WO2012141556A2 - Machine-to-machine node erase procedure - Google Patents

Machine-to-machine node erase procedure Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012141556A2
WO2012141556A2 PCT/KR2012/002876 KR2012002876W WO2012141556A2 WO 2012141556 A2 WO2012141556 A2 WO 2012141556A2 KR 2012002876 W KR2012002876 W KR 2012002876W WO 2012141556 A2 WO2012141556 A2 WO 2012141556A2
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
erase
gateway
token
hash
node
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Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
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PCT/KR2012/002876
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English (en)
French (fr)
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WO2012141556A3 (en
Inventor
Alper Yegin
Young Kyo Baek
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
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Publication date
Application filed by Samsung Electronics Co Ltd filed Critical Samsung Electronics Co Ltd
Priority to JP2014505088A priority Critical patent/JP6370215B2/ja
Priority to EP12771806.2A priority patent/EP2697916A4/en
Priority to KR1020137030300A priority patent/KR101981229B1/ko
Priority to EP19171979.8A priority patent/EP3537741B1/en
Priority to CN201280029216.XA priority patent/CN103703698B/zh
Publication of WO2012141556A2 publication Critical patent/WO2012141556A2/en
Publication of WO2012141556A3 publication Critical patent/WO2012141556A3/en
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0807—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using tickets, e.g. Kerberos
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
    • H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/50—Service provisioning or reconfiguring
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143—Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
    • G06F9/4401—Bootstrapping
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/061—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying further key derivation, e.g. deriving traffic keys from a pair-wise master key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Bootstrap Procedure. More particularly, the present invention relates to an M2M Bootstrap Procedure that authenticates an M2M Device/Gateway with an M2M Service Provider, and allows the M2M Device/Gateway to download service parameters that are needed for utilizing the M2M service, such as a long-term M2M Service Root key (Kmr), IP address of network servers (e.g., M2M Network Node, device management server, etc.), etc.
  • M2M Machine-to-Machine
  • FIG. 1 depicts network elements involved in the M2M Bootstrap and M2M Connection Procedures according to the related art.
  • the lines connecting the network elements show the communication interfaces used among them.
  • Device is the entity seeking to get bootstrapped in order to start using the M2M facilities provided by the M2M Core network.
  • Device engages in bootstrap procedure with an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) via the Core network.
  • MSBF M2M Service Bootstrapping Function
  • Kmr root secret key
  • MAS M2M service layer AAA Server
  • the device goes through the Connection Procedure with the MAS via the Core network.
  • M2M bootstrap state i.e., service subscription
  • Full management of such state requires not only creation of the state but also the deletion of the state by the involved parties. So, a Device/Gateway, an MAS, and an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF) shall be able to erase a bootstrap state. Otherwise, a Device/Gateway that bootstrapped with a given service provider stays in that state forever.
  • MSBF M2M Service Bootstrapping Function
  • a Device/Gateway decides to leave the service (e.g., switching from one service provider to another), or the service provider decides to remove the Device/Gateway from its subscriber base (e.g., unpaid bill, decommissioned device, etc.). Unless these actions are performed with state coordination on both sides, it can create ghost state and wasteful procedures (e.g., service provider trying to access a Device/Gateway that has left its service without notice).
  • a method for erasing bootstrapping, at a device or a gateway in an M2M service includes receiving an erase request containing an M2M-Erase-Token from an MAS or an MSBF, processing the erase request based on the M2M-Erase-Token of the erase request or a local policy of the device or the gateway, and sending an erase response containing an M2M-Erase-Token to the MAS or the MSBF.
  • a device or a gateway for erasing bootstrapping in an M2M service includes a transceiver for communicating signals with an MAS or an MSBF, and a controller for receiving an erase request containing an M2M-Erase-Token from an MAS or an MSBF, for processing the erase request based on the M2M-Erase-Token of the erase request or a local policy of the device or the gateway, and for sending a erase response containing an M2M-Erase-Token to the MAS or the MSBF.
  • an aspect of the present invention is to provide a method for erasing bootstrapping when a Device/Gateway decides to leave the M2M service or the service provider decides to remove the Device/Gateway from its subscriber base.
  • Another aspect of the present invention is to provide a method for Erase Procedure for being initiated by either the Device/Gateway, or a network element such as an M2M Service Bootstrap Function (MSBF) or an M2M Authentication Server (MAS).
  • MSBF M2M Service Bootstrap Function
  • MAS M2M Authentication Server
  • aspects of the present invention applies to M2M systems whether they use automated bootstrapping of the M2M Devices/Gateways, or they rely on pre-provisioning (e.g., during manufacturing time). Aspects of the present invention are agnostic to the methods used as the bootstrap and connection procedures (e.g., PANA, TLS, GBA). It can be used no matter what method is used for creating the M2M state.
  • FIG. 1 depicts network elements for Machine-to-Machine (M2M) Bootstrap and Connection Procedures according to the related art
  • FIG. 2 depicts a call flow for an M2M Service Bootstrapping Function (MSBF)-initiated Erase Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 depicts a call flow for an M2M Authentication Server (MAS)-initiated Erase Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 depicts a call flow for Device/Gateway-initiated Erase with MSBF Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 depicts a call flow for a Device/Gateway-initiated Erase with MAS Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention
  • FIGs. 6A and 6B are a Flowchart for request/response processing according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • an Erase Procedure may be initiated by either the Device/Gateway, or a network element such as an M2M Service Bootstrap Function (MSBF) or an M2M Authentication Server (MAS). According to exemplary embodiments of the present invention, no other network element initiates this procedure.
  • MSBF M2M Service Bootstrap Function
  • MAS M2M Authentication Server
  • the Erase Procedure When the Erase Procedure is initiated by the Device/Gateway, the Erase Procedure may be directed towards either the MSBF or the MAS. This invention covers both possibilities. Which one is used is a decision left to the architectures and deployments using these schemes.
  • the procedure When initiated by any of these aforementioned elements, the procedure provides origin authentication, integrity and replay protection so that it cannot be exploited for denial-of service attacks by unauthorized elements.
  • FIG. 2 depicts a call flow for an MSBF-initiated Erase Procedure of Example 1 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the MSBF initiates the M2M Bootstrap Procedure in step 210.
  • the Erase Procedure it is assumed that the Device/Gateway and the MSBF has already executed the Bootstrap Procedure.
  • This procedure may involve an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node, or not.
  • the Device/Gateway and the MSBF end up sharing a secret key called Kmr.
  • Kmr secret key
  • additional keying material may also be present on these end-points (e.g., Extensible Master Session Key (EMSK) when EAP protocol is used).
  • EMSK Extensible Master Session Key
  • the MSBD sends an Erase Request to the Device/Gateway.
  • This request may be relayed to the Device/Gateway via an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node (as illustrated in FIG. 1), or directly sent to the Device/Gateway.
  • the decision to initiate the Erase Procedure belongs to the MSBF, and the details of the decision-making process are outside the scope of this description.
  • the Erase Request contains a payload called Erase Token. This token conveys the intent of the sender along with the cryptographic proof about the authentication and integrity of the token.
  • Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may also include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node that will be erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index (IKmr)). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element may be included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, and may be omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index IKmr index
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of request. When variations of erase procedure are needed, this Type can help differentiating among them.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • the Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MSBF.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either.
  • Additional parameters may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • the Erase Request may be sent over one of many different protocols, such as PANA (in the form of a PANA AVP, which may be carried over PANA Termination Request or another PANA Request packet), Diameter/RADIUS (in the form of an AVP/attribute), HTTP, etc.
  • PANA in the form of a PANA AVP
  • Diameter/RADIUS in the form of an AVP/attribute
  • HTTP etc.
  • step 230 the Device/Gateway receives the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Request from MSBF and relays the Erase Request to the Device/Gateway.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the request on both sides.
  • the MSBF-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be omitted and the request message may be directly sent from the MSBF to the Device/Gateway.
  • step 240 the Device/Gateway receives and processes the Erase Request.
  • the Device/Gateway verifies the hash before accepting the request as authentic.
  • the Device/Gateway retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching secret key, then the Device/Gateway shall ignore the Erase Request.
  • the matching key is used with the same formula as in step 220 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Request. If the Hash is a match, then the Device/Gateway accepts this incoming Erase Request as valid.
  • the Device/Gateway makes a decision on how to process the Erase Request based on its local policy. For example, a Device/Gateway may be permanently configured to reject such requests. If the Device/Gateway accepts the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway deletes its bootstrapped state after sending the Erase Response back. The Device/Gateway may put a delay before deleting such state, in case the Erase Response is not received by the MSBF and the MSBF retransmits the Erase Request (whose processing may require the state be present).
  • the Device/Gateway sends an Erase Response to the MSBF.
  • This response may be sent via an intermediary such as Network M2M Node.
  • Erase Response shall include an Erase Token.
  • the Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node being erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element is included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of response. It can indicate values corresponding to “Successfully erased”, “Erase rejected due to local policy”, etc.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MSBF.
  • the Secret-key be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either.
  • Additional parameters may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • step 250 the Erase Response is sent over the same protocol that carried the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Response from Device/Gateway and relays it to MSBF.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the response on both sides.
  • the MSBF-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be eliminated and the response message may be directly sent from the Device/Gateway to the MSBF.
  • the MSBF When the MSBF receives the Erase Response, the MSBF verifies the hash before accepting the response as authentic. The MSBF retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching key, then the MSBF shall ignore the Erase Response.
  • the matching key is used with the same formula as in step 240 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the MSBF shall ignore the Erase Response.
  • the MSBF accepts this incoming Erase Response as valid.
  • the MSBF decides what to do with the bootstrapped state associated with the Device/Gateway based on the received Type and its local policy.
  • FIG. 3 depicts the call flow for MAS-initiated Erase Procedure of Example 3 according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • the MAS determines to initiate the M2M Service Connect Procedure in step 310.
  • the Erase Procedure it is assumed that the Device/Gateway and the MAS have already executed the Service Connect Procedure.
  • This procedure may involve an intermediary, such as a Network M2M Node, or not.
  • Kmr a secret key
  • additional keying material may also be present on these end-points (e.g., Extensible Master Session Key (EMSK) when EAP protocol is used).
  • EMSK Extensible Master Session Key
  • the MAS When the MAS decides to initiate the Erase Procedure, the MAS sends an Erase Request to the Device/Gateway in step 320. This request may be relayed to the Device/Gateway via an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node (as illustrated in FIG. 1), or directly sent to the Device/Gateway.
  • the decision to initiate the Erase Procedure belongs to the MAS and the details of how the MAS determines whether to initiate the Erase Procedure are outside the scope of this description.
  • the Erase Request contains a payload called an Erase Token.
  • This token conveys the intent of the sender along with the cryptographic proof about the authentication and integrity of the token.
  • the Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node that will be erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element may be included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, and may be omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of request. When variations of erase procedure are needed, this Type can help differentiate among them.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MAS.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation.
  • Additional parameters may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • the Erase Request may be sent over one of many different protocols, such as PANA (in the form of a PANA AVP, which may be carried over PANA Termination Request or another PANA Request packet), Diameter/RADIUS (in the form of an AVP/attribute), HTTP, etc.
  • PANA in the form of a PANA AVP
  • Diameter/RADIUS in the form of an AVP/attribute
  • HTTP etc.
  • the Device/Gateway receives the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Request from MAS and relays the Erase Request to the Device/Gateway.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the request on both sides.
  • the MAS-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be eliminated and the request message may be directly sent from the MAS to the Device/Gateway.
  • step 340 the Device/Gateway receives and processes the Erase Request.
  • the Device/Gateway verifies the hash before accepting the request as authentic.
  • the Device/Gateway retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching secret key, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Request.
  • the matching key is be used with the same formula as in step 320 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Request. If the Hash is a match, then the Device/Gateway accepts the incoming Erase Request as valid.
  • the Device/Gateway makes a decision on how to process the Erase Request based on its local policy. For example, a Device/Gateway may be permanently configured to reject such requests. If the Device/Gateway accepts the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway should delete its bootstrapped state after sending the Erase Response back. The Device/Gateway may put a delay before deleting such state, in case the Erase Response is not received by the MAS and the MAS retransmits the Erase Request (whose processing requires the state be present).
  • the Device/Gateway sends an Erase Response to the MAS.
  • This response may be sent via an intermediary such as Network M2M Node.
  • Erase Response shall include an Erase Token.
  • Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node being erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element may be included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of response. It can indicate values corresponding to “Successfully erased”, “Erase rejected due to local policy”, etc.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MAS.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either.
  • Additional parameters may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • step 350 the Erase Response is sent over the same protocol that carried the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Response from Device/Gateway and relays the Erase Response to MAS.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the response on both sides.
  • the MAS-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be omitted and the response message may be directly sent from the Device/Gateway to the MAS.
  • the MAS When the MAS receives the Erase Response, the MAS verifies the hash before accepting the response as authentic. The MAS retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching key, then the MAS ignores the Erase Response.
  • the matching key is be used with the same formula as in step 340 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the MAS ignores the Erase Response.
  • the MAS accepts the incoming Erase Response as valid.
  • the MAS decides what to do with the bootstrapped state associated with the Device/Gateway based on the received Type and its local policy.
  • FIG. 4 depicts a call flow for a Device/Gateway-initiated Erase with MSBF Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • step 410 the Device/Gateway initiates the M2M Bootstrap Procedure.
  • the Erase Procedure it is assumed that the Device/Gateway and the MSBF has already executed the Bootstrap Procedure.
  • This procedure may involve an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node, or not.
  • the Device/Gateway and the MSBF end up sharing a secret key called Kmr.
  • Kmr secret key
  • additional keying material may also be present on these end-points (e.g., Extensible Master Session Key (EMSK) when EAP protocol is used).
  • EMSK Extensible Master Session Key
  • the Device/Gateway When the Device/Gateway decides to initiate the Erase Procedure, the Device/Gateway sends an Erase Request to the MSBF in step 420. This request may be relayed to the MSBF via an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node (as illustrated in FIG. 1), or directly sent to the MSBF.
  • the decision to initiate the Erase Procedure is made by the Device/Gateway and the details are outside the scope of this description.
  • the Erase Request contains a payload called Erase Token. This token conveys the intent of the sender along with the cryptographic proof about the authentication and integrity of the token.
  • the Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node that will be erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element may be included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of request. When variations of erase procedure are needed, this Type can help differentiate among them.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MSBF.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either. Additional parameters (shown as “Other parameters” in the formula) may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • the Erase Request may be sent over one of many different protocols, such as PANA (in the form of a PANA AVP, which may be carried over PANA Termination Request or another PANA Request packet), Diameter/RADIUS (in the form of an AVP/attribute), HTTP, etc.
  • PANA in the form of a PANA AVP
  • Diameter/RADIUS in the form of an AVP/attribute
  • HTTP etc.
  • the Device/Gateway receives the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Request from Device/Gateway and relays the Erase Request to the MSBF.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the request on both sides.
  • the MSBF-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be omitted and the request message may be directly sent from the Device/Gateway to the MSBF.
  • step 440 the MSBF receives and processes the Erase Request.
  • the MSBF verifies the hash before accepting the request as authentic.
  • the MSBF retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching secret key, then the MSBF ignores the Erase Request.
  • the matching key used with the same formula as in step 420 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the MSBF shall ignore the Erase Request.
  • the MSBF accepts the incoming Erase Request as valid.
  • the MSBF makes a decision on how to process the Erase Request based on its local policy. For example, an MSBF may be permanently configured to reject such requests. If the MSBF accepts the Erase Request, then the MSBF deletes the Device/Gateway’s bootstrapped state after sending the Erase Response back. The MSBF may put a delay before deleting such state, in case the Erase Response is not received by the Device/Gateway and the Device/Gateway retransmits the Erase Request (whose processing requires the state be present).
  • MSBF sends an Erase Response to the Device/Gateway.
  • This response may be sent via an intermediary such as Network M2M Node.
  • Erase Response includes an Erase Token.
  • the Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node being erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element is included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of response.
  • the type may indicate values corresponding to “Successfully erased”, “Erase rejected due to local policy”, etc.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MSBF.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either. Additional parameters (shown as “Other parameters” in the formula) may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • step 450 the Erase Response is sent over the same protocol that carried the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Response from MSBF and relays the Erase Response to the Device/Gateway.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the response on both sides.
  • the MSBF-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be omitted and the response message can be directly sent from the MSBF to the Device/Gateway.
  • the Device/Gateway When the Device/Gateway receives the Erase Response, the Device/Gateway verifies the hash before accepting the response as authentic. The Device/Gateway retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching key, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Response.
  • the matching key may be used with the same formula as in step 440 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway shall ignore the Erase Response.
  • the Device/Gateway accepts this incoming Erase Response as valid. Device/Gateway decides what to do with the bootstrapped state associated with itself based on the received Type and its local policy.
  • FIG. 5 depicts a call flow for a Device/Gateway-initiated Erase with MAS Procedure according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • step 510 the Device/Gateway initiates the M2M Service Connect Procedure.
  • the Erase Procedure For the Erase Procedure to take place, it is assumed that the Device/Gateway and the MAS has already executed the Service Connect Procedure. This procedure may involve an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node, or not.
  • Kmr a secret key
  • additional keying material may also be present on these end-points (e.g., Extensible Master Session Key (EMSK) when EAP protocol is used).
  • EMSK Extensible Master Session Key
  • the Device/Gateway When the Device/Gateway decides to initiate the Erase Procedure, the Device/Gateway sends an Erase Request to the MAS in step 520. This request may be relayed to the MAS via an intermediary, such as Network M2M Node (as illustrated in FIG. 1), or directly sent to the MAS.
  • the decision to initiate the Erase Procedure belongs to the Device/Gateway and the details are outside the scope of this description.
  • the Erase Request contains a payload called Erase Token. This token conveys the intent of the sender along with the cryptographic proof about the authentication and integrity of the token.
  • Erase Token contains the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node that will be erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element may be included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, and may be omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of request. When variations of erase procedure are needed, this Type may help differentiate among them.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity, and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MAS.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either. Additional parameters (shown as “Other parameters” in the formula) may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • the Erase Request may be sent over one of many different protocols, such as PANA (in the form of a PANA AVP, which may be carried over PANA Termination Request or another PANA Request packet), Diameter/RADIUS (in the form of an AVP/attribute), HTTP, etc.
  • PANA in the form of a PANA AVP
  • Diameter/RADIUS in the form of an AVP/attribute
  • HTTP etc.
  • the MAS receives the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Request from Device/Gateway and relay the Erase Request to the MAS.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the request on both sides.
  • the MAS-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be eliminated and the request message may be directly sent from the Device/Gateway to the MAS.
  • the MAS receives and processes the Erase Response.
  • the MAS shall verify the hash before accepting the request as authentic.
  • the MAS retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching secret key, then the MAS ignores the Erase Request.
  • the matching key is used with the same formula as in Step 520 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the MAS ignores the Erase Request. If the Hash is a match, then the MAS accepts the incoming Erase Request as valid.
  • the MAS makes a decision on how to process the Erase Request based on its local policy. For example, an MAS may be permanently configured to reject such requests. If the MAS accepts the Erase Request, then it should delete the Device/Gateway’s bootstrapped state after sending the Erase Response back. The MAS may put a delay before deleting such state, in case the Erase Response is not received by the Device/Gateway and the Device/Gateway retransmits the Erase Request (whose processing requires the state be present).
  • the MAS sends an Erase Response to the Device/Gateway.
  • This response may be sent via an intermediary such as Network M2M Node.
  • Erase Response includes an Erase Token.
  • the Erase Token may contain the following information elements, and may include additional elements.
  • M2M Node ID This information element contains the identifier of the Device/Gateway M2M Node being erased.
  • This information element contains the index of the shared secret key (e.g., Kmr index). Such indices are used when there may be multiple instances of the same key. Each instance is distinguished from the others with the help of a key index. This information element is included only when the key used for the hash function has an index value, omitted otherwise.
  • Kmr index the index of the shared secret key
  • This information element contains a number generated by the sender.
  • the sender ensures that the same nonce value is not used with the same secret key value before, either by itself or by the other end-point.
  • the value may be generated randomly, sequentially, or by any other pattern.
  • This information element contains a value that indicates the type of response.
  • the Type may indicate values corresponding to “Successfully erased”, “Erase rejected due to local policy”, etc.
  • Hash This information element contains a cryptographically generated hash value in order to provide origin authentication, integrity and replay protection for the Erase Token.
  • Hash Hash-function (Secret-key, M2M Node ID
  • ” indicates concatenation.
  • Hash-function is a one-way keyed hash function, for example HMAC-SHA256.
  • Secret-key is a secret key shared between the Device/Gateway and the MAS.
  • the Secret-key may be Kmr, EMSK, or another shared secret key. Such variations of this formula are valid.
  • M2M Node ID, Key Index, Nonce, and Type are the values of the aforementioned information elements. When any of these information elements are not present in the token, they are not included in the hash computation either. Additional parameters (shown as “Other parameters” in the formula) may be added to the formula. If no such parameters are needed, then the “
  • step 550 the Erase Response is sent over the same protocol that carried the Erase Request.
  • the intermediary receives the Erase Response from MAS and relays the request to the Device/Gateway.
  • the intermediary may have to deal with two different kinds of protocols carrying the response on both sides.
  • the MAS-facing side may be using RADIUS and the Device/Gateway-facing side may be using PANA.
  • the intermediary may be omitted and the response message may be directly sent from the MAS to the Device/Gateway.
  • the Device/Gateway When the Device/Gateway receives the Erase Response, the Device/Gateway verifies the hash before accepting the response as authentic. The Device/Gateway retrieves the Secret-key by using the M2M Node ID and Key index (when present) for a look up from its local key repository. If there is no matching key, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Response.
  • the matching key is used with the same formula as in step 540 in order to generate a Hash value. If the computed Hash does not match the Hash value in the Erase Request, then the Device/Gateway ignores the Erase Response.
  • the Device/Gateway accepts this incoming Erase Response as valid.
  • the Device/Gateway decides what to do with the bootstrapped state associated with itself based on the received Type and its local policy.
  • FIGs. A and 6B depict processing of request and response messages in the form of flowcharts according to an exemplary embodiment of the present invention.
  • Request receiver is the entity that receives the Erase Request (e.g., MSBF and MAS in the case of Device/Gateway initiated Erase Procedure).
  • Response receiver is the entity that sends the request and receives the response (e.g., Device/Gateway in the case of Device/Gateway initiated Erase Procedure).
  • Exemplary embodiments of the present invention are applicable to M2M systems whether they use automated bootstrapping of the M2M Devices/Gateways, or they rely on pre-provisioning (e.g., during manufacturing time). According to exemplary embodiments of the present invention, any method may be used as the bootstrap and connection procedures (e.g., PANA, TLS, GBA). Exemplary embodiments of the present invention may be employed no matter what method is used for creating the M2M state.

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WO2012141556A3 (en) 2013-03-14
KR20140024894A (ko) 2014-03-03
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US20120265979A1 (en) 2012-10-18
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