WO2010070787A1 - 生体認証システムおよびその方法 - Google Patents
生体認証システムおよびその方法 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2010070787A1 WO2010070787A1 PCT/JP2009/004388 JP2009004388W WO2010070787A1 WO 2010070787 A1 WO2010070787 A1 WO 2010070787A1 JP 2009004388 W JP2009004388 W JP 2009004388W WO 2010070787 A1 WO2010070787 A1 WO 2010070787A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- parameter
- template
- server
- sent
- client
- Prior art date
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06V—IMAGE OR VIDEO RECOGNITION OR UNDERSTANDING
- G06V10/00—Arrangements for image or video recognition or understanding
- G06V10/10—Image acquisition
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
- G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
- G06Q20/4014—Identity check for transactions
- G06Q20/40145—Biometric identity checks
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F15/00—Digital computers in general; Data processing equipment in general
- G06F15/16—Combinations of two or more digital computers each having at least an arithmetic unit, a program unit and a register, e.g. for a simultaneous processing of several programs
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/32—User authentication using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voiceprints
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/32—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check
- G07C9/37—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass in combination with an identity check using biometric data, e.g. fingerprints, iris scans or voice recognition
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C9/00—Individual registration on entry or exit
- G07C9/30—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass
- G07C9/38—Individual registration on entry or exit not involving the use of a pass with central registration
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07F—COIN-FREED OR LIKE APPARATUS
- G07F7/00—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus
- G07F7/08—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means
- G07F7/10—Mechanisms actuated by objects other than coins to free or to actuate vending, hiring, coin or paper currency dispensing or refunding apparatus by coded identity card or credit card or other personal identification means together with a coded signal, e.g. in the form of personal identification information, like personal identification number [PIN] or biometric data
- G07F7/1008—Active credit-cards provided with means to personalise their use, e.g. with PIN-introduction/comparison system
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0863—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving passwords or one-time passwords
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
- H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2115—Third party
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C2209/00—Indexing scheme relating to groups G07C9/00 - G07C9/38
- G07C2209/12—Comprising means for protecting or securing the privacy of biometric data, e.g. cancellable biometrics
Definitions
- the present invention relates to a biometric authentication system and method for authenticating an individual using personal biometric information.
- biometric authentication that performs personal authentication based on biometric information has the advantages of not losing, forgetting, and being stolen, and realizes personal authentication with high convenience and impersonation resistance. can do.
- a general biometric authentication system acquires a user's biometric information at the time of initial registration, extracts information called a feature amount from the biometric information, and registers it. This registration information is called a template. At the time of authentication, biometric information is obtained again from the user, the feature amount is extracted, and it is checked with the template registered in advance whether or not the user is the person.
- the server when the server performs biometric authentication for a user on the client side, the server typically holds a template.
- the client acquires the biometric information of the user at the time of authentication, extracts the feature amount and transmits it to the server, and the server checks the received feature amount against the template to confirm whether or not the user is the person.
- the template is information that can identify an individual, strict management is required as personal information, and high management costs are required. Even if strictly managed, many people feel psychological resistance to registering templates from a privacy perspective.
- the template since there is a limit to the number of one type of biometric information that one individual has (for example, the fingerprint is only 10 fingers), the template cannot be easily changed like a password or an encryption key. If the template is leaked and there is a risk of forgery, there is a problem that the biometric authentication cannot be used. Furthermore, if the same biometric information is registered for another system, the other system is exposed to a threat.
- biometric authentication has been proposed in which registration / verification is performed in a state where the feature quantity of biometric information is protected by special encryption. Specifically, a template (feature for registration) is converted (equivalent to encryption) using a secret conversion parameter (corresponding to an encryption key) at the time of registration, and the conversion parameter is registered in the server DB as a conversion template. Is stored in a token (IC card or the like) and issued to the user.
- the user inputs conversion parameters together with biometric information to the client (authentication terminal).
- the client extracts the feature value from the user's biological information, converts the feature value using the conversion parameter read from the card, and transmits the converted feature value to the server.
- the server collates the conversion template in the DB with the conversion feature received from the client, and determines that it is OK (acceptance) if it is close enough, or NG (rejection) otherwise.
- the conversion parameter may be generated from secret information (password) stored by the user. Such an authentication method is called cancelable biometric authentication.
- the server since the user keeps the conversion parameter secret, the server cannot know the original feature amount even at the time of authentication, and the privacy of the user is protected. Even when a template leaks, safety can be maintained by changing the conversion parameter and creating and registering the template again. Furthermore, when the same biological information is used for other systems, by registering templates converted with different parameters, it is possible to prevent the safety of other systems from being reduced even if one template leaks. Can do.
- Patent Document 1 and Patent Document 2 show a method for realizing cancelable fingerprint authentication.
- Non-Patent Document 1 and Non-Patent Document 2 show methods for realizing cancelable iris authentication.
- Non-Patent Document 3 whether a feature value is data represented by an image, particularly a two-dimensional array of luminance values (integers), is determined based on a maximum correlation value that takes into account the positional deviation of the two images. An implementation method applicable to such biometric authentication technology is shown.
- the user needs to manage the conversion parameters safely. For this reason, the user needs to possess a token (such as an IC card) for storing the conversion parameter or store secret information (such as a password) for generating the conversion parameter. Therefore, the convenience inherent in biometric authentication, which is not lost or forgotten, is impaired.
- a token such as an IC card
- secret information such as a password
- the conversion parameter can be stored in the client (authentication terminal), it is generally difficult for the client to ensure safety by operation management. For this reason, in order to prevent leakage, additional costs such as providing tamper resistance are required. In addition, when an unspecified number of users such as bank ATMs and kiosk terminals share a plurality of terminals, it is necessary to manage conversion parameters for all users in each client, which is not practical in terms of safety and operational costs. Absent.
- An object of the present invention is to realize a highly convenient cancelable biometric authentication system in which a user does not need to store property and secret information while ensuring safety.
- the biometric authentication system and the biometric authentication method of the present invention have the following configuration in order to solve the above problems.
- a biometric authentication system and a biometric authentication method having a client, a first server (parameter server), and a second server (authentication server) connected via a network.
- the client includes an input device that inputs an ID given in advance to the user, a first sensor that acquires the user's biological information, and a first feature amount extraction unit that extracts the feature amount from the biological information acquired by the sensor And a feature quantity conversion unit that creates a converted feature quantity by converting the feature quantity using the one-time parameter.
- the first server includes a parameter DB that stores IDs and parameters in association with each other, and a data generation unit that generates data using parameters corresponding to IDs sent from the client.
- the second server is a one-time template by converting a template DB that stores a template obtained by converting a feature amount of a user's biometric information using a parameter in association with an ID, and a template corresponding to an ID sent from the first server. And a collation determination unit that collates one of the conversion feature value sent from the client and the data sent from the first server with the one-time template to determine match / mismatch.
- the first server further includes a parameter generation unit that randomly generates an additional parameter, and the data generation unit uses a parameter corresponding to the ID sent from the client and the additional parameter.
- the one-time parameter is created as data
- the template conversion unit of the second server converts the template corresponding to the ID sent from the first server using the additional parameter sent from the first server to convert the one-time parameter
- a template is created, and the collation determination unit collates the converted feature amount sent from the client with the one-time template, and determines a match / mismatch.
- the client further includes a parameter generation unit that randomly generates a one-time parameter to be used for conversion of the feature amount, and the data generation unit of the first server uses the parameter from the client.
- the converted feature value sent is reconverted into the reconverted feature value as data
- the template conversion unit of the second server converts the template corresponding to the ID sent from the client using the one-time parameter sent from the client.
- the one-time template is created, and the collation determining unit collates the re-converted feature quantity as data sent from the first server with the one-time template to determine coincidence / non-coincidence.
- the client further includes a parameter generation unit that randomly generates a one-time parameter used for feature amount conversion, and the data generation unit of the first server uses an ID sent from the client.
- a parameter difference is calculated as data from the corresponding parameter and the one-time parameter sent from the client, and the template conversion unit of the second server uses the parameter difference as the data sent from the first server via the network.
- the template corresponding to the ID sent from one server is converted to create a one-time template, and the collation determining unit collates the converted feature quantity sent from the client with the one-time template to determine coincidence / non-coincidence.
- the first server randomly generates an additional parameter, generates a new parameter using the parameter stored in the parameter DB and the additional parameter, and the parameter DB
- a DB control unit that updates the stored parameters with the new parameters
- the second server uses the additional parameters sent from the first server to convert the template stored in the template DB to a new one. It further includes a template conversion unit that creates a template, and a DB control unit that updates a template stored in the template DB with a new template.
- the biometric authentication system further connects a registration terminal via a network, and the registration terminal acquires an ID issuing unit that issues an unused ID as the user's ID and the user's biometric information.
- a second sensor that extracts features from the biological information acquired by the second sensor, a parameter generator that generates parameters randomly, and a feature using the generated parameters
- a template creation unit that creates a template by converting the amount
- the first server further includes a DB control unit that associates an ID and a parameter sent from the registration terminal and registers the parameter in the parameter DB
- the second server further includes a DB control unit that registers an ID and a template sent from the registration terminal in association with the template DB.
- the present invention eliminates the need to manage conversion parameters on the user side in the cancelable biometric authentication system. Therefore, the user does not need to possess a token or store secret information such as a password, and can realize highly convenient cancelable biometric authentication.
- FIG. 1 is a system configuration diagram of a biometric authentication system of Example 1.
- FIG. 3 is a flowchart illustrating a registration process according to the first embodiment.
- 3 is a flowchart illustrating authentication processing according to the first exemplary embodiment.
- 3 is a flowchart illustrating authentication post-processing in the first embodiment. It is a flowchart which shows DB update processing in Example 1.
- It is a system configuration
- FIG. 12 is a flowchart illustrating authentication processing according to the second embodiment. It is a system configuration
- 12 is a flowchart illustrating authentication processing according to the third embodiment. It is a block diagram which shows the hardware constitutions in each Example.
- a client, a parameter server that is a first server, and an authentication server that is a second server are connected via a network.
- the client includes an input device that inputs an ID given in advance to the user, a sensor that acquires the user's biological information, a feature amount extraction unit that extracts a feature amount from the biological information acquired by the sensor, and a one-time parameter And a feature quantity conversion unit that creates a converted feature quantity by converting the feature quantity.
- the parameter server has a parameter DB that stores IDs and parameters in association with each other, and a data generation unit that generates data using parameters corresponding to IDs sent from clients.
- the authentication server includes a template DB that stores a template obtained by converting a feature value of a user's biometric information by a parameter in association with an ID, and a template that converts a template corresponding to an ID sent from the parameter server to create a one-time template.
- a conversion unit, and a collation determination unit that collates one of the conversion feature value sent from the client and the data sent from the parameter server with the one-time template to determine matching / mismatching.
- a parameter server is provided in order to safely manage parameters corresponding to encryption keys.
- the parameters themselves are prevented from being transmitted from the parameter server to the network during authentication. Therefore, the parameter server generates data using the parameters and transmits this data over the network.
- the data generated by the parameter server using the parameters is a one-time parameter used by the client for the conversion of the feature value
- the converted feature value converted by the client using the parameter is further used as a parameter.
- An example of the re-converted feature value after re-conversion will be described as Example 2, and an example of the difference between the parameter and the one-time parameter generated by the client will be described as Example 3.
- Embodiment 1 will be described below with reference to the drawings.
- This embodiment is a server authentication type biometric authentication system in which a server authenticates a user of a client.
- This embodiment can be applied to, for example, access control to an in-company information system, Web-based user authentication in net banking, and the like.
- the present invention can also be applied to a biometric authentication service system that provides template management and authentication processing as an outsourcing service.
- FIG. 1 shows a system configuration of a biometric authentication system in the present embodiment.
- the system includes a registration terminal 100 that acquires biometric information when a user's biometric information is registered and creates a template, a client 110 that is used by the user during authentication, an authentication server 120 that stores and collates templates, and a cancelable It comprises a parameter server 130 that manages parameters (corresponding to encryption keys) for converting (corresponding to encryption) biometric information in biometric authentication, and a network 140 that connects them.
- the registration terminal 100 is connected to a sensor 101 that acquires biometric information such as fingerprints and veins.
- the registration terminal 100 extracts a feature quantity from the acquired biometric information of the registered user, and a parameter for converting the feature quantity.
- a parameter generation unit 103 to generate, and a template creation unit that converts the feature amount using the parameter and creates a conversion feature amount for registration (referred to as a conversion template in the background art column, but hereinafter referred to as a template).
- 104 and an ID issuing unit 105 that issues a user ID.
- the client 110 is connected to the sensor 111 and includes an ID input unit that receives an input of a user ID, a feature amount extraction unit 113, and a feature amount conversion unit 114.
- the authentication server 120 includes a template DB 121 that manages a user ID and a template associated with each user, a DB control unit 122 that controls DB search, data registration / update, a template conversion unit 123, a template, It is composed of a collation determination unit 124 that matches the converted feature values to calculate a distance (or similarity) and determines match (OK) / mismatch (NG).
- the parameter server 130 includes a parameter DB 131 that manages user IDs and parameters for each user in association with each other, a DB control unit 132, a parameter generation unit 133, and a parameter conversion unit 134.
- all or part of the communication may be encrypted using SSL or the like.
- biometric authentication SP an external biometric authentication service provider
- the client 110 is an external PC used by the employee
- the biometric authentication SP manages and operates the authentication server 120.
- the registration terminal 100 and the parameter server 130 may be managed by the company, or may be managed by the biometric authentication SP.
- the biometric authentication SP manages the parameter server 130, it is desirable to separate the administrator / management location from the administrator / management location of the authentication server 120.
- FIG. 10 shows a hardware configuration of the registration terminal 100, the client 110, the authentication server 120, and the parameter server 130 in the present embodiment. These can be realized by a PC or server computer having a CPU 1000, a memory 1001, an HDD 1002, an input device 1003, an output device 1004, and a communication device 1005 as shown in the figure.
- the hardware configuration shown in FIG. 10 is the same in other embodiments described later.
- the conversion function F is defined as follows, where ⁇ represents conversion.
- R For any two parameters P and Q ⁇ Sp, there is a parameter R ⁇ Sp, and the following equation holds for any feature quantity X ⁇ Sx.
- F (F (X, P), Q) F (X, R) That is, it is assumed that there is a parameter R such that a feature value (left side) obtained by successively converting X with P and Q is equal to a feature value (right side) obtained by converting X only once with a certain parameter R.
- Such a parameter R is expressed as P + Q. That is, the parameter space Sp is closed with respect to a certain binary operation +.
- the registration terminal 100 acquires biometric information (a fingerprint image, a vein image, etc.) of the registered user through the sensor 101 (S200).
- the feature amount extraction unit 102 extracts the feature amount X from the acquired biological information (S201).
- the parameter generation unit 103 randomly generates a parameter P ⁇ Sp (S202).
- the ID issuing unit 105 determines one ID (for example, a number or character string) that has not been used yet and issues it to the registered user, and associates the determined ID with the created template T to the authentication server 120. Then, the ID and the parameter P are linked and transmitted to the parameter server 130 (S204).
- the ID is information that may be disclosed, and it is not necessary for the user to store it secretly like a personal identification number. The user's name, email address, employee number, etc. may be used as the ID.
- the authentication server 120 receives the set of ID and template T from the registration terminal 100, and the DB control unit 122 registers this in the template DB 121 (S205).
- the parameter server 130 receives the set of ID and parameter P from the registration terminal 100, and the DB control unit 132 registers this in the template DB 131 (S206).
- the registration terminal 100 deletes the feature amount X and the parameter P from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S207).
- the ID input unit 112 of the client 110 receives an input of ID from the user, and transmits the received ID to the parameter server 130 (S300).
- the DB control unit 132 of the parameter server 130 searches for the parameter P from the parameter DB 131 using the ID received from the client 110 as a key (S301).
- the parameter generation unit 133 randomly generates the additional parameter ⁇ P1 ⁇ Sp and transmits it to the authentication server 120 together with the ID (S302). Instead of transmitting to the authentication server 120, the generated additional parameter ⁇ P1 is encrypted using the public key of the authentication server 120 or a common key shared in advance between the authentication server 120 and the parameter server 130, and the following step S303 is performed. May be transmitted to the client 110 together with the one-time parameter P1. In this case, in step S306 below, the client 110 transmits the encrypted additional parameter ⁇ P1 together with the ID and the conversion feature amount U described below to the authentication server 120, and the authentication server 120 uses the secret key or the common key to transmit the additional parameter. Decrypt ⁇ P1. Thereby, the parameter server 130 and the authentication server 120 do not need to communicate directly, and the number of communications can be reduced.
- the client 110 acquires the biometric information of the user through the sensor 111 (S304).
- the feature amount extraction unit 113 extracts the feature amount Y from the acquired biological information (S305).
- the authentication server 120 searches the template DB 121 for the template T using the ID received from the parameter server 130 as a key (S307).
- the collation determination unit 124 checks the correspondence between the ID received from the client 110 and the ID received from the parameter server 130, and then calculates the similarity (or distance) by matching the one-time template T1 and the conversion feature amount U. Then, a match (OK) / non-match (NG) is determined, and an authentication result (OK / NG) is returned to the client 100 (S309).
- the authentication result is transmitted to a system entrusting biometric authentication processing, for example, a server that performs access control of an in-company information system.
- the authentication server 120 deletes the one-time template T1 created from the storage device such as a memory or HDD and the received conversion feature amount U (S310). If the authentication server 120 receives ID and ⁇ P1 from the parameter server 120 (step 302) and there is no communication from the client 110 (step S306) even after a predetermined time has elapsed, the one-time template T1 is used as the timeout process. May be deleted.
- the client 110 deletes the feature amount Y and the one-time parameter P1 from a storage device such as a memory or HDD (S311).
- the parameter server 130 deletes the additional parameter ⁇ P1 and the one-time parameter P1 from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S312).
- step S309 the reason why the collation determination can be performed correctly is as follows.
- the above steps S300 to S312 are defined as an authentication session. After the authentication session ends, the post-authentication process shown in FIG. 4 may be further performed. The authentication post-processing flow will be described below.
- the parameter generation unit 133 of the parameter server 130 randomly generates the additional parameter ⁇ P2 ⁇ Sp and transmits it to the authentication server 120 (S400).
- step 400 and step 302 may be performed simultaneously to transmit the ID, the additional parameter ⁇ P1, and the additional parameter ⁇ P2.
- the DB control unit 132 updates the parameter P corresponding to the ID registered in the parameter DB 131 to the new parameter P2 (S402).
- the parameter server 130 deletes the parameter P and the additional parameter ⁇ P2 from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S403).
- the DB control unit 122 updates the template T corresponding to the ID registered in the template DB 121 to the new template T2 (S405).
- the authentication server 120 deletes the template T and the additional parameter ⁇ P2 from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S406).
- the authentication server manages the template, and the user or client manages the parameter P to ensure safety.
- the user or client manages the parameter P to ensure safety.
- the model managed by the client cannot be applied when the client is not secure or when an unspecified number of users do not know which of a plurality of clients is used.
- the parameter server manages the user parameters, thereby eliminating the need for the user or client to manage. As a result, the user has nothing, can authenticate without memorizing anything, and can realize highly convenient cancelable biometric authentication.
- the parameter server 130 discloses the one-time parameter P1 in response to the parameter inquiry from the client.
- This one-time parameter is valid during the authentication session, that is, between step S300 and step S312 and is invalidated after the authentication session ends or when a certain time elapses (that is, the corresponding one-time parameter is reached).
- Time template T1 is deleted from the authentication server). Therefore, even if the client is vulnerable or used illegally, it is possible to prevent the threat of impersonation and the threat of restoring or estimating the feature amount X.
- step S400 to S406 by performing post-authentication processing (steps S400 to S406) after each authentication session, the true parameter P and the true template T managed in each DB are discarded / updated for each authentication. . Even if one of P and T leaks to the attacker's hand, if the authentication session is executed before the other leaks, the leaked information will be invalidated and security will be increased. It is possible to recover to the state before leakage. However, if there is a user who rarely authenticates, the template T and parameter P of the user are not updated for a long time, and the risk of compromising the feature quantity X increases due to leakage of T and P. This problem can be countered by periodically executing the DB update processing described below.
- the DB control unit 132 of the parameter server 130 reads all IDs registered in the parameter DB 131, and the parameter generation unit 133 randomly generates additional parameters ⁇ P ⁇ Sp for each ID, and the ID and additional parameter ⁇ P. Is created and sent to the authentication server 120 (S501).
- a fixed-length random number seed may be transmitted instead of transmitting the parameter list.
- a pseudo-random number sequence is generated based on the random number seed, and the additional parameter ⁇ P for each ID is sequentially generated, so that the parameter list 500 is shared between both servers. be able to.
- the parameter server 130 deletes the parameter list 500 from a storage device such as a memory or HDD (S504).
- the DB control unit 122 writes (updates) the new template T ′ in the template DB 121 instead of the template T for all IDs (S506).
- the authentication server 120 deletes the parameter list 500 from a storage device such as a memory or HDD (S507).
- FIG. 6 shows the system configuration of the biometric authentication system in the present embodiment.
- this system includes a registration terminal 100 and a sensor 101 connected thereto, a client 600 and a sensor 111 connected thereto, an authentication server 120, a parameter server 610, and a network 140.
- the client 600 has a parameter generation unit 601
- the parameter server 610 has a feature amount conversion unit 611.
- all or part of the communication may be encrypted using SSL or the like.
- the cancelable iris authentication method of Non-Patent Document 1 described in the first embodiment satisfies the above condition because it is based on a simple exclusive OR, but includes the bit substitution described in Non-Patent Document 2.
- the method does not satisfy the above conditions.
- the group consisting of the entire bit permutation (permutation group) is non-commutative.
- the registration processing flow, authentication post-processing flow, and DB update flow of this embodiment are the same as those of the first embodiment.
- the ID input unit 112 of the client 600 receives an input of ID from the user (S701).
- the client 600 acquires the user's biological information through the sensor 111 (S702).
- the feature amount extraction unit 113 extracts the feature amount Y from the biological information (S703).
- the parameter generation unit 601 randomly generates the one-time parameter Q ⁇ Sp and transmits it to the authentication server 120 together with the received ID (S704).
- encryption is performed using the public key of the authentication server 120 or a common key shared in advance between the authentication server 120 and the client 600, and in the next step S705.
- the ID and the conversion feature amount U may be transmitted to the parameter server 610.
- the parameter server 610 transmits the encrypted one-time parameter Q together with the ID and the conversion feature amount V to the authentication server 120 in step S707 below.
- the authentication server 120 decrypts the one-time parameter Q using the secret key or the common key. Thereby, the client 600 does not need to communicate with the authentication server 120, and the number of communication can be reduced.
- the parameter server 610 receives the ID and the conversion feature amount U, and the DB control unit 132 searches the parameter DB 131 for the parameter P using the ID as a key (S706).
- the DB control unit 122 of the authentication server 120 searches the template DB 121 for the template T using the ID received from the client 600 as a key (S708).
- the collation determination unit 124 confirms the correspondence between the ID received from the client and the ID received from the parameter server, and then calculates the degree of similarity (or distance) by matching the one-time template T1 with the reconverted feature quantity V. Then, a match (OK) / non-match (NG) is determined, and an authentication result (OK / NG) is returned to the client 600 (S710).
- the authentication server 120 deletes the one-time template T1 and the reconverted feature value V from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S711). If the authentication server 120 receives ID and ⁇ P1 from the parameter server 120 and there is no communication from the client 600 (step S306) even after a predetermined time has elapsed, the one-time template T1 is deleted as a timeout process. Also good.
- the client 600 deletes the feature amount Y, the one-time parameter Q, and the converted feature amount U from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S712).
- the parameter server 610 deletes the feature quantity U and the feature quantity V from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S713).
- step S710 The reason why the collation determination can be performed correctly in step S710 is as follows.
- the client 600 cannot receive any information from the parameter server 130. For this reason, even when the client is vulnerable, it is possible to achieve higher security against attacks using the client.
- the total number of communication in the authentication processing flow is five times (four times if the additional parameter ⁇ P1 is encrypted and transmitted to the authentication server 120 via the client 110).
- the communication frequency is 4 times (3 times if the parameter Q is encrypted and transmitted to the authentication server 120 via the parameter server 610), and the second embodiment has an advantage that the communication frequency is smaller.
- FIG. 8 shows a system configuration of the biometric authentication system in the present embodiment.
- this system includes a registration terminal 100 and a sensor 101 connected thereto, a client 600 and a sensor 111 connected thereto, an authentication server 120, a parameter server 800, and a network 140.
- the parameter server 800 does not have the feature amount conversion unit 611 but has the parameter difference calculation unit 801 instead.
- all or part of the communication may be encrypted using SSL or the like.
- the method based on the exclusive OR described in Non-Patent Document 1 described in the first embodiment and the method based on bit replacement described in Non-Patent Document 2 satisfy the above conditions.
- the cancelable fingerprint authentication method based on block scrambling described in Patent Document 1 is a one-way function and does not satisfy the above condition because there is no inverse function.
- the ID input unit 112 of the client 600 receives an input of ID from the user (S901).
- the client 600 acquires the user's biological information through the sensor 111 (S902).
- the feature amount extraction unit 113 extracts the feature amount Y from the biological information (S903).
- the parameter generation unit 601 randomly generates the one-time parameter Q ⁇ Sp and transmits it to the parameter server 800 together with the received ID (S904). As will be described later, the ID and the one-time parameter Q may be transmitted to the authentication server 120 in step S905.
- the ID and the one-time parameter Q are encrypted by using the public key of the authentication server 120 or a common key shared in advance between the authentication server 120 and the client 600.
- it may be transmitted to the parameter server 800.
- the parameter server 800 transmits the encrypted conversion feature amount U together with the ID and the parameter difference ⁇ P to the authentication server 120 in step S907 described below.
- the authentication server 120 decrypts the conversion feature amount U using a secret key or a common key. Thereby, the client 600 does not need to communicate with the authentication server 120, and the number of communication can be reduced.
- the parameter server 800 receives the ID and the one-time parameter Q, and the DB control unit 132 searches the parameter DB 131 for the parameter P using the ID as a key (S906).
- the DB control unit 122 of the authentication server 120 searches the template DB 121 for the template T using the ID received from the client 600 as a key (S908).
- the collation determination unit 124 checks the correspondence between the ID received from the client 600 and the ID received from the parameter server 800, and then matches the one-time template T1 and the conversion feature amount U to determine the similarity (or distance). It calculates, matches (OK) / mismatch (NG) is determined, and an authentication result (OK / NG) is returned to the client 600 (S910).
- the authentication server 120 deletes the one-time template T1 and the conversion feature amount U from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S911). If the authentication server 120 receives ID and ⁇ P from the parameter server 120 and there is no communication from the client 600 (step S905) even after a certain time has elapsed, the one-time template T1 is deleted as a timeout process. Also good.
- the client 600 deletes the feature amount Y, the oneta parameter Q, and the converted feature amount U from a storage device such as a memory or an HDD (S912).
- the parameter server 800 deletes the one-time parameter Q and the parameter difference ⁇ P from the storage device such as a memory or HDD (S913).
- step S910 The reason why the collation determination can be performed correctly in step S910 is as follows.
- the client 600 cannot receive any information from the parameter server 130. For this reason, even if the client is vulnerable, high security against attacks using the client can be realized.
- the total number of communications in the authentication processing flow is four times (three times if the conversion feature amount U is encrypted and transmitted to the authentication server 120 via the parameter server 800). There is an advantage that the number of times is small.
- the parameter server 800 does not need to know information created based on the feature amounts X and Y, and the above problem does not occur.
- the biometric information is converted and concealed in the cancelable biometric authentication in which the feature amount of the biometric information is converted and collated while being concealed to the server. It is possible to manage parameters to be performed by a parameter server, eliminate the need for the user to manage, and realize cancelable biometric authentication with high convenience and safety. Also, parameter management by the parameter server does not transmit the parameter itself over the network at the time of authentication, so that the parameter can be prevented from leaking over the network.
- 100 Registration terminal, 101: Sensor, 102: Feature extraction unit, 103: Parameter generation unit, 104: Template creation unit, 105: ID issuing unit, 110: Client, 111: Sensor, 112: ID input unit, 113: Feature amount extraction unit, 114: feature amount conversion unit, 120: authentication server, 121: template DB, 122: DB control unit, 123: template conversion unit, 124: collation determination unit, 130: parameter server, 131: parameter DB, 132: DB control unit, 133: parameter generation unit, 134: parameter conversion unit, 140: network, 600: client, 601: parameter generation unit, 610: parameter server, 611: feature amount conversion unit, 800: parameter server, 801 : Parameter difference calculation unit, 1000: CPU, 100 : Memory, 1002: HDD, 1003: input unit, 1004: output device, 1005: communications device.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Life Sciences & Earth Sciences (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Biodiversity & Conservation Biology (AREA)
- Human Computer Interaction (AREA)
- Biomedical Technology (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Multimedia (AREA)
- Collating Specific Patterns (AREA)
Abstract
Description
い。
本実施例は、クライアントのユーザをサーバが認証する、サーバ認証型の生体認証システムである。本実施例は、例えば企業内情報システムへのアクセス制御や、ネットバンキング等におけるWebベースのユーザ認証などに適用することができる。またテンプレートの管理と認証処理をアウトソーシングサービスとして提供する、生体認証サービスシステムにも適用することができる。
本システムは、ユーザの生体情報登録時に生体情報を取得してテンプレートを作成する登録端末と100と、認証時にユーザが利用するクライアント110と、テンプレートの保管・照合を行なう認証サーバ120と、キャンセラブル生体認証において生体情報を変換(暗号化に相当)するためのパラメータ(暗号鍵に相当)を管理するパラメータサーバ130と、これらを接続するネットワーク140とから構成される。
F: Sx×Sp→Sx
条件:任意の2つのパラメータ P,Q∈Sp に対して、あるパラメータ R∈Sp が存在し、任意の特徴量 X∈Sx に対して以下の等式が成立する。
F(F(X,P),Q)=F(X,R)
つまりXをP,Qで続けて変換した特徴量(左辺)が、あるパラメータRでXを一回だけ変換した特徴量(右辺)と等しくなるような、パラメータRが存在するとする。このようなパラメータRを、P+Qと表現することにする。つまりパラメータ空間Spは、ある二項演算+に関して閉じている。
f(・)≡F(・,P)
g(・)≡F(・,Q)
をそれぞれ Sx→Sx なる関数とみなすと、P+Qは合成関数
f○g(・)≡f(g(・))
に対応するパラメータとみなすことができる。合成関数は結合法則
(f○g)○h=f○(g○h)
を満たすため、任意のパラメータP,Q,R∈Sp に対して結合法則
(P+Q)+R=P+(Q+R)
が成立する。これはつまり、パラメータ空間Spが、演算+に関して半群を成すことを意味する。
F(X,P)≡X(+)P (+)は排他的論理和)
で定義される。このとき、
F(F(X,P),Q)
=(X(+)P)(+)Q
=X(+)(P(+)Q)
であるので、
R=P+Q≡P(+)Q
と定義すれば、
F(F(X,P),Q)=F(X,R)
となり、上記条件を満たすことがわかる。
T1=F(T,ΔP1)
=F(F(X,P),ΔP1)
=F(X,P+ΔP1)
である。一方、変換特徴量Uは、その作り方から
U=F(Y,P1)
=F(Y,P+ΔP1)
である。つまりT1,UはそれぞれX,Yを共通のパラメータ P+ΔP1 で変換したものであり、従ってT1,Uをマッチングすることで、正しく照合判定を行なうことができる。
条件:任意の2つのパラメータ P,Q∈Sp と、任意の特徴量 X∈Sx に対して以下の等式が成立する。
F(F(X,P),Q)=F(F(X,Q),P)
この条件は、以下のように表現することもできる。
P+Q=Q+P
つまり、半群(Sp,+)が可換であることを条件とする。
T1=F(T,Q)
=F(F(X,P),Q)
=F(X,P+Q)
である。一方、変換特徴量Vは、その作り方から
U=F(U,P)
=F(F(Y,Q),P)
=F(Y,Q+P)
である。本実施例における変換関数の数学的条件から、P+Q=Q+Pであるため、T1,Vをマッチングすることで、正しく照合判定を行なうことができる。
条件:任意のパラメータP∈Spに対し、以下の等式が任意の特徴量 X∈Sx に対して成立するようなパラメータ -P∈Spが存在すること。
F(F(X,P),-P)=X
これは、Pで決定される特徴量変換関数に対し、その逆関数に対応するパラメータ -P が存在することを意味する。このとき、
O≡P+(-P)
と定義すると、O∈Sp は恒等写像に対応するパラメータとなる。このとき任意のP∈Spに対し
O+P=P+O=P
が成立することは容易に確かめられる。つまり上記条件は、(Sp,+)に零元Oが存在し、かつ任意のP∈Spに対し逆元 -P∈Sp が存在することと同値であり、換言すれば(Sp,+)が群を成すことが条件である。
T1=F(T,ΔP)
=F(F(X,P),(-P)+Q)
=F(X,P+((-P)+Q))
=F(X,(P+(-P))+Q)
=F(X,O+Q)
=F(X,Q)
である。一方、変換特徴量Uは
U=F(Y,Q)
である。従ってT1,Uをマッチングすることで、正しく照合判定を行なうことができる。
Claims (12)
- ネットワークを介して接続される、
ユーザに予め付与されたIDを入力する入力装置と、前記ユーザの生体情報を取得する第1のセンサと、前記センサによって取得された生体情報から特徴量を抽出する第1の特徴量抽出部と、ワンタイムパラメータを用いて前記特徴量を変換して変換特徴量を作成する特徴量変換部とを有するクライアント、
前記IDとパラメータを対応付けて保管するパラメータDBと、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDに対応した前記パラメータを用いたデータを生成するデータ生成部とを有する第1のサーバ、および、
前記ユーザの生体情報の特徴量を前記パラメータにより変換したテンプレートを前記IDと対応付けて保管するテンプレートDBと、前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換してワンタイムテンプレートを作成するテンプレート変換部と、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記変換特徴量および前記第1のサーバから送られる前記データとの一方と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定する照合判定部とを有する第2のサーバとを設けたことを特徴とする生体認証システム。 - 前記第1のサーバは、追加パラメータをランダムに生成するパラメータ生成部をさらに有し、前記データ生成部は、前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記パラメータと前記追加パラメータとを用いて、前記データとして前記ワンタイムパラメータを作成し、
前記第2のサーバの前記テンプレート変換部は、前記第1のサーバから送られる前記追加パラメータを用いて前記第1のサーバから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記照合判定部は、前記クライアントから送られる前記変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項1記載の生体認証システム。 - 前記クライアントは、前記特徴量の変換に用いる前記ワンタイムパラメータをランダムに生成するパラメータ生成部をさらに有し、
前記第1のサーバの前記データ生成部は、前記パラメータを用いて前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記変換特徴量を前記データとしての再変換特徴量に再変換し、
前記第2のサーバの前記テンプレート変換部は、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記ワンタイムパラメータを用いて前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記照合判定部は、前記第1のサーバから送られる前記データとしての前記再変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項1記載の生体認証システム。 - 前記クライアントは、前記特徴量の変換に用いる前記ワンタイムパラメータをランダムに生成するパラメータ生成部をさらに有し、
前記第1のサーバの前記データ生成部は、前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記パラメータと前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記ワンタイムパラメータから前記データとしてパラメータ差分を計算し、
前記第2のサーバの前記テンプレート変換部は、前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記データとしての前記パラメータ差分を用いて前記第1のサーバから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記照合判定部は、前記クライアントから送られる前記変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項1記載の生体認証システム。 - 前記第1のサーバは、ランダムに追加パラメータを生成し、前記パラメータDBに保管された前記パラメータと前記追加パラメータとを用いて新パラメータを生成するパラメータ生成部と、前記パラメータDBに保管された前記パラメータを前記新パラメータにより更新する第1のDB制御部とをさらに有し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記追加パラメータを用いて、前記テンプレートDBに保管された前記テンプレートを変換して新テンプレートを作成するテンプレート変換部と、前記テンプレートDBに保管された前記テンプレートを前記新テンプレートにより更新する第2のDB制御部とをさらに有することを特徴とする請求項1記載の生体認証システム。 - 未使用のIDを前記ユーザの前記IDとして発行するID発行部と、前記ユーザの生体情報を取得する第2のセンサと、前記第2のセンサによって取得された生体情報から特徴量を抽出する第2の特徴量抽出部と、前記パラメータをランダムに生成するパラメータ生成部と、前記パラメータを用いて前記特徴量を変換して前記テンプレートを作成するテンプレート作成部とを有する登録端末を前記ネットワークを介して接続し、
前記第1のサーバは、前記登録端末から前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDと前記パラメータを対応付けて前記パラメータDBに登録する第1のDB制御部をさらに有し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記登録端末から前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDと前記テンプレートを対応付けて前記テンプレートDBに登録する第2のDB制御部をさらに有することを特徴とする請求項1記載の生体認証システム。 - ネットワークを介して接続される、クライアント、第1のサーバ、および第2のサーバを有する生体認証システムにおける生体認証方法であって、
前記クライアントは、入力装置からユーザに予め付与されたIDを入力し、第1のセンサから前記ユーザの生体情報を取得し、前記取得し生体情報から特徴量を抽出し、ワンタイムパラメータを用いて前記特徴量を変換して変換特徴量を作成し、
前記第1のサーバは、前記IDとパラメータを対応付けて保管するパラメータDBを有し、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDに対応した前記パラメータを用いてデータを生成し、
第2のサーバは、前記ユーザの生体情報の特徴量を前記パラメータにより変換したテンプレートを前記IDと対応付けて保管するテンプレートDBを有し、前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換してワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記変換特徴量および前記第1のサーバから送られる前記データとの一方と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする生体認証方法。 - 前記第1のサーバは、さらに追加パラメータをランダムに生成し、前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記パラメータと前記追加パラメータとを用いて、前記データとして前記ワンタイムパラメータを作成し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記第1のサーバから送られる前記追加パラメータを用いて前記第1のサーバから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記クライアントから送られる前記変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項7記載の生体認証方法。 - 前記クライアントは、さらに前記特徴量の変換に用いる前記ワンタイムパラメータをランダムに生成し、
前記第1のサーバは、前記パラメータを用いて前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記変換特徴量を前記データとしての再変換特徴量に再変換し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記ワンタイムパラメータを用いて前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記第1のサーバから送られる前記データとしての前記再変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項7記載の生体認証方法。 - 前記クライアントは、さらに前記特徴量の変換に用いる前記ワンタイムパラメータをランダムに生成し、
前記第1のサーバは、前記クライアントから送られるIDに対応する前記パラメータと前記クライアントから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記ワンタイムパラメータから前記データとしてパラメータ差分を計算し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記データとしての前記パラメータ差分を用いて前記第1のサーバから送られるIDに対応する前記テンプレートを変換して前記ワンタイムテンプレートを作成し、前記クライアントから送られる前記変換特徴量と前記ワンタイムテンプレートとを照合して一致/不一致を判定することを特徴とする請求項7記載の生体認証方法。 - 前記第1のサーバは、さらにランダムに追加パラメータを生成し、前記パラメータDBに保管された前記パラメータと前記追加パラメータとを用いて新パラメータを生成し、前記パラメータDBに保管された前記パラメータを前記新パラメータにより更新し、
前記第2のサーバは、さらに前記第1のサーバから前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記追加パラメータを用いて、前記テンプレートDBに保管された前記テンプレートを変換して新テンプレートを作成し、前記テンプレートDBに保管された前記テンプレートを前記新テンプレートにより更新することを特徴とする請求項7記載の生体認証方法。 - 前記生体認証システムは前記ネットワークを介してさらに登録端末を接続し、
前記登録端末は、未使用のIDを前記ユーザの前記IDとして発行し、第2のセンサから前記ユーザの生体情報を取得し、前記第2のセンサによって取得し生体情報から特徴量を抽出し、前記パラメータをランダムに生成し、前記パラメータを用いて前記特徴量を変換して前記テンプレートを作成し、
前記第1のサーバは、前記登録端末から前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDと前記パラメータを対応付けて前記パラメータDBに登録し、
前記第2のサーバは、前記登録端末から前記ネットワークを介して送られる前記IDと前記テンプレートを対応付けて前記テンプレートDBに登録することを特徴とする請求項7記載の生体認証方法。
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN200980132294.0A CN102132288B (zh) | 2008-12-18 | 2009-09-04 | 生物体认证系统及其方法 |
US13/060,420 US20120005736A1 (en) | 2008-12-18 | 2009-09-04 | Biometric authentication system and method therefor |
EP09833097.0A EP2360615B1 (en) | 2008-12-18 | 2009-09-04 | Biometric authentication system and method therefor |
KR1020117003750A KR101250132B1 (ko) | 2008-12-18 | 2009-09-04 | 생체 인증 시스템 및 그 방법 |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2008-322057 | 2008-12-18 | ||
JP2008322057A JP5147673B2 (ja) | 2008-12-18 | 2008-12-18 | 生体認証システムおよびその方法 |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2010070787A1 true WO2010070787A1 (ja) | 2010-06-24 |
Family
ID=42268473
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/JP2009/004388 WO2010070787A1 (ja) | 2008-12-18 | 2009-09-04 | 生体認証システムおよびその方法 |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20120005736A1 (ja) |
EP (1) | EP2360615B1 (ja) |
JP (1) | JP5147673B2 (ja) |
KR (1) | KR101250132B1 (ja) |
CN (1) | CN102132288B (ja) |
WO (1) | WO2010070787A1 (ja) |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2016031033A1 (ja) * | 2014-08-29 | 2016-03-03 | 株式会社日立製作所 | データ保持確認方法、装置 |
US10235539B2 (en) | 2013-02-25 | 2019-03-19 | Mitsubishi Electric Corporation | Server device, recording medium, and concealed search system |
WO2022269914A1 (ja) * | 2021-06-25 | 2022-12-29 | 日本電気株式会社 | 端末装置、暗号化情報変換装置、照合システム、入力情報暗号化方法、暗号化情報変換方法、照合方法、入力情報暗号化プログラム、及び暗号化情報変換プログラム |
Families Citing this family (31)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
WO2012042775A1 (ja) * | 2010-09-30 | 2012-04-05 | パナソニック株式会社 | 生体認証システム、通信端末装置、生体認証装置、および生体認証方法 |
CA3179622A1 (en) * | 2010-10-08 | 2012-04-12 | Brian Lee Moffat | Private data sharing system |
JP5710439B2 (ja) * | 2011-10-06 | 2015-04-30 | 株式会社日立製作所 | テンプレート配信型キャンセラブル生体認証システムおよびその方法 |
JP5707311B2 (ja) * | 2011-12-12 | 2015-04-30 | 株式会社日立製作所 | 生体署名システム |
CN102646190B (zh) | 2012-03-19 | 2018-05-08 | 深圳市腾讯计算机系统有限公司 | 一种基于生物特征的认证方法、装置及系统 |
US9721086B2 (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2017-08-01 | Advanced Elemental Technologies, Inc. | Methods and systems for secure and reliable identity-based computing |
US10075384B2 (en) * | 2013-03-15 | 2018-09-11 | Advanced Elemental Technologies, Inc. | Purposeful computing |
US9378065B2 (en) | 2013-03-15 | 2016-06-28 | Advanced Elemental Technologies, Inc. | Purposeful computing |
EP3007383B1 (en) * | 2013-05-28 | 2019-08-14 | Hitachi, Ltd. | Biometric signature system, signature verification method, registration terminal, signature generation terminal, and signature verification device |
JP6151627B2 (ja) * | 2013-11-14 | 2017-06-21 | Kddi株式会社 | 生体認証システム、生体認証方法およびコンピュータプログラム |
US9438590B2 (en) * | 2014-05-23 | 2016-09-06 | Fujitsu Limited | Privacy preserving biometric authentication based on error correcting codes |
US9619633B1 (en) * | 2014-06-18 | 2017-04-11 | United Services Automobile Association (Usaa) | Systems and methods for upgrading authentication systems |
JP6281425B2 (ja) | 2014-06-27 | 2018-02-21 | 富士通株式会社 | 秘匿データ照合装置、秘匿データ更新プログラムおよび秘匿データ更新方法 |
CN106330850B (zh) * | 2015-07-02 | 2020-01-14 | 创新先进技术有限公司 | 一种基于生物特征的安全校验方法及客户端、服务器 |
JP6524899B2 (ja) | 2015-12-02 | 2019-06-05 | 富士通株式会社 | 秘匿データ照合装置、秘匿データ照合プログラムおよび秘匿データ照合方法 |
KR102447501B1 (ko) * | 2015-12-24 | 2022-09-27 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 생체 정보를 처리하는 전자 장치 및 그 제어 방법 |
KR102469569B1 (ko) * | 2016-01-04 | 2022-11-22 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 전자 장치 및 그의 동작 방법 |
US10488534B2 (en) * | 2016-02-22 | 2019-11-26 | Konica Minolta, Inc. | Portable radiation image capturing apparatus |
CH712399A2 (fr) * | 2016-04-27 | 2017-10-31 | Bron Christophe | Système d'identification biométrique basé sur les réseaux veineux et des codages uniques et non falsifiables de structures arborescentes et procédé associé. |
JP6717068B2 (ja) * | 2016-06-13 | 2020-07-01 | コニカミノルタ株式会社 | 情報処理端末、情報処理システム、プログラム、および制御方法 |
KR101836845B1 (ko) * | 2016-07-04 | 2018-03-09 | 엘지전자 주식회사 | 차량용 발광기구 |
WO2019082988A1 (ja) | 2017-10-25 | 2019-05-02 | 日本電気株式会社 | 生体認証装置、生体認証システム、生体認証方法、および記録媒体 |
US10305690B1 (en) * | 2017-11-29 | 2019-05-28 | Fingerprint Cards Ab | Two-step central matching |
KR102483834B1 (ko) * | 2018-01-17 | 2023-01-03 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 음성 명령을 이용한 사용자 인증 방법 및 전자 장치 |
KR102578428B1 (ko) * | 2018-02-13 | 2023-09-14 | 핑거프린트 카드즈 아나카툼 아이피 에이비 | 생체 인식 템플릿 보호 키 업데이트 |
CN111903093B (zh) | 2018-03-20 | 2024-06-11 | 维萨国际服务协会 | 用于分布式生物计量比较框架的方法和设备 |
KR102495238B1 (ko) * | 2018-05-31 | 2023-02-03 | 삼성전자주식회사 | 사용자의 고유 정보와 결합한 생체 정보를 생성하기 위한 전자 장치 및 그의 동작 방법 |
JP7259578B2 (ja) * | 2019-06-18 | 2023-04-18 | 凸版印刷株式会社 | 認証システム及び認証方法 |
WO2021180443A1 (en) * | 2020-03-13 | 2021-09-16 | British Telecommunications Public Limited Company | Computer-implemented continuous control method, system and computer program |
WO2023225078A1 (en) | 2022-05-20 | 2023-11-23 | Advanced Elemental Technologies, Inc. | Systems and methods for a connected computing resource and event/activity identification information infrastructure using near existential or existential biometric identification of humans |
WO2023238308A1 (ja) * | 2022-06-09 | 2023-12-14 | 日本電気株式会社 | 認証システム、認証サーバ装置、認証方法及びプログラム |
Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH0322057A (ja) | 1989-06-19 | 1991-01-30 | Nec Corp | 情報処理装置 |
JP2000092046A (ja) * | 1998-09-11 | 2000-03-31 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | 遠隔認証システム |
US6836554B1 (en) | 2000-06-16 | 2004-12-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for distorting a biometric for transactions with enhanced security and privacy |
JP2006158851A (ja) | 2004-12-10 | 2006-06-22 | Hitachi Ltd | 生体情報の特徴量変換方法および生体認証システム |
JP2007148470A (ja) * | 2005-11-24 | 2007-06-14 | Hitachi Ltd | 処理装置、補助情報生成装置、端末装置、認証装置及び生体認証システム |
Family Cites Families (16)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7120607B2 (en) * | 2000-06-16 | 2006-10-10 | Lenovo (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. | Business system and method using a distorted biometrics |
US7103200B2 (en) * | 2001-03-05 | 2006-09-05 | Robert Hillhouse | Method and system for adaptively varying templates to accommodate changes in biometric information |
US20020194003A1 (en) * | 2001-06-05 | 2002-12-19 | Mozer Todd F. | Client-server security system and method |
WO2003009111A2 (en) * | 2001-07-18 | 2003-01-30 | Daon Holdings Limited | A distributed network system using biometric authentication access |
EP1339189A3 (en) * | 2002-02-21 | 2004-08-11 | Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. | Method for authentication between apparatus using challenge and response system |
US7400749B2 (en) * | 2002-07-08 | 2008-07-15 | Activcard Ireland Limited | Method and apparatus for supporting a biometric registration performed on an authentication server |
SE522615C2 (sv) * | 2002-07-09 | 2004-02-24 | Martin Tiberg Med Tiberg Techn | En metod och ett system för biometrisk identifiering eller verifiering. |
TWI249314B (en) * | 2004-10-15 | 2006-02-11 | Ind Tech Res Inst | Biometrics-based cryptographic key generation system and method |
JP4375212B2 (ja) * | 2004-11-18 | 2009-12-02 | ソニー株式会社 | 照合装置、照合方法、照合システム、およびプログラム |
JP4961214B2 (ja) * | 2006-03-29 | 2012-06-27 | 株式会社日立情報制御ソリューションズ | 生体認証方法およびシステム |
JP4886371B2 (ja) * | 2006-06-07 | 2012-02-29 | 株式会社日立情報制御ソリューションズ | 生体認証方法及びシステム |
KR100826873B1 (ko) * | 2006-09-07 | 2008-05-06 | 한국전자통신연구원 | 생체 인식 방법 및 이를 위한 장치 |
JP2008097438A (ja) * | 2006-10-13 | 2008-04-24 | Hitachi Ltd | ユーザ認証システム、認証サーバ、端末、及び耐タンパデバイス |
JP4966765B2 (ja) * | 2007-06-27 | 2012-07-04 | 株式会社日立情報制御ソリューションズ | 生体認証システム |
JP5028194B2 (ja) * | 2007-09-06 | 2012-09-19 | 株式会社日立製作所 | 認証サーバ、クライアント端末、生体認証システム、方法及びプログラム |
TWI350486B (en) * | 2007-11-26 | 2011-10-11 | Ind Tech Res Inst | Biometrics method and apparatus and biometric data encryption method thereof |
-
2008
- 2008-12-18 JP JP2008322057A patent/JP5147673B2/ja active Active
-
2009
- 2009-09-04 KR KR1020117003750A patent/KR101250132B1/ko active IP Right Grant
- 2009-09-04 WO PCT/JP2009/004388 patent/WO2010070787A1/ja active Application Filing
- 2009-09-04 EP EP09833097.0A patent/EP2360615B1/en active Active
- 2009-09-04 US US13/060,420 patent/US20120005736A1/en not_active Abandoned
- 2009-09-04 CN CN200980132294.0A patent/CN102132288B/zh active Active
Patent Citations (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
JPH0322057A (ja) | 1989-06-19 | 1991-01-30 | Nec Corp | 情報処理装置 |
JP2000092046A (ja) * | 1998-09-11 | 2000-03-31 | Mitsubishi Electric Corp | 遠隔認証システム |
US6836554B1 (en) | 2000-06-16 | 2004-12-28 | International Business Machines Corporation | System and method for distorting a biometric for transactions with enhanced security and privacy |
JP2006158851A (ja) | 2004-12-10 | 2006-06-22 | Hitachi Ltd | 生体情報の特徴量変換方法および生体認証システム |
JP2007148470A (ja) * | 2005-11-24 | 2007-06-14 | Hitachi Ltd | 処理装置、補助情報生成装置、端末装置、認証装置及び生体認証システム |
Non-Patent Citations (5)
Title |
---|
HARUKI OTA; SHINSAKU KIYOMOTO; TOSHIAKI TANAKA: "Proposal of an iris authentication method for keeping iris codes secret", JOURNAL OF INFORMATION PROCESSING, vol. 45, no. 8, 2004, pages 1845 - 1855 |
HARUKI OTA; SHINSAKU KIYOMOTO; TOSHIAKI TANAKA: "roposal of an iris authentication method for keeping iris codes secret", JOURNAL OF INFORMATION PROCESSING, vol. 45, no. 8, 2004, pages 1845 - 1855 |
M. BRAITHWAITE; U. CAHN VON SEELEN; J. CAMBIER; J. DAUGMAN; R. GLASS; R. MOORE; I. SCOTT: "Application-specific biometric templates", AUTO ID02, 2002, pages 167 - 171 |
N. K. RATHA ET AL.: "Enhancing security and privacy in biometric-based authentication systems", IBM SYSTEM JOURNAL, vol. 40, no. 3, 2001, pages 614 - 634, XP008144208 * |
SHINJI HIRATA ET AL.: "Proposal of cancelable biometrics applicable to biometric authentication based on image matching", IEICE, 2006 |
Cited By (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10235539B2 (en) | 2013-02-25 | 2019-03-19 | Mitsubishi Electric Corporation | Server device, recording medium, and concealed search system |
WO2016031033A1 (ja) * | 2014-08-29 | 2016-03-03 | 株式会社日立製作所 | データ保持確認方法、装置 |
WO2022269914A1 (ja) * | 2021-06-25 | 2022-12-29 | 日本電気株式会社 | 端末装置、暗号化情報変換装置、照合システム、入力情報暗号化方法、暗号化情報変換方法、照合方法、入力情報暗号化プログラム、及び暗号化情報変換プログラム |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CN102132288B (zh) | 2015-11-25 |
EP2360615B1 (en) | 2019-08-14 |
EP2360615A4 (en) | 2012-10-17 |
KR20110033281A (ko) | 2011-03-30 |
EP2360615A1 (en) | 2011-08-24 |
KR101250132B1 (ko) | 2013-04-05 |
JP2010146245A (ja) | 2010-07-01 |
US20120005736A1 (en) | 2012-01-05 |
JP5147673B2 (ja) | 2013-02-20 |
CN102132288A (zh) | 2011-07-20 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
JP5147673B2 (ja) | 生体認証システムおよびその方法 | |
CN107925581B (zh) | 生物体认证系统以及认证服务器 | |
EP1791073B1 (en) | Processing device, helper data generating device, terminal device, authentication device and biometrics authentication system | |
US8842887B2 (en) | Method and system for combining a PIN and a biometric sample to provide template encryption and a trusted stand-alone computing device | |
US20190013931A1 (en) | Biometric verification of a blockchain database transaction contributor | |
JP5710439B2 (ja) | テンプレート配信型キャンセラブル生体認証システムおよびその方法 | |
US7669236B2 (en) | Determining whether to grant access to a passcode protected system | |
US20060230284A1 (en) | System for generating requests to a passcode protected entity | |
EP1844567B1 (en) | Passcodes | |
US20060107312A1 (en) | System for handing requests for access to a passcode protected entity | |
US20060107063A1 (en) | Generating requests for access to a passcode protected entity | |
US20070031009A1 (en) | Method and system for string-based biometric authentication | |
JPWO2003069489A1 (ja) | 本人認証の方法 | |
CN101159554A (zh) | 生物体认证系统、登录终端、认证终端以及用户服务器 | |
JP2007522540A (ja) | バイオメトリック識別技術の利用に基づいたユーザー認証方法及び関連のアーキテクチャー | |
WO1999012144A1 (fr) | Serveur et procede de generation de signature numerique | |
Xu et al. | Secure fuzzy identity-based public verification for cloud storage | |
JP2006521762A (ja) | N−次元情報を利用した情報送信システム及び送信方法 | |
Bissessar et al. | Privacy, security and convenience: biometric encryption for smartphone-based electronic travel documents | |
Kevenaar | Protection of biometric information | |
Al-Saidi et al. | Password authentication based on fractal coding scheme | |
CN110689351A (zh) | 金融服务验证系统及金融服务验证方法 | |
JP7427533B2 (ja) | システム、及び認証装置 | |
JP7099975B2 (ja) | 認証情報管理サーバ装置、認証情報管理システム及び認証情報管理方法 | |
Kuznetsov et al. | A Comprehensive Decentralized Digital Identity System: Blockchain, Artificial Intelligence, Fuzzy Extractors, and NFTs for Secure Identity Management. |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 200980132294.0 Country of ref document: CN |
|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 09833097 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 20117003750 Country of ref document: KR Kind code of ref document: A |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 2009833097 Country of ref document: EP |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 13060420 Country of ref document: US |