WO2010078724A1 - Procédé d'authentification locale dans un système de communication mobile - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification locale dans un système de communication mobile Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2010078724A1
WO2010078724A1 PCT/CN2009/070083 CN2009070083W WO2010078724A1 WO 2010078724 A1 WO2010078724 A1 WO 2010078724A1 CN 2009070083 W CN2009070083 W CN 2009070083W WO 2010078724 A1 WO2010078724 A1 WO 2010078724A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
value
packet data
terminal
convergence protocol
data convergence
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2009/070083
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
和峰
甘露
杜忠达
Original Assignee
中兴通讯股份有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Priority to PCT/CN2009/070083 priority Critical patent/WO2010078724A1/fr
Publication of WO2010078724A1 publication Critical patent/WO2010078724A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a wireless cellular communication system, and more particularly to a method for local authentication in a Long Term Evolution (LTE) mobile communication system.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • E-UTRAN Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network
  • EPC Evolved Packet Core
  • EPC Evolved Grouping Center
  • the eNB may have an illegal intrusion attack from the outside of the communication system.
  • the intruder may insert an illegal data packet in the connection between the eNB and the UE (User Equipment), which may threaten the entire connection or system.
  • Security or affect the overall performance of the system, but also may pose a threat or impact on the user experience.
  • the 3GPP (The 3rd Generation Partnership Project) protocol 33401-811 proposes a periodic local authentication process, also known as the Counter Check process.
  • the eNB will always monitor the PDCP COUNT value (PDCP: Packet Data Convergence Protocol; COUNT: Counter) for each radio.
  • the PDCP COUNT value is HFN (Hyper Frame Number) and SN. (Session Number) A combination of counts that reflect the amount of data transmitted or received by the radio bearers in each active state.
  • PDCP COUNT Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • PDCP COUNT Packet Data Convergence Protocol
  • SN Session Number
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, and the counter check message contains the MSB (most Significant Bits) portion of the PDCP COUNT value of each activated radio bearer.
  • the UE compares the PDCP COUNT value in the received counter check message with the PDCP COUNT MSB value of the corresponding radio bearer (including the PDCP uplink COUNT MSB and the PDCP downlink COUNT MSB). If there is a difference, the PDCP COUNT value of the bearer with the deviation will be included in the counter check reply message.
  • the process terminates. If the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing one or several PDCP COUNT values, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME (Mobility Management Entity) or O&M (Operation and Maintenance, Operation and Maintenance) Maintenance) for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • MME Mobility Management Entity
  • O&M Operaation and Maintenance, Operation and Maintenance
  • the signaling of the periodic local authentication process is transmitted through the control plane.
  • the PDCP COUNT value of the eNB may continue to change during the process of receiving the counter check message verification by the UE side.
  • the PDCP COUNT of the eNB and the UE side is inconsistent.
  • the receiving process is relatively short, and the PDCP COUNT value change is limited in a short time. Therefore, the protocol provides some fault-tolerant protection for the process: Only the MSB part of the PDCP COUNT is transmitted, and the change in the least significant bit can be ignored.
  • the above prior art may result in false detection.
  • the most significant bit of its PDCP COUNT value is positive at a critical threshold, ie, the least significant bit is at the threshold for the carry to the most significant bit, at which time the counter is received at the UE side.
  • the least significant bit may be carried over, resulting in the change of the most significant bit, resulting in the final misdetection.
  • the same error detection condition may also occur between the uplink and downlink counts of the same bearer (ie, between PDCP downlink COUNT and PDCP uplink COUNT).
  • the most significant bit of the PDCP uplink count of a bearer changes at this time.
  • the periodic local authentication process is triggered.
  • the most significant bit of the PDCP downlink count of the bearer is positively changed at a critical value, and the aforementioned false detection may also occur.
  • the technical problem to be solved by the present invention is to provide a method for local authentication in a mobile communication system, which reduces false detection and leakage detection and improves system security.
  • the present invention provides a local authentication method.
  • an evolved base station transmits a packet data convergence protocol counter value of a radio bearer to a terminal, and the terminal compares its own packet data convergence protocol counter value and And receiving, by the packet data convergence protocol counter value, if the deviation exceeds the set deviation range, the terminal sends the packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer to the evolved base station.
  • the above method may further have the following characteristics, wherein the deviation between the two exceeds the set deviation range means that the absolute value of the difference is greater than a deviation value.
  • the foregoing method may further have the following feature: the deviation value is transmitted to the terminal by the evolved base station when transmitting the packet data convergence protocol counter value, or is transmitted to the terminal through terminal dedicated signaling or system information broadcast, or Fixed configuration.
  • the above method may further have the following characteristics, the deviation value is 2 to the power of n, and the value of n is any integer value of 0 to 15.
  • the foregoing method may further have the following feature: the evolved base station sends the packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer to the terminal, where the all-bit or least significant part of the packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer is sent.
  • the corresponding bits are compared using all bits or the least significant part of the packet data convergence protocol counter value.
  • the above method may further have the following feature, wherein the least significant bit portion has a bit number ranging from 1 to 32.
  • the packet data convergence protocol counter value includes an uplink packet data convergence protocol counter value, and when the terminal compares, if the terminal's own uplink packet data convergence protocol counter value d is received The uplink packet data convergence protocol counter value is sent, and the terminal sends the packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer to the evolved base station.
  • the evolved base station divides the radio bearer
  • the sending of the group data convergence protocol counter value to the terminal means that the most significant bit portion of the packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer is sent to the terminal, and when the terminal compares, the corresponding packet data convergence protocol counter value is used accordingly. The most significant bit portion is compared, and the deviation value is 1.
  • the radio bearer is all activated radio bearers.
  • the foregoing method may further have the following feature: in the periodic local authentication process, the evolved base station only triggers the high-bit of the uplink or downlink packet data convergence protocol counter value of the radio bearer that triggers the periodic local authentication process. Partially transmitted to the terminal, the deviation range is zero.
  • the foregoing method may further have the following feature: in the periodic local authentication process, the evolved base station sends a counter check message to the terminal, where the counter check message carries the packet data convergence protocol counter value; If the bearer identifier carried in the counter check message is not established locally, or the bearer identifier of the radio bearer of the terminal is not in the counter check message, the radio bearer is asynchronous.
  • the invention improves the false detection which may occur in the verification process of the prior art, enhances the stability of the whole system, reduces the error handling of normal user communication, and can also reduce the system signaling through effective system configuration. Payload. BRIEF abstract
  • Figure 1 is an eNB periodic local verification process
  • FIG. 2 is a signaling flow chart of Embodiment 1 of a periodic local authentication process in the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a second implementation manner of the optimized periodic local authentication process of the present invention
  • FIG. 5 is a fourth implementation manner of the optimized periodic local authentication process of the present invention.
  • Figure 8 is a flow chart of the counter check comparison judgment of the present invention
  • 9 is a flow chart of comparing and evaluating the low effective bit of the counter of the present invention
  • Fig. 10 is a flow chart showing the comparison judgment of the counter high effective bit of the present invention.
  • the basic idea of the present invention is to set a deviation range.
  • the terminal compares the PDCP COUNT and the local PDCP COUNT received from the evolved base station, if the set deviation range is exceeded (for example, the difference between the two)
  • the absolute value of the radio bearer is greater than a set offset value, and the PDCP COUNT of the non-synchronized radio bearer is sent to the base station.
  • the eNB transmits the entire PDCP COUNT value during the periodic local authentication process, ie, transmits
  • Tolerance is a non-negative integer.
  • Tolerance can take 2 ⁇ ⁇ , where ⁇ is the number of bits in Tolerance, such as n.
  • the value is 0, 1, 2, ... 15, and the following conditions are used by Tolerance.
  • the UE comparison process as long as the PDCP COUNT value deviation between the eNB side and the UE side is greater than Tolerance, it is considered to be asynchronous. Otherwise, Think it is synchronous.
  • the eNB only transmits the PDCP COUNT MSB value during the periodic local authentication process.
  • the allowed offset value 1 is verified, ie Tolerance is equal to 1 (ie The value of n is 0, and the default configuration of Tolerance is 1).
  • the deviation of the PDCP COUNT MSB value between the eNB side and the UE side is less than or equal to 1, it is considered to be synchronous, otherwise it is considered to be asynchronous.
  • the eNB may only transmit the LSB (Least Significant Bits) part of the PDCP COUNT during the periodic local authentication process, that is, select the LSB carrying only the PDCP COUNT in the counter check message.
  • the LSB ranges from 1 bit to 32 bits, for example, the LSB can take 7 bits or 12 bits.
  • the UE also uses the LSB part of the PDCP COUNT carried by the UE side. In the comparison process of the UE, the value deviation of the PDCP COUNT LSB part of the eNB side and the UE side is greater than Tolerance, and is considered to be asynchronous, otherwise it is considered to be synchronous. of.
  • comparing PDCP COU T In the case of the uplink count in the same bearer, that is, PDCP uplink COUNT (upstream packet data convergence protocol counter), different decision methods are used.
  • the uplink because the sender is in the UE, in some cases, the UE can explicitly detect whether an attacker has blocked illegal data on a certain bearer, that is, if the PDCP uplink COUNT value on the UE is greater than or equal to the PDCP uplink in the signaling.
  • COUNT ie PDCP uplink COUNT on the eNB
  • the base station has received an illegal packet. That is, if an illegal intruder imposes illegal data on the bearer, the UE needs to report the eNB.
  • the downlink count that is, the PDCP downlink COUNT value
  • the tolerance value Tolerance allowed in the verification process may be selected not to be carried by the counter check message, but may be configured by a fixed configuration or by other means, for example
  • the signaling load is reduced by UE-specific signaling or system information broadcasting.
  • the message When the eNB initiates a counter check, the message includes only one PDCP COUNT MSB information of the bearer that triggers the message (ie, only PDCP downlink COUNT or only PDCP uplink COUNT value), and only the PDCP of the bearer is verified after receiving the UE. COUNT MSB information, the tolerance value is 0 at this time. If it is not synchronized, the PDCP COUNT value of the bearer is included in the counter check reply message. Other bearers are not of concern, which also ensures the reliability of the verification.
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message includes the PDCP COUNT value of each activated radio bearer, and the allowed in the verification.
  • Deviation value Tolerance or the deviation The number of bits corresponding to the value n (for example, Tolerance can be 128, that is, n is 7 bits; or Tolerance takes 4096, that is, n is 12 bits).
  • the UE compares the PDCP COUNT value in the received counter check message with the PDCP COUNT value of the radio bearer saved by the UE side. If the PDCP COUNT value is not synchronized, the UE will include the non-synchronized bearer identity and the bearer PDCP COUNT value saved by the UE in the counter check reply message. See Figure 8 for the principle of judging whether or not to synchronize.
  • the process terminates; if the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing one or several PDCP COUNT values, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference. Serve the MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • Step 301 When the most significant bit of the PDCP COUNT of the bearer in the UE transmission bearer changes, the eNB initiates a periodic local authentication process, and the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message includes each activated radio bearer.
  • the LSB part of the PDCP COUNT value for example, the LSB is 7 bits or 12 bits
  • the tolerance value Tolerance allowed in the verification or its corresponding bit number n the Tolerance value should be smaller than the LSB, so the corresponding Tolerance can take values 32, that is, n is 5 bits; or Tolerance is 1024, that is, n is taken as 10 bits, or other suitable value).
  • Step 302 The UE compares the PDCP COUNT LSB value in the received counter check message with the value PDCP COUNT LSB of the radio bearer saved on the UE side. If the two are not synchronized, the UE will include the non-synchronized bearer ID and PDCP COUNT value in the counter check reply message. See Figure 9 for the principle of judging whether or not to synchronize.
  • Step 303 If the eNB receives a counter check reply message that does not contain any PDCP COUNT value, the process terminates. If the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing one or several PDCP COUNT values, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis. Referring to FIG. 4, the third embodiment is described as follows:
  • the local verification tolerance value Tolerance is configured by a fixed configuration, or by UE dedicated signaling or system information broadcast (Tolerance can take values of 64, 128, 256...4096, and the corresponding n value is 6, 7, 8, ...12).
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message includes the PDCP COUNT value of each activated radio bearer.
  • the UE compares the PDCP COUNT value in the received counter check message with the counter value PDCP COUNT of the corresponding radio bearer saved by the UE side. If the two are not synchronized, the UE will include the non-synchronized bearer ID and PDCP COUNT value in the counter check reply message. See Figure 8 for the principle of judging whether or not to synchronize.
  • the process terminates. If the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing one or several PDCP COUNT values, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • Local Verification Tolerance Value Tolerance is configured in a fixed configuration, or through UE-specific signaling or system information broadcast (Tolerance can be 64, 128, 256...4096).
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message includes an LSB part (such as an LSB) of the PDCP COUNT value of each activated radio bearer. It is 7 bits or 12 bits).
  • the UE compares the received PDCP COUNT LSB value in the counter check message with the counter value PDCP COUNT LSB of the radio bearer stored on the UE side. If the two are not synchronized, the UE will include the non-synchronized bearer identifier and the PDCP COUNT value of the bearer in the counter check reply message. See Figure 9 for the principle of judging whether or not to synchronize.
  • the process terminates. If the eNB receives a count containing one or several PDCP COUNT values The device checks the reply message, and the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message includes the MSB part of the PDCP COUNT value of each activated radio bearer (the MSB may Take 20 bits, or 25 bits, or other values between 1 and 32 bits).
  • the UE compares the received PDCP COUNT MSB value in the counter check message with the PDCP COUNT MSB value of the radio bearer saved by the UE side. If the two are not synchronized, the UE will include the non-synchronized bearer ID and PDCP COUNT value in the counter check reply message. See Figure 10 for the principle of judging whether or not to synchronize. The specific process is as follows.
  • the process terminates. If the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing one or several PDCP COUNT values, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • the eNB sends a counter check message to the UE, where the counter check message only includes the radio bearer.
  • the MSB portion of the PDCP COUNT value ie, with only the PDCP downlink COUNT or PDCP uplink COUNT value
  • the MSB may take 20 bits, or 25 bits, or other value between 1 and 32 bits.
  • the UE compares the PDCP COUNT MSB value in the received counter check message with the count value PDCP COUNT MSB of the radio bearer saved by the UE side. If not, the UE will include the PDCP COUNT value of the bearer in the counter check reply message.
  • the principle for judging whether to synchronize is: If the counter checks the PDCP COUNT MSB value in the message (ie, the eNB side) (upstream or If the PDCP COUNT MSB value (upstream or downlink) saved on the UE side is equal, it is considered to be synchronous, otherwise it is considered to be asynchronous, that is, the offset value is 0 at this time.
  • the process terminates. If the eNB receives a counter check reply message containing the PDCP COUNT value, the eNB may release the connection or report the difference to the serving MME or O&M for subsequent transmission security analysis.
  • the PDCPdownlink COUNT eNB biases ' is equal to H (fixed configuration, or can be configured by system information broadcast or UE-specific signaling), the allowable deviation value Tolerance, namely:
  • the tolerance value Tolerance is:
  • up count PDCPuplinkCOUNT UE UE side is smaller than the count up PDCuplinkCOUNT eNB eNB side, or both the deviation is greater than the permissible deviation value setting Tolerance, ie:
  • the downlink count is considered to be synchronous.
  • H Tolerance ie:
  • the upstream side of the UE uplink significant bit of the count is less than the eNB side PDCPuplinkCOUNTLSBuE significant bit count PDCuplinkCOUNTLSB eNB, or both the permissible deviation is greater than the set value deviation Tolerance, namely:
  • PDCPuplinkCOUNTLSB UE - PDCPuplinkCOUNTLSB eNB ⁇ 0 is considered to be asynchronous, and the bearer comparison ends.
  • the UE After the UE receives the counter check message, it determines that the bearer counter has a high effective bit.
  • the UE has a high row count, and the PDCPuplinkCOUNTMSB UE is smaller than the eNB.
  • the side of the upstream count is the high significant bit ⁇ 0 ⁇ / « 0 ⁇ 3 ⁇ 4»3 ⁇ 4 ⁇ , or the deviation between the two is greater than 1, ie:
  • PDCPuplinkCOUNTMSB UE - PDCPuplinkCOUNTMSB eNB ⁇ 0 is considered to be asynchronous, and the bearer comparison ends.
  • the invention improves the false detection which may occur in the verification process of the prior art, enhances the stability of the whole system, reduces the error handling of normal user communication, and can also reduce the system signaling through effective system configuration. Payload.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé d'authentification locale. Lors d'une procédure d'authentification locale périodique, un eNB transmet une valeur COUNT de protocole de convergence de données en paquets (PDCP) d'un support radio à un UE ; ledit UE compare sa valeur COUNT PDCP à la valeur COUNT PDCP reçue ; si une tolérance entre les deux dépasse une plage de tolérance prédéfinie, l'UE transmet la valeur COUNT PDCP du support radio à l'eNB. L'application de la présente invention permet de réduire les erreurs de détection qui se produisent parfois lors d'une procédure de vérification de l'état de la technique, d'améliorer la stabilité de l'ensemble du système, et de diminuer le traitement d'erreur pour une communication utilisateur normale. Une configuration efficace du système permet de réduire la charge effective de la signalisation du système.
PCT/CN2009/070083 2009-01-08 2009-01-08 Procédé d'authentification locale dans un système de communication mobile WO2010078724A1 (fr)

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CN102572880A (zh) * 2011-12-29 2012-07-11 中兴通讯股份有限公司 序号检测方法、装置及系统
EP4210257A1 (fr) * 2017-06-16 2023-07-12 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Procédé et appareil de traitement de paquet dans un système de communication mobile de prochaine génération

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WO2008005162A2 (fr) * 2006-06-19 2008-01-10 Interdigital Technology Corporation procédé et appareil pour la protection de sécurité de L'identité d'UN utilisateur d'origine dans un message de signalisation initial

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CN102572880A (zh) * 2011-12-29 2012-07-11 中兴通讯股份有限公司 序号检测方法、装置及系统
WO2013097422A1 (fr) * 2011-12-29 2013-07-04 中兴通讯股份有限公司 Procédé, dispositif et système de vérification de compteur
CN102572880B (zh) * 2011-12-29 2019-01-04 上海中兴软件有限责任公司 序号检测方法、装置及系统
EP4210257A1 (fr) * 2017-06-16 2023-07-12 Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. Procédé et appareil de traitement de paquet dans un système de communication mobile de prochaine génération

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