WO2013154714A1 - Procédé et dispositif pour rapport de réception mbms sécurisé - Google Patents

Procédé et dispositif pour rapport de réception mbms sécurisé Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013154714A1
WO2013154714A1 PCT/US2013/030277 US2013030277W WO2013154714A1 WO 2013154714 A1 WO2013154714 A1 WO 2013154714A1 US 2013030277 W US2013030277 W US 2013030277W WO 2013154714 A1 WO2013154714 A1 WO 2013154714A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
server
announcement
reception report
certificate authority
key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2013/030277
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Anand Palanigounder
Jun Wang
Xiaoxia Zhang
Gordon Kent Walker
Original Assignee
Qualcomm Incorporated
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Qualcomm Incorporated filed Critical Qualcomm Incorporated
Priority to JP2015505724A priority Critical patent/JP5932137B2/ja
Priority to CN201380018997.7A priority patent/CN104509030B/zh
Priority to EP15162835.1A priority patent/EP2908462B1/fr
Priority to EP13712047.3A priority patent/EP2837130B1/fr
Publication of WO2013154714A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013154714A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00—Data switching networks
    • H04L12/02—Details
    • H04L12/16—Arrangements for providing special services to substations
    • H04L12/18—Arrangements for providing special services to substations for broadcast or conference, e.g. multicast
    • H04L12/1863—Arrangements for providing special services to substations for broadcast or conference, e.g. multicast comprising mechanisms for improved reliability, e.g. status reports
    • H04L12/1868—Measures taken after transmission, e.g. acknowledgments
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/06—Selective distribution of broadcast services, e.g. multimedia broadcast multicast service [MBMS]; Services to user groups; One-way selective calling services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/168—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer above the transport layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3242—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving keyed hash functions, e.g. message authentication codes [MACs], CBC-MAC or HMAC

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates generally to communication systems, and more particularly, to secure reception reporting.
  • Wireless communication systems are widely deployed to provide various telecommunication services such as telephony, video, data, messaging, and broadcasts.
  • Typical wireless communication systems may employ multiple-access technologies capable of supporting communication with multiple users by sharing available system resources (e.g., bandwidth, transmit power).
  • multiple-access technologies include code division multiple access (CDMA) systems, time division multiple access (TDMA) systems, frequency division multiple access (FDMA) systems, orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) systems, single-carrier frequency division multiple access (SC-FDMA) systems, and time division synchronous code division multiple access (TD- SCDMA) systems.
  • CDMA code division multiple access
  • TDMA time division multiple access
  • FDMA frequency division multiple access
  • OFDMA orthogonal frequency division multiple access
  • SC-FDMA single-carrier frequency division multiple access
  • TD- SCDMA time division synchronous code division multiple access
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
  • 3 GPP Third Generation Partnership Project
  • DL downlink
  • UL uplink
  • MIMO multiple-input multiple- output
  • a method, a computer program product, and an apparatus UE receives, from a service provider, a certificate authority list.
  • the certificate authority list is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the service provider and stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the UE authenticates a server using the received certificate authority list.
  • a method, a computer program product, and an apparatus receives a user service discovery / announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of a server.
  • the apparatus sends a protected reception report to the server based on the reception report configuration.
  • the apparatus may be a UE.
  • the UE receives a protected broadcast announcement.
  • the broadcast announcement is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the UE communicates based on the broadcast announcement.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a network architecture.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of an access network.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of a DL frame structure in LTE.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of an UL frame structure in LTE.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating an example of a radio protocol architecture for the user and control planes.
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating an example of an evolved Node B and user equipment in an access network.
  • FIG. 7A is a diagram illustrating an example of an evolved Multimedia Broadcast
  • FIG. 7B is a diagram illustrating a format of a Multicast Channel Scheduling
  • FIG. 9 is a diagram illustrating a second exemplary method for sending a secure reception report.
  • FIG. 10 is a diagram illustrating an exemplary method for receiving and processing a secure user service discovery / announcement.
  • FIG. 1 1 is a flow chart of a first method of wireless communication.
  • FIG. 12 is a flow chart of a second method of wireless communication.
  • FIG. 13 is a flow chart of a third method of wireless communication.
  • FIG. 14 is a conceptual data flow diagram illustrating the data flow between different modules/means/components in an exemplary apparatus.
  • processors include microprocessors, microcontrollers, digital signal processors (DSPs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), state machines, gated logic, discrete hardware circuits, and other suitable hardware configured to perform the various functionality described throughout this disclosure.
  • DSPs digital signal processors
  • FPGAs field programmable gate arrays
  • PLDs programmable logic devices
  • state machines gated logic, discrete hardware circuits, and other suitable hardware configured to perform the various functionality described throughout this disclosure.
  • One or more processors in the processing system may execute software.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an LTE network architecture 100.
  • the LTE network architecture 100 may be referred to as an Evolved Packet System (EPS) 100.
  • the EPS 100 may include one or more user equipment (UE) 102, an Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) 104, an Evolved Packet Core (EPC) 110, a Home Subscriber Server (HSS) 120, and an Operator's Internet Protocol (IP) Services 122.
  • the EPS can interconnect with other access networks, but for simplicity those entities/interfaces are not shown.
  • the EPS provides packet-switched services, however, as those skilled in the art will readily appreciate, the various concepts presented throughout this disclosure may be extended to networks providing circuit-switched services.
  • the E-UTRAN includes the evolved Node B (eNB) 106 and other eNBs 108.
  • the eNB 106 provides user and control planes protocol terminations toward the UE 102.
  • the eNB 106 may be connected to the other eNBs 108 via a backhaul (e.g., an X2 interface).
  • the eNB 106 may also be referred to as a base station, a Node B, an access point, a base transceiver station, a radio base station, a radio transceiver, a transceiver function, a basic service set (BSS), an extended service set (ESS), or some other suitable terminology.
  • the eNB 106 provides an access point to the EPC 110 for a UE 102.
  • Examples of UEs 102 include a cellular phone, a smart phone, a session initiation protocol (SIP) phone, a laptop, a personal digital assistant (PDA), a satellite radio, a global positioning system, a multimedia device, a video device, a digital audio player (e.g., MP3 player), a camera, a game console, a tablet, or any other similar functioning device.
  • SIP session initiation protocol
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • satellite radio a global positioning system
  • multimedia device e.g., a digital audio player (e.g., MP3 player), a camera, a game console, a tablet, or any other similar functioning device.
  • MP3 player digital audio player
  • the UE 102 may also be referred to by those skilled in the art as a mobile station, a subscriber station, a mobile unit, a subscriber unit, a wireless unit, a remote unit, a mobile device, a wireless device, a wireless communications device, a remote device, a mobile subscriber station, an access terminal, a mobile terminal, a wireless terminal, a remote terminal, a handset, a user agent, a mobile client, a client, or some other suitable terminology.
  • the eNB 106 is connected to the EPC 1 10.
  • the EPC 1 10 includes a Mobility
  • MME Management Entity
  • MBMS Multimedia Broadcast Multicast Service
  • BM-SC Broadcast Multicast Service Center
  • PDN Packet Data Network Gateway 118.
  • the MME 112 is the control node that processes the signaling between the UE 102 and the EPC 1 10. Generally, the MME 112 provides bearer and connection management. All user IP packets are transferred through the Serving Gateway 1 16, which itself is connected to the PDN Gateway 1 18.
  • the PDN Gateway 1 18 provides UE IP address allocation as well as other functions.
  • the PDN Gateway 118 is connected to the Operator's IP Services 122.
  • the Operator's IP Services 122 may include the Internet, an intranet, an IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS), and a PS Streaming Service (PSS).
  • the BM-SC 126 may provide functions for MBMS user service provisioning and delivery.
  • the BM-SC 126 may serve as an entry point for content provider MBMS transmission, may be used to authorize and initiate MBMS Bearer Services within a PLMN, and may be used to schedule and deliver MBMS transmissions.
  • the MBMS Gateway 124 may be used to distribute MBMS traffic to the eNBs (e.g., 106, 108) belonging to a Multicast Broadcast Single Frequency Network (MBSFN) area broadcasting a particular service, and may be responsible for session management (start/stop) and for collecting eMBMS related charging information.
  • MMSFN Multicast Broadcast Single Frequency Network
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating an example of an access network 200 in an LTE network architecture.
  • the access network 200 is divided into a number of cellular regions (cells) 202.
  • One or more lower power class eNBs 208 may have cellular regions 210 that overlap with one or more of the cells 202.
  • the lower power class eNB 208 may be a femto cell (e.g., home eNB (HeNB)), pico cell, micro cell, or remote radio head (RRH).
  • HeNB home eNB
  • RRH remote radio head
  • the macro eNBs 204 are each assigned to a respective cell 202 and are configured to provide an access point to the EPC 110 for all the UEs 206 in the cells 202.
  • the eNBs 204 are responsible for all radio related functions including radio bearer control, admission control, mobility control, scheduling, security, and connectivity to the serving gateway 116.
  • An eNB may support one or multiple (e.g., three) cells (also referred to as a sector).
  • the term "cell” can refer to the smallest coverage area of an eNB and/or an eNB subsystem serving are particular coverage area. Further, the terms “eNB,” “base station,” and “cell” may be used interchangeably herein.
  • the modulation and multiple access scheme employed by the access network 200 may vary depending on the particular telecommunications standard being deployed.
  • OFDM is used on the DL
  • SC-FDMA is used on the UL to support both frequency division duplex (FDD) and time division duplex (TDD).
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • TDD time division duplex
  • FDD frequency division duplex
  • TDD time division duplex
  • EV-DO Evolution-Data Optimized
  • UMB Ultra Mobile Broadband
  • EV-DO and UMB are air interface standards promulgated by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2) as part of the CDMA2000 family of standards and employs CDMA to provide broadband Internet access to mobile stations. These concepts may also be extended to Universal Terrestrial Radio Access (UTRA) employing Wideband-CDMA (W-CDMA) and other variants of CDMA, such as TD-SCDMA; Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) employing TDMA; and Evolved UTRA (E-UTRA), IEEE 802.1 1 (Wi-Fi), IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX), IEEE 802.20, and Flash-OFDM employing OFDMA.
  • UTRA, E-UTRA, UMTS, LTE and GSM are described in documents from the 3 GPP organization.
  • CDMA2000 and UMB are described in documents from the 3GPP2 organization. The actual wireless communication standard and the multiple access technology employed will depend on the specific application and the overall design constraints imposed on the system.
  • the eNBs 204 may have multiple antennas supporting MIMO technology.
  • MIMO technology enables the eNBs 204 to exploit the spatial domain to support spatial multiplexing, beamforming, and transmit diversity.
  • Spatial multiplexing may be used to transmit different streams of data simultaneously on the same frequency.
  • the data streams may be transmitted to a single UE 206 to increase the data rate or to multiple UEs 206 to increase the overall system capacity. This is achieved by spatially precoding each data stream (i.e., applying a scaling of an amplitude and a phase) and then transmitting each spatially precoded stream through multiple transmit antennas on the DL.
  • the spatially precoded data streams arrive at the UE(s) 206 with different spatial signatures, which enables each of the UE(s) 206 to recover the one or more data streams destined for that UE 206.
  • each UE 206 transmits a spatially precoded data stream, which enables the eNB 204 to identify the source of each spatially precoded data stream.
  • Spatial multiplexing is generally used when channel conditions are good.
  • beamforming may be used to focus the transmission energy in one or more directions. This may be achieved by spatially precoding the data for transmission through multiple antennas. To achieve good coverage at the edges of the cell, a single stream beamforming transmission may be used in combination with transmit diversity.
  • OFDM is a spread-spectrum technique that modulates data over a number of subcarriers within an OFDM symbol.
  • the subcarriers are spaced apart at precise frequencies. The spacing provides "orthogonality" that enables a receiver to recover the data from the subcarriers.
  • a guard interval e.g., cyclic prefix
  • the UL may use SC-FDMA in the form of a DFT-spread OFDM signal to compensate for high peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR).
  • PAPR peak-to-average power ratio
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram 300 illustrating an example of a DL frame structure in LTE.
  • a frame (10 ms) may be divided into 10 equally sized subframes. Each subframe may include two consecutive time slots.
  • a resource grid may be used to represent two time slots, each time slot including a resource block.
  • the resource grid is divided into multiple resource elements.
  • a resource block contains 12 consecutive subcarriers in the frequency domain and, for a normal cyclic prefix in each OFDM symbol, 7 consecutive OFDM symbols in the time domain, or 84 resource elements.
  • For an extended cyclic prefix a resource block contains 6 consecutive OFDM symbols in the time domain and has 72 resource elements.
  • Some of the resource elements, indicated as R 302, 304, include DL reference signals (DL-RS).
  • DL-RS DL reference signals
  • the DL- RS include Cell-specific RS (CRS) (also sometimes called common RS) 302 and UE-specific RS (UE-RS) 304.
  • UE-RS 304 are transmitted only on the resource blocks upon which the corresponding physical DL shared channel (PDSCH) is mapped.
  • PDSCH physical DL shared channel
  • the number of bits carried by each resource element depends on the modulation scheme. Thus, the more resource blocks that a UE receives and the higher the modulation scheme, the higher the data rate for the UE.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram 400 illustrating an example of an UL frame structure in LTE.
  • the available resource blocks for the UL may be partitioned into a data section and a control section.
  • the control section may be formed at the two edges of the system bandwidth and may have a configurable size.
  • the resource blocks in the control section may be assigned to UEs for transmission of control information.
  • the data section may include all resource blocks not included in the control section.
  • the UL frame structure results in the data section including contiguous subcarriers, which may allow a single UE to be assigned all of the contiguous subcarriers in the data section.
  • a UE may be assigned resource blocks 410a, 410b in the control section to transmit control information to an eNB.
  • the UE may also be assigned resource blocks 420a, 420b in the data section to transmit data to the eNB.
  • the UE may transmit control information in a physical UL control channel (PUCCH) on the assigned resource blocks in the control section.
  • the UE may transmit only data or both data and control information in a physical UL shared channel (PUSCH) on the assigned resource blocks in the data section.
  • a UL transmission may span both slots of a subframe and may hop across frequency.
  • a set of resource blocks may be used to perform initial system access and achieve UL synchronization in a physical random access channel (PRACH) 430.
  • the PRACH 430 carries a random sequence and cannot carry any UL data/signaling.
  • Each random access preamble occupies a bandwidth corresponding to six consecutive resource blocks.
  • the starting frequency is specified by the network. That is, the transmission of the random access preamble is restricted to certain time and frequency resources. There is no frequency hopping for the PRACH.
  • the PRACH attempt is carried in a single subframe (1 ms) or in a sequence of few contiguous subframes and a UE can make only a single PRACH attempt per frame (10 ms).
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram 500 illustrating an example of a radio protocol architecture for the user and control planes in LTE.
  • the radio protocol architecture for the UE and the eNB is shown with three layers: Layer 1, Layer 2, and Layer 3.
  • Layer 1 (LI layer) is the lowest layer and implements various physical layer signal processing functions.
  • the LI layer will be referred to herein as the physical layer 506.
  • Layer 2 (L2 layer) 508 is above the physical layer 506 and is responsible for the link between the UE and eNB over the physical layer 506.
  • the L2 layer 508 includes a media access control (MAC) sublayer 510, a radio link control (RLC) sublayer 512, and a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) 514 sublayer, which are terminated at the eNB on the network side.
  • MAC media access control
  • RLC radio link control
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • the UE may have several upper layers above the L2 layer 508 including a network layer (e.g., IP layer) that is terminated at the PDN gateway 118 on the network side, and an application layer that is terminated at the other end of the connection (e.g., far end UE, server, etc.).
  • IP layer e.g., IP layer
  • the PDCP sublayer 514 provides multiplexing between different radio bearers and logical channels.
  • the PDCP sublayer 514 also provides header compression for upper layer data packets to reduce radio transmission overhead, security by ciphering the data packets, and handover support for UEs between eNBs.
  • the RLC sublayer 512 provides segmentation and reassembly of upper layer data packets, retransmission of lost data packets, and reordering of data packets to compensate for out-of-order reception due to hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ).
  • HARQ hybrid automatic repeat request
  • the MAC sublayer 510 provides multiplexing between logical and transport channels.
  • the MAC sublayer 510 is also responsible for allocating the various radio resources (e.g., resource blocks) in one cell among the UEs.
  • the MAC sublayer 510 is also responsible for HARQ operations.
  • the radio protocol architecture for the UE and eNB is substantially the same for the physical layer 506 and the L2 layer 508 with the exception that there is no header compression function for the control plane.
  • the control plane also includes a radio resource control (RRC) sublayer 516 in Layer 3 (L3 layer).
  • RRC sublayer 516 is responsible for obtaining radio resources (e.g., radio bearers) and for configuring the lower layers using RRC signaling between the eNB and the UE.
  • FIG. 6 is a block diagram of an eNB 610 in communication with a UE 650 in an access network.
  • upper layer packets from the core network are provided to a controller/processor 675.
  • the controller/processor 675 implements the functionality of the L2 layer.
  • the controller/processor 675 provides header compression, ciphering, packet segmentation and reordering, multiplexing between logical and transport channels, and radio resource allocations to the UE 650 based on various priority metrics.
  • the controller/processor 675 is also responsible for HARQ operations, retransmission of lost packets, and signaling to the UE 650.
  • Each stream is then mapped to an OFDM subcarrier, multiplexed with a reference signal (e.g., pilot) in the time and/or frequency domain, and then combined together using an Inverse Fast Fourier Transform (IFFT) to produce a physical channel carrying a time domain OFDM symbol stream.
  • the OFDM stream is spatially precoded to produce multiple spatial streams.
  • Channel estimates from a channel estimator 674 may be used to determine the coding and modulation scheme, as well as for spatial processing.
  • the channel estimate may be derived from a reference signal and/or channel condition feedback transmitted by the UE 650.
  • Each spatial stream may then be provided to a different antenna 620 via a separate transmitter 618TX.
  • Each transmitter 618TX may modulate an RF carrier with a respective spatial stream for transmission.
  • each receiver 654RX receives a signal through its respective antenna
  • Each receiver 654RX recovers information modulated onto an RF carrier and provides the information to the receive (RX) processor 656.
  • the RX processor 656 implements various signal processing functions of the LI layer.
  • the RX processor 656 may perform spatial processing on the information to recover any spatial streams destined for the UE 650. If multiple spatial streams are destined for the UE 650, they may be combined by the RX processor 656 into a single OFDM symbol stream.
  • the RX processor 656 then converts the OFDM symbol stream from the time-domain to the frequency domain using a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
  • FFT Fast Fourier Transform
  • the symbols on each subcarrier, and the reference signal, are recovered and demodulated by determining the most likely signal constellation points transmitted by the eNB 610. These soft decisions may be based on channel estimates computed by the channel estimator 658. The soft decisions are then decoded and deinterleaved to recover the data and control signals that were originally transmitted by the eNB 610 on the physical channel. The data and control signals are then provided to the controller/processor 659.
  • Channel estimates derived by a channel estimator 658 from a reference signal or feedback transmitted by the eNB 610 may be used by the TX processor 668 to select the appropriate coding and modulation schemes, and to facilitate spatial processing.
  • the spatial streams generated by the TX processor 668 may be provided to different antenna 652 via separate transmitters 654TX. Each transmitter 654TX may modulate an RF carrier with a respective spatial stream for transmission.
  • the UL transmission is processed at the eNB 610 in a manner similar to that described in connection with the receiver function at the UE 650.
  • Each receiver 618RX receives a signal through its respective antenna 620.
  • Each receiver 618RX recovers information modulated onto an RF carrier and provides the information to a RX processor 670.
  • the RX processor 670 may implement the LI layer.
  • Each eNB in an MBSFN area synchronously transmits the same eMBMS control information and data.
  • Each area may support broadcast, multicast, and unicast services.
  • a unicast service is a service intended for a specific user, e.g., a voice call.
  • a multicast service is a service that may be received by a group of users, e.g., a subscription video service.
  • a broadcast service is a service that may be received by all users, e.g., a news broadcast.
  • the first MBSFN area may support a first eMBMS broadcast service, such as by providing a particular news broadcast to UE 770.
  • the second MBSFN area may support a second eMBMS broadcast service, such as by providing a different news broadcast to UE 760.
  • Each MBSFN area supports a plurality of physical multicast channels (PMCH) (e.g., 15 PMCHs).
  • PMCH corresponds to a multicast channel (MCH).
  • MCH multicast channel
  • Each MCH can multiplex a plurality (e.g., 29) of multicast logical channels.
  • Each MBSFN area may have one multicast control channel (MCCH).
  • MCCH multicast control channel
  • one MCH may multiplex one MCCH and a plurality of multicast traffic channels (MTCHs) and the remaining MCHs may multiplex a plurality of MTCHs.
  • MTCHs multicast traffic channels
  • a UE can camp on an LTE cell to discover the availability of eMBMS service access and a corresponding access stratum configuration.
  • the UE may acquire a system information block (SIB) 13 (SIB 13).
  • SIB 13 system information block 13
  • the UE may acquire an MBSFN Area Configuration message on an MCCH.
  • the UE may acquire an MCH scheduling information (MSI) MAC control element.
  • MSI MCH scheduling information
  • FIG. 8 is a diagram 800 illustrating a first exemplary method for sending a secure reception report.
  • a UE 802 may receive a trusted certificate authority list from a service provider 808.
  • step 810 is not performed, and in step 81 1, the UE 802 may receive the trusted certificate authority list from a broadcast multicast service center (BM-SC) 806.
  • the trusted certificate authority list includes certificates of trusted certificate authorities.
  • a trusted certificate authority is an authority from which the UE 802 may trust certificates for setting up a secure connection with a server that provided the certificate.
  • the trusted certificate authority list may be encrypted and/or integrity protected based on a credential known by the UE 802 and the service provider 808 / BM-SC 806.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE 802.
  • the credential may be a shared key that is known only to the UE 802 and the service provider 808 / BM-SC 806.
  • Examples of such a shared key include any key derived from a root key (e.g., Ki, which is a root key used for wireless access authentication) that is known to the service provider808 / BM-SC 806 and the UE 802 based on the UE subscription with the service provider (e.g., on the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) application on the Universal Integrated Circuit Card (UICC) smartcard).
  • a root key e.g., Ki, which is a root key used for wireless access authentication
  • USB Universal Subscriber Identity Module
  • UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
  • the trusted certificate authority list may be hashed using the credential through a keyed hash function, such as a Hash-based Message Authentication code (HMAC) (which may be a function of a shared key such as the MUK or the MRK) to obtain a hash value (also known as hash code, hash sum, checkcode, or hash), and the hash value may be included with the trusted certificate authority list so that the UE 802 may check whether fields within the trusted certificate authority list have been modified since the integrity protection.
  • HMAC Hash-based Message Authentication code
  • the UE 802 may receive a user service discovery / announcement from a
  • the user service discovery / announcement may include one or more reception report configurations and one or more addresses of servers to which the UE may send the reception report.
  • the user service discovery / announcement includes a first reception report configuration and an unsecured server URL for sending unsecure reception reports, and a second reception report configuration and a secured server URL for sending secure reception reports.
  • the unsecured server URL may be a URL for sending the reception report through HTTP.
  • the secured server URL may be a URL for sending the reception report through HTTP secure (HTTPS) (e.g., HTTP with the transport layer security (TLS) protocol).
  • HTTPS HTTP secure
  • the user service discovery / announcement may itself be integrity protected and/or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE 802 and the BM- SC 806.
  • step 814 the UE 802 determines whether to send the reception report and whether sensitive reception report information may be included in the reception report. Step 814 may occur after the UE 802 identifies a complete reception of an MBMS content item or the completion of an MBMS session.
  • step 816 the UE 802 selects a report time and a server. If the UE 802 determines that sensitive reception report information will not be included in the reception report, the UE 802 may select to send the reception report through an unsecured connection to the unsecured server URL. If the UE 802 determines that sensitive reception report information will be included in the reception report, the UE 802 may select to send the reception report through a secured connection to the secured server URL.
  • step 818 the UE 802 initiates setup of HTTPS.
  • the UE 802 receives a certificate of the server 804.
  • the certificate may be an X.509 server certificate. If the UE 802 has not yet received the trusted certificate authority list (step 810 or step 811 has not occurred), in step 820, the UE 802 obtains the trusted certificate authority list from the service provider 808, or in step 821, the UE 802 obtains the trusted certificate authority list from the BM-SC 806.
  • FIG. 9 is a diagram 900 illustrating a second exemplary method for sending a secure reception report.
  • the server 904 receives an MUK or an MRK or a key derived from the MUK or MRK from the BM-SC 906.
  • the UE 902 receives a user service discovery / announcement.
  • the user service discovery / announcement may be integrity protected and/or encrypted based on an MSK or a similar group key.
  • the UE 902 determines whether to send a reception report and whether the reception report would include sensitive information.
  • the UE 902 selects a report time for sending the reception report.
  • step 916 the UE integrity protects and/or encrypts the reception report based on the MUK or the MRK or its derived key.
  • step 918 the UE sends the protected reception report to the server 904. It should be noted that the decision to protect the user service discovery / announcement is independent of the decision to protect the reception report.
  • FIG. 10 is a diagram 1000 illustrating an exemplary method for receiving and processing a secure user service discovery / announcement.
  • the BM- SC 1006 integrity protects and/or encrypts a user service discovery / announcement.
  • the BM-SC 1006 may integrity protect and/or encrypt the complete user service discovery / announcement or one or more fields of the user service discovery / announcement.
  • the BM-SC 1006 may integrity protect and/or encrypt just the reception report configuration within the user service discovery / announcement or just the server URL field.
  • the BM-SC 1006 may integrity protect the user service discovery / announcement by hashing the user service discovery / announcement or one or more fields in the user service discovery / announcement through a hash function to obtain a hash value.
  • the hash function may itself be a function of the MSK or a similar group key known to a group of UEs and the service provider.
  • the BM-SC 1006 may send the hash value with the user service discovery / announcement to the UE 1002.
  • the UE 1002 sends the reception report to the server 1004 through a secure connection (e.g., HTTPS).
  • a secure connection e.g., HTTPS
  • FIG. 11 is a flow chart 1 100 of a first method of wireless communication.
  • the method may be performed by a UE.
  • a UE receives, from a service provider, a certificate authority list.
  • the certificate authority list includes certificates of trusted certificate authorities.
  • the certificate authority list is integrity protected and/or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the service provider.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the credential may be based on any shared key that is known to the UE and the service provider, such as an MUK or an MRK or a key derived from the MUK or the MRK.
  • the UE receives a user service discovery / announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of a server.
  • the entire user service discovery / announcement or one or more fields within the user service discovery / announcement may be integrity protected and/or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the BM-SC.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the credential may be a shared key such as an MSK or a key derived from the MSK.
  • the determination in step 1 106 may be based on the reporting type RAck, StaR, StaR-all, or StaR-only for the reception report or based on other information. If the reception report does not include sensitive information, in step 1108, the UE sends the reception report to the server through an unsecured connection based on the received server address and the reception report configuration. If the reception report includes sensitive information, in step 1 110, the UE initiates a secure connection setup (e.g., HTTPS) and receives a certificate of the server. In step 11 12, the UE authenticates the server using the received certificate authority list and the certificate.
  • a secure connection setup e.g., HTTPS
  • the UE may authenticate the server by verifying the certificate belongs to the same server address as the received server URL and by comparing the certificate to the certificate authority list to verify that the received certificate was issued based on the root certificate in the received certificate authority list.
  • the UE determines to setup a secure connection with the server upon authenticating the server and sets up the secure connection with the server.
  • the UE sends the reception report to the server through the secure connection based on the received server address and the reception report configuration.
  • FIG. 13 is a flow chart 1300 of a third method of wireless communication. The method may be performed by a UE. In step 1302, a UE receives a protected broadcast announcement. The broadcast announcement is integrity protected and/or encrypted.
  • FIG. 14 is a conceptual data flow diagram 1400 illustrating the data flow between different modules/means/components in an exemplary apparatus 1402.
  • the apparatus may be a UE.
  • the apparatus includes a communication module 1404 that may be configured to receive, from a service provider via the eNB 1450, a certificate authority list.
  • the certificate authority list may include certificates of trusted certificate authorities.
  • the certificate authority list may be integrity protected and/or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the service provider.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the credential may be a shared key.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the integrity protection module 1412 may be configured to verify the integrity of the certificate authority list based on a credential known to the UE and the server, such as a shared key (e.g., the MUK/MRK or a key derived from the MUK/MRK).
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the communication module 1404 may be configured to receive a user service discovery / announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of a server.
  • the user service discovery / announcement may be integrity protected and/or encrypted based on a credential known by the UE and the BM-SC.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the credential may be a shared key.
  • the shared key may be an MSK or a key derived from the MSK.
  • the communication module 1404 may be configured to provide the received user service discovery / announcement to a reception report processing module 1406.
  • the reception report processing module 1406 may be configured to decrypt the user service discovery / announcement through the encryption/decryption module 1408 and may be configured to verify the integrity of the user service discovery / announcement through the integrity protection module 1412.
  • the encryption/decryption module 1408 may be configured to decrypt the user service discovery / announcement based on a credential known to the UE and the BM-SC, such as a shared key (e.g., the MSK or a key derived from the MSK).
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the integrity protection module 1412 may be configured to verify the integrity of the user service discovery / announcement based on a credential known to the UE and the BM-SC, such as a shared key (e.g., the MSK or a key derived from the MSK).
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the communication module 1404 may be configured to receive a certificate of the server upon initiating a secure connection with the server.
  • the communication module 1404 may be configured to provide the certificate to the server authentication module 1410.
  • the server authentication module 1410 may be configured to authenticate the server using the received certificate authority list and the received certificate.
  • the server authentication module 1410 may be configured to determine to setup a secure connection (e.g., HTTPS) with the server upon authenticating the server.
  • the server authentication module 1410 may be configured to communicate with the communication module 1404 so that the communication module 1404 sets up a secure connection with the server.
  • the communication module 1404 may communicate to the reception report processing module 1406 when there is a complete reception of a content item or the completion of a session.
  • the reception report process module 1406 may determine whether a reception report is required, and if a reception report is required, generate a reception report.
  • the reception report processing module 1406 may be configured to encrypt the reception report through the encryption/decryption module 1408.
  • the encryption/decryption module 1408 may be configured to encrypt the reception report based on a credential known to the UE and the server, such as a shared key (e.g., the MUK/MRK or a key derived from the MUK/MRK).
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the reception report processing module 1406 may be configured to integrity protect the reception report through the integrity protection module 1412.
  • the integrity protection module 1412 may be configured to integrity protect the reception report based on a credential known to the UE and the server, such as a shared key (e.g., the MUK/MRK or a key derived from the MUK/MRK).
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the UE.
  • the reception report processing module 1406 may provide the generated reception report to the communication module 1404, which may be configured to send the reception report to the server. If the communication module 1404 has setup a secure connection with the server, the communication module 1404 may be configured to send the reception report to the server through the secure connection.
  • the apparatus may include additional modules that perform each of the steps of the algorithm in the aforementioned diagrams of FIGs. 8-10 and the flow charts of FIGs. 11-13. As such, each step in the aforementioned diagrams of FIGs. 8-10 and the flow charts of FIGs. 1 1-13 may be performed by a module and the apparatus may include one or more of those modules.
  • the modules may be one or more hardware components specifically configured to carry out the stated processes/algorithm, implemented by a processor configured to perform the stated processes/algorithm, stored within a computer-readable medium for implementation by a processor, or some combination thereof.
  • FIG. 15 is a diagram illustrating an example of a hardware implementation for an apparatus 1402' employing a processing system 1514.
  • the processing system 1514 may be implemented with a bus architecture, represented generally by the bus 1524.
  • the bus 1524 may include any number of interconnecting buses and bridges depending on the specific application of the processing system 1514 and the overall design constraints.
  • the bus 1524 links together various circuits including one or more processors and/or hardware modules, represented by the processor 1504, the modules 1404, 1406, 1408, 1410, 1412, and the computer-readable medium 1506.
  • the bus 1524 may also link various other circuits such as timing sources, peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art, and therefore, will not be described any further.
  • the processing system 1514 may be coupled to a transceiver 1510.
  • the transceiver 1510 may be coupled to a transceiver 1510.
  • the processing system 1514 includes a processor 1504 coupled to a computer- readable medium 1506.
  • the processor 1504 is responsible for general processing, including the execution of software stored on the computer-readable medium 1506.
  • the software when executed by the processor 1504, causes the processing system 1514 to perform the various functions described supra for any particular apparatus.
  • the computer-readable medium 1506 may also be used for storing data that is manipulated by the processor 1504 when executing software.
  • the processing system further includes at least one of the modules 1404, 1406, 1408, 1410, and 1412.
  • the modules may be software modules running in the processor 1504, resident/stored in the computer readable medium 1506, one or more hardware modules coupled to the processor 1504, or some combination thereof.
  • the processing system 1514 may be a component of the UE 650 and may include the memory 660 and/or at least one of the TX processor 668, the RX processor 656, and the controller/processor 659.
  • the apparatus 1402/1402' for wireless communication includes means for receiving, from a service provider, a certificate authority list.
  • the certificate authority list is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the apparatus and the service provider.
  • the credential may be stored on a smartcard in the apparatus.
  • the apparatus further includes means for authenticating a server using the received certificate authority list.
  • the apparatus may further include means for receiving a certificate of a server, and means for determining to setup a secure connection with the server upon authenticating the server.
  • the apparatus may further include means for receiving a user service discovery / announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of the server, means for setting up a secure connection with the server, and means for sending a reception report to the server through the secure connection based on the address and the reception report configuration.
  • the aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned modules of the apparatus 1402 and/or the processing system 1514 of the apparatus 1402' configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • the processing system 1514 may include the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659.
  • the aforementioned means may be the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • the apparatus 1402/1402' for wireless communication includes means for receiving a user service discovery / announcement including a reception report configuration and an address of a server, and means for sending a protected reception report to the server based on the reception report configuration.
  • the apparatus may further include means for setting up a secure connection with the server.
  • the apparatus may further include means for receiving, from a service provider, a certificate authority list, means for receiving a certificate of the server, and means for authenticating the server using the received certificate authority list and the certificate.
  • the apparatus may further include means for integrity protecting and/or encrypting the reception report.
  • the aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned modules of the apparatus 1402 and/or the processing system 1514 of the apparatus 1402' configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • the processing system 1514 may include the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659.
  • the aforementioned means may be the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • the apparatus 1402/1402' for wireless communication includes means for receiving a protected broadcast announcement.
  • the broadcast announcement is at least one of integrity protected or encrypted based on a credential known by the apparatus and stored on a smartcard in the appartus.
  • the apparatus further includes means for communicating based on the broadcast announcement.
  • the apparatus may further include means for decrypting the broadcast announcement based on an MSK when the broadcast announcement is encrypted.
  • the apparatus may further include means for verifying an integrity of the broadcast announcement based on an MSK when the broadcast announcement is integrity protected.
  • the aforementioned means may be one or more of the aforementioned modules of the apparatus 1402 and/or the processing system 1514 of the apparatus 1402' configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • the processing system 1514 may include the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659.
  • the aforementioned means may be the TX Processor 668, the RX Processor 656, and the controller/processor 659 configured to perform the functions recited by the aforementioned means.
  • Combinations such as "at least one of A, B, or C,” “at least one of A, B, and C,” and “A, B, C, or any combination thereof include any combination of A, B, and/or C, and may include multiples of A, multiples of B, or multiples of C.
  • combinations such as “at least one of A, B, or C,” “at least one of A, B, and C,” and “A, B, C, or any combination thereof may be A only, B only, C only, A and B, A and C, B and C, or A and B and C, where any such combinations may contain one or more member or members of A, B, or C.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Multimedia (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Selon l'invention, dans une première configuration, un équipement utilisateur (UE) (802) reçoit, d'un fournisseur de services (808), une liste d'autorités de certification (811). La liste d'autorités de certification est soit à protection d'intégrité, soit cryptée, sur la base d'un justificatif d'identité connu par l'UE et le fournisseur de services et stocké sur une carte à puce dans l'UE. L'UE authentifie un serveur à l'aide de la liste d'autorités de certification reçue. Dans une deuxième configuration, l'UE reçoit une découverte/annonce de service d'utilisateur (812) comprenant une configuration de rapport de réception et une adresse d'un serveur. L'UE envoie un rapport de réception protégé au serveur sur la base de la configuration de rapport de réception (826). Dans une troisième configuration, l'UE reçoit une annonce de diffusion protégée (812) et communique sur la base de l'annonce de diffusion (826). L'annonce de diffusion est à protection d'intégrité et/ou cryptée sur la base d'un justificatif d'identité connu par l'UE et stocké sur une carte à puce dans l'UE.
PCT/US2013/030277 2012-04-10 2013-03-11 Procédé et dispositif pour rapport de réception mbms sécurisé WO2013154714A1 (fr)

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JP2015505724A JP5932137B2 (ja) 2012-04-10 2013-03-11 安全なｍｂｍｓ受信報告のための方法およびデバイス
CN201380018997.7A CN104509030B (zh) 2012-04-10 2013-03-11 用于安全mbms接收报告的方法和设备
EP15162835.1A EP2908462B1 (fr) 2012-04-10 2013-03-11 Procédé et dispositif pour rapport de réception mbms sécurisée
EP13712047.3A EP2837130B1 (fr) 2012-04-10 2013-03-11 Procédé et dispositif pour rapport de réception mbms sécurisé

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US201261622434P 2012-04-10 2012-04-10
US61/622,434 2012-04-10
US13/791,879 US9078130B2 (en) 2012-04-10 2013-03-08 Secure reception reporting
US13/791,879 2013-03-08

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CN104509030A (zh) 2015-04-08
JP5932137B2 (ja) 2016-06-08
US9338653B2 (en) 2016-05-10
JP2015514380A (ja) 2015-05-18
JP6242947B2 (ja) 2017-12-06
US20130267202A1 (en) 2013-10-10
EP2908462B1 (fr) 2018-10-17
JP2016187205A (ja) 2016-10-27
US20150133088A1 (en) 2015-05-14
US9344891B2 (en) 2016-05-17
JP6141485B2 (ja) 2017-06-07
US9078130B2 (en) 2015-07-07
EP2908463B1 (fr) 2018-04-18
EP2837130B1 (fr) 2017-07-19
EP2908462A1 (fr) 2015-08-19
JP2016167860A (ja) 2016-09-15
US20150087271A1 (en) 2015-03-26
EP2837130A1 (fr) 2015-02-18
EP2908463A1 (fr) 2015-08-19

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