CN101815293A - Link security certification method, device and system in wireless relay network - Google Patents

Link security certification method, device and system in wireless relay network Download PDF

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Publication number
CN101815293A
CN101815293A CN200910004704A CN200910004704A CN101815293A CN 101815293 A CN101815293 A CN 101815293A CN 200910004704 A CN200910004704 A CN 200910004704A CN 200910004704 A CN200910004704 A CN 200910004704A CN 101815293 A CN101815293 A CN 101815293A
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key
authentication code
count value
context
message
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CN101815293B (en
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李波杰
卢磊
梁文亮
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Huawei Technologies Co Ltd
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Priority to CN2009100047045A priority Critical patent/CN101815293B/en
Priority to PCT/CN2009/076217 priority patent/WO2010094206A1/en
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general

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  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
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Abstract

The invention discloses a link security certification method, a device and a system in a wireless relay network. The method comprises the following steps that: a multi-hop relay base station or an access relay station receives a first management message sent by a mobile station; the first management message carries a first message authentication code, and a first message authentication code key counting value and a first message authentication code grouping number counting value which are contained in the context of a first authentication key stored by the mobile station per se; the first message authentication code is verified according to a second authentication key, a second authentication key mark, the first message authentication code key counting value and the first message authentication code grouping number counting value, wherein the second authentication key and the second authentication key mark are contained in the context of a second authentication key; and whether the access link between the mobile station and the access relay station is secure or not is determined according to the verification results. When the technical scheme of the invention is adopted, the relay attack in the wireless relay network can be effectively prevented.

Description

Link security certification method in the wireless relay network, device and system
Technical field
The present invention relates to communication technical field, relate in particular to link security certification method, device and system in the wireless relay network.
Background technology
WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access, the microwave interoperability is inserted in the whole world) is a kind of wireless metropolitan area network technology based on IEEE 802.16 standards.IEEE 802.16d is the standard of fixed wireless access, can be applied to 2～11GHz non line of sight (NLOS, Non Light of Sight) transmission and 10～66GHz sighting distance (LOS, Light of Sight) transmission.IEEE 802.16e has added the ambulant new features of support on the basis of IEEE 802.16d.
Defined a kind of method that prevents that administrative messag from resetting in the IEEE 802.16e agreement, at any time promptly, CMAC (Cipher-based message authentication code, based on the message authentication code of password, being called for short message authentication code in this article) combination of keys of packet number count value and the corresponding CMAC of generation message authentication code is unique.For preventing to reset effectively, these keys must often upgrade, and CMAC KEY COUNT (authentication code key counting) count value then is used for guaranteeing the freshness of key; Simultaneously, message authentication code packet number count value also can be upgraded when the administrative messag of each transmission band message authentication code, further strengthens the ability of the anti-replay-attack of message authentication code.Terminal reenters or carries out home and upgrade or switch in the process of target BS at network, before the base station sends RNG-REQ (distance measurement request) message, the CMAC_KEY_COUNT count value all can be upgraded, and the zero setting of message authentication code packet number count value, count value after the terminal utilization is upgraded generates new authentication code key, to utilize the message authentication code packet number count value after this authentication code key and the zero setting be that RNG-REQ message generates the CMAC message authentication code to terminal then, the while network side also uses the count value generation corresponding secret key after the renewal to be used to verify this RNG-REQ message, prevents Replay Attack with this.
The inventor finds that there are the following problems at least in the prior art: in the multi-hop relay network scenarios of WiMAX, existing protocol (NWG (Network Working Group, network work group) and 802.16j) how under the distributed security pattern, to utilize authentication code key count value and message authentication code packet number count value to carry out anti-replay-attack not provide concrete solution for terminal and network.
Summary of the invention
The purpose of the embodiment of the invention is to provide link security certification method, device and the system in a kind of wireless relay network, in order to prevent the Replay Attack in the wireless relay network.
To achieve these goals, the embodiment of the invention provides the link security certification method in a kind of wireless relay network, comprising:
First administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, and first authenticate key in first authentication key context obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign;
Verify first message authentication code according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value, determine whether safety of travelling carriage and the access link of access between relay station according to the checking result, second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The embodiment of the invention also provides the link security certification method in a kind of wireless relay network, comprising:
Receive and insert second administrative messag that relay station sends, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, the 3rd message authentication code is according to the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to inserting relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign, and described the 3rd authentication key context is the relevant authentication key context of access relay station that described access relay station is preserved;
Verify the 3rd message authentication code according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, the 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of link security certification device, comprising:
First receiver module, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, and first authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign;
First processing module, second authenticate key, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to second authentication key context are verified first message authentication code, determine whether safety of travelling carriage and the access link of access between relay station according to the checking result, second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of multi-hop relay base station, comprising:
Second receiver module, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code calculates and generates according to the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign, and the 3rd authenticate key calculates by the setting rule with the multi-hop relay base station sign according to access relay station sign and obtains;
Second processing module, the 4th authenticate key, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to the 4th authentication key context are verified the 3rd message authentication code, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, the 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The embodiment of the invention also provides a kind of wireless relay network system, comprising:
Insert relay station, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is verified first message authentication code, determine whether safety of travelling carriage and the access link of access between relay station according to the checking result, and first administrative messag is converted to second administrative messag and sends, wherein, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, first authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign, and second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key;
Multi-hop relay base station, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, and according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value is verified the 3rd message authentication code, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, wherein, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, the 3rd message authentication code is according to the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to inserting relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign, and the 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The beneficial effect of the embodiment of the invention is:
The embodiment of the invention can effectively prevent the Replay Attack in the wireless relay network for detection access link and repeated link fail safe in the wireless relay network provide concrete technical scheme.
Description of drawings
In order to be illustrated more clearly in the embodiment of the invention or technical scheme of the prior art, to do to introduce simply to the accompanying drawing of required use in embodiment or the description of the Prior Art below, apparently, accompanying drawing in describing below only is some embodiments of the present invention, for those of ordinary skills, under the prerequisite of not paying creative work, can also obtain other accompanying drawing according to these accompanying drawings.
Fig. 1 is the flow chart that detects access link fail safe in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 2 is the flow chart that detects repeated link fail safe in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention;
Fig. 3 is the network architecture schematic diagram of IEEE 802.16j definition;
Fig. 4 is the schematic flow sheet of the link security certification method in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention one;
Fig. 5 is the schematic flow sheet of the link security certification method in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention two;
Fig. 6 is the schematic flow sheet of the link security certification method in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention three;
Fig. 7 is the schematic flow sheet of the link security certification method in the wireless relay network in the embodiment of the invention four;
Fig. 8 is the link security certification device block diagram in the embodiment of the invention five;
Fig. 9 is the multi-hop relay base station block diagram in the embodiment of the invention six;
Figure 10 is the wireless relay network system block diagram in the embodiment of the invention seven.
Embodiment
In embodiments of the present invention, the method for access link fail safe may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 1 in the detection wireless relay network:
Step 101, first administrative messag that multi-hop relay base station or access relay station receiving mobile send;
Carry the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value that comprise in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag.
Authentication key context comprises authenticate key, authenticate key sign, authentication code key, authentication code key count value, message authentication code packet number count value, authenticate key and authentication code key count value are used to calculate authentication code key jointly, and authentication code key and authenticate key sign, message authentication code packet number count value are used to calculate or the message authentication code of verification management message jointly.
First message authentication code calculates and generates according to first authenticate key in first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value.
First authenticate key in first authentication key context obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign.
Step 102, verify first message authentication code according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value, determine access link safety whether between travelling carriage and access relay station according to the checking result.
Second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key.The executive agent of such scheme can be A-RS (Access Relay Station inserts relay station) or MS-BS (Multi-hop Relay Base Station, multi-hop relay base station).This second authentication key context can be kept at A-RS or MS-BS this locality, also can obtain from authentication device under the MS.
In embodiments of the present invention, the method for repeated link fail safe may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 2 in the detection wireless relay network:
Step 201 receives and inserts second administrative messag that relay station sends;
Carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code generates according to the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign, and the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to inserting relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign;
Step 202, verify the 3rd message authentication code according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result.
The 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key, and the executive agent of such scheme can be MS-BS, and the 4th authentication key context can be kept at MS-BS this locality.
Below in conjunction with the accompanying drawing in the embodiment of the invention, the technical scheme in the embodiment of the invention is described in detail.
Embodiment one
IEEE 802.16j is the air protocol that realizes relay capabilities on the 16e basis that IEEE organizes to set up.The network architecture of its definition as shown in Figure 3, comprising:
MR-BS: a kind ofly be connected the equipment of management and control for relay station provides with user terminal;
RS (Relay Station, relay station): a kind of MR-BS that depends on provides the equipment of connection for other RS or travelling carriage.The RS that has also can provide management and control for subordinate RS or user terminal.Between RS and MS eat dishes without rice or wine with MR-BS and MS between to eat dishes without rice or wine be identical.RS is exactly the website of data between transfer base station and the terminal, makes wireless signal to arrive the destination through repeatedly transmitting (multi-hop).
MS (Mobile Station, travelling carriage): the user uses this devices accessing WiMAX network.
In the link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides, verify access link safety earlier, verify repeated link safety again, wherein, the safety verification of access link is based on relevant AK (the Authentication Key of MS, authenticate key) context, the safety verification of repeated link is based on the relevant AK context of A-RS; In the replacement scheme of present embodiment, the safety verification of access link is based on the relevant AK context of MS, and the safety verification of repeated link is also based on the relevant AK context of MS.In following all embodiment, AK key in the relevant AK context of MS is that the affiliated authentication device of MS or MS calculates generation according to MS sign and A-RS sign by certain rule, and the AK key in the relevant AK context of A-RS is that authentication device generates by certain regular calculating according to A-RS sign and MR-BS sign under A-RS or the A-RS.In the present embodiment, MS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC KEY COUNT value X in this context M, A-RS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC KEY COUNT value Y in this context M, authentication device is safeguarded the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC KEY COUNT value Z in this context M, A-RS also safeguards the A-RS AK context of being correlated with, and comprises CMAC KEY COUNT value X in this context R, MR-BS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, comprises CMAC KEY COUNT value Y in the context R
As shown in Figure 4, the link security certification method in the wireless relay network that provides of present embodiment may further comprise the steps:
Step 301, MS generates first administrative messag, i.e. RNG-REQ message;
MS before sending first administrative messag to A-RS, the first authentication code key count value that comprises in the authentication key context (present embodiment is called first authentication key context) with self maintained, i.e. CMAC KEY COUNT value X MFrom adding 1, and with the first message authentication code packet number count value zero setting in the relevant AK context (i.e. an AK context) of the local MS that preserves of MS, utilize the local MS that preserves of the MS AK context of being correlated with to generate first message authentication code for RNG-REQ message; Detailed process is that MS utilizes AK key, MS sign (specifically can be MS MAC layer address), RS sign and the X in the AK context MCalculate authentication code key by specific mode, utilize AK sign, the first message authentication code packet number count value in this authentication code key and the AK context to calculate generation first message authentication code again for RNG-REQ message, concrete computational methods can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, and the BS sign that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign.
Need to prove, all comprise AK key, AK sign, authentication code key, authentication code key count value CMAC_KEY_COUNT herein in the various AK contexts of mentioning, and message authentication code packet number count value.Wherein, the AK key (being also referred to as first authenticate key in the present embodiment) in the local described AK context of preserving of MS is that MS calculates according to setting rule according to MS ID (specifically can be the MAC layer address of MS) and RS ID.
MS carries out that network reenters or carries out home and upgrade or switch under the situation that target inserts relay station and initiate this step at A-RS.
Step 302, MS sends RNG-REQ message to A-RS, carries this current X in this message M, the first message authentication code packet number count value and first message authentication code;
Step 303, A-RS judges whether this locality preserves the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of this MS, if carry out step 310; Otherwise carry out step 304;
Described the 2nd AK context is the AK context that includes second authenticate key, and described second authenticate key and described first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
Step 304, A-RS sends MS Context-REQ (travelling carriage context request) message to MR-BS, carries this MS ID (MS sign) in this message;
This MS ID can be carried in the RNG-REQ message by MS and send to A-RS, also can be known by other prior art means by A-RS.
In embodiments of the present invention, message between A-RS and MR-BS and MR-BS and the authentication device can send to directly or indirectly, it is that A-RS sends a message to MR-BS through other RS that what is called sends to indirectly, and MR-BS can send a message to authentication device through other network elements (as gateway).
Step 305, MR-BS sends Context_Req (context request) message to authentication device (Authenticator), carries MS ID and A-RS ID in this message;
The authentication device of mentioning herein is the authentication device under the MS.
Step 306, authentication device calculates MS relevant AK key with RS ID according to the setting rule identical with MS according to MS ID, generates the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of MS;
Step 307, authentication device sends Context_Rpt (context report) message to MR-BS, carries the 2nd AK context in this message, comprises the relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z of the local MS that preserves of authentication device in the 2nd AK context M
Step 308, MR-BS returns MS_Context-RSP (travelling carriage context response) message to A-RS, carries the 2nd AK context that authentication device provides in this message, comprises the relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z of the local MS that preserves of authentication device in the 2nd AK context M
Step 309, A-RS makes Y MEqual Z M, Y MThe relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value of MS for the A-RS maintenance;
Step 310 is judged X MWhether more than or equal to Y MIf,, carry out step 311, otherwise, carry out step 325;
This step judges promptly whether the first authentication code key count value is not less than the second authentication code key count value that comprises in second authentication key context.
This step is the whether supplementary means of safety of a checking access link, if judged X MLess than Y M, then be interpreted as the access link Replay Attack to have occurred.Do not need to have carried out the message authentication code verifying of RNG-REQ message, as seen, adopt this step, may utilize simple judging means just to know whether safety of access link.
Step 311, A-RS utilizes the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message M, the message authentication code in the AK key in the relevant AK context of message authentication code packet number count value (i.e. the 2nd AK context), AK sign checking RNG-REQ message with MS, concrete verification mode can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, and the BS sign that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 312, otherwise carry out step 325;
Be proved to be successful the access link safety that to determine between MS and A-RS, otherwise determine that access link is dangerous.
Step 312, A-RS makes Y MEqual X M
Step 313, A-RS generates second administrative messag, promptly new RNG-REQ message;
A-RS generates the method for second administrative messag and is in this step: with the 3rd CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in the relevant AK context (i.e. the 3rd AK context) of A-RS of self maintained RWith the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value replacement step 302RNG-REQ message MWith the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the 3rd authentication code key and the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value of utilizing A-RS to be correlated with in the AK context (i.e. the 3rd AK context) recomputate message authentication code for the RNG-REQ message (not comprising original message authentication code part) after replacing, i.e. the 3rd message authentication code, the 3rd message authentication code is replaced the first original message authentication code, obtain new RNG-REQ message, i.e. second administrative messag;
Step 314, second administrative messag that A-RS obtains to MR-BS forwarding step 313 (being new RNG-REQ message) comprises X in this message R
Step 315, MR-BS judges the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message of receiving RThe Y that preserves more than or equal to this locality whether RIf,, carry out step 316, otherwise carry out step 324;
This step judges promptly whether the 3rd authentication code key count value is not less than the 4th authentication code key count value that comprises in local the 4th authentication key context of preserving of MR-BS, if judge X RLess than Y M, then be interpreted as the repeated link Replay Attack to have occurred.
Step 316, the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message that MR-BS receives according to step 314 R, the message authentication code in the AK key in message authentication code packet number count value and the relevant AK context (the 4th AK context) of the local A-RS that preserves, RNG-REQ message that AK sign verification step 314 is received; Detailed process is that MR-BS utilizes A-RS be correlated with AK key, A-RS MAC layer address, MR-BS sign and X in the AK context (the 4th AK context) RCalculate authentication code key by specific mode, utilize the message authentication code of the message authentication code packet number count value checking RNG-REQ message in the RNG-REQ message that AK identifies, step 314 is received in the relevant AK context of this authentication code key again with A-RS, the concrete similar 802.16e protocol method of verification method, the terminal iidentification that different is in the 802.16e verification method need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 317, otherwise carry out step 324;
Be proved to be successful the repeated link safety that to determine between A-RS and MR-BS, otherwise determine that repeated link is dangerous.
Step 317, MR-BS makes Y REqual X R, and send to A-RS and be with RNG-RSP (ranging response) message of successfully indicating;
Step 318, A-RS returns to MS and is with the successfully RNG-RSP message of indication;
Step 319, A-RS sends MS_Context-REQ message to MR-BS, carries MS ID and X in this message MValue;
When specific implementation, step 318 and 319 does not have certain sequencing.
Step 320, MR-BS sends Context_Rpt message to authentication device, carries X in this message M
This message can also be CMAC_Key_Count_Update (authentication code key count update) message, and the response message in the step 322 corresponding with it is CMAC_Key_Count_Update_Ack (affirmation of an authentication code key count update) message.
After step 321, authentication device receive Context_Rpt message, upgrading the CMAC_Key_Count value in the relevant AK context of the local MS that preserves of authentication device, specifically is to get Z MAnd X MIn big person add 1, and assignment is given Z M, i.e. Z M=max (X M, Z M) ++;
If in concrete operations, need only detect the fail safe of access link, then should be with X after confirming access link safety MNotice authentication device, authentication device upgrade the relevant CMAC_Key_Count value of the local MS that preserves of authentication device.
Step 322, authentication device sends Context_Ack (context affirmation) message to MR-BS;
Step 323 after MR-BS receives Context_Ack message, sends the above-mentioned MS_Context-REQ message of MS_Context-RSP message response to A-RS, finishes;
Step 324, MR-BS sends to A-RS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information;
The concrete processing method of this step can for: the Ranging Status (distance measuring states) in the RNG-RSP message is set to Abort (termination), Location Update Response (position upgrade response) perhaps is set is failure (failure).
Step 325, A-RS sends to MS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information.
The concrete processing method of this step can for: the Ranging Status in the RNG-RSP message is set to Abort, and it is failure (failure) that Location Update Response perhaps is set.
In concrete realization, can carry out some adjustment to above-mentioned flow process, for example: in step 314, can carry the CMAC_Key_Count value X of MS in the RNG-REQ message simultaneously MCMAC_Key_Count value X with RS R, then MR-BS can just be known X at this moment M, and judged result is to carry out step 320 under the situation that is to 322, with X in step 315 MThe notice authentication device.Like this, step 319 and 323 can omit.
Present embodiment also has a kind of replacement scheme, and promptly on the basis of the described scheme of Fig. 4, MR-BS also needs to safeguard the MS AK context (the 2nd AK context) of being correlated with, and comprises the relevant CMAC_Key_Count value Y of MS in the 2nd AK context M, at this moment: step 305～307,313,319,323 can be omitted.The reason that keeps step 320～322 is to have the relevant AK context that other can need obtain this MS with the MR-BS that authentication device is communicated by letter from authentication device.If can all preserve the relevant AK context of MS with all MR-BS that authentication device is communicated by letter, then step 320-322 can omit.
When specific implementation, can only detect whether safety or only detect whether safety of access link of repeated link.In the present embodiment,, then can omit step 313～317, after step 312 finishes, directly carry out step 318 if only detect whether safety of access link; If only detect whether safety of repeated link, then can omit step 303～312,319～323.Below situation and the present embodiment of several embodiment similar, those skilled in the art can according to each step be safety detection with access link relevant or with the safety detection of repeated link relevant determine only to detect access link when whether safe situation or only detect the situation of repeated link when whether safe, in follow-up each embodiment, repeat no more.
Embodiment two
In the link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides, verify access link safety earlier, verify repeated link safety again, the safety verification of access link is based on the relevant AK context of MS, and the safety verification of repeated link is based on relevant AK context of A-RS and the employed CMAC_KEY_COUNT value of access link RNG-REQ.In the present embodiment, MS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in this context M, A-RS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y in this context M, authentication device is safeguarded the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z in this context M, A-RS also safeguards the A-RS AK context of being correlated with, MR-BS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, safeguards the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y that a MS is relevant simultaneously MRCompare with embodiment one, do not need to safeguard the A-RS CMAC_KEY_COUNT value of being correlated with in the present embodiment.
Link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 5:
Step 401, MS generates first administrative messag, i.e. RNG-REQ message;
Carry the first authentication code key count value X that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag M, the first message authentication code packet number count value.
Step 402, MS sends this RNG-REQ message to A-RS, carries this current X in this message M, the first message authentication code packet number count value and first message authentication code;
Step 403, A-RS judges whether this locality preserves the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of this MS, if carry out step 410; Otherwise carry out step 404;
Step 404, A-RS sends MS_Context-REQ message to MR-BS, carries this MS ID in this message;
Step 405, MR-BS sends Context_Req message to authentication device, carries MS ID and A-RS ID in this message;
The authentication device of mentioning herein is the authentication device under the MS.
Step 406, authentication device calculates MS relevant AK key with RS ID according to the setting rule identical with MS according to MS ID, generates the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of MS;
Step 407, authentication device sends Context_Rpt message to MR-BS, carries the 2nd AK context in this message, comprises local the 2nd CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z that preserves of authentication device in the 2nd AK context M
Step 408, MR-BS makes the relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y of the MS of self maintained MREqual Z M
Step 409, MR-BS returns MS_Context-RSP message to A-RS, carries the 2nd AK context that authentication device provides in this message;
Step 410, A-RS makes Y MEqual Z M
Step 411 is judged X MWhether more than or equal to Y MIf,, carry out step 412, otherwise, carry out step 424;
This step judges promptly whether the first authentication code key count value is not less than the second authentication code key count value that comprises in second authentication key context.
Step 412, A-RS utilizes the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message M, the message authentication code in AK, AK in the relevant AK context of the message authentication code packet number count value sign checking RNG-REQ message with MS, concrete verification mode can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, and the BS sign that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 413, otherwise carry out step 424;
Be proved to be successful the access link safety that to determine between MS and A-RS, otherwise determine that access link is dangerous.
Step 413, A-RS makes Y MEqual X M
Step 414, A-RS generates second administrative messag, promptly new RNG-REQ message;
In this step, A-RS utilizes the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in AK key, AK sign and the RNG-REQ message in the relevant AK context (i.e. the 3rd AK context) of the A-RS of self maintained MWith message authentication code packet number count value, for RNG-REQ message (not comprising original message authentication code part) recomputates message authentication code, the message authentication code that recomputates is replaced original message authentication code, obtain new RNG-REQ message;
Step 415, A-RS sends new RNG-REQ message to MR-BS;
Step 416, MR-BS judges the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message of receiving MThe Y that preserves more than or equal to this locality whether MRIf,, carry out step 417, otherwise carry out step 423;
This step judges promptly whether the 3rd authentication code key count value is not less than the 4th authentication code key count value that comprises in local the 4th authentication key context of preserving of MR-BS.
Step 417, MR-BS is according to the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message of receiving M, the AK key in message authentication code packet number count value and the relevant AK context (the 4th AK context) of the local A-RS that preserves, the message authentication code in the AK sign checking RNG-REQ message; Detailed process is that MR-BS utilizes A-RS be correlated with AK key, A-RS MAC layer address, MR-BS sign and X in the AK context (the 4th AK context) MCalculate authentication code key by specific mode, utilize the AK sign in the relevant AK context of this authentication code key (the 4th AK context), the message authentication code of the message authentication code packet number count value checking RNG-REQ message in the RNG-REQ message again with A-RS, the concrete similar 802.16e protocol method of verification method, the terminal iidentification that different is in the 802.16e verification method need change to the RS sign, and verifies that required parameter is from different contexts.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 418, otherwise carry out step 423;
Be proved to be successful the repeated link safety that to determine between A-RS and MR-BS, otherwise determine that repeated link is dangerous.
Step 418, MR-BS makes Y MREqual X M, and send to A-RS and be with the RNG-RSP message of successfully indicating;
Step 419, A-RS returns to MS and is with the successfully RNG-RSP message of indication;
Step 420, MR-BS sends Context_Rpt message to authentication device, carries X in this message M
When specific implementation, step 419 and 420 does not have certain sequencing.
After step 421, authentication device receive Context_Rpt message, upgrading the CMAC_Key_Count value in the local MS related context of preserving of authentication device, specifically is to get Z MAnd X MIn big person add 1, and assignment is given Z M, i.e. Z M=max (X M, Z M) ++;
Step 422, authentication device sends Context_Ack message 4 to MR-BS, finishes;
Step 423, MR-BS sends to A-RS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information;
Step 424, A-RS sends to MS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information.
Present embodiment three
In the link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides, checking repeated link safety is verified access link safety more earlier.The safety verification of access link is based on the relevant AK context of MS, and the safety verification of repeated link is based on the relevant AK context of A-RS.In the present embodiment, MS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in this context M, A-RS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y in this context M, authentication device is safeguarded the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z in this context M, A-RS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in this context R, MR-BS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y in this context RCompare with embodiment one, present embodiment is checking repeated link safety earlier, verifies access link safety again.
Link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 6:
Step 501, MS generates first administrative messag, i.e. RNG-REQ message;
Step 502, MS sends RNG-REQ message to A-RS, carries this current X in this message M, the first message authentication code packet number count value and first message authentication code;
Step 503, A-RS generates second administrative messag, promptly new RNG-REQ message;
In this step, A-RS is with the CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in the relevant AK context (i.e. the 3rd AK context) of A-RS of self maintained RCMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in the RNG-REQ message that replacement is received with message authentication code packet number count value MWith message authentication code packet number count value, and utilize authentication code key and message authentication code packet number count value in the relevant AK context of A-RS to recomputate message authentication code for the RNG-REQ message (not comprising original message authentication code part) after replacing, the message authentication code that recomputates is replaced original message authentication code, obtain new RNG-REQ message;
Step 504, A-RS sends new RNG-REQ message to MR-BS;
Step 505, MR-BS judges the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message of receiving RThe Y that preserves more than or equal to this locality whether RIf,, carry out step 506, otherwise carry out step 522;
Step 506, MR-BS is according to the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message of receiving R, AK key, AK sign in message authentication code packet number count value and the relevant AK context (i.e. the 4th AK context) of the local A-RS that preserves verify the message authentication code in the RNG-REQ message of receiving; Detailed process is that MR-BS utilizes AK key, A-RS MAC layer address, MR-BS sign and the X in the relevant AK context of A-RS RCalculate authentication code key by specific mode, the message authentication code of the message authentication code packet number count value checking RNG-REQ message in the RNG-REQ message of utilize AK sign in the relevant AK context of this authentication code key again, receiving with A-RS, the concrete similar 802.16e protocol method of verification method, the terminal iidentification that different is in the 802.16e verification method need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 507, otherwise carry out step 522;
Be proved to be successful the repeated link safety that to determine between A-RS and MR-BS, otherwise determine that repeated link is dangerous.
Step 507, MR-BS makes Y REqual X R, and send to A-RS and be with the RNG-RSP message of successfully indicating;
Step 508, MR-BS sends Context_Req message to authentication device, carries MS ID and A-RS ID in this message;
Step 509, authentication device calculates MS relevant AK key with RS ID according to the setting rule identical with MS according to MS ID, generates the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of MS;
Step 510, authentication device sends Context_Rpt message to MR-BS, carries the 2nd AK context in this message, comprises the relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z of the local MS that preserves of authentication device in the 2nd AK context M
Step 511, MR-BS returns MS_Context-RSP message to A-RS, carries the 2nd AK context that authentication device provides in this message;
In the present embodiment, the correlation step of MR-BS checking A-RS CMAC does not have definite precedence relationship with obtaining between the contextual correlation step of the relevant AK of MS.
Step 512, A-RS makes Y MEqual Z M
Step 513 is judged X MWhether more than or equal to Y MIf,, carry out step 514, otherwise, carry out step 523;
Step 514, the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message that A-RS utilizes step 502 to receive M, the message authentication code in AK, the AK sign checking RNG-REQ message in message authentication code packet number count value and the relevant AK context of MS that step 511 is received, concrete verification mode can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, and the BS sign that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 515, otherwise carry out step 523;
Be proved to be successful the access link safety that to determine between MS and A-RS, otherwise determine that access link is dangerous.
Step 515, A-RS makes Y MEqual X M
Step 516, A-RS returns to MS and is with the successfully RNG-RSP message of indication;
Step 517, A-RS sends MS_Context-REQ message to MR-BS, carries MS ID and X in this message MValue;
When specific implementation, step 516 and 517 does not have certain sequencing.
Step 518, MR-BS sends Context_Rpt message to authentication device, carries X in this message M
After step 519, authentication device receive Context_Rpt message, upgrading the relevant CMAC_Key_Count value of the local MS that preserves of authentication device, specifically is to get Z MAnd X MIn big person add 1, and assignment is given Z M, i.e. Z M=max (X M, Z M) ++;
Step 520, authentication device sends Context Ack message to MR-BS;
Step 521 after MR-BS receives Context_Ack message, sends the above-mentioned MS_Context-REQ message of MS_Context-RSP message response to A-RS, finishes;
Step 522, MR-BS sends to A-RS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information;
Step 523, A-RS sends to MS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information.
When specific implementation, MR-BS can judge whether A-RS preserves the relevant AK context of MS, if then step 508-511 can omit.
Embodiment four
In the link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides, the safety verification of access link and the safety verification of repeated link all carry out at MR-BS.The safety verification of access link is based on the relevant AK context of MS, and the safety verification of repeated link is based on the relevant AK context of A-RS.In the present embodiment, MS safeguards the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in this context M, authentication device is safeguarded the relevant AK context of a MS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z in this context M, A-RS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value X in this context R, MR-BS safeguards the relevant AK context of an A-RS, comprises CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Y in this context R, MR-BS also may safeguard the MS AK context of being correlated with.Compare with embodiment one, access link safety and repeated link safety in the present embodiment are all carried out at MR-BS.
Link security certification method in the wireless relay network that present embodiment provides may further comprise the steps as shown in Figure 7:
Step 601, MS generates first administrative messag, i.e. RNG-REQ message;
Step 602, MS sends RNG-REQ message to A-RS, carries this current X in this message M, the first message authentication code packet number count value and first message authentication code;
Step 603, A-RS generates second administrative messag, promptly new RNG-REQ message;
In this step, A-RS is with the 3rd authentication code key count value X in the relevant AK context (i.e. the 3rd AK context) of A-RS of self maintained RAdd RNG-REQ message end to the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, and be that the RNG-REQ message of adding after the newer field is calculated relevant the 3rd message authentication code of A-RS with the relevant AK context of A-RS, new message authentication code is added to the RNG-REQ message of adding after the newer field, generate new RNG-REQ message, the concrete computational methods of A-RS related news authentication code can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, and the terminal iidentification that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign;
At this moment, comprise first message authentication code, the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value in the new RNG-REQ message, and the 3rd authentication code key count value X R, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, the 3rd message authentication code.
Step 604, A-RS sends new RNG-REQ message to MR-BS;
Step 605, MR-BS sends Context_Req message to authentication device, carries MS ID and A-RS ID in this message;
Step 606, authentication device calculates MS relevant AK key with RS ID according to the setting rule identical with MS according to MS ID, generates the relevant AK context (i.e. the 2nd AK context) of MS;
Step 607, authentication device sends Context_Rpt message to MR-BS, carries the 2nd AK context in this message, comprises the relevant CMAC_KEY_COUNT value Z of the local MS that preserves of authentication device in the 2nd AK context M
Step 608, MR-BS judges whether to satisfy the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message RY more than or equal to this locality preservation RAnd the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message MMore than or equal to Z MIf,, carry out step 609, otherwise carry out step 615;
Step 609, the X that MR-BS comprises according to end in the RNG-REQ message of receiving R, AK key, AK sign in A-RS related news authentication code packet number count value and the relevant AK context (i.e. the 4th AK context) of the local A-RS that preserves verify the A-RS related news authentication code in the RNG-REQ message of receiving; Detailed process is that MR-BS utilizes AK key, A-RS MAC layer address, MR-BS sign and the X in the relevant AK context of A-RS RCalculate authentication code key by specific mode, the A-RS related news authentication code of the message authentication code packet number count value checking RNG-REQ message in the RNG-REQ message of utilize AK sign in the relevant AK context of this authentication code key again, receiving with A-RS, the concrete similar 802.16e protocol method of verification method, the terminal iidentification that different is in the 802.16e verification method need change to the RS sign.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 610, otherwise carry out step 615;
Be proved to be successful the repeated link safety that to determine between A-RS and MR-BS, otherwise determine that repeated link is dangerous.
Step 610 is utilized the X that comprises in the RNG-REQ message M, the MS related news authentication code in AK, AK in the relevant AK context of the MS related news authentication code packet number count value sign checking RNG-REQ message with MS, concrete verification mode can be with reference to the 802.16e agreement, the BS sign that different is in the 802.16e computational methods need change to the RS sign, and need ignore the X at RNG-REQ message end during checking R, A-RS related news authentication code packet number count value and A-RS related news authentication code.If be proved to be successful, carry out step 611, otherwise carry out step 615;
Be proved to be successful the access link safety that to determine between MS and A-RS, otherwise determine that access link is dangerous.
Step 611, MR-BS makes Y REqual X R, and send to A-RS and be with the successfully RNG-RSP message of indication, A-RS is with the RNG-RSP message of successfully indicating to the MS transmission;
Step 612, MR-BS sends Context_Rpt message to authentication device, carries X in this message M
After step 613, authentication device receive Context_Rpt message, upgrading the relevant CMAC_Key_Count value of the local MS that preserves of authentication device, specifically is to get Z MAnd X MIn big person add 1, and assignment is given Z M, i.e. Z M=max (X M, Z M) ++;
Step 614, authentication device sends Context_Ack message to MR-BS, finishes;
Step 615, MR-BS sends to A-RS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information;
Step 616, A-RS sends to MS and carries the RNG-RSP of refusal information.
In the present embodiment, before carry out step 604, can judge earlier whether A-RS preserves the relevant AK context of MS, if, then can carry out the associative operation checking access link among the embodiment one and the fail safe of repeated link, otherwise, can carry out step 604, utilize the technical scheme of present embodiment to carry out respective handling.
When specific implementation, can only verify whether safety of access link, in this case, can generate new RNG-REQ, promptly the 3rd authentication code key count value in second administrative messag is the first authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value is the first message authentication code packet number count value, the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value are included in first authentication key context of travelling carriage self preservation, and promptly second administrative messag is first administrative messag that A-RS transmits.The follow-up step that relates to checking repeated link safety all can be omitted.
Embodiment five
Link security certification device in the present embodiment as shown in Figure 8, comprising:
First receiver module, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, first authenticate key, first authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value of carrying in first administrative messag in first authentication key context that first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preserve are calculated and are generated, first authenticate key according to mobile station identification with insert the relay station sign and calculate and obtain by setting rule;
First processing module, second authenticate key, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to second authentication key context are verified first message authentication code, determine whether safety of travelling carriage and the access link of access between relay station according to the checking result, second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
This relay station can also comprise:
First key obtains module, be used for after first receiver module receives first administrative messag, judge whether first memory module preserves second authentication key context, do not preserve if having, then the authentication device under travelling carriage sends and comprises mobile station identification and the context request that inserts the relay station sign, offers first processing module with second authentication key context that obtains from authentication device.
Concrete processing method can be referring to step 301～312, step 401～413 of embodiment two, the step 501 of embodiment three, 513～516 relevant portions of describing of embodiment one.
Said apparatus can be for inserting relay station or multi-hop relay base station.
Embodiment six
Multi-hop relay base station in the present embodiment as shown in Figure 9, comprising:
Second receiver module, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code calculates and generates according to the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign, and the 3rd authenticate key calculates by the setting rule with the multi-hop relay base station sign according to access relay station sign and obtains;
Second processing module, the 4th authenticate key, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to the 4th authentication key context are verified the 3rd message authentication code, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, the 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
The relevant portion that concrete processing method can be described referring to step 415～419 of step 314～318 of embodiment one, embodiment two, the step 504 of embodiment three～507.
Embodiment seven
Wireless relay network system in the present embodiment as shown in figure 10, comprising:
Insert relay station, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is verified first message authentication code, determine whether safety of travelling carriage and the access link of access between relay station according to the checking result, and first administrative messag is converted to second administrative messag and sends, wherein, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and travelling carriage self preservation in first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, first authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign, and second authenticate key and first authenticate key are reciprocity key;
Multi-hop relay base station, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, and according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value is verified the 3rd message authentication code, determine to insert repeated link safety whether between relay station and multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, wherein, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, the 3rd message authentication code is according to the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to inserting relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign, and the 4th authenticate key and the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
In sum, the embodiment of the invention can effectively prevent the Replay Attack in the wireless relay network for detection access link and repeated link fail safe in the wireless relay network provide concrete technical scheme.
Obviously, those skilled in the art can carry out various changes and modification to the present invention and not break away from the spirit and scope of the present invention.Like this, if of the present invention these are revised and modification belongs within the scope of claim of the present invention and equivalent technologies thereof, then the present invention also is intended to comprise these changes and modification interior.

Claims (14)

1. the link security certification method in the wireless relay network is characterized in that, comprising:
First administrative messag that multi-hop relay base station or access relay station receiving mobile send, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and described travelling carriage self preservation in described first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, described first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in described first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, and first authenticate key in described first authentication key context obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign;
Verify described first message authentication code according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value, determine access link safety whether between described travelling carriage and described access relay station according to the checking result, described second authenticate key and described first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
2. method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, after receiving described first administrative messag, earlier judge whether this locality preserves described second authentication key context, do not preserve if having, then the authentication device under described travelling carriage sends the context request that comprises described mobile station identification and described access relay station sign, and obtains described second authentication key context from described authentication device.
3. method according to claim 1, it is characterized in that, after receiving described first administrative messag, earlier judge whether the described first authentication code key count value is not less than the second authentication code key count value that comprises in described second authentication key context, if, then verify the step of described first message authentication code, otherwise, determine that described access link is dangerous.
4. method according to claim 1 is characterized in that, also comprises:
If what receive described first administrative messag is to insert relay station, then described access relay station also sends second administrative messag to multi-hop relay base station, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in described second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, described the 3rd message authentication code is according to described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, and described the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to described access relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign;
So that described multi-hop relay base station is verified described the 3rd message authentication code according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, determine repeated link safety whether between described access relay station and described multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, described the 4th authenticate key and described the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
5. the link security certification method in the wireless relay network is characterized in that, comprising:
Receive and insert second administrative messag that relay station sends, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in described second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, described the 3rd message authentication code is according to described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, described the 3rd authenticate key identifies by setting rule according to described access relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station and calculates acquisition, and described the 3rd authentication key context is the relevant authentication key context of access relay station that described access relay station is preserved;
Verify described the 3rd message authentication code according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, determine repeated link safety whether between described access relay station and described multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, described the 4th authenticate key and described the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
6. method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that, after receiving described second administrative messag, earlier judge whether described the 3rd authentication code key count value is not less than the 4th authentication code key count value that comprises in described the 4th authentication key context, if, then verify the step of described the 3rd message authentication code, otherwise, determine that described repeated link is dangerous.
7. method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that, described the 3rd authentication code key count value is the first authentication code key count value, described the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value is the first message authentication code packet number count value, and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value are included in first authentication key context of travelling carriage self preservation.
8. method according to claim 5, it is characterized in that described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value are authentication code key count value, the message authentication code packet number count value that comprises in described the 3rd authentication key context.
9. method according to claim 8, it is characterized in that, described second administrative messag also carries the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and described travelling carriage self preservation, the first message authentication code packet number count value, described first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in described first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, and first authenticate key in described first authentication key context obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign;
After receiving described second administrative messag, also verify described first message authentication code according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value, determine access link safety whether between described travelling carriage and described access relay station according to the checking result, described second authenticate key and described first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
10. the link security certification device in the wireless relay network is characterized in that, comprising:
First receiver module, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and described travelling carriage self preservation in described first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, described first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in described first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, and described first authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign;
First processing module, second authenticate key, second authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to second authentication key context are verified described first message authentication code, determine access link safety whether between described travelling carriage and described access relay station according to the checking result, described second authenticate key and described first authenticate key are reciprocity key.
11. device according to claim 10 is characterized in that, also comprises:
First key obtains module, be used for after described first receiver module receives described first administrative messag, judge whether described first memory module preserves described second authentication key context, do not preserve if having, then the authentication device under described travelling carriage sends the context request that comprises described mobile station identification and described access relay station sign, offers described first processing module to obtain described second authentication key context from described authentication device.
12., it is characterized in that described device is for inserting relay station or multi-hop relay base station according to claim 10 or 11 described devices.
13. a multi-hop relay base station is characterized in that, comprising:
Second receiver module, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in described second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, described the 3rd message authentication code is according to described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, and described the 3rd authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to described access relay station sign and multi-hop relay base station sign;
Second processing module, the 4th authenticate key, the 4th authenticate key sign and described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value that are used for comprising according to the 4th authentication key context are verified described the 3rd message authentication code, determine repeated link safety whether between described access relay station and described multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, described the 4th authenticate key and described the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
14. a wireless relay network system is characterized in that, comprising:
Insert relay station, be used for first administrative messag that receiving mobile sends, according to second authenticate key that comprises in second authentication key context, second authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is verified described first message authentication code, determine access link safety whether between described travelling carriage and described access relay station according to the checking result, and described first administrative messag is converted to described second administrative messag and sends, wherein, carry the first authentication code key count value that comprises in first authentication key context of first message authentication code and described travelling carriage self preservation in described first administrative messag, the first message authentication code packet number count value, described first message authentication code is according to first authenticate key in described first authentication key context, first authenticate key sign and the described first authentication code key count value, the first message authentication code packet number count value is calculated and is generated, described first authenticate key obtains by setting rule calculating according to mobile station identification and access relay station sign, and described second authenticate key and described first authenticate key are reciprocity key;
Multi-hop relay base station, be used to receive second administrative messag that inserts the relay station transmission, and according to the 4th authenticate key that comprises in the 4th authentication key context, the 4th authenticate key sign and described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value is verified described the 3rd message authentication code, determine repeated link safety whether between described access relay station and described multi-hop relay base station according to the checking result, wherein, carry the 3rd message authentication code and the 3rd authentication code key count value in described second administrative messag, the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value, described the 3rd message authentication code is according to described the 3rd authentication code key count value, the 3rd authenticate key in the 3rd message authentication code packet number count value and the 3rd authentication key context, the 3rd authenticate key sign is calculated and is generated, described the 3rd authenticate key calculates by the setting rule with the multi-hop relay base station sign according to described access relay station sign and obtains, and described the 4th authenticate key and described the 3rd authenticate key are reciprocity key.
CN2009100047045A 2009-02-20 2009-02-20 Link security certification method, device and system in wireless relay network Expired - Fee Related CN101815293B (en)

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