WO2014080272A1 - Appareil et procédé permettant de générer des nombres aléatoires à partir d'une désintégration radioactive - Google Patents

Appareil et procédé permettant de générer des nombres aléatoires à partir d'une désintégration radioactive Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2014080272A1
WO2014080272A1 PCT/IB2013/002618 IB2013002618W WO2014080272A1 WO 2014080272 A1 WO2014080272 A1 WO 2014080272A1 IB 2013002618 W IB2013002618 W IB 2013002618W WO 2014080272 A1 WO2014080272 A1 WO 2014080272A1
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Prior art keywords
radioactivity
sampler
sensor
source
radioactive
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PCT/IB2013/002618
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English (en)
Inventor
Riccardo Bernardini
Mirko LOGHI
Pier Luca Montessoro
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UNIVERSITá DEGLI STUDI DI UDINE
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Publication of WO2014080272A1 publication Critical patent/WO2014080272A1/fr

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F7/00—Methods or arrangements for processing data by operating upon the order or content of the data handled
    • G06F7/58—Random or pseudo-random number generators
    • G06F7/588—Random number generators, i.e. based on natural stochastic processes

Definitions

  • the present invention concerns an apparatus and a method to generate random numbers using the sampling the decay of a source of radioactivity defined by a radioactive material.
  • the present invention can be used for the secure generation of random numbers used in making security schemes, such as for example authentication schemes, or in the encryption of data or codes contained or processed for example in/by electronic cards or smart cards, microprocessors, chips or other electronic circuits.
  • security schemes such as for example authentication schemes, or digital encryption algorithms, both to encode data so as to protect them and hide them, and also to decode encrypted data, so that they can be consulted and/or processed.
  • the first objective of such security schemes is therefore to protect data and allow them to be exchanged or preserved secure from the intervention of third parties.
  • Some of these applications are for example the use of digital signatures to authenticate documents, the recourse to trading on virtual shops, or "e- commerce", the use of protected navigation protocols to convey reserved data from the electronic mail or public administration websites, the use of virtual banks and the now common use of home-banking to manage current accounts and payments made through banks.
  • Radioactive decay is a natural phenomenon, in which subsequent conditions of the material are not reversible and hence not repeatable, which allows to obtain a real randomness of the numbers generated. This is different from the generation of random numbers using algorithms because the latter have a component, although remote, of predictability, which penalizes them in terms of security against the ill-intentioned attacks of third parties.
  • Radioactive decay functions as an entropic source and is measured by a radioactivity sensor, which is interrogated with said sampling frequency by a sampling device. Afterward, a processor processes the result of the sampling to generate a sequence of whole numbers, or symbols, determined by the different conditions detected by the radioactivity sensor in successive sampling instants. It is known to connect said apparatuses for generating random numbers to data processing or memorization devices, such as for example calculators, memory chips, hard discs, digital archives or electronic databases, and other electronic devices for which it is important to be able to protect the exchange and reading of data by encryption or other security schemes.
  • data processing or memorization devices such as for example calculators, memory chips, hard discs, digital archives or electronic databases, and other electronic devices for which it is important to be able to protect the exchange and reading of data by encryption or other security schemes.
  • the apparatus for generating random numbers can be associated with an electronic device, such as a memory chip, by applying the radioactive material on the silicon semi-conductor that makes up said chip, and positioning the radioactivity sensor near the radioactive material.
  • Apparatuses are known, which provide that the radioactive material is applied on the silicon substrate for example by spreading or gluing a film of radioactive material, or by depositing a drop of said material, or by attaching a disc of radioactive material on the external surface of the chip.
  • radioactive materials used in known apparatuses are Americium-241 ( 241 Am), Thorium (Th) and Uranium isotopes (U). These materials decay emitting a radiations which are captured and measured by the radioactivity sensor.
  • Document JP-A-2002024001 describes a generator of random impulses that uses weak radiations, for example alpha rays 100 Bq.
  • Document GB-A- 1.443.434 describes a semi-conductor device used as a timer device and which comprises a radioactive material.
  • Document WO-A-2006/004075 describes a semi-conductor device for generating random impulses that includes an emitter of alpha particles or beta rays and a detector of alpha particles or beta rays.
  • One purpose of the present invention is to obtain an apparatus for the generation of random numbers from radioactive decay that is efficient in detecting almost all the occurrences of decay of the radioactive material.
  • Another purpose of the present invention is to obtain an apparatus that is easy and quick to produce, that has limited sizes and that uses materials that do not condition the working life of the data processing or memorization device to which it is associated, or of the radioactivity sensor.
  • Another purpose of the present invention is to obtain an apparatus for the generation of random numbers that is able to control and self-regulate the frequency of sampling, or reading, of the radioactivity sensor, to preserve over time a statistical reliability of the readings carried out by the sampling device.
  • Another purpose of the present invention is to obtain an apparatus for the generation of random numbers that is reliable, quick, safe against possible ill- intentioned attacks from third parties and that can be used inside devices implementing security schemes.
  • the Applicant has devised, tested and embodied the present invention to overcome the shortcomings of the state of the art and to obtain these and other purposes and advantages.
  • an apparatus for generating random numbers from radioactive decay comprises at least a source of radioactivity and a first radioactivity sensor, to detect the radioactive decay of said source of radioactivity.
  • the source of radioactivity is incorporated inside said first radioactivity sensor.
  • the radioactive material is completely inside the semiconductor, the radiations due to its decay do not emerge from the sensor, with obvious advantage in terms of safety.
  • the apparatus comprises a sampler configured to read with a determinate sampling frequency the detections of the first radioactivity sensor, a data processing device configured to process a succession of data coming from the sampler, to generate a random succession of numbers, and a module to control the sampling frequency of said sampler, configured to maintain the equiprobability of the readings carried out.
  • the first radioactivity sensor is made of a semiconductor material with a layered structure.
  • the source of radioactivity is made of a radioactive material compatible with said semi-conductor material.
  • the radioactive material is chosen from a group which consists of: Nickel-63 and Silicon-32.
  • the advantage of using one of these two materials as the source of radiations in the generator in question is that both are technologically compatible with the material that the electronic device in which they are integrated is made of. In fact, both nickel and silicon are commonly used in the production of semi-conductor devices.
  • radioactivity sensor allows to integrate the apparatus in question in electronic devices such as for example a microprocessor, a memory chip, a smart card, or other electronic cards containing data that require protection by means of security schemes or encryption.
  • Forms of embodiment described here also concern a method for the production of an apparatus for generating random numbers from radioactive decay.
  • the method provides to incorporate a source of radioactivity inside a radioactivity sensor configured to detect the radioactive decay of said source of radioactivity, to connect to the radioactivity sensor a sampler configured to read with a determinate sampling frequency the detections of the first radioactivity sensor, to connect to the sampler a data processing device configured to process a succession of data coming from the sampler and to connect to the sampler and to the data processing device a control module to control the sampling frequency of the sampler configured to maintain the equiprobability of the readings carried out.
  • FIG. 1 is a block diagram of an apparatus to generate random numbers according to the present invention
  • - fig. 2 is a schematic sectioned view of a component of the apparatus in fig. 1 ;
  • - fig. 3 is a block diagram of another component of the apparatus in fig. 1.
  • an apparatus 10 for generating random numbers comprises at least a source of radioactivity 1 1, which can be defined by a determinate quantity of radioactive material, and a first radioactivity sensor 12, configured to detect the radioactive decay of the source of radioactivity 1 1.
  • the source of radioactivity 1 1 is incorporated inside the first radioactivity sensor 12.
  • the apparatus 10 can also comprise a sampler 13 configured to read with a determinate sampling frequency f the detections of the first radioactivity sensor
  • the sampler 13 is connected to the first radioactivity sensor 12 to interrogate it with a determinate sampling frequency and provide as output data relating to whether or not at least a radioactive decay has taken place in the period of time between two successive readings.
  • the apparatus 10 comprises a data processing device 14 that can be connected to the sampler 13 in order to process the succession of data coming from the latter, in order to generate, based on said processing, a random succession of numbers, such as for example a string of bits having a desired length.
  • a control module or device 15 may be provided, to control the sampling frequency f of the sampler 13, configured to maintain the equiprobability of the readings carried out.
  • the control device 15 can be connected to the data processing device 14 and to the sampler 13, to control and regulate, for example in feedback, the reading mode of the first radioactivity sensor 12, so as to maintain, over time, the equiprobability of the numbers generated. This can happen, for example, by means of a continuous regulation of the reading speed, or the frequency of sampling.
  • a second radioactivity sensor 17 is connected to the data processing device 14 and to the control module 15.
  • the second radioactivity sensor 17 allows to protect the apparatus 10 from ill- intentioned external attacks, so-called "illumination” attacks, carried out by hitting the apparatus 10 with radiations in order to distort the detection of the first radioactivity sensor 12 and consequently the sampler 13. In this way it would be possible to compromise the equiprobability or statistical independence of the data output by the latter, so as to pilot the subsequent processing toward successions or strings of numbers that the ill-intentioned attacker could deduce.
  • the second radioactivity sensor 17 detects the corresponding radiations and stops the functioning of the sampler 13 and the control module 15. Consequently, the activity of the apparatus 10 in its entirety also stops, so as not to allow the attacker to take possession of decryption keys or protected data.
  • a statistical conditioning unit 16 which in general can cooperate with the sampler 13 to maintain the equiprobability of the data output by the sampler 13, irrespective of the speed with which the reading of the first radioactivity sensor 12 is performed.
  • the apparatus 10 allows to increase the quantity of data generated by the apparatus 10 in the unit of time, maintaining the reliability thereof.
  • the increased sampling frequency if not properly managed, can increase the probability that an absence of decay is detected between two successive and somewhat close sampling instants.
  • the source of radioactivity 11 (fig. 2) is preferably, but not restrictively, a ⁇ type decay radioactive material, that is, it emits ⁇ radiations and is incorporated inside the radioactivity sensor 12.
  • ⁇ radiations are preferable to a radiations that are normally present in known apparatuses because they are less harmful for the semi-conductor devices.
  • the radioactive material is nickel-63 ( 63 Ni), which has only one possible decay toward the stable isotope Copper -63 ( 63 Cu) and without secondary decays. This allows to prevent situations of instability and statistical uncertainty, which can occur in the event of different activities due to the onset of problems of statistical dependence.
  • An alternative form of embodiment provides to use Silicon-32 ( Si) as radioactive material.
  • the ⁇ radiations deriving from the decay of Ni have a median energy of about 70 keV, which makes them at the same time both strong enough to generate a number of electrons-gap pairs sufficient for a good detection of the radioactivity, but also not too powerful, so as not to cause damage to the electronic components.
  • Scientific studies have found that 200 keV is the limit threshold above which appreciable damage is caused to electronic components, and 145 keV is the minimum energy value for the onset of ⁇ radiation damage.
  • the first radioactivity sensor 12 is substantially an electronic chip and has a layered structure, defining a substrate such as a wafer, with a semi-conductor.
  • the structure consists, in the case shown by way of example in fig. 2, of four overlapping layers, and is similar for example to the structure of an avalanche diode.
  • the radioactivity sensor 12 comprises a first layer, indicated by the reference "p+”, made for example of considerably doped silicon, and hence containing numerous electron acceptor atoms.
  • a second layer above the previous first layer p+ and indicated by the reference ⁇ , defines the intrinsic zone of the radioactivity sensor 12, that is, where the semi-conductor material is not doped, or is very weakly doped.
  • the source of radioactivity 1 1 is incorporated in the second layer ⁇ .
  • silicon and nickel are commonly used materials in the manufacture of chips, therefore both 63 Ni and alternatively 32 Si are compatible with these materials.
  • the source of radioactivity 1 1 is also possible to use known production processes to incorporate the source of radioactivity 1 1 into the second layer ⁇ .
  • the incorporation is obtained, for example, using so-called "damp" processes, where the Ni is deposited on the material of the second layer ⁇ by immersing the wafer in a solution of nickel ions that are reduced to metal nickel.
  • Known reduction mechanisms are electro-deposition, in which the nickel ions are deposited on the wafer by means of the action of an electric current; spontaneous or “electroless” deposition, in which the deposition does not require excitation by electric current; or photo-induced deposition, which provides to illuminate the wafer, immersed in the solution of nickel ions, with a laser that excites the silicon electrons, giving them sufficient energy to reduce the nickel.
  • the radioactivity sensor 12 comprises a third layer "p", also doped and therefore having electron acceptor atoms, but less strongly doped than the first layer p+.
  • the radioactivity sensor 12 comprises a fourth layer "n", also doped, but with opposite characteristics compared with the first layer p+ and the second layer p, that is, the fourth layer n is a donor of electrons.
  • the radioactivity sensor 12 is advantageously configured so as to have a spatial bulk greater than the distance traveled by the ⁇ radiations in the semi- conductor material before it is completely absorbed. This distance, also known as the "path" of the radioactive particles, depends on the energy of the radiations and the density of the semi-conductor material.
  • the source of radioactivity 1 1 consisting of 63 Ni emits, as we said, ⁇ radiations with an energy of 66 keV, which are absorbed in the silicon of the radioactivity sensor 12 having a density of 2.33 g/cm , after having traveled about 30 ⁇ .
  • This value is sufficiently low to allow to obtain easily a radioactivity sensor 12 able to completely absorb all the radiations emitted by the source of radioactivity 1 1 positioned inside it.
  • the complete absorption of the radiations thus obtained has the double advantage of maximizing the efficiency of the radioactivity sensor 12, from which the particles emitted by the 63 Ni cannot escape, and also of preventing the radiations from emerging from the radioactivity sensor 12 itself, thus guaranteeing a high level of security of the apparatus 10.
  • the sampler 13 is connected to the radioactivity sensor 12 and reads the radioactivity sensor 12 at a desired sampling frequency. Therefore, at input the sampler 13 detects the radioactivity of the source of radioactivity 1 1 carried out by the radioactivity sensor 12. If between two successive sampling instants the sampler 13 reads a variation in radioactivity, that is, if it detects at least one decay, as output it supplies the number 1 , otherwise it supplies 0.
  • the probability of obtaining 0 or 1 bit at every reading of the sampler 13 is as close as possible, or equal to, a ratio of 1/2.
  • the sequence generated of random bits has optimum characteristics of randomness, given that its bits are independent and identically distributed and perfectly balanced.
  • N is the Avogadro number.
  • the natural frequency f 0 is therefore given by the product of the mass of material by a constant that is characteristic of the latter.
  • the entropy of each aleatory variable of the succession of random numbers is equal to 1 bit.
  • the probability of observing a number k of radioactive decays in period T is equal to:
  • rate R max For calculating the maximum rate R max , the definition of rate R as relation between entropy H(p 0 ) of every bit of the sequence and period T must be taken into account, and therefore it is possible to obtain the normalized rate p as the relation between the generic entropy H(D.) and the normalized time ⁇ . Therefore, for po and p 1? we have:
  • the sampler 13 is connected to the processing device 14 which processes, based on specific computational requirements, the sequences of bits that the sampler 13 supplies as output.
  • the processing device 14, after having processed these sequences, can supply as output data encryption or decryption codes, to protect or read said data.
  • some forms of embodiment of the apparatus 10 provide a control module 15 able to control and regulate the sampling frequency f. This control is intended to preserve the equality and the regulation of the speed at which the sampler 13 reads the radioactivity sensor 12 occurs in feedback.
  • the control module 15 comprises a calculation unit 18, connected to the sampler 13, from which it receives as input the bits 0 or 1 relating to the readings.
  • the calculation unit 18 is configured to calculate the probability or not that a decay will occur inside period T, and is connected at to a frequency divider 19, the function of which is to regulate the sampling frequency f of the sampler 13.
  • control module 15 the function of the control module 15 is to estimate the probability ] of reading a "1" (at least one decay) and consequently to adjust the reading speed.
  • the difference q should be zero; if the difference q is positive, it means that p[ is too big and the sampling speed f must be increased, whereas if the difference q is negative, the sampling speed f must be decreased.
  • the purpose of the calculation unit 18 is to estimate the difference q and comprises a shift register 20, having a capacity L of bits which preserves the memory of the last bits read by the sampler 13.
  • the calculation unit 18 also comprises a first counter 21, the value of which represents the difference between number of bits 1 and bits 0 contained in the shift register 20.
  • the first counter 21 is "two-directional", that is, it can be both increased and decreased and is controlled by two inputs, a first input 22 which specifies if the value of the first counter 21 has to be increased or decreased, and a second input 23 which is taken to 1 at the moment the value of the first counter 21 is updated.
  • a bistable circuit 24, for example the flip-flop type, is connected to the shift register 20 and to the first counter 21; its output remains true during the reading of the first L samples, that is, until the shift register 20 is completely full.
  • bistable circuit 24 is in a "false" logical condition (that is, if n ⁇ L), having defined b n-L as the oldest bit in the shift register 20, if b n-L is equal to b n , the first counter 21 is not modified.
  • the first counter 21 is always updated, but after the initialization step the first counter 21 is updated only if b n and b nL are different. Therefore, at every instant, the counter 21 contains the difference between the number of 0 bits and the number of 1 bits present in the shift register.
  • the first bit in the shift register 20 is put at 1 during the initialization step, so as to facilitate the recognition of the end of the initialization step itself. In fact, during the first L readings, only zeroes come out of the shift register 20; when the first "1" comes out, this is a sign that the shift register 20 has been filled and the initialization step is finished. This "1" output by the shift register 20 changes the logical state of the bistable circuit 24, which becomes false and remains so for as long as the control module 15 is functioning.
  • the reading period is regulated by the control module 15 according to the value contained in the first counter 21. Let C be said value, the corresponding value of the difference q is equal to C L.
  • the frequency divider 19 comprises a second counter 26, fed by a clock generator 27, able to generate a very fast signal at a clock frequency F C LK that is much higher than the natural frequency f 0 .
  • the register 28 is controlled by two inputs, the first of which is connected to the second input 23. When the first input is true, the value present on the second input is added to the value contained in the register 28, which represents the value At cited above, measured in units of is the supersampling factor associated with the clock generator 27 which feeds the second counter 26. It should be noted that the reading period T is adjustable using whole multiples of 1 FCLK-
  • the output of the second counter 26 and the value contained in the register 28 are compared, at every instant, by a comparator 29.
  • the output from the comparator 29 causes a new bit to be read by the sampler 13 and at the same time the second counter 26 to be zeroed.
  • the value of the capacity L must be chosen as a compromise between the requirement of a high value for L, to have a precise estimate of the probability, and not too sensitive to statistical noise, and the requirement of an L value that is not too high, so as to keep the complexity of the control module 15 acceptable and to keep the adjustment time of the sampling frequency f reasonably low.
  • the probability of reading a 0 bit increases with respect to the probability of reading a 1 bit.
  • the apparatus 10 uses the statistical conditioning unit 16, configured to guarantee at least the equiprobability of obtaining bit 1 and bit 0 (p ⁇ po), whatever the sampling frequency f is, determining at output a number of random bits generated per second which is equal to or tends towards a theoretical maximum limit.
  • An important source of divergence from the condition of equiprobability described above could be, for example, in apparatuses 10 comprising the components described above, an attack from the outside intended to unbalance probability p] with respect to probability p 0 .
  • Such an attack can occur by illuminating the apparatus 10 with an external source of radioactivity, to distort the detection of the first radioactivity sensor 12 and the sampler 13. So that this does not occur, the apparatus 10 can comprise the second radioactivity sensor 17, already mentioned, which is immersed in a non-radioactive environment and hence normally does not detect any radioactivity.
  • the second radioactivity sensor 17 supplies a non-zero measurement, which stops the functioning of both the control module 15 and also the sampler 13, to both of which the second radioactivity sensor 17 is connected.
  • the functioning of the apparatus 10 also stops in all security, before the attacker is able to pilot the output of the apparatus 10 in his own favor.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un appareil permettant de générer des nombres aléatoires à partir d'une désintégration radioactive, l'appareil comprenant au moins une source de radioactivité et un capteur de radioactivité servant à détecter la désintégration radioactive de la source de radioactivité, la source de radioactivité (11) étant incorporée à l'intérieur dudit premier capteur de radioactivité (12). L'appareil comprend également un échantillonneur (13) conçu pour lire à une fréquence d'échantillonnage déterminée (f) les détections dudit premier capteur de radioactivité (12) et un module de commande (15) servant à commander la fréquence d'échantillonnage (f) dudit échantillonneur (13).
PCT/IB2013/002618 2012-11-23 2013-11-22 Appareil et procédé permettant de générer des nombres aléatoires à partir d'une désintégration radioactive WO2014080272A1 (fr)

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Cited By (10)

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US10901695B1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-01-26 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Apparatus, systems, and methods for beta decay based true random number generator
US11048478B1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-06-29 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for tritium-based true random number generator
US11249725B1 (en) 2021-07-22 2022-02-15 Randaemon Sp. Zo.O. Method and apparatus for highly effective on-chip true random number generator utilizing beta decay
US11281432B1 (en) 2021-07-22 2022-03-22 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for true random number generator based on nuclear radiation
US11372623B2 (en) * 2019-04-09 2022-06-28 Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute Random number generating device and operating method of the same
US11379624B2 (en) * 2017-03-20 2022-07-05 Blueskytec Ltd Electronic anti-tamper device
EP4123441A1 (fr) * 2021-07-22 2023-01-25 RANDAEMON sp. z o.o. Procédé et appareil pour un générateur de nombres aléatoires réels sur puce hautement efficace utilisant la désintégration bêta
WO2023001937A1 (fr) * 2021-07-22 2023-01-26 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Procédé de fabrication d'une source de rayonnement à base de nickel-63 rentable pour des générateurs de nombres aléatoires réels
US11567734B1 (en) 2021-10-22 2023-01-31 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for highly effective on-chip quantum random number generator
US11586421B2 (en) 2021-07-22 2023-02-21 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method for making cost-effective nickel-63 radiation source for true random number generators

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Cited By (14)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US11379624B2 (en) * 2017-03-20 2022-07-05 Blueskytec Ltd Electronic anti-tamper device
US11372623B2 (en) * 2019-04-09 2022-06-28 Electronics And Telecommunications Research Institute Random number generating device and operating method of the same
US11048478B1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-06-29 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for tritium-based true random number generator
US10901695B1 (en) * 2020-03-03 2021-01-26 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Apparatus, systems, and methods for beta decay based true random number generator
US11036473B1 (en) 2020-03-03 2021-06-15 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Apparatus, systems, and methods for beta decay based true random number generator
WO2021097468A1 (fr) * 2020-03-03 2021-05-20 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Appareil, systèmes et procédés pour générateur de vrai nombre aléatoire basé sur la désintégration bêta
US11249725B1 (en) 2021-07-22 2022-02-15 Randaemon Sp. Zo.O. Method and apparatus for highly effective on-chip true random number generator utilizing beta decay
US11281432B1 (en) 2021-07-22 2022-03-22 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for true random number generator based on nuclear radiation
EP4123441A1 (fr) * 2021-07-22 2023-01-25 RANDAEMON sp. z o.o. Procédé et appareil pour un générateur de nombres aléatoires réels sur puce hautement efficace utilisant la désintégration bêta
WO2023001937A1 (fr) * 2021-07-22 2023-01-26 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Procédé de fabrication d'une source de rayonnement à base de nickel-63 rentable pour des générateurs de nombres aléatoires réels
WO2023001938A1 (fr) * 2021-07-22 2023-01-26 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Procédé et appareil pour générateur quantique hautement efficace de nombres aléatoires sur puce
US11586421B2 (en) 2021-07-22 2023-02-21 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method for making cost-effective nickel-63 radiation source for true random number generators
US11614921B2 (en) 2021-07-22 2023-03-28 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for highly effective on- chip quantum random number generator
US11567734B1 (en) 2021-10-22 2023-01-31 Randaemon Sp. Z O.O. Method and apparatus for highly effective on-chip quantum random number generator

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