WO2012019410A1 - 智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法及装置 - Google Patents

智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2012019410A1
WO2012019410A1 PCT/CN2010/080117 CN2010080117W WO2012019410A1 WO 2012019410 A1 WO2012019410 A1 WO 2012019410A1 CN 2010080117 W CN2010080117 W CN 2010080117W WO 2012019410 A1 WO2012019410 A1 WO 2012019410A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
access
access request
control
policy
terminal
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PCT/CN2010/080117
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
万邦睿
喻红宇
周洪济
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Application filed by 中兴通讯股份有限公司 filed Critical 中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority to EP10855830.5A priority Critical patent/EP2605455A4/en
Publication of WO2012019410A1 publication Critical patent/WO2012019410A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/102Entity profiles
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/2803Home automation networks
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L12/00Data switching networks
    • H04L12/28Data switching networks characterised by path configuration, e.g. LAN [Local Area Networks] or WAN [Wide Area Networks]
    • H04L12/2803Home automation networks
    • H04L12/283Processing of data at an internetworking point of a home automation network
    • H04L12/2834Switching of information between an external network and a home network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/10Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources
    • H04L63/108Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for controlling access to devices or network resources when the policy decisions are valid for a limited amount of time

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of Internet of Things security technologies, and in particular, to a method and apparatus for preventing illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network. Background technique
  • Smart home is a residential, platform that combines architecture, network communication, information appliances, equipment automation and sensor networks. It integrates systems, structures, services and management into an efficient, comfortable, safe, convenient and environmentally friendly living environment.
  • the ubiquitous network-based smart home accesses the external network through multiple access methods such as wireless and wired, and forms the home internal network through the wireless and wired methods of the gateway.
  • the external network and the internal network constitute the ubiquitous network foundation of the smart home service. .
  • the smart home internal networking is that the various terminal devices inside the smart home connect to the gateway through wireless, wired, etc., to form an internal local area network.
  • the control center in the internal network is not connected to any external network, but only connected to the gateway.
  • the gateway sends various commands to control various terminals in the internal network.
  • the service support platform and the service gateway access the gateway through an external network.
  • the various terminal devices inside the smart home can be divided into two types of control terminals: local control terminals and remote control terminals.
  • the local control terminal is connected to the gateway for receiving the user's control command, and sends the control command to the control center through the gateway.
  • the remote control terminal starts the application sending instruction, and the service supporting platform receives the control command sent by the user remote control terminal, and forwards it to the control center via the service gateway and the gateway.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method and a device for preventing an illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network, so that the smart home internal network can prevent malicious illegal access and ensure the security of the smart home internal network.
  • a method for preventing an illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network comprising: a control center receiving an access request forwarded by a gateway; and a control center detecting the access request according to a pre-stored access control policy, and acquiring a detection result; When the detection is performed, the control center sends the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal through the gateway, otherwise the access request is rejected.
  • the method Before receiving the access request forwarded by the gateway, the method further includes: the control center acquiring the user requirement, and configuring the access control policy according to the user requirement.
  • the control center Before the detecting the access request, the control center further determines: the control center determines whether the control instruction carried in the access request is in a pre-stored control instruction list, and if yes, sends the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal. , otherwise enter the step of detecting the access request.
  • the method further includes: the control center acquiring a policy selection parameter, and determining, according to the policy selection parameter, the access control policy currently participating in the access control from the pre-saved access control policy.
  • the detecting the access request specifically: the control center detects the access request according to an access control policy currently participating in the access control, and obtains the detection result.
  • the access control policy is related to the access history data of the communication object corresponding to the access request and/or the information carried by the current access request.
  • the method further includes: when the number of access requests that cannot be detected within a predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in the access request sent by the first source address, the control center will be the first source The address is sent to the gateway, and the gateway rejects the access request sent by the first source address.
  • the method further includes: when the number of the access requests that cannot be detected within the predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in the access request whose destination address is the destination address of the first terminal, the control center saves the first terminal Address, to deny access requests for all destination addresses to the address of the first terminal.
  • a smart home internal network device for preventing illegal intrusion including:
  • a saving module configured to save an access control policy
  • a receiving module configured to receive an access request forwarded by the gateway
  • a detecting module configured to detect the access request according to the access control policy, and obtain a detection result
  • a processing module configured to send, by the gateway, a control instruction carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal when the detection result is a pass detection, otherwise reject the access request.
  • the device further includes: a policy configuration module, configured to configure an access control policy according to user requirements.
  • the saving module further includes a control instruction list, and the control center further includes: a pre-judging module, configured to determine whether the control instruction carried in the access request is in the control instruction list, and obtain a determination result;
  • a forwarding module configured to send the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal when the control result indicates that the control instruction is in the control instruction list, otherwise trigger the detection module.
  • the device further includes: a parameter obtaining module, configured to acquire a policy selection parameter; and a policy enabling module, configured to determine, according to the policy selection parameter, an access control of the current participating access control from an access control policy saved in the saving module Strategy
  • the detecting module is specifically configured to: detect the access request according to an access control policy currently participating in access control determined by the policy enabling module, and obtain the detection result.
  • the access control policy is related to the access history data of the communication object corresponding to the access request and/or the information carried by the current access request.
  • the device further includes: a sending processing module, configured to: when the number of access requests that cannot be detected within a predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in the access request sent by the first source address, send the first source address to the gateway The access request sent by the first source address is rejected by the gateway.
  • a sending processing module configured to: when the number of access requests that cannot be detected within a predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in the access request sent by the first source address, send the first source address to the gateway The access request sent by the first source address is rejected by the gateway.
  • the device further includes: an identifier saving module, configured to save the address of the first terminal when the number of access requests that cannot be detected within a predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in an access request whose destination address is an address of the first terminal , to reject all destination addresses as access requests of the first terminal.
  • an identifier saving module configured to save the address of the first terminal when the number of access requests that cannot be detected within a predetermined time period exceeds a preset threshold in an access request whose destination address is an address of the first terminal , to reject all destination addresses as access requests of the first terminal.
  • the method and device for preventing an illegal intrusion in the smart home internal network receive the access request forwarded by the gateway through the control center; the control center detects the access request and obtains the detection result; When the detection result is that the detection center passes the control, the control center sends the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal through the gateway, otherwise the access request is rejected, so that the smart home internal network can prevent malicious and illegal access, and ensure the smart home.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of a method for preventing an illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a control center according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of a specific implementation of a method for preventing an illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network according to an embodiment of the present invention. detailed description
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a method for preventing an illegal intrusion in a smart home internal network. As shown in FIG. 1 , the method may include the following steps: Step 101: The control center receives an access request forwarded by the gateway.
  • Step 102 The control center detects the access request according to a pre-saved access control policy, and obtains a detection result.
  • Step 103 When the detection result is the pass detection, the control center sends the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal through the gateway, otherwise rejects the access request.
  • the device for preventing illegal intrusion in the smart home internal network includes:
  • a saving module configured to save an access control policy
  • a receiving module configured to receive an access request forwarded by the gateway
  • a detecting module configured to detect the access request according to the access control policy, and obtain a detection result
  • a processing module configured to send, by the gateway, a control instruction carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal when the detection result is a pass detection, otherwise reject the access request.
  • the access control is controlled by the access control policy to ensure that the control command carried by the illegal access request is not sent to the terminal to ensure the security of the terminal.
  • the method for preventing the illegal intrusion in the smart home internal network further includes the following steps: acquiring user requirements, and configuring the access control policy according to user requirements.
  • the configuration may be specifically:
  • the examples are as follows. If the user's home newly adds an information appliance, the information appliance is different from other controlled devices and requires an independent access control policy. In this case, the user can newly add an access control policy through the policy configuration module.
  • the operation may be that the access control policy is input by the user in an operation interface, and is saved to the save module after the user input is completed.
  • the access control policy saved by the user and stored in another location may be directly downloaded and saved to the save module.
  • the user finds that the current access control policy cannot meet the requirements after a period of time, and the access control policy needs to be modified to be able to resist the new intrusion means. Then the user can invoke the policy configuration module. After editing the access control policy that needs to be modified, save the modified access control policy.
  • the access control policy for the device is no longer useful, and the user can delete the access control policy through the policy configuration module.
  • the user can update the access control policy at any time, so that the access control policy is no longer a fixed policy, which greatly improves the adaptability and scalability of the device.
  • the saving module further includes a control instruction list, and the device further includes: a pre-judging module, configured to determine whether the control instruction carried by the access request is in the control instruction list In the middle, obtain a judgment result;
  • a forwarding module configured to send the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal when the control result indicates that the control instruction is in the control instruction list, otherwise trigger the detection module.
  • the method further includes:
  • step 102 Determining whether the control command carried in the access request is saved in the control instruction list in advance, and if yes, transmitting the control command carried in the access request to the corresponding terminal, otherwise proceeding to step 102.
  • the user can configure the access control policy through the policy configuration module to improve the adaptability and scalability of the device, but these methods do not help the intelligence of the device.
  • some activation determination conditions may be set to enable the device to use appropriate access control policies under appropriate conditions (such as time, customer requirements, etc.) to improve the efficiency of access control.
  • the device of the specific embodiment of the present invention further includes:
  • a parameter obtaining module configured to acquire a policy selection parameter
  • a policy enabling module configured to determine, according to the policy selection parameter, an access control policy currently participating in access control from an access control policy saved in the save module
  • the detecting module is configured to detect the access request according to an access control policy currently participating in access control determined by the policy enabling module, and obtain the detection result.
  • the method for preventing the illegal intrusion in the smart home internal network of the embodiment of the present invention also includes:
  • the control center detects the access request according to the access control policy currently participating in the access control, and obtains the detection result.
  • the policy selection parameter is the current time, when the current time is found to be 10:00 PM.
  • the first access control policy (such as rejecting all access requests) is selected as the access control policy currently participating in the access control, and when the current time is found to be 10:00 AM, the second access control policy is selected to be switched.
  • An access request sent by a legitimate user can pass) as an access control policy currently participating in access control.
  • the policy selection parameter may be an electronic device.
  • the usage status (such as whether the TV is turned on, whether the air conditioner is turned on), etc. If any electronic device is found to be on, select the following first access control policy (such as rejecting all access requests) as the access control for the current participating access control.
  • the policy when it is found that all the electronic devices are in the off state, then switches to select the second access control policy (only the access request sent by the legitimate user can pass) as the access control policy currently participating in the access control.
  • control center can intelligently select whether to use the access control policy and the access control policy according to the actual value of the policy selection parameter, and does not mean that only the above can be used.
  • An example to choose an access control policy is merely for explaining that the control center can intelligently select whether to use the access control policy and the access control policy according to the actual value of the policy selection parameter, and does not mean that only the above can be used.
  • control center further includes:
  • a sending processing module configured to send the first source address to the gateway, where the gateway rejects the access request sent by the first source address; and the access request sent by the first source address fails to pass the detected access within a predetermined time period The number of requests exceeds the preset threshold.
  • the burden on the control center can be alleviated, so that the access request control operation can be shared by the gateway, and the utilization rate of the gateway is improved.
  • the access request sent by a certain type of illegal address is directly rejected by the gateway, so that the control center no longer needs to waste unnecessary resources to obtain the detection result, which is inevitably unable to pass the detected access request, thereby improving the access request. Processing efficiency.
  • control center further includes:
  • An identifier saving module configured to save an address of the first terminal, to reject an access request that all destination addresses are addresses of the first terminal; where the destination address is an access request of the address of the first terminal, the predetermined time period cannot be The number of access requests detected by the detection exceeds the preset threshold.
  • the burden on the control center can be alleviated and the processing efficiency can be improved.
  • the access control strategy can be constructed based on a variety of different factors. Several factors are listed below, as follows:
  • the communication object corresponding to the above access request is the sender of the access request and/or the terminal to be controlled corresponding to the access request.
  • the access control policy of the embodiment of the present invention can perform configuration operations such as adding, modifying, and deleting according to user requirements, technological advancement, and the like.
  • the above various parameters are merely enumerating possible ways, but cannot It is understood that the access control strategy can only be constructed based on the above parameters.
  • the access history record data of the communication object corresponding to the access request may include one or more of the following information:
  • the access control policy is described as an example of A, B, C, and D, but it should be understood that any one or any combination of A, B, C, and D can form an access. Control Strategy.
  • parameters involved in the policy and access control thresholds are included: parameters involved in the policy and access control thresholds.
  • the access control policy is related to the number of access requests sent by the requester of the access request, the following parameters need to be saved in advance: the requester, the number of thresholds for sending access requests (such as 1000 times), and the number of access requests sent so far. .
  • the control center first determines whether the currently received access request is sent by the sender that needs to be controlled, and if so, whether the number of access requests currently sent by the requester exceeds a preset number of thresholds. If yes, the access request is rejected, otherwise the access request is allowed.
  • the access control policy is related to the number of times the terminal is accessed in the predetermined time period corresponding to the access request, the following parameters need to be saved in advance: the terminal, the number of accessed thresholds (eg, 1000 times), and the accesses that have been accessed so far. frequency.
  • the control center first determines whether the currently received access request is to access the predetermined terminal, and if so, whether the number of times that have been accessed so far exceeds a preset number threshold, and if so, Reject this access request, otherwise allow this access request.
  • the access control policy is related to the number of times the requesting party of the access request requests access to the terminal corresponding to the access request, the following parameters need to be saved in advance: a terminal, a requester, a quantity threshold (eg, 1000 times), and The number of times the requestor has accessed the terminal so far.
  • the control center first determines whether the currently received access request is a predetermined requestor accessing the predetermined terminal, and if so, determining whether the number of times the requester has accessed the terminal has exceeded a preset Quantity threshold, if yes, refuse this visit Ask for a request, otherwise allow this access request.
  • the above various access times, the number of access request transmissions, and the like can be recorded by setting a counter.
  • the information such as the name, content, and quantity of the access control policy information that may be involved in the embodiments of the present invention is not limited to the foregoing listed access control policy information, and is inspired by those skilled in the art based on the technical solution provided by the present invention.
  • Other proposed access control policy information is within the scope of the present invention.
  • the smart home internal network separately performs a valid source address protocol parsing failure policy to prevent unauthorized access to the smart home internal network.
  • the smart home internal network performs an effective source address flow control policy and a terminal address protection policy to prevent the smart home internal network from accessing the illegal intrusion.
  • access control such as authentication information, a key, and the like, may also be performed according to information carried by the current access request, which will be described in detail in the following embodiments.
  • Step 201 The control center receives an access request forwarded by the gateway.
  • Step 202 When the control center receives the access request forwarded by the gateway, if the active address flow control policy is defined for the source address of the access request, the control center may control the policy counter according to the source address corresponding to the source address at a predetermined time. The history data recorded in the data, determining whether the access request flow sent by the source address sending the access request is greater than a predefined The source address flow control policy corresponds to a threshold to determine whether to resolve the access request.
  • the control center does not parse the data.
  • the message goes to step 203.
  • the control center can reject the access request and can choose to discard the access request or return related information to the gateway. If the access request traffic sent by the source address in the previous predetermined time period is less than the threshold corresponding to the predefined source address flow control policy, the process proceeds to step 204.
  • Step 204 The control center may add a value to the source address flow control policy counter corresponding to the source address, that is, the historical record data of the source address flow control policy is incremented, so that the next threshold value is determined.
  • the control center may start a process of determining whether the threshold value of the security policy information is reached, the data recorded by the counter after the change, and the predefined security. The threshold corresponding to the policy information is judged and compared.
  • the source address flow control policy is used as an example. If the access request traffic sent by a source address does not reach the threshold corresponding to the source address flow control policy corresponding to the source address, the control center does not start the lock protection process. . If the access request traffic sent by a source address reaches the threshold corresponding to the source address flow control policy corresponding to the source address, the control center starts the lock protection process to determine that the access request sent by the source address is subsequently refused to be received.
  • the source address information is sent to the gateway in the smart home internal network, and the gateway adds the source address to the control list (that is, the blacklist), and the gateway may subsequently refuse to receive the access request sent by the source address.
  • the control center may perform the unlock recovery according to the recovery mode corresponding to the predefined source address flow control policy.
  • the control center may perform the unlock recovery according to the recovery mode corresponding to the predefined source address flow control policy.
  • the source address flow control policy corresponding to the source address is controlled manually. You can log in to the control center to manually unlock the source address traffic control policy. The policy counter is restored to its initial value, such as 0. If the recovery mode corresponding to the predefined source address flow control policy is automatic, the control center can automatically perform the source address effective for the source address when the recovery time corresponding to the predefined source address flow control policy is reached, for example, 60 seconds.
  • the traffic control policy is unlocked and restored, and the source address flow control policy counter corresponding to the source address is restored to the initial value.
  • the subsequent control center may send the source address information to the gateway, and the gateway deletes the source address from the control list, and the gateway resumes receiving the access request sent by the source address.
  • the lock protection process and the unlock recovery process of the source address protocol parsing failure policy according to the embodiment of the present invention are similar to the lock protection process and the unlock recovery process of the source address flow control policy. For details, refer to the above description.
  • Step 205 The control center parses the access request to obtain key information. If the parsing is successful, the process goes to step 207, and if the parsing fails, the process goes to step 206.
  • the key information may specifically include: an authentication identifier, a terminal information, a control instruction, and the like.
  • the terminal information may specifically include a terminal address to be accessed by the access request, and the like.
  • the control center may first parse the authentication identifier in the message header of the access request to perform authentication verification.
  • the authentication identifier is generated by the service support platform when the gateway is registered with the service support platform, and is returned to the gateway. All message interactions between the gateway and the service support platform need to be verified by the authentication identifier, when the access request is used. If the authentication ID does not match the authentication ID assigned at the time of registration, the verification fails.
  • the control center can perform key verification on the access request and parse out the message body of the access request.
  • the message body of the access request may be transmitted in the form of an encrypted string to ensure security, and the encrypted string ciphertext is calculated by the encryption algorithm, and the corresponding key is allocated by the service support platform when the gateway registers with the service support platform.
  • business support The message sent by the platform to the smart home internal network is encrypted according to the key.
  • the smart home internal network (specifically, the control center or other functional entities) may also decrypt the access request received according to the key.
  • the message body of the decrypted access request may be verified by the control center according to a protocol such as its corresponding encapsulation, and it is determined whether it is a message body conforming to the relevant protocol.
  • the security policy information corresponding to the above verification process may specifically correspond to the source address protocol resolution failure policy.
  • Step 206 When the control center fails to resolve the access request, if the source address protocol resolution failure policy defined by the control center is valid, the control center may add a value to the source address protocol resolution failure policy counter corresponding to the source address, that is, the source is implemented. The history data of the source address protocol resolution failure policy corresponding to the address is incremented. At the same time, the control center can reject the access request, and can take various operations such as discarding the access request or returning related information to a functional entity such as a gateway.
  • Step 207 After the control center resolves the access request successfully, the control center may perform security verification such as an authentication identifier, a key, and an encapsulation protocol. If the verification passes to step 209, if the verification does not pass, then go to step 208, and the control center can perform the same technical operation as step 206.
  • security verification such as an authentication identifier, a key, and an encapsulation protocol.
  • Step 209 The control center can verify the terminal, that is, whether the terminal address exists. Since the terminal has a unique terminal address in the smart home internal network, if the terminal address included in the key information obtained by the control center is not present in the smart home internal network, the process proceeds to step 210, and the control center can execute Step 206 is the same technical operation. If the terminal exists, step 211 is performed.
  • Step 211 The control center can verify the control instruction. If the control center retains the control instruction set corresponding to the terminal, if the control command included in the key information obtained by the control center analysis does not exist in the control instruction set corresponding to the terminal, the control command verification fails, and the process goes to step 212 to control.
  • the center can perform the same technical operations as step 206. If the control command exists, the control center performs step 213.
  • a special control command of the terminal such as a fire extinguishing command
  • step 205 step 207, step 209, and step 211, there may be no order in execution.
  • Step 214 If the terminal address protection policy defined by the control center is valid, the control center determines whether the data recorded by the terminal address protection policy counter corresponding to the terminal address is larger than the predefined one in the historical record data in the predetermined time period. The threshold of the terminal address protection policy corresponding to the terminal address. If it is greater than the threshold, step 215 is performed, and the control center can perform the same technical operation as step 203. If it is less than the threshold, step 216 is executed, and the control center increases the terminal address protection policy counter corresponding to the terminal address by a value, that is, increases the history data of the terminal address protection policy counter.
  • the foregoing terminal address protection policy may specifically refer to a security policy based on total access traffic of the terminal address.
  • the terminal address protection policy does not need to distinguish the source address information of the sending access request.
  • the control center when the counter corresponding to the terminal address protection policy changes in value, the control center may also trigger the process of determining the changed counter record data and the terminal address save policy corresponding threshold.
  • the control center listed above is similar to the lock protection process initiated by the source address flow control policy and the unlock recovery process.
  • the control center can also initiate the lock protection process and the unlock recovery process for the terminal address protection policy based on the corresponding history data. .
  • the difference is that the terminal address protection policy (and the terminal address flow control policy) protects the terminal, and the source address flow control policy (and the source address protocol resolution failure policy) protects the gateway.
  • the control center may add the terminal address whose access traffic reaches the corresponding threshold to the control list based on the terminal address protection policy, and refuse to deliver all the access requests to the terminal address.
  • the control center can also determine whether the terminal is in the control list. In the process, it is determined whether the access traffic of the terminal is greater than a threshold corresponding to the terminal address protection policy.
  • the terminal address flow control policy of the embodiment of the present invention is similar to the terminal address protection policy. The difference is that the terminal address flow control policy is directed to the control of the access traffic of a certain source address to a certain terminal address.
  • Step 217 If the terminal address flow control policy defined by the control center is valid, the control center may determine, in the historical record data of the previous predetermined time, the source address of the access request, and whether the access traffic of the terminal address is greater than a predefined one.
  • the control center can be determined by viewing the data recorded by the terminal address flow control policy counter corresponding to the source address.
  • the control center may also check whether the terminal address is in the control list to determine whether the access flow of the source address to access the terminal address is greater than a predefined threshold.
  • the control center may perform the same technical operation as step 203; otherwise, go to step 219, the control center
  • the terminal address flow control policy counter corresponding to the terminal is increased by a value, that is, the history data of the terminal address flow control policy counter is increased.
  • the control center can also trigger the threshold judgment, and the corresponding lock protection process and unlock recovery process.
  • the control center can also trigger the threshold judgment, and the corresponding lock protection process and unlock recovery process.
  • Step 214 and step 217 may be executed without a sequence.
  • Step 220 The control center sends the control command to the terminal through the gateway, that is, the smart home device, by sending a control message.
  • the control center in the smart home, when a large number of illegal accesses bypass the service support platform and deliberately illegally access the internal network, the control center can identify the illegal access, thereby protecting the gateway and the terminal device.
  • the method and device for preventing an illegal intrusion by the smart home internal network are provided by the control center, and the control center receives the access request forwarded by the gateway; the control center detects the access request, and obtains the detection result; when the detection result is the pass detection, The control center sends the control command carried by the access request to the corresponding terminal through the gateway, otherwise rejects the access request, so that the smart home internal network can prevent malicious and illegal access, and ensure the security of the smart home internal network.

Description

智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法及装置 技术领域
本发明涉及物联网安全技术领域, 具体涉及智能家居内部网络防止非 法入侵的方法及装置。 背景技术
智能家居是以住宅为平台, 兼备建筑、 网络通信、 信息家电、 设备自 动化和传感网络, 集系统、 结构、 服务、 管理为一体的高效、 舒适、 安全、 便利、 环保的居住环境。
基于泛在网络的智能家居通过无线、 有线等多种接入方式接入外部网 络, 通过网关的无线、 有线等方式构成家庭内部网络, 外部网络和内部网 络构成智能家居服务泛在化的网络基础。
智能家居内部组网是智能家居内部各种终端设备通过无线、 有线等方 式连接网关, 构成内部局域网。 内部组网中的控制中心不与任何外部网络 连接, 只与网关连接, 通过网关下发各种指令控制内部网络中的各种终端。 业务支撑平台和业务网关通过外部网络接入到网关。
智能家居内部各种终端设备可划分为两种类型的控制终端: 本地控制 终端和远程控制终端。 本地控制终端与网关相连, 用于接收用户的控制指 令, 通过网关将控制指令发送至控制中心。 远程控制终端启动应用发送指 令, 业务支撑平台接收用户远程控制终端发送的控制指令, 经业务网关、 网关转发至控制中心。
现有的系统中, 各种非法用户可能通过外部网络(如因特网、 有线电 视网、 移动网络等)接入网关, 进而通过控制中心访问控制各种终端, 而 由于控制中心安全防范策略的不足, 导致终端可能被非法使用。 发明内容
有鉴于此, 本发明所要解决的技术问题是提供一种智能家居内部网络 防止非法入侵的方法及装置, 从而实现智能家居内部网络能够防范恶意非 法访问, 保证智能家居内部网络的安全。
为解决上述技术问题, 本发明的技术方案是这样实现的:
一种智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法, 包括: 控制中心接收网 关转发的访问请求; 控制中心根据预先保存的访问控制策略对所述访问请 求进行检测, 获取检测结果; 在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 控制中心通 过网关将所述访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述 访问请求。
所述接收网关转发的访问请求之前, 还包括: 控制中心获取用户需求, 并根据所述用户需求对访问控制策略进行配置。
所述对访问请求进行检测之前, 还包括: 控制中心判断访问请求携带 的所述控制指令是否在预先保存的控制指令列表中, 如果是, 则将访问请 求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则进入对访问请求进行检测的步 骤。
所述根据预先保存的访问控制策略对访问请求进行检测之前, 还包括: 控制中心获取一策略选择参数, 并根据该策略选择参数从预先保存的访问 控制策略中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略; 所述对访问请求进行 检测, 具体为: 控制中心根据当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略对所述访 问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。
所述访问控制策略与访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记录数据和 / 或当前访问请求携带的信息相关。
所述方法还包括: 在第一源地址发送的访问请求中, 预定时间段内无 法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 所述控制中心将第一源地 址发送到网关, 由网关拒绝所述第一源地址发送的访问请求。
所述方法还包括: 在目的地址为所述第一终端的目的地址的访问请求 中, 预定时间段内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 所述 控制中心保存第一终端的地址, 以拒绝所有目的地址为所述第一终端的地 址的访问请求。
一种智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的装置, 包括:
保存模块, 用于保存访问控制策略;
接收模块, 用于接收网关转发的访问请求;
检测模块, 用于根据所述访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获 取检测结果;
处理模块, 用于在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 通过网关将所述访问 请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求。
所述装置还包括: 策略配置模块, 用于根据用户需求配置访问控制策 略。
所述保存模块还保存有一控制指令列表, 所述控制中心还包括: 预判模块, 用于判断所述访问请求携带的所述控制指令是否在所述控 制指令列表中, 获取一判断结果;
转发模块, 用于在判断结果指示所述控制指令在所述控制指令列表中 时, 将访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则触发所述检测模 块。
所述装置还包括: 参数获取模块, 用于获取一策略选择参数; 策略使 能模块, 用于根据该策略选择参数从所述保存模块中保存的访问控制策略 中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略;
所述检测模块具体用于: 根据所述策略使能模块确定的当前参与访问 控制的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。 所述访问控制策略与访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记录数据和 / 或当前访问请求携带的信息相关。
所述装置还包括: 发送处理模块, 用于在由第一源地址发送的访问请 求中, 预定时间段内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 将 第一源地址发送到网关, 由网关拒绝所述第一源地址发送的访问请求。
所述装置还包括: 标识保存模块, 用于在目的地址为第一终端的地址 的访问请求中, 预定时间段内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门 限时, 保存第一终端的地址, 以拒绝所有目的地址为所述第一终端的访问 请求。
从以上所述可以看出, 本发明提供的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵 的方法及装置, 通过控制中心接收网关转发的访问请求; 控制中心对所述 访问请求进行检测, 获取检测结果; 在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 控制 中心通过网关将所述访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒 绝所述访问请求, 从而实现智能家居内部网络能够防范恶意非法访问, 保 证智能家居内部网络的安全。 附图说明
图 1 为本发明实施例提供的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵方法实现 流程示意图;
图 2为本发明实施例的控制中心的结构示意图;
图 3 为本发明实施例提供的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法的 一种具体实现的流程图。 具体实施方式
本发明实施例提供了一种智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法, 如 图 1所示, 具体可以包括以下步骤: 步骤 101 , 控制中心接收网关转发的访问请求;
步骤 102,控制中心根据预先保存的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行 检测, 获取检测结果;
步骤 103 , 在所述检测结果为通过检测时,控制中心通过网关将所述访 问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求。
本发明实施例的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的装置, 如图 2所示, 包括:
保存模块, 用于保存访问控制策略;
接收模块, 用于接收网关转发的访问请求;
检测模块, 用于根据所述访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获 取检测结果;
处理模块, 用于在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 通过网关将所述访问 请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求。
本发明实施例中, 通过访问控制策略对访问请求进行访问控制, 保证 非法的访问请求所携带的控制指令不会下发到终端, 以保证终端安全。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 考虑到以后业务的不断发展、 控制终端类 型的不断增加、 用户需求的不断变化, 因此有必要在装置设置一策略配置 模块, 用于根据用户需求配置访问控制策略。
而本发明实施例的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法中也对应包 括如下步骤: 获取用户需求, 根据用户需求对访问控制策略进行配置。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 所述的配置具体可以是:
新增访问控制策略;
删除访问控制策略;
修改访问控制策略。
分别举例说明如下。 如用户家庭新增加一个信息家电, 该信息家电不同于其他的被控设备, 需要独立的访问控制策略, 在这种情况下, 用户就可以通过该策略配置模 块新增加访问控制策略, 该新增加的操作可以是在一操作界面下由用户输 入访问控制策略, 等用户输入完毕后保存到保存模块, 当然也可以是直接 将用户选择的保存于其他位置的访问控制策略下载并保存到保存模块。
如随着入侵手段的不断变化, 用户在一段时间后发现当前的访问控制 策略已经无法满足需要, 需要修改访问控制策略才能够抵抗新的入侵手段, 则此时用户就可以通过该策略配置模块调用并编辑需要修改的访问控制策 略后, 保存修改后的访问控制策略。
又如, 用户家庭一个设备淘汰不再使用, 则之前针对该设备的访问控 制策略不再有用, 则用户可以通过策略配置模块删除该访问控制策略。
通过策略配置模块, 使得用户能够随时更新访问控制策略, 使得访问 控制策略不再是固定的策略, 大大提高了装置的适应性和可扩展性。
当然, 对于家庭网络而言, 外部控制中有一部分指令可能是非常重要 的指令, 如启动报警器、 启动灭火装置等, 对于这一类指令, 一般来说, 利用访问控制策略来对访问请求进行控制, 有可能存在误判断的可能性, 即使其可能性非常小, 但对于以上的启动报警器、 启动灭火装置等指令而 言, 一旦误判就有可能造成无法挽回的后果, 因此, 在本发明的具体实施 例的装置中, 所述保存模块还保存有一控制指令列表, 所述装置还包括: 预判模块, 用于判断所述访问请求携带的所述控制指令是否在所述控 制指令列表中, 获取一判断结果;
转发模块, 用于在判断结果指示所述控制指令在所述控制指令列表中 时, 将访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则触发所述检测模 块。
相对应的, 本发明实施例的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法中, 在步骤 102之前还包括:
判断所述访问请求携带的所述控制指令是否预先保存在控制指令列表 中, 如果是, 则将访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则进入 步骤 102。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 之前已经提到, 用户可以通过策略配置模 块来配置访问控制策略, 以提高了装置的适应性和可扩展性, 但这些手段 对装置的智能性没有帮助, 在本发明的具体实施例中, 可以设置一些启动 判断条件, 让所述装置在合适的条件 (如时间、 客户要求条件等)釆用合 适的访问控制策略, 以提高访问控制的效率, 在这种情况下, 本发明具体 实施例的装置还包括:
参数获取模块, 用于获取一策略选择参数;
策略使能模块, 用于根据该策略选择参数从所述保存模块中保存的访 问控制策略中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略;
所述检测模块具体用于根据所述策略使能模块确定的当前参与访问控 制的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。
相对应的, 本发明实施例的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法中, 也包括:
获取一策略选择参数, 并根据该策略选择参数从预先保存的访问控制 策略中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略;
所述步骤 102 中, 控制中心根据当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略对 所述访问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。
对上述的情况举例说明如下。
例如, 对于一类用户而言, 其只有上午 10点之后到晚上 10点之前才 会不在家, 因此, 也只有这段时间才有可能发生访问请求, 其他时间不会 发生访问请求, 而对于上述的情况, 可以认为, 在晚上 10点之后到第二天 10点之前的访问请求都是非法的, 而其他时间则有可能是合法的, 有可能 是非法的, 对于这种情况下, 则策略选择参数就是当前时间, 在发现当前 时间为 10:00PM时, 则选择如下的第一访问控制策略(如拒绝所有访问请 求)作为当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略,而在发现当前时间为 10:00AM 时, 则切换为选择第二访问控制策略(仅有合法用户发送的访问请求才能 通过)作为当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略。
又例如, 对于单身居住的家庭, 可以认为只要家中有人, 访问请求都 是非法的, 其他情况则有可能是合法的, 有可能是非法的, 对于这种情况 下, 策略选择参数可以是电子设备的使用状况(如电视机是否打开、 空调 是否打开)等, 如发现任意一个电子设备处于开启状态, 则选择如下的第 一访问控制策略(如拒绝所有访问请求)作为当前参与访问控制的访问控 制策略, 而在发现所有电子设备都处于关闭状态时, 则切换为选择第二访 问控制策略(仅有合法用户发送的访问请求才能通过)作为当前参与访问 控制的访问控制策略。
当然, 应当理解的是, 上述的举例仅仅是为了说明控制中心可以根据 策略选择参数的实际值来智能选择是否釆用访问控制策略以及釆用何种访 问控制策略, 而并不代表只能使用上述的举例来选择访问控制策略。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 该控制中心还包括:
发送处理模块, 用于将第一源地址发送到网关, 由网关拒绝所述第一 源地址发送的访问请求; 所述第一源地址发送的访问请求中, 预定时间段 内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限。
通过上述发送处理模块的设置, 可以减轻控制中心的负担, 使得访问 请求控制操作可以由网关来分担一部分, 提高了网关的利用率。 而且对于 某一类非法地址发送的访问请求直接由网关拒绝, 使得控制中心不再需要 浪费无谓的资源来得到检测结果必然是无法通过检测的访问请求, 提高了 处理效率。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 该控制中心还包括:
标识保存模块, 用于保存第一终端的地址, 以拒绝所有目的地址为所 述第一终端的地址的访问请求; 目的地址为所述第一终端的地址的访问请 求中, 预定时间段内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限。
通过上述标识保存模块的设置, 可以减轻控制中心的负担, 提高了处 理效率。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 该访问控制策略可以基于各种不同的因素 来构建, 下面列举几种因素, 如下:
1、 访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记录数据;
2、 当前访问请求携带的信息。
上述的访问请求对应的通信对象为访问请求的发送方和 /或访问请求对 应的待控制终端。
当然, 之前已经进行了说明, 本发明实施例的访问控制策略可以根据 用户需求、 技术进步等因素进行增加、 修改、 删除等配置操作, 上述的各 种参数仅仅是列举可能实现的方式, 而不能理解为访问控制策略只能根据 上述的参数来构建。
下面对利用上述两类信息如何进行访问控制进行详细说明。
在本发明的具体实施例中, 该访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记 录数据可以包括如下信息中的一个或多个:
A、 所述访问请求的请求方之前预定时间内发送的访问请求的数量;
C、之前预定时间内所述访问请求的请求方请求访问所述访问请求对应 的终端的次数;
D、 所述访问请求的请求方之前预定时间内访问请求解析失败的次数。 在后续的说明, 以访问控制策略与 A、 B、 C和 D为例均相关为例进行 说明, 但应当理解的是, A、 B、 C和 D中的任意一个或任意组合都可以形 成访问控制策略。
对于以上形式的访问控制策略, 其中包括如下的参数: 策略涉及到的 参数以及访问控制门限。
如访问控制策略与访问请求的请求方发送的访问请求的数量相关时, 需要预先保存如下的参数: 请求方、发送访问请求的数量门限(如 1000次) 以及到目前为止已发送访问请求的数量。
则利用上述的访问控制策略, 控制中心首先判断当前接收到的访问请 求是否由需要控制的发送方发送, 如果是, 则判断该请求方当前已经发送 的访问请求数量是否超过预设的数量门限, 如果是, 则拒绝本次访问请求, 否则允许本次访问请求。
如访问控制策略与所述访问请求对应的终端之前预定时间内被访问的 次数相关时, 需要预先保存如下的参数: 终端、被访问的数量门限(如 1000 次) 以及到目前为止已被访问的次数。
则利用上述的访问控制策略, 控制中心首先判断当前接收到的访问请 求是否是访问该预定终端, 如果是, 则判断到目前为止已被访问的次数是 否超过预设的数量门限, 如果是, 则拒绝本次访问请求, 否则允许本次访 问请求。
如访问控制策略与之前预定时间内所述访问请求的请求方请求访问所 述访问请求对应的终端的次数相关时, 需要预先保存如下的参数: 终端、 请求方、数量门限(如 1000次)以及到目前为止请求方已访问终端的次数。
则利用上述的访问控制策略, 控制中心首先判断当前接收到的访问请 求是否是预定请求方访问该预定终端, 如果是, 则判断到目前为止该请求 方访问该终端的次数是否已超过预设的数量门限, 如果是, 则拒绝本次访 问请求, 否则允许本次访问请求。
上述的各种访问次数、 访问请求发送次数等都可以通过设置计数器来 记录。
可以理解的是, 本发明实施例可以涉及的访问控制策略信息的名称、 内容以及数量等信息, 不限于上述所列举的访问控制策略信息, 本领域技 术人员基于本发明提供的技术方案的启发下所提出的其他访问控制策略信 息, 均在本发明的保护范围内。
本发明实施例中, 对于预先定义的安全策略, 在具体实施时, 可以全 部执行生效, 也可以执行生效其中的一个、 或多个。
比如, 在本发明的一个具体实施例中, 智能家居内部网络单独执行生 效源地址协议解析失败策略, 以防止智能家居内部网络访问非法入侵。
再比如, 在本发明的一个具体实施例中, 智能家居内部网络执行生效 源地址流量控制策略以及终端地址保护策略, 以防止智能家居内部网络访 问非法入侵。
之前已经提到, 本发明实施例中, 还可以根据当前访问请求携带的信 息来进行访问控制, 如鉴权信息、 密钥等, 这将在以下实施例进行详细说 明。
下面, 以智能家居内部网络中控制中心为执行主体, 结合附图 3对本 发明实施例提供的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵方法的一个具体实施例 进行详细的描述, 具体可以包括:
步骤 201 , 控制中心接收网关转发的访问请求。
步骤 202,控制中心收到网关转发的访问请求时, 如果对应该访问请求 的源地址定义有源地址流量控制策略, 则控制中心可以根据该源地址对应 的源地址流量控制策略计数器在之前预定时间内所记录的历史记录数据, 判断发送该访问请求的源地址所发送的访问请求流量是否大于预先定义的 源地址流量控制策略对应的阀值, 从而确定是否解析该访问请求。
若记录数据中, 该源地址在之前预定时间段内发送的访问请求流量已 经大于预先定义的源地址流量控制策略对应的阀值, 比如 10000 次或者 10000次 /60秒, 则控制中心不解析该消息, 转至步骤 203 , 控制中心可以 拒绝该访问请求, 并可选择将该访问请求丟弃或者向网关返回相关信息等 多种操作。 若记录数据中, 该源地址在之前预定时间段内发送的访问请求 流量小于预先定义的源地址流量控制策略对应的阀值, 则转至步骤 204。
步骤 204,控制中心可以将该源地址对应的源地址流量控制策略计数器 增加一个数值, 即实现源地址流量控制策略的历史记录数据自增, 以备下 次进行阀值判断。
在本发明实施例中, 当计数器的数值, 即历史记录数据发生变动时, 控制中心可以启动判断是否达到安全策略信息对应阀值的流程, 即将变动 后计数器所记录的数据, 与预先定义的安全策略信息对应的阀值进行判断 比较。
以源地址流量控制策略为例进行说明, 如果记录数据中, 某个源地址 发送的访问请求流量没有达到该源地址对应的源地址流量控制策略对应的 阀值, 则控制中心不启动锁定保护流程。 如果记录数据中, 某个源地址发 送的访问请求流量达到该源地址对应的源地址流量控制策略对应的阀值 , 则控制中心启动锁定保护流程, 确定后续拒绝接收该源地址发送的访问请 求, 并将该源地址信息发送至智能家居内部网络中的网关, 由网关将该源 地址加入控制名单(即黑名单), 网关后续可以拒绝接收该源地址发送的访 问请求。
在本发明的另一个具体实施例中, 如果需要解除控制中心启动的针对 源地址流量控制策略的锁定保护流程, 则控制中心可以根据预先定义的源 地址流量控制策略对应的恢复方式, 进行解锁恢复流程。 具体的, 如果预 先定义的源地址流量控制策略对应的恢复方式为手动方式, 则具体可以由 用户登录控制中心, 手动对源地址执行生效的源地址流量控制策略进行解 锁恢复, 将源地址对应的源地址流量控制策略计数器恢复至初始值, 比如 为 0。如果预先定义的源地址流量控制策略对应的恢复方式为自动方式, 则 控制中心可以在预先定义的源地址流量控制策略对应的恢复时间达到时, 比如 60秒, 自动对源地址执行生效的源地址流量控制策略进行解锁恢复, 将源地址对应的源地址流量控制策略计数器恢复至初始值。 后续控制中心 可将该源地址信息发送至网关, 由网关将该源地址从控制名单中删除, 网 关恢复接收该源地址发送的访问请求。
本发明实施例所涉及的源地址协议解析失败策略的锁定保护流程和解 锁恢复流程, 与上述源地址流量控制策略的锁定保护流程和解锁恢复流程 类似, 具体请参照上述描述。
步骤 205 , 控制中心解析该访问请求, 获取关键信息。 如果解析成功转 至步骤 207, 如果解析失败则转至步骤 206。
本发明实施例中, 关键信息具体可以包括: 鉴权标识、 终端信息、 控 制指令等。 上述终端信息, 具体可以包括访问请求所要访问的终端地址等。
需要说明的是, 在控制中心解析该访问请求过程中, 具体可以首先由 控制中心解析该访问请求的消息头中鉴权标识, 进行鉴权验证。 所述鉴权 标识, 是网关到业务支撑平台注册时, 由业务支撑平台产生该鉴权标识并 返回给网关, 网关与业务支撑平台间所有消息交互都需要校验鉴权标识, 当访问请求中鉴权标识与注册时分配的鉴权标识不匹配, 则校验失败。
在通过鉴权标识校验后, 控制中心可对访问请求进行密钥验证, 解析 出该访问请求的消息体。 由于通常情况下, 访问请求的消息体可以以加密 串形式传送以保证安全, 而加密串密文由加密算法计算所得, 其对应密钥 为网关到业务支撑平台注册时, 由业务支撑平台分配。 分配后, 业务支撑 平台发给智能家居内部网络的消息都按该密钥进行加密, 智能家居内部网 络(具体可为控制中心或者其他功能实体)也可以对应按该密钥对所收到 的访问请求进行解密。
最后, 可由控制中心对解密后的访问请求的消息体, 按其对应封装等 协议进行校验, 判断其是否为符合相关协议的消息体。
上述验证过程对应的安全策略信息具体可对应源地址协议解析失败策 略。
步骤 206,控制中心解析访问请求失败时, 若控制中心预先定义的源地 址协议解析失败策略生效, 则控制中心可以将该源地址对应的源地址协议 解析失败策略计数器增加一个数值, 即实现该源地址对应的源地址协议解 析失败策略的历史记录数据自增。 同时, 控制中心可以拒绝该访问请求, 并可以釆取将该访问请求丟弃或者向网关等功能实体返回相关信息等多种 操作。
步骤 207, 控制中心解析访问请求成功后, 可以进行鉴权标识、 密钥、 封装协议等安全验证。如果验证通过转至步骤 209, 如果验证不通过则转至 步骤 208, 控制中心可以执行与步骤 206相同的技术操作。
步骤 209, 控制中心可验证终端, 即终端地址是否存在。 由于终端在智 能家居内部网络中均有唯一的终端地址, 若控制中心解析获取的关键信息 中所包括的终端地址, 不存在于智能家居内部网络中, 则转至步骤 210, 控 制中心可以执行与步骤 206相同的技术操作。若终端存在,则执行步骤 211。
步骤 211 , 控制中心可以对控制指令进行验证。 由于控制中心保留有终 端对应的控制指令集合, 若控制中心解析获取的关键信息中所包括的控制 指令不存在于该终端对应的控制指令集合中, 则控制指令验证失败, 转至 步骤 212,控制中心可以执行与步骤 206相同的技术操作。若控制指令存在, 则控制中心执行步骤 213。 步骤 213 ,控制中心判断控制指令是否为终端的特殊控制指令, 比如灭 火等指令, 如果是特殊控制指令, 则转至步骤 220, 控制中心将特殊控制指 令通过网关下发至对应的终端, 即智能家居设备; 否则转至步骤 214。
需要说明的是, 步骤 205、 步骤 207、 步骤 209、 步骤 211在执行时可 以没有先后顺序。
步骤 214, 如果控制中心预先定义的终端地址保护策略生效, 则控制中 心判断之前预定时间内的历史记录数据中, 该终端地址对应的终端地址保 护策略计数器所记录的数据, 是否大于预先定义的该终端地址对应的终端 地址保护策略的阀值。 如果大于阀值, 则执行步骤 215 , 控制中心可以执行 与步骤 203相同的技术操作。 如果小于阀值, 则执行步骤 216, 控制中心将 该终端地址对应的终端地址保护策略计数器增加一个数值, 即增加终端地 址保护策略计数器的历史记录数据。
上述终端地址保护策略, 具体可以是指基于终端地址总的访问流量的 安全策略。 终端地址保护策略无需区分发送访问请求的源地址信息。
在本发明实施例中, 当终端地址保护策略对应的计数器发生数值变动, 同样可以触发控制中心将变动后的计数器记录数据与终端地址保存策略对 应阀值进行判断的过程。 并且与上述列举的控制中心针对源地址流量控制 策略所启动的锁定保护流程以及解锁恢复流程类似, 控制中心同样可以基 于对应的历史记录数据, 启动针对终端地址保护策略的锁定保护流程和解 锁恢复流程。 不同的是, 终端地址保护策略(以及终端地址流量控制策略) 所保护的是终端, 而源地址流量控制策略(以及源地址协议解析失败策略) 所保护的是网关。 而且, 本发明实施例中, 可由控制中心基于终端地址保 护策略, 将访问流量达到对应阃值的终端地址加入控制名单, 拒绝下发给 该终端地址所有访问请求。
那么在步骤 214 中, 控制中心还可以通过判断该终端是否在控制名单 中 , 来确定该终端的访问流量是否大于终端地址保护策略对应的阀值。 本发明实施例所涉及的终端地址流量控制策略与终端地址保护策略类 似, 不同的是, 终端地址流量控制策略所针对的是某个源地址对某个终端 地址的访问流量的控制。
步骤 217, 如果控制中心预先定义的终端地址流量控制策略生效, 则控 制中心可以判断之前预定时间内的历史记录数据中, 发送该访问请求的源 地址, 访问该终端地址的访问流量是否大于预先定义的终端地址流量控制 策略对应的阀值。 控制中心具体可以通过查看该源地址对应的终端地址流 量控制策略计数器所记录的数据进行判断。 在本发明的另一个实施例中, 控制中心也可以查看该终端地址是否在控制名单中, 以确定该源地址访问 该终端地址的访问流量是否大于预先定义的阀值。
如果源地址访问某个终端地址的流量大于预先定义的终端地址流量控 制策略中的阀值, 则转至步骤 218,控制中心可以执行与步骤 203相同的技 术操作; 否则转至步骤 219,控制中心将该终端对应的终端地址流量控制策 略计数器增加一个数值, 即增加终端地址流量控制策略计数器的历史记录 数据。
当终端地址流量控制策略计数器所记录的数据发生变动时, 同样可以 触发控制中心进行阀值判断, 以及相应的锁定保护流程和解锁恢复流程。 具体请参照终端地址保护策略的相关描述。
需要说明的是, 步骤 214与步骤 217在执行时可以没有先后顺序。 步骤 220,控制中心通过发送控制消息, 将解析获取的控制指令通过网 关下发至终端, 即智能家居设备。
由上述实施例可以看出, 本发明实施例在智能家居中, 当大量的非法 访问绕过业务支撑平台, 蓄意非法访问内部网络时, 控制中心能够识别非 法访问, 进而保护网关和终端设备。 本发明提供的智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法及装置, 通过控 制中心接收网关转发的访问请求; 控制中心对所述访问请求进行检测, 获 取检测结果; 在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 控制中心通过网关将所述访 问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求, 从而 实现智能家居内部网络能够防范恶意非法访问, 保证智能家居内部网络的 安全。
以上所述仅是本发明的实施方式, 应当指出, 对于本技术领域的普通 技术人员来说, 在不脱离本发明原理的前提下, 还可以作出若干改进和润 饰, 这些改进和润饰也应视为本发明的保护范围。

Claims

权利要求书
1. 一种智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的方法, 其特征在于, 包括: 控制中心接收网关转发的访问请求;
控制中心根据预先保存的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获 取检测结果;
在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 控制中心通过网关将所述访问请求携 带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求。
2. 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述接收网关转发的访问 请求之前, 还包括:
控制中心获取用户需求, 并根据所述用户需求对访问控制策略进行配 置。
3. 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述对访问请求进行检测 之前, 还包括:
控制中心判断访问请求携带的所述控制指令是否在预先保存的控制指 令列表中, 如果是, 则将访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否 则进入对访问请求进行检测的步骤。
4. 如权利要求 1所述的方法, 其特征在于,
所述根据预先保存的访问控制策略对访问请求进行检测之前, 还包括: 控制中心获取一策略选择参数, 并根据该策略选择参数从预先保存的访问 控制策略中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略;
所述对访问请求进行检测, 具体为: 控制中心根据当前参与访问控制 的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。
5. 根据权利要求 1至 4任一所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述访问控制 策略与访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记录数据和 /或当前访问请求携 带的信息相关。
6. 如权利要求 1至 4任一所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法还包括: 在第一源地址发送的访问请求中, 预定时间段内无法通过检测的访问 请求的数量超过预设门限时, 所述控制中心将第一源地址发送到网关, 由 网关拒绝所述第一源地址发送的访问请求。
7. 如权利要求 1至 4任一所述的方法, 其特征在于, 所述方法还包括: 在目的地址为所述第一终端的目的地址的访问请求中, 预定时间段内 无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 所述控制中心保存第一 终端的地址, 以拒绝所有目的地址为所述第一终端的地址的访问请求。
8. 一种智能家居内部网络防止非法入侵的装置, 其特征在于, 包括: 保存模块, 用于保存访问控制策略;
接收模块, 用于接收网关转发的访问请求;
检测模块, 用于根据所述访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获 取检测结果;
处理模块, 用于在所述检测结果为通过检测时, 通过网关将所述访问 请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则拒绝所述访问请求。
9. 如权利要求 8所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述装置还包括: 策略配置模块, 用于根据用户需求配置访问控制策略。
10. 如权利要求 8所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述保存模块还保存有 一控制指令列表, 所述控制中心还包括:
预判模块, 用于判断所述访问请求携带的所述控制指令是否在所述控 制指令列表中, 获取一判断结果;
转发模块, 用于在判断结果指示所述控制指令在所述控制指令列表中 时, 将访问请求携带的控制指令下发至对应的终端, 否则触发所述检测模 块。
11. 如权利要求 8所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述装置还包括:
参数获取模块, 用于获取一策略选择参数;
策略使能模块, 用于根据该策略选择参数从所述保存模块中保存的访 问控制策略中确定当前参与访问控制的访问控制策略;
所述检测模块具体用于: 根据所述策略使能模块确定的当前参与访问 控制的访问控制策略对所述访问请求进行检测, 获取所述检测结果。
12. 根据权利要求 8至 11任一所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述访问控 制策略与访问请求对应的通信对象的访问历史记录数据和 /或当前访问请求 携带的信息相关。
13. 如权利要求 8至 11任一所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述装置还包 括:
发送处理模块, 用于在由第一源地址发送的访问请求中, 预定时间段 内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 将第一源地址发送到 网关, 由网关拒绝所述第一源地址发送的访问请求。
14. 如权利要求 8至 11任一所述的装置, 其特征在于, 所述装置还包 括:
标识保存模块, 用于在目的地址为第一终端的地址的访问请求中, 预 定时间段内无法通过检测的访问请求的数量超过预设门限时, 保存第一终 端的地址, 以拒绝所有目的地址为所述第一终端的访问请求。
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