content to the terminal 202 remotely accessed from the external network 220. Examples of forms for providing content include streaming and content movement (MOVE).
- the terminal 202 is a multi-function mobile terminal such as a mobile phone, a smartphone, or a tablet, and requests content from the server 201 via the IP network including the home network 210 and the external network 220.
- different types of devices such as the server 201 and the terminals 202 and 203 are interconnected via the home network 210 and the external network 220 according to a protocol defined by, for example, DLNA.
- the communication procedure at the time of mutual connection between the server 201 and the terminal 202 is based on UPnP, for example, and processing such as device discovery is performed.
- DTCP -Use when transmitting compressed content between the server 201 and the terminal 203 interconnected via the home network 210 and the external network 220, and between the terminal 202 and the terminal 203, for example, DTCP -Use an encryption process according to IP to prevent unauthorized use.
- the terminal 203 performs mutual authentication with the server 201 or the terminal 202 and shares a remote access shared key (described later) via the IP network including the home network 210 and the external network 220, and then the server 201 or the terminal The content stored in 202 is requested.
- the server 201 or the terminal 202 encrypts and transmits the content requested from the terminal 203 using an encryption key generated from the remote access shared key.
- the terminal 203 needs to be registered in advance in the server 201 or the terminal 202 in the home network 210 (described later).
- the server 201 or the terminal 202 that provides the content corresponds to a DTCP source device, and the terminal 203 that uses the content corresponds to a DTCP sink device.
- FIG. 3 schematically shows a functional configuration of the content transmission apparatus 300 that operates as a source device of DTCP.
- the server 101 that downloads content to the terminal 102
- the terminal 102 that downloads content to the terminal 103
- the server 201 that downloads content, the terminal 102 that downloads content to the terminal 103, and the like correspond to the source device shown in the figure.
- the communication / control unit 301 controls the communication operation via the home network and the external network, and controls the overall operation of the content transmission apparatus 300.
- the communication / control unit 301 interconnects different types of devices such as terminals via a home network and an external network in accordance with a protocol defined by DLNA.
- the communication procedure at the time of mutual connection conforms to UPnP, for example, and the communication / control unit 301 executes processing such as device discovery for a device, for example.
- the communication / control unit 301 is used for external device connection such as HDMI (registered trademark) (High Definition Multimedia Interface), MHL (registered trademark) (Mobile High-Definition Link), USB (Universal Serial Bus), or the like.
- Interface for digital output) and recording / playback equipment such as a hard disk device or a Blu-ray disk device can be connected externally.
- the content recording unit 302 records content to be provided to the terminal via the home network and the external network.
- the content recording unit 302 includes a recording medium for recording content such as a hard disk, a Blu-ray disk, and a DVD (Digital Versatile Disc), for example, and a general file system such as FAT (File Allocation Table). Each content recorded under the management of is managed.
- the content acquisition unit 303 acquires content to be provided to the terminal.
- the content acquisition unit 303 includes a terrestrial digital broadcast tuner, for example, and acquires broadcast content.
- the content acquisition unit 303 is based on specifications defined by, for example, ARIB (Association of Radio Industries and Businesses).
- the content acquisition unit 303 can receive, for example, all or part of a broadcast channel segment, EPG (Electronic Program Guide) functions (program search, program information display, program reservation), HDCP (High-bandwidth Digital Content)
- EPG Electronic Program Guide
- HDCP High-bandwidth Digital Content
- a copy control function based on the (Protection) specification, a content protection function for performing limited reception of broadcast content, or encrypting received broadcast content when it is externally output, and the like.
- the content acquisition unit 303 reads commercial content such as a movie from a medium from a media playback device (not shown) such as a Blu-ray disc connected to the communication / control unit 301.
- the content acquisition unit 303 includes a browser and downloads paid or free content from a content server (not shown) on the Internet.
- the content acquisition unit 303 may record the acquired content in the content recording unit 302 as necessary. In addition, the content acquisition unit 303 may acquire content to be provided to the sink device from the content recording unit 302.
- the content acquisition unit 303 Among the content (broadcast content and commercial content) acquired by the content acquisition unit 303, there is high-value content composed of high-quality digital data. A provider of high-value content may require handling with a higher security level.
- the content providing unit 304 provides the content acquired by the content acquiring unit 303 in response to a request from a content receiving device (described later) operating as a sink device.
- the content providing unit 304 transmits the content to the sink device through the communication / control unit 301 using, for example, an HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) protocol or an RTP (real Time Protocol).
- the content providing unit 304 has a compression function or a content compression processing unit (not shown in FIG. 3).
- the DTCP standard is applied in order to prevent the transmission content from being safe, that is, illegal use. That is, the content providing unit 304 encrypts and transmits the compressed content using the encryption key generated from the shared key shared with the sink device by the authentication / key sharing unit 306 (described later).
- the sink device when a sink device requests content by remote access from an external network, the sink device must be pre-registered in the terminal management unit 307 (described later).
- the content list providing unit 305 provides a list of content that can be provided and detailed information in response to a request from a content receiving device (described later) operating as a sink device.
- the content that the servers 101 and 201 can provide to the terminal includes broadcast content received by the content acquisition unit 303, commercial content read from the media, and content already recorded in the content recording unit 302. .
- the Content Directory Service (CDS) function that distributes the content list and the detailed information of the content in a hierarchy developed by UPnP (Universal Plug and Play), which is the base of DLNA, is applied.
- CDS information is generated for a CDS: Browse action from a sink device and returned as a CDS Result.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 performs mutual authentication with a sink device as a content request source in accordance with an authentication and key exchange (AKE) algorithm defined by DTCP-IP, and obtains an encryption key K c of the content.
- the shared key K X for generation is delivered.
- authentication and key sharing unit 306, with respect to the Sink device coming requests content by remote access from the external network, and share the shared key K R for remote access, requesting transfer of content
- a shared key K XM for movement is shared for the coming sink device.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 includes a shared key K X2 that is passed to a conventional sink device that has not been subjected to security enhancement measures, and a shared key K X1 that is passed to a sink device that has been subjected to predetermined security enhancement measures. It is different.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 Since the latter shared key K X1 is shared only between devices with a predetermined security enhancement measure, it can be used to handle high-value content (because conventional devices have only the shared key K X2 This is because high-value content encrypted based on the shared key K X1 cannot be decrypted.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 generates a conventional encryption key having a key length for a sink device corresponding to a new (long key length) encryption method (that is, completely shifted). instead of the key K x, it may be handed over the shared key K X_NEW for generating a long encryption key of the key length.
- the shared key delivery process will be described later.
- a device with a predetermined security enhancement measure is, for example, a device that only supports the conventional encryption algorithm, but can ensure the safety of more vulnerable parts other than the encryption method, It is positioned as a device in the transition stage when the system is replaced with a new encryption method.
- the conventional encryption method is applied as it is between the devices in the transition stage, but by using a dedicated shared key K X1 , high-value content can be handled. Note that the process of separately using a shared key for handling high-value content is the same using the dedicated shared keys K R1 and K XM1 during the remote access and content transfer (Move). Can be done.
- the terminal management unit 307 manages the information of the sink device that requests the content.
- remote access to a server in the home is limited to only the sink device registered in the server. Only a sink device pre-registered in the terminal management unit 307 is allowed to request content by remote access.
- the terminal management unit 307 performs pre-registration processing on a sink device that uses content by remote access from an external network, and information on the sink device is “remote sink registry” or “RAC (Remote Access Connection) registry”. To manage.
- pre-registration is not directly related to the technology disclosed in this specification, detailed description is omitted.
- the content reproduction output unit 308 decodes the content recorded in the content recording unit 302 and reproduces and outputs it.
- the above functional blocks 303 to 307 can also be realized as application programs executed by the communication / control unit 301 on top of the operating system or the TCP / IP protocol.
- this kind of application program can be distributed at a predetermined download site on a wide area network such as the Internet, and is a multi-function such as a CE (Consumer Electronics) device such as a digital broadcast tuner and a TV receiver, and a smartphone. It is downloaded to the terminal for use.
- CE Consumer Electronics
- Such a download site includes, for example, a server 2210 including a storage device 2211 for storing a computer program and a communication device 2212 that accepts the download in response to receiving a download request for the computer program (
- the computer program distribution system 2200 is configured together with a client device (DTCP source device or DTCP sink device) that installs the downloaded computer program.
- This type of server further includes an information notification device 2213 for notifying information indicating the name of the computer program in response to a download request for the computer program from the client.
- the information notification device 2213 notifies information indicating that it is an application that provides commercial content recorded in a home to a remote terminal, together with the name of the computer program.
- FIG. 4 schematically shows a functional configuration of the content receiving apparatus 400 that operates as a DTCP sink device.
- the terminal 102 that requests content from the server 101
- the terminal 103 that requests content from the server 101 or the terminal 102
- the terminal 202 that requests content from the server 201
- the terminal 203 that requests content from the server 201 or the terminal 202, and the like correspond to the illustrated sink device.
- the communication / control unit 401 controls the communication operation via the home network and the external network, and also comprehensively controls the operation of the content receiving apparatus 400 as a whole.
- the communication / control unit 401 interconnects different types of devices such as terminals via a home network and an external network according to a protocol defined in DLNA. Further, the communication procedure at the time of mutual connection is based on UPnP, for example, and the communication / control unit 401 executes a response process for device discovery from a control point, for example.
- the content list browsing unit 402 makes a content list acquisition request to the content transmission apparatus 300 (described above) operating as a source device, and displays the acquired content list browsing screen.
- the CDS function formulated in UPnP which is a DLNA base is applied (described above), and a CDS: Browse action is issued to a source device, for example.
- the contents list browsing unit 402 displays a contents list screen.
- the user can select content to be reproduced and output on the list screen via the input unit 407 or the like.
- the input unit 407 corresponds to a keyboard in a personal computer, a touch panel in a multifunction terminal such as a mouse and a smartphone, a cross key arrangement determination button in a remote controller, and the like.
- the content acquisition unit 403 transmits a content acquisition request to the source device, and acquires the content in the source device. For example, the content acquisition unit 403 requests acquisition of the content selected by the user as described above in the content list screen displayed by the content / list browsing unit 402.
- the content acquisition unit 403 uses a protocol such as HTTP or RTP for the content acquisition request and content acquisition to the source device (same as above).
- the content acquired by the content acquisition unit 403 from the source device is encrypted using an encryption key generated from a shared key shared with the source device by the authentication / key sharing unit 406 described later (described later).
- the content decryption unit 404 can decrypt the encrypted content acquired from the source device using the encryption key generated from the shared key. Then, the content reproduction output unit 405 reproduces and outputs the decrypted content.
- the content recording unit 408 records the content acquired by the content acquisition unit 403 in a download (copy or move) format.
- the content to be recorded may be separately subjected to a recording encryption process.
- the content recording unit 302 includes a recording medium for recording content, such as a hard disk, Blu-ray, or DVD, and manages each content recorded under the management of a general file system such as FAT. Yes.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 406 performs mutual authentication according to the authentication and key exchange (AKE) algorithm defined by DTCP-IP with the source device that is the request destination of the content, and also obtains the encryption key K c of the content. A shared key K X for generation is received.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 406 performs pre-registration for remote access to the source device when the home network 210 is connected (described above).
- some contents include high-value contents composed of high-quality digital data.
- a provider of high-value content may require handling with a higher security level.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 406 when receiving the shared key, notifies the source device whether or not the content receiving apparatus 400 has a security enhancement measure. Then, the authentication / key sharing unit 406 receives the shared key K X2 when the security strengthening measure is not taken, and receives the shared key shared key K X1 when the security strengthening measure is taken. Since the latter shared key K X1 is shared only between the devices in the transition stage to which a predetermined security enhancement measure has been applied, it is possible to receive and decrypt high-value content from the source device (described above).
- the content receiving apparatus 400 is a sink device that supports a new encryption method (with a longer key length) (that is, has completely shifted), an encryption key with a conventional key length is generated.
- a shared key K X_NEW for generating an encryption key having a long key length may be received.
- details of the shared key delivery process will be described later.
- the above functional blocks 402 to 406 can also be realized as application programs executed on the upper level of the operating system or TCP / IP protocol in the communication / control unit 401.
- This type of application program can be distributed on a predetermined download site over a wide area network such as the Internet, and downloaded to a multifunction terminal that plays back content in a home server such as a smartphone.
- Such a download site includes, for example, a server 2210 including a storage device 2211 for storing a computer program and a communication device 2212 that accepts the download in response to receiving a download request for the computer program (
- the computer program distribution system 2200 is configured together with a client device (DTCP source device or DTCP sink device) that installs the downloaded computer program.
- This type of server further includes an information notification device 2213 for notifying information indicating the name of the computer program in response to a download request for the computer program from the client.
- the information notification device 2213 notifies the information indicating that the application is permitted to browse the commercial content recorded in the home, for example, together with the name of the computer program.
- the source device here refers to the server 101 that downloads content to the terminals 102 and 103 in the content transmission system 100 shown in FIG. 1, the terminal 102 that downloads content to the terminal 103, and the content transmission system shown in FIG.
- the server 201 that downloads content to the terminals 202 and 203 and the terminal 202 that downloads content to the terminal 203.
- the sink device is a terminal 102 that requests content from the server 101, a terminal 103 that requests content from the server 101 or the terminal 102, and the content transmission shown in FIG.
- a terminal 202 that requests content from the server 201 and a terminal 203 that requests content from the server 201 or the terminal 202.
- FIG. 5 schematically shows an overall procedure when content transmission is performed between a source device and a sink device.
- the content list browsing phase (SEQ501) for designating the content that the sink device requests to move, and the mutual authentication and key exchange procedure are performed between the source device and the sink device to obtain the shared key K X.
- a shared AKE procedure phase (SEQ502), the content specified by the content list view phase, consisting of the shared key K cryptographic key X is generated from the K C used content transmission phase for transmitting encrypted (SEQ503).
- FIG. 6 schematically shows the contents of the content list browsing phase (SEQ501). This processing procedure is mainly performed between the content list providing unit 305 on the source device side and the content list browsing unit 402 on the sink device side.
- a content list browsing request is issued from the content list browsing unit 402 (SEQ601).
- the CDS function which is developed by UPnP, which is a DLNA base, and distributes the content list and the detailed information of the content in a hierarchy (described above) is applied. Therefore, in SEQ 601, a CDS: Browse action is issued from the sink device.
- the content list providing unit 305 obtains all the content information that can be provided by the content providing unit 304 (SEQ602), and a sufficient amount of information is obtained. CDS information is generated (SEQ603). Then, the source device returns the CDS result to the sink device (SEQ604).
- the content list browsing unit 402 analyzes the received CDS Result and displays the content information including the title of the content and more detailed information (SEQ605).
- the user of the sink device can select content to be reproduced from the displayed content list.
- transmission of content from the source device to the sink device is started.
- mutual authentication and key exchange that is, AKE processing (SEQ502) is performed between the sink device and the source device. Is done.
- AKE processing methods In the DTCP specification, two types of AKE processing methods are defined: full authentication using a public key encryption method (Full Authentication) and limited authentication using a secret key method (Restricted Authentication). In limited authentication, only two types of content, No More Copy and Copy one generation, can be handled. In full authentication, in addition to the above two types of data, Copy Never content can also be handled.
- FIG. 7 shows the contents of the AKE procedure phase (SEQ502) based on full authentication, which is defined in the DTCP specification. However, although the arrow drawn with a solid line is always implemented, the arrow drawn with a dotted line is implemented conditionally. This processing procedure is mainly performed between the authentication / key sharing unit 306 on the source device side and the authentication / key sharing unit 406 on the sink device side.
- the sink device transmits an AKE status command (SEQ 701), and tries to check the state of the source device, such as whether the source device supports full authentication.
- the Source device returns an AKE status (SEQ702).
- the sink device transmits a random number to the source device by a CHALLENGE subfunction message (SEQ703), and initializes the AKE process of the source device.
- the CHALLENGE subfunction message includes a Device Certificate (device certificate).
- the device certificate is a certificate given from the DTLA to each DTCP compliant device.
- FIG. 15 shows the format of Device Certificate.
- the source device verifies the consistency of the device certificate of the sink device and returns a response (SEQ704).
- the source device transmits an AKE status command (SEQ 705), tries to check the state of the sink device, and the sink device returns an AKE status (SEQ 706). Then, the Source device transmits a random number to the Sink device by a CHALLENGE subfunction message (SEQ707), and initializes the AKE processing of the Sink device. In response to this, the sink device returns a response (SEQ 708).
- the source device calculates the random number sent immediately before by a formula built in the counterpart device, and transmits the result to the sink device by a RESPONSE subfunction message (SEQ 709). In response to this, the sink device returns a response (SEQ 710). Similarly, the sink device calculates the random number sent immediately before by a formula built in the counterpart device, and transmits the result to the source device by a RESPONSE subfunction message (SEQ711). In response to this, the Source device returns a response (SEQ712). Then, the sink device and the source device compare each other with the received value and the result calculated based on the built-in formula, and recognize that the counterparts are devices having the same protocol. Can do.
- the Source device generates a shared key K X used to generate a content encryption key, and transmits this to the sink device using an EXCHANGE_KEY subfunction message (SEQ 713). In response to this, the sink device returns a response (SEQ714).
- SRM System Renewability Message
- the sink device sends a CONTENT_KEY_REQ subfunction message to the source device to request an encryption key (SEQ717).
- the Source device returns an encryption key as a response (SEQ 718).
- FIG. 8 shows the contents of the AKE (RA-AKE) procedure phase (SEQ502) performed at the time of remote access, which is defined in the DTCP-IP specification.
- RA-AKE RA-AKE
- SEQ502 remote access is limited to sink devices pre-registered in the source device with the intention of restricting the use of content by third parties (described above).
- the illustrated AKE process includes a procedure for checking whether or not the sink device is pre-registered. This processing procedure is mainly performed between the authentication / key sharing unit 306 on the source device side and the authentication / key sharing unit 406 on the sink device side.
- the sink device transmits a CHALLENGE command including a shared key field in which a bit for a remote access shared key K R (Remote Exchange Key) is set, and requests the source device to perform an AKE process (SEQ801). ). Then, the challenge / response portion of the authentication procedure is executed between the source device and the sink device (SEQ802 to 804).
- K R Remote Access shared key
- Source device aborts the RA-AKE procedure, it is possible to continue the AKE procedure other than RA-AKE.
- sink-ID When the source device receives the device ID or IDu from the sink device as a sink-ID (SEQ805), is the sink-ID registered in the remote sink registry (described above) managed in its own terminal management unit 307? A check is made (SEQ806).
- the source device transmits an AKE_CANCEL command to the sink device (SEQ814) and cancels the RA-AKE procedure (SEQ815).
- the source device determines whether or not the RAC record corresponding to the sink-ID already exists. The inside of the registry (described later) is checked (SEQ807).
- the source device uses the remote access shared key K R and the shared key label K R _label stored in the RAC record. Decide on. Alternatively, if the source device does not transmit content using the remote access shared key K R , the source device refers to the inside of the RAC record and updates the stored values of K R and K R _label. You may make it (SEQ813).
- the source device determines whether the count value RACC for counting the RAC record is less than RACC max . Is checked (SEQ808).
- RACC max is a counter that counts remote access connections, and is initialized to zero when there is no remote access connection.
- the Source device transmits an AKE_CANCEL command to the sink device (SEQ814), and cancels the RA-AKE procedure (SEQ815).
- Source device After incrementing by 1 the value of the RACC (SEQ809), according to a predetermined calculation rule, shared key K R and the shared key labels for remote access K R — label is generated (SEQ 810), and these are associated with the sink device ID of the sink device and stored in the RAC record in the RAC registry (SEQ 811).
- the source device manages the RAC record in the terminal management unit 307, for example.
- the source device uses the remote access shared key K R extracted from the existing RAC record and its shared key label K R _label (including the updated case) or the newly generated shared key K for remote access.
- R and its shared key label K R _label are transmitted to the sink device (SEQ816).
- Source device supports RA_MANAGEMENT function, to initiate K R for survival timer for maintaining a shared key K R for remote access, for holding at least one minute K R (SEQ812).
- FIG. 9 shows the contents of the AKE (MOVE RTT-AKE) procedure phase (SEQ502) for moving content, which is defined in the DTCP-IP specification.
- This processing procedure is mainly performed between the authentication / key sharing unit 306 on the source device side and the authentication / key sharing unit 406 on the sink device side.
- the sink device starts a move AKE (MOVE RTT-AKE) procedure by transmitting an MV_INITIATE command to the source device (SEQ901).
- MOVE RTT-AKE moves AKE
- the source device can execute the DTCP-IP Move protocol, it returns an MV_INITIATE response as a receipt confirmation (SEQ902).
- the sink device transmits a CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE command to the source device at this time (SEQ903).
- the Source device returns a CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE response (SEQ904).
- This Challenge-Response port of AKE procedure includes a sequence (not shown) up to the CHALLENGE command transmission from the sink device and the response transmission from the sink device to the RESPONSE or RESPONSE2 transmission from the source device.
- the Source device and the Sink device share a mobile authentication key (HK AUTH ).
- the Protected RTT Protocol procedure is performed (SEQ906).
- the DTCP-IP specification imposes a limit on the round trip time (RTT) for an AKE command in order to limit remote access.
- the Protected RTT Protocol procedure is a procedure for confirming this RTT restriction (described later).
- the Protected RTT Protocol procedure can be skipped.
- the source device generates a shared key K XM for movement from the above-described movement authentication key (HK AUTH ), and transmits this to the sink device using the MV_EXCHANGE_KEY command (SEQ907).
- the sink device returns an MV_EXCHANGE_KEY response (SEQ908).
- FIG. 10 shows the contents of the Protected RTT Protocol procedure (SEQ906).
- an Rx challenge including an Rx random number and an Rx certificate (Device Certificate) is transmitted from the sink device.
- a Tx challenge including a Tx random number and a Tx certificate (Device Certificate) is returned from the Source device.
- the Rx response including the Rx random number, the Tx message, and the Tx signature is transmitted from the source device, and the Tx response including the Tx random number, the Rx message, and the Rx signature is transmitted from the sink device.
- the response authentication procedure continues (not shown).
- the command RTT_READY. CMD is transmitted (SEQ1001), and the response RTT_READY.
- An RSP is returned (SEQ1002).
- the command RTT_READY. CMD is transmitted (SEQ1003), and the response RTT_READY.
- the Protected RTT Protocol procedure starts.
- the source device side calculates two types of message authentication codes MAC1A and MAC2A (SEQ1010), and the sink device side also calculates two types of message authentication codes MAC1B and MAC2B by the same calculation method. (SEQ1030).
- the Source device has a command RTT_SETUP (N).
- variable N is transmitted by CMD (SEQ1005).
- the Sink device has a response and ACCEPTED (N).
- An RSP is returned (SEQ1006).
- a message authentication code for the variable N transmitted here is prepared for both the source device and the sink device.
- the source device is RTT_TEST (MAC1A).
- CMD is transmitted (SEQ1007), and the sink device responds to ACCEPTED (MAC2B).
- An RSP is returned (SEQ1008).
- the source device checks whether or not the round-trip delay time RTT from the transmission of the RTT measurement command to the reception of the response is equal to or less than a predetermined threshold (7 milliseconds), that is, the RTT check (SEQ1011). When the RTT exceeds the threshold (No in SEQ1011), the Source device further checks whether the number of trials exceeds 1023 (SEQ1012). If the number of trials does not exceed 1023 (Yes in SEQ1012), the source device increments N by 1, and then prepares a message authentication code corresponding to the new N and sends an RTT_SETUP (N) command.
- a predetermined threshold 7 milliseconds
- the Sink device also prepares a message authentication code corresponding to the new N and transmits an ACCEPTED (N) response, and repeats the transmission of the RTT measurement command and the response reply between the Source device and the Sink device.
- N ACCEPTED
- the source device aborts this authentication procedure (Abort).
- the Source device is ACCEPTED (MAC2B). It is further checked whether or not the message authentication code MAC2B received by the RSP matches the MAC2A generated by itself (SEQ1013). If they do not match (No in SEQ1013), the Source device aborts this authentication procedure (Abort).
- the Source device sends an RTT verification command RTT_VERIFY.
- the CMD is transmitted (SEQ1009).
- the sink device responds to the RTT_TEST (MAC1A). It is checked whether or not the message authentication code MAC1A received by the CMD matches the MAC1B generated by itself (SEQ1032). If they do not match (No in SEQ 1032), the sink device aborts this authentication procedure (Abort), and if they match (Yes in SEQ 1032), ACCEPTED (OKMSG). The RSP is returned (SEQ1010).
- Source device is ACCEPTED (OKMSG) from Sink device.
- the message OKMSG included in the RSP is verified (SEQ1014). If the verification of the message OKMSG is successful (Yes in SEQ1014), the Source device adds the Sink device to the RTT registry and sets the content transmission counter to 40 hours (SEQ1015). If verification of the message OKMSG fails (No in SEQ1014), the Source device aborts this authentication procedure (Abort).
- K X can be shared between the Source device and the Sink device.
- K R the shared key at the time of remote access
- K XM the shared key at the time of content transfer by remote access
- FIG. 11 schematically shows the contents of the content transmission phase (SEQ503). This processing procedure is mainly performed between the content provision unit 304 on the source device side and the content acquisition unit 403 on the sink device side.
- the sink device requests content from the source device by an HTTP request (HTTP GET request) using the HTTP GET method (SEQ1101).
- HTTP GET request includes the shared key label K X _label acquired in the AKE procedure phase (SEQ502) together with the URL (Uniform Resource Locator) of the content.
- the source device When the source device authorizes the content request from the sink device, the source device generates the encryption key K C from the shared key K X specified by the shared key label K X _label, and uses this encryption key K C to generate the content. It encrypts and transmits to a Sink device as an HTTP response (HTTP GET response) (SEQ1102).
- FIG. 12 schematically shows the flow of content encryption, transmission, and decryption based on the DTCP specification and the DTCP-IP specification.
- the Source device and the Sink device first establish one TCP / IP connection and perform an AKE procedure. Then, after confirming that the devices are legitimate DTCP compliant devices based on each other's Device Certificate, the authentication key K auth is shared. Then, Source device when generating the shared key K x, sends a Sink device encrypts the authentication key K auth this.
- the source device encrypts the content to be transmitted. Specifically, the source device generates a nonce N c using a random number, uses the shared key K x and the nonce N c as arguments, and obtains the encryption key K c by an arithmetic process corresponding to an encryption mode (described later). Generate. Then, encrypting the content using the encryption key K c.
- the HTTP response for transmitting the encrypted content from the source device is composed of one or more PCPs.
- the source device when the source device generates the nonce N c using a random number, the source device generates the encryption key K c based on the shared key K X , the nonce N c, and E-EMI (Extended Encryption Mode Indicator) indicating the encryption mode. It computes, and encrypted using the encryption key K c (E-EMI is composed of fields of 4-bit length describing the cipher mode, the value of which corresponds to the seven types of copy control information). Then, a PCP (Protected Content Packet) packet including nonce Nc and E-EMI in the header and including encrypted content in the payload is placed on the TCP stream.
- a TCP stream including encrypted content is divided into packet sizes as a predetermined unit, further converted into an IP packet with a header portion added, and delivered to a specified IP address.
- the sink device When the sink device receives each IP packet from the source device, it assembles it into a TCP stream. When the nonce N c and E-EMI are extracted from this stream, the encryption key K c is calculated using these and the shared key K x , and the received encrypted content can be decrypted. Then, processing such as reproduction, copying, and movement can be performed on the plaintext content after decryption.
- the DTCP specification and the DTCP-IP specification can provide a technology for securely transmitting content as digital data. Recently, since high-quality and high-value content such as content having 4K resolution is targeted for transmission, security enhancement is required more than ever.
- a mechanism for gradually moving to a safer system is introduced to reduce time and cost burden. Specifically, by making it possible to handle high-value content only during a certain system transition period for a device in the transition stage that has been subjected to predetermined security enhancement measures, the time problem required for the transition is avoided, The transition to a safer system is facilitated.
- Authentication and key sharing unit 306 of the Source devices or content transmitting apparatus 300 side a shared key K X2 passed to conventional Sink devices not subjected to security measures, shared key passed to the Sink device performs predetermined security measures K X1 is different.
- a device with a predetermined security enhancement measure is, for example, a device that only supports the conventional encryption algorithm, but can ensure the safety of more vulnerable parts other than the encryption method, It is positioned as a device in the transition stage when the system is replaced with a new encryption method.
- the conventional encryption algorithm is applied, but high-value content can be handled by using the dedicated shared key K X1 . This is because the conventional device has only the shared key K X2 and cannot decrypt high-value content encrypted based on the shared key K X1 .
- both the device with the prescribed security enhancement measures and the device without it do not support the new encryption algorithm method, and both apply the conventional encryption algorithm.
- the difference in whether or not a predetermined security enhancement measure has been taken relates to the robustness of the implementation, for example. More specifically, a device that can implement security only with software cannot be said to have implemented security enhancement measures, but a device that protects highly confidential information such as device keys with hardware is subject to security enhancement measures. It can be said that.
- a shared key K for generating an encryption key having a long key length is used instead of the shared key K x for generating an encryption key having a conventional key length.
- X_NEW is shared.
- FIG. 13 schematically shows a time chart 1300 for switching the content transmission system from the conventional encryption method to the new encryption method.
- the new encryption method is not supported, but it is allowed to handle high-value content even in a device that has been subjected to a predetermined security enhancement measure (in the transition stage).
- an appropriate system migration deadline 1301 may be set.
- FIG. 14 shows the correspondence between the source and sink device encryption methods and the contents that can be transmitted. However, in the figure, it is assumed that the Source and Sink devices corresponding to the new encryption method are compatible with the conventional encryption method.
- Source devices that are compatible with conventional encryption methods and have not been subjected to predetermined security enhancement measures cannot handle high-value content in the first place. Accordingly, high-value content cannot be transmitted to any of a sink device that has not been subjected to a predetermined security enhancement measure, a sink device that has been subjected to a predetermined security enhancement measure, and a sink device that supports a new encryption method.
- content other than high-value content can only be transmitted using a conventional encryption method (C1401, C1402, C1403).
- a source device that has been subjected to a predetermined security enhancement policy is to switch a shared key from K X2 to K X1 for a sink device that has been subjected to a predetermined security enhancement measure and a sink device that supports a new encryption method
- High-value content can be transmitted by a conventional encryption method (C1412, C1413).
- content other than high-value content can only be transmitted using a conventional encryption method (C1411).
- a source device corresponding to a new encryption method switches a shared key from K X2 to K X1 and transmits high-value content using a conventional encryption method to a sink device with a predetermined security enhancement measure.
- the high-value content can be transmitted by the new encryption method to the sink device corresponding to the new encryption method (C1423).
- content other than high-value content can only be transmitted using a conventional encryption method (C1421).
- a source device transmits high-value content is the destination sink device taking a predetermined security enhancement measure (whether it is possible to secure the security of weaker parts other than the encryption method) or new It is necessary to know whether the encryption method is supported. Also, a sink device that supports a new encryption method cannot instruct the encryption method unless it knows whether or not the source device that is a request destination of high-value content supports the new encryption method.
- an ES flag is defined that indicates whether or not the device has taken a predetermined security enhancement measure (whether the security of a weaker part other than the encryption method has been secured).
- ES flag 0 is written.
- an ES flag can be defined in Device Certificate.
- FIG. 16 shows a state where an ES flag is defined at a position reserved in the current specification, which is indicated by a reference number 1601, in Device Certificate.
- Device Certificate is a certificate given to each DTCP compliant device from DTLA.
- the sink device has taken a predetermined security strengthening measure by storing the ES flag in the device certificate sent in the CHALLENGE subfunction message (SEQ 703) (encryption method) It is possible to notify the source device of the fact that the security of the more vulnerable part other than the above is ensured.
- the sink device is taking a predetermined security enhancement measure in the same way (the security of weaker parts other than the encryption method can be secured). Can be notified to the Source device.
- FIG. 17 shows a specific configuration example of the payload sent by this command.
- An ES flag 1702 is stored in the SINK-CAPABILITY field 1701 of the payload 1700.
- the device private key (private key) of the sink device itself the tampering during transmission is prevented by accompanying the SINK-SIGNATURE field 1703 including the electronic signature calculated for the data in the above-mentioned SINK-CAPABILITY field 1701. To do.
- the SINK-CAPABILITY field 1701 includes an NS flag 1704 in addition to the ES flag 1702.
- the NS flag is a flag defined to indicate whether or not the device is compatible with a new encryption method (New System).
- a sink device capable of handling high-value content always sends a command including the NS flag in the AKE process, whether or not the new encryption method is supported.
- the source device confirms that the command including the NS flag is received during the AKE process when the ES flag of the sink is 1, and if this is not possible, the abnormal AKE process is performed. to decide. For example, when the sink device stores the ES flag in the device certificate and transmits it (see FIG. 16), if the source device cannot receive the command including the NS flag in the AKE process, the AKE process is performed. Is interrupted as an error.
- the sink device uses the data 1700 shown in FIG. 17 as, for example, CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE.
- CAPABILITY_EXCHANGE During the MOVE RTT-AKE procedure shown in FIG. It can be sent by being included in the payload of the CMD message (SEQ903).
- the sink device can send the data 1700 shown in FIG. 17 even during the RTT-AKE process or the pre-registration process at the time of remote access.
- the sink device can send the data 1700 shown in FIG. 17 in other AKE processes (for example, RA-AKE).
- RA-AKE RA-AKE
- the Source device can store the NS flag in the payload sent in response to the command as shown in FIG. 17 to indicate whether the new encryption method is supported.
- FIG. 18 shows a specific configuration example of such a payload.
- NS flag 1802 is stored in the SOURCE-CAPABILITY field 1801 of the payload 1800.
- the SOURCE-SIGNATURE field 1803 including the electronic signature calculated for the data in the SOURCE-CAPABILITY field 1801 is used to prevent tampering during transmission. To do.
- the source device to which a predetermined security enhancement measure is applied refers to the ES flag received from the sink device in the format as shown in FIG. 16 or FIG. 17, and the common key K X1 that can handle the high-value content or the high-value It is determined which of the common keys K X2 that cannot handle content is to be passed to the sink device.
- FIG. 19 shows a processing procedure for the source device to determine the common key in the form of a flowchart. This process is mainly performed by the authentication / key sharing unit 306 in the Source device.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 checks whether the ES flag transmitted from the sink device is 1 (step S1901).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 If the ES flag is not 1 (No in step S1901), the authentication / key sharing unit 306 generates a common key K X2 that cannot handle high-value content, and transmits the common key K X2 from the communication / control unit 301 to the sink device. Send (step S1904). In this case, the source device can transmit only the high-value content to the sink device.
- step S1901 the authentication / key sharing unit 306 further checks whether a command including the NS flag has been received during the AKE process (step S1902).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 interrupts the AKE process as an error.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 When the command including the NS flag can be received during the AKE process (Yes in step S1902), the authentication / key sharing unit 306 generates a common key K X1 that can handle high-value content, and performs communication. Sending from the control unit 301 to the sink device (step S1903).
- FIG. 20 shows a processing procedure for preferentially executing a new encryption method on the sink device side in the form of a flowchart. This process is performed during the AKE process by the authentication / key sharing unit 406 in the sink device corresponding to the new encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 406 displays the source through the communication / control unit 401 until reception of a response to a command indicating the presence or absence of a new encryption method (that is, storing the NS flag) times out (No in step S2002).
- the device waits for a response to the command indicating the presence or absence of a new encryption method (No in step S2003).
- step S2002 when the response reception of the command indicating the presence or absence of the new encryption method times out (Yes in step S2002), the authentication / key sharing unit 406 determines that the Source device does not support the new encryption method, The content transmission is requested to the source device through the control unit 401 using the conventional encryption method (step S2006).
- step S2003 When a command response indicating the presence or absence of a new encryption method can be received from the source device (Yes in step S2003), the authentication / key sharing unit 406 refers to the NS flag stored in the command response. Then, it is checked whether or not the source device is compatible with the new encryption method (step S2004).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 406 indicates that the source device supports the new encryption method.
- the source device is requested to transmit content using the conventional encryption method to the source device through the communication / control unit 401.
- FIG. 21 shows a processing procedure for preferentially executing a new encryption method on the source device side in the form of a flowchart. This process is performed during the AKE process by the authentication / key sharing unit 306 in the Source device corresponding to the new encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 checks whether or not the sink device requests content transmission using the conventional encryption method (step S2101).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 uses the conventional encryption method for content transmission to the sink device. This is determined (step S2106).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 indicates the presence or absence of a new encryption method (that is, stores the NS flag). It waits until a command is received through the communication / control unit 301 (No in step S2102).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 When receiving a command indicating the presence or absence of a new encryption method (Yes in step S2102), the authentication / key sharing unit 306 refers to the NS flag stored in the command and the Sink device supports the new encryption method. It is checked whether it is present (step S2103).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 further checks whether the sink device requests content transmission using the conventional encryption method. (Step S2104).
- the authentication / key sharing unit 306 uses a new encryption method for content transmission to the sink device. Is determined (step S2105).
- the key sharing unit 306 determines to use a conventional encryption method for content transmission to the sink device (step S2106).
- the content transmission system to which the technology disclosed in the present specification is applied can make a transition to a more secure system with a new encryption method in a step-by-step manner. It is intended to reduce.
- the specified security enhancement measures for example, devices that only support conventional cryptographic algorithms but can secure the security of more vulnerable parts other than cryptographic methods
- high-value content can be handled only during a certain period of system transition.
- the processing capacity per unit cost of the apparatus generally tends to increase year by year, and it is highly possible that the burden on the cryptographic algorithm that requires more calculation amount can be reduced by such a long-term response.
- a content transmission apparatus that operates as a server 201 or a DTCP source device, a set top box, a recorder, a television receiver, a personal computer, a network access network, Server (NAS).
- FIG. 23 shows a configuration example of a personal computer 2300 that can operate as the server 201 or a DTCP Source device. It is assumed that the personal computer 2300 also supports a remote access function (described above).
- the illustrated personal computer 2300 includes a CPU (Central Processing Unit) 2301, a RAM (Random Access Memory) 2302, an EEPROM (Electrically Erasable and Programmable ROM) 2303, a display 2304, a speaker 2305, for example, an HDD (HardDrD).
- Circuit components such as a mass information storage device 2306 such as a Super Density Disc 2306 and an I / O interface 2307 are provided, and these circuit components are interconnected via a bus 2308.
- the CPU 2301 reads and executes a program loaded in the RAM 2302 as the main memory.
- the RAM 2302 is loaded with functions related to content encryption and decryption. For example, a program for executing the DTCP + function and a program for executing the RA-AKE process are loaded into the RAM 2302.
- the EEPROM 2303 is a rewritable nonvolatile storage device and stores setting information and the like.
- a source device that is, a content transmission apparatus
- a RAC record including a sink-ID of the sink device is stored in the EEPROM 2503.
- the CPU 2501 when receiving a request from the sink device to register as a terminal capable of remote access, the CPU 2501 reads a program in which DTCP + AKE processing is described from the RAM 2302, and exchanges with the sink device. Execute the AKE procedure. If this procedure is successful, the CPU 2301 generates the exchange key K R and its label K R _label according to the program stored in the RAM 2302, and stores them in the EEPROM 2303 as a RAC record associated with the sink ID.
- the CPU 2301 compares the sink-ID of the sink device making the request with the sink-ID stored in the EEPROM 2303; A process for determining whether or not to complete the RA-AKE process is executed.
- a common exchange key is generated between the personal computer 2300 and the sink device that has requested the RA-AKE process.
- the content key generated based on the exchange key is temporarily stored, and when the content is read from the mass information storage device 2306, this content is encrypted with the temporarily stored content key. Turn into.
- the encrypted content is output to the outside via the I / O interface 2308.
- the I / O interface 2308 has a wireless LAN function, the encrypted content is transmitted to the sink device that has requested the RA-AKE process via the wireless LAN.
- FIG. 24 shows a configuration example of a recorder 2400 that can operate as the server 201 or a DTCP Source device. It is assumed that the recorder 2400 also supports a remote access function (described above).
- the illustrated recorder 2400 includes a system chip 2401, a mass storage device 2402, a RAM 2403, an EEPROM 2404, a wireless LAN chip 2405, or a LAN port 2409, a tuner 2406, a display 2407, and a speaker 2408.
- the system chip 2401 includes circuit modules such as a CPU 2401a, a coprocessor 2401b, and an interface function unit 2401c, and these circuit modules are interconnected by a bus 2401d in the chip.
- the CPU 2401a can execute a program stored in a storage device connected via the interface function unit 2401c.
- the coprocessor 2401b is an auxiliary arithmetic device, and mainly executes compression or decoding processing of moving images. For example, an algorithm such as H264, VC1, MPEG2, or JPEG is executed.
- the coprocessor 2401b transmits moving image content (stored in the mass storage device 2402) to a content receiving device such as a sink device
- the coprocessor 2401b converts the image size according to the communication environment such as the communication speed.
- processing for enabling transmission at a size optimum for the communication environment that is, transcoding of the codec is performed. Due to transcoding of the codec, it is possible to reduce a delay in reproduction at a content transmission destination such as a sink device.
- the transcoding of the codec may be performed by the CPU 2401a instead of dedicated hardware such as the coprocessor 2401b.
- the compression rate for transcoding content can be specified by the user for each content.
- the large-capacity storage device 2402 is, for example, an HDD or an SDD, and stores content to be provided to a sink device or a content reception device.
- Tuner 2406 selects and receives a broadcast signal such as terrestrial digital broadcast.
- a broadcast signal such as terrestrial digital broadcast.
- the program is recorded or reserved for recording, and the broadcast content is stored in the mass storage device 2402.
- Broadcast programs received by the tuner 2406 and contents stored in the large-capacity storage device 2402 can be viewed using the displays 2407 and 2408.
- the wireless LAN chip 2405 performs processing of a physical layer and a MAC (Media Access Control) layer in a wireless LAN standard such as Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) or IEEE 802.11, for example, via a predetermined access point or as a sink device Direct wireless connection with other content receivers.
- the LAN port 2409 is connected to a wired LAN (not shown) such as Ethernet (registered trademark) via a plugged-in LAN cable 2409A, and for example, a physical layer and a MAC layer in a wired LAN standard such as IEEE 802.3.
- a content receiving apparatus as a sink device.
- the RAM 2403 as the main memory is loaded with a program executed by the CPU 2401a.
- the main program loaded in the RAM 2403 is a program that realizes functions related to content encryption and decryption. For example, a program for executing the DTCP + function and a program for executing the RA-AKE processing are stored in the RAM 2403. Loaded.
- the EEPROM 2404 is a rewritable nonvolatile storage device and stores setting information and the like.
- a source device that is, a content transmission device
- a RAC record including the sink-ID of the sink device is stored in the EEPROM 2404.
- the CPU 2401a when receiving a request from the sink device to register as a terminal capable of remote access, the CPU 2401a reads out the program describing the DTCP-IP AKE process from the RAM 2403, and exchanges with the sink device. Execute the AKE procedure. If this procedure is successful, the CPU 2401a generates an exchange key K R and its label K R — label according to the program stored in the RAM 2403, and stores them in the EEPROM 2404 as a RAC record associated with the Sink-ID.
- the sink-ID of the sink device making the request is compared with the sink ID of the sink device stored in the EEPROM 2404, and the RA -Perform a process to determine whether to complete the AKE process.
- a common content key is generated between the recorder 2400 and the sink device that has requested the RA-AKE process.
- the generated content key is temporarily stored, and when the content is read from the mass information storage device 2402, the content is encrypted with the temporarily stored content key.
- the encrypted content is transmitted via the interface function unit 2401c and the wireless LAN chip 2405 to the terminal that has requested the RA-AKE process.
- FIG. 25 shows a configuration example of a network access server (NAS) 2500 that can operate as the server 201 or a DTCP Source device.
- NAS network access server
- the network access server 2500 includes a large-capacity storage device, is installed in the home networks 110 and 210, and transmits information in the large-capacity storage device according to the IP protocol. For example, the broadcast content recorded by the recorder 2500 is dubbed to the network access server 2500, or the content stored in the network access server 2500 is transmitted to a sink device such as a personal computer 2300 or a smartphone for viewing. can do. Further, it is assumed that the network access server 2500 also supports a remote access function.
- the illustrated network access server 2500 includes at least one of a system chip 2501, a mass storage device 2502, a RAM 2503, an EEPROM 2504, a wireless LAN chip 2505, or a LAN port 2506.
- the system chip 2501 includes circuit modules such as a CPU 2501a, a coprocessor 2501b, and an interface function unit 2501c, and these circuit modules are interconnected by a bus 2501d in the chip.
- circuit modules such as a CPU 2501a, a coprocessor 2501b, and an interface function unit 2501c, and these circuit modules are interconnected by a bus 2501d in the chip.
- the CPU 2501a can execute a program stored in a storage device connected via the interface function unit 2501c.
- the coprocessor 2501b is an auxiliary arithmetic device, and mainly executes moving image compression or decoding processing. For example, an algorithm such as H264, VC1, MPEG2, or JPEG is executed.
- the coprocessor 2501b converts the image size according to the communication environment such as the communication speed when transmitting the moving image content (stored in the mass storage device 2502) to a content receiving device such as a sink device. Then, processing for enabling transmission at a size optimum for the communication environment, that is, transcoding of the codec is performed. Due to transcoding of the codec, it is possible to reduce a delay in reproduction at a content transmission destination such as a sink device. However, transcoding of the codec can be performed by the CPU 2501a instead of dedicated hardware such as the coprocessor 2501b. Also, the compression rate for transcoding content can be specified by the user for each content.
- the large-capacity storage device 2502 is, for example, an HDD or an SDD, and stores content to be provided to a sink device or a content receiving device.
- broadcast content recorded by the network access server 2500 can be dubbed into the mass storage device 2502 (received via the wireless LAN chip 2705).
- the wireless LAN chip 2505 performs processing of a physical layer and a MAC (Media Access Control) layer in a wireless LAN standard such as Wi-Fi (Wireless Fidelity) or IEEE802.11, for example, via a predetermined access point or as a sink device. Direct wireless connection with other content receivers.
- the LAN port 2506 is connected to a wired LAN (not shown) such as Ethernet (registered trademark) via a plugged LAN cable 2506A, and also includes a physical layer and a MAC layer in a wired LAN standard such as IEEE 802.3, for example. To communicate with a content receiving apparatus as a sink device.
- a program to be executed by the CPU 2501a is loaded into the RAM 2503 as the main memory.
- the main program loaded into the RAM 2503 is a program that realizes functions related to content encryption and decryption. For example, a program for executing the DTCP-IP function and a program for executing the RA-AKE processing are provided. It is loaded into the RAM 2503.
- the EEPROM 2504 is a rewritable nonvolatile storage device and stores setting information and the like.
- a RAC record including a sink-ID of the sink device is stored in the EEPROM 2504.
- the CPU 2501a when receiving a request from the sink device to register as a terminal capable of remote access, the CPU 2501a reads a program in which DTCP + AKE processing is described from the RAM 2503, and communicates with the sink device. AKE procedure is executed between. If successful this procedure, CPU2501a imparts the exchange key K R and its label K R _label in accordance with a program stored in the RAM 2503, and stored in EEPROM2504 in the Sink-ID pair.
- the sink device's sink ID and the sink device's sink ID stored in the EEPROM 2504 are received.
- a process of comparing and determining whether or not to complete the RA-AKE process is executed.
- a common content key is generated between the network access server 2500 and the sink device that has requested the RA-AKE process.
- the generated content key is temporarily stored, and when the content is read from the large-capacity information storage device 2502, the content is encrypted with the temporarily stored content key. .
- the encrypted content is transmitted through the interface function unit 2501c and the wireless LAN chip 2505 to the terminal that has requested the RA-AKE process.
- the technology disclosed in the present specification has been described mainly with respect to an embodiment in which the technology disclosed in this specification is applied to a network of DTCP and DTCP-IP specifications.
- the gist of the technology disclosed in this specification is limited to this. is not.
- the technology disclosed in the technology disclosed in this specification can also be applied to a content transmission system that moves content between devices on a network based on technical specifications other than DTCP or DTCP-IP.
- An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and shared key delivery with the content receiving device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard;
- a content providing unit that encrypts and transmits content to the content receiving device using an encryption key generated from the shared key; Comprising The authentication / key sharing unit switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content receiving device has a predetermined security strength.
- Content transmission device (2)
- the predetermined transmission standard is DTCP (Digital Transmission Content Protection) or DTCP-IP (DTCP mapping to IP).
- the authentication / key sharing unit delivers the first shared key that can handle the first content to the content receiving device having the predetermined security strength, and has the predetermined security strength.
- a second shared key that cannot handle the first content is delivered to a non-content receiving device;
- the predetermined security strengthening measure is that safety of a more weak part other than the encryption method is secured.
- the content provider encrypts and transmits the first content with the encryption key generated from the first shared key, but encrypts the first content with the encryption key generated from the second shared key. No transmission The content transmission device according to (3) above.
- the first shared key and the second shared key are shared keys for generating an encryption key according to the first encryption method
- the authentication / key sharing unit delivers the first shared key or the second shared key to a content receiving apparatus that supports only the first encryption method, but receives content corresponding to the second encryption method. Handing over a shared key for generating an encryption key according to the second encryption method to the device; The content transmission device according to (3) above.
- the authentication / key sharing unit determines whether the content receiving device has the predetermined security strength based on an ES flag stored in a device certificate transmitted from the content receiving device during mutual authentication. To determine whether or not The content transmission device according to (3) above.
- the authentication / key sharing unit determines that the content receiving device has the predetermined security strength. To determine whether the device has The content transmission device according to (3) above. (9) Based on the NS flag stored in the CAPABILITY field of the payload of the command sent from the content receiving device at the time of mutual authentication, the authentication / key sharing unit causes the content receiving device to execute the second encryption method. To determine whether or not The content transmission device according to (8) above. (10) The CAPABILITY field is accompanied by an electronic signature calculated from the data of the field using the secret key of the content receiving device. The content transmission device according to any one of (8) and (9) above.
- the authentication / key sharing unit has confirmed that the ES flag is stored in the device certificate transmitted from the content receiving apparatus, but cannot confirm the NS flag in the command at the time of mutual authentication. , Interrupt the mutual authentication process as an error,
- the authentication / key sharing unit stores an NS flag indicating whether or not the second encryption method is supported in a CAPABILITY field of a payload of a command to be sent to the content receiving device during mutual authentication.
- the authentication / key sharing unit accompanies the CAPABILITY field with an electronic signature calculated from data in the field using its own secret key.
- the predetermined transmission standard is DTCP (Digital Transmission Content Protection) or DTCP-IP (DTCP mapping to IP).
- the content receiving device according to (15) above.
- the authentication / key sharing unit receives a first shared key that can handle the first content according to the fact that the authentication / key sharing unit has a predetermined security strength,
- the content acquisition unit acquires the first content encrypted and transmitted with the encryption key generated from the first shared key;
- the predetermined security enhancement measure is to secure safety of a more weak part other than the encryption method.
- the content receiving device according to (15) above.
- the authentication / key sharing unit stores an ES flag indicating whether or not the device certificate to be sent to the content transmission apparatus at the time of mutual authentication has the predetermined security strength.
- the content receiving device stores an ES flag indicating whether or not the authentication / key sharing unit has the predetermined security strength in a CAPABILITY field of a payload of a command to be sent to the content transmission apparatus during mutual authentication.
- the content receiving device stores in the CAPABILITY field of a payload of a command sent to the content transmitting apparatus at the time of mutual authentication, an NS flag indicating whether or not it is compatible with an encryption method.
- the authentication / key sharing unit accompanies the CAPABILITY field with an electronic signature calculated from data in the field using its own secret key.
- the content transmission device according to any one of (20) and (21).
- Content receiving method
- An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and shared key delivery with the content receiving device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard;
- a content providing unit that encrypts and transmits content to the content receiving device using an encryption key generated from the shared key;
- Written in computer readable form to make the computer work as The authentication / key sharing unit switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content receiving device has a predetermined security strength.
- An authentication / key sharing unit that performs mutual authentication and shared key reception with the content transmission device in accordance with a predetermined transmission standard;
- a content acquisition unit for acquiring content encrypted and transmitted using an encryption key generated from the received shared key;
- Written in computer readable form to make the computer work as The authentication / key sharing unit receives a shared key according to the fact that the user has a predetermined security strength;
- Computer program The content transmitting device and a content receiving device that perform mutual authentication and exchange of a shared key, and encrypt and transmit content using an encryption key generated from the shared key, The content transmission device switches a shared key to be delivered depending on whether or not the content reception device has a predetermined security strength.
- Content transmission system
- DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 100 ... Content transmission system 101 ... Server, 102, 103 ... Terminal, 110 ... Home network 200 ... Content transmission system 201 ... Server, 202, 203 ... Terminal 210 ... Home network, 220 ... External network 230 ... Router 300 ... Content Transmission device (Source device) DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 301 ... Communication / control part, 302 ... Content recording part 303 ... Content acquisition part, 304 ... Content provision part 305 ... Content list provision part, 306 ... Authentication and key sharing part 307 ... Terminal management part, 308 ... Content reproduction output part 400: Content receiving device 401 ... Communication / control unit 402 ... Content / list browsing unit 403 ...
- Mass storage device 2403 ... RAM 2404 ... EEPROM, 2405 ... Wireless LAN chip 2406 ... Tuner, 2407 ... Display, 2408 ... Speaker 2409 ... LAN port, 2409A ... LAN cable 2500 ... Network access server 2501 ... System chip, 2501a ... CPU, 2501b ... Coprocessor, 2501c ... Interface function unit 2501d ... Bus, 2502 ... Mass storage device, 2503 ... RAM 2504 ... EEPROM, 2505 ... Wireless LAN chip 2506 ... LAN port, 2506A ... LAN cable
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Technology Law (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Two-Way Televisions, Distribution Of Moving Picture Or The Like (AREA)
- Information Transfer Between Computers (AREA)
Abstract
Description
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信装置である。
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信方法である。
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じて、第1のコンテンツを扱うことができる第1の共有鍵を受け取り、
前記コンテンツ取得部は、前記第1の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵で暗号化伝送された第1のコンテンツを取得する、
コンテンツ受信装置である。
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンテンツ受信方法である。
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンピューター・プログラムである。
所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンピューター・プログラムである。
相互認証と共有鍵の交換を行ない、前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを暗号化伝送するコンテンツ送信装置とコンテンツ受信装置で構成され、
前記コンテンツ送信装置は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ伝送システムである。
図1には、本明細書で開示する技術を適用したコンテンツ伝送システム100の構成例を模式的に示している。図示のコンテンツ伝送システム100は、家庭内に敷設されたホーム・ネットワーク110上に接続されたサーバー101と、端末102、端末103で構成される。同図では、簡素化のため、1台のサーバーと2台の端末しか描いていないが、2台以上のサーバー、並びに3台以上の端末がホーム・ネットワーク上に設置されることも想定される。
続いて、DTCP仕様並びにDTCP-IP仕様に従ってSourceデバイスとSinkデバイスとの間で行なわれる通信動作について説明する。
図7~図12に示したように、DTCP仕様並びにDTCP-IP仕様は、ディジタル・データとしてのコンテンツをセキュアに伝送する技術を提供することができる。最近では、4K解像度を持つコンテンツなどの高品質で高価値のコンテンツが伝送対象となることから、これまで以上にセキュリティーの強化が求められてくる。
(1)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信装置。
(2)前記所定の伝送規格は、DTCP(Digital Transmission Content Protection)若しくはDTCP-IP(DTCP mapping to IP)である、
上記(1)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(3)前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有したコンテンツ受信装置には第1のコンテンツを扱うことができる第1の共有鍵を引き渡し、前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有していないコンテンツ受信装置には第1のコンテンツを扱うことができない第2の共有鍵を引き渡す、
上記(1)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(4)前記所定のセキュリティー強化策は、暗号方式以外のより脆弱な部分の安全性が確保されていることである、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(5)前記コンテンツ提供部は、前記第1の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵で第1のコンテンツを暗号化伝送するが、前記第2の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵では第1のコンテンツを暗号化伝送しない、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(6)前記第1の共有鍵及び前記第2の共有鍵は第1の暗号方式に従う暗号鍵を生成するための共有鍵であり、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記第1の暗号方式にしか対応しないコンテンツ受信装置には前記第1の共有鍵又は前記第2の共有鍵を引き渡すが、第2の暗号方式に対応するコンテンツ受信装置には前記第2の暗号方式に従う暗号鍵を生成するための共有鍵を引き渡す、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(7)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくる機器証明書に格納されたESフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有する機器か否かを判別する、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(8)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくるコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに格納されたESフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有する機器か否かを判別する、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(9)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくるコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに格納されたNSフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記第2の暗号方式に対応しているか否かを判別する、
上記(8)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(10)前記CAPABILITYフィールドは、前記コンテンツ受信装置の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴う、
上記(8)又は(9)のいずれかに記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(11)前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてきた機器証明書にESフラグが格納されていることを確認したが、相互認証時のコマンド内でNSフラグを確認できないときには、その相互認証処理をエラーとして中断する、
上記(9)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(12)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置に送るコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに、第2の暗号方式への対応の有無を示すNSフラグを格納する、
上記(3)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(13)前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記CAPABILITYフィールドに、自分の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴わせる、
上記(12)に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(14)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信方法。
(15)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンテンツ受信装置。
(16)前記所定の伝送規格は、DTCP(Digital Transmission Content Protection)若しくはDTCP-IP(DTCP mapping to IP)である、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(17)前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じて、第1のコンテンツを扱うことができる第1の共有鍵を受け取り、
前記コンテンツ取得部は、前記第1の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵で暗号化伝送された第1のコンテンツを取得する、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(18)前記所定のセキュリティー強化策は、暗号方式以外のより脆弱な部分の安全性を確保することである、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(19)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ送信装置に送る機器証明書に、自分が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かを示すESフラグを格納する、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(20)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ送信装置に送るコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに、自分が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かを示すESフラグを格納する、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(21)前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ送信装置に送るコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに、自分が暗号方式に対応しているか否かを示すNSフラグを格納する、
上記(15)に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。
(22)前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記CAPABILITYフィールドに、自分の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴わせる、
上記(20)又は(21)のいずれかに記載のコンテンツ送信装置。
(23)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンテンツ受信方法。
(24)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンピューター・プログラム。
(25)所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンピューター・プログラム。
(26)相互認証と共有鍵の交換を行ない、前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを暗号化伝送するコンテンツ送信装置とコンテンツ受信装置で構成され、
前記コンテンツ送信装置は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ伝送システム。
101…サーバー、102、103…端末、110…ホーム・ネットワーク
200…コンテンツ伝送システム
201…サーバー、202、203…端末
210…ホーム・ネットワーク、220…外部ネットワーク
230…ルーター
300…コンテンツ送信装置(Sourceデバイス)
301…通信・制御部、302…コンテンツ記録部
303…コンテンツ取得部、304…コンテンツ提供部
305…コンテンツ・リスト提供部、306…認証・鍵共有部
307…端末管理部、308…コンテンツ再生出力部
400…コンテンツ受信装置
401…通信・制御部
402…コンテンツ・リスト閲覧部、403…コンテンツ取得部
404…コンテンツ復号部、405…コンテンツ再生出力部
406…認証・鍵共有部、407…入力部、408…コンテンツ記録部
2200…コンピューター・プログラム配信システム
2210…サーバー、2211…記憶装置
2212…通信装置、2213…情報通知装置
2300…パーソナル・コンピューター、2301…CPU
2302…RAM、2303…EEPROM、2304…ディスプレイ
2305…スピーカー、2306…大容量記憶装置
2307…I/Oインターフェース、2308…バス
2400…レコーダー、2401…システム・チップ、2401a…CPU、
2401b…コプロセッサー、2401c…インターフェース機能部
2401d…バス、2402…大容量記憶装置、2403…RAM
2404…EEPROM、2405…無線LANチップ
2406…チューナー、2407…ディスプレイ、2408…スピーカー
2409…LANポート、2409A…LANケーブル
2500…ネットワーク・アクセス・サーバー
2501…システム・チップ、2501a…CPU、
2501b…コプロセッサー、2501c…インターフェース機能部
2501d…バス、2502…大容量記憶装置、2503…RAM
2504…EEPROM、2505…無線LANチップ
2506…LANポート、2506A…LANケーブル
Claims (20)
- 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有したコンテンツ受信装置には第1のコンテンツを扱うことができる第1の共有鍵を引き渡し、前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有していないコンテンツ受信装置には第1のコンテンツを扱うことができない第2の共有鍵を引き渡し、
前記コンテンツ提供部は、前記第1の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵で第1のコンテンツを暗号化伝送するが、前記第2の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵では第1のコンテンツを暗号化伝送しない、
請求項1に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記所定のセキュリティー強化策は、暗号方式以外のより脆弱な部分の安全性が確保されていることである、
請求項2に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記第1の共有鍵及び前記第2の共有鍵は第1の暗号方式に従う暗号鍵を生成するための共有鍵であり、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記第1の暗号方式にしか対応しないコンテンツ受信装置には前記第1の共有鍵又は前記第2の共有鍵を引き渡すが、第2の暗号方式に対応するコンテンツ受信装置には前記第2の暗号方式に従う暗号鍵を生成するための共有鍵を引き渡す、
請求項2に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくる機器証明書に格納されたESフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有する機器か否かを判別する、
請求項2に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくるコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに格納されたESフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有する機器か否かを判別する、
請求項2に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてくるコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに格納されたNSフラグに基づいて、前記コンテンツ受信装置が前記第2の暗号方式に対応しているか否かを判別する、
請求項6に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記CAPABILITYフィールドは、前記コンテンツ受信装置の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴う、
請求項6又は7のいずれかに記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置から送られてきた機器証明書にESフラグが格納されていることを確認したが、相互認証時のコマンド内でNSフラグを確認できないときには、その相互認証処理をエラーとして中断する、
請求項7に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ受信装置に送るコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに、第2の暗号方式への対応の有無を示すNSフラグを格納するとともに、自分の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴わせる、
請求項2に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 前記所定の伝送規格は、DTCP(Digital Transmission Content Protection)若しくはDTCP-IP(DTCP mapping to IP)である、
請求項1に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ送信方法。 - 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部と、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部と、
を具備し、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じて、第1のコンテンツを扱うことができる第1の共有鍵を受け取り、
前記コンテンツ取得部は、前記第1の共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵で暗号化伝送された第1のコンテンツを取得する、
コンテンツ受信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ送信装置に送る機器証明書に、自分が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かを示すESフラグを格納する、
請求項13に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、相互認証時に前記コンテンツ送信装置に送るコマンドのペイロードのCAPABILITYフィールドに、自分が前記所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かを示すESフラグ、又は、自分が暗号方式に対応しているか否かを示すNSフラグのうち少なくとも一方を格納する、
請求項13に記載のコンテンツ受信装置。 - 前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記CAPABILITYフィールドに、自分の秘密鍵を使って当該フィールドのデータから計算された電子署名を伴わせる、
請求項15に記載のコンテンツ送信装置。 - 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有ステップと、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得ステップと、
を有し、
前記認証・鍵共有ステップでは、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンテンツ受信方法。 - 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ受信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の引き渡しを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを前記コンテンツ受信装置へ暗号化伝送するコンテンツ提供部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンピューター・プログラム。 - 所定の伝送規格に従って、コンテンツ送信装置と相互認証及び共有鍵の受け取りを行なう認証・鍵共有部、
前記の受け取った共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いて暗号化伝送されたコンテンツを取得するコンテンツ取得部、
としてコンピューターを機能させるようにコンピューター可読形式で記述され、
前記認証・鍵共有部は、自分が所定のセキュリティー強度を有していることに応じた共有鍵を受け取る、
コンピューター・プログラム。 - 相互認証と共有鍵の交換を行ない、前記共有鍵から生成した暗号鍵を用いてコンテンツを暗号化伝送するコンテンツ送信装置とコンテンツ受信装置で構成され、
前記コンテンツ送信装置は、前記コンテンツ受信装置が所定のセキュリティー強度を有しているか否かに応じて、引き渡す共有鍵を切り替える、
コンテンツ伝送システム。
Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US14/900,317 US10044683B2 (en) | 2013-07-19 | 2014-04-30 | Content transmission and reception device compatible to switch to a new encryption scheme |
JP2015527200A JP6390618B2 (ja) | 2013-07-19 | 2014-04-30 | コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、コンピューター・プログラム、並びにコンテンツ伝送システム |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2013151075 | 2013-07-19 | ||
JP2013-151075 | 2013-07-19 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2015008521A1 true WO2015008521A1 (ja) | 2015-01-22 |
Family
ID=52345996
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2014/062018 WO2015008521A1 (ja) | 2013-07-19 | 2014-04-30 | コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、コンピューター・プログラム、並びにコンテンツ伝送システム |
Country Status (3)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US10044683B2 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP6390618B2 (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2015008521A1 (ja) |
Cited By (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN112218171A (zh) * | 2020-09-15 | 2021-01-12 | 深圳数字电视国家工程实验室股份有限公司 | 基于接口的数据传输方法、电子设备及存储介质 |
Families Citing this family (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20160364553A1 (en) * | 2015-06-09 | 2016-12-15 | Intel Corporation | System, Apparatus And Method For Providing Protected Content In An Internet Of Things (IOT) Network |
Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2006094241A (ja) * | 2004-09-24 | 2006-04-06 | Fuji Xerox Co Ltd | 暗号化装置、暗号化処理方法及びプログラム、並びに該暗号化装置を用いた情報保護システム |
US20070058814A1 (en) * | 2005-09-13 | 2007-03-15 | Avaya Technology Corp. | Method for undetectably impeding key strength of encryption usage for products exported outside the U.S. |
JP2008066834A (ja) * | 2006-09-05 | 2008-03-21 | Sony Corp | 通信システムおよび通信方法、情報処理装置および方法、デバイス、プログラム、並びに記録媒体 |
JP2008113172A (ja) * | 2006-10-30 | 2008-05-15 | Hitachi Ltd | コンテンツ送信装置、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ暗号化方法 |
Family Cites Families (17)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US6823454B1 (en) * | 1999-11-08 | 2004-11-23 | International Business Machines Corporation | Using device certificates to authenticate servers before automatic address assignment |
US7225259B2 (en) * | 2001-02-21 | 2007-05-29 | Nokia Inc. | Service tunnel over a connectionless network |
EP1304844B1 (en) * | 2001-10-19 | 2007-04-04 | Sony Deutschland GmbH | Content protection and copy management system for a network |
US7590840B2 (en) * | 2003-09-26 | 2009-09-15 | Randy Langer | Method and system for authorizing client devices to receive secured data streams |
JP4734872B2 (ja) * | 2004-09-07 | 2011-07-27 | パナソニック株式会社 | コンテンツ配信管理装置及びコンテンツ配信管理方法 |
US7742438B1 (en) * | 2004-10-21 | 2010-06-22 | Owlink Technology, Inc. | HDCP data transmission over a single communication channel |
JP2006171892A (ja) * | 2004-12-13 | 2006-06-29 | Betrusted Japan Co Ltd | ウェブサイト所有者情報伝達方法、ウェブサイト所有者情報送信装置及び方法並びにプログラム |
US20060143701A1 (en) * | 2004-12-23 | 2006-06-29 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | Techniques for authenticating network protocol control messages while changing authentication secrets |
US7913289B2 (en) * | 2005-05-23 | 2011-03-22 | Broadcom Corporation | Method and apparatus for security policy and enforcing mechanism for a set-top box security processor |
JP3949148B2 (ja) * | 2005-09-06 | 2007-07-25 | 株式会社東芝 | 無線通信装置、受信装置、送信装置および通信制御プログラム |
JP4581955B2 (ja) * | 2005-10-04 | 2010-11-17 | ソニー株式会社 | コンテンツ伝送装置及びコンテンツ伝送方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
JP4518058B2 (ja) * | 2006-01-11 | 2010-08-04 | ソニー株式会社 | コンテンツ伝送システム、コンテンツ伝送装置及びコンテンツ伝送方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム |
US8023478B2 (en) * | 2006-03-06 | 2011-09-20 | Cisco Technology, Inc. | System and method for securing mesh access points in a wireless mesh network, including rapid roaming |
JP5324813B2 (ja) | 2008-04-28 | 2013-10-23 | Kddi株式会社 | 鍵生成装置、証明書生成装置、サービス提供システム、鍵生成方法、証明書生成方法、サービス提供方法およびプログラム |
DE102009032466B4 (de) * | 2008-07-16 | 2017-03-02 | Infineon Technologies Ag | Sicherheit in Netzwerken |
JP5899687B2 (ja) * | 2011-07-15 | 2016-04-06 | ソニー株式会社 | 通信装置及び通信方法、通信システム、並びにコンピューター・プログラム |
CN113596828A (zh) * | 2014-10-31 | 2021-11-02 | 康维达无线有限责任公司 | 端对端服务层认证 |
-
2014
- 2014-04-30 JP JP2015527200A patent/JP6390618B2/ja active Active
- 2014-04-30 WO PCT/JP2014/062018 patent/WO2015008521A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2014-04-30 US US14/900,317 patent/US10044683B2/en active Active
Patent Citations (4)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JP2006094241A (ja) * | 2004-09-24 | 2006-04-06 | Fuji Xerox Co Ltd | 暗号化装置、暗号化処理方法及びプログラム、並びに該暗号化装置を用いた情報保護システム |
US20070058814A1 (en) * | 2005-09-13 | 2007-03-15 | Avaya Technology Corp. | Method for undetectably impeding key strength of encryption usage for products exported outside the U.S. |
JP2008066834A (ja) * | 2006-09-05 | 2008-03-21 | Sony Corp | 通信システムおよび通信方法、情報処理装置および方法、デバイス、プログラム、並びに記録媒体 |
JP2008113172A (ja) * | 2006-10-30 | 2008-05-15 | Hitachi Ltd | コンテンツ送信装置、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ暗号化方法 |
Cited By (2)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
CN112218171A (zh) * | 2020-09-15 | 2021-01-12 | 深圳数字电视国家工程实验室股份有限公司 | 基于接口的数据传输方法、电子设备及存储介质 |
CN112218171B (zh) * | 2020-09-15 | 2022-07-19 | 深圳数字电视国家工程实验室股份有限公司 | 基于接口的数据传输方法、电子设备及存储介质 |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
JPWO2015008521A1 (ja) | 2017-03-02 |
US10044683B2 (en) | 2018-08-07 |
US20160149868A1 (en) | 2016-05-26 |
JP6390618B2 (ja) | 2018-09-19 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US8984646B2 (en) | Content transmission device and content reception device | |
CN101517975B (zh) | 通过将互联网协议电视和家庭网络互相连接来发送/接收内容的方法和设备 | |
US8413256B2 (en) | Content protection and digital rights management (DRM) | |
JP4518058B2 (ja) | コンテンツ伝送システム、コンテンツ伝送装置及びコンテンツ伝送方法、並びにコンピュータ・プログラム | |
EP2975854B1 (en) | Content distribution method, content distribution system, source device, and sink device | |
TWI404385B (zh) | 安全位移媒體內容之系統及方法 | |
EP2917867B1 (en) | An improved implementation of robust and secure content protection in a system-on-a-chip apparatus | |
WO2017138075A1 (ja) | コンテンツ送信装置、および、そのコンテンツ送信方法 | |
JP2010021875A (ja) | データ送信装置、データ受信装置、データ送信方法およびデータ受信方法 | |
US20150149778A1 (en) | Content reception apparatus and method, and content transmission apparatus and method | |
US8306226B2 (en) | Transmitting apparatus, receiving apparatus, and content transmitting method | |
US7886160B2 (en) | Information processing apparatus and method, and computer program | |
JP6390618B2 (ja) | コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、コンピューター・プログラム、並びにコンテンツ伝送システム | |
JP4292222B2 (ja) | 著作権保護処理装置および著作権保護処理方法 | |
JP6221428B2 (ja) | コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、並びにコンピューター・プログラム | |
JP6848013B2 (ja) | コンテンツ送信装置、および、そのコンテンツ送信方法 | |
US20230254342A1 (en) | Cryptographic binding of data to network transport | |
KR101337561B1 (ko) | 안전한 콘텐츠 전송을 위해 적합한 drm 클라이언트를 다운로드 할 수 있는 셋톱박스 및 그 운영방법 | |
JP2018038041A (ja) | 通信システム及び通信方法 | |
JP6332280B2 (ja) | コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、並びにコンピューター・プログラム | |
WO2015004978A1 (ja) | コンテンツ送信装置及びコンテンツ送信方法、並びにコンピューター・プログラム | |
JP6187139B2 (ja) | コンテンツ伝送システム | |
Li et al. | RFID-based digital content copy protection system in movie and audio rental agency | |
JP2015082681A (ja) | コンテンツ受信装置及びコンテンツ受信方法、並びにコンピューター・プログラム | |
JP2015014979A (ja) | コンテンツ伝送システム |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 14826401 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2015527200 Country of ref document: JP Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 14900317 Country of ref document: US |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |
Ref document number: 14826401 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |