WO2013072437A1 - Key protected nfc tag method and system, and a method for diversify coupon on a viral distribution chain by nfc - Google Patents

Key protected nfc tag method and system, and a method for diversify coupon on a viral distribution chain by nfc Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2013072437A1
WO2013072437A1 PCT/EP2012/072786 EP2012072786W WO2013072437A1 WO 2013072437 A1 WO2013072437 A1 WO 2013072437A1 EP 2012072786 W EP2012072786 W EP 2012072786W WO 2013072437 A1 WO2013072437 A1 WO 2013072437A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
coupon
tag
nfc
diversify
chain
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2012/072786
Other languages
French (fr)
Inventor
Lionel Brahami
Nicolas BERBIGIER
Original Assignee
Famoco
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
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Publication of WO2013072437A1 publication Critical patent/WO2013072437A1/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0492—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload by using a location-limited connection, e.g. near-field communication or limited proximity of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • NFC (Near Field Communication) Tag reader (reader mode) is an important feature of the NFC eco-system. Nevertheless NFC Tags payload is most of the time in plain clear data, with no mean of protection.
  • NFC Tags are subject to attack by just replacing the Tag content, or by sticking another tag with a "fake" content on top of the regular tag. NFC Reader Device has no way to identify if the tag content is valid or not.
  • This invention proposes a solution to issue Tags with authenticated tag's payload, and to let NFC Reader Device enforces security and make sure that Tag content is genuine.
  • the object of the invention is a key protected NFC tag method, wherein a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a RFID tag, and a data format is created and modified to enable the authentication.
  • the current standard for RFID is not able to provide such an authentication.
  • a sign/encrypt tag payload using regular cryptography techniques is implemented.
  • NFC Reader Device shares/stores Keys used to authenticate the Tag's payload.
  • a subsequent problem is that new Tag can surely be issued after the NFC Reader Device issuance, and that tag issuer wants to use their owns keys to protect their tag content.
  • the invention also proposes to let Reader Device synchronize they Key Store with a Key Server. That way new Service Provider is able to issue new Tag with authenticated content, secured with their owns keys, even after Reader Device issuance.
  • NFC Reader Device is an electronic device with at least the following capabilities: NFC Reader mode capability, an Internet connection, and an optional secure storage to store Cryptographic Keys and perform Cryptographic algorithm.
  • NFC Reader Device is named : Reader.
  • Tag we mean data content store in the Tag.
  • the invention aims to enable viral spreading of e-coupon with no Internet connection, while still controlling how many coupons can be spread on the field.
  • the invention also insures that Coupons are tempered protected and that a back end server can authenticate the chain of distribution of Coupon (who gives Coupon to whom).
  • the object of the invention is a method to diversify Coupon on a viral distribution chain by NFC, wherein a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a Coupon.
  • a data format is created to enable the authentication certification and signing by using a signing / authentication protocol to track and certify full coupon transfer chain, and a secure/ authenticated coupon vault is created within the smart card.
  • the invention provides a solution to face different problem :
  • Coupons are stored into Coupon Container Device, which are short range communication device. Two Coupon Container Devices can communicate together (i.e. exchange information) when they are both located within a proximity area which size could vary from few meter to few centimeter.
  • Coupon Container Device A selects on the Device the coupon to "give” to another user's Coupon Container Device B. Then the 2 users move/locate their 2 devices close to each other and Device A "gives” a copy of the Coupon to Device B.
  • FIG. 1 a functional diagram.
  • Figure 3 a Coupon Container Device.
  • Figure 4 a Coupon comprising a Coupon Properties, Tracking History(ies) and a Coupon Signature.
  • Figure 5 distribution of a Coupon from one Coupon Device to another.
  • Figures 6 and 7 the generation of a Transaction History and creation of a Coupon signature.
  • Figure 8 the redeem operation of a coupon and the Tracking History chain process.
  • Each Service Provider SP 1 (SP1, SP2,7) who wants to issue Tags 2 is connected to a central server 4, where they have to register as a "Tag Issuer". On per registration, each SP 1 is given Keys and Identification data that is used to authenticate Tags the SP will issue. That connection can preferably be used only once (at registration time), and can be protected by SSL or other mean in order to protect keys transfer between Server and SP.
  • SP uses Authentication Data and Keys to protect (encrypt and authenticate) Tag data content.
  • Reading NFC Device 5 When reading a Tag, Reading NFC Device 5 reads Tag data content 3 and determines from Tag data who is the issuer. If the NFC Device already has the SP's Keys and authentication data, we skip step 4 (server) and go to step 5 (NFC device).
  • the Reader Device When reading a Tag for the first time, the Reader Device downloads the SP's Key and authentication data, and go to step 5.
  • NFC Device enforces Tag data authentication, and process Tag data.
  • SP When issuing Tags, SP generates an authenticated Tag content, that contains Tag data (like URL, Text, Phone number, etc, authentication data and cryptogram.
  • Tag content is made of a Tag Header and Tag Data.
  • the Tag Header contains information that lets the Reader understand how the Tag content is protected.
  • Table 2 indicates if MAC is present and if data is encrypted.
  • Security Level byte is encoded as followed :
  • X X X 1 MAC is present with algo type defined in byte 1 to 3
  • Table 3 indicates the Key configuration :
  • the key value is coded in plain text with a length of 16 bytes. Reader will use this key to verify the "MAC" and/or encrypt Data.
  • Issuer ID is store on 2 bytes and used to identify the Key used to protect this tag. If the Key value is present in the Tag Header, then Key Issuer ID add an extra level of diversification in the calculation of the "MAC"/Encrypted data.
  • the MSB 4 bits of byte 1 of this field indicate the length of the Key Diversification Element. If the value of this byte is 0, then there is no Diversification Element.
  • MAC is a 8 byte “MAC” calculated from Data & Tag issuer's Key according to “MAC” algorithm coded by Security Level byte.
  • Data is Tag's payload data.
  • Data length is total Tag's payload length minus Tag's header length.
  • Data can be plain text or encrypted using Tag issuer's key and according to encryption algorithm coded by Security Level byte.
  • Each RFID tag will be labeled A, B, C or D or 1, 2, 3 and 4. Such sets are stick on each university desk or given to people in the crowd. All set are identical, but each tag within a set is identified by a unique ID number written into the memory of the RFID chip. Such chip is a read only chip;
  • Mobile NFC device 22 which is made of at least RFID Tag reading capability, internet connection (either by wifi or GSM), and a LCD display.
  • Each Mobile NFC Device is identified by a unique serial number. Such number is used to identify the device on each Internet communication;
  • the QCM issuing server 23 that host the list of QCM, and through Internet connection send each to them to each device and receive the answer.
  • the QCM Server received all answers.
  • FIG. 3 describes a Coupon Container Device 101 with a Memory 102, a CPU 103, a separated Crypto Calculator 104 that could be a SIM Card or a SE and a short range connectivity interface such as NFC, Bluetooth, zigbee, IR, ...108.
  • the memory 102 contains 0 or more coupons illustrated in Figure 3 with coupon # 1 106 and coupon #2 107, and Container Properties 105.
  • the Container Properties 105 contains amount other related application information, the device ID that identified uniquely a device amount a fleet of devices.
  • Figure 4 describes a Coupon 201 made of:
  • Coupon Properties main function is to uniquely identify a coupon and control the spreading of the coupon. It can also be used to store redeem information, such as value, discount, expiration date, validity date, etc.
  • Coupon Properties has 2 parameters Largeness Count 206 and Deepness Count 207 to control the number of Coupons that will be spread on the field.
  • Largeness Count 206 defines how many times the same coupon can be distributed (duplicated) by the same user to other unique user (same coupon can't be given twice to the same user).
  • Deepness Count 207 defines how long is the chain of user who will distribute/duplicate the same coupon.
  • Figure 5 describes how a coupon is distributed from one Coupon Container Device to another.
  • Coupon Container 301 is the coupon distribution source
  • Coupon Container 310 is the coupon distribution recipient.
  • Coupon Container 301 and 310 enter the proximity zone 308 and that Coupon 302 is selected to be distributed a new Coupon 311 is created into Coupon Container Device 310's memory.
  • Coupon Properties 312 is created from Coupon Properties 303 and adjusted according to propagation rules defined by the coupon. For example the deepness can be decreased and if reach 0 then the coupon can no longer be distributed to anyone;
  • Coupon Signature 314 is created to protect coupon 311 against tempering. Such crypto calculation is performed by Crypto Calculator 311 of Coupon Container 310.
  • Figures 6 and 7 show how a Transaction History is generated and how Coupon Signature is calculated.
  • Transaction History is used to track Coupon distribution from one Coupon Container Device to another.
  • a Transaction History 404 is generated by the issuing device (Coupon Container Device 301 from Fig 3) and is made of Tracking Data 401 and a Signature 405 created by a Crypto Algorithm 403 that takes in input Tracking Data 401and Device's Secret Key 402.
  • Tracking Data 401 is made with the following data :
  • Coupon ID which identify uniquely a Coupon within the backend server running a coupon generation system. This information can be found into the Coupon Properties 202;
  • Coupon Signature 205 is used to protect Coupon information (Coupon Properties 202, Tracking History # 1 ... #n 203 & 204) against modification
  • a Coupon Signature 409 is generated by the receiving Coupon Container Device's Crypto Calculator 406. As more detailed in Figure 7, a Coupon Signature 409 is created by signature algorithm 410 that takes in input:
  • Figure 8 illustrates the redeem operation of a coupon and how the Tracking History chain is processed.
  • the Redeem Device 504 read the coupon information 502 and connect to backend Server 505 to process the operation. Redeem process operation can be done on the back end server or on the Redeem Device 505.
  • Redeem process is as following :
  • Coupon Signature 507 to insure security and check if coupon has not been tempered
  • Redeem Device checks each Tracking History # 1 to #n (508 to 509), to analyze the propagation chain of the coupon. For each Tracking History Redeem Device check the signature to insure that no fake device are in the chain;

Abstract

Authenticating near field communication (NFC) by signing the payload of a message using a chain of keys and creating a data format for enabling authentication. Authentication is enabled by embedding in the message a certificate chain associated with the chain of keys used to sign the message. A particular embodiment relates to viral distribution of a coupon using NFC and involves signing the coupon tracking history at each stage of the distribution so that a recipient can verify the transfer chain of the coupon.

Description

KEY PROTECTED NFC TAG METHOD AND SYSTEM, AND A METHOD FOR DIVERSIFY COUPON ON A VIRAL DISTRIBUTION CHAIN BY NFC
Description
Technical field and background
NFC (Near Field Communication) Tag reader (reader mode) is an important feature of the NFC eco-system. Nevertheless NFC Tags payload is most of the time in plain clear data, with no mean of protection.
Therefore NFC Tags are subject to attack by just replacing the Tag content, or by sticking another tag with a "fake" content on top of the regular tag. NFC Reader Device has no way to identify if the tag content is valid or not.
Summary of the invention
This invention proposes a solution to issue Tags with authenticated tag's payload, and to let NFC Reader Device enforces security and make sure that Tag content is genuine.
More specifically, the object of the invention is a key protected NFC tag method, wherein a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a RFID tag, and a data format is created and modified to enable the authentication.
The current standard for RFID is not able to provide such an authentication. To protect Tag payload, a sign/encrypt tag payload using regular cryptography techniques is implemented. NFC Reader Device shares/stores Keys used to authenticate the Tag's payload.
A subsequent problem is that new Tag can surely be issued after the NFC Reader Device issuance, and that tag issuer wants to use their owns keys to protect their tag content.
So, the invention also proposes to let Reader Device synchronize they Key Store with a Key Server. That way new Service Provider is able to issue new Tag with authenticated content, secured with their owns keys, even after Reader Device issuance.
In that invention we assume that NFC Reader Device is an electronic device with at least the following capabilities: NFC Reader mode capability, an Internet connection, and an optional secure storage to store Cryptographic Keys and perform Cryptographic algorithm.
Later on in this document the NFC Reader Device is named : Reader. By Tag we mean data content store in the Tag.
According to anther aspect, the invention aims to enable viral spreading of e-coupon with no Internet connection, while still controlling how many coupons can be spread on the field.
The invention also insures that Coupons are tempered protected and that a back end server can authenticate the chain of distribution of Coupon (who gives Coupon to whom).
More specifically, the object of the invention is a method to diversify Coupon on a viral distribution chain by NFC, wherein a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a Coupon. A data format is created to enable the authentication certification and signing by using a signing / authentication protocol to track and certify full coupon transfer chain, and a secure/ authenticated coupon vault is created within the smart card.
The invention provides a solution to face different problem :
- How to uniquely identify the newly created Coupon in Device
B;
- How to synchronize the newly created Coupon with a backend server when no Internet connection is available;
- How to control the distribution and limit the spread of Coupon (control how many coupons can be spread on the field); and/or
- How to authenticate the chain of distribution and make sure no fake coupon and/or Coupon Container Device are part of the chain.
Coupons are stored into Coupon Container Device, which are short range communication device. Two Coupon Container Devices can communicate together (i.e. exchange information) when they are both located within a proximity area which size could vary from few meter to few centimeter.
The user of a Coupon Container Device A selects on the Device the coupon to "give" to another user's Coupon Container Device B. Then the 2 users move/locate their 2 devices close to each other and Device A "gives" a copy of the Coupon to Device B.
Brief description of drawings
The overall scheme of Tag issuing can be seen on figure 1. Figure 2: a functional diagram. Figure 3: a Coupon Container Device.
Figure 4: a Coupon comprising a Coupon Properties, Tracking History(ies) and a Coupon Signature. Figure 5: distribution of a Coupon from one Coupon Device to another.
Figures 6 and 7: the generation of a Transaction History and creation of a Coupon signature.
Figure 8: the redeem operation of a coupon and the Tracking History chain process.
Preferred Embodiments of the invention
The overall scheme of Tag issuing system can be seen on figure 1.
Each Service Provider SP 1 (SP1, SP2,...) who wants to issue Tags 2 is connected to a central server 4, where they have to register as a "Tag Issuer". On per registration, each SP 1 is given Keys and Identification data that is used to authenticate Tags the SP will issue. That connection can preferably be used only once (at registration time), and can be protected by SSL or other mean in order to protect keys transfer between Server and SP.
When issuing Tags, SP uses Authentication Data and Keys to protect (encrypt and authenticate) Tag data content.
When reading a Tag, Reading NFC Device 5 reads Tag data content 3 and determines from Tag data who is the issuer. If the NFC Device already has the SP's Keys and authentication data, we skip step 4 (server) and go to step 5 (NFC device).
When reading a Tag for the first time, the Reader Device downloads the SP's Key and authentication data, and go to step 5.
NFC Device enforces Tag data authentication, and process Tag data. When issuing Tags, SP generates an authenticated Tag content, that contains Tag data (like URL, Text, Phone number,...), authentication data and cryptogram.
Tag content is made of a Tag Header and Tag Data. The Tag Header contains information that lets the Reader understand how the Tag content is protected.
Tag Header has the following format (Table 1) :
Figure imgf000006_0001
Table 1
Table 2 indicates if MAC is present and if data is encrypted. Security Level byte is encoded as followed :
B7 B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 Bl BO
X X X 0 X X X 0 No security. Data start on byte 2
0 0 0 1 MAC is present with default algo type
X X X 1 MAC is present with algo type defined in byte 1 to 3
0 0 0 1 Data is encrypted with default algo type
X X X 1 Data is encrypted with with algo type defined in byte 1 to 3 Table 2
Table 3 indicates the Key configuration :
Figure imgf000007_0001
Table 3
The key value is coded in plain text with a length of 16 bytes. Reader will use this key to verify the "MAC" and/or encrypt Data.
Issuer ID is store on 2 bytes and used to identify the Key used to protect this tag. If the Key value is present in the Tag Header, then Key Issuer ID add an extra level of diversification in the calculation of the "MAC"/Encrypted data.
The MSB 4 bits of byte 1 of this field indicate the length of the Key Diversification Element. If the value of this byte is 0, then there is no Diversification Element.
Diversification Element is store in plain text, with a max length of 16 bytes.
"MAC" is a 8 byte "MAC" calculated from Data & Tag issuer's Key according to "MAC" algorithm coded by Security Level byte.
Data is Tag's payload data. Data length is total Tag's payload length minus Tag's header length. Data can be plain text or encrypted using Tag issuer's key and according to encryption algorithm coded by Security Level byte.
Considering the NFC based QCM session, the system represented in the diagram of figure 2 has the following components:
- set of RFID Tags (Tag Set) 21. Each RFID tag will be labeled A, B, C or D or 1, 2, 3 and 4. Such sets are stick on each university desk or given to people in the crowd. All set are identical, but each tag within a set is identified by a unique ID number written into the memory of the RFID chip. Such chip is a read only chip;
- a Mobile NFC device 22 which is made of at least RFID Tag reading capability, internet connection (either by wifi or GSM), and a LCD display. Each Mobile NFC Device is identified by a unique serial number. Such number is used to identify the device on each Internet communication;
- the QCM issuing server 23 that host the list of QCM, and through Internet connection send each to them to each device and receive the answer.
The QCM Server received all answers.
Figure 3 describes a Coupon Container Device 101 with a Memory 102, a CPU 103, a separated Crypto Calculator 104 that could be a SIM Card or a SE and a short range connectivity interface such as NFC, Bluetooth, zigbee, IR, ...108.
The memory 102 contains 0 or more coupons illustrated in Figure 3 with coupon # 1 106 and coupon #2 107, and Container Properties 105.
The Container Properties 105 contains amount other related application information, the device ID that identified uniquely a device amount a fleet of devices. Figure 4 describes a Coupon 201 made of:
- a Coupon Properties 202,
- 0 or more Tracking History illustrated in Fig 2 with Tracking History # 1 203 and Tracking History #n 204,
- a Crypto Signature 205 used to protect the coupon again authorized modification.
Coupon Properties main function is to uniquely identify a coupon and control the spreading of the coupon. It can also be used to store redeem information, such as value, discount, expiration date, validity date, etc.
Coupon Properties has 2 parameters Largeness Count 206 and Deepness Count 207 to control the number of Coupons that will be spread on the field.
Largeness Count 206 defines how many times the same coupon can be distributed (duplicated) by the same user to other unique user (same coupon can't be given twice to the same user).
Deepness Count 207 defines how long is the chain of user who will distribute/duplicate the same coupon.
Figure 5 describes how a coupon is distributed from one Coupon Container Device to another.
Coupon Container 301 is the coupon distribution source, Coupon Container 310 is the coupon distribution recipient. When 301 and 310 enter the proximity zone 308 and that Coupon 302 is selected to be distributed a new Coupon 311 is created into Coupon Container Device 310's memory.
At Coupon 311 creation time, the following operations are done: - Coupon Properties 312 is created from Coupon Properties 303 and adjusted according to propagation rules defined by the coupon. For example the deepness can be decreased and if reach 0 then the coupon can no longer be distributed to anyone;
- tracking History 304 is duplicated into Tracking History 313;
- tracking History 314 is created by the Crypto Calculator 307 of Coupon Container 301, transmitted to Coupon Container 310. Figures 8 and 9 describe how Tracking History 314 is created;
- a new Coupon Signature 314 is created to protect coupon 311 against tempering. Such crypto calculation is performed by Crypto Calculator 311 of Coupon Container 310.
Figures 6 and 7 show how a Transaction History is generated and how Coupon Signature is calculated.
Transaction History is used to track Coupon distribution from one Coupon Container Device to another. A Transaction History 404 is generated by the issuing device (Coupon Container Device 301 from Fig 3) and is made of Tracking Data 401 and a Signature 405 created by a Crypto Algorithm 403 that takes in input Tracking Data 401and Device's Secret Key 402.
In order to resist Tamper attack and ensure confidentiality of the Secret Key and of the processing of the algorithm, signature processing of the Crypto Algorithm 403 and the Device's Secret Key 402 injection into the algorithm are made within the Crypto Calculator 406.
Tracking Data 401 is made with the following data :
- Coupon ID, which identify uniquely a Coupon within the backend server running a coupon generation system. This information can be found into the Coupon Properties 202;
- date and time of the new coupon creation/distribution; - device ID of the Coupon Container Device used as the coupon distribution source. This information can be found into the Device Properties 105;
- any other data used to qualify and characterize the coupon type and the coupon distribution source.
Coupon Signature 205 is used to protect Coupon information (Coupon Properties 202, Tracking History # 1 ... #n 203 & 204) against modification
A Coupon Signature 409 is generated by the receiving Coupon Container Device's Crypto Calculator 406. As more detailed in Figure 7, a Coupon Signature 409 is created by signature algorithm 410 that takes in input:
- a concatenated form of Coupon Properties 407 with the list of Tracking History # 1 to Tracking History #n 408;
- the Coupon Container Device's Secret Key 408.
In order to resist tamper attack and ensure confidentiality of the Secret Key and of the processing of the algorithm, signature processing of the Crypto algorithm 410 and the Device's Secret Key 402 injection into the algorithm are made within the Crypto Calculator 406.
Figure 8 illustrates the redeem operation of a coupon and how the Tracking History chain is processed.
User performs a redeem action from the Coupon Container Device 501 of the selected Coupon 502 when the device enters the Proximity area 506. Using short range communication technologies (such as NFC, Bluetooth, zigbee, ...), the Redeem Device 504 read the coupon information 502 and connect to backend Server 505 to process the operation. Redeem process operation can be done on the back end server or on the Redeem Device 505.
Redeem process is as following :
- redeem Device reads Coupon Properties 503 to identify the Coupon being redeemed;
- redeem Device checks Coupon Signature 507 to insure security and check if coupon has not been tempered;
- then Redeem Device checks each Tracking History # 1 to #n (508 to 509), to analyze the propagation chain of the coupon. For each Tracking History Redeem Device check the signature to insure that no fake device are in the chain;
- information is then consolidated on the Backend Server 505.

Claims

Claims
1. Key protected NFC tag method, characterized in that a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a RFID tag, and a data format is created and modified to enable the authentication.
2. Key protected NFC tag method according to claim 1, wherein, to protect Tag payload, a sign/encrypt tag payload using regular cryptography techniques is implemented and a NFC Reader Device shares/stores Keys is used to authenticate the Tag's payload.
3. Key protected NFC tag method according to claim 2, wherein the Reader Device synchronizes they Key Store with a Key
Server to issue new Tag with authenticated content and secured with their owns keys.
4. Key protected NFC tag method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the NFC Reader is able to have the capabilities of a mode capability, an Internet connection, and an optional secure storage to store Cryptographic Keys and perform Cryptographic algorithm.
5. Key protected NFC tag system to implement the method according to any preceding claim, wherein each Service Provider (SP) who wants to issue Tags is connected to a central server, where they register as a "Tag Issuer" and on per registration, each SP is given Keys and Identification data that is used to authenticate Tags the SP will issue.
6. Method to diversify Coupon on a viral distribution chain by NFC, characterized in that a chain of keys is set up and certificate authority is delegated to authenticate content of a Coupon, a data format is created to enable the authentication certification and sign by using a signing / authentication protocol to track and certify full coupon transfer chain, and a secure/ authenticated coupon vault is created within the smart card.
7. Method to diversify Coupon according to claim 6, wherein Coupons are stored into a Coupon Container Device, which are short range communication device, two Coupon Container Devices being able to communicate together when they are both located within a proximity area which size vary from few meter to few centimeter.
8. Method to diversify Coupon according to the preceding claim, wherein the Coupon Container Device (101) has a Memory (102) containing 0 or more coupons (106, 107), a CPU (103), a separated Crypto Calculator (104), a SIM Card or a Secure Element, a short range connectivity interface (108) and a Container Properties (105) that contains amount other related application information.
9. Method to diversify Coupon according to any of claim
6 to 8, wherein a Coupon (201) is made of a Coupon Properties (202), 0 or more Tracking History (203, 204), and a Crypto Signature (205) used to protect the coupon again authorized modification.
10. Method to diversify Coupon according any of to claim
7 to 9, wherein a coupon is distributed from one Coupon Container Device to another, a Coupon Container (301) being the coupon distribution source that is the coupon distribution recipient and wherein, when Coupon Containers (301, 310) enter the proximity zone (308) and that Coupon (302) is selected to be distributed, a new Coupon (311) is created into Coupon Container Device (310) memory.
11. Method to diversify Coupon according any of to claim 7 to 10, wherein a Transaction History (404) is used to track Coupon distribution from one Coupon Container Device to another, the Transaction History (404) being generated by the issuing Coupon Container Device (301) and is made of Tracking Data 401, and a Signature (405) is created by a Crypto Algorithm (403) that takes in input Tracking Data (401) and Device's Secret Key (402).
12. Method to diversify Coupon according to the preceding claim, wherein a Redeem process is implemented as following : redeem Device reads Coupon Properties (503) to identify the Coupon being redeemed; redeem Device checks Coupon Signature (507) to insure security and check if coupon has not been tempered; then Redeem Device checks each Tracking History (508 to 509), to analyze the propagation chain of the coupon and, for each Tracking History Redeem Device, checks the signature to insure that no fake device are in the chain, information being then consolidated on the Backend Server (505).
PCT/EP2012/072786 2011-11-18 2012-11-15 Key protected nfc tag method and system, and a method for diversify coupon on a viral distribution chain by nfc WO2013072437A1 (en)

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