Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
  • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/02—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for separating internal from external traffic, e.g. firewalls
  • H04L63/0227—Filtering policies
  • H04L63/0254—Stateful filtering
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
  • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
  • H04L63/0464—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload using hop-by-hop encryption, i.e. wherein an intermediate entity decrypts the information and re-encrypts it before forwarding it
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
  • H04L63/0876—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities based on the identity of the terminal or configuration, e.g. MAC address, hardware or software configuration or device fingerprint
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/30—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting lawful interception, monitoring or retaining of communications or communication related information
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
  • H04W12/033—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the user plane, e.g. user's traffic
• • G—PHYSICS
  • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
  • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
  • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
  • G06F2221/2111—Location-sensitive, e.g. geographical location, GPS
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
  • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
  • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party

Definitions

• This invention relates to a system and method for allowing an authorised third party to access encrypted electronic messages sent to or from a mobile device.
• Portable devices for sending and receiving messages are very popular.
• the Blackberry (RTM) range of devices, produced by the company Research In Motion, is one example.
• a suitably-configured mail server such as a mail server inside a corporate firewall at the user's place of employment
• the email is encrypted and then forwarded over the wired Internet to a network operation centre (NOC) operated by the email service provider.
• NOC network operation centre
• the NOC is in contact with the user's mobile device, and pushes the email to the device via a wireless telecoms network local to the user.
• the message is decrypted at the mobile device and displayed to the user.
• the messages are cryptographically encrypted at least while in transit between the NOC and the mobile device, thereby preventing any third party from being able to access the message content by intercepting or eavesdropping on the communication. In this way the privacy of the sender and recipient of the message can be protected.
• encryption is usually established between the corporate mail server and the mobile device.
• a national law-enforcement or security body may, on occasion, wish to access messages in order to carry out its duties effectively; e.g. to intercept messages being sent or received by a known or suspected criminal in the country.
• the invention provides a method of communicating using a mobile device, comprising the mobile device:
• the invention extends to a mobile device configured to:
• the invention further extends to a system for communicating using a mobile device, comprising:
• a messaging server configured for transmission, between the messaging server and the mobile device, of an electronic message which is encrypted with a messaging key
• the system may additionally comprise monitoring means configured to decrypt an encrypted copy of a message received by the monitoring server, and to display at least part of the decrypted message.
• the monitoring means may be a computing device comprising a display, such as a personal computer (PC), for example.
• the monitoring server preferably comprises storage means, such as optical, magnetic or silicon memory, arranged to store encrypted copies of messages.
• an encrypted copy of a message sent securely from the mobile device, or received securely by it, is generated by the device itself, and is sent to a monitoring server, where it can be decrypted by an authorised third party who has access to a decryption key associated with the monitoring key.
• an authorised third party can, when needed, monitor a message without the operator of the messaging server being required to participate in the monitoring process. Because both the message and its copy are encrypted when in transit to or from the mobile device, unauthorised eavesdropping by malicious parties is still prevented.
• the messaging server may be a network operation centre (NOC), operated by a messaging service provider such as Research In Motion (RTM); or it may be a component of a corporate email system, such as a Blackberry Enterprise Server (RTM) or Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync (RTM), or of a public email service such as Microsoft's Hotmail (RTM) or Google's Gmail (RTM).
• NOC network operation centre
• RTM Research In Motion
• RTM Microsoft Exchange ActiveSync
• RTM Microsoft's Hotmail
• the monitoring server would typically be managed by, or be accessible to, a government agency, such as a national security department or law-enforcement body, although this is not essential.
• Embodiments of the invention are not limited to any particular separation between the messaging server and the remote monitoring server.
• the servers may typically be on different physical sites from one another; they may be separated by at least 10 km, 100 km, 1 ,000 km or more. However, this is not essential; they may, for example, be situated in different buildings on the
• the necessary keys for decrypting messages at the monitoring server may be stored on, or be accessible to, the monitoring server, but it is preferred that they are held elsewhere, potentially by a body independent from a national government, who can be trusted to provide or use the key for decrypting one or more stored messages only when certain conditions are met; e.g. when a government agency has been given a court order authorising the reading of one or more intercepted messages.
• a key server may release a decryption key when an authorisation condition has been met.
• the key server may perform a decryption operation using the decryption key when an authorisation condition has been met.
• the mobile device may send copies to the monitoring server of received encrypted messages only, or of sent encrypted messages only, but preferably sends copies for both received and sent encrypted messages.
• the encrypted copies may be sent by any suitable means, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP), File Transfer Protocol (FTP), or a proprietary protocol. They may be sent substantially at the same time as transmission of the message between the messaging server and the mobile device (e.g. within 1 , 10 or 60 seconds thereof), or may be sent later, for example, in a batch of several copied messages at once.
• the sending of the message copy is preferably invisible to the device user; e.g. happening in the background while the user interacts with an email client as normal. The user is therefore not inconvenienced by the copy transmission.
• the copy of the message sent to the monitoring server may be compressed, either before or after encryption. This can reduce network traffic.
• the messaging server, monitoring server and any key server may be located in different buildings from each other, while still being in the same country, or two or more of them may be in different countries from each other.
• the invention may be particularly useful when the messaging server is located outside a jurisdiction in which the portable device is being used, or outside the jurisdiction of a body managing the monitoring server, since without the invention there would not necessarily be any legal or physical mechanism by which a jurisdictional body, such as a national intelligence agency, could access
• the mobile device may be a smartphone or a text messaging device, such as a Blackberry (RTM), and is preferably configured to display at least part of the message, e.g. on a display screen.
• a text messaging device such as a Blackberry (RTM)
• RTM Blackberry
• the message may comprise or be an email (e.g. as defined in the Internet
• the message may comprise or consist of all or part of a Short Message Service (SMS) message or a BlackBerry (RTM) PIN message or a BlackBerry (RTM) Messenger (BBM) message.
• SMS Short Message Service
• RTM BlackBerry
• RTM BlackBerry
• BBM BlackBerry
• the invention is currently envisaged as being most useful with a discrete message, such as an email or a multimedia packet, a message could instead be a data stream, such as one side of a telephone call or videoconference call.
• the message is preferably sent or received wirelessly by the device, e.g. over a mobile telecoms network or an IEEE 802.1 1 network.
• the message will, however, typically also travel over a wired network such as the Internet for at least part of its journey to the messaging server or monitoring server.
• the copy of the message may be sent before, or after, or at the same time as the message itself is sent.
• the messaging key is preferably known only to one or both of the messaging server and the mobile device.
• the key may be used with a symmetric encryption algorithm such as Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), or with an asymmetric algorithm such as RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Aldeman).
• AES Advanced Encryption Standard
• RSA Rivest, Shamir, Aldeman
• the monitoring key may be suitable for use with the same encryption algorithm as the messaging key, or for a different algorithm.
• the system preferably comprises one or more key servers, which may be the same or different from a monitoring server.
• a key server may be bound to a geographic or jurisdictional region.
• the key server may store or have access to information relating to a set of mobile devices implementing the invention.
• the key server may have access to a cryptographic monitoring key that is specific to a particular mobile device. It may be able to generate such keys.
• a monitoring key may additionally or alternatively be specific to the particular key server or monitoring server, or to a set of key or monitoring servers within a geographic or jurisdictional region.
• the information relating to a specific mobile device may be prevented from leaving the key server unless an access condition is met, such as a valid password being received by the key server.
• This access condition may be established between the mobile device or the device user and the key server during a registration process.
• the mobile device may cache the monitoring key for reuse, optionally with a finite lifetime set for the key. By caching the key in the mobile device, network traffic can be reduced.
• a monitoring key may expire after use with a single message (in which case caching the key for subsequent reuse would typically be inappropriate), or it might be usable indefinitely. Alternatively, between these extremes, a monitoring key might have a lifetime of, say, a week, after which time the mobile device will need to request a new key.
• the mobile device may access a key server, in order to obtain a new monitoring key.
• the key may be associated with a key identifier which may also be provided to the mobile device, or directly to the monitoring server.
• a user of the mobile device may have to satisfy an access condition, such as entering a valid password or biometric data, before the monitoring key becomes accessible to the device.
• Data relating to the access condition, such as a password may be transmitted to the key server for verification, preferably over a secure connection such as one using Transport Layer Security (TLS) or Secure Sockets Layer (SSL).
• TLS Transport Layer Security
• SSL Secure Sockets Layer
• the monitoring key may be obtained by the mobile device from a key server in accordance with any of the methods described in WO 201 1/083343, which is hereby incorporated by reference in its entirety.
• the mobile device may advantageously contain a hardware cryptography engine or module, such as a Trusted Platform Module conforming to specifications from the Trusted Computing Group. This can allow the mobile device to be authenticated by the key server with a high degree of confidence. It can also allow the mobile device to authenticate the key server with confidence. It can also protect cryptographic keys stored on the device, such as the monitoring key, from being read by a user of the device or by an attacked. It may also be used to enforce policies on the mobile device. Such a hardware module is not essential, however, and appropriate cryptographic functions may instead be performed by software running on the device. In addition to sending an encrypted message copy to the monitoring server, the mobile device may identify to the monitoring server the monitoring key which was used to encrypt the message.
• a hardware cryptography engine or module such as a Trusted Platform Module conforming to specifications from the Trusted Computing Group.
• the monitoring server may store the encrypted copy of the message along with an identifier indicating a key for decrypting the message.
• This identifier may be used to obtain the appropriate key from the key server, should a message need to be decrypted.
• Technical or procedural mechanisms may be in place to ensure that only authorised access to the decryption key is permitted.
• a decryption key may only allow the decryption of a single message, or may enable decryption of some or all messages sent or received by a mobile device, depending on what policy has been used regarding key lifetimes.
• the key server may be configured to receive an encrypted message and decrypt it using a decryption key associated with the monitoring key.
• the monitoring server may be configured to receive a decryption key associated with the monitoring key and to decrypt an encrypted message.
• the decryption key may be the monitoring key (e.g. in a symmetric cipher) or it may be one of a pair of keys in an asymmetric cipher.
• the system comprises a central key server and one or more regional key servers.
• the central key server may be configured to store or access information relating to a plurality of mobile devices, such as profile information or access condition information (e.g. passwords).
• Each regional key server is preferably configured for secure communication with the central key server. Having a regional key server located in each jurisdiction implementing the invention, rather than merely having a central key server located in, say, the United States of America, may be desirable for legal or practical reasons. In particular, national authorities may wish the decryption keys to be located within their jurisdictional boundary.
• a regional key server does not share monitoring keys or associated decryption keys with the central server.
• a central server can nonetheless be desirable for coordinating the provision of monitoring keys across multiple regions, e.g. to prevent a mobile device user having to re-register security information with the system, or to re-install software, when travelling between countries.
• a regional key server may be configured to retrieve information specific to a mobile device from the central key server. This may include information relating to access conditions (such as a password), or user preferences or policy requirements.
• a key server such as a regional key server, may be configured to store monitoring keys, or associated decryption keys. These may be stored indefinitely, or for a predetermined duration. This may impose significant storage requirements, especially if each monitoring key only has a relatively short lifetime.
• a key server is configured to generate a decryption key associated with a monitoring key, which need only be done as required. This can be accomplished by the key server having access to a master key, and using the result of encrypting a monitoring key (or associated decryption key) with the master key (using a suitable cipher) as a key identifier for that monitoring key; i.e. the resulting ciphertext is used as the key identifier.
• the key identifier can be sent to the key server (optionally along with the encrypted message), and the key server can determine the relevant decryption key by decrypting the key identifier. In this way, no requirement to store decryption keys is placed on the key server; it can instead recreate a decryption key as required.
• the mobile device is configured to communicate with the message server via a network router which is configured to block transmission of an encrypted message between the mobile device and the messaging server (in one or both directions) when an access condition is not met (or equivalently, when a blocking condition is met).
• a network router which is configured to block transmission of an encrypted message between the mobile device and the messaging server (in one or both directions) when an access condition is not met (or equivalently, when a blocking condition is met).
• the system is such that, when the network router is blocking transmission, the message cannot be sent between the mobile device and the messaging server, at least while the mobile device remains in a predetermined geographical region. I.e. there is preferably no other communication channel by which the message may successfully be transmitted.
• the access condition is preferably such that it is satisfied only if a user of the device indicates his assent to the mobile device sending a copy of the message to the monitoring server.
• the mobile device may be configured to receive a binary input from a user, representing agreement or refusal to a copy of some or all messages sent or received (or both) by the mobile device being sent to the monitoring server.
• the agreement may be geographically or temporally limited; e.g. it may last for as long as the mobile device remains in a particular country or jurisdiction.
• the mobile device may communicate the result of the binary input to a server, and the input may be used to determined whether the network router blocks or allows the transmission of relevant messages.
• the access condition may be such that it is satisfied only if the mobile device is configured to send copies of encrypted messages to the monitoring server. I.e. a mobile device that is not configured to send a copy of messages to or from the messaging server will be prevented from communicating messages with the messaging server.
• the network router may form part of a national Internet firewall, or it may be part of a wireless network infrastructure.
• it may be a component of a mobile telecommunication network with which the mobile device is registered; this could be the device's home network or a network accessed via an international roaming agreement.
• Such a network router is inventive in its own right, and thus from another aspect the invention provides a network router which is configured to block transmission of encrypted messages between a mobile device and a messaging server when an access condition for the mobile device is not met.
• the network router is configured to allow the transmission of unencrypted messages between the mobile device and the messaging server while it is blocking encrypted messages.
• the ability to block communication between the mobile device and the messaging server can be especially beneficial, in that it provides a mechanism whereby a user of the mobile device can be blocked from sending or receiving any messages that are not accessible to the monitoring server (at least while the user remains within a predetermined geographical region).
• the user can be presented (e.g. via SMS message) with the option either of allowing the possibility of official monitoring, or of having the messaging capabilities of the device disabled for the duration of the user's stay in the country.
• a national government requires all mobile network operators providing coverage within its national boundaries to support a blocking mechanism as described, the government can ensure that copies of all relevant messages are sent to the monitoring server.
• the device may be configured to carry out the steps of encrypting a copy of a message with a monitoring key and sending the encrypted copy to a monitoring server, by a software application running on the device.
• This software application may be transmitted to the mobile device, e.g. wirelessly, when the device first attempts to register with a suitable network, or at any other appropriate time.
• Many mobile devices have operating systems that allow the installation of software applications after shipment of the device, and mechanisms for delivering and installing such third-party software applications are well known.
• the access condition may be such that it is satisfied only if the user installs, or allows the installation of, the software application.
• the invention extends to a software application, to a carrier bearing the same, and to a signal encoding the same, comprising instructions which, when executed on a mobile device, cause the device:
• monitoring key is different from the messaging key.
• the device can be configured to support the invention without requiring the direct involvement of the device supplier (as might be the case if the functionality were provided in hardware or firmware), or of a messaging service provider (as might be the case if an attempt were made to monitor communications at the network level). This can be very advantageous given that such other parties may not be willing to cooperate for technical or commercial reasons.
• the software application is preferably active whenever a relevant messaging application, such as an email client, is running on the mobile device.
• the management of the transmission of messages between the mobile device and the messaging server may be implemented by the software application, or may be performed by a standard messaging function or application on the device.
• the cryptographic operations on the original message may be provided by the software application or may be standard device functions.
• the mobile device may be configured to determine a geographical, political or jurisdictional location in which it is situated. It may use this information to determine whether to send copies of encrypted messages to the monitoring server. It may access a list or database of locations or regions, stored on or off the device, in order to make this determination. For example, when the device registers with a mobile network, it may be informed that it is in country A. It can then query a database server to discover if country A requires encrypted messages to be sent to a monitoring server. The device may access a database to obtain a network address of a suitable monitoring server.
• an update mechanism is preferably provided by which the list may be updated.
• the mobile device may obtain an update from a server, e.g. by receiving an SMS configuration message, or by accessing a central server.
• the mobile device may obtain an update from a server, e.g. by receiving an SMS configuration message, or by accessing a central server.
• a network component communicates with a predetermined DNS name or IP address, and a network component is configured so that the DNS name or IP address is routed to a server controlled by a geographic or jurisdictional authority.
• a geographic or jurisdictional authority e.g. because each country controls its local network (mobile telecoms or Internet backbone), it can force DNS names to resolve to a particular address, or can route particular IP addresses to specific servers. In this way, the mobile device need only be configured with one address for use globally.
• Blocking or monitoring of encrypted messages may be carried out for all messages sent or received by a mobile device, or only those sent or received to one or more specific messaging servers; e.g. only those situated outside the jurisdiction in which the mobile device is located (since, for example, a government may already be able to access copies of the messages sent through local Internet service providers).
• a mobile device may support a plurality of users or identities, e.g. different user log-ins or profiles for the or for one or more messaging servers. It will be appreciated that the sending of copies of messages to a monitoring server may be particular to a specific user or identity or email address. For example, a user who refuses to agree to monitoring may have her encrypted messages blocked, while another user (or the same user but acting under a different email address) may have agreed to the monitoring. References to the mobile device in the present specification should therefore be understood as potentially being limited to a particular combination of mobile device and user, user identity, or email address.
• FIG. 1 is a diagrammatic representation of a system embodying the invention.
• FIG 1 shows a human user 1 of a mobile device, such as a Blackberry (RTM) smartphone 2.
• the smartphone 2 is in wireless communication with a mobile telephone network base station 3.
• the base station 3 is connected via the Internet to a corporate email server 4 running Blackberry Enterprise Server (RTM) software, with which the user has an email account.
• RTM Blackberry Enterprise Server
• a national monitoring server 5 Also connected to the base station 3 by the Internet are a national monitoring server 5 and a national key server 6.
• the national key server 6 is connected to a central key server 7.
• the user 1 , his smartphone 2, the network base station 3, the national monitoring server 5, and the national key server 6 are all located in the same country 8.
• the corporate email server 4 and the central key server 7 are, for this example, both situated outside the country 8 (although one or both of them could be inside it instead).
• the user 1 may send and receive emails on the smartphone 2 via the corporate email server 4 using established techniques. Such emails are typically encrypted in transit between the smartphone 2 and the email server 4. If the national authorities of the country 8 in which the user is located wish to intercept an email, either to read it in real-time or to access it at a future time, they will be unable to access the unencrypted message, at least without requiring time-consuming efforts to crack the encryption.
• a monitoring software application is loaded on the user's smartphone 2, which uses a monitoring encryption key 9 to send a copy of any email sent or received by the smartphone 2 to the monitoring server 5, where it is stored
• the national authorities can instruct the mobile network base station 3 (or some other suitable router within the country 8) to block the passage of encrypted emails between the smartphone 2 and the corporate email server 4.
• the operation of the system will now be described in more detail, first considering two different scenarios: (i) when the user asks the smartphone 2 to send an email; and (ii) at some point during the reception or opening of a received email by the smartphone 2. (i) When the user 1 indicates to the smartphone's 2 email application that it should send an email, the following steps occur:
• the monitoring application asks the smartphone 2 where it is currently located;
• the application stops and passes control back to the smartphone's 2 email application; otherwise it continues, as below;
• a monitoring key 9 (such as an AES key), along with a unique key identifier, will then be transferred to the smartphone 2 by the national key server 6 using a secure download procedure, e.g. such as is described in WO 201 1/083343;
• a copy of the email to be sent is encrypted using the monitoring key 9, and the unique key identifier is integrated with the encrypted copy;
• the monitoring application arranges for this encrypted copy to be transmitted to the national monitoring server 5, which is managed by appropriate interception authorities of the country 8.
• This procedure will effectively double the data transmission cost for every transmitted email.
• emails sent to the monitoring server 5 may be compressed to reduce network traffic. Sending the copy email does not delay the user's experience of the smartphone 2 as it occurs as a background process, invisible to the user 1 .
• the send (and receive) completes immediately just as when no monitoring is in place from the user interface and user's point of view. (ii) When the smartphone's 2 email application receives a new email, the following steps occur:
• the software monitoring application is activated and is given a handle to the received email
• the application asks the smartphone 2 where the smartphone is currently located;
• the application stops and passes control back to the smartphone's 2 mail application; otherwise it continues as below;
• a monitoring key 9 (such as an AES key), along with a unique key identifier, will then be transferred to the smartphone 2 by the national key server 6 using a secure download procedure, e.g. such as is described in WO 201 1/083343;
• the monitoring application arranges for this encrypted copy to be transmitted to the national monitoring server 5, which is managed by appropriate interception authorities of the country 8.
• central key server 7 This central key server 7 will maintain a profile and password for every smartphone 2 which has the monitoring software application installed.
• the central key server 7 will be updated every time the monitoring software application is installed on a smartphone 2.
• the central key server 7 has a means for secure communication with all the national key servers 6, e.g. in the form of shared cryptographic keys.
• the national key server 6 keeps a set of user profiles and associated passwords, which can be managed as follows. When a smartphone 2 contacts national key server 6, the following steps can take place:
• the national key server 6 checks whether or not it possesses a profile and password for this smartphone 2. If not, then the server 6 will contact the central key server 7 and request a copy of the appropriate password and profile information for this user (e.g. containing user preferences or policy requirements for this user). This information is sent to the requesting server 6 via a secure channel;
• the national key server 6 authenticates the smartphone 2 using the password (e.g. by requesting its transfer across an SSL-protected channel);
• the national key server 6 then sends the monitoring key 9 (along with a unique identifier) to the smartphone 2;
• the national key server keeps copies of all monitoring keys 9 (along with their unique identifiers) for a period of time determined by the interception authorities of the jurisdiction in which it is operated.
• the national key server 6 might maintain a master key, and encrypt every monitoring key 9 under this master key, and send a smartphone 2 both plaintext and encrypted copies of the monitoring key 9. The encrypted copy will then serve as the unique identifier.
• the master key could be changed regularly, e.g. on a daily or weekly basis.
• a jurisdiction-specific monitoring key 9 could have a wide range of possible lifetimes. Its lifetime will have a significant effect on the granularity of the monitoring functionality. At one extreme a different key could be used for every message. That is, a new key would be generated every time the smartphone 2 requests one (in such a case, caching of monitoring keys at the smartphone 2 would not be possible). At the other extreme the jurisdiction-specific monitoring key for a particular smartphone 2 could be fixed. Key caching at the smartphone 2 could be used to reduce communication between the smartphone 2 and the national key server 6 to a single message on the first occasion that a smartphone 2 roams to a particular country.
• a middle approach involves a monitoring key having a fixed lifetime, e.g. a week, with key caching meaning that smartphone 2; thus key- server communications could be restricted to the occasional refreshing of the monitoring key.
• the intercepting authority might ask the national key server 6 to provide a monitoring key 9 or keys for a specific smartphone 2, using the unique identifiers sent in the encrypted messages. If the monitoring keys have a long lifetime, then this would mean that the intercepting authority might have the means to decrypt messages for a much longer period than its legal authority justifies. On the other hand, whilst frequent monitoring key changes would enable a much finer-grained level of monitoring, it would also potentially mean that larger volumes of keys would need to be provided to the authority.
• the intercepting authority could simply pass to the national key server 6 copies of all the message it wishes to have decrypted, and the server could then decrypt them and send them back. Whilst this would enable very fine-grained control over the monitoring capability, it would also means that potentially very large volumes of data would flow between the national key server 6 and the intercepting authority. Such an approach might also impose an unacceptable delay on licensed decryption, particularly for the case where monitoring access is required almost instantly for newly sent messages.
• the system is able to inform the user 1 that monitoring may be occurring, and to give the user 1 the opportunity to accept the alternative, i.e. to have the smartphone 2 disabled.
• the user 1 might be prompted for consent on every occasion where the
• smartphone 2 is about to contact the national key server 6, or on every occasion where the smartphone 2 is about to contact the monitoring server 5.
• user consent to such a process could be deemed valid for a specified period of time.
• the smartphone's 2 data capabilities will barred.
• the local network operator will disallow all data traffic, or at least all encrypted emails, to and from the smartphone 2, until it receives a positive monitoring acknowledgement from the user 1 .

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