WO2014102707A1 - Procédé de réalisation d'un chèque de banque et chèque de banque réalisé avec ledit procédé - Google Patents

Procédé de réalisation d'un chèque de banque et chèque de banque réalisé avec ledit procédé Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014102707A1
WO2014102707A1 PCT/IB2013/061273 IB2013061273W WO2014102707A1 WO 2014102707 A1 WO2014102707 A1 WO 2014102707A1 IB 2013061273 W IB2013061273 W IB 2013061273W WO 2014102707 A1 WO2014102707 A1 WO 2014102707A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
cheque
information
compilation
basic information
blank
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2013/061273
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Claudio Santacesaria
Original Assignee
Rototype S.P.A.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Rototype S.P.A. filed Critical Rototype S.P.A.
Publication of WO2014102707A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014102707A1/fr
Priority to IN1971MUN2014 priority Critical patent/IN2014MN01971A/en

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G06Q20/042—Payment circuits characterized in that the payment protocol involves at least one cheque

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a method of realising a bank cheque, a bank cheque realised with said method and also means of implementing said method, as described in the preamble of the independent claims.
  • a bank cheque is an instrument of payment issued by a bank; technically defined as a negotiable financial instrument, in the sense that it may be used for payment in place of cash, on condition that the bank issuing it acknowledges it as negotiable: it does not consequently have an intrinsic value but acquires value from the moment that the bank acknowledges its validity.
  • Cheques have existed since the banking system was invented in that they were one of the first financial instruments issued by the first banks. According to some sources the first cheque was issued in 763 by Hoare's bank in London but it is not clear whether similar instruments had been used even prior to such date.
  • a cheque consists of a pre-printed form ready for compilation and is issued in the form of a book containing from 10 to 50 cheques, by the issuing bank to its customer, defined in the jargon as the drawer. At the moment of issue the cheque is already associated with a specific current account held in the issuing bank.
  • the cheque is identified by a progressive number, which is unique to each single cheque even from the same book, by codes identifying the issuing bank and the holder's current account: all these codes are printed on the cheque and generally coded in a so-called "codeline” printed with magnetic ink and in special characters.
  • the codeline is read by a magnetic head like those used in tape recorders; the characters used comply with one of the two most common standards known as E13b and CMC7.
  • each cheque is accompanied by a stub on which the holder may make notes when the cheque is detached.
  • the drawer compiles the blank cheque described above by completing the fields usually provided; the date, the amount to be written in letters and num- bers, the payee and the drawer's signature.
  • the drawer may make a payment to the payee by giving him the duly compiled cheque: in the jargon it is said that the cheque is torn off to recall the fact that it is physically detached from the stub to which it is usually attached by a punching of the paper.
  • the payee may give the cheque to the issuing bank, to his own bank or to any bank, for its conversion into cash after withdrawal from the drawer's current account.
  • Recent legislation permits the dematerialisation or processing of the cheque in the form of an electronic image eliminating the paper object at the moment of deposit and making the electronic image of the cheque circulate within the banking circuit in place of the physical object. This paves the way for automatic deposit mechanisms using self-service ATMs and image scanning technologies.
  • a type of fraud exists consisting of generating a forged cheque which may be mistaken for a real cheque.
  • a second type of fraud consists of the legitimate payee changing the amount so as to make an illegitimate gain.
  • a further type of fraud consists of stealing the real blank cheque and subsequently compiling and cashing or using it.
  • a further type of fraud consists of stealing the real cheque filled in and subse- quently changing the payee's name. This type of fraud occurs in particular when cheques are sent by post and in some cases intercepted and stolen; the forger can then change the payee's name and cash the cheque.
  • the patent application GB-A-1404366 introduces the idea of a secret code known only to the drawer of the cheque and of a code alphabet different for each cheque and printed for example on the cheque stub. At the moment of use the user proves his identity by manually encoding the secret code with the alphabet shown on the cheque stub and initials the result of the operation on the cheque. Such method, while entailing important advantages, only protects the drawer's identity and does not protect a cheque issued by the drawer from being fraudulently altered. In addition it does not safeguard the payee in that verification may only be performed by a bank, it being necessary to have secret information available, namely the drawer's password and alphabet associated with the specific cheque.
  • Such methods consist of encrypting, by means of a known cryptography, information such as: the amount of the cheque, the name of the payee and so forth.
  • information such as: the amount of the cheque, the name of the payee and so forth.
  • Such information is encrypted by means of an irreversible algorithm with a secret key in the first case or with an algorithm with a public key and a private key in the second case.
  • the encrypted result is converted by the drawer into a barcode, printed and affixed on the cheque.
  • Such methods are extremely secure but very inconvenient for the user who needs to have a computer and printer available for the barcode.
  • the technical purpose of the present invention is to overcome the drawbacks of the prior art.
  • one important aim of the invention is to realise a bank cheque which is not subject to the methods of fraud de- scribed and which is easy to realise for the drawer.
  • the technical purpose of the present invention is to devise a bank cheque able to substantially overcome the drawbacks mentioned.
  • one important aim of the invention is to realise a bank cheque which is not subject to the methods of fraud de- scribed, which is easy to realise for the drawer and which maintains its characteristics of security and simplicity also in the dematerialised version.
  • Fig. 1 shows, in brief, the method according to the invention
  • Fig. 2 shows, the main steps of the method according to the invention
  • Fig. 3 shows the printing steps of the cheque by the issuing bank
  • Fig. 4 shows the steps of compiling a cheque by a drawer
  • Fig. 5 shows the steps of controlling the cheque by a payee or receiving bank.
  • reference numeral 1 globally denotes the bank cheque according to the invention.
  • Said bank cheque 1 may be a paper cheque or a dematerialised cheque, that is to say a digital image of the cheque.
  • bank cheque 1 is understood to mean both types of cheque.
  • the bank cheque 1 is issued as a blank cheque 1a by an issuing body 5, such as a bank or similar body, and consigned to a drawer 6.
  • the blank cheque 1a is then detached by the drawer, that is compiled and separated from the stub, and becomes a compiled check 1 b.
  • the bank cheque 1 is then consigned to the payee 7 and cashed by the latter at a receiving bank 8, that is, the negotiating bank, or other similar body.
  • the method of realization of a bank cheque according to the invention is globally denoted by reference numeral 10 and comprises, in brief, at least one of the following: an issuing procedure 20 of the blank cheque 1a, a compilation procedure 30 of the cheque by the drawer and a control procedure 40 of the blank cheque 1 a or compiled cheque 1 b by the payee or receiving bank.
  • blank cheque is understood to mean that the check does not yet have the data to be added by the drawer, such as the payee, the amount paid and the issue date.
  • Such issuing procedure 20 is realised by printing means.
  • the issuing body 5 preferably calculates the basic information 2 to be inserted in the blank cheque 1a.
  • the basic information 2 is: information on the issuing body 5, information on the drawer 6 and univocal information making each single cheque unique.
  • Such basic information 2 is the same as that already present on each cheque, in particular the so-called codeline of the cheque itself includes at least some of the basic information 2.
  • the information on the bank consists of the name of said issuing body 5, or of a code related to such name, for example the ABI (Italian Banking As- sociation) code.
  • the information on the drawer is in particular information on the current account, which is univocally connected to the drawer or drawers 6.
  • the univocal information on the cheque is a progressive number usually also included in the codeline.
  • Such basic information 2 thus univocally identifies, worldwide, the bank cheque 1 , the issuing body 5 and drawer 6.
  • Said basic information 2 is then entered in a computer in the form of alphanumerical strings, in particular in the form of alphanumerical strings in XML format.
  • the alphanumerical string is signed by means of a known asymmetric encryption procedure with a public and private key, in particular with a PGP standard protocol according to the RFC4880 published by IETF with use of an RSA public and private key.
  • Such procedures permit the creation of a private key 50, with which a series of operations may be performed, and a public key 51 , with which other operations may be performed.
  • the two keys are, in addition, functionally connected.
  • Said asymmetric algorithms in signature mode thus make it possible to univo- cally establish the source and completeness of the information, given that only the owner of the private key is able to generate the digital signature.
  • the certification step 22 then makes it possible to safely determine that the cheque has been issued by the issuing body and the completeness and source of the basic information 2, inserted in the blank cheque.
  • a digital signature is then obtained which is entered, together with the basic information 2 in unencrypted form, in an XML file which contains the signed basic information 2a.
  • the procedure then comprises a transformation step 23, in which the signed basic information 2a is transformed into a machine legible format, more in particular into a format easily legible by a machine by means of an image, more in particular a barcode and even more in particular a barcode of the QR type.
  • the QR code including the signed basic information 2a is thus easily legible by a machine even in a dematerialised cheque and makes it possible to safely de- termine that the cheque has been issued by the issuing body and the completeness and source of the information 2a.
  • the procedure 20 lastly comprises a printing step 24, on a paper medium or the like, or solely at a digital level, in which the basic information and the QR code are printed by the issuing body 5, or with its consent, on a blank cheque 1a, appropriately together with the traditional print and filigrees.
  • the method 50 further comprises the compilation procedure 30 of the blank cheque 1a by the drawer 6, to make it into a compiled cheque 1b.
  • Such compilation procedure 30 requires the support of an electronic processor such as a computer, or telephone with computing abilities such as a smart- phone or tablet or the like, provided with dedicated software, provided by said bank or by related bodies.
  • the procedure 20 is highly advantageous when used on a portable device.
  • the drawer 6 decides the values of the information to be inserted in the blank cheque 1a.
  • the values of the following compilation information 3 information on the payee 7, such as the name thereof, information on the amount to be transferred, such as its numerical value in the currency pre-printed on said cheque, and preferably information on the moment of compilation, such as in particular the date of compilation.
  • the drawer After which in a computing step 32, the drawer computes a resulting string 3b, further specified below.
  • the computing step 32 comprises a preliminary simplification step of the data in which special expedients are applied to prevent errors in the special characters or in the point or comma separating units and decimals.
  • special expedients are applied to prevent errors in the special characters or in the point or comma separating units and decimals.
  • ex- pedients provide for removing from the payee's name all the spaces and characters other than current characters and numerical digits and provide that the amounts are expressed as whole numbers, for example in hundredths of currency.
  • the computing step 32 comprises an encryption step 33 in which at least part of the compilation information 3, and preferably all, preferably together with a part of the basic information 2 such as specifically the information making each single cheque unique, is encrypted and an encrypted string 3a is computed.
  • the encrypted string 3a is then connected to at least part of the compilation information 3 and preferably also to part of the basic information 2.
  • the computing step 32 preferably further comprises a compression step 34, in which the encrypted string 3a is compressed, preferably irreversibly, into a resulting string 3b of reduced dimensions.
  • the resulting string 3b is obtained by means of a Hash function, in particular by means of the Hash function known as R16, in itself known. Such function makes it possible to obtain a resulting string 3b consisting of a string in hexadecimal numbers of four digits.
  • the encryption 33 and compression 34 steps are preferably in the order described but may also be simply inverted. They may in addition also be performed off-line given that the secret code 52, further defined below, is suitably already present in the processor in the local memory.
  • the computing step 32 preferably takes place by means of said software loaded on the electronic processor.
  • the drawer enters the compilation information 3 on a dedicated software interface in dedicated alphanumerical characters.
  • the basic information 2 is preferably acquired by the software by means of scanning the signed basic infor- mation 2a easily legible by a machine.
  • the encrypted string 3a is preferably encrypted using a symmetric algorithm, simpler and faster than asymmetric algorithms.
  • a symmetric algorithm simpler and faster than asymmetric algorithms.
  • an AES type algorithm at 128 bit is used, for which both the drawer 6 and the issuing body 5 have a secret code 52.
  • a procedure of the public key-private key type is also used in the encryption step 33, for which in any case the private key is shared by the drawer 6 and by the issuing body 5 and in this case represents the secret key 52, while the public key is not used.
  • the secret key 52 is entered in the software and installed therewith or subsequently.
  • the bank also keeps a copy of the secret key 52 which is univocally destined to the drawer and more specifically to a current account.
  • a writing step 35 in which the drawer copies the compilation information 3 onto the cheque by merely writing, by hand, by printing or the like, or analogous digital method on a dematerialised cheque.
  • the drawer writes on the cheque 1 the resulting string 3b and in particular the string described, simple to copy since in hexadecimal and thus without symbols or ambiguities between upper case and lower case letters and also because consisting of only four hexadecimal digits.
  • step 35 the compilation procedure 30 is terminated and the drawer 6 can tear off the compiled cheque 1 b, physically or virtually, and give it to the payee 7 physically or virtually.
  • control procedure 40 of the bank cheque 1 Such control procedure 40 may be carried out on the compiled cheque 1 b but also, at least in part, on the blank cheque 1a and both by the payee 7 and by the receiving bank 8.
  • control procedure 40 is also preferably implemented by means of an electronic processor equipped with dedicated software, suitably also available for portable devices such as smartphones, tablets and the like.
  • Said software comprises the public key 51 , associated with the private key 50 which has generated the signed basic information 2a, of all the banks.
  • the public keys 51 are housed in an on-line portal which the control software automatically accesses.
  • the software can in addition preferably be remotely connected to a issuing body or to an as- sociation which is familiar with the secret key 52 for realising the string 3b.
  • the control procedure 40 provides for at least one out of a verification process 41 of the authenticity of the blank cheque 1a, which in actual fact may also be implemented on the compiled cheque 1b, and a process of ascertaining 42 the correctness of the compilation information 3.
  • the verification process 41 comprises a reading step 43 in which the electronic processor reads the machine legible code, in particular the QR code, including the signed basic information 2a, preferably by means of a photo camera or by simply analysing a digital image.
  • the reading step 43 is followed by a decoding step 44, in which the electronic processor performs verification of the signed basic information 2a.
  • the same software then extracts the basic information 2 and ascertains the source and completeness thereof, by means of a public key 51.
  • the decoding step 44 may be performed off-line if the software already includes the public key 51 of the issuing bank 5, or alternatively on-line. In the lat- ter case the decoding step may include controlling the possible cashing of a cheque with the same progressive number.
  • the verification process 41 lastly provides for a notification step 45, in which the electronic processor notifies the controller, that is the payee 7 or receiving bank 8, that the cheque 1 is authentic, confirming the source and completeness of the basic information 2.
  • the process of ascertaining 42 comprises an initial acquisition step 46 in which at least part and preferably all the information 3, the resulting string 3b and possibly some basic information 2 is entered.
  • Substantially the payee 7 uses the same electronic processor and the same software used by the drawer for the compilation procedure 30, but not provided with the secret key 32.
  • the payee 7 or the receiving bank 8 compiles the compilation information 3 on a dedicated interface provided by the software.
  • the resulting string 3b is also entered with the compilation information 3.
  • the software acquires the basic information 2 of the machine legible code, in particular the QR code, including the signed basic information 2a to extract the data relative to the cheque number, issuing body and/or codeline without typing it in.
  • the electronic processor suitably remotely connectable, for example via Inter- net, sends the compilation information 3 indicated herein and resulting string 3b to a special reserved area, connected to the issuing body 5 or the like.
  • the acquisition step 46 is followed by a comparison step 47, in which, through the reserved area and using the secret key 52, the resulting string 3b is newly computed starting from the compilation information 3, together with the parts of basic information 2 such as the codeline or merely the cheque number, provided by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8, and is compared to the resulting string 3b reported by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8.
  • a comparison step 47 in which, through the reserved area and using the secret key 52, the resulting string 3b is newly computed starting from the compilation information 3, together with the parts of basic information 2 such as the codeline or merely the cheque number, provided by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8, and is compared to the resulting string 3b reported by the payee 7 or by the receiving bank 8.
  • the software permits various compilation attempts, it is thus possible to carry out the ascertainment procedure 42 several times, give the possibility of incurring in transcription errors.
  • said software permits a finite number of attempts, in particular a number from two to ten and more in particular equal to three.
  • the resulting string 3b as described permits 65536 different combinations and it is best for it not to be possible to control too many times given that such number of combinations is not sufficiently high to counter an attack based on so-called brute strength.
  • the invention achieves some important advantages.
  • the method 10 permits an optimal balance of security and ease of compilation to be achieved.
  • the cheque may thus be compiled in a substantially standard manner and also be used in a dematerialised format.
  • the issuing procedure 20 achieves the realization of a blank cheque 1a with maximum security and little further commitment by the issuing body 5.
  • the cheque described is able to prevent all the attacks listed above. Forgery of the cheque is in fact extremely problematic and, at the same time, even the compilation of a cheque which one is not the owner of or the alteration of the compilation information 3 by a payee or by third parties, is not possible.
  • the compilation procedure instead provides for optimised procedures to achieve an optimal compromise between the security of the cheque and ease of compilation thereof.

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  • Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
  • Strategic Management (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Analysing Materials By The Use Of Radiation (AREA)
  • Financial Or Insurance-Related Operations Such As Payment And Settlement (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé consistant à réaliser (10) un chèque de banque (1) comprenant une procédure d'émission (20) d'un chèque vierge (1a) par un organisme d'émission (5) comprenant les étapes suivantes : une étape de génération (21) dans laquelle l'organisme d'émission (5) calcule de préférence les informations de base (2) à insérer dans le chèque vierge (1a), une étape de certification (22) dans laquelle lesdites informations de base (2) sont signées au moyen d'une procédure de chiffrement asymétrique, avec une clé privée (50), pour obtenir des informations de base signées (2a), une étape de transformation (23) dans laquelle les informations de base signées (2a) sont transformées dans un format lisible par machine, et une étape d'impression (24) dans laquelle les informations de base signées (2a) dans un format lisible par machine sont imprimées sur le chèque vierge (1a). Le procédé (10) comprend en outre une procédure de compilation (30) d'un chèque vierge (1a) comprenant les étapes suivantes : une étape initiale (31) dans laquelle les valeurs des information de compilation (3) devant être insérées dans le chèque vierge (1a) sont décidées, une étape de calcul (32) dans laquelle une chaîne résultante (3b) est calculée connectée aux valeurs desdites informations de compilation (3), l'étape de calcul (32) comprenant une étape de chiffrement (33) dans laquelle les informations (3) sont chiffrées, et une étape d'écriture (35) dans laquelle elles sont copiées sur le chèque (1) conjointement avec la chaîne résultante (3b).
PCT/IB2013/061273 2012-12-28 2013-12-23 Procédé de réalisation d'un chèque de banque et chèque de banque réalisé avec ledit procédé WO2014102707A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
IN1971MUN2014 IN2014MN01971A (fr) 2012-12-28 2014-10-01

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
ITMI2012A002258 2012-12-28
IT002258A ITMI20122258A1 (it) 2012-12-28 2012-12-28 Metodo di realizzazione di un assegno bancario e assegno bancario realizzato con detto metodo

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Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2016036332A1 (fr) * 2014-09-05 2016-03-10 Kkb-Kredi Kayit Burosu Anonim Şirketi Système de gestion pour le paiement par chèque et procédé associé
US20220101281A1 (en) * 2019-01-08 2022-03-31 Sivam RAJOO Check clearing system and method

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GB1404366A (en) 1972-07-24 1975-08-28 Century Int Co Personal authority vertification system
WO1997026615A1 (fr) 1996-01-18 1997-07-24 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Procede et systeme de detection d'alteration de cheques
US20020067827A1 (en) * 2000-12-04 2002-06-06 Kargman James B. Method for preventing check fraud
US20020164021A1 (en) 1996-03-01 2002-11-07 Sandru Calin A. Apparatus and method for enhancing the security of negotiable instruments
US20020174074A1 (en) * 2001-05-18 2002-11-21 Payformance Corporation Check authorization system and method
US20030225704A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2003-12-04 Bottomline Technologies (De) Inc. System and method for producing and verifying secure negotiable instruments
WO2004090705A1 (fr) 2003-03-04 2004-10-21 Sony Corporation Dispositif de saisie, dispositif de terminal d'information et procede de commutation de mode
EP1980984A2 (fr) 2006-07-06 2008-10-15 Firethorn Holdings, LLC Procédés et systèmes pour effectuer un paiement via un chèque dans un environnement mobile
WO2009045998A1 (fr) 2007-10-05 2009-04-09 Global Standard Financial, Inc. Systèmes et procédés de paiement financier par chèque électronique
WO2010091184A1 (fr) 2009-02-04 2010-08-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Autorisation de paiement à l'aide d'une image sans papier d'un chèque

Patent Citations (11)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
GB1404366A (en) 1972-07-24 1975-08-28 Century Int Co Personal authority vertification system
WO1997026615A1 (fr) 1996-01-18 1997-07-24 Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. Procede et systeme de detection d'alteration de cheques
US20020164021A1 (en) 1996-03-01 2002-11-07 Sandru Calin A. Apparatus and method for enhancing the security of negotiable instruments
US20020067827A1 (en) * 2000-12-04 2002-06-06 Kargman James B. Method for preventing check fraud
WO2002052487A1 (fr) 2000-12-04 2002-07-04 Ipdev Co. Procede relatif a la prevention de la fraude sur cheque
US20020174074A1 (en) * 2001-05-18 2002-11-21 Payformance Corporation Check authorization system and method
US20030225704A1 (en) * 2002-06-04 2003-12-04 Bottomline Technologies (De) Inc. System and method for producing and verifying secure negotiable instruments
WO2004090705A1 (fr) 2003-03-04 2004-10-21 Sony Corporation Dispositif de saisie, dispositif de terminal d'information et procede de commutation de mode
EP1980984A2 (fr) 2006-07-06 2008-10-15 Firethorn Holdings, LLC Procédés et systèmes pour effectuer un paiement via un chèque dans un environnement mobile
WO2009045998A1 (fr) 2007-10-05 2009-04-09 Global Standard Financial, Inc. Systèmes et procédés de paiement financier par chèque électronique
WO2010091184A1 (fr) 2009-02-04 2010-08-12 Qualcomm Incorporated Autorisation de paiement à l'aide d'une image sans papier d'un chèque

Cited By (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2016036332A1 (fr) * 2014-09-05 2016-03-10 Kkb-Kredi Kayit Burosu Anonim Şirketi Système de gestion pour le paiement par chèque et procédé associé
US20220101281A1 (en) * 2019-01-08 2022-03-31 Sivam RAJOO Check clearing system and method

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ITMI20122258A1 (it) 2014-06-29
IN2014MN01971A (fr) 2015-07-03

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