Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
  • H04L9/0866—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving user or device identifiers, e.g. serial number, physical or biometrical information, DNA, hand-signature or measurable physical characteristics
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
  • G06F21/31—User authentication
  • G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
  • G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
  • G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
  • G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
  • G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
  • G07C9/37—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
  • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
  • H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
  • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions

Definitions

• the present invention relates to enrollment and biometric verification.
• Biometric verification traditionally refers to the authentication or identification of individuals, humans or animals, from biometric data, relating to characteristics of one or more biological attributes of these individuals, such as the minutiae of fingerprints, a general shape of the fingers of the hand, the veins of a hand or a finger, characteristics of the voice, characteristics of the iris of the eye, etc.
• Such a biometric verification conventionally uses a database storing biometric data relating to individuals having previously undergone a registration phase called “enrollment” to be issued, during a biometric verification, any right whatsoever (issue of a driving license, a ticket, compensation, authorization to access a room, etc.).
• FIG. 1 A very simple example of biometric verification is illustrated in FIG. 1, which distinguishes a database 1 storing a set of biometric data b-i, b2,. . . , bN relating to enlisted individuals.
• biometric data b-i, b2, ... , b are, for example, images representing a particular biological attribute of respective individuals (for example fingerprint images, iris, etc.), characteristics relating to a biological attribute (for example a type, a position and an orientation of minutiae in the case of fingerprints), or other.
• a digital representation of the biometric data can be used, so as to simplify the manipulation thereof and to make these data integrable in a cryptographic algorithm.
• the biometric data bi, b 2 ,..., BN stored in the database 1 may each consist of a digital vector, for example a binary vector.
• a digital vector for example a binary vector.
• Many ways to get a vector digital data from biometric information are known.
• biometric verification happens in the following manner relative to a given individual.
• a biometric datum b ' is obtained, for example in its representation in the form of a digital vector, of the individual considered.
• This datum b ' is compared with all or part of the data bi, b2, - .., bN stored in the database 1 (reference 2).
• the biometric database 1 is sometimes linked to an identity database of individuals (for example in alphanumeric form). This is particularly the case, in an authentication scenario, to conclude that an individual is or is not the enlisted individual he claims to be.
• a unambiguous link i.e. 1 for 1
• biometric data and identity data stored in these databases could allow the owner of these databases to know too easily the correspondence between the two types of data. This can be a problem when the owner is not a trusted person, or when constraints, for example of a legislative nature, prohibit this situation.
• any indelicate person, other than the owner of the databases, who manages to access these databases could use the correspondence between the two types of data to impersonate enrollees.
• the biometric database 3 stores groups of several biometric data relating to different individuals. In the example shown, these groups consist of two elements, although a larger number of elements is quite possible or even recommended.
• the identity database 4 stores groups of several identity data relating to different individuals, in this case two in the example of Figure 2, although a larger number of elements is also quite possible. The number of groups and / or elements per group may possibly differ between the biometric database 3 and the identity database 4.
• the lowercase link I ("I") between the two databases 3 and 4 corresponds to each group of biometric data, for example (bi, b t ), a respective group of identity data, for example (ii, i t ).
• a biometric check is still possible.
• the presence of b' in the biometric database 3 is checked, then finds the group of identity data (i " , ip) corresponding to the group of biometric data to which b 'belongs according to the weak link I.
• a result R can then be deduced from a comparison between i' and the elements of the group ( ⁇ ⁇ , ⁇ ) ⁇ If i 'corresponds to one of the data of identity i «or ⁇ , one can for example conclude that the individual is indeed the one that he claims to be.
• the even weak link between a biometric database and an identity database represents a weak link in protecting the privacy of citizens.
• An object of the present invention is to limit at least part of the disadvantages of the prior art described above.
• the invention thus proposes a method of enrollment for subsequent biometric verification purposes, comprising the following steps relating to an individual:
• alphanumeric data including at least one identifier relating to said individual
• Such enrollment takes advantage of an additional biometric data (the second biometric data) compared to the conventional techniques mentioned above.
• This additional biometric data allows to organize a link between the first biometric data and the alphanumeric data.
• This link is furthermore particularly efficiently protected by the complementary use of an index system and cryptographic decryption encryption mechanism of this index.
• the second biometric datum is a biometric datum without a trace
• the correspondence table initially stores synthetic information of the same type as said first information, each corresponding to an index, and the storage, in the correspondence table, of said first information corresponding to said index comprises the replacement of a synthetic information initially stored in correspondence with said index by said first information; and or - the same mechanism can be implemented by initially filling the first database and / or second database with synthetic data, which complicates the problem and increases the protection of privacy;
• said first information is stored in the correspondence table in association with at least one synthetic information of the same type as said first information;
• said index is used in the correspondence table and in the second database only in relation to the first information and the second information relating to said individual;
• said index is used in the correspondence table and / or in the second database in relation to information relating to several individuals.
• the invention further proposes a system or device (the device being a particular case of a system which groups together all the functions rendered in the same cabin) for the implementation of an enrollment as mentioned above, comprising relatively to an individual:
• a unit for obtaining alphanumeric data including at least one identifier relating to said individual
• a first biometric database for storing the first biometric data, in association with a decryption key
• a correspondence table for storing first information from the second biometric data item and the alphanumeric data item, in correspondence with an index
• a second database for storing second information among the second biometric data and the alphanumeric data obtained, distinct from the first information, in association with a version of said encrypted index with an encryption key corresponding to said decryption key.
• the invention also proposes a biometric identification method using a first biometric database, a second database and a correspondence table filled during an enrollment process such as: mentioned above.
• This biometric identification method includes the following steps relating to an individual:
• the last step above may for example consist in making a possibly exhaustive path of the second database to find a version of said encrypted index with an encryption key corresponding to said decryption key.
• the invention also proposes a biometric authentication method using a first biometric database, a second database and a correspondence table filled during an enrollment process such as: mentioned above.
• This biometric authentication method includes the following steps relating to an individual: - obtain a first biometric data relating to said individual;
• the invention also proposes a system or device (the device being a particular case of a system that groups together all the functions rendered in the same cabin) for the implementation of a biometric identification using a first base.
• This system or device comprises, in relation to an individual:
• a unit for obtaining a first biometric datum relating to said individual a unit for obtaining a first information item from a second biometric data item relating to said individual and an alphanumeric item including at least one identifier relating to said individual;
• the invention also proposes a system or device (the device being a particular case of a system that groups together all the functions rendered in the same cabin) for the implementation of a biometric authentication using a first base. biometric data, a second database and a correspondence table filled in during an enrollment process as mentioned above.
• This system or device comprises, in relation to an individual:
• the invention also proposes a computer program product comprising code instructions for implementing the enrollment method and / or the biometric identification method and / or the biometric authentication method mentioned above, when it is loaded and executed on computer means.
• FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating an example of enrollment according to a nonlimiting embodiment of the invention.
• FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating an example of a biometric verification according to a nonlimiting embodiment of the invention.
• Figure 3 illustrates an example of enrollment according to one aspect of the invention.
• I i
• Figure 3 illustrates an example of enrollment according to one aspect of the invention.
• the first biometric datum 4 is a fingerprint of the individual I, possibly in a digital representation.
• the second biometric data item 5 relates to characteristics of an iris of the individual I, possibly in a digital representation.
• biometric data 4 and 5 could be of any conceivable type (face, general shape of the fingers of the hand, veins of a hand or a finger, characteristics of the voice, etc.).
• the biometric data 4 and 5 are advantageously of different types to each other.
• biometric data may be advantageous for the biometric data to relate to biometrics not used in official documents.
• the means for obtaining the biometric data 4 and 5 are adapted to the nature of these data. It may for example be a fingerprint capture unit for the biometric data 4 and an iris capture unit for the biometric data item 5, possibly supplemented by data processing modules captured for the data. put in an expected format.
• the biometric data 4 and / or 5 could be obtained without new capture, but from existing official documents (paper or electronic), for example a passport which already contains biometric data of the individual I. Others Examples may still be contemplated, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the alphanumeric data has, for its part, an identifier relating to the individual I.
• This identifier can for example include or consist of an identity of the individual I, or other types of information relating to the individual I.
• alphanumeric data may include some or all of the following information about individual I: surname, first name, date of birth, social security number, and / or other. Alternatively or in addition, it may include personal information, financial information, and / or others.
• the format and how to obtain alphanumeric data may be diverse.
• This alphanumeric data can for example result from the concatenation of different alphabetic and / or numerical information relating to the individual I. But it can also come from a more elaborate processing, such as for example the generation of a condensed from different alphabetical and / or numerical information relating to the individual I, eg using a hash function and / or other.
• the means for obtaining alphanumeric data a may be various. They can be fully manual, fully automated, or semi-automated. For example, they may include a consultation of existing official documents (paper or electronic), for example a passport which already contains identity data of individual I. Other examples may still be considered, as will be apparent from skilled person.
• fingerprint 4 iris 5 and identifier a to designate respectively the first biometric data 4, the second biometric data 5 and the alphanumeric data a. This should not be interpreted as limiting the generality of the subject.
• step 7 the imprint 4 obtained is then stored in a biometric database 1 intended to receive the fingerprints (or possibly other types of biometric data) of all the enlisted individuals.
• the fingerprint 4 is stored in association with a decryption key 6, as indicated by the reference 8.
• the decryption key 6 is a cryptographic key of any kind and of any conceivable form. It can be associated with any type of known decryption algorithm. It also corresponds to a key of cryptographic encryption, that is to say it is able to decrypt an encrypted data using the corresponding encryption key. In other words, the two cryptographic keys, encryption and decryption, are linked.
• the decryption key 6 may be the same as the corresponding encryption key (in the case of symmetrical encryption) or different (in the case of asymmetric encryption), as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the decryption key 6 may be generated specifically for the individual I and not used for any other enlisted individual. Alternatively, it could be reused for all or part of the enlisted individuals. The generation of the decryption key 6 may for example be carried out by the owner of the database 1 or other.
• the iris 5 is stored in a correspondence table T, in correspondence with an index j.
• the format and nature of the correspondence table T may be various, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the index j can be stored as a field in the correspondence table T, in the same way as the iris 5, as shown in FIG. 3.
• the index it could be deduced directly, for example from the line number where the iris 5 is stored in the correspondence table T.
• the index j can for example consist of a numerical value, for example a value of natural integer, or take any other form conceivable as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the correspondence table T initially stores synthetic information of the same type as the iris 5.
• This synthetic information 9 is representations of false iris (ie say iris does not correspond to actual individuals enlisted). They are each stored in correspondence with an index k, I, ... This storage can be performed randomly.
• the storage of the iris 5 in the correspondence table T is then done by replacing by this iris 5 one of the synthetic information, in this case one of those which was initially stored in correspondence with index j.
• the real iris 5 can for example randomly replacing any synthetic iris stored in the correspondence table T and thus be assigned the index j corresponding to this synthetic iris.
• a mechanism of the same type can be implemented in relation with the database 1 and / or the database 2.
• one and / or the other of these databases can initially be filled with synthetic data. This makes things difficult for an unscrupulous person and enhances the protection of privacy.
• Synthetic information 9 such as iris 5, could be iris images. But it seems preferable to use coded irises (or "iriscodes”), that is to say digital representations of irises. Indeed, irises coded from synthetic images of iris, for example, seem difficult to differentiate, if not impossible to differentiate, from actual coded irises. Synthetic coded irises thus seem more likely to deceive an indelicate person than images of false irises. This further complicates the task of the indelicate person.
• the correspondence table T can store several pieces of information in correspondence with a given index.
• one or more synthetic irises can be stored in correspondence with the index j, alongside the iris 5 of the individual I, as illustrated in FIG. another optional measure to complicate the task of the indelicate person by adding horizontal noise.
• step 12 the identifier a of the individual I is stored in a second database 2. It is stored there in association with a version J of the index j, encrypted with an encryption key corresponding to the decryption key 6.
• the correspondence table T establishes a link between the fingerprint 4 and the identifier stored in the databases 1 and 2 respectively.
• This link is based on a second biometric data item, namely iris 5 in this example.
• the use of such a second biometric data is particularly simple, since it is information that the individual I always carries on him, without necessarily knowing the detail.
• This link is also based on the use of an index which acts as a pointer between the correspondence table T and the database 2. This index provides additional indirection complicating the decision by an unauthorized person.
• This link is further protected by means of the encryption / decryption mechanism (the index being accessible in clear in the correspondence table T, but only in an encrypted version in the database 2 by means of an encryption key whose corresponding decryption key 6 is stored only in the database 1), which complicates the relationship between the three data 4, 5 and a.
• the index j can only be used in the correspondence table
• the same index j can be used in the correspondence table T and in the database 2 (in its encrypted form J) in relationship with the iris and the identifier of one or more individuals, in addition to the individual I.
• the fingerprint 4, the iris 5 and the identifier a would be stored in the database (biometric) 1, the correspondence table T and the database (alphanumeric) 2 respectively.
• the imprint 4, the identifier a and the iris 5 could be stored in the (biometric) database 1, the correspondence table T and the (biometric) database 2 respectively, according to the same general principles as those described above, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• synthetic information is used in the correspondence table T, as has been envisaged above, then it will be alphanumeric data including dummy identifiers.
• FIG. 4 illustrates an example of a biometric verification taking advantage of the databases 1 and 2 and of the correspondence table T thus indicated.
• biometric verification i.e., identification and / or authentication
• first biometric data 14 a second biometric data item 15 and, optionally, alphanumeric data item a 'relating to this individual P. More generally, any pair among the three data 14, 15 and a 'could be obtained.
• These data are of identical or similar type to the data 4, 5 and mentioned above in relation to the individual I.
• the means to obtain them can also be identical or similar to those described above in the context of the enrollment of the individual I.
• step 17 a decryption key stored in the biometric database 1 is searched in association with a fingerprint corresponding to the fingerprint 14 of the individual ⁇ .
• This search can for example consist of a route of all or part of the fingerprints stored in the biometric database 1, and for each of them, in a comparison with the fingerprint 14.
• This comparison can implement any appropriate method such as a calculation of a Hamming distance, a minutia comparison or the like, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the decryption key 16 stored in association with this fingerprint.
• the decryption key 16 found is normally the same as the decryption key 6 mentioned above.
• step 18 an index is searched in correspondence of which an iris corresponding to the iris 15 of the individual is stored in the correspondence table T.
• This search can for example consist of a course of all or part of the irises stored in the correspondence table T, and for each of them, in a comparison with the iris 15.
• This comparison can implement any appropriate method, such as a calculation of a Hamming distance or the like, as will be apparent to those skilled in the art.
• the index found in step 21 is encrypted with the encryption key obtained and is compared with one or more encrypted indexes of the database 2.
• the indexes and the encryption decryption mechanism could be defined so that the decryption of any of the encrypted indexes, using any of the decryption keys, nevertheless leads to an index value (possibly false ).
• This can for example be achieved by using a decryption algorithm to provide a return value index always within a certain range of values, each index being associated with real or false irises.
• the decryption space of the indexes is covered by the table of correspondence T, ie all the possible decryptions which will give an index must be found in the correspondence table T in order to associate an iris (synthetic or not).
• an El Gamal encryption algorithm that corresponds to the need for confidentiality of the encrypted indexes, since the encryption is then probabilistic (two ciphers of the same index give two distinct values). This restricts the search to a single meaning: the decrypted index must be deciphered to make the link with the index in the correspondence table T.
• the decryption procedure can be defined as the classical El Gamal decryption, but with a reduction of the result modulo the size of the table T.
• the index I decrypted using the decryption key 16 (identical to the decryption key 6) must be of the same value as the index I found in step 21.
• the comparison 22 between these two index values thus reveals a concordance. The identification of the individual ⁇ as an enlisted individual is thus carried out successfully.
• the identifier stored in association with the encrypted J version of can also be found.
• This identifier has found may possibly be compared to the identifier ⁇ ', when the latter has been obtained for the purpose of biometric verification. We are then in an authentication case.
• it can be performed beforehand, for example to find the index J stored in association with a, and then compare only this index to that found in step 21 (to an encryption or decryption), this which avoids to have to browse a large number of indexes of the database 2.
• the biometric verification can be carried out by obtaining the print 14 of the document. 'individual ⁇ and its identifier ⁇ ', by deducing a decryption key 16 and an index from the database 1 and the correspondence table T, then by finding, in the database 2, a stored iris in association with a version of said encrypted index with an encryption key corresponding to said decryption key. This iris can possibly be compared to an iris 15 of the individual to bring a conclusion to the biometric verification.
• the enrollment as described above may be performed using a system or device comprising appropriate units for this purpose.
• the same is true of biometric verification.
• the systems or devices used for enrollment and biometric verification may be the same or, on the possibly some similar parts, even common.
• These systems or devices may for example each comprise an electronic and / or computer device comprising a data processing module, possibly associated with a biometric capture terminal.
• All or part of the enrollment and / or biometric verification operations mentioned above can be implemented using a computer program including appropriate instructions, when loaded and executed on computer means.

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• 2011
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