WO2012100730A2 - 数据安全擦除方法及装置 - Google Patents

数据安全擦除方法及装置 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2012100730A2
WO2012100730A2 PCT/CN2012/070650 CN2012070650W WO2012100730A2 WO 2012100730 A2 WO2012100730 A2 WO 2012100730A2 CN 2012070650 W CN2012070650 W CN 2012070650W WO 2012100730 A2 WO2012100730 A2 WO 2012100730A2
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
mapping relationship
storage unit
address
physical
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2012/070650
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Other versions
WO2012100730A3 (zh
Inventor
高志宏
杨琴琴
李科
Original Assignee
成都市华为赛门铁克科技有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 成都市华为赛门铁克科技有限公司 filed Critical 成都市华为赛门铁克科技有限公司
Publication of WO2012100730A2 publication Critical patent/WO2012100730A2/zh
Publication of WO2012100730A3 publication Critical patent/WO2012100730A3/zh

Links

Classifications

    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60Protecting data
    • GPHYSICS
    • G06COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06FELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/21Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/2143Clearing memory, e.g. to prevent the data from being stolen

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of storage technologies, and in particular, to a data security erasing method and apparatus.
  • Solid State Drive also known as an electronic hard drive or solid state electronic drive, is a hard drive consisting of a control unit and a solid state storage unit such as a NAND FLASH chip.
  • the SSD can perform a read operation multiple times after writing the data, but erase the location before writing the data before writing the new data.
  • the SSD in the prior art is usually stored in a new physical address when performing a write operation. The unit writes new data without writing the new data in the original address after erasing the original address data, thereby effectively avoiding frequent erasure of the storage medium.
  • the inventor has found that in the prior art, when a user needs to write new data at a specified address to overwrite the original data, or needs to delete data of a specified location, only the mapping relationship between the logical address and the physical address of the data is cleared, and the display is performed.
  • the information to the user indicates that the original data has been overwritten or deleted, but in essence, the original data still exists, and the professional technician can read the data, so the prior art cannot guarantee that the deleted data information is not leaked.
  • Embodiments of the present invention provide a data security erasing method and apparatus, so that user-specified data can be completely erased from a storage medium, thereby effectively protecting user security information.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a data security erasing method, including:
  • mapping relationship Obtaining, by using a pre-maintained mapping relationship, all physical addresses corresponding to the logical address, and erasing data in the storage unit corresponding to the obtained physical address; Wherein, each time data is written into the storage unit corresponding to the physical address, a mapping relationship between the physical address and the logical address of the data write is established in the mapping relationship.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a data security erasing apparatus, including:
  • An instruction information receiving unit configured to receive data security erasure instruction information, where the instruction information includes a logical address of data that needs to be securely erased;
  • mapping relationship maintenance unit configured to establish a mapping relationship between a physical address and a logical address of the data write in a mapping relationship whenever data is written in a storage unit corresponding to the physical address;
  • the physical data corresponding to the logical address of the data storage is obtained by searching the mapping relationship, and the data in the storage unit corresponding to all the obtained physical addresses is erased.
  • the system only provides the user with an instruction selection related to data deletion.
  • the user deletes the specified data, only the mapping relationship between the logical address and the physical address of the specified data storage is deleted, and the storage medium still substantially retains the mapping relationship.
  • the data is specified, and the storage data is released from the dirty data collection process after the storage system is idle for a certain period of time, or after the storage system is running for a certain period of time.
  • the user is provided with data.
  • the selection of the secure erase after receiving the data security erase command information, erases the data in the corresponding storage unit corresponding to all the physical addresses corresponding to the logical address storing the specified data, so that the data specified by the user can be completely Erasing in the storage medium effectively protects the user's security information.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a data security erasure method according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of another data security erasure method according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a structural diagram of another data security erasing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the user may select whether the data needs to be securely erased, and if the user has no choice, it may directly default to the normal deletion in the prior art; it should be noted that, in the embodiment of the present invention, The deletion is an operation at the user level, and the erasure according to the embodiment of the present invention is an operation at the storage medium level, and the data that the user thinks has been deleted may actually exist on the storage medium (no erasure is performed);
  • the system when the user selects the data "secure erase" command, the system sends the data security erase command information to the storage system, and the storage system may be a non-volatile storage system, such as an SSD; Step 12: By searching The pre-maintained mapping relationship table acquires all the physical addresses corresponding to the logical addresses of the data storage, and erases data in the storage units corresponding to all the obtained physical addresses, where each time the data is written to the physical address When the unit is stored, the mapping between the physical address and the logical address of the data write is established in
  • mapping relationship In the mapping relationship provided by the embodiment of the present invention, whenever there is data written to the corresponding storage unit of the physical address, the mapping relationship between the physical address of the write data and the logical address is established in the mapping relationship, regardless of the data in the storage system. Migration, or user rewriting data, as long as data is written to the corresponding storage unit of the physical address, a mapping relationship is added, so that the mapping data can find specific data or all physical versions of the specific data stored in the storage medium. address.
  • the system only provides the user with an instruction selection related to data deletion.
  • the user deletes the specified data, only the mapping relationship between the logical address and the physical address of the specified data storage is deleted, and the storage medium still substantially retains the mapping relationship.
  • the data is specified, and the storage data is released from the dirty data collection process after the storage system is idle for a certain period of time, or after the storage system is running for a certain period of time.
  • the user is provided with data.
  • the secure erase selection after receiving the data secure erase command information, corresponds to the logical address where the specified data is stored.
  • Step 200 Receive data security erasure instruction information, where the instruction information includes a data logical address that needs to be securely erased;
  • Step 202 Find the pre-maintained mapping table and obtain all the physical addresses corresponding to the logical address of the data storage. It should be noted that, for garbage collection and other requirements, the data written to a logical address will be migrated to the storage process.
  • mapping relational tables When a user writes new data, a mapping relationship between a logical address and a physical address written by the new data is established in the mapping relationship.
  • the logic of adding the specific data in the mapping relationship is added.
  • the mapping relationship between the address and the logical address stored after the migration; or when the user modifies the data on the original logical address, the mapping relationship between the logical address of the data and the logical address of the modified data storage is added in the mapping relationship, in short, in the physical
  • the physical address is indexed, when the data on the corresponding storage unit of the physical address is erased, the logical address corresponding to the erased data is 0; wherein the pre-maintained mapping table does not limit the specific performance. Or storage form, as long as the maintenance mapping relationship can be implemented;
  • the specific data is written in the corresponding storage unit in the physical address by the maintenance of the second mapping table, the specific data is added to the physical address in the mapping relationship between the logical address and the physical address of the specific data in the mapping relationship.
  • the new physical address is stored, and the previous physical address that still stores the specific data and the old version of the specific data is retained.
  • the specific data may be the old version before the user modified; the logical address of the data and all the stored data or the
  • the mapping table of physical addresses of different versions of data can be indexed by physical address, assuming that the data storage unit is in block-level units, as shown in Table 1: Table 1
  • Step 204 Determine the current Whether the storage unit of all physical addresses corresponding to the data to be securely erased contains valid data other than the data to be erased, if yes, proceed to step 206; if no, proceed to step 208;
  • the physical address obtained for securely erasing data may be a physical address range, and the storage unit corresponding to the obtained physical address may contain valid data, and the valid data needs to be migrated before erasing the block, specifically
  • the operation may be to move a valid page in the block to a storage unit of another physical address; in the embodiment of the present invention, the storage Yuan said storage medium a data erasing unit or the reading unit, which can be defined according to the actual size, this embodiment does not limit the embodiment of the present invention;
  • Step 206 Migrate valid data in the storage unit to a storage unit in another physical address
  • the data security erasure method provided in FIG. 2 provides a method for quickly erasing user-specified data, and the previously stored mapping table can quickly locate the storage location in the storage medium corresponding to the logical address of the specified data storage. Thereby quickly erasing, while achieving secure erasure of data, improving The erasing efficiency.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a data security erasing apparatus, including: an instruction information receiving unit 31, configured to receive data security erasure instruction information, where the instruction information includes a logical address of a data that needs to be securely erased;
  • the "secure erase" in the embodiment indicates that the user needs to completely erase the specified data from the storage medium and the different version data generated by the user to modify the specified data.
  • the user may select whether the data needs to be selected. If the user has no choice, the user can directly default to the normal deletion in the prior art.
  • the “delete” mentioned in the embodiment of the present invention is directed to the operation at the user level, and the present invention is implemented.
  • the erasure described in the example is an operation at the storage medium level, and the data that the user thinks has been deleted may actually exist on the storage medium (no erasure is performed), and the data is completely deleted only after the actual erasure is performed;
  • the mapping relationship maintenance unit 32 is configured to establish a mapping relationship between the physical address and the logical address of the data writing in the mapping relationship whenever data is written to the corresponding storage unit of the physical address;
  • the erasing unit 33 is configured to obtain all the physical addresses corresponding to the logical addresses of the data storage by searching the pre-maintained mapping relationship table, and erasing the data in the storage units corresponding to all the obtained physical addresses;
  • the mapping relationship maintenance unit 32 can maintain the physical address and the logical address mapping relationship through the mapping relationship table.
  • the mapping relationship table is indexed by a logical address
  • the physical address corresponding to the logical address corresponds to the data on the storage unit. After being safely erased, the corresponding physical address can be identified as 0. If the physical address is indexed, when the data on the corresponding storage unit of the physical address is erased, the corresponding logical address is identified as 0.
  • the mapping relationship maintenance unit establishes a mapping relationship between the physical address of the write data and the logical address in the mapping relationship, regardless of the data.
  • the system only provides the user with an instruction selection involving data deletion.
  • the user deletes the specified data
  • only the mapping relationship between the logical address and the physical address of the specified data storage is deleted, and the storage is performed.
  • the specified data is still substantially stored in the medium, and the dirty data recovery process is released to release the storage space after the storage system has a free space lower than a preset value or after the storage system runs for a certain period of time.
  • the device provided in the example provides the user with a choice of whether to perform data security erasure. After receiving the data security erasure instruction information, the physical data corresponding to the logical address storing the specified data corresponds to the data in the storage unit. All erased, so that the user-specified data can be completely erased from the storage medium, effectively protecting the user's security information.
  • data written to a certain logical address may be migrated to another physical address in the storage process and the logical address is unchanged, and the modified data is written by the user.
  • the physical address is corresponding to the storage unit and the logical address is unchanged, therefore, different versions of data or data may be stored in multiple physical addresses. In order to ensure information security, all physical entities are required. The data stored on the address corresponding storage unit is erased. Therefore, in the embodiment of the present invention, it is necessary to maintain a mapping relationship table of the same logical address of a data storage and all physical addresses storing the data and the old version of the data.
  • the physical address obtained in the embodiment of the present invention for securely erasing data may be a physical address range, and the storage unit corresponding to the acquired physical address may contain valid data, and valid data needs to be erased before the block is erased.
  • the migration may be performed by moving the valid page in the block to the storage unit of the other physical address.
  • the storage unit represents a data erasing unit or a reading unit in the storage medium, and the size may be defined according to actual conditions.
  • the embodiment of the invention is not limited;
  • the structure of the instruction information receiving unit and the mapping relationship maintenance unit are the same as those of the foregoing embodiment, and the erasing unit 33 may include:
  • the searching unit 401 is configured to search for a pre-maintained mapping relationship, and obtain all physical addresses corresponding to the logical addresses of the data storage;
  • the determining unit 402 is configured to determine whether a data erasing instruction is included in the storage unit corresponding to the obtained physical address; if not, directly outputting the data erasing instruction;
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a storage system, including the data security erasing device provided in the foregoing embodiment; wherein the storage system may be a non-volatile storage system, such as an SSD.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Bioethics (AREA)
  • General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)

Description

数据安全擦除方法及装置 本申请要求于 2011 年 01 月 30 日提交中国专利局、 申请号为 201110035551.8、 发明名称为"数据安全擦除方法及装置"的中国专利申请的优 先权, 其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本发明涉及存储技术领域, 尤其是一种数据安全擦除方法及装置。
背景技术
固态硬盘 ( Solid State Drive )也称作电子硬盘或者固态电子盘, 是由控制 单元和固态存储单元(例如 NAND FLASH芯片 )组成的硬盘。 与传统磁盘写 过程不同, SSD写入数据后可以多次执行读操作,但在执行写数据之前先对该 位置进行擦除操作, 然后才能再写入新数据。 为避免频繁执行擦除操作对 SSD寿命的影响, 以及在每次擦除数据时对 有效数据的搬移, 因此, 现有技术中 SSD在执行写操作时, 通常都是在新的 物理地址对应存储单元写入新数据,而不会擦除原地址数据后在原地址中写入 新数据, 从而有效地避免对存储介质的频繁擦除。 但发明人发现,现有技术中当用户需要在指定地址写入新数据而覆盖原数 据, 或者需要删除指定位置的数据时, 只是清除了数据的逻辑地址和物理地址 之间的映射关系,显示给用户的信息表明原有的数据已经被覆盖或删除,但实 质上, 原有数据仍然存在, 通过专业技术人员能够读取该数据, 因此现有技术 无法保证被删除数据信息不被泄漏。
发明内容
本发明实施例提供一种数据安全擦除方法及装置,使得用户指定的数据能 够彻底从存储介质中擦除, 有效保护了用户的安全信息。
本发明实施例提供一种数据安全擦除方法, 包括:
接收数据安全擦除指令信息,所述指令信息中包括需要安全擦除的数据的 逻辑地址;
通过查找预先维护的映射关系, 获取所述逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地 址, 对获取的物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行擦除; 其中,每当有数据写入物理地址对应的存储单元中时,在映射关系中建立 所述数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系。
本发明实施例提供一种数据安全擦除装置, 包括:
指令信息接收单元, 用于接收数据安全擦除指令信息, 所述指令信息中包 括需要安全擦除的数据的逻辑地址;
映射关系维护单元, 用于每当有数据写入物理地址对应的存储单元中时, 在映射关系中建立所述数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系; 擦除单元, 用于通过查找所述映射关系, 获取所述数据存储的逻辑地址所 对应的所有物理地址,对获取的所有物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行擦 除。
现有技术中, 系统仅提供给用户涉及数据删除的指令选择, 当用户删除指 定数据时,仅删除指定数据存储的逻辑地址和物理地址之间的映射关系,存储 介质中实质上依然保存有该指定数据,而通常是在存储系统的空闲空间低于预 设值之后, 或者存储系统运行一定时间之后等情况下, 启动脏数据回收流程释 放存储空间; 本发明实施例, 给用户提供是否进行数据安全擦除的选择, 在接 收到数据安全擦除指令信息后,通过对存储有指定数据的逻辑地址所对应的所 有物理地址对应存储单元中的数据均擦除,使得用户指定的数据能够彻底从存 储介质中擦除, 有效保护了用户的安全信息。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案, 下面将对实 施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍,显而易见地, 下面描 述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例,对于本领域普通技术人员来讲,在不 付出创造性劳动性的前提下, 还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。 图 1为本发明实施例所提供的数据安全擦除方法流程图; 图 2为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据安全擦除方法流程图; 图 3为本发明实施例所提供的一种数据安全擦除装置结构图; 图 4为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据安全擦除装置结构图。
具体实施方式
为使本发明的目的、技术方案和优点更加清楚, 下面将结合附图对本发明 实施方式作进一步地详细描述。应当理解, 此处所描述的具体实施方式仅仅用 以解释本发明, 并不用于限定本发明。 参见图 1 , 本发明提供一种数据安全擦除方法, 包括: 步骤 10: 接收数据安全擦除指令信息, 指令信息中包括需要安全擦除的 数据逻辑地址; 其中, 所述"安全擦除"在本实施例中表示擦除后的数据不可恢复, 例如用 户从存储介质上彻底擦除指定数据以及用户修改指定数据所产生的数据不同 版本。 在具体实施中, 可以由用户选择是否需要对数据进行安全擦除, 而如果 用户没有选择, 可以直接默认为现有技术中的普通删除; 需要说明的是, 本发 明实施例中提到的"删除"是针对用户层面的操作,而本发明实施例所述的擦除 是存储介质层面的操作, 用户认为已删除的数据, 实际上有可能在存储介质上 还存在 (没有执行擦除) ; 本发明实施例中, 当用户选择数据"安全擦除"指令, 系统将数据安全擦除 指令信息发送给存储系统,所述存储系统可以是非易失性存储系统,例如 SSD; 步骤 12: 通过查找预先维护的映射关系表, 获取所述数据存储的逻辑地址 所对应的所有物理地址 ,对获取的所有物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行 擦除, 其中, 每当有数据写入物理地址对应存储单元时, 映射关系中建立所述 数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系。
本发明实施例所提供的映射关系中,每当有数据写入物理地址对应存储单 元, 映射关系中将会建立写入数据物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关系, 无论 数据在存储系统中的迁移, 或是用户改写数据, 只要有数据写入物理地址对应 存储单元, 都会增加一个映射关系, 这样, 映射关系中可以查找到特定数据或 者该特定数据的不同版本在存储介质中存储的所有物理地址。
现有技术中, 系统仅提供给用户涉及数据删除的指令选择, 当用户删除指 定数据时,仅删除指定数据存储的逻辑地址和物理地址之间的映射关系,存储 介质中实质上依然保存有该指定数据,而通常是在存储系统的空闲空间低于预 设值之后, 或者存储系统运行一定时间之后等情况下, 启动脏数据回收流程释 放存储空间; 本发明实施例, 给用户提供是否进行数据安全擦除的选择, 在接 收到数据安全擦除指令信息后,通过对存储有指定数据的逻辑地址所对应的所 有物理地址对应存储单元中的数据均擦除,使得用户指定的数据能够彻底从存 储介质中擦除, 有效保护了用户的安全信息。 结合图 2, 对本发明实施例所提供的一种数据安全擦除方法进行详细描 述, 包括: 步骤 200: 接收数据安全擦除指令信息, 指令信息中包括需要安全擦除的 数据逻辑地址; 步骤 202: 查找预先维护的映射关系表, 获取数据存储的逻辑地址对应的 所有物理地址的; 需要说明的是,通常为了垃圾回收等需求, 写入某一逻辑地址的数据会在 存储过程中发生迁移到其他物理地址上而逻辑地址不变的情况, 以及, 用户修 改后的数据写入到其他物理地址上而逻辑地址不变的情况, 因此,会出现某一 数据或数据的不同版本在多个物理地址对应存储单元上都有存储的情况,为了 能保证信息安全, 需要将所有物理地址对应存储单元上存储的数据都擦除; 因 此,本发明实施例中需要预先维护一个数据存储的同一逻辑地址和所有存储有 该数据以及数据旧版本的物理地址的映射关系表。 当用户写入新数据时,在映射关系中建立新数据写入的逻辑地址和物理地 址之间的映射关系, 当物理地址对应存储单元中特定数据迁移时,在映射关系 中增加特定数据的逻辑地址与迁移后存储的逻辑地址的映射关系;或者在用户 对原逻辑地址上的数据进行修改时,在映射关系中增加数据逻辑地址与修改后 数据存储的逻辑地址的映射关系, 总之,在物理地址对应存储单元中写入数据 时, 映射关系中就会建立写入数据的物理地址和逻辑地址的映射关系; 每当物理地址对应存储单元中的数据被擦除时,在所述映射关系表中清除 被擦除数据的物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关系,具体实施中清除的方式可 以是: 当映射关系表以逻辑地址为索引时, 当逻辑地址所对应的物理地址对应 存储单元上的数据被安全擦除后, 被擦除数据对应的物理地址上可以标识为 0; 如果以物理地址为索引时, 当物理地址对应存储单元上的数据被擦除后, 被擦除数据对应的逻辑地址标识为 0; 其中,预先维护的映射关系表不限定具 体的表现或存储形式, 只要能实现维护映射关系这个功能就可以; 其中,通过对第二映射表的维护, 当物理地址对应存储单元中写入特定数 据时,在映射关系中特定数据的逻辑地址与物理地址的映射关系中,在物理地 址中增加所述特定数据存储的新的物理地址,并保留当前仍然存储所述特定数 据以及特定数据旧版本的以前的物理地址,特定数据可能是用户修改之前的旧 版本; 数据的逻辑地址和所有存储有该数据或该数据不同版本的物理地址的映 射关系表, 可以通过物理地址来索引, 假设数据存储单元以块级为单位, 如下 表 1 : 表 1
Figure imgf000007_0001
以特定数据迁移为例, 当逻辑地址 LBA6所写入的数据迁移到 PA3 , 则添 加 PA3和 LBA6的对应关系到映射表中, 因此上表中物理地址 PA1和 PA3都 对应逻辑地址 LBA6; 逻辑地址 LBA6上的数据在物理地址 PA1和 PA3上都 存在, 当物理地址对应存储单元上的数据被擦除后, 逻辑地址可以标识为 0; 也可以通过逻辑地址来索引,假设数据存储单元以块级为单位,如下表 2: 表 2 数据块逻辑地 数据块的物理
址 地址
LBA1 PA6 PA7
PA8 LBA2 PA5 PA4
LBA3 0
仍以特定数据迁移为例, 当 LBA1 中的数据被迁移到 PA6, 则增加 PA6 与 LBA1的对应关系, 因此从表 2中可以看出 LBA1对应的物理地址有 PA6、 PA7、 PA8, 意味着写入 LBA1的数据在 PA6、 PA7、 PA8中都存储了; 当逻 辑地址所对应的物理地址对应存储单元上的数据被安全擦除后 ,对应的物理地 址上可以标识为 0; 步骤 204: 判断当前需要安全擦除的数据所对应的所有物理地址的存储单 元中, 是否包含除待擦除数据之外的有效数据, 如果是, 则进行步骤 206; 如 果否, 则进入步骤 208; 本发明实施例中为了安全擦除数据所获得的物理地址可以是一个物理地 址范围, 获取的物理地址所对应的存储单元中, 可能会包含有效数据, 需要在 擦除 block之前对其中的有效数据进行迁移, 具体操作可以是将 block中有效 页搬移到其他物理地址的存储单元中;本发明实施例中存储单元表示存储介质 中数据擦除单元或读取单元, 其大小可根据实际情况定义, 本发明实施例不做 限制;
步骤 206: 将所述存储单元中有效数据迁移至其他物理地址中的存储单元 中;
步骤 208: 将通过查找映射关系表获取的所有物理地址对应存储单元中的 数据进行擦除; 为了避免维护的映射关系表数据庞大, 如前所述, 本实施例还可以包括: 步骤 209: 每当物理地址对应存储单元中的数据被擦除时, 在所述映射关 系中清除被擦除数据的物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关系。
图 2所提供的数据安全擦除方法,提供了一个快速擦除用户指定数据的方 法 ,通过之前所维护的映射关系表能够很快定位指定数据存储的逻辑地址对应 的在存储介质中的存储位置从而快速擦除,在实现安全擦除数据的同时,提高 了擦除效率。 参见图 3 , 本发明实施例还提供一种数据安全擦除装置, 包括: 指令信息接收单元 31 , 用于接收数据安全擦除指令信息, 指令信息中包 括需要安全擦除的数据逻辑地址; 其中,所述"安全擦除"在本实施例中表示用户需要从存储介质上彻底擦除 指定数据以及用户修改指定数据所产生的不同版本数据,在具体实施中, 可以 由用户选择是否需要对数据进行安全擦除, 而如果用户没有选择, 可以直接默 认为现有技术中的普通删除; 需要说明的是, 本发明实施例中提到的"删除" 是针对用户层面的操作, 而本发明实施例所述的擦除是存储介质层面的操作, 用户认为已删除的数据, 实际上有可能在存储介质上还存在(没有执行擦除), 只有真正执行擦除后, 数据才被彻底删除;
映射关系维护单元 32, 用于每当有数据写入物理地址对应存储单元时, 映射关系中建立所述数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系;
擦除单元 33 , 用于通过查找预先维护的映射关系表获取所述数据存储的 逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地址,对获取的所有物理地址所对应存储单元中的 数据进行擦除;
其中, 映射关系维护单元 32可以通过映射关系表对物理地址和逻辑地址 映射关系进行维护, 当所述映射关系表以逻辑地址为索引时, 当逻辑地址所对 应的物理地址对应存储单元上的数据被安全擦除后 ,对应的物理地址上可以标 识为 0; 如果以物理地址为索引时, 当物理地址对应存储单元上的数据被擦除 后, 对应的逻辑地址标识为 0 。
本发明实施例所提供的装置中, 每当有数据写入物理地址对应存储单元, 映射关系维护单元将会在映射关系中建立写入数据物理地址和逻辑地址之间 的映射关系, 无论数据在存储系统中的迁移, 或是用户改写数据, 只要有数据 写入物理地址对应存储单元, 都会增加一个映射关系, 这样, 映射关系中可以 查找到特定数据或者该特定数据的不同版本在存储介质中存储的所有物理地 址。
现有技术中, 系统仅提供给用户涉及数据删除的指令选择, 当用户删除指 定数据时,仅删除指定数据存储的逻辑地址和物理地址之间的映射关系,存储 介质中实质上依然保存有该指定数据,而通常是在存储系统的空闲空间低于预 设值之后, 或者存储系统运行一定时间之后等情况下, 启动脏数据回收流程释 放存储空间; 本发明实施例中提供的装置,给用户提供是否进行数据安全擦除 的选择,在接收到数据安全擦除指令信息后,通过对存储有指定数据的逻辑地 址所对应的所有物理地址对应存储单元中的数据均擦除,使得用户指定的数据 能够彻底从存储介质中擦除, 有效保护了用户的安全信息。
本发明实施例中,通常为了垃圾回收等需求, 写入某一逻辑地址的数据会 在存储过程中发生迁移到其他物理地址上而逻辑地址不变的情况, 以及, 用户 修改后的数据写入到其他物理地址对应存储单元上而逻辑地址不变的情况 ,因 此,会出现某一数据或数据的不同版本在多个物理地址上都有存储的情况, 为 了能保证信息安全, 需要将所有物理地址对应存储单元上存储的数据都擦除; 因此,本发明实施例中需要预先维护一个数据存储的同一逻辑地址和所有存储 有该数据以及数据旧版本的物理地址的映射关系表。本发明实施例中为了安全 擦除数据所获得的物理地址可以是一个物理地址范围 ,获取的物理地址所对应 的存储单元中, 可能会包含有效数据, 需要在擦除 block之前对其中的有效数 据进行迁移, 具体操作可以是将 block中有效页搬移到其他物理地址的存储单 元中; 本发明实施例中存储单元表示存储介质中数据擦除单元或读取单元, 其 大小可根据实际情况定义, 本发明实施例不做限制;
因此, 参见图 4所提供的数据安全擦除装置图, 指令信息接收单元和映射 关系维护单元的结构和前述实施例相同, 所述擦除单元 33可以包括:
查找单元 401 , 用于查找预先维护的映射关系, 获取所述数据存储的逻辑 地址所对应的所有物理地址;
判断单元 402, 用于判断获取的物理地址所对应的存储单元中是否包含有 数据擦除指令; 如果否, 直接下发数据擦除指令;
处理单元 403 , 用于根据接收所述判断单元下发的数据擦除指令, 将通过 查找映射关系表获取的所有物理地址对应存储单元中的数据进行擦除。 为避免映射关系维护单元维护庞大的数据, 所述映射关系维护单元 32, 还用于: 每当物理地址对应存储单元中的数据被擦除时,在所述映射关系中清 除被擦除数据的物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关系。 本发明实施例,给用户提供是否进行数据安全擦除的选择,在接收到数据 安全擦除指令信息后 ,通过对存储有指定数据的逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地 址对应存储单元中的数据均擦除,使得用户指定的数据能够彻底从存储介质中 擦除, 有效保护了用户的安全信息。 本发明实施例还提供一种存储系统,包括前述实施例中所提供的数据安全 擦除装置; 其中, 存储系统可以是非易失性存储系统, 例如 SSD。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分步骤 是可以通过程序来指令相关的硬件来完成,所述程序可以存储于计算机可读取 存储介质中, 所述存储介质为 ROM/RAM、 磁碟、 光盘等。
以上所述,仅为本发明的具体实施方式,但本发明的保护范围并不局限于 此,任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本发明揭露的技术范围内, 可轻易想到 变化或替换, 都应涵盖在本发明的保护范围之内。 因此, 本发明的保护范围应 所述以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims

权 利 要 求
1、 一种数据安全擦除方法, 其特征在于, 包括:
接收数据安全擦除指令信息,所述指令信息中包括需要安全擦除的数据的 逻辑地址;
通过查找预先维护的映射关系, 获取所述逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地 址, 对获取的物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行擦除;
其中,每当有数据写入物理地址对应的存储单元中时,在映射关系中建立 所述数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系。
2、 根据权利要求 1所述的数据安全擦除方法, 其特征在于, 所述通过查 找预先维护的映射关系, 获取所述逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地址,对获取的 物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行擦除, 包括:
查找预先维护的映射关系 ,获取所述数据存储的逻辑地址所对应的所有物 理地址;
判断获取的物理地址所对应的存储单元中是否包含有效数据,如果是, 则 的数据擦除, 如果否, 则将所获取的存储单元中的数据进行擦除。
3、 根据权利要求 1或 2所述的数据安全擦除方法, 其特征在于, 该方法 还包括: 物理地址对应存储单元中的数据被擦除后,在所述映射关系中清除被 擦除数据的物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关系。
4、 根据权利要求 1或 2所述的数据安全擦除方法, 其特征在于, 如果所述映射关系表以逻辑地址为索引,当逻辑地址所对应的物理地址对 应存储单元上的数据被安全擦除后, 对应的物理地址上可以标识为 0;
如果所述映射关系表以物理地址为索引,当物理地址对应存储单元上的数 据被擦除后, 对应的逻辑地址标识为 0 。
5、 一种数据安全擦除装置, 其特征在于, 包括:
指令信息接收单元, 用于接收数据安全擦除指令信息, 所述指令信息中包 括需要安全擦除的数据的逻辑地址;
映射关系维护单元, 用于每当有数据写入物理地址对应的存储单元中时, 在映射关系中建立所述数据写入的物理地址与逻辑地址之间的映射关系; 擦除单元, 用于通过查找所述映射关系, 获取所述数据存储的逻辑地址所 对应的所有物理地址,对获取的所有物理地址所对应存储单元中的数据进行擦 除。
6、 根据权利要求 5所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述擦除单元包括: 查找单元, 用于查找预先维护的映射关系, 获取所述需要安全擦除的数据 存储的逻辑地址所对应的所有物理地址;
判断单元,用于判断获取的物理地址所对应的存储单元中是否包含有效数 据, 如果是, 则将所述存储单元中有效数据迁移至其他存储单元后, 下发数据 擦除指令; 如果否, 直接下发数据擦除指令;
处理单元, 用于根据接收所述判断单元下发的数据擦除指令,将通过查找 映射关系表获取的所有物理地址对应存储单元中的数据进行擦除。
7、 根据权利要求 5或 6所述的装置, 其特征在于:
所述映射关系维护单元, 还用于物理地址对应存储单元中的数据被擦除 后, 在所述映射关系中清除被擦除数据的物理地址和逻辑地址之间的映射关 系。
8、 根据权利要求 5或 6所述的装置, 其特征在于:
所述映射关系维护单元通过映射关系表对物理地址和逻辑地址映射关系 进行维护,如果所述映射关系表以逻辑地址为索引时, 当逻辑地址所对应的物 理地址的存储单元中的数据被安全擦除后, 对应的物理地址上可以标识为 0; 如果所述映射关系表以物理地址为索引时,当物理地址的存储单元中的数 据被擦除后, 对应的逻辑地址标识为 0 。
9、 根据权利要求 5或 6所述的装置, 其特征在于:
所述数据安全擦除装置为固态硬盘。
PCT/CN2012/070650 2011-01-30 2012-01-20 数据安全擦除方法及装置 WO2012100730A2 (zh)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201110035551.8 2011-01-30
CN201110035551.8A CN102622309B (zh) 2011-01-30 2011-01-30 数据安全擦除方法及装置

Publications (2)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2012100730A2 true WO2012100730A2 (zh) 2012-08-02
WO2012100730A3 WO2012100730A3 (zh) 2012-09-20

Family

ID=46562236

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2012/070650 WO2012100730A2 (zh) 2011-01-30 2012-01-20 数据安全擦除方法及装置

Country Status (2)

Country Link
CN (1) CN102622309B (zh)
WO (1) WO2012100730A2 (zh)

Families Citing this family (19)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102929792B (zh) * 2012-11-12 2016-03-30 华为技术有限公司 数据移动方法和系统、存储设备和主机
JP2015191336A (ja) * 2014-03-27 2015-11-02 キヤノン株式会社 メモリ制御装置、情報処理装置とその制御方法、及びプログラム
EP3133604B1 (en) * 2015-08-17 2020-11-11 Harman Becker Automotive Systems GmbH Method and device for fail-safe erase of flash memory
CN105302485B (zh) * 2015-10-19 2018-01-26 福州瑞芯微电子股份有限公司 一种安全擦除方法及装置
CN105824577B (zh) * 2016-03-10 2018-09-28 福州瑞芯微电子股份有限公司 一种优化安全擦除的方法以及系统
CN106201659B (zh) 2016-07-12 2019-07-05 腾讯科技(深圳)有限公司 一种虚拟机热迁移的方法及宿主机
CN106293873B (zh) * 2016-07-29 2019-11-05 北京北信源软件股份有限公司 一种准确获取虚拟机控制块(vmcs)中关键数据位置的方法
CN107870732B (zh) * 2016-09-23 2020-12-25 伊姆西Ip控股有限责任公司 从固态存储设备冲刷页面的方法和设备
CN106599699B (zh) * 2016-11-01 2020-06-09 惠州Tcl移动通信有限公司 一种移动终端内实现数据安全删除的方法及系统
CN107766000A (zh) * 2017-10-16 2018-03-06 北京易讯通信息技术股份有限公司 一种云计算中基于分布式存储的数据安全擦除方法
EP3696681B1 (en) * 2017-11-07 2023-12-20 Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. Memory block recovery method and device
CN109783023A (zh) * 2019-01-04 2019-05-21 平安科技(深圳)有限公司 一种数据下刷的方法和相关装置
CN110007875B (zh) * 2019-04-15 2022-07-08 苏州浪潮智能科技有限公司 一种有效数据的迁移方法、装置及设备
CN114518834B (zh) * 2020-11-18 2023-10-27 中移物联网有限公司 一种信息存储方法、装置及电子设备
CN112559564B (zh) * 2020-11-19 2022-08-12 山东云海国创云计算装备产业创新中心有限公司 一种应用层状态信息的存取方法、装置和介质
CN112632043B (zh) * 2021-01-26 2021-08-17 浙江争游网络科技有限公司 一种数据仓库优化方法和装置
CN114400037B (zh) * 2021-12-24 2023-03-24 珠海妙存科技有限公司 Nand擦除方法、装置及可读存储介质
CN115469801B (zh) * 2022-08-16 2023-06-06 上海江波龙数字技术有限公司 存储设备的格式化方法及相关设备
CN115576504A (zh) * 2022-12-09 2023-01-06 紫光同芯微电子有限公司 一种Flash存储器写入数据的方法及装置

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1351350A (zh) * 2000-10-27 2002-05-29 岳京星 闪存中存储块的分区及读写信息标识的方法
CN101030167A (zh) * 2007-01-17 2007-09-05 忆正存储技术(深圳)有限公司 闪存的区块管理方法
CN101673243A (zh) * 2009-09-29 2010-03-17 威盛电子股份有限公司 数据储存装置与方法
CN101714065A (zh) * 2009-11-24 2010-05-26 西安奇维测控科技有限公司 一种闪存控制器的映射信息管理方法

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN1351350A (zh) * 2000-10-27 2002-05-29 岳京星 闪存中存储块的分区及读写信息标识的方法
CN101030167A (zh) * 2007-01-17 2007-09-05 忆正存储技术(深圳)有限公司 闪存的区块管理方法
CN101673243A (zh) * 2009-09-29 2010-03-17 威盛电子股份有限公司 数据储存装置与方法
CN101714065A (zh) * 2009-11-24 2010-05-26 西安奇维测控科技有限公司 一种闪存控制器的映射信息管理方法

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN102622309A (zh) 2012-08-01
WO2012100730A3 (zh) 2012-09-20
CN102622309B (zh) 2016-03-30

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
WO2012100730A2 (zh) 数据安全擦除方法及装置
US8521949B2 (en) Data deleting method and apparatus
US20220075548A1 (en) Selective erasure of data in a ssd
US9489297B2 (en) Pregroomer for storage array
US8838875B2 (en) Systems, methods and computer program products for operating a data processing system in which a file delete command is sent to an external storage device for invalidating data thereon
US9053007B2 (en) Memory system, controller, and method for controlling memory system
KR101813786B1 (ko) Ssd 상의 기록-시-복사를 위한 시스템 및 방법
US20170139825A1 (en) Method of improving garbage collection efficiency of flash-oriented file systems using a journaling approach
WO2012100726A1 (zh) 无效数据擦除方法、装置及系统
US9785547B2 (en) Data management apparatus and method
WO2014139184A1 (zh) 用于闪存存储器的数据擦除方法及装置
US10114576B2 (en) Storage device metadata synchronization
JP2015507798A (ja) メモリ・モジュールにおいてデータ・エンティティを消去するための方法
US9983826B2 (en) Data storage device deferred secure delete
JP2015507798A5 (zh)
KR20120081351A (ko) Ftl을 수행하는 비휘발성 메모리 장치 및 그의 제어 방법
WO2021068517A1 (zh) 一种存储数据整理方法与装置
JP2007265492A (ja) データ消去機能付きディスク装置
WO2017000821A1 (zh) 存储系统、存储管理装置、存储器、混合存储装置及存储管理方法
JP5729479B2 (ja) 仮想テープ装置及び仮想テープ装置の制御方法
EP4372540A1 (en) Techniques for zoned namespace (zns) storage using multiple zones
US20140281581A1 (en) Storage Device
KR20140113103A (ko) 호스트 및 메모리 시스템을 포함하는 사용자 시스템의 동작 방법
KR102282006B1 (ko) 컴퓨터 장치 및 저장 장치
JP2015014963A (ja) ストレージ制御装置、制御プログラム及び制御方法

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 12739583

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2

NENP Non-entry into the national phase in:

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 12739583

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A2