WO2009146655A1 - 一种密码输入方法、装置和系统 - Google Patents

一种密码输入方法、装置和系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2009146655A1
WO2009146655A1 PCT/CN2009/072129 CN2009072129W WO2009146655A1 WO 2009146655 A1 WO2009146655 A1 WO 2009146655A1 CN 2009072129 W CN2009072129 W CN 2009072129W WO 2009146655 A1 WO2009146655 A1 WO 2009146655A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
password
user
party
input
dynamic key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2009/072129
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
薛明
Original Assignee
Xue Ming
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Xue Ming filed Critical Xue Ming
Publication of WO2009146655A1 publication Critical patent/WO2009146655A1/zh

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Classifications

    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H04L9/16Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms the keys or algorithms being changed during operation
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of information security technologies, and in particular, to a password input method, apparatus and system. Background of the invention
  • a soft keyboard is generally employed to prevent keyboard input from being intercepted by a virus program.
  • These include: When a password is required, the application provides a graphical keyboard interface, and the user clicks on the graphical character button with the mouse to input the password character to the application instead of the keyboard tap.
  • the computer system when the user clicks the character picture button, the computer system only receives the location information of the mouse click, instead of the real character, so even if the input is intercepted by the virus program, the virus cannot know which character is input. Only the application knows the correspondence between the position information of each graphic character and the character.
  • the soft keyboard only simulates the input of the keyboard. After the conversion process of the application, the real character will still be provided to the text box of the input password.
  • the virus can obtain the content of the password input text box through the COM interface of the web browser, or directly intercept the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Http) message sent by the browser, and obtain the password information input by the user.
  • Http Hypertext Transfer Protocol
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a password input method to improve password input security.
  • the embodiment of the invention also proposes a password input system to improve password input security.
  • the embodiment of the invention also provides a keyboard input device to improve password input security.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention is as follows:
  • a password input method for arranging a hash Hash function between a password authenticator and a password input party comprising:
  • the password authentication direction password input party provides a dynamic key
  • the password input party generates an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the agreed Hash function, and sends the encrypted value to the password authenticator for authentication;
  • the password authenticating party generates an encrypted value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function, and determines that the password input party provides when the encrypted value generated by the password authenticating party is the same as the encrypted value sent by the password input party.
  • the user password is correct.
  • the providing a dynamic key by the password authentication direction password input party includes: the password authenticator provides the dynamic key to the password input party in the form of a picture or a character.
  • the password input party generates an encryption value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the contract hash function: the password input party generates a key hash HMAC for message authentication according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the contract hash function. value;
  • the password authenticating party generates an encryption value according to the user password saved by the user, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function: the password authenticating party generates the HMAC value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function. ;
  • the password input party After generating the HMAC value, the password input party further converts the HMAC value into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship, and sends the visible character sequence to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • a password input system comprising a password authenticator and a password input party, wherein a hash Hash function is agreed between the password authenticator and the password input party;
  • a password authenticating party configured to generate a dynamic key when the password input party logs in, and provide the dynamic key to the password input party; and generate an encrypted value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the agreed hash function.
  • the encrypted value generated by the password authenticator is the same as the encrypted value sent by the password input party, it is determined that the user password provided by the password input party is correct;
  • the password input party is configured to generate an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key provided by the password authenticator, and the agreed Hash function, and send the encrypted value to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • the password authenticating party configured to provide the password input party in the form of a picture or a character Dynamic key.
  • the password input party is configured to use a user password, the dynamic key, and the agreement
  • the Hash function generates a key hash HMAC value for message authentication
  • the password authenticating party is configured to generate an HMAC value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function, and when the HMAC value generated by the password authenticating party is the same as the HMAC value sent by the password input party, It is determined that the user password provided by the password input party is correct.
  • Both the password input party and the password authenticator maintain a mapping relationship between the value represented by one byte and the visible character on the keyboard;
  • the password input party is configured to convert the HMAC value into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship after generating the HMAC value, and send the visible character sequence to the password authenticator for authentication;
  • the password authenticating party is configured to convert the HMAC value calculated by itself into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship, and then compare with the visible character sequence transmitted by the password input party, and when the two are the same, determine the password.
  • the user password provided by the importer is correct.
  • a keyboard input device comprising: a keyboard and a password encoder; wherein: the keyboard is used for a user to input a dynamic key and a user password;
  • the password encoder is configured to record a dynamic key and a user password input by the user through the keyboard, and generate an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and a hash function pre-agreed with the password authenticator, and the encrypted value is obtained. Send to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • Two function keys are provided in the keyboard for providing the user with a distinction between the input dynamic key and the user password.
  • the cipher encoder is integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard coder of the keyboard, or integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard interface of the keyboard, or integrated as a software module in the operating system.
  • a hash Hash function is first agreed between the password authenticator and the password input party, and the password input party is based on the user password, the dynamic key provided by the password authenticator, and the The agreed hash function generates an encrypted value, and sends the encrypted value to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • the password authenticator generates an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the agreed hash function, and inputs the encrypted value and the password.
  • the input password since the password is input through the keyboard, the input password generally displays the password as a non-text mask in the text box, even if the HMAC value of the password is displayed, because the HMAC function has unidirectionality. , it will not cause the password to be cracked, thus further improving the security of password input.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart showing a password input method according to the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a password input system according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a password input system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a keyboard input device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Mode for carrying out the invention
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart showing a password input method according to the present invention.
  • a hash function is first agreed between the password authenticator and the password input party.
  • a one-way function is a mathematical function.
  • the results can be easily calculated using a one-way function for the specified input.
  • it is difficult to reverse the value of the input.
  • Hash function The following is an exemplary description of the Hash function.
  • Hash function is called a one-way hash function and is a public function that maps arbitrarily long messages to fixed-length Hash values.
  • the result of the Hash function is called the summary of the original input message.
  • Hash functions are widely used in cryptography and are closely related to various encryption algorithms.
  • M is the message data to be processed
  • H is the Hash function
  • h is the generated message summary; its length is fixed and independent of the length of M.
  • the Hash function has the following properties:
  • the Hash function can be applied to data blocks of arbitrary length
  • Step 101 A password authentication direction password input party provides a dynamic key.
  • a random dynamic key is dynamically generated by the password authenticating party, and the dynamic key is transmitted to the password input party in the form of a picture or a character, and the password input party will This dynamic key picture or character is displayed in the login interface so that the user can know the dynamic key.
  • the use of pictures to transmit dynamic keys can enhance the anti-cracking capability during network transmission. If you do not worry about being cracked, you can also pass the dynamic key in character form. Accordingly, the dynamic key is saved in the password authenticator for use in subsequent authentication procedures.
  • Step 102 The password input party generates an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the agreed Hash function, and sends the encrypted value to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • the password input party generates a key hash (HMAC) value for message authentication based on the user password, the dynamic key, and the contract Hash function, and transmits the HMAC value to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • HMAC key hash
  • Step 103 The password authenticating party generates an encrypted value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function, and determines that the encrypted value generated by the password authenticating party is the same as the encrypted value sent by the password input party.
  • the user password provided by the password input party is correct.
  • the password authenticator generates an HMAC value according to the user password saved by itself, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function.
  • HMAC value generated by the password authenticator is the same as the HMAC value sent by the password input party, it is determined that the user password provided by the password input party is correct.
  • the HMAC function is described in detail below.
  • HMAC Based on the Hash function, an algorithm called HMAC is generated.
  • the HMAC function can be expressed as:
  • k represents a key shared by both parties to the communication (here, the dynamic key provided by the password authentication direction password input party);
  • h represents a hash algorithm (here, the hash algorithm agreed by the password authenticator and the password input party), such as the common MD5 and SHA1;
  • y represents the result of the calculation of the HMAC function, which is a summary of X.
  • the application process of the HMAC function is as follows:
  • the determination of the hash algorithm can be implemented through protocol interaction or through some system convention.
  • the HMAC key k is dynamically changed, and the key k used for each communication session is different.
  • the HMAC function becomes a hash function, which has unidirectionality and anti-collision, and can calculate the corresponding digest for the input password.
  • the hacker intercepts the HAMC submitted by the user.
  • the value the hacker can not crack the real password (uniformity of HMAC), nor can it use the replay attack to pass the system authentication (the dynamics of HMAC).
  • HMAC Since the result of HMAC ( x, k, h ) is a sequence of bytes, some of which may be undisplayable characters, this may cause some trouble for the transmission and use of characters.
  • embodiments of the present invention propose a preferred solution.
  • a mapping relationship between a value represented by a byte and a visible character on the keyboard may be established, and after generating the HMAC value, the password input party further converts the HMAC value into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship, and The visible character sequence is sent to the password authenticator for authentication, and the password authenticator also converts the HMAC value calculated by itself with the same mapping relationship, and then compares with the visible character sequence transmitted from the password input party, when the two are the same , Determine that the user password provided by the password input party is correct.
  • mapping table that maps the value represented by a byte (0 - 255 ) to the visible characters that can be entered on the keyboard. After the password is calculated by the HMAC function, the output byte is converted by the mapping table, and a new sequence of visible characters is obtained. At this time, the sequence is still unidirectional and anti-collision.
  • the implementation of the mapping table can be combined in many ways, as long as a unified implementation is used in the password authenticator and the password input party.
  • an embodiment of the present invention also provides a password input system.
  • FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing the structure of a password input system in accordance with the present invention.
  • the password input system includes a password input party 201 and a password authenticator 202, wherein a hash hash function is agreed between the password authenticator 202 and the password input party 201; a password authenticator 202 is used for password entry.
  • the party 201 generates a dynamic key when logging in, and provides the dynamic key to the password input party 201, and generates an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function saved by itself, when the password authenticator 202 generates
  • the encrypted value is the same as the encrypted value sent by the password input party 201, it is determined that the user password provided by the password input party 201 is correct;
  • the password input party 201 is configured to generate an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key provided by the password authenticator 202, and the contracted hash function, and send the encrypted value to the password authenticator 202 for authentication.
  • the password input party 201 can access the password authenticator 202 by providing an application for the user to log in to the operation interface.
  • the login operation interface may be a login page of the website or a login interface of the application software.
  • the login screen should have a dynamic key display box.
  • the password input party 201 is configured to generate a key hash HMAC value for message authentication according to the user password, the dynamic key, and the contract Hash function;
  • the password authenticating party 202 is configured to generate an HMAC value according to the user password saved by the password, the dynamic key, and the contracted hash function, and when the HMAC value generated by the password authenticating party 202 is the same as the HMAC value sent by the password input party, It is determined that the user password provided by the password input party 201 is correct.
  • mapping relationship between the value represented by one byte and the visible character on the keyboard is stored between the password input party 201 and the password authenticator 202;
  • the password input party 201 is configured to convert the HMAC value into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship after generating the HMAC value, and send the visible character sequence to the password authenticator 202 for authentication;
  • the password authenticating party 202 is configured to convert the HMAC value calculated by itself into a visible character sequence according to the mapping relationship, and then perform authentication.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a password input system according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the system mainly includes three parts: keyboard, computer and user authentication system.
  • the function of function key A is: When function key A is pressed for the first time, it means that the dynamic key is to be input later, when it is pressed for the second time, it means that the dynamic key input is completed, and then when function key A is pressed repeatedly , repeat the aforementioned functions.
  • function key B When function key B is pressed for the first time, it means that user password is input afterwards, when it is pressed for the second time, it means that user password input is completed; when function key B is pressed repeatedly, repeat The aforementioned functions.
  • the keyboard also includes a keyboard encoder and a keyboard interface.
  • the keyboard encoder is a circuit device that digitally encodes the electrical signal generated by the button, and has the same function and implementation as the corresponding component in the current keyboard.
  • the keyboard interface is the interface circuit for connecting the keyboard cable on the computer. The function and implementation are the same as the corresponding components in the current computer.
  • the system further includes a cryptographic encoder, which is a module for encrypting the password, and has the following functions:
  • the cipher encoder When the cipher encoder detects that the function key A is pressed for the first time, the cipher encoder records the characters that are subsequently entered on the keyboard and records them as dynamic keys. When the function key A is detected to be pressed a second time, the recording of the dynamic key is stopped, and the recorded dynamic key is not transmitted to the operating system.
  • the cipher encoder calculates the HMAC value of the user key by the function HMAC (x, k, h).
  • h is a hash algorithm agreed with the user authentication system
  • k is the dynamic key recorded in step (1)
  • X is in step (2).
  • the recorded user password can be obtained by HMAC calculation to obtain the HMAC value of the user password.
  • the cryptographic encoder calculates the HMAC value
  • the simulated keyboard input sends a sequence of HMAC value bytes of the user key to the operating system.
  • the cipher encoder can be located in different locations, including but not limited to the following three forms:
  • the cipher encoder is integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard coder.
  • the password encoder is integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard interface.
  • the password encoder is integrated as a software module in the operating system, but the operating system is required to ensure that the virus can not intercept the keyboard input before the password encoder receives the keyboard input.
  • the system also includes an application that provides the user with a login user interface to log in to the system.
  • the login operation interface also has a dynamic key display box.
  • the application can directly obtain the HMAC value of the password when the user enters the password.
  • the system also includes a user authentication system for authenticating the identity of the user. As mentioned earlier, the user authentication system generates a random dynamic key each time the user logs in. This shared key is also saved in the user authentication system.
  • the user authentication system calculates the HMAC (x, k, h) using the same HMAC algorithm as the aforementioned cipher encoder, where x is the user password stored in the authentication system, and k is the authentication system.
  • the shared key dynamically generated by the secondary authentication session, h is a hash algorithm agreed upon in the system, which is consistent with the hash algorithm used by the cryptographic encoder.
  • the authentication system first calculates the HMAC value of the password saved by itself and compares it with the HMAC value submitted by the user. If they match, the user is assumed to have entered the correct password, otherwise the password is considered incorrectly entered.
  • the user authentication system can run on the computer used by the user, or it can be a server connected to the user terminal through the network. According to the specific application situation, the user recognizes
  • the card system may also have various variations and should be included in the scope of the present invention.
  • the application issues a request to the user authentication system to obtain the user login interface.
  • the user authentication system generates a random dynamic key for the login session.
  • the dynamically generated dynamic key is saved in the user authentication system and transmitted to the application as an image or text.
  • the application is logged in.
  • the dynamic key is displayed to the user in the interface.
  • the user first inputs the dynamic key displayed on the login interface according to the operation method of the function key A, and then inputs the real password of the user according to the operation method of the function key B.
  • the user's real password is converted to the HMAC value of the password by the cipher encoder and sent to the operating system.
  • the operating system then passes the sequence of characters sent from the password encoder to the application.
  • the application puts the password characters entered as the user into the password text box, and then the user submits the HMAC value of the username and password to the authentication system.
  • the authentication system uses the user password saved by itself, the dynamic key used in the login session, and the hash algorithm consistent with the password encoder to calculate the HMAC value of the user password, and compares it with the HMAC value submitted by the user. If the agreement is consistent, the system assumes that the password entered by the user is correct; otherwise, the password is considered incorrectly entered.
  • an embodiment of the present invention also provides a keyboard input device.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a keyboard input device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the keyboard input device includes a keyboard 401 and a cipher encoder 402;
  • a keyboard 401 configured to input a dynamic key and a user password by the user
  • the cipher encoder 402 is configured to record a dynamic key and a user password input by the user through the keyboard 401, and generate an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key, and a hash function pre-agreed with the password authenticating party, and generate the encrypted value. Send to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • the user can also set the processing status of the password encoder through software, such as issuing a command to the password encoder through a menu or a button to notify that the character entered later is a dynamic key. , the password entered later must be made
  • the cipher encoder 402 can be integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard coder of the keyboard 401, or integrated as a hardware module in the keyboard interface of the keyboard 401, or integrated as a software module in the operating system.
  • a hash Hash function is first agreed between the password authenticator and the password input party, and the password input party generates the hash key according to the user password, the dynamic key provided by the password authenticator, and the contract hash function. Encrypt the value, and send the encrypted value to the password authenticator for authentication.
  • the password authenticator generates an encrypted value according to the user password, the dynamic key and the agreed hash function saved by the password, and sends the encrypted value and the password input party.
  • the encryption value is the same, it is determined that the user password provided by the password input party is correct. It can be seen that after the embodiment of the present invention is applied, since the transmitted cipher character sequence is the converted encrypted value, the hacker cannot decrypt the real password through the encrypted value, thereby improving the security of the cipher input.
  • the input password since the password is input through the keyboard, the input password generally displays the password as a non-text mask in the text box, even if the HMAC value of the password is displayed, since the HMAC function has a one-way
  • the invention also does not cause the password to be cracked, so the embodiment of the invention further improves the security of the password input.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further improves the security of password input.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Description

一种密码输入方法、 装置和系统
技术领域
本发明涉及信息安全技术领域, 更具体地, 涉及一种密码输入方法、 装置和系统。 发明背景
随着网络应用的不断普及, 人们经常需要访问各种各样的网站, 如 电子购物、 收发电子邮件 ( Email )、 网上聊天、 网络游戏等。 在登录网 站之前, 通常都需要用户输入自己的用户名和密码。 然而, 目前网上存 在着各种病毒, 可以在用户输入密码时偷偷记录下用户通过键盘所输入 的字符, 从而盗取用户的密码, 这就给用户带来^艮大的风险。
在现有技术中, 一般采用软键盘来防止键盘输入被病毒程序截获。 具体包括: 在需要输入密码时, 应用程序提供一个图形化的键盘界面, 用户使用鼠标点击其中图形化的字符按钮, 代替键盘的敲击将密码字符 输入给应用程序。 在这种技术中, 当用户点击字符图片按钮时, 计算机 系统只是接收到了鼠标点击的位置信息, 而不是真正的字符, 因而即使 输入被病毒程序截获, 病毒也无法知道输入的到底是哪个字符, 只有应 用程序才知道各图形字符的位置信息与字符之间的对应关系。
软键盘的使用在某种程度上能够阻止键盘记录器等病毒对键盘输入 的窃听, 但是一些病毒程序仍然可以采用其它方法盗取输入的密码, 比 如:
( 1 )屏幕快照:
例如, 2004年江民反病毒中心截获 "证券大盗" 病毒。 该病毒作者 已考虑到软键盘输入密码保护技术。 病毒在运行后, 会通过屏幕快照将 用户的登陆界面连续保存为两张黑白图片, 然后通过自带的发信模块将 图片发向指定的邮件接受者。 黑客通过对照图片中鼠标的点击位置, 就 很有可能破译出用户的登陆账号和密码, 从而突破软键盘密码保护技 术, 严重威胁股民网上证券交易安全。
( 2 )直接捕获软键盘输入后的字符:
软键盘只是模拟了键盘的输入, 经过应用程序的转换处理后, 仍然 会向输入密码的文本框中提供真实的字符。 病毒可以通过网络浏览器的 COM接口获取密码输入文本框中的内容, 或者直接拦截浏览器发送的 超文本传输协议(Http )报文, 从中也可以获得用户输入的密码信息。
由此可见, 尽管现在已经出现了一些防止密码被非法截取的技术, 随着病毒技术的进步, 目前的密码输入安全性仍然有待提高。 发明内容
本发明实施例提出一种密码输入方法, 以提高密码输入安全性。 本发明实施例还提出一种密码输入系统, 以提高密码输入安全性。 本发明实施例还提出一种键盘输入装置, 以提高密码输入安全性。 本发明实施例的技术方案如下:
一种密码输入方法,在密码认证方和密码输入方之间约定散列 Hash 函数, 该方法还包括:
密码认证方向密码输入方提供动态密钥;
密码输入方根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生 成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证;
密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成加密值,并当密码认证方生成的加密值与密码输入方发送 来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。 所述密码认证方向密码输入方提供动态密钥包括: 密码认证方以图片或字符的形式向密码输入方提供所述动态密钥。 所述密码输入方根据用户密码、 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生 成加密值为: 密码输入方根据用户密码、所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成用于消息认证的密钥散列 HMAC值;
所述密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约 定 Hash 函数生成加密值为: 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所 述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成 HMAC值;
当密码认证方生成的该 HMAC值与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值 相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
进一步建立一个字节所表示的数值与键盘上可见字符之间的映射 关系;
所述密码输入方在生成 HMAC值后, 进一步将所述 HMAC值根据 该映射关系转换成可见字符序列, 并将所述可见字符序列发送到密码认 证方进行认证。
一种密码输入系统, 包括密码认证方和密码输入方, 其中在密码认 证方和密码输入方之间约定散列 Hash函数;
密码认证方, 用于在密码输入方登录时生成动态密钥, 并向密码输 入方提供该动态密钥; 并根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 当密码认证方生成的加密值与密码输入 方发送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确;
密码输入方, 用于根据用户密码、 密码认证方提供的动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认 证。
所述密码认证方, 用于以图片或字符的形式向密码输入方提供所述 动态密钥。
所述密码输入方, 用于根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定
Hash函数生成用于消息认证的密钥散列 HMAC值;
所述密码认证方, 用于根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以 及该约定 Hash函数生成 HMAC值, 并当密码认证方生成的 HMAC值 与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户 密码正确。
所述密码输入方和所述密码认证方都保存有一个字节所表示的数 值与键盘上可见字符之间的映射关系;
所述密码输入方, 用于在生成 HMAC值后, 将所述 HMAC值根据 该映射关系转换成可见字符序列, 并将所述可见字符序列发送到密码认 证方进行认证;
所述密码认证方, 用于根据该映射关系将自身计算出来的 HMAC 值转换为可见字符序列, 然后再与所述密码输入方传来的可见字符序列 进行比较, 当两者相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
一种键盘输入装置,该键盘输入装置包括键盘和密码编码器;其中: 所述键盘, 用于供用户输入动态密钥和用户密码;
所述密码编码器, 用于记录用户通过键盘所输入的动态密钥和用户 密码, 并根据该用户密码、动态密钥以及与密码认证方预先约定的 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证。
所述键盘中提供有两个功能键, 用于提供给用户区分输入动态密钥 和用户密码。
所述密码编码器作为硬件模块集成在所述键盘的键盘编码器中, 或 者作为硬件模块集成在所述键盘的键盘接口中, 或者作为软件模块集成 在操作系统中。 从上述技术方案中可以看出, 在本发明实施例中, 首先在密码认证 方和密码输入方之间约定散列 Hash 函数, 密码输入方根据用户密码、 密码认证方提供的动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该 加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证, 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密 码、 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并当该加密值与密码 输入方发送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。 由此可见, 应用本发明实施例以后, 由于发送的密码字符序列是经过转 换过的加密值, 黑客无法通过该加密值破获真实密码, 因此能够提高密 码输入安全性。
而且, 应用本发明实施例以后, 由于密码是通过键盘输入的, 输入 的密码在文本框中一般都将密码显示为非文本的掩码, 即使显示密码的 HMAC值, 由于 HMAC函数具有单向性, 也不会导致密码被破解, 因 此进一步提高了密码输入安全性。
还有, 即使病毒程序可以读取密码文本框中的字符, 或者截获了用 户提交的登录请求中的密码文本, 由于黑客获得的只是密码的 HMAC 值, 既不能通过此值破解密码的真实值, 也无法直接向密码认证系统重 放, 因此又进一步提高了密码验证的安全性。 附图简要说明
图 1为根据本发明的密码输入方法流程示意图;
图 2为根据本发明的密码输入系统结构示意图;
图 3为根据本发明实施例的密码输入系统结构示意图;
图 4为根据本发明实施例的键盘输入装置结构示意图。 实施本发明的方式
为使本发明的目的、 技术方案和优点表达得更加清楚明白, 下面结 合附图及具体实施例对本发明再作进一步详细的说明。
图 1为根据本发明的密码输入方法流程示意图。 该方法中, 首先在 密码认证方和密码输入方之间约定散列 (Hash ) 函数。
众所周知, 单向函数是一种数学函数。 针对指定的输入, 利用单向 函数能够很容易地计算出结果。 然而, 在仅仅知道计算结果的情况下, 要反推出输入的值却是很难做到的。
下面对 Hash函数进行示范性说明。
Hash函数被称为单向散列函数,是一种能将任意长的消息映射为定 长的 Hash值的公开函数。 Hash函数的计算结果被称为原来输入消息的 摘要。 Hash函数在密码学中应用十分广泛, 与各种加密算法有着密切的 联系。
Hash函数的模型如下:
h=H ( M ):
其中, M是待处理的消息数据; H是 Hash函数; h是生成的消息摘 要; 它的长度是固定的, 并且和 M的长度无关。
Hash函数具有下面一些性质:
( 1 ) : Hash函数可应用于任意长度的数据块;
( 2 ) : Hash函数产生定长的输出;
( 3 ) : 对于任何给定的 M和 H, 计算 h比较容易, 用硬件和软件均 可实现;
( 4 ) : 对任何给定的 H和 h, 无法计算出 M, 这又可称之为单向性; ( 5 ): 对任何给定的 H和 M, 找到不同的消息 Ml , 使得 H ( Ml )
=H ( M ), 在计算上是不可行的, 这又称之为抗弱碰撞性; ( 6 ): 对任何给定的 H, 找到不同的消息 Ml和 M2, 使得 H ( M1 ) = H ( M2 ), 在计算上是不可行的, 这又称之为抗碰撞性。
目前常用的消息摘要算法有 MD5和 SHA1。
下面继续对本发明的流程进行说明。 如图 1所示, 该方法包括: 步骤 101: 密码认证方向密码输入方提供动态密钥。
优选地, 密码输入方侧的用户每次登录时, 都会由密码认证方动态 生成一个随机的动态密钥, 并以图片或者字符的形式将该动态密钥传送 给密码输入方, 密码输入方将此动态密钥图片或字符显示在登录界面 中, 从而用户可以获知该动态密钥。 用图片传送动态密钥可以增强网络 传输过程中的抗破解能力, 如果不担心被破解, 也可以采用字符形式传 递该动态密钥。 相应地, 在密码认证方中保存该动态密钥, 以在后续的 认证过程中予以使用。
步骤 102: 密码输入方根据用户密码、 该动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证。
在这里, 优选地, 密码输入方根据用户密码、 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成用于消息认证的密钥散列 (HMAC )值, 并将该 HMAC 值发送到密码认证方进行认证。
步骤 103: 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以 及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并当密码认证方生成的该加密值与密 码输入方发送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正 确。
在这里, 优选地, 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态 密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成 HMAC 值。 当密码认证方生成的该 HMAC值与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值相同时, 判定密码输入方提 供的用户密码正确。 本领域技术人员可以意识到,使用 HMAC函数来生成加密值仅是一 种示范性实例, 并不应用于限定本发明的保护范围。 实质上, 本发明实 施例还可以采用其它的函数来生成加密值, 这些函数上的变换都不脱离 本发明的保护范围。
下面对 HMAC函数进行详细说明。
在 Hash函数的基础上, 又产生了一种被称为 HMAC的算法。
HMAC函数可以表示为:
y = HMAC ( x, k, h )
其中 x代表输入消息;
k代表一个为通讯双方所共享的密钥 (此处为密码认证方向密码输 入方提供的动态密钥);
h代表某种 hash算法(此处为密码认证方和密码输入方约定的 hash 算法), 例如常见的 MD5和 SHA1;
y代表 HMAC函数的计算结果, 也就是 X的一种摘要。
HMAC函数的应用过程如下:
( 1 ) : 在传输数据前, 通讯双方通过某种方式协商出共同的 hash算 法和 HMAC密钥 k。 hash算法的确定可以通过协议交互实现, 也可以通 过某种系统约定来实现。 HMAC密钥 k是动态变化的, 每次通讯会话所 使用的密钥 k都是不同的。
( 2 ) : 在 k和 h都确定的情况下, HMAC函数就变成了一个 hash 函数, 具有单向性和抗碰撞性, 可以对输入的密码计算出相应的摘要。
( 3 ) : 当本次通讯会话结束后, 密钥 k就失效。 以后用户登录系统 时, 系统将产生新的共享密钥 k, 从而得到与前一次通讯不同的 HMAC 值。
这样, 即使在用户登录过程中黑客截获了用户所提交密码的 HAMC 值, 黑客既无法破获真实的密码(HMAC 的单向性), 也无法使用重放 攻击通过系统的认证 ( HMAC的动态性)。
由于 HMAC ( x, k, h ) 的计算结果是一个字节序列, 其中某些字 节可能是不可显示的字符, 这可能会给字符的传输和使用带来一些麻 烦。 有鉴于此, 本发明实施例提出优选的解决方案。
进一步优选的, 可以建立一个字节所表示的数值与键盘上可见字符 之间的映射关系, 密码输入方在生成 HMAC值后, 进一步将根据该映 射关系将 HMAC值转换成可见字符序列, 并将该可见字符序列发送到 密码认证方进行认证, 密码认证方也采用相同的映射关系将自己计算的 HMAC值进行转化, 然后再与密码输入方传来的可见字符序列进行比 较, 当两者相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
具体地, 可以设计一张映射表, 将一个字节所表示的数值(0 - 255 ) 映射为键盘上可以输入的可见字符。 当密码经过 HMAC 函数计算后, 再经过此映射表对输出的字节进行转换, 就可以得到一个新的可见字符 的序列, 此时该序列依然具有单向性和抗碰撞性。 映射表的实现可以多 种组合, 只要在密码认证方和密码输入方中采用统一的实现方式即可。
基于上述分析, 本发明实施例还提出了一种密码输入系统。
图 2为根据本发明的密码输入系统结构示意图。
如图 2 所示, 该密码输入系统包括密码输入方 201 和密码认证方 202,其中在密码认证方 202和密码输入方 201之间约定散列 Hash函数; 密码认证方 202, 用于在密码输入方 201登录时生成动态密钥, 并 向密码输入方 201提供该动态密钥, 并根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成加密值, 当密码认证方 202生成的 加密值与密码输入方 201发送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方 201 提供的用户密码正确; 密码输入方 201 , 用于根据用户密码、 密码认证方 202提供的动态 密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证 方 202进行认证。
密码输入方 201可以通过为用户提供登录操作界面的应用程序来访 问密码认证方 202。 该登录操作界面可以是是网站的登录页面, 也可以 是应用软件的登录界面。 该登录界面除了提供用户名和密码的文本输入 框外, 还应该有一个动态密钥显示框。
优选地, 密码输入方 201 , 用于根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash函数生成用于消息认证的密钥散列 HMAC值;
密码认证方 202, 用于根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以 及该约定 Hash函数生成 HMAC值,并当密码认证方 202生成的 HMAC 值与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值相同时, 判定密码输入方 201提供 的用户密码正确。
而且, 在密码输入方 201和所述密码认证方 202之间都保存有一个 字节所表示的数值与键盘上可见字符之间的映射关系;
密码输入方 201 , 用于在生成 HMAC值后, 将所述 HMAC值根据 该映射关系转换成可见字符序列, 并将所述可见字符序列发送到密码认 证方 202进行认证;
密码认证方 202,用于根据该映射关系将自己计算的 HMAC值转化 为可见字符序列, 然后再进行认证。
基于图 2所述的系统, 可以不脱离本发明的保护范围而产生多种形 式的具体实施方式。
比如: 图 3为根据本发明实施例的密码输入系统结构示意图。
如图 3所示, 该系统主要包括键盘、 计算机和用户认证系统三大部 分。 其中键盘上新定义有两个功能键 A和功能键^ 功能键 A的功能是: 当第一次按下功能键 A时,表示其后要输入动 态密钥, 当第二次按下时, 表示动态密钥输入完毕, 以后反复按下功能 键 A时, 重复前述的功能。
功能键 B的功能是: 当第一次按下功能键 B时, 表示其后要输入用 户密码, 当第二次按下时, 表示用户密码输入完毕; 以后反复按下功能 键 B时, 重复前述的功能。
键盘还包括键盘编码器和键盘接口。 键盘编码器是对按键产生的电 信号进行数字编码的电路器件, 在功能和实现方式上与目前键盘中对应 的部件一样。 键盘接口是计算机上连接键盘电缆的接口电路, 功能和实 现方式上与目前的计算机中对应的部件一样。
该系统进一步包括密码编码器, 密码编码器是对密码进行加密处理 的模块, 其功能如下:
( 1 ) 当密码编码器检测到功能键 A第一次按下时, 密码编码器将 记录随后在键盘上输入的字符, 作为动态密钥记录下来。 当检测到功能 键 A第二次按下时, 将停止动态密钥的记录, 记录的动态密钥不传送给 操作系统。
( 2 ) 当密码编码器检测到功能键 B第一次按下时, 将记录随后在 键盘上输入的字符, 作为用户密码记录下来。 当检测到功能键 B第二次 按下时, 将停止用户密码的记录。
( 3 )在功能键 B第二次按下时, 密码编码器通过函数 HMAC ( x, k, h )计算获得用户密钥的 HMAC值。
同上分析, 在函数 HMAC ( X , k, h ) 中, h为和用户认证系统约 定好的某种 hash算法, k为步骤( 1 )中所记录的动态密钥, X为步骤( 2 ) 中所记录的用户密码, 通过 HMAC计算就可以得到用户密码的 HMAC 值。 密码编码器计算出 HMAC值后 ,模拟键盘输入向操作系统发送用户 密钥的 HMAC值字节序列。
在实际应用中, 密码编码器可以位于不同的位置, 包括但是并不局 限于以下三种形式:
( 1 ) 密码编码器作为硬件模块集成在键盘编码器中。
( 2 ) 密码编码器作为硬件模块集成在键盘接口中。
( 3 )密码编码器作为软件模块集成在操作系统中,但要求操作系统 保证在密码编码器接收到键盘输入之前, 不能有病毒截获键盘输入的可 h
匕。
该系统还包括应用程序, 应用程序可以为用户提供登录系统的登录 操作界面。 该登录操作界面除了提供用户名和密码的文本输入框外, 还 有一个动态密钥显示框。
通过使用前述的键盘输入系统, 在用户输入密码时, 应用程序可以 直接得到密码的 HMAC值。 该系统还包括用于对用户身份进行认证的 用户认证系统。 如前所述, 在用户每次登录时, 用户认证系统生成一个 随机的动态密钥。 该共享密钥在用户认证系统中同样予以保存。 当用户 认证系统验证用户密码时, 用户认证系统采用与前述密码编码器相同的 HMAC算法, 计算 HMAC ( x, k, h ), 其中 x为认证系统中保存的用 户密码, k为认证系统为此次认证会话动态生成的共享密钥, h 为系统 内约定的某种 hash算法, 与密码编码器所采用的 hash算法一致。
认证系统先计算自己保存的密码的 HMAC 值, 并与用户提交的 HMAC值进行比较。 如果一致, 就认为用户输入了正确的密码, 否则, 就认为密码输入错误。
其中: 用户认证系统可以运行在用户所使用的计算机上, 也可以是 通过网络与用户终端相连的服务器。 根据具体应用情形的不同, 用户认 证系统也可能有各种变体, 都应该包括在本发明的保护范围之内。
下面描述图 3所示系统的一次示范性完整密码险证过程。
首先, 应用程序向用户认证系统发出获取用户登录界面的请求。 用 户认证系统为本次登录会话生成了一个随机的动态密钥, 该动态生成的 动态密钥在用户认证系统中保存一份, 并以图片或文本的形式传送给应 用程序, 由应用程序在登录界面中将动态密钥显示给用户。 当用户期望 进行认证时,用户首先按照功能键 A的操作方法输入登录界面上所显示 的动态密钥, 然后再按照功能键 B的操作方法, 输入用户的真实密码。 用户的真实密码被密码编码器转换为密码的 HMAC值, 发送给操作系 统。 操作系统再将从密码编码器发来的字符序列传递给应用程序, 应用 程序将其作为用户输入的密码字符放入密码文本框, 然后用户提交用户 名和密码的 HMAC值给认证系统。 认证系统使用自己保存的用户密码、 本次登录会话所使用的动态密钥、与密码编码器一致的 hash算法计算出 用户密码的 HMAC值, 将其与用户提交的 HMAC值进行比较。 如果一 致, 系统就认为用户输入的密码正确; 否则, 就认为密码输入错误。
基于上述分析, 本发明实施例还提出了一种键盘输入装置。
图 4为根据本发明实施例的键盘输入装置结构示意图。
如图 4所示, 该键盘输入装置包括键盘 401和密码编码器 402; 其 中:
键盘 401 , 用于供用户输入动态密钥和用户密码;
密码编码器 402, 用于记录用户通过键盘 401所输入的动态密钥和 用户密码, 并根据该用户密码、 动态密钥以及与密码认证方预先约定的 Hash函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证。
其中, 在键盘 401中可以提供有两个功能键, 用于提供给用户区分 输入动态密钥和用户密码。 使用两个功能键是为了触发编码器对随后输 入的字符序列做特殊处理。
可选地, 如果密码编码器对操作系统提供驱动接口的话, 用户也可 以通过软件来设置密码编码器的处理状态, 如通过菜单或按钮给密码编 码器下达指令通知后面输入的字符是动态密钥, 后面输入的密码要作
HMAC计算等。
密码编码器 402可以作为硬件模块集成在所述键盘 401的键盘编码 器中, 或者作为硬件模块集成在所述键盘 401的键盘接口中, 或者作为 软件模块集成在操作系统中。
综上所述, 在本发明实施例中, 首先在密码认证方和密码输入方之 间约定散列 Hash 函数, 密码输入方根据用户密码、 密码认证方提供的 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码 认证方进行认证, 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并当该加密值与密码输入方发送来的加 密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。 由此可见, 应用本 发明实施例以后, 由于发送的密码字符序列是经过转换过的加密值, 黑 客无法通过该加密值破获真实密码, 因此能够提高密码输入安全性。
而且, 应用本发明实施例以后, 由于因为密码是通过键盘输入的, 输入的密码在文本框中一般都将密码显示为非文本的掩码, 即使显示密 码的 HMAC值, 由于 HMAC函数具有单向性,也不会导致密码被破解, 因此本发明实施例进一步提高了密码输入安全性。
还有, 即使病毒程序可以读取密码文本框中的字符, 或者截获了用 户提交的登录请求中的密码文本, 由于黑客获得的只是密码的 HMAC 值, 既不能通过此值破解密码的真实值, 也无法直接向认证系统重放, 因此本发明实施例又进一步提高了密码输入安全性。
以上所述, 仅为本发明的较佳实施例而已, 并非用于限定本发明的 保护范围。 凡在本发明的精神和原则之内, 所作的任何修改、等同替换、 改进等, 均应包含在本发明的保护范围之内。

Claims

权利要求书
1、 一种密码输入方法, 其特征在于, 在密码认证方和密码输入方之 间约定散列 Hash函数, 该方法还包括:
密码认证方向密码输入方提供动态密钥;
密码输入方根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生 成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证;
密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成加密值,并当密码认证方生成的该加密值与密码输入方发 送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
2、根据权利要求 1所述的密码输入方法, 其特征在于, 所述密码认 证方向密码输入方提供动态密钥包括:
密码认证方以图片或字符的形式向密码输入方提供所述动态密钥。
3、根据权利要求 1所述的密码输入方法, 其特征在于, 所述密码输 入方根据用户密码、 动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值为: 密 码输入方根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash 函数生成用于 消息认证的密钥散列 HMAC值;
所述密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约 定 Hash 函数生成加密值为: 密码认证方根据自身保存的用户密码、 所 述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成 HMAC值;
当密码认证方生成的该 HMAC值与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值 相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
4、根据权利要求 3所述的密码输入方法, 其特征在于, 进一步建立 一个字节所表示的数值与键盘上可见字符之间的映射关系;
所述密码输入方在生成 HMAC值后, 进一步将所述 HMAC值根据 该映射关系转换成可见字符序列, 并将所述可见字符序列发送到密码认 证方进行认证。
5、一种密码输入系统,其特征在于,包括密码认证方和密码输入方, 其中在密码认证方和密码输入方之间约定散列 Hash函数;
密码认证方, 用于在密码输入方登录时生成动态密钥, 并向密码输 入方提供该动态密钥, 并根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 当密码认证方生成的加密值与密码输入 方发送来的加密值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确;
密码输入方, 用于根据用户密码、 密码认证方提供的动态密钥以及 该约定 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认 证。
6、 根据权利要求 5所述的密码输入系统, 其特征在于:
所述密码输入方, 用于根据用户密码、 所述动态密钥以及该约定 Hash函数生成用于消息认证的密钥散列 HMAC值;
所述密码认证方, 用于根据自身保存的用户密码、 所述动态密钥以 及该约定 Hash函数生成 HMAC值, 并当密码认证方生成的 HMAC值 与密码输入方发送来的 HMAC值相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户 密码正确。
7、 根据权利要求 6所述的密码输入系统, 其特征在于:
所述密码输入方和所述密码认证方都保存有一个字节所表示的数值 与键盘上可见字符之间的映射关系;
所述密码输入方, 用于在生成 HMAC值后, 将所述 HMAC值根据 该映射关系转换成可见字符序列, 并将所述可见字符序列发送到密码认 证方进行认证;
所述密码认证方, 用于根据该映射关系将将自身计算出的 HMAC 值转换为可见字符序列, 然后再与所述密码输入方传来的可见字符序列 进行比较, 当两者相同时, 判定密码输入方提供的用户密码正确。
8、 一种键盘输入装置, 其特征在于, 该键盘输入装置包括键盘和密 码编码器; 其中:
所述键盘, 用于供用户输入动态密钥和用户密码;
所述密码编码器, 用于记录用户通过键盘所输入的动态密钥和用户 密码, 并根据该用户密码、动态密钥以及与密码认证方预先约定的 Hash 函数生成加密值, 并将该加密值发送到密码认证方进行认证。
9、根据权利要求 8所述的键盘输入装置, 其特征在于, 所述键盘中 提供有两个功能键, 用于提供给用户区分输入动态密钥和用户密码。
10、 根据权利要求 8或 9所述的键盘输入装置, 其特征在于, 所述 密码编码器作为硬件模块集成在所述键盘的键盘编码器中, 或者作为硬 件模块集成在所述键盘的键盘接口中, 或者作为软件模块集成在操作系 统中。
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