WO2012083652A1 - 一种具有链路层加解密能力的终端设备及其数据处理方法 - Google Patents
一种具有链路层加解密能力的终端设备及其数据处理方法 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2012083652A1 WO2012083652A1 PCT/CN2011/075854 CN2011075854W WO2012083652A1 WO 2012083652 A1 WO2012083652 A1 WO 2012083652A1 CN 2011075854 W CN2011075854 W CN 2011075854W WO 2012083652 A1 WO2012083652 A1 WO 2012083652A1
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 16
- 238000003672 processing method Methods 0.000 claims description 15
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 238000010276 construction Methods 0.000 claims description 5
- 238000004364 calculation method Methods 0.000 claims description 4
- 239000000284 extract Substances 0.000 claims description 4
- 238000004458 analytical method Methods 0.000 claims 4
- 238000010511 deprotection reaction Methods 0.000 claims 2
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 abstract description 10
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000006855 networking Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012544 monitoring process Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/16—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer
- H04L63/162—Implementing security features at a particular protocol layer at the data link layer
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
Definitions
- the invention belongs to the field of network security, and relates to a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability and a data processing method thereof.
- Wired LANs are generally broadcast networks. Data sent by one node can be received by other nodes. Each node on the network shares a channel, which brings great security risks to the network. As long as the attacker accesses the network for monitoring, it can capture all the packets on the network.
- the LAN does not provide a method of data privacy, which makes it easy for an attacker to steal critical information.
- the link layer data packets are transmitted in the network in clear text, and the transmitted information is easily intercepted, which poses a large security risk.
- IEEE 802.1AE provides a hop-by-hop encryption link layer data privacy method for LANs. This mechanism restricts the terminal device to encrypt and decrypt data frames at the link layer only by using the key with the nearest access switching device. For processing, the data packet may not be encrypted or decrypted at the link layer by directly using a key with other terminal devices or other switching devices.
- This link layer processing mode of the IEEE 802.1AE-enabled terminal device makes the calculation load of the nearest access switching device heavy; and because the data frame constructed in this way requires each switching device on the link to decrypt and re-encrypt The forwarding operation can reach the destination terminal device, and the data transmission delay is large; and the IEEE 802.1AE-enabled terminal device does not support the hybrid networking of the general switching device and the IEEE 802.1AE-enabled switching device.
- the embodiment of the present invention provides a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability and a data processing method thereof.
- the embodiment of the invention provides a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability, and the terminal device is provided.
- the link layer processing module includes a control module, a data frame encryption processing module, a data frame decryption processing module, a key management module, an algorithm module, a sending port, and a receiving port.
- the control module passes The data frame encryption processing module accesses the sending port; the receiving port accesses the control module through the data frame decryption processing module; the control module is connected to the key management module; and the data frame encryption processing module passes the key management module and the data
- the frame decryption processing module is connected; the data frame encryption processing module is connected to the data frame decryption processing module by the algorithm module;
- the control module has policy management and control capabilities
- the key management module has a link layer key management capability, and is established between the terminal device and other terminal devices in the network and/or between the terminal device and the switching device in the network according to the policy requirements of the control module.
- a shared key and is responsible for storing, updating, or deleting management operations of the key;
- the established shared key is pre-shared or negotiated after the terminal device successfully authenticates with other terminal devices or switching devices;
- the data frame encryption processing module After receiving the user data that needs to be sent out, the data frame encryption processing module obtains a corresponding key by interacting with the key management module, and then invokes an algorithm module to implement encryption processing on the user data to obtain a confidentiality of the user data. And constructing a link layer to encrypt the data frame, and sending the encrypted data frame through the sending port;
- the data frame decryption processing module After receiving the data frame through the receiving port, the data frame decryption processing module obtains a corresponding key by interacting with the key management module, and then calls the algorithm module to decrypt the data frame to obtain the plaintext information of the user data. And submit the plaintext information to the upper layer through the control module;
- the algorithm module relates to an encryption and decryption algorithm and/or an integrity check algorithm.
- the embodiment of the invention further provides a data processing method for a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability, the method comprising:
- the link layer control module of the terminal device receives user data that is sent by the upper layer and needs to be sent by the link layer;
- the control module selects the link layer encryption protocol type and the security processing policy to be used according to the local policy; and selects the selected link layer encryption protocol type, the security processing policy, and the user data information. Sending a data frame encryption processing module;
- the data frame encryption processing module processes the user data according to the corresponding link layer encryption protocol and the security processing policy, determines whether the user data needs to be encrypted, and constructs Frame A1;
- the data frame encryption processing module sends the constructed Frame A1 through the sending port, thereby completing the transmission of the link layer data frame;
- the terminal device receives the data frame Frame A2 sent to the terminal device through the physical layer, and passes the received data frame Frame A2 to the data frame decryption processing module through the receiving port;
- the data frame decryption processing module determines the corresponding link layer encryption protocol according to the received data frame Frame A2;
- the data frame decryption processing module determines whether the user data is plaintext according to the corresponding link layer encryption protocol, and parses Frame A2 to obtain user data:
- the data frame decryption processing module submits the obtained plaintext of the user data to the upper layer through the control module, thereby completing the reception of the link layer data frame;
- the frame A1 is a data frame sent by the terminal device through the sending port; the frame
- A2 is the data frame received by the terminal device through the receiving port.
- the terminal device with the link layer encryption and decryption capability in the embodiment of the present invention can maintain the shared key with other terminal devices in the network and the key between the other switching devices, and can directly use the destination terminal device when transmitting the data frame.
- the security of the data frame between the key or the key exchange with other switching devices can effectively reduce the computational burden of the access switching device closest to the terminal device and reduce the data transmission delay.
- the terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability can support standard ISO/IEC 8802-3 data frames and various link layer encryption protocol data frames, including IEEE 802.1AE protocol data frames. While implementing forward compatibility, support for various link layer encryption protocols can be implemented, and data frames can be encrypted and decrypted at the link layer to improve network security.
- 1 is a schematic diagram of a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability according to an embodiment of the present invention
- 2 is a schematic diagram of an implementation manner of using an inter-station key according to an embodiment of the present invention
- a link layer processing module of a terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability includes a control module, a data frame encryption processing module, a data frame decryption processing module, a key management module, and an algorithm module.
- the key management module and the algorithm module are both connected to the data frame encryption processing module and the data frame decryption processing module.
- the control module has policy management and control capabilities
- the key management module has a link layer key management capability, and is established between the terminal device and other terminal devices in the network and/or between the terminal device and a switching device in the network according to a policy requirement of the control module.
- the shared key and is responsible for the management operations of storing, updating, and deleting these keys; the established shared key may be pre-shared, or the identity of the terminal device and other terminal devices or switching devices may be successfully authenticated. Established after consultation;
- the data frame encryption processing module After receiving the user data that needs to be sent out, the data frame encryption processing module obtains a corresponding key by interacting with the key management module, and then invokes the algorithm module to implement encryption processing on the user data to obtain user data.
- the ciphertext constructing a link layer to encrypt the data frame, and transmitting the encrypted data frame through the sending port;
- the data frame decryption processing module After receiving the data frame through the receiving port, the data frame decryption processing module obtains a corresponding key by interacting with the key management module, and then invokes the algorithm module to perform decryption processing on the data frame to obtain user data. Clear text information, and the clear text information is delivered to the upper layer through the control module.
- the algorithm module relates to an encryption and decryption algorithm and/or an integrity verification algorithm, and may be a hardware implementation or a software implementation.
- the ISO/IEC 8802-3 data frame also supports the link layer encryption protocol data frame.
- the supported link layer encryption protocol data frame includes a Frame Header field and a Payload field, as shown in Table 1 below: Frame Header Payload
- the Frame Header field indicates the frame header information, as shown in Table 2 below:
- DA field indicates the identifier of the destination node, which is the MAC address of the destination node.
- SA field indicates the identifier of the source node, and the MAC address of the source node.
- Ethertype field indicates an Ethernet type field, which is an Ethernet type field of the link layer encryption protocol; and is used to identify a corresponding link layer encryption protocol and a frame structure;
- the isE field indicates an encryption flag bit, which is used to identify whether the payload of the data frame is plaintext information of the user data or ciphertext information, and the receiver of the data packet regards the field as a determining factor of whether decryption is required;
- Keylndex field an identifier indicating a key for protecting user data (encryption and/or computation integrity check); the key protecting the user data may be a key between the terminal device and the switching device; It may also be a key between the terminal device and the destination terminal device;
- the Payload field which indicates the payload of the data frame, may be plaintext information of the user data or ciphertext information of the user data; when the isE field indicates encryption, the payload is ciphertext information of the user data; when the isE field indicates no encryption , the payload is the plaintext information of the user data;
- a description when describing each field of a data frame, a description will be made using a "frame name. field name".
- the DA field of Frame A1 is recorded as Frame Al .DA
- the Payload field of Frame A2 is recorded as Frame A2. Payload.
- the terminal device of the embodiment of the present invention sends the value of the SA field in the data frame sent by the sending port to the network through the data encryption processing module to the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention sends the data to the data decryption processing module through the receiving port.
- the DA field value in the processed data frame is the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the data frame sent by the terminal device of the embodiment of the present invention through the sending port is recorded as Frame Al;
- the data frame received by the terminal device through the receiving port is recorded as Frame A2;
- the Payload field in the data frame Frame A1 sent by the terminal device in the embodiment of the present invention is the ciphertext information of the user data
- the key used to construct the Frame A1 is KEY1
- the data frame received by the terminal device of the present invention is in the Frame A2
- Payload The field is the ciphertext information of the user data
- the key used to parse Frame A2 is KEY2.
- the upper layer sends the user data that needs to be sent by the link layer to the link layer control module of the terminal device;
- the control module selects the link layer encryption protocol type and the security processing policy to be used according to the local policy; and sends the selected link layer encryption protocol type, the security processing policy and the user data information to the data frame encryption processing module;
- the data frame encryption processing module processes the user data according to the corresponding link layer encryption protocol and the confidential processing strategy, and constructs Frame A1, where:
- Frame A1 is constructed as follows: Frame A1.DA field, value The MAC address of the destination node;
- the frame A1.SA field is the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the Ethertype field is the value of the Ethernet type field of the corresponding link layer encryption protocol.
- Frame Al.keylndex field the value is not limited (this field has no meaning when the user data is not encrypted);
- Payload field the value is user data
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the key management module, and obtains the key KEY1 for encrypting the user data and the identifier keylndex1 of the key KEY1; 1.3.2.2) The data frame encryption processing module invokes the algorithm module to encrypt the user data according to the obtained key KEY1, and obtains the ciphertext of the user data;
- the data frame encryption processing module completes the construction of Frame A1 as follows:
- the Frame A1.DA field is the MAC address of the destination node.
- the frame A1.SA field is the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the Ethertype field is the value of the Ethernet type field of the corresponding link layer encryption protocol.
- Payload field which is a ciphertext of user data
- the data frame encryption processing module sends the constructed Frame Al through the sending port to complete the transmission of the link layer data frame.
- the terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability When the terminal device with link layer encryption and decryption capability provided by the embodiment of the present invention receives the link layer encryption protocol data frame, the operation is as follows:
- the terminal device receives the data frame Frame A2 sent to the terminal device through the physical layer, and passes the received data frame Frame A2 to the data frame decryption processing module through the receiving port;
- the data frame decryption processing module determines the corresponding link layer encryption protocol according to the received data frame Frame A2;
- the data frame decryption processing module parses Frame A2 according to the corresponding link layer encryption protocol to obtain user data, where:
- the data frame decryption processing module submits the frame A2.keyIndex field information to the key management module, and retrieves the key KEY2 for decrypting the Frame A2. Payload; 2.3.2.2) The data frame decryption processing module calls the algorithm module to decrypt the Frame A2. Payload according to the obtained key KEY2, and obtains the plaintext of the user data, and completes the parsing of the Frame A2;
- the data frame decryption processing module submits the obtained plaintext of the user data to the upper layer through the control module, thereby completing the reception of the link layer data frame.
- the link layer encryption protocol data frame supported by the terminal device of the embodiment of the present invention may further include an integrity check MIC field in addition to the frame header Frame Header and the payload Payload; the MIC field is a link layer decryption protocol.
- the integrity check value calculated by all fields or partial fields of the data frame (such as Frame Al, Frame A2) except the MIC field.
- the key for performing security processing on the data frame (such as KEY1, KEY2) includes two parts: an integrity check key and an encryption key;
- the verification key is used to calculate or verify the MIC field;
- the encryption key portion is used to encrypt user data or decrypt the ciphertext of the user data.
- the specific implementation manner of the step 1.3) when the terminal device in the foregoing embodiment of the present invention sends the data frame is:
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the key management module to obtain the key KEY1 for secret processing of the data frame and the identifier of the key KEY1 keylndexl;
- the data frame encryption processing module constructs a field other than the Frame A1.MIC field of Frame A1 as follows:
- Frame Al.DA field the value is the MAC address of the destination node
- the frame A1.SA field is the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the Frame Al.Ethertype field is a value of the Ethernet type field of the corresponding link layer encryption protocol.
- Frame Al. Payload field the value is user data
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the corresponding algorithm module except for Frame A except the Frame A 1.
- MIC field and calculates the value of the Frame Al.MIC field by using the integrity check key of KEY1; The construction of Frame Al;
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the key management module to obtain the key KEY1 for secret processing of the data frame and the identifier of the key KEY1 keylndexl;
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the algorithm module according to the obtained key KEY1, and encrypts the user data by using the encryption key of KEY1 to obtain the ciphertext of the user data;
- the data frame encryption processing module constructs a field of Frame Al except the Frame Al.MIC field as follows:
- Frame Al.DA field the value is the MAC address of the destination node
- the frame A1.SA field is the MAC address of the terminal device.
- the Frame Al.Ethertype field is a value of the Ethernet type field of the corresponding link layer encryption protocol.
- Frame Al .isE field the value is encrypted
- Payload field which is a ciphertext of user data
- the data frame encryption processing module calls the corresponding algorithm module for Frame Al except the frame Al.MIC field, and calculates the Frame Al.MIC field value by using the integrity check key of KEY1; Construction.
- step 2.3 In an implementation manner in which the supported link layer encryption protocol data frame includes the MIC field, when the terminal device of the present invention receives the data frame, the specific implementation manner of step 2.3) is:
- the data frame decryption processing module submits the frame A2.keyIndex field information to the key management module, and retrieves the key KEY2 for performing confidential processing on the Frame A2; 2.3.1.2)
- the data frame decryption processing module uses the obtained integrity check key portion of the key KEY2 to call the algorithm module to verify the correctness of the Frame A2.MIC field in Frame A2; if the Frame A2.MIC is correct, execute Step 2.3.1.3); otherwise, discard the packet;
- the data frame decryption processing module extracts the Frame A2. Payload field as the plaintext of the user data, and completes the parsing of Frame A2;
- the data frame decryption processing module submits the frame A2.keyIndex field information to the key management module, and retrieves the key KEY2 for performing confidential processing on the frame A2;
- the data frame decryption processing module uses the obtained integrity check key of the key KEY2 to call the algorithm module to verify the correctness of the Frame A2.MIC field in Frame A2; if the Frame A2.MIC is correct, the steps are performed. 2.3.2.3); otherwise, discard the packet;
- the data frame decryption processing module uses the obtained encryption key of the key KEY2, and calls the algorithm module to decrypt the Frame A2. Payload, and obtains the plaintext of the user data, and completes the parsing of the Frame A2.
- the encryption and integrity check involved in protecting the user data by the terminal device of the present invention may be implemented as the data frame encryption in step 1.3).
- the processing module first encrypts the user data to construct a Payload field of the payload of the data frame, and then performs integrity check on the data frame to construct an MIC field.
- the data frame decryption processing module in step 2.3) first verifies the MIC field. The correctness, only after determining that the MIC field is correct, decrypting the payload of the data frame Payload field to obtain the plaintext information of the user data, and submit it to the upper layer.
- the encryption and integrity check involved in protecting the user data by the terminal device of the present invention may also be implemented as the data in step 1.3).
- the frame encryption processing module first uses the plaintext of the user data as the payload Payload field, calculates the integrity check on the data frame, constructs the MIC field, encrypts the plaintext of the user data, and updates the payload of the data frame with the obtained user data ciphertext Payload.
- the data frame decryption processing module in step 2.3) first decrypts the payload Payload field of the data frame to obtain the plaintext information of the user data; and then verifies the correctness of the MIC field, and only determines the user data obtained before decrypting the MIC field.
- the plaintext information is valid only before it can be submitted to the upper level.
- the key between the terminal device and the terminal device is an inter-station key.
- any of the embodiments mentioned above may be used in a terminal device when the terminal device is specifically implemented.
- the inter-station key between the STA-A and the terminal device STA-B implements link layer secure transmission. As shown in Figure 2, the link between the end devices STA-B is only required to protect the data frame to be transmitted (encryption and/or calculation) using the inter-station key KEY_AB between the terminal device STA-B. Integrity check); when the terminal device STA-B receives the data frame from the terminal device STA-A, regardless of the terminal device
- the switching device between the terminal device STA-A and the terminal device STA-B does not need to perform encryption and decryption processing on the data frames between them, and can directly forward the data frames.
- the switching device between the terminal device STA-A and the terminal device STA-B may have link layer encryption and decryption capability, or may not have link layer encryption and decryption capability;
- the inter-station key a hybrid networking of a switching device with link layer encryption and decryption capability and a switching device without link layer encryption and decryption capability is supported.
- the MAC header field may also be included in the Frame Header; the MAClist field is used to indicate the specific MAC address list information, and the switching device in the specific MAC address list given by the field needs to encrypt and decrypt the received ciphertext data frame; A switching device outside the specific MAC address list only needs to forward the ciphertext data frame directly unless it is the destination node.
- the presence of the MAClist field allows the switching device to eliminate the need to decrypt, re-encrypt, and forward all data frames to be forwarded.
- the MAClist field may be defined as the first switching layer with link layer encryption and decryption capability on the link from the transmitting terminal device to the destination terminal device, and finally A list of MAC addresses of a switching device with link layer encryption and decryption capabilities.
- Device SW ⁇ SW MAC address of the switching device 2 sent from the terminal apparatus to STA- A data terminal STA-B frame, only the switching device and a switching device SW SWi 2 needs to be decrypted and then re-encrypted forwarding, other switching devices (For example, other switching devices SW M located on the link between the terminal device STA-A and the terminal device STA-B) can be directly forwarded;
- the MAC address of S and SW 2 is transmitted as a MAClist field when constructing the data frame;
- the user data is encrypted in the transmitted data frame, and the MIC field is calculated using the terminal device STA-A and the switching device SWi.
- the key KEY is processed, and the value of key ⁇ keylndexii ⁇ is transmitted to the keylndex field of the data frame;
- the terminal device STA-B When receiving the data frame sent by the terminal device STA-A, the terminal device STA-B, which is the destination terminal device, processes the key KEY 2 with the switching device SW 2 to obtain the plaintext information of the user data.
- the switching device 8 receives the data sent by the terminal device STA-A to the terminal device STA-B.
- the user data is decrypted by using the key 5 identified by the keylndex;
- the switching device SW 2 uses the key KE Y with the STA-B. 2 Encrypt the user data, and update the keylndex2 of ⁇ 2 to the keylndex field in the data frame for transmission.
- the switching device 8 may also be used ⁇ ⁇ encrypted transmission between the key and the switch device SW 2, an embodiment of the present invention is not defined ;
- the STA-A and the terminal equipment between SWr ⁇ , ⁇ between 2 there may be one or more without having to exchange encryption and decryption capability link layer between terminal device SW 2 and STA-B
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Priority Applications (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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US13/995,641 US9009466B2 (en) | 2010-12-20 | 2011-06-17 | Terminal device capable of link layer encryption and decryption and data processing method thereof |
KR1020137019262A KR101421399B1 (ko) | 2010-12-20 | 2011-06-17 | 링크 계층 암호화/복호화 능력을 구비하는 단말 장치 및 그의 데이터 처리 방법 |
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CN2010105966636A CN102130768B (zh) | 2010-12-20 | 2010-12-20 | 一种具有链路层加解密能力的终端设备及其数据处理方法 |
CN201010596663.6 | 2010-12-20 |
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US (1) | US9009466B2 (zh) |
KR (1) | KR101421399B1 (zh) |
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US20130283045A1 (en) | 2013-10-24 |
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US9009466B2 (en) | 2015-04-14 |
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