WO2013098863A1

WO2013098863A1 - Monitoring device of an intrusion barrier

Info

Publication number: WO2013098863A1
Application number: PCT/IT2011/000423
Authority: WO
Inventors: Vincenzo DE ASTIS; Alfredo Cigada; Emanuele ZAPPA; Stefano Manzoni
Original assignee: Cias Elettronica S.R.L.
Priority date: 2011-12-29
Filing date: 2011-12-29
Publication date: 2013-07-04

Abstract

The present invention concerns a monitoring device (Mj) for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier (3), comprising a transducer (2) for sensing physical quantities induced on said security barrier to generate a first electric signal (Vei), electric communication means (4A, 4B) being configured to output said first electric signal (Vei) and a support (5) which is configured to support said transducer (2) and said electric communication means (4A, 4B). The security device (Mj) is characterized in that the electric communication means (4A, 4B) comprise a first electric communication port (4A) and a second electric communication port (4B), the latter being configured to receive a second electric signal (Vei') and said first electric communication port being configured to output at least said first electric signal (Vei) and to comprise visual identification means (6) associated with said support (5) for uniquely identifying said first electric communication port (4A).

Description

Monitoring device of an intrusion barrier.

Technical Field

The present invention relates to a monitoring device for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier as defined in the preamble of claim 1.

Background art

Various security devices are currently available for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier, e.g. a metal fence, to detect any break-in event.

Generally, security systems are based on transducers which sense the vibrations propagating over the intrusion detection barrier, as a result of atmospheric agents or break- in attempts (climbing, cutting, displacements and the like).

Currently available security systems usually consist of a cable having transducers (i.e. sensors) pre-wired at predetermined distances, to avoid field wiring which would require very high installation costs, to ensure accuracy.

However, pre-wired transducers stiffen the cable/transducer system and complicate transport and handling during installation.

For example, security systems with transducers operating in a distributed-constant arrangement, i.e. systems characterized by a single transducer consisting of the cable itself, allowing use of the triboelectric effect or the piezoelectric effect or the capacitive effect to generate an electric signal proportional to the vibration of the fence upon which it is installed, generally involve difficulties in manufacture and especially handling during installation[i].

Thus, for example, the cables that use the triboelectric effect require some rubbing to occur between an inner conductor and a surrounding sheath. For this purpose, their ends are required to be blocked, by special grease materials, to prevent moisture ingress without hindering movement of the inner conductor/s. Furthermore, for effective adhesion to the structure, the cable shall be fixed to the fence with a number of cable ties.

This is a very laborious operation, whose outcome hardly has the required uniformity.

These cables are very difficult to handle during installation, and any damage thereto prevents successful installation.

Processing of the electric signal generated by vibration of the fence on which the cable is installed, requires the cable to be equipped with an electric communication port, having a plurality of pins or wires, some of which are designed to output the generated electric signal and others are designed to receive the generated signal from other cables in electric communication therewith.

It shall be noted that the wiring process to connect the various cables and form the system for monitoring the intrusion detection barrier, even when such, process is carried out at the factory and not on site, requires the use of qualified resources, with times and costs that considerably increase the final cost of the cable.

Any wiring problem would not only cause degraded or even impossible reception and/or output of the generated signals, but would also be difficult to solve, as the process of finding which pins and/or wires designed to receive or output the generated signals have been wrongly wired is difficult and time-consuming, and requires a great number of resources and capabilities.

Furthermore, field wiring requires cable connections to be accurate even in terms of proper tightening of any terminals, to ensure good and durable contact, or requires the conductors to be welded to connection terminals, and the cable to be stripped to an adequate length, neither too short not too long. These operations, to be carried out with the outmost accuracy outdoors (under hot, cold, rainy weather, etc.) are very delicate and their success relies on the skill, expertise, responsibility and care of each operator, and requires long process times, although high quality, uniformity and minimized times are required.

Technical problem

Therefore, the need is strongly felt for quick, secure, and fail-safe wiring in the field of security devices for monitoring intrusion detection barriers.

Hence, the present invention is based on the problem of providing a device that has such functional features as to fulfill the above need, while obviating the above prior art drawbacks.

Technical solution

This problem is solved by a security device for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier as defined in claim 1.

Advantageous effects

The present invention provides a fail-safe security device for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier during installation thereof. The installer is allowed to immediately and unambiguously recognize which electric communication port of the device should be used for data retrieval.

Furthermore the present invention allows the security device to be precisely oriented along an axis and with a direction relative to either a device equipped with a microcontroller or a central analyzer.

Also, using the present invention and the analysis capability of each sensor, the response of the latter can be adapted to any heterogeneity of the fences on which the sensors are installed.

Furthermore, the use of MEMS sensors affords highly accurate, repeatable and stable measurements both with time and through different ambient conditions.

Finally, the use of MEMS sensors in the security device allows ^' generation of Volt signals that are not affected by the noise of the whole structure but only of a small part of it, i.e. the part around the MEMS sensor. This affords improved signal-to-noise ratio and improved analysis quality, and reduces or even eliminates false positives.

Brief description of the drawings

Further features and advantages of the security device of this invention, will be apparent upon reading the following description of one preferred embodiment thereof, which is given by way of illustration and without limitation with reference to the accompanying figures, in which:

- Figure 1 is a cable-and-trunk schematic of the device of the present invention;

- Figure 2 is a sectional diagram of the device of Figure 1, when it is associated with an intrusion detection barrier;

- Figure 3 shows a security system with the device of Figure 1 , according to the present invention, is used.

Detailed description

Referring to the accompanying figures, Mj designates a security device comprising a transducer 2 for sensing physical quantities induced on a security barrier 3. The transducer 2 of the device M_j is configured to generate at least one electric signal if a mechanical action is exerted on the barrier 3.

It should be noted that the term mechanical action on the barrier is intended to indicate actions that can apply a force on the barrier. These mechanical actions include actions that can be exerted on the barrier by man, such as cutting, climbing, lifting, displacing, hitting, etc., and actions that can be exerted by weather agents, such as wind, heavy hitting rain, hail, as well as actions that can be exerted by animals.

As explained in further detail hereinafter, the electric signal V_ei is generated by the transducer 2 in response to a mechanical action on the intrusion detection barrier 3. Such electric signal V_ei is used alone or in combination with other electric signals generated by other security devices (see Figure 3) to determine whether the intrusion detection barrier 3 experiences a break-in attempt and where.

For example, the signal V_ei is indicative of the power or other synthesis parameters (determined over appropriate intervals of time) of the mechanical action exerted on the intrusion detection barrier.

The security device M_j comprises electric communication means 4 for establishing signal communication among the devices M_j that compose the security system 12 (see Figure 3).

For example, in a preferred layout, the devices Mj are connected to one another in series and are organized in unique sets, as described in greater detail hereinafter.

It should be noted that the electric commumcation means 4 are configured to output the electric signal V_ei.

The security device M_j is characterized in that the electric communication means comprise a first electric communication port 4A and a second electric communication port 4B.

Particularly, the second electric communication port 4B is adapted to receive a second electric signal V_er at its input, which signal may be, for instance, the electric signal Vei generated by a previous device Mj, whereas the first electric communication port 4A is configured to output at least the first electric signal V_ei and also the second electric signal

Ver if there is one.

In other words, the first electric communication port 4A is designed to output the data detected by the transducer 2 of that security device Mj and possibly to also output the electric signal V_ei- generated by the previous security device Μ .

In practice, the first electric communication port 4A is in signal communication with the transducer 2 and may also be in signal communication with the second electric communication port 4B.

If the second electric communication port 4B is terminated by a terminator 14, then the first electric communication port 4A only outputs the signal generated by the transducer 2 of its device M_j.

It shall be noted that the first port 4A and the second port 4B are each in the form of a standard female RJ45 connector.

The security device M_j comprises a support 5, which is configured to support the transducer 2 and the electric communication means 4.

Advantageously, the safety device M_j comprises visual identification means 6 which are associated with the support 5, to uniquely identify the first electric communication port 4A.

For this purpose, the visual identification means 6 are unremovably associated with the support 5 and are preferably located near the first electric communication port 4A.

Therefore, the security device M_j has both the advantage of separating the electric communication port that is designed to receive signals from the one that is designed to output the signal V_ei generated by its transducer 2, and of affording visual and fail-safe identification of the communication port that is designed to output the signal V_ei and the signal Vei'.

Therefore, such visual identification means 6 are visible to the user/operator and may be hidden to his/her view.

Preferably, the visual identification means comprise an icon, such as a circle, a dot or, according to the preferred embodiment of the present invention, an arrow (see Figure 1), to indicate the axis and the direction of the electric connection, as explained in greater detail hereinafter.

In a preferred aspect, the first and second communication ports 4A, 4B and the transducer 2 and the required wiring are mounted to a face 5 A of the support 5. The latter is conformed in such a manner that the first and second ports 4A, 4B, and the transducers 2 are biased to be only accommodated on the face 5 A of the support in the proper position.

The support 5 is made of a special thermoplastic material and is metallized to form a screen for the transducer 2 so that the influence of any electromagnetic noise is minimized.

Referring now to Figure 2, the security device M_j comprises a housing 8, having a bottom 8 A on which the support 5 may be laid. A closing lid 11 extends from the bottom

8A of the housing to enclose the transducer 2.

The housing 8 of the security device is associated with the intrusion detection barrier 3 through a retainer plate 9 which is associated, for instance, with the bottom of the housing 8 and/or the support 5 by means of fastener elements 10, which may consist of stainless steel screws. This allows the barrier 3 to be interposed between the bottom 8A and the retainer plate 9.

By this arrangement, the transducer 2 will be located in the proximity of the barrier 3 to detect any vibration therein, and the conformation of the housing 8 will prevent any oscillation due to its structure from distorting measurements.

For this purpose, for example the container 8 will be made from a thermoplastic polymer material, such as polycarbonate. This container accomplishes the tasks of: 1) insulating the (metallized) support 5 from the barrier 3, which may be made of metal and hence conduct electromagnetic noise, 2) prevent the ingress of dirt and water and 3) impart mechanical strength and UV protection (UV resistant polycarbonate).

It shall be noted that, in a preferred embodiment of the security device M_j the visual identification means 6 are, for example, impressed in the support 5.

For example, the visual identification means 6 are impressed during die-casting on the face 5B of the support 5, opposite to the face 5 A where the first and second ports 4A, 4B and the transducer 2 are mounted.

Thus, the connector 4A that outputs the signal is the connector identified by the visual identification means 6.

Preferably, the transducer 2 comprises a Micro Electro-Mechanical Systems sensor (in short MEMS), which is adapted to generate the electric signal V_el in response to a mechanical action on the intrusion detection barrier 3.

In a preferred embodiment, the MEMS sensor is an uniaxial, biaxial or triaxial sensor and can generate an electric signal V_ei of the order of a few Volts, e.g. three Volts, along each of its axes. Therefore, this value is about three orders of magnitude larger than other prior art sensors, of either lumped or distributed constant type.

The security device M_j may comprise processing means 12 A, e.g. in the form of a microcontroller having a fuzzy or Boolean logic firmware for processing the electric signal Vei and/or the signal V_ei', as explained in greater detail below.

Referring now to Figure 3, it shall be noted that a security system 12 comprises a plurality of unique sets SBSj with l<i<N, where N is twenty, and where each unique set SBSj comprises at least one security device M_j with l<j<K where, for instance, K is seven, such that a plurality of subnetworks, each subnetwork being connected in series via its respective first and second electric communication ports 4 A e 4B.

In other words, security devices are organized into a modular structure (each module consisting of a unique set), so that multiple modules of MEMS sensors M_j are electrically connected to one another via the electric connection ports 4 A and 4B.

In one embodiment, each unique set SBSj is preferably composed of an odd number of security devices M_j , e.g. seven, although a smaller number of security devices Mj may be provided, composed of three, two, one MEMS sensors respectively.

The intrusion detection system 12 further comprises processing means 12 A, in the form of a peripheral microcontroller 7 and/or a central microcontroller AC.

Such peripheral microcontroller AP 7 and central microcontroller AC are in mutual signal communication via the ports of each security device M_j and hence with the plurality of MEMS sensors. They are configured to respond to each of the (one or more) electric signals V_ei generated by each device Mj, to generate an alarm signal Sail representative of the portion of the barrier 3 where the mechanical action was exerted.

In order to notify users where the mechanical action actually took place on the intrusion detection barrier, the system 12 comprises a communication device adapted to communicate such alarm signal Vaii (see Figure 3).

For instance, the communication device is in the form of an electrical/electronic apparatus that can emit audible sounds, signal lights, communications displayed on a screen, communications transmitted via GSM or the like, etc.

It shall be noted that in each unique set SBS^ processing means 12A may be implemented in at least one security device M_j.

The device with the processing means 12A is the peripheral device AP equipped with the microcontroller 7.

This allows such device M_j to conduct processing on the signals generated by its transducer 2 and/or the signals V_el' received via the second communication port 4B.

In other words, the peripheral device AP is in signal communication via the input/output ports of each security device M_j and hence with the plurality of MEMS sensors.

Thus, also referring to Figure 3, the MEMS sensor j=2 coincides with the peripheral analyzer AP. Here, all the remaining MEMS sensors of the unique set communicate with such peripheral analyzer AP, i.e. with the microcontroller via a particular communication channel.

The number of MEMS sensors in each unique set is selected according to the maximum number of MEMS that a peripheral analyzer AP can handle with its memory capacity, considering that the microcontroller of the AP shall have a small size, to avoid excessive power consumption, and hence shall have memory restrictions.

It shall be further noted that the use of an odd number is advantageous because the peripheral analyzer AP itself contains a MEMS and hence, the connecting structure has to be balanced left and right by providing the same number of sensors both to the right and the left of the AP.

This will provide ^'a repeated structure for unique sets SBS;, equal to the previous and the next ones.

Furthermore, each peripheral analyzer AP of each unique set SBSj comprises a mass storage medium, for storing the coordinates that define the distance between each pair of adjacent MEMS sensors M_j of the unique set. The origin is arbitrary and may coincide with the position of the MEMS sensor Mj=i .

Each microcontroller 7 of the peripheral analyzer AP comprises firmware configured to:

- sample the signals V_ei for the vibration data detected by the MEMS sensors Mj of that particular unique set;

- analyze such signals V_ei to provide a first estimate of the break-in probability on the barrier 2, such analysis being implemented with Boolean logics and/or preferably fuzzy logics.

For this purpose, the microcontroller 7 of the peripheral analyzer AP of each unique set SBS; is adapted to:

- detect, preferably continuously, one, more or all electric signals V_er generated by each MEMS sensor M_j of the unique set SBS;:

- comparing the electric signal/s V_ei so detected with a plurality of reference signals

Sref, the latter being previously stored in such mass storage medium, and

- generating the alarm signal Van according to the result of such comparison, i.e. when the electric signals V_ei , e.g. their modulus values, are greater than one of the plurality of reference signals S_ref during an analysis interval Tanai- It shall be noted that, if a Boolean logic is used, the reference signals S_ref will be the thresholds that uniquely delimit the inclusion of the instantaneous signal (e.g. the power) within the set of break-in signals or the set of non-break- in signals on the barrier. If a fuzzy logic is used, the reference signals are not that clear-cut, but their blurred character affords more accurate determinations. This is because a signal V_ei is no longer compared to a single threshold S_ref, but it is as if it were compared to hundreds of different thresholds and, if it exceeds them, it will belong time after time to different sets of signals, i.e. having characteristics differing, possibly to a small extent, from those of other signals, which affords much more accurate analysis of the signal generated by the sensors and better understanding if its origin (i.e. whether it was triggered by a break-in attempt or noise).

An analysis interval is intended herein as the time during which a modulus of the signal V_ei (e.g. the ^'intensity modulus) is equal to or greater than that of the reference signal/s S_ref,

The above described analysis for each MEMS sensor Mj, possibly repeated for a series of adjacent sensors, allows validation and invalidation of the recognition of an event instead of another, e.g. fence cutting instead of rain or other noisy events.

Still referring to Figure 3, in the system 12 the plurality of unique sensors SBS; are interconnected for exchange of the various electric signals V_e[. For this purpose, the processing means 12A include the central analyzer AC which is advantageously in signal communication with each unique set SBSj.

For example, such signal communication is provided as a warning through the actuation of one or more relays, or a notification of the event, with the sector and distance data, through an RS485 serial communication network or an Ethernet network and/or other types of remote connection).

The central analyzer AC has its own mass storage medium, which can store all significant signals generated by said plurality of MEMS sensors Mj, as well as the coordinates of all the MEMS in the various unique sets SBSj.

It shall be noted that each peripheral analyzer AP of a particular unique set SBSj generates an alarm signal Sail' , and that the central analyzer AC is configured, by firmware, to obtain a comparative analysis of all signals, preferably using fuzzy logics. For this purpose, the central analyzer AC is configured to:

- detect one or more alarm signals Sau' generated by the peripheral analyzers AP of a particular unique set SBSj;

- process the alarm signals Sail' generated by adjacent (previous or next) sets SBSj;

- generate the alarm signal as a result of such processing, to notify whether two or more zones (i.e. two or more unique sets SBSi) have detected the same or different mechanical actions on the intrusion detection barrier.

In other words, the central analyzer AC both performs correlations that cannot be made by the individual peripheral analyzers AP, and allows simultaneous detection of mechanical actions on two or more distinct zones of the barrier 3, such zones being either adjacent to (e.g. when the mechanical action is exerted at the boundary of two zones, i.e. of two unique sets) or remote from each other (e.g. when the mechanical action is exerted on ₁ two distant, non-contiguous zones).

Both input and output ports 4A, 4B of each security device M_j are connected by an electric connection cable 13 which, if such ports 4A and 4B consist of RJ45 connectors, may be a standard electric cable having male RJ45 connectors at its ends.

Thus, the various security devices M_j of each unique set SBS; are cascaded, and no error is possible during wire, which may occur at the factory or- on site.

Any peripheral security device M_j in a given unique set SBSi, i.e. with the electric communication port 4B not communicating with another port is terminated by the network terminator 14.

Due to the presence of the visual identification means 6, no special prearrangement has to be made, as the data output port 4A of each security device M_j is uniquely determined, whether such port is a peripheral analyzer AP or a simple device having the MEMS sensor only.

It shall be noted that, if a unique set comprises, for instance, five security devices M_j=lj..,5 arranged as exemplified by the set SBSi₌₃ of Figure 3, then:

- the first electric communication port 4 A of the security device M_j=i is configured to - output the electric signal V_ei generated by its MEMS sensor, whereas its port is tenninated by the terminator 14;

- the first electric communication port 4A of the security device M_j=2i4 is configured to output the electric signal V_ej generated by its MEMS sensor whereas the electric signal

Vei of the MEMS of the previous security device, i.e. Mj₌₁ for the device M_j=₂, Mj₌₅ for the device M_j= respectively, is received through the second electric communication port 4B of the security device M_j=_2j4;

- the first electric communication port 4A of the security device M_j=₃, i.e. the one with the microcontroller AP, is configured to output the electric signal Sail according to the processing conducted by the microcontroller 7 on the electric signals V_ei of the previous security devices M_j=i and M_j=₂ and M_j=5 and M_j=-4, and received through the second electric communication port 4B of the security device M_j=3.

The same applies to the other security devices.

Particularly, if the visual identification means 6 are in the form of an arrow, the arrow on the support of each security device M_j needs simply be oriented along an axis, e.g. the x axis of a system of Cartesian axes.

Iii other words, the arrow designates the axis and direction towards which the communication port 4A of each security device M_j should be turned in its unique set SBS, according to its position relative to the security device M_j, which acts as a peripheral analyzer AP, i.e. relative to the peripheral analyzer AP that acts as a center of the origin of the reference system for the particular unique set SBSj.

For peripheral analyzers AP, the arrow designates the direction towards which the communication port 4A should be turned according to its position relative to the central analyzer AC, which in turn acts as the center of the reference system for the various unique sets SBSi.

In other words, in a unique set SBSj, once the (barycentric or peripheral) position of the peripheral analyzer AP has been determined, the other security devices M_j of such unique set SBSj will have the visual identification means 6 with the same and/or different orientation as the axis (e.g. the x axis) of the reference system, according to their position relative to the position of the peripheral analyzer AP, and the latter according to its position relative to the central analyzer AC.

For example, also referring to the particular example of Figure 3, it shall be noted that the unique set SBSi₌₁ comprises a security device M_j=2 with the microcontroller AP and two devices M_j=_{1; j}=₃ without such microcontroller 7. It may be appreciated that, if the security device M_j=2 with the microcontroller AP is located in a barycentric position (i.e. with the security device M_j=₂ acting as the origin of the reference system) relative to the two devices M_{j=1, j}=₃ without such microcontroller 7, then the visual identification means 6 for identifying the output port 4A of both devices Mj_{=1> j}=₃ will have in one case the same direction (M_j=i) and in the other a different direction (M_j=₃) with respect to the x axis of the Cartesian system as shown in such Figure 3.

The same applies to the other unique sets SBSj shown.

Furthermore, the security device M_j=₂ (i.e. the peripheral analyzer of the unique set

SBSj₌₁) has the visual identification means 6 directed in the same direction as the axis (e.g. the x axis), because the center of the reference system of the unique sets SBSj is the central analyzer AC.

Each sensor is automatically addressed upon startup of the system 12, when the position of each sensor M_j is sequentially detected based on the supply voltage as measured in each of them.

Since the field sensors M_j and particularly the peripheral analyzers AP are powered, via the connection cable 13 that interconnects them, by the central analyzer AC, the farther they are from their AC, the lower the voltage supplied to them due to the increasing voltage drop occurring as the supply line is extended. This allows the central analyzer AC to distinguish the various peripheral analyzers AP, upon startup, and to assign them different addresses, that will be used from then on in the communication between the AC and all the APs connected thereto.

On the other hand, the address of each transducer Mj relative to its AP is uniquely determined by the arrow and by its relative position, as wiring automatically scales the position of the signal-carrying conductors. Thus, the first signal input of an AP with a right-directed arrow is the third to the left, the second input is the one of the second sensor to the left, the third input is the one of the first sensor to the left, the fourth is the one of the sensor in the AP itself, the fifth is the one of the first sensor to the right, the sixth is the one of the second sensor to the right, the seventh is the one of the tfiird sensor to the right.

Those skilled in the art will obviously appreciate that a number of variants may be envisaged to the above device, still within the scope of the invention, as defined in the following claims.

Claims

1. A monitoring device (M_j) for monitoring an intrusion detection barrier (3), comprising:

- a transducer (2) for' sensing physical quantities induced on said security barrier to generate a first electric signal (V_ei),

- electric communication means (4A, 4B) configured to output said first electric signal

- a support (5), configured to support said transducer (2) and said electric communication means (4A, 4B),

characterized in that said electric communication means (4A, 4B) comprise a first electric commumcation port (4A) and a second electric communication port (4B), the latter being configured to receive a second electric signal and said first electric communication port being configured to output at least said first electric signal and to comprise visual identification means (6) associated with said support (5) for uniquely identifying said first electric communication port (4A).

2. A monitoring device as claimed in claim 1, wherein said visual identification means (6) are unremovably associated with said support (5).

3. A monitoring device as claimed in claim 1 or 2, wherein said visual identification means (6) are located in the proximity of said first electric communication port (4 A).

4. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein said visual identification means (6) are impressed in said support (5).

5. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein said support (5) comprises a first side (5 A) and a second side (5B), said transducer (2) and said first and second electric communication ports (4A, 4B) being located at said first side (5 A) and said visual identification means (6) being located at said second side (5B).

6. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein said visual identification means (6) include an icon that shows the axis and direction of the electric connection.

7. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein said first and/or said second electric communication ports (4A, 4B) are in signal communication with said transducer (2).

8. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claims, comprising processing means (12A) with fuzzy or Boolean logic-based firmware for processing said at least one first and second electric signals.

9. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein each of said first port and/or said second port (4A, 4B) comprises a standard female RJ45 connector.

10. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claims, which comprises a housing (8) comprising a bottom (8A), said support (5) being laid on said bottom (8A), and a retainer plate (9) associated with said bottom (8 A) via fastener means (10), said intrusion detection barrier (3) being designed to be interposed between said bottom (8A) and said retainer plate (9).

11. A monitoring device as claimed in any preceding claim, wherein said transducer (2) comprises a uniaxial, biaxial or triaxial MEMS sensor.

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