WO2010094206A1

WO2010094206A1 - Method for link security authentication in wireless relay networks, device and system thereof

Info

Publication number: WO2010094206A1
Application number: PCT/CN2009/076217
Authority: WO
Inventors: 李波杰; 卢磊; 梁文亮
Original assignee: 华为技术有限公司
Priority date: 2009-02-20
Filing date: 2009-12-29
Publication date: 2010-08-26
Also published as: CN101815293B; CN101815293A

Abstract

A method, device and system for link security authentication in wireless relay networks are disclosed in the present invention, and the method includes that: a multi-hop relay base station or an access relay station receives a first management message sent by a mobile station, the first management message carries a first message authentication code, and the first management message also carries a count value of the first message authentication code key and a count value of the first message authentication code packet number which are contained in a first authentication key context stored by the mobile station itself; the first message authentication code is verified based on a second authentication key and a second authentication key identification which are contained in a second authentication key context, the count value of the first message authentication code key, and the count value of the first message authentication code packet number, and whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is safe is determined based on the verification result. With the technical scheme of the present invention, replay attacks in the wireless relay networks could be prevented effectively

Description

Link security authentication method, device and system in wireless relay network The application claims to be submitted to the Chinese Patent Office on February 20, 2009, the application number is 200910004704.5, and the invention name is "link security authentication method in the wireless relay network" The priority of the Chinese Patent Application, the entire disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. TECHNICAL FIELD The present invention relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a link security authentication method, apparatus, and system in a wireless relay network. Background technique

WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access) is a wireless metropolitan area network technology based on the IEEE 802.16 standard. IEEE 802.16d is a standard for fixed wireless access and can be applied to 2 to llGHz Non-Line of Sight (NLOS) transmission and 10 to 66 GHz (Light of Sight) transmission. IEEE 802.16e adds new features to support mobility based on IEEE 802.16d.

A method for preventing management message playback is defined in the IEEE 802.16e protocol, that is, a CMAC (Cipher-based message authentication code, referred to herein as a message authentication code) packet number counter value at any time. The combination of the corresponding key that generates the CMAC message authentication code is unique. In order to effectively prevent playback, these keys must be updated frequently, and the CMAC_KEY_COUNT (message authentication code key count) count value is used to ensure the freshness of the key; meanwhile, the message authentication code packet number count value is Each time a management message with a message authentication code is sent, it is also updated to further enhance the ability of the message authentication code to defend against attacks. When the terminal re-enters or performs a secure location update or handover to the target base station, the CMAC_KEY_COUNT count value is updated before the RNG-REQ (Ranging Request) message is sent to the base station, and the message authentication code packet number is updated. The count value is set to zero, and the terminal generates a new message authentication code key by using the updated count value, and then the terminal uses the message authentication code key and the zeroed message to recognize The code group number count value is a RNG-REQ message to generate a CMAC message authentication code, and the network side also uses the updated count value to generate a corresponding key for verifying the RNG-REQ message, thereby preventing a replay attack.

The inventors have found that at least the following problems exist in the prior art: In the multi-hop relay network scenario of WiMAX, existing protocols (NWG (Network Working Group) and 802.16j) are distributed security for terminals and networks. The anti-replay attack using the message authentication code key count value and the message authentication code packet number count value in the mode does not give a specific solution. SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION It is an object of embodiments of the present invention to provide a link security authentication method, apparatus, and system in a wireless relay network for preventing replay attacks in a wireless relay network.

In order to achieve the above object, an embodiment of the present invention provides a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network, including:

Receiving a first management message sent by the mobile station, where the first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first message authentication code key count value included in the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself, and the first message authentication a first packet authentication code according to the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, the first message authentication code key count value, and the first message authentication code group number in the first authentication key context. Count value calculation is generated, and the first authentication key in the first authentication key context is calculated according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to the setting rule;

And verifying the first message authentication code according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code packet number count value included in the second authentication key context, according to The verification result determines whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network, and a package Includes:

Receiving a second management message sent by the access relay station, where the second management message carries a third message authentication code, a third message authentication code key count value, a third message authentication code packet number count value, and a third message authentication code according to the third The third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group number count value, and the third authentication key in the third authentication key context are calculated and generated, and the third authentication key is generated according to the access. The relay station identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier are obtained according to a setting rule, where the third authentication key context is an authentication key context related to the access relay station saved by the access relay station;

And verifying the third message authentication code according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code packet number count value included in the fourth authentication key context, according to The verification result determines whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a link security authentication device, including:

a first receiving module, configured to receive a first management message sent by the mobile station, where the first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first message authentication code key included in the context of the first authentication key saved by the mobile station itself a count value, a first message authentication code packet number count value, the first message authentication code is based on the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value in the first authentication key context, The first message authentication code group number count value calculation calculation is generated, and the first authentication key is calculated according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to the setting rule; the first processing module is configured to include according to the second authentication key context The second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value verify the first message authentication code, and determine the mobile station and the access relay station according to the verification result. Whether the access link is secure, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a multi-hop relay base station, including:

a second receiving module, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, where the second management message carries a third message authentication code and a third message authentication code key count value, and the third message acknowledges a code group number count value, the third message authentication code is based on the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third authentication key and the third authentication in the third authentication key context Key identification calculation is generated, and the third authentication key is calculated according to the access relay identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier according to a set rule;

a second processing module, configured to verify, according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number count value included in the fourth authentication key context The third message authentication code determines whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure according to the verification result, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.

The embodiment of the invention further provides a wireless relay network system, including:

An access relay station, configured to receive a first management message sent by the mobile station, according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value included in the second authentication key context, a message authentication code packet number count value verifies the first message authentication code, determines, according to the verification result, whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure, and converts the first management message into a second management message and sends, The first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first message authentication code key count value included in the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself, the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message. The authentication code is generated according to the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, the first message authentication code key count value, and the first message authentication code group number count value in the first authentication key context, and the first authentication key is generated. The key is obtained according to the setting rule according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are equal. ;

a multi-hop relay base station, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, and according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key included in the fourth authentication key context And the third message authentication code is verified by the count value and the third message authentication code packet number, and the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is determined according to the verification result, wherein the second management message carries the first The third message authentication code and the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group number count value, and the third message authentication code according to the third message authentication code key The count value, the third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context are calculated and generated, and the third authentication key is according to the access relay station identifier and the multi-hop. After the base station identifier is calculated according to the setting rule, the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.

The beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention are as follows:

The embodiment of the invention provides a specific technical solution for detecting the security of the access link and the relay link in the wireless relay network, and can effectively prevent the replay attack in the wireless relay network. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings to be used in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly described below, and obviously, in the following description The drawings are only some of the embodiments of the present invention, and other drawings may be obtained from those skilled in the art without departing from the drawings.

1 is a flowchart of detecting security of an access link in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 2 is a flowchart of detecting security of a relay link in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention; A schematic diagram of a network architecture defined for IEEE 802.16j;

4 is a schematic flowchart of a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

6 is a schematic flowchart of a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention;

7 is a schematic flowchart of a link security authentication method in a wireless relay network according to an embodiment of the present invention;

8 is a block diagram of a link security authentication apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG. 9 is a block diagram of a multi-hop relay base station according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 10 is a block diagram of a wireless relay network system according to an embodiment of the present invention. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION In the embodiment of the present invention, a method for detecting security of an access link in a wireless relay network is as shown in FIG. 1 , and includes the following steps:

Step 101: The multi-hop relay base station or the access relay station receives the first management message sent by the mobile station.

The first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value included in the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself.

The authentication key context includes an authentication key, an authentication key identifier, a message authentication code key, a message authentication code key count value, a message authentication code packet number count value, and an authentication key and a message authentication code key count value are used together. The message authentication code key, the message authentication code key and the authentication key identifier, and the message authentication code group number count value are jointly used to calculate or verify the message authentication code of the management message.

The first message authentication code is generated according to the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, the first message authentication code key count value, and the first message authentication code group number count value in the first authentication key context. .

The first authentication key in the first authentication key context is calculated according to the mobile station identity and the access relay station identity according to a set rule.

Step 102: Verify the first message authentication according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value included in the second authentication key context. The code determines whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure according to the verification result.

The second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys. The executor of the above solution may be an A-RS (Acces s Relay Station) or an MS-BS (Mul ti- hop Relay Base) Stat ion, multi-hop relay base station). The second authentication key context may be stored locally at the A-RS or the MS-BS, or may be obtained from an authenticator to which the MS belongs.

In the embodiment of the present invention, a method for detecting security of a relay link in a wireless relay network is as shown in FIG. 2, and includes the following steps:

Step 201: Receive a second management message sent by the access relay station.

The second management message carries a third message authentication code and a third message authentication code key count value, a third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third message authentication code is based on the third message authentication code key count value, and the third The message authentication code packet number count value and the third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context are generated, and the third authentication key is set according to the access relay station identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier. Rule calculation is obtained;

Step 202: Verify third message authentication according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number count value included in the fourth authentication key context. The code determines whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure according to the verification result.

The fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys. The executor of the foregoing solution may be an MS-BS, and the fourth authentication key context may be stored locally in the MS-BS.

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention.

IEEE 802.16j is an air interface protocol developed by the IEEE organization to implement relay capability based on 16e. The network architecture defined by it is shown in Figure 3, which includes:

MR-BS: A device that provides connection, management, and control for relay stations and user terminals; RS (Relay Station): A device that relies on MR-BS to provide connectivity to other RSs or mobile stations. Some RSs can also provide management and control for subordinate RSs or user terminals. The air interface between the RS and the MS is the same as the air interface between the MR-BS and the MS. The RS is a station that relays data between the base station and the terminal, so that the wireless signal can reach the destination through multiple transmissions (multi-hop). MS (Mobile Station): The user uses this device to access the WiMAX network. In the link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided by this embodiment, the security of the access link is verified first, and then the security of the relay link is verified. The security verification of the access link is based on the MS related AK (Authentication). Key, authentication key) context, security verification of the relay link is based on the A-RS related AK context; in an alternative to this embodiment, the security verification of the access link is based on the MS-related AK context, the security of the relay link The verification is also based on the MS related AK context. In all of the following embodiments, the AK key in the MS-related AK context is generated by the MS or the MS-affiliated authenticator according to the MS identifier and the A-RS identifier, and the AK key in the A-RS related AK context is The A-RS or A-RS belonging authenticator is calculated and generated according to a certain rule according to the A-RS identifier and the MR-BS identifier. In this embodiment, MS-related AK MS maintains a context that contains CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _M, A-RS MS maintains a correlation AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Y _M, The authenticator maintains an MS-related AK context, which contains the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z _M , and the A-RS also maintains an A-RS related AK context, which includes CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X _R , MR -BS a-RS maintains a correlation AK context, context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Y _R.

As shown in FIG. 4, the link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided by this embodiment includes the following steps:

Step 301: The MS generates a first management message, that is, an RNG-REQ message.

The first message authentication code key count value included in the authentication key context (referred to as the first authentication key context in this embodiment) maintained by the MS before sending the first management message to the A-RS, that is, CMAC— KEY_ COUNT value X _{M is} self-powered B 1, and sets the first message authentication code packet number count value in the MS-related AK context (ie, the first AK context) saved locally by the MS to zero, using the MS-related AK context locally saved by the MS. Generating a first message authentication code for the RNG-REQ message; the specific process is that the MS uses the AK key in the AK context, the MS identifier (specifically, the MS media access control layer address), the RS identifier, and the X _M to be calculated in a specific manner. Message The authentication code key is used to calculate and generate the first message authentication code by using the message authentication code key and the AK identifier in the AK context and the first message authentication code packet number count value as the RNG-REQ message. For the specific calculation method, refer to 802.16e. Protocol, the difference is that the BS identifier in the 802.16e calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier.

It should be noted that the various AK contexts mentioned herein include the AK key, the AK identifier, the message authentication code key, the message authentication code key count value CMAC_KEY_COUNT, and the message authentication code group number count. value. The AK key (also referred to as the first authentication key in this embodiment) in the first AK context saved by the MS is the MS according to the MS ID (specifically, the media access control layer address of the MS) and the RS. The ID is calculated according to the set rules.

The MS initiates this step if the A-RS performs network re-entry or performs a secure location update or handover to a target access relay station.

Step 302: The MS sends an RNG-REQ message to the A-RS, where the message carries the current X _M , the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message authentication code.

Step 303, the A-RS determines whether the MS related AK context (ie, the second AK context) is saved locally, and if so, proceeds to step 310; otherwise, proceeds to step 304;

The second AK context is an AK context including a second authentication key, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys.

Step 304: The A-RS sends an MS_Context-REQ (Mobile Station Context Request) message to the MR-BS, where the message carries the MS ID (MS identifier);

The MS ID may be carried by the MS in the RNG-REQ message and sent to the A-RS, or may be

A-RS is known by other prior art means.

In the embodiment of the present invention, the message between the A-RS and the MR-BS and the MR-BS and the authenticator may be directly or indirectly sent, so that the indirect transmission to the A-RS passes through other RSs. The message is sent to the MR-BS, and the MR-BS can send the message to the authenticator via other network elements (such as a gateway).

Step 305, the MR-BS sends a Context_Req to the Authenticator (up and down) Message request) message, the message carries the MS ID and the A-RS ID;

The authenticators mentioned in this document are all authenticators to which the MS belongs.

Step 306: The authenticator calculates an MS-related AK key according to the same setting rule as the MS according to the MS ID and the RS ID, and generates an MS-related AK context (ie, a second AK context). Step 307, the authenticator to the MR-BS Sending a Context_Rpt (Context Report) message, the message carries a second AK Context, and the second AK Context includes an MS-related CMAC-KEY-COUNT value ZM locally saved by the authenticator _;

Step 308: The MR-BS returns an MS_Context-RSP (Mobile Station Context Response) message to the A-RS, where the message carries the second AK context provided by the authenticator, and the second AK context includes the locally saved by the authenticator. MS related CMAC - KEY - COUNT value Z _M ;

Step 309, A-RS makes Y _M equal to Z _M , and Y _M is the MS-related CMAC-KEY_COUNT value maintained by the A-RS;

Step 310, it is determined whether X _M is greater than or equal to Y _M , and if so, proceed to step 311, otherwise, proceed to step 325;

In this step, it is determined whether the first message authentication code key count value is not less than the second message authentication code key count value included in the second authentication key context.

This step is an auxiliary means for verifying whether the access link is secure. If it is determined that X _{M is} less than Y _M , it is understood that an access link replay attack occurs. It is not necessary to perform the message authentication code verification of the RNG-REQ message. It can be seen that with this step, it is possible to know whether the access link is secure by using a simple judgment means.

Step 311, A-RS using X _M RNG-REQ message includes the message authentication code value and the packet count number associated MS AK context (i.e., a second context AK) in key AK, AK verify identification in the RNG-REQ message For the specific authentication mode, refer to the 802.16e protocol. The difference is that the BS identifier in the 802.16e calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 312, otherwise proceed to step 325;

After the verification is successful, the access link between the MS and the A-RS can be determined to be secure, otherwise the access link is determined. Not safe.

Step 312, A-RS makes Y _M equal to X _M ;

Step 313, the A-RS generates a second management message, that is, a new RNG-REQ message. The method for generating the second management message by the A-RS in this step is: A-RS related AK context maintained by itself (ie, the third AK) Third CMAC - KEY - COUNT value in context)

The first CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _M and a first message authentication code value of said third count number of packets message authentication code value of the packet count number replacing step 302 RNG-REQ message, and using A-RS Related AK context (i.e. The third message authentication code key and the third message authentication code packet number in the three AK contexts are the replaced RNG-REQ message (excluding the original message authentication code part). The message authentication code is recalculated, that is, the third message. The authentication code replaces the third message authentication code with the original first message authentication code to obtain a new RNG-REQ message, that is, the second management message. Step 314, the A-RS sends the second management obtained in step 313 to the MR-BS. Message (ie new RNG-REQ message), which includes X _R;

Step 315, the MR-BS determines whether the X _R included in the received RNG-REQ message is greater than or equal to the locally saved Y _R , and if yes, proceeds to step 316, otherwise proceeds to step 324;

In this step, it is determined whether the third message authentication code key count value is not less than the fourth message authentication code key count value included in the fourth authentication key context saved by the MR-BS, and if it is determined that X _{R is} less than Y _M , It is understood that a relay link replay attack has occurred.

Step 316, the MR-BS receives the X _R according to the RNG-REQ message received in step 314, the message authentication code packet number count value, and the AK key in the locally saved A-RS related AK context (fourth AK context). The AK identifies the message authentication code in the RNG-REQ message received by the verification step 314; the specific process is that the MR-BS utilizes the AK key in the A-RS related AK context (fourth AK context), and the A-RS media access control layer address, MR-BS and _identify] calculated message authentication code key in a specific way, reuse of the identification AK message authentication code key a-RS and the AK context related, RNG-REQ message received in step 314 The message authentication code packet number count value in the verification of the message authentication code of the RNG-REQ message, the specific verification method is similar The 802.16e protocol method differs in that the terminal identifier in the 802.16e authentication method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, go to step 317, otherwise go to step 324;

The success of the verification can determine the security of the relay link between the A-RS and the MR-BS, otherwise it is determined that the trunk link is not secure.

Step 317, the MR-BS makes Y _R equal to X _R , and sends an RNG-RSP (Ranging Response) message with a success indication to the A-RS;

Step 318: The A-RS returns an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the MS.

Step 319, the A-RS sends an MS_Context-REQ message to the MR-BS, where the message carries the MS ID ^n X _M {t;

In the specific implementation, steps 318 and 319 do not have a certain order.

Step 320: The MR-BS sends a Context_RPt message to the authenticator, where the message carries XM _; the message may also be a CMAC_Key_Count_Update message authentication step, and the corresponding step The response message in 322 is CMAC_Key_Count_Update_ Ack (Message Authentication Code Key Count Update Confirmation) message.

Step 321: After receiving the Context_RPt message, the authenticator updates the CMAC_Key_Count value in the MS-related AK context saved locally by the authenticator, specifically, the greater of Z _M and X _M is added, and Assigned to Z _M , ie Z _M =max(X _M , Z _M )++ _;

If in the specific operation, only the security of the access link needs to be detected, the X _M should be notified to the authenticator after confirming the security of the access link, and the authenticator updates the MS-related CMAC locally saved by the authenticator— Key—Count value.

Step 322: The authenticator sends a Context_Ack (Context Acknowledgement) message to the MR-BS. Step 323: After receiving the Context_Ack message, the MR-BS sends an MS_Context-RSP message to the A-RS to respond to the MS-Context. -REQ message, end;

Step 324: The MR-BS sends an RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the A-RS.

The specific processing method of this step may be: setting the Ranging Status in the RNG-RSP message to Abort, or setting the Location Update Response (bit) Set update response) to failure.

Step 325: The A-RS sends an RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the MS.

The specific processing method of this step may be: setting the Ranging Status in the RNG-RSP message to Abort, or setting the Location Update Response to failure.

In a specific implementation, some adjustments may be made to the foregoing process, for example: In step 314, the RNG-REQ message may carry the CMAC_Key_Count value X _{M of the} MS and the CMAC_Key_Count value X _{R of the} RS. Then, the MR-BS can know X _M at this time, and if the result of the determination in step 315 is YES, steps 320 to 322 are performed, and X _{M is} notified to the authenticator. Thus, steps 319 and 323 can be omitted.

There is another alternative in this embodiment, that is, based on the scheme described in FIG. 4, the MR-BS also needs to maintain an MS-related AK context (second AK context), and the second AK context includes an MS-related CMAC-Key- Count value Y _M , at this time: Steps 305~307, 313, 319, 323 can be omitted. The reason for retaining steps 320-322 is that there may be other MR-BSs that can communicate with the authenticator that need to obtain the relevant AK context of the MS from the authenticator. If all MR-BSs that can communicate with the authenticator save the MS-related AK context, steps 320-322 may be omitted.

In specific implementation, it is possible to detect only whether the relay link is secure or only to detect whether the access link is secure. In this embodiment, if only the access link is detected to be safe, step 313-317 may be omitted. After step 312 is ended, step 318 is directly performed. If only the relay link is detected to be safe, step 303 may be omitted. 312, 319-323 The situation of the following embodiments is similar to that of the embodiment, and those skilled in the art can determine whether to detect only according to whether the steps are related to the security detection of the access link or the security detection of the relay link. The case when the access link is secure or the case where only the relay link is safe is not described in the following embodiments.

In another embodiment, in the link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided by the embodiment, the access link is first verified to be secure, and the relay link is verified. The security verification of the access link is based on the MS correlation. The AK context, the security verification of the relay link is based on the A-RS related AK context and the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value used by the access link RNG-REQ. In this embodiment, MS maintains a relevant MS AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _M, A-RS MS maintains a correlation AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Y _M, authenticator maintains a MS Related AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Z _M, a-RS still maintains a relevant a-RS AK context, MR-BS maintains a relevant a-RS AK context, while maintaining a MS associated CMAC- KEY—COUNT value YMR. Compared with the previous embodiment, it is not necessary to maintain the A-RS related CMAC_KEY_COUNT value in this embodiment.

The link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided in this embodiment is as shown in FIG. 5, and includes the following steps:

Step 401: The MS generates a first management message, that is, an RNG-REQ message.

The first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first message authentication code key count value X _M and the first message authentication code group number count value included in the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself.

Step 402: The MS sends the RNG-REQ message to the A-RS, where the message carries the current X _M , the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message authentication code.

Step 403, the A-RS determines whether the MS-related AK context (ie, the second AK context) is saved locally, and if yes, proceeds to step 410; otherwise, proceeds to step 404;

Step 404: The A-RS sends an MS_Context-REQ message to the MR-BS, where the message carries the MS ID.

Step 405: The MR-BS sends a Context_Req message to the authenticator, where the message carries the MS ID and the A-RS ID.

Step 406: The authenticator calculates an MS-related AK key according to the same setting rule as the MS according to the MS ID and the RS ID, and generates an MS-related AK context (ie, a second AK context). Step 407, the authenticator to the MR-BS Send a Context_Rpt message, the message carries a second AK context, and the second AK context contains a second locally saved by the authenticator CMAC—KEY—COUNT value Z _M;

Step 408, the MR-BS maintains the MS related CMAC-KEY- COUNT value Y _MR is equal to Z _M;

Step 409: The MR-BS returns an MS_Context-RSP message to the A-RS, where the message carries the second AK context provided by the authenticator;

Step 410, A-RS makes Y _M equal to Z _M ;

Step 411, it is determined whether X _M is greater than or equal to Y _M , and if so, proceed to step 412, otherwise, proceed to step 424;

Step 412, A-RS using X _M RNG-REQ message includes the message authentication code packet number counter value and MS-related AK context of the AK, AK identification verification RNG-REQ message is a message authentication code, the specific authentication manner Referring to the 802.16e protocol, the difference is that the BS identifier in the 802.16e calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 413, otherwise proceed to step 424;

If the verification is successful, the access link between the MS and the A-RS can be determined. Otherwise, the access link is determined to be insecure.

Step 413, A-RS makes Y _M equal to X _M;

Step 414, the A-RS generates a second management message, that is, a new RNG-REQ message. In this step, the A-RS uses the AK key, AK in the A-RS related AK context (ie, the third AK context) maintained by itself. The identifier and the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X _M and the message authentication code packet number count value in the RNG-REQ message, for the RNG-REQ message (excluding the original message authentication code part), recalculate the message authentication code, and the recalculated message The authentication code replaces the original message authentication code to obtain a new RNG-REQ message;

Step 415: The A-RS sends a new RNG-REQ message to the MR-BS.

Step 416: The MR-BS determines whether the X _M included in the received RNG-REQ message is greater than or Is equal to the locally saved Y _MR , if yes, proceed to step 417, otherwise proceed to step 423;

In this step, it is determined whether the third message authentication code key count value is not less than the fourth message authentication code key count value included in the fourth authentication key context saved locally by the MR-BS.

Step 417, the MR-BS according to the X _M , the message authentication code packet number count value included in the received RNG-REQ message, and the AK key, AK in the locally saved A-RS related AK context (fourth AK context) Identifying the message authentication code in the RNG-REQ message; the specific procedure is that the MR-BS utilizes the AK key in the A-RS related AK context (fourth AK context), the A-RS media access control layer address, and the MR-BS identifier. And X _M calculates the message authentication code key in a specific manner, and then utilizes the message authentication code key and the AK identifier in the A-RS related AK context (fourth AK context), and the message authentication code in the RNG-REQ message. The packet number count value verifies the message authentication code of the RNG-REQ message, and the specific verification method is similar to the 802.16e protocol method. The difference is that the terminal identifier in the 802.16e authentication method needs to be changed to the RS identifier, and the parameters required for the verification are from different contexts. . If the verification is successful, go to step 418, otherwise go to step 423; verify the success to determine the security of the relay link between the A-RS and the MR-BS, otherwise determine that the relay link is not secure.

Step 418, MR-BS causes YMR to be equal to X _M , and sends a success indication to the A-RS.

RNG-RSP message;

Step 419: The A-RS returns an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the MS.

Step 420: The MR-BS sends a Context_RPt message to the authenticator, where the message carries XM _. In the specific implementation, steps 419 and 420 do not have a certain sequence.

Step 421: After the authenticator receives the Context_RPt message, the update identifier is locally saved.

The CMAC-Key-Count value in the context of the MS is specifically the larger of Z _M and X _M plus

1, and assigned to Z _M , ie Z _M =max(X _M , Z _M )++ _;

Step 422, the authenticator sends a Context_Ack message 4 to the MR-BS, and ends; Step 423, the MR-BS sends the RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the A-RS;

Step 424: The A-RS sends an RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the MS. In another embodiment, in the link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided in this embodiment, the security of the relay link is verified first, and then the security of the access link is verified. The security verification of the access link is based on the MS-related AK context, and the security verification of the relay link is based on the A-RS related AK context. In this embodiment, MS-related AK MS maintains a context that contains CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _M, A-RS MS maintains a correlation AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Y _M, The authenticator maintains an MS-related AK context, which contains CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z _M , and the A-RS maintains an A-RS related AK context, which includes CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X _R , MR- a-RS BS maintains a correlation AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Y _R. Compared with the first embodiment, this embodiment first verifies the security of the relay link and then verifies the security of the access link.

The link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided in this embodiment is as shown in FIG. 6, and includes the following steps:

Step 501: The MS generates a first management message, that is, an RNG-REQ message.

Step 502: The MS sends an RNG-REQ message to the A-RS, where the message carries the current X _M , the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message authentication code.

Step 503: The A-RS generates a second management message, that is, a new RNG-REQ message. In this step, the A-RS will maintain the A-RS related AK context (ie, the third AK context) CMAC_KEY. — COUNT value _] ^ and the message authentication code packet number count value replaces the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X _M and the message authentication code packet number count value in the received RNG-REQ message, and utilizes the A-RS related AK context The message authentication code key and the message authentication code packet number count value are the replaced RNG-REQ message (excluding the original message authentication code part). The message authentication code is recalculated, and the recalculated message authentication code is replaced with the original message authentication code. Obtain a new RNG-REQ message;

Step 504: The A-RS sends a new RNG-REQ message to the MR-BS.

Step 505: The MR-BS determines whether the X _R included in the received RNG-REQ message is greater than or Is equal to the locally saved Y _R , if yes, proceed to step 506, otherwise proceed to step 522;

Step 506: The MR-BS according to the X _R included in the received RNG-REQ message, the message authentication code packet number count value, and the AK key in the locally saved A-RS related AK context (ie, the fourth AK context), The AK identifier verifies the message authentication code in the received RNG-REQ message; the specific process is that the MR-BS utilizes the AK key in the A-RS related AK context, the A-RS media access control layer address, the MR-BS identifier, and the pass The message authentication code key is calculated in a specific manner, and the RNG- is verified by using the message authentication code key and the AK identifier in the A-RS related AK context, and the message authentication code packet number count value in the received RNG-REQ message. The message authentication code of the REQ message is similar to the 802.16e protocol method. The difference is that the terminal identifier in the 802.16e authentication method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 507, otherwise proceed to step 522;

Step 507, the MR-BS makes Y _R equal to X _R , and sends an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the A-RS.

Step 508: The MR-BS sends a Context_Req message to the authenticator, where the message carries the MS ID and the A-RS ID.

Step 509: The authenticator calculates an MS-related AK key according to the same setting rule as the MS according to the MS ID and the RS ID, and generates an MS-related AK context (ie, a second AK context). Step 510, the authenticator to the MR-BS Context- Rpt send message, and the message carries a second AK context, the second context includes AK locally stored authentication MS-related CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Z _M;

Step 511: The MR-BS returns an MS_Context-RSP message to the A-RS, where the message carries the second AK context provided by the authenticator;

In this embodiment, there is no determined sequential relationship between the steps of the MR-BS to verify the A-RS CMAC and the steps of obtaining the MS-related AK context. Step 512, A-RS makes Y _M equal to Z _M ;

Step 513, it is determined whether X _M is greater than or equal to Y _M , and if so, proceed to step 514, otherwise, proceed to step 523;

Step 514, X _M RNG-REQ message received from A-RS 502 utilizing the step comprising, MS AK context 511 associated message authentication code received packet count value and the number of steps AK, AK identification verification RNG-REQ message The message authentication code in the medium can be referred to the 802.16e protocol. The difference is that the BS identifier in the 802.16e calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 515, otherwise proceed to step 523;

Step 515, A-RS makes Y _M equal to X _M;

Step 516: The A-RS returns an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the MS.

Step 517, the A-RS sends an MS_Context-REQ message to the MR-BS, where the message carries the MS ID ^n X _M {t;

In the specific implementation, steps 516 and 517 do not have a certain order.

Step 518: The MR-BS sends a Context_RPt message to the authenticator, where the message carries XM _{. In} step 519, after the authenticator receives the Context_RPt message, the updater locally saves the identifier.

MS related CMAC - Key - Count value, specifically take the larger of Z _M and X _M plus 1 and assign it to Z _M , ie Z _M =max(X _M , Z _M )++;

Step 520: The authenticator sends a Context_Ack message to the MR-BS.

Step 521: After receiving the Context_Ack message, the MR-BS sends the message to the A-RS.

The MS_Context-RSP message responds to the above MS_Context-REQ message, and ends;

Step 522: The MR-BS sends an RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the A-RS.

Step 523: The A-RS sends the RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the MS.

In a specific implementation, the MR-BS can determine whether the A-RS holds the MS-related AK context, and if so, steps 508-511 can be omitted. In another embodiment, in the link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided by the embodiment, the security verification of the access link and the security verification of the relay link are performed on the MR-BS. The security verification of the access link is based on the MS-related AK context, and the security verification of the relay link is based on the A-RS related AK context. In this embodiment, MS-related AK MS maintains a context that contains CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _M, MS-related authenticator maintains a AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value Z _M, a-RS a-RS maintains a correlation AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT value X _R, MR-BS maintains a relevant a-RS AK context, which context includes CMAC- KEY- COUNT values Y _R, The MR-BS may also maintain an MS related AK context. Compared with the first one, the access link security and the relay link security in this embodiment are all performed in the MR-BS.

The link security authentication method in the wireless relay network provided in this embodiment is as shown in FIG. 7, and includes the following steps:

Step 601: The MS generates a first management message, that is, an RNG-REQ message.

Step 602: The MS sends an RNG-REQ message to the A-RS, where the message carries the current X _M , the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message authentication code.

Step 603, the A-RS generates a second management message, that is, a new RNG-REQ message. In this step, the A-RS will maintain the third message in the A-RS related AK context (ie, the third AK context) maintained by itself. The authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code packet number count value are added to the end of the RNG-REQ message, and the A-RS related third message authentication is calculated by using the A-RS related AK context for adding the new field after the RNG-REQ message. The code adds a new message authentication code to the RNG-REQ message after adding the new field, and generates a new RNG-REQ message. The specific calculation method of the A-RS related message authentication code can refer to the 802.16e protocol, and the difference is 802.16e. The terminal identifier in the calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier;

At this time, the new RNG-REQ message includes a first message authentication code, a first message authentication code key count value, a first message authentication code packet number count value, and a third message authentication code key count value X _R , The third message authentication code packet number count value and the third message authentication code. Step 604: The A-RS sends a new RNG-REQ message to the MR-BS. Step 605: The MR-BS sends a Context_Req message to the authenticator, where the message carries the MS ID and the A-RS ID.

Step 606: The authenticator calculates an MS-related AK key according to the same setting rule as the MS according to the MS ID and the RS ID, and generates an MS-related AK context (ie, a second AK context). Step 607, the authenticator to the MR-BS Sending a Context_RPpt message, where the message carries a second AK context, where the second AK context includes an MS-related CMAC-KEY_COUNT value ZM locally saved by the authenticator _;

Step 608, MR-BS judges _whether] ¥ RNG-REQ message includes greater than or equal locally stored and ^ 0- ^ X _M 0 contained in the message is greater than or equal to Z _M, if yes, proceeds to step 609, otherwise proceeds Step 615;

Step 609: The MR-BS according to the X _R and A-RS related message authentication code group number count value included in the received RNG-REQ message and the locally saved A-RS related AK context (ie, the fourth AK context) The AK key and the AK identifier verify the A-RS related message authentication code in the received RNG-REQ message; the specific process is that the MR-BS utilizes the AK key in the A-RS related AK context, and the A-RS media access control The layer address, the MR-BS identifier, and the X _R calculate the message authentication code key in a specific manner, and then use the message authentication code key and the AK identifier in the A-RS related AK context, and the received RNG-REQ message. The message authentication code packet number count value verifies the A-RS related message authentication code of the RNG-REQ message, and the specific verification method is similar to the 802.16e protocol method. The difference is that the terminal identifier in the 802.16e authentication method needs to be changed to the RS identifier. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 610, otherwise proceed to step 615;

Step 610: Verify the MS-related message authentication code in the RNG-REQ message by using the X _M and MS-related message authentication code packet number count value included in the RNG-REQ message and the AK and AK identifiers in the MS-related AK context, and the specific verification mode. Can refer to the 802.16e protocol, the difference is The BS identifier in the 802.16e calculation method needs to be changed to the RS identifier, and the X _R , the A-RS related message authentication code packet number count value, and the A-RS related message authentication code at the end of the RNG-REQ message need to be ignored in the verification. If the verification is successful, proceed to step 611, otherwise proceed to step 615;

Step 611, the MR-BS makes Y _R equal to X _R , and sends an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the A-RS, and the A-RS sends an RNG-RSP message with a success indication to the MS.

Step 612: The MR-BS sends a Context_RPt message to the authenticator, where the message carries XM _{. In} step 613, after receiving the Context_RPt message, the authenticator updates the MS-related CMAC-Key saved locally by the authenticator. — Count value, specifically taking the larger of Z _M and X _M plus 1 and assigning it to Z _M , ie Z _M =max(X _M , Z _M )++;

Step 614: The authenticator sends a Context_Ack message to the MR-BS, and ends.

Step 615: The MR-BS sends an RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the A-RS.

Step 616: The A-RS sends the RNG-RSP carrying the rejection information to the MS.

In this embodiment, before performing step 604, it may be determined whether the A-RS saves the MS-related AK context, and if so, the related operations in the first embodiment may be performed to verify the security of the access link and the relay link. Otherwise, step 604 can be performed to perform corresponding processing by using the technical solution of the embodiment.

In a specific implementation, it is possible to verify only whether the access link is secure. In this case, the new RNG-REQ may not be generated, that is, the third message authentication code key count value in the second management message is the first message. The authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group number count value is a first message authentication code packet number count value, the first message authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code group number count value is included in the mobile station In the first authentication key context saved by itself, that is, the second management message is the first management message forwarded by the A-RS. Subsequent steps involving verifying the security of the relay link can be omitted.

The device security authentication device in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 8, includes: a first receiving module, configured to receive a first management message sent by the mobile station, where the first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first authentication key in the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself, and the first The authentication key identifier and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value are calculated and generated, and the first authentication key is calculated according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to the setting rule;

a first processing module, configured to verify, according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value included in the second authentication key context The first message authentication code determines whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure according to the verification result, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys.

The relay station can also include:

a first key obtaining module, configured to: after the first receiving module receives the first management message, determine whether the first storage module saves the second authentication key context, and if not saved, send the identifier to the authenticator to which the mobile station belongs A context request including a mobile station identity and an access relay station identity is provided to the first processing module with a second authentication key context obtained from the authenticator.

For the specific processing method, refer to steps 301 to 312 of the first embodiment, steps 401-413 of the second embodiment, and related parts described in steps 501 and 513 to 516 of the third embodiment.

The above device may be an access relay station or a multi-hop relay base station.

Another apparatus embodiment, the multi-hop relay base station in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 9, includes: a second receiving module, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, where the second management message carries The third message authentication code and the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group number count value, and the third message authentication code according to the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number count value And generating, by the third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context, the third authentication key is obtained according to the setting rule according to the access relay identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier;

a second processing module, configured to: according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group included in the fourth authentication key context The number of the counters verifies the third message authentication code, and according to the verification result, it is determined whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.

For the specific processing method, refer to the related parts described in steps 314 to 318 of the first embodiment, steps 415 to 419 of the second embodiment, and steps 504 to 507 of the third embodiment.

System Embodiment, the wireless relay network system in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 10, includes: an access relay station, configured to receive a first management message sent by the mobile station, according to a second The second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value, and the first message authentication code packet number count value verify the first message authentication code, and determine, between the mobile station and the access relay station, according to the verification result. Whether the access link is secure, and the first management message is converted into a second management message and sent, where the first management message carries the first message authentication code and the first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself a first message authentication code key count value, a first message authentication code packet number count value, and the first message authentication code is based on the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, and the first message in the first authentication key context The authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value are calculated and generated, and the first authentication key is determined according to the mobile station identifier and the access Station identification by setting rule obtained by calculation, the second authentication key and the authentication key for the first key and the like;

a multi-hop relay base station, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, and according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key included in the fourth authentication key context And the third message authentication code is verified by the count value and the third message authentication code packet number, and the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is determined according to the verification result, wherein the second management message carries the first The third message authentication code and the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code group number count value, and the third message authentication code according to the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number count value And calculating, by the third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context, the third authentication key is obtained according to the setting rule according to the access relay identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier, and the fourth The authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys. In summary, the embodiment of the present invention provides a specific technical solution for detecting the security of the access link and the relay link in the wireless relay network, and can effectively prevent the replay attack in the wireless relay network.

One of ordinary skill in the art will appreciate that all or part of the processing of the above-described embodiments can be accomplished by a program that instructs the associated hardware, which can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. It is apparent that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and variations to the invention without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention. Thus, it is intended that the present invention cover the modifications and modifications of the invention

Claims

Rights request

A link security authentication method in a wireless relay network, comprising: a multi-hop relay base station or an access relay station receiving a first management message sent by a mobile station, where the first management message carries a a message authentication code and a first message authentication code key count value and a first message authentication code packet number count value included in a first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself, the first message authentication code according to the Generating, by the first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, the first message authentication code key count value, and the first message authentication code packet number count value in the first authentication key context, the first The first authentication key in the authentication key context is calculated according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to a setting rule;

And verifying the first message according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value included in the second authentication key context. The authentication code determines whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure according to the verification result, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys.

The method according to claim 1, wherein after receiving the first management message, it is first determined whether the second authentication key context is saved locally, and if not saved, to the mobile station The authenticator sends a context request including the mobile station identity and the access relay identity, and obtains the second authentication key context from the authenticator.

The method according to claim 1, wherein, after receiving the first management message, determining whether the first message authentication code key count value is not less than the second authentication key context The second message authentication code key count value is included, and if yes, the step of verifying the first message authentication code is performed, otherwise, determining that the access link is insecure.

4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

And if the receiving the first management message is an access relay station, the access relay station further sends a second management message to the multi-hop relay base station, where the second management message carries the third message authentication code and the third message. An authentication code key count value, a third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third message authentication code is grouped according to the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group The third counter key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context are calculated and generated, and the third authentication key is set according to the access relay station identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier. The rule is calculated and obtained;

The fourth multi-hop relay base station according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group included in the fourth authentication key context. Verifying the third message authentication code, determining, according to the verification result, whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure, the fourth authentication key and the third The authentication key is a peer key.

A link security authentication method in a wireless relay network, comprising: receiving a second management message sent by an access relay station, where the second management message carries a third message authentication code and a third message An authentication code key count value, a third message authentication code packet number count value, the third message authentication code according to the third message authentication code key count value, a third message authentication code packet number count value, and a third authentication The third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the key context are calculated and generated, and the third authentication key is calculated according to the access relay identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier according to a setting rule, where The third authentication key context is an authentication relay context associated with the access relay station saved by the access relay station;

Verifying the third message according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code packet number count value included in the fourth authentication key context The authentication code determines whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure according to the verification result, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.

The method according to claim 5, wherein, after receiving the second management message, determining whether the third message authentication code key count value is not less than the fourth authentication key context The fourth message authentication code key count value is included, and if yes, the step of verifying the third message authentication code is performed, otherwise, determining that the relay link is insecure.

The method according to claim 5, wherein the third message authentication code is dense The key count value is a first message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code packet number count value is a first message authentication code packet number count value, the first message authentication code key count value, the first The message authentication code packet number count value is included in the context of the first authentication key held by the mobile station itself.

The method according to claim 5, wherein the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number count value are message authentications included in the third authentication key context. Code key count value, message authentication code group number count value.

The method according to claim 8, wherein the second management message further carries a first message authentication code and a first message authentication code included in a first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself a first key authentication value, a first authentication key, a first message authentication code, a first message authentication code, and a first message authentication code The message authentication code key count value and the first message authentication code packet number count value are calculated and generated, and the first authentication key in the first authentication key context is calculated according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to the setting rule. ;

After receiving the second management message, the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value and the first message included in the second authentication key context are further The authentication code packet number counter value verifies the first message authentication code, and determines, according to the verification result, whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure, the second authentication key and the first The authentication key is a peer key.

A link security authentication device in a wireless relay network, comprising: a first receiving module, configured to receive a first management message sent by a mobile station, where the first management message carries a first message An authentication code and a first message authentication code key count value and a first message authentication code packet number count value included in a first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself, the first message authentication code according to the first The first authentication key, the first authentication key identifier, the first message authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value calculation calculation, and the first authentication Key based on mobile station identity and access relay The station identification is calculated according to the set rules;

a first processing module, configured to count, according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code group number included in the second authentication key context And verifying, by the value, the first message authentication code, determining, according to the verification result, whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure, and the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer-to-peer key.

The device according to claim 10, further comprising:

a first key obtaining module, configured to determine, after the first receiving module receives the first management message, whether the first storage module saves the second authentication key context, if not saved, An authenticator to which the mobile station belongs sends a context request including the mobile station identity and the access relay station identity, to obtain the second authentication key context from the authenticator to provide to the first process Module.

12. Apparatus according to claim 10 or 11, wherein said apparatus is an access relay station or a multi-hop relay base station.

A multi-hop relay base station, comprising:

a second receiving module, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, where the second management message carries a third message authentication code, a third message authentication code key count value, and a third message authentication code group number count And the third message authentication code is based on the third message authentication code key count value, the third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third authentication key and the third authentication key in the third authentication key context. Key identification calculation is generated, and the third authentication key is calculated according to the access relay identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier according to a setting rule;

a second processing module, configured to count, according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code key count value and the third message authentication code group number included in the fourth authentication key context And verifying, by the value, the third message authentication code, determining, according to the verification result, whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are Peer key.

14. A wireless relay network system, comprising:

An access relay station, configured to receive a first management message sent by the mobile station, according to the second authentication key, the second authentication key identifier, and the first message authentication code key count value included in the second authentication key context And determining, by the first message authentication code packet number, the first message authentication code, determining, according to the verification result, whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure, and the first management message is Converting to the second management message and transmitting, where the first management message carries a first message authentication code and a first message authentication code key included in a first authentication key context saved by the mobile station itself a first value, a first message authentication code, a first message authentication code, a first message authentication code, a first authentication key, a first authentication key identifier, and a first message authentication. The code key count value and the first message authentication code group number count value are calculated and generated, and the first authentication key is set according to the mobile station identifier and the access relay station identifier according to a setting rule. Calculating, the second authentication key and the first authentication key are peer keys;

a multi-hop relay base station, configured to receive a second management message sent by the access relay station, and according to the fourth authentication key, the fourth authentication key identifier, and the third message authentication code included in the fourth authentication key context Determining, by the key count value, the third message authentication code packet number, the third message authentication code, determining, according to the verification result, whether the relay link between the access relay station and the multi-hop relay base station is secure, wherein The second management message carries a third message authentication code, a third message authentication code key count value, and a third message authentication code packet number count value, where the third message authentication code is based on the third message authentication code. The key count value, the third message authentication code packet number count value, and the third authentication key and the third authentication key identifier in the third authentication key context are calculated and generated, and the third authentication key is generated according to the access The relay station identifier and the multi-hop relay base station identifier are obtained according to a setting rule, and the fourth authentication key and the third authentication key are peer keys.